# 1AC

### Plan

Plan text: The United States federal government ought to raise the federal minimum wage to $15/hour. Seattle is normal means.

**Sheetz 14** James Zissler and Breanne Sheetz. “United States: Seattle Increases Minimum Wage To $15.00 Per Hour Over Several Years.” Mondaq. June 6th, 2014. http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/318950/Employee+Benefits+Compensation/Seattle+Increases+Minimum+Wage+to+1500+Per+Hour+Over+Several+Years

How are franchisees treated under the ordinance? **Any franchisee** associated with a franchisor or network of franchises **with franchisees that employ more than 500** employees in aggregate in the United States **is considered a Schedule 1 Employer**.12 In other words, even if a franchisee employs only one employee, that franchisee is considered a Schedule 1 Employer if it is associated with a franchisor or network of franchises with franchisees that employ more than 500 employees in total in the United States. What are the new minimum wage rates? **The Seattle minimum wage is initially $11.00 per hour, effective April 1, 2015, followed by incremental increases** according to the timelines set forth below. **Schedule 1 Employers have two and a half years to reach** a minimum wage of **$15.00**. Those that provide qualifying medical benefits will have an additional year. **Schedule 2 Employers have four and a half years to reach $15.00** per hour. Those that can claim a sufficient credit for tips and/or qualifying employer-paid medical benefits have an additional two years, and also benefit from a lower initial effective minimum wage rate of $10.00 per hour.

Seattle’s minimum wage increase is a model for the rest of the US and it’s a living wage.

**Wegmann 14** Philip Wegmann (member of the young leaders program at the Heritage Foundation). “Seattle Mayor Says $15 Minimum Wage Is ‘Model for the Nation.’” The Daily Signal. June 9th, 2014. http://dailysignal.com/2014/06/09/seattle-mayor-says-15-minimum-wage-model-nation/

A week ago, **Seattle made history when it bumped its minimum wage to $15 an hour, and** yesterday **Mayor** Ed **Murray defended** the city’s move, trumpeting **it as a “**model for the nation**.”** Murray argued that the minimum wage hike is key to Washington state’s recovery. “If we want to regain our economic strength and be competitive in the nation,” the mayor told ABC News’ Neal Karlinsky, “the minimum wage is going to have to raise.” Murray described the increase as an attempt to bolster the middle class and once again kick start “a vibrant economy.” **A longstanding proponent of the** living wage**, Murray** rode public support for the measure into office during the 2013 mayoral election. Now, the newly elected mayor **views Seattle as a national example, “a laboratory for democracy.”**

### Advantage 1 = Food Security

Decline in minimum wage is the main source of economic inequality.

Boushey 14 Heather Boushey (Executive Director and Chief Economist, Washington Center for Equitable Growth). “Understanding how raising the federal minimum wage affects income inequality and economic growth.” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. March 12th, 2014. http://equitablegrowth.org/research/understanding-the-minimum-wage-and-income-inequality-and-economic-growth/

Finally, the level of the minimum wage has a considerable effect on the distribution of wages in the United States. As mentioned above, the minimum wage used to be much closer to the average wage. But **since 1968,** the average wage grew as the **purchasing power of** the **minimum wage declined by 23 percent**. At the same time, the **distance between wage earner at the 10th percentile and** median wage earner, or the earner at **the 50th percentile, grew by 18 percent from** 19**79 to 2009. Economists have found** that the **declining inflation-adjusted value of the minimum wage had a considerable effect on wage inequality** for those workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution. A 1996 paper by economists John DiNardo, of the University of Michigan, Nicole Fortin, of the University of British Columbia, and Thomas Lemieux, also of the University of British Columbia, found that the decrease in the minimum wage from 1979 to 1988 had a considerable effect on the wage distribution. They found the decline over that time could explain up to 25 percent of the change in the standard deviation in the logarithm of male wages and up to 30 percent for female wages. In plain English, this means the decline in the minimum wage explained up to a fourth of increasing wage inequality for men and up to three-tenths of increase wage inequality for women. In more recent work, MIT economist David **Autor**, London School of Economics economist Alan Manning, **and** Federal Reserve Board economist Christopher **Smith find that** about **75 percent of the increase in low-end inequality from** 19**79 to** 19**91 is due to** the **decline in the value of the minimum wage, but** the decline **only explains 45 percent** of the increase **from** 19**79 to** 20**09**. While the literature has not come to an agreement on the exact size of the effect, the decline of the minimum wage was a significant factor in the increase in inequality for lower half of the income distribution.

Raise in minimum wage is key addressing wage inequality-multiple statistical analyses confirm.

Gindling and Terrell 4 T.H. Gindling (University of Maryland, Baltimore County) and Katherine Terrell (University of Michigan, CEPR, WDI and IZA Bonn) “Minimum Wages, Inequality and Globalization” IZA DP No. 1160 May 2004 <http://repec.iza.org/dp1160.pdf> JW 2/22/15

