### T-Countries (Short)

#### Interpretation: debaters may not specify a particular country or group of countries in the plan text, they must defend all countries.

#### Violation: the plan stops nuclear power in a single country.

#### Standards:

#### 1. Textuality. Bare plurals lack determiners.

Carlson 77 Greg N. Carlson (linguist) “A Unified Analysis of the English Bare Plural” Linguistics and Philosophy 1977 413-457 D Reidal Publishing Company, Dordrecht Holland. NS 8/26/16

ABSTRACT. It is argued that **the** English **'bare plural'** (**a**n NP with **plural head that lacks a determiner**), **in spite of its apparently diverse possibilities of interpretation**, **is optimally represented in the grammar as a unified phenomenon.** The chief distinction to be dealt with is that between the 'generic' use of the bare plural (as in 'Dogs bark') and its existential or `indefinite plural' use (as in 'He threw oranges at Alice'). The difference between these uses is not to be accounted for by an ambiguity in the NP itself, but rather by explicating how the context of the sentence acts on the bare plural to give rise to this distinction. A brief analysis is sketched in which bare plurals are treated in all instances as proper names of kinds of things. A subsidiary argument is that the null determiner is not to be regarded as the plural of the indefinite article a.

#### “Countries” is a bare plural which means plans aren’t T.

Debois 16 Danny (champion of TOC, NCFL Grand Nationals, the Minneapple, The Glenbrooks, and the Harvard Invitational (twice), coaches Harvard-Westlake) “Topic Analysis by Danny Debois” September-October 2016 LD Brief JW

Importantly, “countries” in this resolution is a bare plural—i.e. there’s no article or demonstrative in front of adolescents like “the” or “these” indicating which adolescents the resolution is talking about. Bare plurals indicate that the resolution is a generic statement, and consequently, in order to textually affirm, aff advocacies have to be why in general countries have to prohibit nuclear power, not why specific countries should prohibit it.

#### The topicality rule comes first – best links to fairness and education.

Nebel 15 Jake “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics” vbriefly February 20th 2015 <http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/> JW

