Evaluate the resolution as a question of **truth**, not of desirability. Two reasons:

1. **Ground** – offense/defense kills core aff ground on this topic because it forces the aff to prove the *desirability* of murder whereas almost all aff ground on this topic only goes so far as to prove that murder is merely permissible.

2. **Predictability** – We’re only given the text of the resolution to work with beforehand, not the other debater’s advocacy, so the only predictable source of ground is the text of the topic itself, not a comparison of advocacies.

An action is morally permissible if it is not prohibited by morality.

Charles Pidgen explains Dworkin’s definition of “moral permissibility”[[1]](#footnote-1)

In his famous paper 'Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe it' (1996) Ronald Dworkin argues that wholesale or Archimedean moral skepticism of the kind advanced by Mackie (and in my view by Nietzsche) is fundamentally incoherent. **You can't be a skeptic about all moral claims, since if you** think that abortion is not wrong - or if you think that it is not full-bloodedly true that abortion is wrong - you are committed to the first-order view that abortion is morally permissible. But that only holds if you subscribe to something like (RDI) - that [because] the claim that actions of kind X are [is] not wrong, entails that actions of kind X [is] are right (in the sense of morally permissible). [Pidgen disagrees with Dworkin and later provides a rebuttal to Dworkin’s argument.]

Prefer this interpretation because:

**a.** Neg won a significant majority of both prelims and elims at VBT, Emory, Berkeley, and Harvard. Aff needs to set ground to compensate for pervasive neg side bias.

**b.** Aff needs skep ground to prevent neg bidirectionality. Otherwise the neg can argue that morality is either more or less stringent than the aff suggests, which makes it impossible to affirm because any answers I make against one side of the spectrum can be leveraged against me as offense on the other side.

Section 1 is determinism.

Our brains function according to deterministic physical law.

Brandi Newell 09 of Wellesley College[[2]](#footnote-2)

For example, by utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), researchers are able to observe which areas of the brain are active as participants engage in [one] experimental tasks. In one study by Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen (2004), participants were scanned while making difficult moral decisions. Greene and his colleagues found that the neural activation varied systematically depending on whether the dilemma was of a personal or impersonal nature. Additionally, depending on the relative activation of the brain centers associated with “cognitive” and “emotional” processing, one could make relatively accurate predictions as to how the participants would respond to the questions being posed. Another experiment by Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, and Platt (2006) found that differential levels of activation within the lateral prefrontal cortex during a gambling task could predict participants’ preferences for risk taking and general behavioral impulsiveness. Looking at studies like these, it seems evident that the neural activations researchers are detecting have a causal relationship with the behavior being observed. It also seems clear that it is not an immaterial “soul” that is at work during the decision-making processes, but a very material brain. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine a task that would be more under the “soul’s” jurisdiction than solving a moral dilemma. If the brain is at work solving even this most sacred problem, chances are good (and research points to the conclusion) that the brain is, in fact, in charge of all of our cognitive functions. As these and other studies suggest increasingly mechanistic views of the way the brain works, it is becoming harder and harder to deny that it operates according to the same physical laws as the rest of the universe. As new neuroscientific knowledge push[ing]es conclusions toward the determinism end of the determinism vs. chaos spectrum, we inevitably think about what this means for the free will vs. constraint spectrum. Let us consider how these findings may affect our perceptions of free will.

Next, determinism doesn't allow for moral prohibitions. Two reasons:

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1. People can't change who they are.

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Professor Galen Strawson 93 of the University of Reading[[3]](#footnote-3)

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This may seem contrived, but essentially the same argument can be given in a more natural form. (1) It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early experience, and it is undeniable that these are things for which one cannot be held to be in any way responsible (morally or otherwise). (2) One cannot at any later [in] stage of life hope to accede to true moral responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience. Fo6r (3) [because] both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one's success in one's attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience. And (4) any further changes that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and previous experience. (5) This may not be the whole story, for it may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable not to heredity and experience but to the influence of indeterministic or random factors. But it is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is ex hypothesi in no way responsible, can in themselves contribute in any way to one's being truly morally responsible for how one is. The claim, then, is not that people cannot change the way they are. They can, in certain respects (which tend to be exaggerated by North Americans and underestimated, perhaps, by Europeans). The claim is only that people cannot be supposed to change themselves in such a way as to be or become truly or ultimately morally responsible for the way they are, and hence for their actions.

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2. People only deserve blame if they could have done otherwise. Determinism precludes this.