The results of the estimates of equation (2) are also reported in Table 4. In the equation estimated using data on workers without higher education, the coefficient β1 is positive (0.432) and significant. In the equation estimated with data on workers with higher education, the coefficient β 1 is also positive (0.817) and significant. These results provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that the reduction in the inequality of minimum wages for workers with and without higher education caused a reduction in the inequality of actual wages for each of these categories workers. In the equation estimated using data on both workers without and without higher education, the coefficient β 1 is positive (0.245) but not significant The literature on the impact of minimum wages on inequality has generally analyzed the impact of changes in the “minimum minimum wage” (rather than the dispersion of minimum wages) on wage inequality. The argument generally made is that an increase in the minimum minimum wage will increase the wages of the lowest-paid workers, and therefore reduce the inequality of wages by truncating the left tail of the distribution. To test this hypothesis, we estimate an equation similar to equation (2), but that includes the log of real minimum minimum wage (lnMinMWit) as an independent variable rather than the standard deviation of the log of minimum wages: 0 1 it γtYRt μit T t 1 SD Wit ln MinMW Σ + = (ln ) = β + A negative and significant coefficient on the real minimum minimum wage variable would provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that an increase in the minimum minimum wage reduces inequality in actual wages. We estimate this equation with data on all workers and less educated workers and present the results in Table 4. In both cases, the coefficient on the real minimum minimum wage is positive and insignificant. These findings allows us to reject the hypothesis that an increase in the minimum minimum wage causes a reduction in inequality in actual wages in Costa Rica. Finally, to examine the relative impacts of changes in the dispersion and the levels of minimum wages, we estimate an equation that includes both the standard deviation of the log of the minimum wage and the real value of the minimum minimum wage as independent variables: (ln ) 0 1 (ln ) 2 it γtYRt μit . T t 1 SD Wit SD MWit ln MinMW Σ + = = β + β + β + (4) coefficients confirm our previous results. That is, they provide evidence that changes in the dispersion of minimum wages are positively and significantly correlated with the changes in the dispersion of the wages of workers without higher education, while changes in the real minimum minimum wage do not have statistically significant effects on the dispersion of wages. This finding is important since many studies use the level of the minimum wage as an explanatory factor in their analysis of the rising skilled to unskilled wage ratio over time (e.g., Bell, 1997 and Cortez, 2001). Whereas the minimum wage can increase the average wage, it is not clear that it should reduce dispersion. And when only one minimum wage is used in cases when there are multiple minimum wage (as in the case of studies of Mexico, e.g. Bell, 1997), then it is not surprising that there are no significant results. In Table 4, we present the coefficient estimates of β1 and β2 from estimating equations (4) using data for all workers and for less educated workers, separately. These estimated In summary, we show that Costa Rica experienced rising wage inequality in the 1990s, during the period it opened its economy to global forces. We know from Robbins and Gindling (1999) that the rise in the relative wages of more skilled workers in Costa Rica could be attributed in part to rising demand for more skilled workers due to trade liberalization. Work by Gindling and Trejos (2003) finds a number of other factors that can also help explain rising earnings inequality (including changes in the levels or supply of education) but notes there is a large part of the change in inequality that they cannot explain with such variables as education, gender, region, hours worked or job characteristics. In this paper, we test whether minimum wage legislation is part of the missing story. Our examination of Costa Rica’s complex minimum wage structure and its dynamics suggested three hypotheses: (1) The increase in the gap between the minimum wages of workers with and without higher education cause the gap between the actual wages of workers with and without higher education to increase (and therefore cause an increase in wage inequality); (2) The reduction in the inequality of minimum wages for workers without higher education cause a reduction in the inequality of actual wages for these workers; and (3) The reduction in the inequality of minimum wages for workers with higher education cause a reduction in the inequality of actual wages for these workers. We find that the evidence supports [this] each of these three hypotheses. The level of minimum MW was not found to be important in affecting the dispersion of wages. It was expected that the minimum minimum would truncate the left tale of the earnings distribution and as such lower inequality. However, in a complex system such as that in Costa Rica (or Mexico and Argentina), it is not clear the either the minimum MW or the average MW should affect the distribution since there are a multitude of wages that can affect the distribution at higher levels. Nevertheless, since many studies have used this variable in trying to explain changes in earnings inequality, we thought it worthwhile testing for it as well. In sum, the structure of minimum wages matters, and we found it contributes to wage inequality in Costa Rica. This suggests that countries with an interest in mitigating inequality arising from trade liberalization have the levers to do so with a multiple minimum wage policy. In Costa Rica, the reduction in the inequality of legal minimum wages from 1987 to 1992 contributed to a decline in actual wage inequality, mitigating the disequalizing impact of the trade liberalization (found by Robbins and Gindling, 1999). However, when the addition of legal minimum wages for university-educated workers in 1993 increased the gap between the minimum wages of worker with and without higher education, changes in the structure of minimum wages contributed to an increase in wage inequality.

Income inequality causes famine and societal collapse. We’re close to the brink-policy actions must be taken.

**Motesharrei et al 14** Safa Motesharrei and Eugenia Kalnay (University of Maryland researchers) and Jorge Rivas (University of Minnesota researcher). “Human and nature dynamics (HANDY): Modeling inequality and use of resources in the collapse or sustainability of societies.” Science Direct. May 2014. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800914000615

The scenarios most closely reflecting the reality of our world today are found in the third group of experiments (see the scenarios for an unequal society in Section 5.3), where we introduced economic stratification. Under such conditions, we find that collapse is difficult to avoid, which helps to explain why **economic stratification is** one of the elements **recurrently found in** past **collapsed societies**. Importantly, in the first of these unequal society scenarios, 5.3.1, the solution appears to be on a sustainable path for quite a long time, but even using an optimal depletion rate (δ\*) and starting with a very small number of Elites, the **Elites eventually consume too much, resulting in** a **famine among Commoners that** eventually **causes** the **collapse of society**. It is important to note that this Type-L **collapse is due to** an **inequality-induced famine that causes** a **loss of workers**, rather than a collapse of Nature. Despite appearing initially to be the same as the sustainable optimal solution obtained in the absence of Elites, economic stratification changes the final result: Elites' consumption keeps growing until the society collapses. The Mayan collapse – in which population never recovered even though nature did recover – is an example of a Type-L collapse, whereas the collapses in the Easter Island and the Fertile Crescent – where nature was depleted – are examples of a Type-N collapse. In scenario 5.3.2, with a larger depletion rate, the decline of the Commoners occurs faster, while the Elites are still thriving, but eventually the Commoners collapse completely, followed by the Elites. It is important to note that in both of these scenarios, the **Elites – due to their wealth – do not suffer** the **detrimental effects of** the **environmental collapse until** much **later than** the **Commoners. This** buffer of wealth **allows Elites to continue “business as usual” despite** the **impending catastrophe**. It is likely that this is an important mechanism that would help explain how historical collapses were allowed to occur by elites who appear to be oblivious to the catastrophic trajectory (most clearly apparent in the Roman and Mayan cases). This buffer effect is further reinforced by the long, apparently sustainable trajectory prior to the beginning of the collapse. While some members of society might raise the alarm that the system is moving towards an impending collapse and therefore advocate structural changes to society in order to avoid it, **Elites and their supporters**, who opposed making these changes, **could point to the** long **sustainable trajectory “so far” in support of doing nothing**. The final two scenarios in this set of experiments, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, are designed to indicate the kinds of policies needed to avoid this catastrophic outcome. They show that, in the context of economic stratification, **inequality must be greatly reduced** and population growth must be maintained below critical levels in order **to avoid** a **societal collapse** (Daly, 2008).

The US is key to global food supplies. Food crises cause war and instability.

**Klare 12** Michael T. Klare is a Five Colleges professor of Peace and World Security Studies, whose department is located at Hampshire College, defense correspondent of The Nation magazine, and author of Resource Wars and Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency (Metropolitan). Klare also teaches at Amherst College, Smith College, Mount Holyoke College, and the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Klare also serves on the boards of directors of Human Rights Watch, and the Arms Control Association. He is a regular contributor to many publications including The Nation, TomDispatch, Mother Jones, and is a frequent columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus. He also was the narrator of the movie, Blood and Oil which was produced by the Media Education Foundation, Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, As Food Prices Rise, Dangers of Social Unrest Seem Imminent, August 9, 2012.