1.1 The Topicality Rule vs. Pragmatic Considerations There is an obvious objection to my argument above. If the topicality rule is justified for reasons that have to do with fairness and education, then shouldn’t we just directly appeal to such considerations when determining what proposition we ought to debate? There are at least three ways I see of responding to this objection. One way admits that such pragmatic considerations are relevant—i.e., they are reasons to change the topic—but holds that they are outweighed by the reasons for the topicality rule. It would be better if everyone debated the resolution as worded, whatever it is, than if everyone debated whatever subtle variation on the resolution they favored. Affirmatives would unfairly abuse (and have already abused) the entitlement to choose their own unpredictable adventure, and negatives would respond (and have already responded) with strategies that are designed to avoid clash—including an essentially vigilantist approach to topicality in which debaters enforce their own pet resolutions on an arbitrary, round-by-round basis. Think here of the utilitarian case for internalizing rules against lying, murder, and other intuitively wrong acts. As the great utilitarian Henry Sidgwick argued, wellbeing is maximized not by everyone doing what they think maximizes wellbeing, but rather (in general) by people sticking to the rules of common sense morality. Otherwise, people are more likely to act on mistaken utility calculations and engage in self-serving violations of useful rules, thereby undermining social practices that promote wellbeing in the long run. That is exactly what happens if we reject the topicality rule in favor of direct appeals to pragmatic considerations. Sticking to a rule that applies regardless of the topic, of the debaters’ preferred variations on the topic, and of debaters’ familiarity with the national circuit’s flavor of the week, avoids these problems. A second strategy denies that such pragmatic benefits are relevant. This strategy is more deontological. One version of this strategy appeals to the importance of consent or agreement. Suppose that you give your opponents prior notice that you’ll be affirming the September/October 2012 resolution instead of the current one. There is a sense in which your affirmation of that resolution is now predictable: your opponents know, or are in a position to know, what you will be defending. And suppose that the older resolution is conducive to better (i.e., more fair and more educational) debate. Still, it’s unfair of you to expect your opponents to follow suit. Why? Because they didn’t agree to debate that topic. They registered for a tournament whose invitation specified the current resolution, not the Sept/Oct 2012 resolution or a free-for-all. The “social contract” argument for topicality holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic. This claim might be contested, depending on what constitutes implicit consent. What is less contestable is this: given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism. Someone who wishes to debate only the announced resolution has a strong claim against changing the topic, and no one has a stronger claim against debating the announced resolution (ignoring, for now, some possible exceptions to be discussed in the next subsection). So it is unfair to expect your opponent to debate anything other than the announced resolution. This unfairness is a constraint on the pursuit of education or other goods: it wrongs and is unjustifiable to your opponent. Another deontological argument might appeal to legitimate authority. The NSDA is the only entity with the legitimate authority to determine the topics. This process begins with a committee: anyone can sit in on the committee’s meetings and suggest topics on their website. The process ends with a democratic voting procedure. Some philosophers believe that democratic procedures generate obligations to obey rules. This would yield an obligation to debate the resolution as worded. And some philosophers believe that legitimate authorities can generate reasons that exclude (not merely outweigh) other considerations that would usually be relevant. In general, if your teachers instruct you to do something, then you don’t get to weigh up the reasons for or against it; you just have to do it.3 Similarly, although the fact that some proposition would be good to debate would usually be a reason to debate it, or a reason for the NSDA to propose it and for debaters to vote for it, that fact is irrelevant and no longer a reason if that proposition is not the chosen resolution. Here is a third kind of response to the view that we should directly appeal to pragmatic considerations when evaluating topicality. This view justifies debating propositions that are completely irrelevant to the resolution but are much better to debate. Once you say that pragmatic benefits can justify debating a proposition that isn’t really what the resolution means, or that the resolution means whatever it would be best for it to mean, there is no principled way of requiring any particular threshold of similarity in order to be an eligible interpretation of the resolution. This means that the pragmatic approach justifies affirmatives that have nothing to do with the resolution. Of course some see no problem with non-topical affirmatives whose impacts outweigh the reasons to debate the resolution. But suppose you want a principled response to such strategies. You have one if you take seriously the idea that the debate should be about the resolution, and the idea that the proposition expressed by the resolution is independent of what proposition would be best to debate. Without a commitment to debating the proposition that the resolution actually means, I don’t think there is a principled response to such strategies, as I discuss below.

#### Vote on jurisdiction – if the aff isn’t T vote neg since the ballot asks you who did the better debating in the context of the tournament given resolution so it’s impossible to endorse their advocacy. That also means T outweighs theory because jurisdictions the most important voter.

#### 2. Limits. According to the World Atlas[[1]](#footnote-1) there are at least 189 different countries. If the aff can spec, they get 189 factorial plans because they can defend any permutation of countries that exist. Having to be prepared to debate the specifics of each one forces prepping millions of case negs that can never be run. Kills fairness – you get to prep the aff before the round but I don’t know what it will be, gives you a massive structural prep advantage since you only need to prep one thing. Also kills education – if I don’t have enough research then we can’t have a nuanced contention debate and I’m forced to go for generics.

#### 3. Ground. Some countries shouldn’t have nuclear energy – for example its easier to defend Iran shouldn’t have a nuclear program than Russia, means you get hyper quality ground because you can pick one country where it shouldn’t exist and I don’t get offense underneath your framework. Impacts: A] Infinite abuse – you’ll pick the most desirable slice of the res in order to win. Even if your specific plan is fair, it sets an unfair norm for other rounds. B] Link turns policy discussion – I can’t engage if you’ve chosen an aff with terrible neg ground.

#### Voters: 1. Fairness—debate’s a competitive activity with wins and losses. If the round is skewed towards one debater you can’t test who’s better 2. Education—it’s the end goal of debate and provides portable skills that apply in the real world.

#### Drop the debater on T: 1. Drop the arg is severance—lets you read new arguments in the 1AR and connect the plan to whole res which is a complete restart. 2. I had to spend time reading T-dropping the arg gives you a huge time trade-off which incentivizes sketchy affs.

