### NC

#### Something qualifies as an action and not a mere event only if it is constituted by practical reasoning.

Rodl Sebastian. Self-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 2000

**Calculation from desire does not yield a premise for instrumental reasoning because its conclusion represents a changeable state**, while an instrumental reasoning proceeds from a thought that represents something with the temporality of a movement. But the instrumental syllogism is a necessary form of practical reasoning, for practical reasoning arrives at a thought on which a movement may rest. And **if a movement rests on thought, then the unity of its phases**, which constitutes it as a movement, **must rest on thought.** So it does **if I reason [that]** from the same thought now, **“I want to do B. So let me do [X]”**, and then, “I want to do B. So let me do [Y]”, and so on. As “I want to do B” expresses the same thought all the while that I am doing B and until I have done it, **the unity of the phases of my doing B consists in the fact that they all hang on that thought. By contrast, if “I want to do B” represented a changeable state** I would not reason from the same thought, now to doing A1, and then to doing A2. In consequence, my doing A1 and my doing A2 would bear no unity. **These would not be phases of a movement, and I would not**, in doing A1 and A2, **be doing B.**

#### Outweighs the aff framework:

A) it’s a prerequisite-we can’t evaluate what a good action is if we don’t have a basic definition of what an action is.

B) denial of reason is impossible-we can always question why our desires matter, but asking whether we have a reason to act for reasons would be self-defeating because the question itself concedes the authority of reasons.

Next, rational reflection requires that the maxims we act upon be universalizable. Any reasoner would know that two plus two equals four because there is no a priori distinction between agents so norms must be universally valid. And- willing coercion is a contradiction in conception because you extend your own freedom while simultaneously undermining your ability to act in the first place.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom.

#### Impact analysis:

#### 1. only harms intrinsic to the structure of the maxim are relevant.

#### A) freedom is a property of agency, not an additive consequence. Adding two circles together does not make anything more circular than what was before, just like two humans are not freer than one human.

#### B) even if the net effect of the aff is more freedom, the means by which you have achieved that freedom is an inherently coercive action so you don’t address the appropriate response. I answer whether the state is even in the position to coerce in the first place.

#### 2. Merriam Webster[[1]](#footnote-1) defines “to negate” as “**to deny the** existence or **truth of**” so the neg burden is to prove the resolution false-textual claims come first jurisdictionally since if the aff isn’t topical you can’t sign your ballot for them-truth testing is the only way to account for debate wording. That means permissibility and presumption flows neg- if the statement isn’t obligatory then it’s false.

#### I contend banning handguns violates freedom.

Libertarian Party Issues: Gun Law s<https://www.lp.org/issues/gun-laws> JW

Libertarians, like other Americans, want to be able to walk city streets safely and be secure in their homes. We also want our Constitutional rights protected, to guard against the erosion of our civil liberties. In particular, Libertarians want to see all people treated equally under the law, as our Constitution requires. America's millions of gun owners are people too. Law-abiding, responsible citizens do not and should not need to ask anyone's permission or approval to engage in a peaceful activity. Gun ownership, by itself, harms no other person and cannot morally justify criminal penalties. Constitutional Rights America's founders fought the Revolutionary War to throw off British tyranny. Most of the revolutionaries owned and used their own guns in that war. After the war, in 1789, the 13 American States adopted the Constitution, creating the federal government. Before ratifying the Constitution, the people demanded a Bill of Rights to prevent our government from depriving them of their liberties as the British had done. One of the most important protections we have against government tyranny is that we are presumed innocent of any crime until proven guilty, before a jury, in a proper trial. Gun control advocates would declare all gun owners guilty without trial, simply for owning guns, even though millions of them have never used their guns to harm another person. Such blanket condemnation is immoral, unfair and contrary to the principles on which America was founded.

### T-People Spec Bad

#### A. Interpretation: the affirmative must defend a handgun ban on all private ownership, not a specific group of people.

#### B. Violation: they specified a group of people in the plan.

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Accuracy-

The lit makes a very clear distinction between common-sense gun control and total gun bans-your aff is functionally background checks.