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Carl Ginet 96 of Cornell University[[4]](#footnote-4)

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It is very natural to think that a person deserves blame or credit for a certain thing's being the case, is morally responsible [for something] for it, only if she could have made it otherwise. I deserve blame for the fact that the car is not yet repaired only if I could have made it the case that the car was repaired by now. Smith deserves credit for knocking down the opposing quarterback only if he could have avoided knocking down the quarterback. It's natural to embrace the following general principle, to which I will give the name "The Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (PAP for short): PAP: An agent S is morally responsible for its being the case that p only if S could have made it not the case that p. A slightly stronger principle is equally plausible, namely, that S is morally responsible for it's being the case that p only if S could have made it not the case that p *by some means that S knew about, or should have known about, in time to do so.* The driver whose cup of coffee was, unbeknownst to her, laced with a reaction-slowing drug does not deserve to be reprehended for its being the case that while subsequently driving her car she reacted too slowly to avoid hitting a pedestrian, because there is no way she could have prevented that's being the case that she knew about in time to do so; she could have prevented it by not drinking the coffee or by not driving after drinking it but it's not the case that she knew or should have known this. But the ordinary drunken driver may be culpable for his reacting too slowly to avoid hitting a pedestrian, because he knew or should have known that he could have prevented such a situation by not drinking before driving or not driving after drinking.

Section 2 is Quantum Immortality

The double slit experiment shows that photons behave differently based on whether or not they are observed.

Edwin Cartlidge 11 of Scientific American[[5]](#footnote-5)

In the classic double-slit experiment, first done more than 200 years ago, light waves passing through two parallel slits create a characteristic pattern of light and dark patches on a screen positioned behind the slits. The patches correspond to the points on the screen where the peaks and troughs of the waves diffracting out from the two slits combine with one another either constructively or destructively. In the early twentieth century, physicists showed that this interference pattern was evident even when the intensity of the light was so low that photons pass through the apparatus one at a time. In other words, individual photons **seem to** interfere with themselves, **so light exhibits both particle**-like **and wave-like properties.**

However, placing detectors at the slits to determine which [slit] one a particle is passing through destroys the interference pattern on the screen behind. This is a manifestation of Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which states that it is not possible to precisely measure both the position (which of the two slits has been traversed) and the momentum (represented by the interference pattern) of a photon.

But, the traditional Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics fails to account for this because it means that light waves instantaneously collapse into particles, which is a finite length over zero time, which is impossible.

Physicist at Imperial College London Michael Price 95 gives 3 reasons Copenhagen fails[[6]](#footnote-6)

An unobserved system, according to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, evolves in a deterministic way determined by a wave equation. An observed system changes in a random fashion, at the moment of observation, instantaneously, with the probability of any particular outcome given by the Born formula. This is known as the "collapse" or "reduction" of the wavefunction. The problems with this approach are:
(1) The collapse is an instantaneous process across an extended region ("non-local") which is non-relativistic.
(2) The idea of an observer having an effect on microphysics is repugnant to reductionism and smacks of a return to pre-scientific notions of vitalism. Copenhagenism is a return to the old vitalist notions that life is somehow different from other matter, operating by different laws from inanimate matter.

[3]The collapse is triggered by an observer, yet no definition of what an "observer" is available, in terms of an atomic scale description, even in principle.

Only the many-worlds interpretation makes the double-slit experiment consistent with the rest of physics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 02[[7]](#footnote-7)

The reason for adopting the [Many-Worlds Interpretation] MWIis thatit avoids the collapse of the quantum wave. (Other non-collapse theories['] are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions of the Universe prior to the experiment: only the probabilities are governed by the initial state. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI. We need not assume that Nature plays dice. The MWI [and it] is a deterministic theory for a physical Universe and it [that] explains why a world appears to be indeterministic for human observers.

MWI says that every potential state of affairs happens in different worlds, but we only observe one. Physicist James Higgo 98[[8]](#footnote-8)

First, a disclaimer for those new to the subject: Niels Bohr, the founder of modern quantum theory said, "Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it". And he didn't know about the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI). The quantum mechanics (QM) presented here is quite mainstream, even though it still seems crazy to physicists, who have no choice but to accept it. The major assumption I have made is to adopt Everett's (1957) MWI, which is just one of half a dozen competing interpretations of QM. According to various polls, MWI and the original 1927 'Copenhagen Interpretation' now have a similar share of the votes among physicists, but many of the 'big names' (Hawking, Feynman, [and] Deutsch, Weinberg) are said to (Price, 1995) have subscribed to the MWI.