#### Competing interps: 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline- we should set the best norms. 2. Collapses- you use offense-defense to determine reasonability being good which concedes the authority of competing interps- saying reasonability is reasonable is circular.

#### No RVIs: 1. Illogical- being fair doesn’t mean you should win- otherwise both debaters would win without theory, which would be irresolvable- comes first since every debate needs a winner. 2. Topical clash- once theory is initiated we never go back to substance because its unnecessary so no one engages in the topic. 3. Norm setting- RVIs force me to defend a norm that I might realize is bad in the middle of the debate, if I win then an incorrect norm is set. 4. Chilling effect- debaters will be scared to read theory for fear of losing to a prepped out counter interp, proliferating abuse.

### T-Countries (Long)

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#### Standards:

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ABSTRACT. It is argued that **the** English **'bare plural'** (**a**n NP with **plural head that lacks a determiner**), **in spite of its apparently diverse possibilities of interpretation**, **is optimally represented in the grammar as a unified phenomenon.** The chief distinction to be dealt with is that between the 'generic' use of the bare plural (as in 'Dogs bark') and its existential or `indefinite plural' use (as in 'He threw oranges at Alice'). The difference between these uses is not to be accounted for by an ambiguity in the NP itself, but rather by explicating how the context of the sentence acts on the bare plural to give rise to this distinction. A brief analysis is sketched in which bare plurals are treated in all instances as proper names of kinds of things. A subsidiary argument is that the null determiner is not to be regarded as the plural of the indefinite article a.

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Because they didn’t agree to debate that topic. They registered for a tournament whose invitation specified the current resolution, not the Sept/Oct 2012 resolution or a free-for-all. The “social contract” argument for topicality holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic. This claim might be contested, depending on what constitutes implicit consent. What is less contestable is this: given that some proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism. Someone who wishes to debate only the announced resolution has a strong claim against changing the topic, and no one has a stronger claim against debating the announced resolution (ignoring, for now, some possible exceptions to be discussed in the next subsection). 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Once you say that pragmatic benefits can justify debating a proposition that isn’t really what the resolution means, or that the resolution means whatever it would be best for it to mean, there is no principled way of requiring any particular threshold of similarity in order to be an eligible interpretation of the resolution. This means that the pragmatic approach justifies affirmatives that have nothing to do with the resolution. Of course some see no problem with non-topical affirmatives whose impacts outweigh the reasons to debate the resolution. But suppose you want a principled response to such strategies. You have one if you take seriously the idea that the debate should be about the resolution, and the idea that the proposition expressed by the resolution is independent of what proposition would be best to debate. 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#### Pragmatic considerations just prove we should change the topic. Thus, reasons why plans are good aren’t competitive.

Nebel 15 Jake “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics” vbriefly February 20th 2015 <http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/> JW

The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. Pragmatic considerations for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They might show that it would be better or worse if the resolution meant X, but sentences do not in general mean what it would be best for them to mean. At best, pragmatic considerations may show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. They are (if anything) reasons to change the topic, contrary to the topicality rule. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for the topicality rule, not against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above.

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#### 2. Limits. According to the World Atlas[[2]](#footnote-2) there are at least 189 different countries. If the aff can spec, they get 189 factorial plans because they can defend any permutation of countries that exist. Having to be prepared to debate the specifics of each one forces prepping millions of case negs that can never be run. Impacts: A] Kills fairness – you get to prep the aff before the round but I don’t know what it will be, gives you a massive structural prep advantage since you only need to prep one thing. B] Education – if I don’t have enough research then we can’t have a nuanced contention debate and I’m forced to go for generics. Solvency advocate doesn’t check since lots of people in the lit talk about lots of countries – energy policy is hugely popular. Disclosure doesn’t solve since people post dozens of plan texts on their wiki and I have to prep against all of them. Generics don’t solve since there are only so many and you can prep them all out and leverage the specificity of the aff offense. And, if you read a counter interp you must have a limiting principle that solves the limits abuse otherwise huge caselist outweighs since we can’t debate.

