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# SKEP NC with theory preempts

[Omitted]

# SKEP NC Without Theory Preempts

To affirm means “**to say that something is true.**”[[1]](#footnote-1) To negate means **“to deny the truth of”** which implies **a)**that you presume neg since negating has no positive connotation and permissibility negates and **b)** that indicting assumptions negates since it denies the fact that the resolution can be true by making it logically incoherent*.* **C)** truth testing is the only paradigm consistent with the text of the word negate, which means it is the only paradigm you have jurisdiction to use since when you sign the ballot you are saying the better debating was done by the negative, which is only a sensical statement under truth testing. Also, prefer substantive reasons to presume to theoretical ones, since if I win that we ought to see the resolution as false then the debate isn’t a tie – I did the better debating by showing we should negate.

*Additionally, presume neg* ***1)*** *The Aff gets the last word in every debate; so the burden should be on the aff to ensure that there is still offense in the round in the 2AR. Don’t punish me for my opponent’s strategic choices* ***2)*** *The neg needs presumption to check back spikey ACs, as the aff can take out entire swaths of neg speech time in seconds by extending blippy spikes, one of which the neg is bound to drop. This also prevents sketchy presumption triggers in AC’s.* ***3)****. there is only one possible way to prove something true, there are infinitely many ways to prove it false, which means that any given proposition such as the resolution is more likely false than true.*

Skep is true.

**First,** linguistic skep: we can never know what a statement means so it is impossible for it to be true, **Kripke**

Normally, when we consider a mathematical rule such as addition, we think of ourselves as guided in our application of it to each new instance. Just this is the difference between someone who computes new values of a function and someone who calls out numbers at random. Given my past intentions regarding the symbol ‘+’, one and only one answer is dictated as the one appropriate to ‘68+57'. On the other hand, although an intelligence tester may suppose that there is only one possible continuation to the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8,…, mathematical and philosophical sophisticates know that **an indefinite number of rules** (even rules stated in terms of mathematical functions as conventional as ordinary polynomials) **are compatible with any** such **finite initial segment. So if the tester urges me to respond, after 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., with the** unique **appropriate next number, the proper response is that no such unique number exists**, nor is there any unique (rule determined) infinite sequence that continues the given one. The problem can then be put this way: Did I myself, in the directions for the future that I gave myself regarding [plus] ‘+’, really differ from the intelligence tester? True, I may not merely stipulate that [plus] ‘+’ is to be a function instantiated by a finite number of computations. In addition, I may give myself directions for the further computation of [plus] ‘+', stated in terms of other functions and rules. In turn, I may give myself directions for the further computation of these functions and rules, and so on. Eventually, however, the process must stop, with ‘ultimate’ functions and rules that I have stipulated for myself only by a finite number of examples, just as in the intelligence test. If so, is not my procedure as arbitrary as that of the man who guesses the continuation of the intelligence test? In what sense is my actual computation procedure, following an algorithm that yields ‘125’, more justified by my past instructions than an alternative procedure that would have resulted in ‘5'? Am I not simply following an unjustifiable impulse?" Of course, **these problems apply throughout language** and are not confined to mathematical examples, though it is with mathematical examples that they can be most smoothly brought out. **I think that I** have **learned the term 'table'** in such a way that it will **[to] apply to indefinitely many future items.** So **I** can **apply the term to a new situation,** say **when I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table** at the base**. Can I answer a sceptic who supposes that by `table' in the past I meant *tabair,* where a 'tabair' is anything that is a table not found at** the base of **the Eiffel Tower,** or a chair found there? Did I think explicitly of the Eiffel Tower when I first `grasped the concept of' a table, gave myself directions for what I meant by `table'? And even if I did think of the Tower, cannot any directions I gave myself mentioning it be reinterpreted compatibly with the sceptic's hypothesis?

Negates since it denies the truth of the resolution-no linguistic statement can ever be true since its impossible to determine its meaning.

**Second,** No amount of subjective evidence can ever prove objective knowledge. **Searle**[[2]](#footnote-2) writes:

[Y]ou could have the best possible evidence about some domain and still be radically mistaken. You could have the best possible evidence about other people’s behavior and still be mistaken about their mental states. You could have the best possible evidence about the past and still be mistaken about the future. You could have the best possible evidence about your own perceptual experiences and still be mistaken about the external world. This is so because you could be dreaming, having hallucinations, be a brain in a vat, or be deceieved systematically by an evil demon. Strange situations, yes, but it is impossible to disprove the potentiality for any of these scenarios.”

**Moreover**, we have positive reason to believe our perceptions of the world are false. Suppose Macbeth sees a dagger in front of him, when in fact there is no dagger. Since for Macbeth, there is no difference between his perception whether the dagger is really there or really not, and since our perceptions of the external world are relevantly similar to Macbeth’s, we have reason to believe that the things we perceive in the world do not exist.

External world skep negates since we say governments ought pay a living wage we are asserting both that governments and living wages exist. **Russel**[[3]](#footnote-3)

The distinction of primary and secondary occurrences also enables us to deal with the question whether the present King of France is bald or not bald, and generally with the logical status of denoting phrases that denote nothing. **If "C" is a denoting phrase,** say **[denoting] "the term having the property F," then [the proposition] "C has the property [W]" means "one and only one term has the property F, and that one has the property [W]". If now the property F belongs to no terms**, or to several, **it follows that "C has the property [W]" is false for all values of [W]'. Thus [the proposition] "the present King of France is bald " is certainly false;** and "the present King of France is not bald" is false if it means "There is an entity which is now King of France and is not bald,” **but** **[the proposition]** is true if it means **"It is false that there is an entity which is now King of France and is bald" [is true].** That is, "the King of France is not bald " is false if the occurrence of "the King of France" is primary and true if it is secondary. **Thus all propositions in which "the King of France" has a primary occurrence are false; [and] the denials of such propositions are true**, but in them "the King of France" has a secondary occurrence.Thus we escape the conclusion that the King of France has a wig.

**Third,** Determinism is true **Inwagen[[4]](#footnote-4)**

**“Physics teaches us that all** physical **changes transpire in accordance with the laws of nature.** Now **my firing of the gun, along with my aunt’s** ensuing **death, were physical events. So**, if the dictates of science are to be accepted, **these events were ultimately the outcome of events occurring in (say) 2 million B.C., together with the laws of nature.** But **it is not up to me what went on 2 million years ago. And** it is not up to me **what the laws of nature are** either. **Therefore, the consequences of these things, including my present actions, are not up to me either.”**

Morality or any system of obligations inherently must serve as a guide for action, since statements about obligations are only meaningful if they tell us how I am supposed to act. Otherwise, morality or any system of obligations lacks normativity since it doesn’t obligate me to act in a certain way. However, since changing one’s actions to adhere to moral norms is impossible in a deterministic world, people and governments cannot be moral agents, so there are no obligations, and you negate since it's the aff’s burden to prove a moral obligation, which is the definition of ought.

**Fourth,** moral theories must be either motivational or non-motivation. Double bind a) they are non-motivational and won’t be followed, so morality can’t guide action since guides need to be followed or b) morality is motivational and people will do what it says no matter what so its just descriptive of action, not providing an obligation.

1. Merriam Webster Dictionary, “affirm” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Searle, John R. Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World. New York: Basic Books; 2000. (27). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Russel, Bertrand. “On Denoting.” *Mind*. Vol. 14, No. 56. Oxford University Press; 1905. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2248381>. (490). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Inwagen, Van Peter. “Objectivist Theory of Free Will”. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)