The weirdness of quantum physics can be seen in the famous parallel-slit experiment. This shows that individual photons seem to split into two particles which can nevertheless interfere with each other as if they were waves. The 'Copenhagen Interpretation' of the phenomena and the equations which describe them, agreed at the 1927 Solvay conference, essentially says that the 'wave packet' somehow associated with a particle 'collapses' when it is observed - this necessitates a relationship between the observer's consciousness and the particle. The MWI, on the other hand, **holds that** the equations used to predict quantum **mechanical** events continue to hold after observation - it is just that all things happen simultaneously, but due to 'decoherence' we do not actually see, for example, a radioactive source both decay and not decay.. For an explanation of how this implies parallel universes, see Vaidman (1996).

The ramifications of MWI on our minds means that our consciousnesses are immortal, since we can never experience death; our minds will just survive in a separate universe where we were lucky enough to live. Higgo-2[[9]](#footnote-9)

This is important when trying to understand how the brain can act as a 'quantum computer', and very interesting when we take these ideas in conjunction with Tegmark's experiment.Tegmark and Stapp Consider a calcium ion which has a 50% probability, according to Schrödinger's equations, of activating its target receptor. Imagine that that [a] receptor will make the difference between two possible states of mind: one corresponding with a motorcyclist's decision to overtake a car on a dangerous road, and the other corresponding with the opposite decision. Assume that the overtaking manoeuvre [which] would be fatal [and one not to]. The motorcyclist is the experimenter in Tegmark's quantum suicide. According to the MWI prediction, the cyclist will perceive that he has made the decision corresponding to the stay[ed]ing-alive outcome with 100% certainty. Of course, onlookers in 50% of universes will see a messy accident. The Quantum Theory of Immortality developed here says that [in] all life-or-death decisions correspond with the same quantum mechanical equations. In all life-or-death decisions,

the 'experimenter' finds that he has chosen life. Further implications Deutsch (1997) argues that it follows from MWI that anything possible exists - somewhere in the 'multiverse'. If this is true, we can say that there are many universes (but a very tiny proportion of the multiverse) where you, dear reader, are a billion years old. Could it follow that you, the experimenter's consciousness, will inevitably 'end up' in one of those universes? If so,

we are immortal - from our own point of view.

If you killed your abuser, you would perceive them as dead, but they would perceive that you had failed to kill them, so there is no net harm.

Section 3 is Util

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Even if the neg wins that morality can exist, all moral systems collapse into util.

Two warrants. **First**, MWI means that there is no connected personal identity.

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The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 02[[10]](#footnote-10)

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"I" am an object, such as Earth, cat, etc. "I" is defined at a particular time by a complete (classical) description of the state of my body and of my brain. "I" and "Lev" do not name the same things (even though my name is Lev). At the present moment there are many different [me's] "Lev"s in different worlds (not more than one in each world), but it is meaningless to say that now there is another "I". I have a particular, well defined past: I correspond to a particular "Lev" in 2002, but I do not have a well defined future: I correspond to a multitude of [me's] "Lev"s in 2010. In the framework of the MWI it is meaningless to ask: Which Lev in 2010 will I be? I will correspond to them all. Every time I perform a quantum experiment (with several possible results) it only seems to me that I obtain a single definite result. Indeed, Lev who obtains this particular result thinks this way. However, this Lev cannot be identified as the only Lev after the experiment. Lev before the experiment corresponds to all "Lev"s obtaining all possible results. Although this approach to the concept of personal identity seems somewhat unusual, it is plausible in the light of the critique of personal identity by Parfit 1986. Parfit considers some artificial situations in which a person splits into several copies, and argues that there is no good answer to the question: Which copy is me? He concludes that personal identity is not what matters when I divide.

In the absence of personal identity, only util can function.

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David Shoemaker 99 writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. Many people claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not justified in maximizing the good across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single, deeply unified person, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if the only justification for the different treatment of individual lives and sets of lives is the further fact, and this fact is undermined by the truth of reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment. **There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives** and sets of lives **is mistaken.** If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states** people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, would be the most plausible. Utilitarianism is just such a theory.

Also, lack of personal identity undermines desert based theories of morality.