#### 3. Ground. Some countries shouldn’t have nuclear energy – for example its easier to defend Iran shouldn’t have a nuclear program than Russia, means you get hyper quality ground because you can pick one country where it shouldn’t exist and I don’t get offense underneath your framework. Impacts: A] Infinite abuse – you’ll pick the most desirable slice of the res in order to win. Even if your specific plan is fair, it sets an unfair norm for other rounds. B] Link turns policy discussion – I can’t engage if you’ve chosen an aff with terrible neg ground.

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## 2NR Frontlines

### Jurisdiction outweighs

This outweighs: a) the rez wouldn’t be on the ballot if the judge wasn’t expected to consider it, so my interp of the judge’s role is most probable, b) it’s the only resolvable interp – debaters lose and win arguments, the rez is the only way to determine which ones implicate the ballot, c) the aff gets the power to fiat from the word ‘resolved’ in the resolution – they don’t get access to post-fiat offense about non-T actions, d) the text of the rez controls the internal link to all standards about how we divide ground. “Pigs fly” may be fair, but textuality constrains it, and f) theoretical standards are ways to resolve interps, but if the interp isn’t textual it doesn’t meet the litmus test for evaluating theory so the rest of the layer is moot.

### EXT: Bare Plurals

#### Existential plurals don’t affirm the resolution.

Nebel 14 Jake (Rhodes scholar and currently at Oxford and graduated from Princeton) “Jake Nebel on Specifying “Just Governments”” December 19th

Some noun phrases include articles like “the,” demonstratives like “these,” possessives like “my,” or quantifiers like “some” or “all.” These words are called determiners. Bare plurals, including “just governments,” lack determiners. There’s no article, demonstrative, possessive, or quantifier in front of the noun to tell you how many or which governments are being discussed. We use bare plurals for two main purposes. Consider some examples: Debaters are here. Debaters are smart. In (1), “debaters” seems equivalent to “some debaters.” It is true just in case there is more than one debater around. If I enter a restaurant and utter (1), I speak truly if there are a couple of debaters at a table. This is an existential use of the bare plural, because it just says that there exist things of the relevant class (debaters) that meet the relevant description (being here). In (2), though, “debaters” seems to refer to debaters in general. This use of the bare plural is generic. Some say that generics refer to kinds of things, rather than particular members of their kinds, or that they refer to typical cases. There is a large literature on understanding generics. Here my aim is not to figure out the truth conditions for the generic reading of the resolution; I shall simply work with our pre-theoretical grip on the contrast between sentences like (1) and (2). This distinction bears importantly on the resolution. If “just governments” is a generic bare plural, then the debate is about whether just governments in general ought to require that employers pay a living wage. If it is an existential bare plural, then the debate is about whether some just governments—i.e., more than one—ought to require that employers pay a living wage. Only the second interpretation allows one to affirm by specifying a few governments. First Argument To my ear, the generic reading is correct. I think the best evidence for this is simply the undistorted judgments of ordinary speakers. No competent speaker of English would, without distorting influence or additional evidence of generalizability, endorse an inference from a plan involving two just governments to the resolution. Suppose Sally, an American citizen, believes that the U.S. and Canada should require employers to pay a living wage, but that no other government (just or unjust, actual or possible) should. She would not represent her view by asserting, “Just governments ought to require that employers pay a living wage.” She would deny this claim and hold that the U.S. and Canada are exceptions. One might object that Sally would endorse this assertion if she believed that the U.S. and Canada are the only just governments. Maybe she would, but that is explained by the generic reading, because she would then be making a generalization about (what she believes to be) just governments. And the onus would be on the affirmative, when specifying particular governments, to add such a premise. Moreover, many linguists would add that Sally could not regard it is as mere accident that these governments are just and that they ought to require employers to pay a living wage: the resolution requires there to be some explanatory connection between the justness of governments and the living wage requirement (see Carlson 2005). This is good evidence because ordinary speakers have an implicit (but not infallible) mastery over the language in which the resolution is stated. The resolution is stated in English, not in some special debate-specific dialect of English. Facts of usage constrain interpretation. The existential interpretation is not even, as I see it, eligible. So its pragmatic benefits are irrelevant. Compare: I think it would be better if the resolution were, “It is not the case that just governments ought to …” But that’s not the resolution, so it’s not even an eligible interpretation in a T debate. (Here I assume a controversial view about whether pragmatic benefits can justify a semantically inadequate interpretation of the resolution. I cannot defend this view here, but I welcome questions and objections in the comments to be addressed in a later article.) Some speakers might balk at the generic reading of the resolution. How, they might think, could anyone assent to such a sweeping claim about what just governments ought to do? It seems to depend heavily on the details of each country. I can easily get into this frame of mind. But, equipped with this frame of mind, it’s not as if I would assent to, “Just governments ought to require that employers pay a living wage,” and expect my audience to pick up on the existential reading. I would instead either deny the resolution or suspend judgment about it. This means that the anti-generalization view is not evidence of an eligible existential interpretation; rather, it’s a reason not to affirm the resolution. One more argument for affirmatives to answer! Consider an analogy. Suppose I say, “Dogs are ugly.” You might think it’s silly to say of dogs in general that they are ugly: how could one support such a generalization about the aesthetics of dogs? So you’ll reject my statement. You won’t reinterpret it to mean that some dogs are ugly and agree with it.