The Great Drought of 2012 has yet to come to an end, but we already know that its consequences will be severe. With more than one-half of America’s counties designated as drought disaster areas, the 2012 **harvest of** corn, soybeans, and other **food** staples **is guaranteed to fall** far **short of predictions. This**, in turn, **will boost food prices** domestically and abroad, **causing** increased misery for farmers and low-income Americans and far greater **hardship for** poor people in **countries that rely on imported U.S. grain**s. This, however, is just the beginning of the likely consequences: If history is any guide, **rising** food **prices** of this sort **will** also **lead to widespread** social unrest and violent **conflict**. **Food**—affordable food—**is essential to human survival** and well-being. **Take that away,** and **people become** anxious, **desperate**, and angry. In the United States, food represents only about 13 percent of the average household budget, a relatively small share, so a boost in food prices in 2013 will probably not prove overly taxing for most middle—and upper-income families. It could, however, produce considerable hardship for poor and unemployed Americans with limited resources. “You are talking about a real bite out of family budgets,” commented Ernie Gross, an agricultural economist at Omaha’s Creighton University. This could add to the discontent already evident in depressed and high-unemployment areas, perhaps prompting an intensified backlash against incumbent politicians and other forms of dissent and unrest. It is in the international arena, however, that the Great Drought is likely to have its most devastating effects. Because so **many** nations **depend on** grain **imports from the U.S.** to supplement their own harvests, and because intense drought and floods are damaging crops elsewhere as well, food supplies are expected to shrink and prices to rise across the planet. “**What happens to the U.S. supply has immense impact around the world,”** **says** Robert **Thompson, a food expert** at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. As the crops most affected by the drought, corn and soybeans, disappear from world markets, he noted, the price of all grains, including wheat, is likely to soar, causing immense hardship to those who already have trouble affording enough food to feed their families. The Hunger Games, 2007-2011 What happens next is, of course, impossible to predict, but if the recent past is any guide, it could turn ugly. In 2007-2008, when rice, corn, and wheat experienced prices hikes of 100 percent or more, sharply **higher prices**—especially for bread—**sparked** “food **riots**” **in** more than two dozen countries, including **Bangladesh**, **Cameroon, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Senegal, and Yemen**. In Haiti, the rioting became so violent and public confidence in the government’s ability to address the problem dropped so precipitously that the Haitian Senate voted to oust the country’s prime minister, Jacques-Édouard Alexis. In other countries, angry protestors clashed with army and police forces, leaving scores dead. Those price increases of 2007-2008 were largely attributed to the soaring cost of oil, which made food production more expensive. (Oil’s use is widespread in farming operations, irrigation, food delivery, and pesticide manufacture.) At the same time, increasing amounts of cropland worldwide were being diverted from food crops to the cultivation of plants used in making biofuels. The next price spike in 2010-11 was, however, closely associated with climate change. An intense drought gripped much of eastern Russia during the summer of 2010, reducing the wheat harvest in that breadbasket region by one-fifth and prompting Moscow to ban all wheat exports. **Drought** also **hurt China’s** grain **harvest**, while intense flooding destroyed much of Australia’s wheat crop. Together with other extreme-weather-related effects, these disasters sent wheat prices soaring by more than 50 percent and the price of most food staples by 32 percent. Once again, a surge in food prices resulted in widespread social unrest, this time concentrated in North Africa and the Middle East. The earliest protests arose over the cost of staples in Algeria and then Tunisia, where—no coincidence—the precipitating event was a young food vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, setting himself on fire to protest government harassment. Anger over rising food and fuel prices combined with long-simmering resentments about government repression and corruption sparked what became known as the Arab Spring. The rising cost of basic staples, especially a loaf of bread, was also a cause of unrest in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. Other factors, notably anger at entrenched autocratic regimes, may have proved more powerful in those places, but as the author of Tropic of Chaos, Christian Parenti, wrote, “The initial trouble was traceable, at least in part, to the price of that loaf of bread.” As for the current drought, **analysts are** already **warning of instability in Africa**, where corn is a major staple, **and** of increased popular **unrest in China**, where food prices are expected to rise at a time of growing hardship for that country’s vast pool of low-income, migratory workers and poor peasants.

Food wars go nuclear.

**Cribb 14** Julian, “Human extinction: it is possible?” Sydney Morning Herald, Published: April 2, 2014, p. http://www.smh.com.au/comment/human-extinction-it-is-possible-20140402-zqpln.html

However our own behaviour is liable to be a far more immediate determinant of human survival or extinction. Above two degrees – which we have already locked in – the world’s **food harvest is going to become increasingly unreliable**, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warned this week. **That means** mid-century **famines in** places like **India, China, the Middle East and Africa**. But what scientists cannot predict is how humans living in the tropics and subtropics will respond to this form of stress. So let us turn to the strategic and military think tanks, who like to explore such scenarios, instead. The Age of Consequences study by the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies says that under a 2.6 degree rise “nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The **internal cohesion** of nations **will be under** great **stress**…as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world… has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. **Armed conflict** between nations **over resources**… **is likely and nuclear war is possible**. The social consequences range from increased religious fervour to outright chaos.” Of five degrees – which the world is on course for by 2100 if present carbon emissions continue – it simply says the consequences are "inconceivable". **Eighteen nations** currently **have nuclear weapons** technology or access to it, **raising the stakes on nuclear conflict** to the highest level since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, with more than 4 billion people living in the world’s most vulnerable regions, scope for refugee tsunamis and pandemic disease is also large. It is on the basis of scenarios such as these that scientists like Peter Schellnhuber – **science advisor to German President** Angela Merkel – and Canadian author Gwynne Dyer have **warned of the** potential **loss of most of the human population in the conflicts, famines and pandemics** spinning out of climate impacts. Whether that adds up to extinction or not rather depends on how many of the world’s 20,000 nukes are let off in the process. These issues all involve assumptions about human, national and religious behaviour and are thus beyond the remit of scientific bodies like the IPCC, which can only hint at what they truly think will happen. So you are not getting the full picture from them.

### Util FW

The standard is maximizing life.

1. Actor specificity-key to the text of the resolution which is the basis for all burdens-the resolution is a question of government action for which there is no act/omission distinction.

Sunstein Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermuele, “Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life‐Life Tradeoffs,” Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 85 (March 2005), p. 17.

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

Impacts: A. life comes first-its instrumental in pursuing all other values so means based frameworks collapse to the aff. B. no skep or presumption-governments are always forced to take some action so deflationary arguments have no impact, C. no generic util indicts-policymakers can act in cases of uncertainty-they still have a general idea.

2. Moral uncertainty means we should preserve life to find ethical truth in the future.

Bostrom Nick Bostrom, 2001 prof of Philosophy, Oxford University Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March 2002. First version: 2001 March, JStor

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest[s] an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.