Rebecca Dresser continues[[12]](#footnote-12)

The provocative implications of Parfit's theory for criminal law emerge in his discussion of the moral principle of desert. Desert is a principle governing the distribution of burdens and benefits to individuals. An all-or-nothing, determinate view of personal identity seems a necessary underpinning to desert; the state can justifiably hold a person responsible for past criminal acts only if that person committed the acts. The non-reductionist may argue, then, that desert is incompatible with reductionism because without the existence of a separate, persistent self, desert lacks a metaphysical and moral base. If the reductionist view is true, if personal identity can be indeterminate and a matter of degree, then no one can deserve punishment for past criminal acts. Parfit labels this the "Extreme Claim."

**Second,** there is no distinction between acts and omissions. Thus, we are fully complicit with any harms we allow.

Alan Gewirth 82 writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

To be responsible for inflicting lethal harms, a person need not intend or desire to produce such harms, either as an end or a means. It is sufficient if the harms come about as an unintended but foreseeable and controllable effect of what he does. For since he knows or has good reasons to believe what actions or policies under his control will lead to the harms in question he can control whether the harms will occur, so that it is within his power to prevent or at least lessen the probability of their occurrence by ceasing to engage in these actions. Thus, just as all persons have the right to informed control, so far as possible, over the conditions relevant to their incurring cancer and other serious harms, so the causal and moral responsibility for inflicting cancer can be attributed to persons who have informed control over other persons’ suffering the lethal harms of cancer.

Util affirms. **First**, the universe is flat.

**NASA 10**[[14]](#footnote-14)

The WMAP spacecraft can measure the basic parameters of the Big Bang theory including the geometry of the universe. If the universe were open, the brightest microwave background fluctuations (or "spots") would be about half a degree across. **If the universe were flat, the** spots **[brightest microwave background fluctuations] would be about 1 degree across. While if the universe were closed, the brightest spots would be about 1.5 degrees across.**

**Recent measurement**s (c. 2001) by a number of ground-based and balloon-based experiments, including MAT/TOCO, Boomerang, Maxima, and DASI, have shown that the brightest spots are about 1 degree across. Thus the universe was known to be flat to within about 15% accuracy prior to the WMAP results. WMAP has [spacecraft have] confirmed this result with very high accuracy and precision. We now know that the universe is flat with only a 2% margin of error.

In a flat universe, all actions are morally neutral because there will always be an infinite amount of total happiness.

Bostrom 02[[15]](#footnote-15)

In the standard Big Bang model, assuming the simplest topology (i.e., that space is singly connected), there are three basic possibilities: the universe can be open, flat, or closed. Current data suggests a flat or open universe, although the final verdict is pending. If the universe is either open or flat, then it is spatially infinite at every point in time and the model entails that it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. There exists a common misconception which confuses the universe with the (finite) ‘observable universe’. But the observable part—the part that could causally affect us—would be just an infinitesimal fraction of the whole. Statements about the “mass of the universe” or the “number of protons in the universe” generally refer to the content of this observable part; see e.g. [1]. Many cosmologists [also] believe that our universe is just one in an infinite ensemble of universes (a multiverse), and this adds to the probability that the world is canonically infinite; for a popular review, see [2].” Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite. Moreover, [I]f the totality of physical existence [it] is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there [is] an infinite number of planets then there is, with probability one, an infinite number of people. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations—there are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc.  Suppose the world contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically [an] infinite world contains an infinite quantity of [both] positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: **[namely] none** whatsoever. Aggregative consequentialist theories threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that if the world is canonically infinite then it is always ethically indifferent [to] what we do.

But, even if we can make util calculations, permitting deadly force maximizes utility because it reduces domestic violence in the long-term.

Professor Benjamin Zipursky 96 gives 4 warrants[[16]](#footnote-16)

A similar argument applies with regard to the possibility of more pervasive physical and psychological forms of domination. What is at stake, in this regard, is not only physical security, but, as Jane Cohen has pointed out, liberty of thought, speech, movement, and sexuality. Physical domination is an instrument for the elimination of these forms of liberty, and for the elimination of psychological independence and well-being. And one particularly important enhancement of the physical domination is the elimination of the dominated woman's access to outside help. n38 If use of deadly force in no-access situations were permitted, then it would arguably be the case that: (1) she [the victim] would increase her ability to avert death or injury in thesortof "no-access" case[s] that **does** frequently arise **in these** scenarios; (2) to the extent that her sense of lack of liberty and helplessness wer based on her actual condition, she [the victim] might experience a greater sense of liberty because, if access has truly been cut off, she will still have the right to defend herself; and (3) the assailant could no longer count on being able to rape and terrorize her by cutting off access and engaging in brutal conduct without facing the risk of defensive homicide (a risk that would presumably increase substantially if such defensive homicide were legal). Perhaps this fact would diminish the terrorizing conduct and the cutting off of access. With regard to both forms of domination I have considered, it might also be added that society might change so that access for women to alternative paths of relief were more available than it now is. [4] If the cost to society of no-access scenarios were [is] women killing men without criminal liability, the state might be more motivated to provide alternative avenues of relief. This provision of access would arguably enhance women's security.