Lind 15 Dara Lind, 12-7-2015, "The new Democratic agenda on gun control," Vox, <http://www.vox.com/2015/12/7/9859802/democrats-gun-control> JW

The new Democratic gun control agenda boils down to something the Center for American Progress says: "Dangerous people should not be able to easily acquire guns." That means universal background checks. It means more robust mental health requirements for gun ownership. And it means preventing particular populations of people from buying guns legally — including suspected terrorists and domestic abusers. In the 1990s, the gun control debate was about particularly dangerous guns or forms of ammunition. The "dangerous people" agenda deemphasizes those policies. Instead, it's about the process by which the government decides whether it's okay for someone to own a gun to begin with. It's actually possible to pin down exactly when this shift occurred — or at least when it was formalized. In April 2013, Senate Democrats decided to try to pass a gun control bill after a mass shooting killed 26 people, most of them children, at Sandy Hook Elementary School. But then–Majority Leader Harry Reid deliberately decided not to include an "assault weapons ban" (banning guns with particular "military-style" features from being sold) in the main bill. When sponsor Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) offered it as an amendment, only 40 senators voted for it. (Compare that with 2004, when a similar bill got 52 yes votes in a Republican-controlled Senate.) When Sens. Joe Manchin (D-WV) and Pat Toomey (R-PA) agreed on a proposal to expand background checks, though, Reid and Senate Democrats tried to get it into the existing bill. When the Manchin-Toomey proposal got only 54 votes — not enough to clear the 60-vote threshold required — President Obama gave a Rose Garden speech calling it a "shameful day for America." But the legislative defeat for the Democrats opened up a big political opportunity. Expanded background checks are overwhelmingly popular — 85 percent of Americans support requiring background checks for gun-show purchases, according to the Pew Research Center. That includes 79 percent of Republicans and 82 percent of people who think protecting gun rights is more important than controlling gun ownership. Add that to the fact that a majority of senators had voted for Manchin-Toomey, and it became a no-brainer policy for Democrats to rally around — one they didn't have to worry would alienate moderates. "The trick to winning over moderates is to be the most reasonable person in the room," says Sarah Trumble of Third Way — an organization that pushes for moderation and bipartisanship. "It's not hard to support both the Second Amendment and reasonable restrictions, because the proposals on the table that people are talking about are things that legitimate gun owners do as a matter of course." Former Democratic strategist and current head of the Institute on Politics at Georgetown Mo Elleithee put it another way: "There is no more powerful interest, no more powerful constituency, than suburban moms. And I think you would be hard-pressed to find a suburban mom who doesn't support some form of increased gun safety measure. Even the suburban moms who support the Second Amendment, who like the idea that there should be a gun in the house for safety, still believe that there should be a background check." Of course, in theory, something so broadly supported would simply be passed by Congress — taking it away as a rallying point for one party. But because the NRA and Republican members of Congress are standing firm against any gun restrictions, they have allowed Democrats to seize the issue. "Right now," Trumble says, "the NRA doesn't look even remotely reasonable." And that's opened up an opportunity for Democrats to come off as the adults in the room. The urgency progressives feel has put a damper on civil liberties concerns Expanding background checks is one component of the "dangerous people shouldn't have guns" agenda. The other is who can be barred from buying a gun once the information in that background check comes back. Chelsea Parsons of the Center for American Progress brings up domestic abusers as one example. There's an "increased risk of homicide to women posed by domestic abusers who have easy access to guns," she says. "That is another gap in the law that we spent a lot of time working on, to strengthen the laws and reduce access by that group of known dangerous people." That's also the logic behind tighter restrictions on mentally ill gun buyers, another policy that's overwhelmingly supported by Americans across the ideological spectrum. In fact, it's more popular with Republicans than with Democrats — in part because many liberals feel that conservatives scapegoat the mentally ill after mass shootings to distract from the issue of gun violence. And this is where the "dangerous people" agenda runs into a bit of trouble. The particular groups targeted by restrictions are often either marginalized — like the mentally ill — or intersect with other issues where liberals tend to be much more skeptical of government power, such as national security. After the San Bernardino shooting last week, President Obama and White House officials urged Congress to pass a law barring people on the federal "no-fly list" from buying guns. Obama presented this as another no-brainer issue: "Those same people who we don’t allow to fly can go in to a store right now in the United States and buy a firearm, and there’s nothing that we can do to stop them." But what Senate Democrats actually proposed (unsuccessfully) was a slightly different proposal that dates back to the George W. Bush administration: giving the Department of Justice the power to ban people on the FBI's terrorism watch list, much bigger