### AT: Weigh Pragmatics

#### Extend Nebel 15 – don’t weigh fairness and education against the topicality rule – it’s better to accept it as an all-encompassing stance.

#### A] Best rule – even if some variations from the topic are good, the general practice of straying from it produces terrible norms because affs would subtly vary their interpretations of the topic to get an advantage. It’s best to accept it on face to avoid any advocacy harms. That’s Nebel 15.

#### B] Ground – since there’s no principled way to say some T violations are good and others are bad, affs would be able to get away with reading an advocacy text that’s impossible to argue against, like North Korea shouldn’t be a nuclear power by making nuclear weapons. That outweighs your standards since it would become impossible to negate. That’s also Nebel 15.

#### C] Your pragmatic offense is non-unique. It just proves we should petition the NSDA to change the topic, or that it’s bad that we are debating this topic, but it doesn’t prove that being topical is bad.

### AT: Leslie

#### 1. Leslie talks about syntax but not semantics. Even if specification is permissible in some instances, sentences like “the tiger migrated from Asia” have definite singulars but are still generic generalizations so you can’t affirm by specifying a dog.

#### 2. Prefer Nebel – its debate specific-more tailored to the resolution which ensures consistency with what we’re actually debating-he’s also specifically qualified since he coaches a lot so he’s good at interpreting topic. Supercharged by the fact that Leslie indicates there is controversy in the literature surrounding this issue.

#### 3. Leslie talks about physical and empirical examples of things like animals but it never answers the normative question of what governments ought to do.

4. The Leslie evidence talks about syntax, not semantics, which means it’s totally irrelevant to the issue. **Nebel** [ibid]

Jake Nebel (debate coach his students have won the TOC, NDCA, Glenbrooks, Bronx, Emory, TFA State, and the Harvard Round Robin. As a debater, he won six octos-bid championships and was top speaker at the TOC and ten other major tournaments) “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics by Jake Nebel” VBriefly February 20th 2015 <http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/> JW 2/20/15

Not quite, I think.It's important to distinguish syntax from semantics. Leslie **is** say**ing that** avariety of syntactic structures  **(**bare plurals, indefinite singulars, definite singulars)can express generic generalizations **(**which is at the level of semantics, or meaning). "The dog is a fascinating animal" or"the tiger migrated from Asia in the third century" has a definite singular subject but is a generic generalization about the kind, dog ortiger**;** you couldn't affirm it by specifying a particular dog or tiger. It means that although the res, if generic, could have been expressed with a singular subject(as in Sept/Oct "a just society"), you still can't spec.

Implications: a) your arguments are about sentence structure, not word meanings, which means they are not relevant to how we interpret just governments, b) your argument only means that the res could have been expressed with a singular subject, not that you can affirm its present phrasing with a specific-country plan.

### AT: Sorin

#### 1. This evidence is just a jumble of grammatical terms—if you didn’t understand the warrant enough to repeat it back after they read it, then you can’t prefer it.