3. Empiricism. Morality must be based in empirical facts to avoid infinite regress.

Richards Robert, “A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics,” *Biology and Philosophy*, (1986) 265-293

This brief discussion of justification of ethical principles indicates how the concept of justification must, I believe, be employed. "To justify" means "**to demonstrate that a proposition** or system of propositions **conforms to a set of** acceptable **rules**, a set of acceptable factual propositions, or a set of acceptable practices. The order of justification is from rules to empirical propositions about beliefs and practices. That is, if **rules serving as** inference principles or the rules serving **as premises** (e.g., the Golden Rule) **of a justifying argument are themselves put to the test, then they must** be shown to **conform [to]** either to still **more general rules or** to **empirical propositions** about common beliefs and practices. **Barring an infinite regress, this procedure must end in** what are regarded as acceptable beliefs or **practices**. Aristotle, for instance, justified the forms of syllogistic reasoning by showing that they made explicit the patterns employed in argument by rational men. Kant justified the categorical imperative and the postulates of practical reason by demonstrating, to his satisfaction, that they were the necessary conditions of common moral experience: that is, he justified normative principles by showing that their application to particular cases reproduced the common moral conclusions of 18th century German burgers and Pietists. If this is an accurate rendering of the concept of justification, then the justification of first moral principles and inference rules must ultimately lead to an appeal to the beliefs and practices of [people], **which** of course **is an empirical appeal.** So **moral principles** ultimately **can be justified only by facts.**

The only morally accessible empirical facts are pain and pleasure-we can’t escape the fundamental fact that pleasure feels good and pain feels bad.

Sinhababu Neil (National University of Singapore) "The Epistemic Argument for Hedonism" http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3

One can form a variety of beliefs **using phenomenal introspection**. For example, one can believe that one is having sound experiences of particular noises and visual experiences of different shades of color. When looking at a lemon and considering the phenomenal states that are yellow experiences, one can form some beliefs about their intrinsic features – for example, that they are bright experiences. And **when considering experiences of pleasure, one can make** some **judgments about their intrinsic features** – for example, that they are good experiences. Just as one can look inward at one's experience of lemon yellow and appreciate its brightness, **one can look inward at one's experience of pleasure and appreciate its goodness.** When I consider **[in] a situation of increasing pleasure, I can form the belief that things are better than they were before**, in the same way I form the belief that there is more brightness in my visual field as lemon yellow replaces black. And when I suddenly experience pain, I can form the belief that things are worse in my experience than they were before. **"Pleasure"** here **refers to the hedonic tone of experience**. Having pleasure consists in one's experience having this hedonic tone. Without descending into metaphor, it is hard to give a further account of what pleasure is like than to say that when one has it, one feels good. As Aaron Smuts writes in defending the view of pleasure as hedonic tone, “to 'feel good' is about as close to an experiential primitive as we get.” Some philosophers, like Fred Feldman, see pleasure as fundamentally an attitude rather than a hedonic tone. But as long **as hedonic tones** – good and bad feelings – **are real components of experience, phenomenal introspection will reveal pleasure's goodness.** Opponents of the hedonic tone account of pleasure usually concede that hedonic tones exist, as Feldman seems to in discussing “sensory pleasures,” which he thinks his view helps us understand. Even on his view of pleasure, phenomenal introspection can produce the belief that some hedonic tones are good while others are bad. **There are many different kinds of pleasant experiences [like]**. There are **sensory pleasures,** like the pleasure of tasting delicious food, receiving a massage, or resting your tired limbs in a soft bed after a hard day. There are the **pleasures of seeing** that **our desires** are **satisfied**, like the **pleasure of winning a game, getting a promotion, or seeing a friend succeed**. These experiences differ in many ways, just as the experiences we have when looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day differ. It is easy to see the appeal of Feldman's view that pleasures “have just about nothing in common phenomenologically” (79). **But** just as our experiences in looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day have brightness in common, **pleasant experiences all have “a certain common quality – feeling good,” as Roger Crisp argues** (109). As the analogy with brightness suggests, hedonic tone is phenomenologically very thin, and usually mixed with a variety of other experiences. **Pleasure of any kind feels good, and displeasure of any kind feels bad**. These feelings may or may not have bodily location or be combined with other sensory states like warmth or pressure. “Pleasure” and “displeasure” mean these thin phenomenal states of feeling good and feeling bad. As Joseph Mendola writes, “the pleasantness of physical pleasure is a kind of hedonic value, a single homogenous sensory property, differing merely in intensity as well as in extent and duration, which is yet a kind of goodness” (442).

### EM

Use an epistemically modest method of framework evaluation-that’s probability of the moral theory multiplied by the action’s value under the theory if it were true-3 reasons.

1. An ethically modest method of evaluation is most consistent with real world decision making.

Overing and Bistagne 14 Bob Overing (TOC finalist 2012) and Adam Bistagne (triple-major in Philosophy, Economics and Mathematics, coach for Loyola) “Ethical Modesty Part 1” Premier Debate Today August 31st 2014 <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2014/08/31/moral-modesty-part-1-by-bob-overing-and-adam-bistagne/>

First, ethical modesty seems consistent with everyday decision-making. The following example is taken from the dissertation of Andrew Sepielli, now a professor at the University of Toronto: Suppose that I am deciding whether to drink a cup of coffee. I have a degree of belief of .2 that the coffee is mixed with a deadly poison, and a degree of belief of .8 that it’s perfectly safe. If I act on the hypothesis in which I have the highest credence, I’ll drink the coffee. But this seems like a bad call. A good chance of coffee isn’t worth such a significant risk of death – at least, not if I assign commonsensical values to coffee and death, respectively.[1] It’s hard to argue that confidence gets it right here. We should think similarly when deliberating about normative theories. Employing some social-contract theory, we might think that the United States government should take only Constitutional action; however, some Constitutional violation might be permissible to protect a large city from a terrorist attack even if we care less about utilitarian reasons.

Real world decision making is key to education since it teaches us how to act in the real world.

2. Letting the aff weigh the plan is key to structural reciprocity.

Overing and Bistagne 2 Bob Overing (TOC finalist 2012) and Adam Bistagne (triple-major in Philosophy, Economics and Mathematics, coach for Loyola) “Ethical Modesty Part 1” Premier Debate Today August 31st 2014 <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2014/08/31/moral-modesty-part-1-by-bob-overing-and-adam-bistagne/>

That’s all well and good but why should we adopt it in debate? Ethical modesty might remedy a lot of the fairness concerns with frameworks. Necessary/insufficient burdens, skepticism, and unturnable cases lose their force when the criterion is no longer all-or-nothing. Those arguments create reciprocity problems precisely because they exclude the opponent’s offense. Under a frame of ethical modesty, they would not be exclusive; the aff can weigh its offense. Status quo LD framework debate incentivizes finding frameworks that heavily favor one side such that winning the criterion is sufficient to vote. More reasonable, inclusive frameworks are crowded out in favor of more unfair ones. For instance, a deontological framework is a predictable, reasonable framework, but ethical confidence makes it much more likely to create structural unfairness. If the neg defends a narrow conception of deontology, a strong act/omission distinction, that perfect duties strictly precede imperfect duties, and that any risk of a violation of the standard is sufficient to negate, aff offense under the neg framework is effectively impossible. These arguments alone are not problematic, however. If the aff can weigh the advantages of the plan even when the framework debate favors the neg, then the aff still has options. Modesty makes the strength of the aff impacts matter at the end of the day. Perhaps such a method of evaluation will help the time-pressured 1AR beat back neg layering strategies without resorting to theory arguments.

