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== Moral Skepticism == | == Moral Skepticism == | ||
Moral skepticism denies the existence of morality. It is supported by a variety of arguments that deny morality’s existence, prove that morality is arbitrary, and/or prove that people have no reason to act moral. Skepticism is a generic argument that can be applied to any debate without topic-specific preparation. | Moral skepticism denies the existence of morality. It is supported by a variety of arguments that deny morality’s existence, prove that morality is arbitrary, and/or prove that people have no reason to act moral. Skepticism is a generic argument that can be applied to any debate without topic-specific preparation. | ||
==== Conceptualizing Moral Skepticism ==== | ==== Conceptualizing Moral Skepticism ==== | ||
The morality of actions (such as the resolution) is typically divided into the three categories of obligatory, prohibited, and permissible. If an action is obligatory, you ought to do it; it would be immoral not to take the action. Since LD resolutions are typically phrased as “ought” statements, such as “states ought to ban lethal autonomous weapons,” it is often argued that the affirmative debater must defend that the resolution is obligatory. Prohibited actions are actions that would be immoral to take. For instance, murder is immoral and therefore morally prohibited. Permissible actions are actions that are neither obligatory nor permissible. Instead, they are morally neutral – neither good nor bad. Actions such as looking out of a window or drawing a pigeon are categorized as permissible because they don’t have any influence on morality. | The morality of actions (such as the resolution) is typically divided into the three categories of obligatory, prohibited, and permissible. If an action is obligatory, you ought to do it; it would be immoral not to take the action. Since LD resolutions are typically phrased as “ought” statements, such as “states ought to ban lethal autonomous weapons,” it is often argued that the affirmative debater must defend that the resolution is obligatory. Prohibited actions are actions that would be immoral to take. For instance, murder is immoral and therefore morally prohibited. Permissible actions are actions that are neither obligatory nor permissible. Instead, they are morally neutral – neither good nor bad. Actions such as looking out of a window or drawing a pigeon are categorized as permissible because they don’t have any influence on morality. | ||
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Skepticism is typically read by the negative debater because it is easier to win that permissibility negates. This is because the negative can argue that the affirmative defending an “ought” statement (as most resolutions are written) means that the affirmative must prove an obligation, and an action cannot be both obligatory and permissible; thus, permissibility is sufficient to disprove the “ought” statement and negate. | Skepticism is typically read by the negative debater because it is easier to win that permissibility negates. This is because the negative can argue that the affirmative defending an “ought” statement (as most resolutions are written) means that the affirmative must prove an obligation, and an action cannot be both obligatory and permissible; thus, permissibility is sufficient to disprove the “ought” statement and negate. | ||
To recap, the premises of moral skepticism typically follow as such: moral skepticism is true --> the resolution is permissible --> permissibility affirms/negates. The following section will explain a few common arguments that prove the first premise of moral skepticism | To recap, the premises of moral skepticism typically follow as such: moral skepticism is true --> the resolution is permissible --> permissibility affirms/negates. The following section will explain a few common arguments that prove the first premise of moral skepticism. | ||
==== Arguments for Moral Skepticism ==== | ==== Arguments for Moral Skepticism ==== | ||
''[[Determinism]]'' is an argument that the future is completely set in stone and humans do not have free will. This is typically based on arguments from logic, physics, and neuroscience. It argues that since free will is necessary for moral responsibility, moral responsibility does not exist. | ''[[Determinism]]'' is an argument that the future is completely set in stone and humans do not have free will. This is typically based on arguments from logic, physics, and neuroscience. It argues that since free will is necessary for moral responsibility, moral responsibility does not exist. | ||
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''Solipsism'' makes a similar argument as external world skepticism. It posits that you can only be certain that your own consciousness exists. Other people may act like conscious agents, but they could, for example, be hyper-realistic robots that act without consciousness – the opponent must prove that other consciousnesses exist. Solipsism implies that morality is irrelevant because there does not exist anyone else for morality to apply to. | ''Solipsism'' makes a similar argument as external world skepticism. It posits that you can only be certain that your own consciousness exists. Other people may act like conscious agents, but they could, for example, be hyper-realistic robots that act without consciousness – the opponent must prove that other consciousnesses exist. Solipsism implies that morality is irrelevant because there does not exist anyone else for morality to apply to. | ||
==== Skepticism Triggers ==== | ==== Skepticism Triggers ==== | ||
Moral skepticism is not always read as a full off-case position. Instead, debaters can “trigger” skepticism, arguing that their opponent’s framework fails to generate moral obligation. For instance, a debater responding to utilitarianism can choose to make the ''is/ought gap'' argument while responding to arguments about pleasure instead of reading it as part of a skepticism NC. This makes the skeptic argument less developed but more time efficient. For more information, see this page on [[Skepticism Triggers|skepticism triggers]]. | Moral skepticism is not always read as a full off-case position. Instead, debaters can “trigger” skepticism, arguing that their opponent’s framework fails to generate moral obligation. For instance, a debater responding to utilitarianism can choose to make the ''is/ought gap'' argument while responding to arguments about pleasure instead of reading it as part of a skepticism NC. This makes the skeptic argument less developed but more time efficient. For more information, see this page on [[Skepticism Triggers|skepticism triggers]]. | ||
==== Common Objections ==== | ==== Common Objections ==== | ||
Debaters responding to skepticism often argue that it is ''morally repugnant''. Since a skeptic would argue that morality does not exist, they are unable to condemn actions, including moral atrocities, such as genocide. Although this argument is persuasive in front of some judges, it is logically invalid since calling a concept "morally repugnant" presupposes that morality exists in the first place. Since skepticism denies morality existing, one could not leverage morality as a reason to reject the framework. | Debaters responding to skepticism often argue that it is ''morally repugnant''. Since a skeptic would argue that morality does not exist, they are unable to condemn actions, including moral atrocities, such as genocide. Although this argument is persuasive in front of some judges, it is logically invalid since calling a concept "morally repugnant" presupposes that morality exists in the first place. Since skepticism denies morality existing, one could not leverage morality as a reason to reject the framework. | ||
''Pascal’s Wager'' is the argument against skepticism that we should act morally in case there is a chance we are wrong about skepticism. There are no negative effects from ''not'' adhering to skepticism if it is true since every action would be neutral, but there would be negative effects from ''adhering'' to skepticism if morality does exist. This argument functions better under a [[comparative worlds]] role of the ballot than a [[Truth Testing|truth testing]] role of the ballot. | ''Pascal’s Wager'' is the argument against skepticism that we should act morally in case there is a chance we are wrong about skepticism. There are no negative effects from ''not'' adhering to skepticism if it is true since every action would be neutral, but there would be negative effects from ''adhering'' to skepticism if morality does exist. This argument functions better under a [[comparative worlds]] role of the ballot than a [[Truth Testing|truth testing]] role of the ballot. | ||
== Other Resources == | == Other Resources == | ||
==== Readings ==== | ==== Readings ==== | ||
[https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_moral_skepticism.html Moral Skepticism (Philosophy Basics)] | [https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_moral_skepticism.html Moral Skepticism (Philosophy Basics)] | ||
[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/ Moral Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)] | [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/ Moral Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)] | ||
[https://conceptually.org/concepts/determinism Determinism (Conceptually)] | [https://conceptually.org/concepts/determinism Determinism (Conceptually)] | ||
==== Samples Cases ==== | ==== Samples Cases ==== | ||
[[Media:Skepticism NC.docx|Skepticism NC.docx]] | [[Media:Skepticism NC.docx|Skepticism NC.docx]] | ||