#### 2. The resolution gives context to indefinite statements—in the abstract it could be existential but in the context of private ownership it’s a category, which means it’s a generic noun only.

#### 3. No warrants in this evidence—it’s just a description of the view that existential view is good. It doesn’t warrant it. Gut-check neg here- no speaker of English would express their view that we should do the plan in a specific country by saying “countries ought to ban nuclear production.” The res would have determiners if it was supposed to have plans.

### AT: Semantics Racist

#### 1. TURN-semantics is key to inclusion by weeding out false theory arguments.

Nebel 15 Jake “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics” vbriefly February 20th 2015 <http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/> JW

My approach interacts pretty straightforwardly with critiques that see topicality (either in general or on this specific topic) as oppressive. Debaters often respond to critiques of topicality by pointing out the emancipatory or other outweighing benefits of acting like policy-makers (without explaining who is supposed to enjoy these benefits), by distinguishing between different kinds of fairness (without grounding or situating this distinction in the philosophical literature on fairness), and by going hard for theory (without appealing to an actual theory of debate pedagogy). These strategies feed the link: it probably is exclusionary to make up hoops for one’s opponents to jump through, in the form of pseudo-rules, -concepts, and -impacts designed to force them to debate on one’s favored terms, even if one’s intentions are good. And the initial link is, I think, usually pretty credible, because the status quo approach to topicality is based on how one wants one’s opponents to debate, not on the meaning of a sentence that is accessible and, in principle, knowable to everyone. It reeks of the advice, given by some debate instructors, to run theory against any ways in which one’s current debate round falls short of the round one most wishes to debate. The semantic approach to topicality, by contrast, appeals to an impartial rule requiring students to debate the resolution, whatever it means, regardless of what one wants it or thinks it would be best for it to mean. Some might think that this rule is still objectionably exclusionary. But that claim is much less credible than the link to topicality as many currently run it. Let’s briefly consider three possible arguments for the claim.

#### 2. Grammar isn’t racist, only specific applications of it are. You should read your K when people have racist semantic interpretations, not just on semantics in general.

Nebel 15 Jake “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics” vbriefly February 20th 2015 <http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/> JW

First, some might argue that the notion of “meaning” on which the semantic approach is based is illusory and oppressive. I realize that some authors claim to hold this view, but I don’t take it very seriously. If it were illusory, then how could the judge grasp the meaning of the argument? And would it really be oppressive to point out that some extension of an argument isn’t what the original argument meant, and is therefore new? There may be a much more credible claim in the vicinity. For example, suppose that the affirmative interprets some word or phrase in the resolution in African American Vernacular English, and the negative objects to this interpretation on semantic grounds because it’s “incorrect” English. There is good reason to reject this objection as false and oppressive, because of its assumption that some spoken dialects are objectively wrong, sloppy, or inferior to others. But this kind of scenario is much more specific than the generic objection to the semantic approach.4 The fact that many dialects are legitimate does not deny that words in each dialect mean things.

**1. Turn:** you bite—grammar is about interpreting language and they criticize my argument based on an extension of the way they have interpreted my original claims. Either a) I do link which means they needed to use grammar so they link too or b) it’s impossible to interpret what I said so I don’t link and this round is nonsense. If so, default me since I provide the ability of coherence.

**2. Turn:** without grammar, there would be no way to interpret anything—you are literally saying we can’t have rules to determine what things mean, which means that everything becomes gibberish and there’s no way to engage or advocate for anything.

**3. Turn:** grammar is key to clearly advocate and understand issues—controls the internal link to all of their impacts. **Bradshaw 13**

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-b-bradshaw/why-grammar-is-important\_b\_4128521.html William B. Bradshaw Why Grammar Is Important Article Byline Information Posted: 10/19/2013 11:59 am EDT Huffington Post Blog William B. Bradshaw, a graduate of both the University of Missouri and Yale Divinity School, earned a PhD from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland. Bradshaw has served as a minister, a college English instructor, and a college president.