Key to fairness since neg has the structural advantage over the aff.

3. Modesty causes innovative framework debates.

Overing and Bistagne 3 Bob Overing (TOC finalist 2012) and Adam Bistagne (triple-major in Philosophy, Economics and Mathematics, coach for Loyola) “Ethical Modesty Part 1” Premier Debate Today August 31st 2014 <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2014/08/31/moral-modesty-part-1-by-bob-overing-and-adam-bistagne/>

Ethical modesty might also encourage LDers to make multiple kinds of moral arguments in a given round. For instance, instead of defending utilitarianism to the death, a debater might also forward rights-based or contract-based reasons. This model would be a less dogmatic form of framework debating that largely reflects how applied philosophy is done. When thinking about abortion, drone strikes, or physician-assisted suicide, a comprehensive analysis would include justification from a variety of moral perspectives. Additionally, with more frameworks in any given debate, the cost to introducing an ethical principle would be much lower since a debater would have others to fall back on. If a framework can be ‘kicked’ at little strategic loss, debaters might be more willing to ditch their tired framework backfiles in favor of more innovative strategies. Ethical modesty might inject some life into deont vs. util debates that have largely characterized even the best framework debates in LD for some time.

Key to education since it revitalizes the way we learn about philosophy.

Education is a voter since it’s the portable purpose of debate. Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity so no debater ought to have an advantage.

### Underview

First, neg abuse outweighs aff abuse-neg has the ability to be reactive to the AC and take advantage of the 746 timeskew. Also neg won 66% of out-rounds at VBT, empirical warrant for the advantage.

Second, T is an RVI for the aff if I win a counter interp-the nature of T makes it a NIB since it’s a layer before theory and the neg doesn’t have to be topical so I can’t turn it-outweighs other disads to the RVI since it’s intrinsic the structure of theory and not a side effect or substantive abuse.

Third, reject the argument.

A. Drop the argument is much more realistic. We don’t give the death penalty for minor offenses. Means drop the arg is key to proportional punishment and real world education.

B. Drop the debater harms substance A. Creates an incentive to read more theory because it gives debaters an easy win which diverts focus from topical clash. B. Drop the argument increases topical clash by forcing the debate back down to substance—we can still debate the resolution.

C. Drop the arg is sufficient punishment. I lose the argument, you lose the time you spent on theory—I never got to exploit the arg to my advantage so no reason to drop me.

D. Fairness is just a gateway issue to evaluating the round, so if you can determine the better debater on the flow, there’s no jurisdiction to vote on fairness.

E. Dropping the argument is less interventionist; the voter section is the part of the theory shell that’s the most arbitrary on paradigms, if we take it out debates become easier to adjudicate in general and thus fairer. Intervention outweighs all other abuse because it means the debate doesn’t determine the winner, creating 100% arbitrariness.

Fourth, presume aff. A. its harder to affirm so an equal debate means I did the better debating which best meets the role of the ballot. Theoretical warrants for presumption come first since theory is a layer before substance. B. presuming statements false causes paralysis because we can never act on our assumptions.

Fifth, substantive abuse can’t be a voter-that is a contradiction.

Scoggin and Overing John Scoggin (debate coach) and Bob Overing (TOC 2012 finalist) “SUBSTANTIVE/STRUCTURAL FAIRNESS” January 14th 2015 Premier Debate Today <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2014/01/14/substantivestructural-fairness-by-bob-overing-and-john-scoggin/> JW 1/15/14

Today we aim to add some clarity to an increasingly argued issue in LD theory debates: the substantive/structural fairness divide. Theory introduces a new method of evaluation for the judge. Instead of evaluating the merits of the aff and neg cases, the judge is to determine the theory debate based on which interpretation is most fair and educational. To do this, we must have some definition of fairness. A commonly-accepted understanding of fairness in debate is something like Fairness 1: A debate is fair when the judge impartially determines who the better debater is in a given round. Contrast this with another definition: Fairness 2: A debate is fair when both debaters have an equal chance of winning a given round. Fairness 2 is obviously wrong. First, it would imply that an adjudication method like flipping a coin is fair because both debaters have an equal chance of success. The first definition would exclude coin-flipping because it would not result in a determination of skill nor would it be impartial: it would disadvantage the more skilled debater relative to other models. Second, Fairness 2 would never be satisfied in a normal debate. Any skill discrepancy (being a better researcher, writer, or arguer) would mean that one debater has a greater chance of success. Thus, our definition of fairness must be concerned with impartial adjudication and not producing equal outcomes. What kinds of practices compromise the judge’s ability to impartially determine the better debater? The term “structural abuse” is used to describe practices that would violate Fairness 1 and “substantive abuse” to describe practices that would violate Fairness 2 but not Fairness 1. Let’s give some examples. Negative NIB: The neg debater is of inferior skill but reads a [NIB] necessary/insufficient burden, an argument about epistemic skepticism, and then turns the aff case. Now, the neg has two ways to win while the aff only has one. In Negative NIB, Fairness 1 is compromised because the judge cannot impartially determine the better debater given that the neg was at an arbitrary advantage. Better Evidence: [Second] The neg debater is of superior skill because she reads a solvency turn backed by better evidence than the solvency of the aff. In Better Evidence, Fairness 2 is compromised because the neg has a better chance of winning, but Fairness 1 is not compromised because the judge can still make an impartial decision about who is more skilled. The difference between the two cases is that in Negative NIB, the advantage gained cannot be traced to superior skill, but in Better Evidence, we can say the neg is more skilled in the area of research. In Negative NIB, the aff might win the debate, but nothing could allow the judge to make a completely impartial evaluation of skill. Consider a basketball game where team A was allowed a three-point shot and team B was not. It would be difficult to determine which team is truly better. Some amount of skill might allow team B to win, but we still would not call that arrangement fair. Allowing abuse claims based on Fairness 2 creates a contradiction. Say in Better Evidence that the aff debater advances a theory argument that says “I do not have an equal chance to win the round because the neg has better evidence, so the round is unfair. Cast your ballot that I am the better debater.” Because this substantive abuse claim isolates a skill discrepancy, the theory argument really says “I am the worse debater because the neg has better evidence. Cast your ballot that I am the better debater.” We should reject any definition of fairness that allows “I am the worse debater; vote for me” to be a valid theory argument.