Domestic violence outweighs death for 2 reasons.

**A.** Scope – domestic violence affects millions of women.

National Organiztion of Women 06[[17]](#footnote-17)

Murder. **Every day four women die in this country as a result of domestic violence**, the euphemism for murders and assaults by husbands and boyfriends. **That’s**  approximately **1,400** women **a year,** according to the FBI. The number of women who have been murdered by their intimate partners is greater than the number of soldiers killed in the Vietnam War Battering. Although only 572,000 reports of assault by intimates are reported to federal officials each year, the most conservative estimates indicate **two to four million women** of all races and classes **are battered each year. At least 170,000** of those violent incidents **are serious enough to require hospitalization,** emergency room care or a doctor’s attention.

**B.** Reducing violence also reduces death in the long-term by reducing both the death of thousands of women from domestic violence and reducing the need to kill as a response.

Next – Preempts

1. Accept the aff interpretation as long as it is reasonable because the negative can adapt in the next speech, whereas I would have to start over entirely in the 1AR.

This also sets the brightline for whether an interpretation is reasonable. The abusiveness of the interpretation must outweigh the structural disadvantage of forcing a 1AR restart for it to be unreasonable.

2. RVIs are uniquely justified for the aff because

(a) the massive time-skew of the LD 1AR makes it impractical to fully cover theory and still have a fair chance at substance; and

(b) no risk theory would exacerbate neg bias by giving him a free source of no risk offense that comes prior to all AC offense.

3. I’m willing to clarify in cross-ex.

**1AR**

Counter-interpretation: Aff can \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ unless he asks me not to during cross-examination or prior to the AC.

I meet, he didn’t ask.

Counter-interp solves 100% of his offense because either I say yes and there’s no abuse or I say no and he can go for theory.

2 net benefits.

1. Substantive education –theory trades off with it. That’s uniquely important on this topic because (A) domestic violence affects many people in the community, and (B) domestic violence is caused largely because of the lack of public engagement with the problem. That means there are unique out-of-round impacts to productive discussion of domestic violence that he precludes.

Education outweighs fairness

1. It’s the only impact with long-term, **out-of-round** implications. Fairness only matters until you sign your ballot.

2. Education is more easily **quantifiable** whereas fairness is contingent on subjective preferences of what “better debating” means and external constraints such as resource disparities and side-bias.

2. Theory Abuse – if I can’t clarify in cross-ex, neg has 100% guaranteed theory ground because he can prep out mutually exclusive theory violations. NC theory is uniquely unfair because (a) it moots all offense in the AC which is the only advantage that the aff has in the round, and (b) the blippy nature of theory means it causes a massive time tradeoff for the 1ar. 1ar time skew outweighs other theory standards because it is the cause of the massive neg side bias.

Err aff on theory to compensate for neg side bias.

Counter-interpretation: Aff can go for defensive permissibility arguments in the AC as long as I go for offensive permissibility or obligation arguments by the 2AR.

My counter-interpretation solves 100% of her offense because it still requires the aff to prove positive permissibility by the 2AR. The difference is that my counter-interp says it’s OK for the aff to read a different interpretation in the AC if I kick out of it later.

Reasons to prefer

*Not read*

~~1. My interpretation encourages theory debate over the best interpretation because neg has to prove that her interp is best to access her best offense. Theory debate is good:~~

~~A subpoint is it teaches in round critical thinking skills which are uniquely educational because all other forms of education can be gained outside of debate.~~

~~B subpoint is theory debate compensates for big school-small school disparities because the round comes down to in round analytic argumentation rather than whose coach cut the best evidence.~~

2. Time skew. Allowing the aff to read a different interpretation in the AC forces the neg to spend some of the NC answering theory before getting to her offense. NC timeskew is good because neg has a massive side bias that needs to be checked back for fair debate.

Counter-interpretation: Aff gets defensive permissibility.

Extend the 2 conceded standards from the AC.

First, skep ground is key to check back large neg-bias.

Second, skep ground is key to prevent neg bidirectionality which makes affirming impossible because I’m forced to take the middle ground and beat back offense from both sides.

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