**Grammar**, regardless of the country or the language, **is the foundation for communication -- the better the grammar, the clearer the message, the more likelihood of understanding the message's intent and meaning.** That is what communication is all about. Recent national and international events make it clear that **in the United States today we are lacking in the quality of communication that leads to understanding our fellow citizens and the people of other countries** -- and this at a time when better understanding at home and abroad is so necessary. **English is the primary grammatical standard for the world** today -- in all venues of life: business, government, medicine, education, and so forth. In most countries where English is not the primary language, English is the language of second choice. For those of us who have had international students in our classrooms, although they usually speak with a noticeable accent, their knowledge of English grammar is frequently superior to that of our own students. **Most in-depth thinkers, regardless of their national identity, realize that correct grammar leads to the kind of power in leadership that comes from superior communication**, and they plan accordingly. As the economy of the United States has sputtered and our federal government has continued to put off action until the last minute, our prestige in the world has suffered. Among the leadership of some non-western countries, this has fueled their dreams of becoming the new world leader.

**4.** Their argument would apply if for example this rez were interpreted differently in African American Vernacular but it isn’t so all of their offense is a red herring.

**5. Turn:** grammar exists in the real world—nobody would take policy suggestions or social criticism seriously if it were literally incoherent, which means debate is a crucial training ground to prepare ourselves for real-world advocacy.

**6.** Grammar will exist regardless if you ignore it now—your impacts are non-unique.

### AT: Solvency Advocate

1. You have no qualifier for what counts as a solvency advocate – under your interp you could claim yourself or any crackpot author which makes it just as hard to prep.

2. You don’t meet your own threshold – no author advocates the specific phrasing of the plan as you have worded it which means they’re talking about different things.

### AT: Disclosure

1. You can put lots of different plan texts on the wiki

2. I only know about disclosure right before the round – doesn’t solve pre round prep.

### AT: PICs

1. You can always read PICs bad in the 1AR—that’s a compelling argument since PICs moot aff ground.

2. You do not have to do specific prep against PICs. You can just say that they’re less of the aff so case outweighs. That outweighs—I can’t say that because I have to engage in the aff; I have nothing else to leverage against it.

3. Just frontline your aff—every aff should be ready to deal with PICs.

4. Turn: you allow for more PICs—when you bring it down to the micro level of every different country, I could find more nit-picky implementation issues to PIC out of.

### AT: Stable Advocacy

1. T-if you defend the entire resolution then there’s nothing to shift out of since you defend all effects of the resolution.

2. T-plans are shifty since there are lots of different implementation, enforcement and funding mechanisms.

3. CX solves ambiguities; I can hold you to things through clarification and asking.

4. If you do shift, I can just read 2NR theory after the fact which is better for my strategy since it’s a persuasive argument with in round abuse.

5. don’t vote on altruistic standards-if I thought that was an issue I wouldn’t have read theory.

### AT: Policymaking

1. non unique-under my interp you still defend a policy, just a really large policy. You can read specific advantages that are functionally plans which takes out all your offense-we still get education I’m just allowed links to other disads.

2. T-not all of us will become policymakers but all of us need to know about generic current events in our life, meaning my interp is more useful in the real world.

3. debating in policy solves your offense-you can switch activities but LD is key to general principle so my offense is unique

### AT: Depth

Breadth is better than depth-here’s a carded pedagogical meta-study with lots of warrants.

Bile 87 Jeffrey Bile (Associate Professor, School of Communication, Spalding University) “When the Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts: The Implications of Holistic Resolutional Focus” Contemporary Argumentation & Debate 8-15 1987