Sixth, use reasonability on topicality with a brightline of a solvency advocate in the topic literature and the presence of link and impact turn ground. A. there are tons of many mutually exclusive T interps and I can’t possibly know which one you’ll read so I shouldn’t be punished for setting ground. B. increases topical clash-as long as you can debate under my plan the substantive education we receive outweighs time spent reading T.

Seventh, skepticism triggers presumption.

A. If skepticism is true, judges have no obligations to do anything, including voting for the correct winner, so they no longer have system to decide the round based on.

B. If morality has no content, i.e. there are no moral standards, than nothing is permissible because things can only be permissible according to a given set of standards. This triggers presumption because there is no possible way to give an RFD.

C. Skepticism questions an assumption of the resolution, rather than the truth value of the resolution itself. All statements make assumptions, but the fact that those assumptions are false doesn’t make the statement false. That means the statement is indeterminate, and thus triggers presumption.

Eighth, skepticism is avoided by accepting a margin of error in our moral statements.

**Parfit 97** Parfit, Derek 'Reasons and motivation', Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, vol. 71 (1997), pp. 99-130.

**We may not be able to prove that our** normative epistemic **[moral] beliefs are not illusions. We may also be unable to prove that we are not brains in a vat**, or being deceived by some demon. **But if we claim less than absolute certainty, we can** justifiably **reject such skeptical views.** In arguing that we can know some normative epistemic truths, we must appeal to some of these truths. We must claim that we have reasons to believe that we can respond to reasons. Such arguments are in one way circular, but that does not make them fail. Any justification must end somewhere. Justifications of beliefs can best end with intrinsic credibilities and decisive epistemic reasons. We do not have to show that we have further reasons to believe that we have these reasons, and further reasons to believe that we have these further reasons, and so on forever. Some beliefs seem indubitable, and we seem to have decisive reasons to accept many other beliefs. Nor do we seem to have any strong reason to doubt that we do have such reasons. Given these facts, if we can understand how it might be true that we are responding to such reasons, we can justifiably believe that we are responding to such reasons. **We can justifiably believe that there are some [moral] truths** about what we ought to believe, **and that we know some of these truths.**

Skep is self-defeating.

**Wedgwood 10** Wedgwood, Ralph (Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California). “Leiter’s Nietzschean Argument for Moral Scepticism: A Critique.” March 29, 2010 at 8:31 am. http://onthehuman.org/2010/03/moral-skepticism-and-moral-disagreement-developing-an-argument-from-nietzsche/

**If there is no objective fact of the matter** about a certain question p, **it is** surely **pointless to** engage in debate about p, trying to **persuade** other **people who disagree** with you about p. (It would be at least as pointless as trying to persuade someone that vanilla ice cream is yummier than chocolate ice cream.) **These** other **people should just ignore your attempts to persuade them** about p. So Leiter’s argument implies that people who are inclined to believe that there are no meaningful questions on which there are “no objective facts” should just ignore any attempt to persuade them that there are questions of this kind. Several of Leiter’s opponents on this issue will be philosophers who are inclined to believe that there are no meaningful questions on which there is no objectively correct answer. (Indeed, I am one of these philosophers myself.) But Leiter’s argument is itself an attempt to persuade the readers of this web site that there are some questions of this kind – namely, moral questions. **So,** it seems, **the** Nietzschean **argument is** effectively **telling its opponents that** it is an argument **that they should** simply **ignore [it]. In this way,** as it seems to me, **the argument is** entirely **self-defeating.**

# 1AR

## A2 T-Plural

### C/I

Counter interp: the aff may defend United States only. I meet. Prefer:

1. Stable advocacy. Without spec the aff can shift out of disads by saying specific harms don’t link to general principle. Kills fairness since if arguments can be shifted out of the neg has no shot of winning. Outweighs text-no point to having a debate about the topic if I can shift.

2. Depth. Spec lets us focus the debate on an implementable policy instead of spreading ourselves thin on different issues. Focusing on one policy forces discussion on an actual issue-key to education since it ensures we’re learning things.

### A2 Semantic First

1. Adhering to the strict resolution text does not produce fair and educational debate-the res is written by traditional 80 years old for lay debaters. We should be allowed to

2. the ‘topicality rule’ is nonsense-you can evaluate my standards like that too. The ‘resolvability’ and ‘depth’ rule also promote fair and educational outcomes.

3. Your arguments concede the authority of fairness and education first-for example, your warrants for semantics good are that they provide for better predictability. That means it already collapses.

## UBI CP

### Poverty Turns

UBI increases income inequality. Living wage is preferable

**Waltman 02** Jerry Waltman (taught political science at the University of Southern Mississippi for 25 years; in 15 of those he participated in the British Studies Program. He currently holds an endowed professorship in political science at Baylor University, where he teaches British politics and comparative public law. He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, and is the author of eight books and numerous articles in academic journals on both British and American politics. In addition to his years spent on the British Studies Program, he has traveled and taught in the UK on many occasions). “Civic Republicanism, The Basic Income Guarantee, and the Living Wage.” USBIG Discussion Paper. No. 25, March 2002.

**When it come to** softening **inequality,** the **living wage wins** again. Because everyone gets the same UBI, there is no compressing of income skews. In fact, a **UBI could** actually **increase inequality. Affluent people would have more** money **to invest, and** the **long term impacts of accumulation versus spending would exacerbate the wealth gap. A living wage**, as I define it, **would** at least **keep everyone in sight of the mean.**

UBI breeds stigma against the poor. Living wage solves

**Waltman 2** Jerry Waltman (taught political science at the University of Southern Mississippi for 25 years; in 15 of those he participated in the British Studies Program. He currently holds an endowed professorship in political science at Baylor University, where he teaches British politics and comparative public law. He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, and is the author of eight books and numerous articles in academic journals on both British and American politics. In addition to his years spent on the British Studies Program, he has traveled and taught in the UK on many occasions). “Civic Republicanism, The Basic Income Guarantee, and the Living Wage.” USBIG Discussion Paper. No. 25, March 2002.

If the **UBI** were set high enough to remove people from poverty, what its devotees obviously hope, it **would** have the further deleterious effect of **spawning a culture of dependency** in the recipients. All the **pathologies of** the old American **AFDC** program **would develop, with** the **calamitous political consequences** they brought in their train. Republican citizens, recall, need to be able to look each other in the eye. None can be dependent on another, and a **UBI**, by the straightforward mechanism of a public budgetary transfer, **would make some dependent on others** (unless the amounts were trivial, in which case, what would be the point?). **By providing payment for work** performed**,** the **living wage removes** any possible **social, and** hence, **political, stigma from what is received. The earner of the wage can look anyone in the eye**, both because of the source of the income and the fact that it is adequate to allow him or her to live a decent lifestyle.

### A2 Informal market DA

**TURN – Informal sector is high now; living wage is key to solve it. Studies prove.**

**Lemos 4**

Sara Lemos (University of Leicester and IZA Bonn). “The Effects of the Minimum Wage in the Formal and Informal Sectors in Brazil.” Institute for the Study of Labor. March 2004. http://ftp.iza.org/dp1089.pdf

6. Policy Implications The evidence here suggests that the poorest are not out of the reach of the legislation, **despite being** over-represented **in the informal sector, where the legislation is not complied with.** The minimum wage is effective throughout the bottom half of the distribution. **Spillover effects are substantial and robust** at the lowest percentiles, benefiting even those below the minimum wage. Although the effect on wages is sizeable, the employment effects of the minimum wage are small for Brazil when compared to the -1% in the international literature (Brown, 1999). The employment rate effect (job effects) is at the most -0.04% in the formal and -0.17% in the informal sector. Camargo (1989) and Carneiro and Henley (2001) argue that a policy such as this might be more effective to reduce poverty than policies that attempt to incorporate informal sector workers into the 15 formal sector, which might generate higher unemployment. Furthermore, the informal sector, as a way of avoiding the inefficiencies of labour market regulation (Soto, 1989; Loayza, 1997; Maloney, 1999), is large and growing in Brazil as a result of successive stabilization plans (Fox and Morley, 1989). The excess of regulations increase non-compliance, and non-compliance increases the de facto size of the informal sector (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979). Neri (1997) argues that minimum wage increases are more likely to informalize than to destroy jobs. In a developing country, with very little social security, people cannot afford to stay out of work and will move into lower paid informal sector jobs (Macedo, 1981; Amadeo et al., 1995; Carneiro and Henley, 1998). McIntyre (2002) reported evidence confirming that the minimum wage increases the size of the informal sector in Brazil. 7. Conclusion There is very little evidence on the effects of the minimum wage in developing countries and in particular on these effects on the formal and informal sectors of such countries. The informal sector is not only large and overpopulated by minimum wage workers in Brazil, but it is also where most of the poor workers are. Extending the understanding of minimum wage effects both in developing countries and in particular in the informal sector is crucial if the minimum wage is to be used as a policy to help poor people in poor countries. This paper estimates wage and employment effects in both the formal and informal sectors for a key developing country, namely Brazil. The minimum wage was found to compress the wage distribution of both sectors. The compression effect extends higher in the informal sector wage distribution, but it is stronger at the bottom of the formal sector distribution. This suggests that the minimum wage redistributes in favour of the poorer in both sectors, but that it redistributes in favour of those in the very bottom of the distribution in the formal sector, while it redistributes more widely in favour of those in the half bottom half of the distribution in the informal sector. Consistent with the presence of a spike, spillover effects, and the associated compression effect in both sectors, employment was found to decrease in both sectors. Negative employment rate effects (jobs effects) were found to be negative in both sectors – stronger in the informal sector – and aggregate unemployment rate effects was found to be positive. The compression effect together with the disemployment effect of the minimum wage in the informal sector in Brazil is the novelty here. This suggests a downwards sloping labour demand curve 16 in both sectors, challenging the standard Two Sectors Model as inadequate to explain the effect of the minimum wage on the formal and informal sectors in Brazil and in Latin America more generally. Most importantly, the novelty here is that the poorest are not out of the reach of the legislation. The findings here have important policy implications because they entail that the minimum wage is effective **not only in the formal, but also** in **the informal sector**, where legislation is not complied with. Furthermore, the minimum wage affects the wage of those above and even of those below the minimum wage in the informal sector, where the poorest workers are.

**Enforcement is irrelevant. Living wage creates a norm of fairness which solves the informal sector.**

**Dinkelman and Ranchhod 10**

Taryn Dinkelman (Princeton) and Vimal Ranchhod (University of Cape Town). Evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an informal sector: Domestic workers in South Africa. July 2010. https://www.princeton.edu/rpds/papers/dinkelman\_ranchhod\_minwages\_0710.pdf

The introduction of a new minimum wage law in a previously unregulated informal market presents a unique opportunity to examine important issues around responses to legal wage floors. It also allows us a window into how informal labor markets operate and the conditions under which they might formalize. Although conditions in and characteristics of the domestic worker industry in South Africa were stable before the introduction of a minimum wage, wages in this sector rose significantly and substantially -- at least 10% compared with other workers -- POST-law. When we consider the difference-in-differences results, it is clear that domestic workers who work in areas where the pre-law median wage is below the minimum (i.e. where the new law has more “bite") experienced even larger increases in wages in the POST-period. **Despite the absence of full compliance** and a sharp wage spike at the minimum, we find evidence of a strong wage response to the law, and little statistical evidence that the law had a negative effect on work on the intensive or extensive margin. The main purpose of our paper has been to document these changes and to provide evidence that labor market regulation in an informal sector of considerable importance can have real impact, **even without monitoring or enforcement**. Given that issues of compliance are not often at the center of empirical work on minimum wages42, it is worthwhile considering how our results should be interpreted. One possible reason that the law had an effect is that some fraction of employers erroneously believed that the government was going to enforce the new minimum and penalize non-compliers. A difficulty with this explanation is that it cannot account for wage or earnings increases for domestic workers already paid more than the minimum before the law. Although we do not have a panel data set of workers to test this directly, the fact that the wage and earnings distribution fanned out (the variance increased) rather than compressing after the law suggests that some employers increased wages in excess of the minimum, despite already being compliant with the law. A second reason that an unenforced law may have been effective relates to models of fairness in wage-setting. A theoretical literature in labor economics posits that the notion of a fair wage is important in incentivizing workers to provide high effort in tasks for which effort is unobservable (Akerlof, 1982, 1984 and Akerlof and Yellen, 1988). These models are difficult to test empirically, since defining and measuring a fair wage, or a reference wage, is tricky in practice.43 Experimental studies have separately established the importance of gift exchange and fairness intentions in employer-employee relationships.44 In the case of the domestic worker industry in South Africa, it is plausible that the announcement of a wage floor defined, or re-defined, what the fair wage was and set in motion voluntary

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employer responses, even though the two traditional channels for encouraging compliance-- enforcement and penalties-- were closed off.45 What we take from our analysis is that in the initial stages of labor market formalization, governments may need to accept partial compliance with new legislation in order to bring about real changes in outcomes without significant disemployment.46 Even without enforcement, such legislation can move the market towards a more formal setting, if, for example, it increases contract coverage, as in the South African case. We emphasize that our conclusions are valid for the domestic worker industry, which is one example of an informal sector. The dynamics of the employment relationship between a single employer and a single employee no doubt condition the response to the law and so may only be relevant in some types of informal enterprizes. However, this characterization of the informal sector may not be too far from a description of the typical small-scale firm that generates much informal sector employment in developing countries.47 Also, our analysis is only relevant for the short-run effects of a new minimum wage policy: while we find clear effects in the 16 months after the law, as employers face annual increases in this minimum (often above inflation in the case of South Africa) and as workers sort across space in response to these new protections, the wage, earnings and employment effects of the policy may change as the sector itself becomes more formal over time. For example, employers may decide to contract child-care out to day-care centers which could have feedback effects on equilibrium wages, earnings, hours of work and number of jobs for domestic workers. We leave questions about the longer-term effects of formalizing the domestic worker market for future research. source of income for the poor.27

### A2 Robots DA

1. Non unique. The rush to mechanization already began, small changes in the minimum wage won’t have a significant impact-income inequality outweighs.