Holistic resolutional focus is pedagogically preferable to the par- ametric approach. Academic debate is a powerful educational tool. In addition to the plethora of other process-based advantages, debaters are forced to learn a great deal substantively about significant contemporary topics in their world (Freeley, 1986). Once we accept that debaters will learn about the topics they debate, we must confront the question "What is it that we want them to learn?" Holistic topic focus promotes a more general education than relatively narrow parametric sub-topics. This stands to reason since the research, preparation presentation; and analysis of more general arguments is encouraged by a more general focus. The pedagogical question becomes: "Is a general or a specific educational focus pedagogically superior?" Murty (1963) argues that "unless a man is capable of thinking and planning for himself, and unless he is able to rise above the parochial- ism of his own time, race and society . . . he cannot lead a full and integrated life. General education alone can enable everyone to do this" (po 44). Murty lists holistic and synthetic thinking as well as recognition of pattern and perspective among the fruits of a general education. This author favors general education for a number of reasons. Initially, general education enhances content relevance. Ulrich (1985) suggests that arguing generics can force the debater to understand issues common to a wide range of affairs. Sawhill (1970) concludes that general education has importance far beyond its immediate concern. This is intuitive. It is very unlikely that our students will ever be asked to decide the fate of a proposal for a one percent increase in M-16’s; it is far more likely however that they will be asked to make decisions regarding the appropriate level of general military preparedness our nation should pursue. Additionally , general education tends to have greater longevity (Goodlad, 1976) since "theories" tend to have more staying-power than "facts." Educators argue for example that "liberal education provides a general background which makes reorientation easier. By stressing the theory of a subject matter, it avoids imprisonment in the narrow applications which may soon be obsolete" (Eastman, 1981, p. 30). The general intellectual skills associated with a broad based education are quite valuable. Biscounti's research (1976) found that only 8% of graduates listed specific knowledge as the most important aspect of their education and that the number decreased as their careers progressed. "Instead they reported that general concepts of their majors, general learning , in college, and the study experience itself were more valuable. These results suggest that, over time, the value of specific knowledge declines while the importance of general intellectual skills associated with liberal education grows." For example understanding the specifics of Reagan's military policies will have less relevance after 1989, understanding the merits of military preparedness how- ever, will have utility for as long as there are m ilitaries. General education is preferable therefore since it enhances the relevance and longevity of learning.

### AT Example of the Rez

The “example of the resolution” view of topicality fails as well if I win my semantic argument. **Nebel**

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Perhaps I have misunderstood the parametric approach, by taking the resolution to be a boundary on the wrong sorts of objects. Let’s consider a different version of the parametric view. On this view, the resolution is a boundary on a set of *examples*. More specifically, these examples are agent-action pairs—e.g., the U.S. doing something, the UK doing something, etc., where “something” is a way in which that agent could require employers to pay a living wage. The affirmative may pick an example within that set as their advocacy, and the question of topicality is just which examples belong in the set. There is a problem with this view, however. **It presupposes what I earlier called the *existential* interpretation of the topic. If the resolution said** (or meant), **“Some just governments ought to . . . ,” then it would be clearly permissible**, if not obligatory, for the affirmative **to specify a particular** just government. **But if the res**olution’s “just governments” **is** instead a **generic, then it’s unclear why it should be legitimate for the affirmative to specify a particular** government. To see why this is suspicious, **suppose that the resolution stated, “All just governments ought to . . . .”** I hope everyone would agree that **one couldn’t affirm by specifying a single government or even a few governments**, *even if those are examples of just governments requiring employers to pay a living wage*. This is because **universal generalizations are not affirmed by a single witnessing instance.** Nor would it be persuasive to suggest that although the resolution is worded as a universal or generic generalization, we should ignore that feature because it is undesirable for debate. The same goes for generic generalizations. So it should be no more legitimate for the affirmative to specify a particular example on a generic resolution than it is on a universal one. At the very least, this is a reason why the version of the parametric approach under consideration cannot be applied to resolutions regardless of their wording: the resolution’s semantics comes first.

### AT Multi Actor Fiat Bad

**1.** This is a pragmatic concern—text comes first; cross-apply that weighing.

**2.** No education voter read—game over since no impact to this argument.

**3.** No impact – you defend more nations, and I get more ground to respond to them.

**4.** Implementation mechanisms differing doesn’t mean the resolution is incoherent, it just means the specifics of your advocacy are complex and vary from location to location. You are missing an internal link.

**5.** No reason you need multi-actor fiat: you can defend one international body like the UN or the ICC.

**6.** You don’t have to defend the plan; defend the resolution as a generic if you really hate multi-actor fiat.

1. http://www.worldatlas.com/nations.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://www.worldatlas.com/nations.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. http://www.worldatlas.com/nations.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-3)