Nordan 14 Richard Nordan. Triangle Network. 5.28.14. [www.newsobserver.com/2014/03/28/3740766/why-a-modest-increase-in-the-us.html?sp=/99/108/](http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/03/28/3740766/why-a-modest-increase-in-the-us.html?sp=/99/108/)

Some may argue that increasing the minimum wage would provide more incentive for mechanization, but the rush to mechanize production of unskilled labor began over a century ago. Modest changes in the minimum wage will not affect the mechanization process. However, the free market system is loaded with imperfections. If the market system were perfect, there would be no gap between worker’s pay and productivity. So providing a floor for the least-skilled is a small-scale “distortion” of the market that can marginally improve people’s lives and provide them slightly more purchasing power. This seems like a reasonable trade-off, in light of the fact that many people of modest income have a hard time making ends meet. We should not permit a system in which individuals who work full time cannot afford to live.

Automation’s inevitable.

**Thibodeau 14** Patrick Thibodeau (reporter, covers cloud computing and enterprise applications, outsourcing, government IT policies, data centers and IT workforce issues for Computerworld). “Automation arrives at restaurants (but don’t blame rising minimum wages).” Computerworld. October 24th, 2014. http://www.computerworld.com/article/2837810/automation-arrives-at-restaurants-but-dont-blame-rising-minimum-wages.html

McDonald's this week told financial analysts of its plans to install self-ordering kiosks and mobile ordering at its restaurants. It isn't the only food chain doing this. The company that owns Chili's Grill & Bar also said this week it will complete a tablet ordering system rollout next month at its U.S. restaurants. Applebee's announced last December that it would deliver tablets to 1,800 restaurants this year. The pace of self-ordering system deployments appears to be gaining speed. But there's a political element to this and it's best to address it quickly. The **move toward** more **automation comes at the same time pressure to raise minimum wage**s **is growing**. A Wall Street Journal editorial this week, "Minimum Wage Backfire," said that while it may be true for McDonald's to say that its tech plans will improve customer experience, the move is also "a convenient way...to justify a reduction in the chain's global workforce." The Journal faulted those who believe that raising fast food wages will boost stagnant incomes. "The result of their agitation will be more jobs for machines and fewer for the least skilled workers," it wrote. The elimination of jobs because of **automation will happen anyway.** Gartner says software and robots will replace one third of all workers by 2025, and that includes many high-skilled jobs, too. **Automation is hardly new to retail. Banks rely on ATMs, and grocery stores**, including Walmart, **have** deployed **self-service checkouts**. But **McDonald's** hasn't changed its basic system of taking orders since its founding in the 1950s, said Darren Tristano, executive vice president of Technomic, a research group focused on the restaurant industry. The **move to kiosk and mobile ordering**, said Tristano, **is happening because it will improve order accuracy, speed up service and** has the potential of **reduc**ing **labor cost**, which can account for about 30% of costs. But **automated self-service is** a convenience that's **now expected**, particularly among **younger customers, he said. "It's keeping up with the times**, and the (McDonald's) franchises are going to clamor for it," said Tristano, who said any labor savings is actually at the bottom of the list of reasons restaurants are putting in these self-service systems. McDonald's is already deploying mobile ordering in other countries. In France, you can order a McDonald's hamburger from a mobile device, tablet or desktop and pick it up later at a restaurant, said Thomas Husson, a Forrester analyst in a report. "By reducing the stress of the ordering, McDonald's has significantly increased the average revenue per order," wrote Husson of the experience in France. Chili's has deployed some 45,000 tablets from Ziosk, which makes the system. Ziosk CEO Austen Mulinder says the tablets are used for ordering drinks, appetizers and desserts and for making payments, but they remain optional for customers. The waitstaff will take the first drink and entrée orders, which are often modified by people at the table. Mulinder said there's no capital cost to installation, and the multi-year subscription price for the system is more than offset by increased revenues it generates. The tablet also includes games and an opportunity for people to give feedback, and to join a loyalty program. That creates the potential for increased sales, because customers aren't necessarily waiting to catch an employee's attention to refill a drink. It also avoids the frustration of waiting for the check, said Mulinder. "**Restaurants want to speak the language of** the **millennials** and the language of millennials is digital," said Mulinder. Wyman Roberts, the CEO of Chili's parent company, Brinker International, spoke to financial analysts this week in a conference call about the new system. "We're excited about the potential this has to create a stronger connection and smarter interactivity between us and our guests," said Roberts, according to a transcript by Seeking Alpha.

2. No impact. Humans and robots don’t compete for jobs.

Grobart 12 Grobart, Sam. "Robot Workers: Coexistence Is Possible." Bloomberg Business Week. Bloomberg, 13 Dec. 2012. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/robot-workers-coexistence- is-possible>.

All that said, it’s too soon to write dirges for the humble human worker. In today’s workplace, there are still things that robots just can’t do. At Quiet Logistics, an order-fulfillment center for online retailers in Devens, Mass., 64 robots are used to move merchandise around the warehouse, but 330 humans are required to fold, package, and ship the products. Why not have robots do the whole thing? “People are really good at picking up things,” says Bruce Welty, Quiet Logistics’ chief executive officer. “It’s very difficult to get a robot to make the decisions required that a human makes to pick something out of a bin—particularly if there are many different things in that bin.” Humans continue to have another advantage over robots: They remain a more flexible workforce. To handle this year’s holiday shopping season, Amazon.com (AMZN) hired 50,000 part-time workers. While seasonal, part-time labor is not something you can necessarily build an economy on, it’s worth noting that Amazon didn’t buy more robots, because you can’t hire a robot part-time (yet). What would additional robots do when demand receded? “Come January,” says Jim Tompkins, a supply-chain consultant, “all that automation’s going to be staring you in the face.” This is the state of the robotic arts today: a point where humans and robots share labor, with robots handling the simple and repetitive and humans taking care of the complex and dynamic. Some robotics designers and engineers would like this to be a blueprint for the future, where increased automation does not necessarily displace human beings. Rodney Brooks, a former MIT robotics professor, is an optimist. To Brooks, who is also founder and chairman of robot maker Rethink Robotics, these machines are going to help workers, not compete with them. He points out that personal computers didn’t get rid of office workers, they changed the jobs people did. When it comes to robots, “it’s not a one-for-one replacement,” he says. “People are so much better at certain things.”