than the no-fly list, from legally buying a gun. A recent GAO report found that people on the watch list have succeeded in buying guns about 2,000 times between 2004 and 2014. But there are 700,000 people or more on the list. And, as progressives have pointed out throughout the Bush and Obama administrations, it's hard to even know who's on the watch list — and even harder for those wrongfully placed on it to get off. The Senate, ironically, knows better than anyone that the government's terrorism watch lists can be overbroad: Former Sen. Ted Kennedy spent three weeks trying to get his name off the no-fly list in 2004. (This might have been why the Senate went with the FBI watch list instead.) But the FBI watch list is much bigger, and unlikely to be less flawed — especially given reports of FBI profiling and entrapment of Muslims. The awkward politics of the issue are epitomized by who's sponsoring the bill in each chamber: In the Senate, it's centrist Democrat and security hawk Feinstein; in the House, it's Rep. Peter King (R-NY), Congress's most vocal supporter of surveilling American Muslims. Of course, it's not unusual for policies that pose civil liberties concerns to garner broad public support. Progressives are generally more sensitive to those concerns, but when it comes to guns, they're compelled by the sheer obviousness of the "dangerous people shouldn't have guns" logic. Parsons, of CAP, says the answer is to fix the watch list. "We should do both things. We should strive to make the watch list appropriate and accurate and constitutional, and at the same time we should make sure that individuals who are known to the FBI to have ties to terrorism aren't able to buy guns." Both moderates and advocates are cooling on assault weapons bans Though it doesn't look like Democrats will be able to expand background checks, fix what Parsons calls the "terror gap," or enact any other restrictions on gun ownership anytime soon, this could actually be good news. Much like the defeat of Manchin-Toomey in 2013, these failures are an advantage for Democrats: As long as there are policies that are overwhelmingly supported not just by the public but by gun owners themselves, but aren't yet law, there will be a way for Democratic elected officials to talk about guns without alienating gun owners. But it's genuinely hard to tell how deep the consensus on gun control among moderates (including gun owners), liberals, and Democratic elected officials goes. Mo Elleithee assumes that passing expanded background checks will build momentum for further action. "The assault weapons ban, a ban on armor-piercing bullets, a ban on high-capacity clips — that is, I think, the next level of where the fight will go," he says. "Because we don't have those things despite significant public support — it's not as high as the background checks, but there's still more than a bare majority." That significant public support, however, comes with a big asterisk. According to Pew, 57 percent of Americans support a ban on assault-style weapons; in 2013, 53 percent of Americans supported a ban on high-capacity ammunition clips. But unlike the "dangerous people" agenda, bans on these types of weapons divide gun owners from non–gun owners. Of Americans with a gun in the house, 49 percent support an assault weapons ban; in 2013, 43 percent of people who said they owned a gun supported the ban (and only 41 percent of gun owners supported a ban on high-capacity clips). "The place you're most likely to see a policy difference" between moderates and liberals, Trumble explains, "is when you're talking about bans. Liberals are much more likely to support assault weapons bans and high-capacity magazine bans. That's a dog whistle for moderates and people on the right" — talk about banning one thing, and gun owners (and those more sympathetic to them) start getting worried the government will ban more things. That isn't stopping some liberal institutions like the New York Times editorial board from calling for a version of an assault weapons ban. But at the same time the Times is embracing the concept, others in the liberal policy elite are shying away from it — not because it goes too far, but because it doesn't go nearly far enough. For some people, the problem is simply too many guns This is the other thing that makes the "dangerous people" agenda different from the rest of the gun policy debate. Gun policy experts are fairly well convinced that expanding background checks would have a meaningful role in reducing gun violence — not necessarily the spectacular mass shootings that are often the political reason Congress tries to pass gun control, but what CAP's Chelsea Parsons calls "interpersonal violence that happens in communities around the country that ends up becoming fatal because of easy access to firearms." In other words, it's not only good politics but also good (as in effective) policy. The same is true for other planks in the "dangerous people" agenda: mental health screenings, domestic violence restrictions. And while Parsons acknowledges, "I don't think that individuals on the terror watch list are primary drivers of gun violence in this country," she still thinks the "terror gap" is too obvious a hole in the law not to fix. But assault weapons bans don't work as well. As Nick Baumann wrote in the Huffington Post in response to the Times's op-ed, "Assault weapons bans are hard to write and implement, and easy to undermine and circumvent. Even a perfect assault weapons ban wouldn't do anything about most gun violence, because most gun violence involves handguns that aren't forbidden under such laws." And this gets to the heart of the problem: Many of the progressives who are worried about gun violence in its own right are increasingly convinced that the real problem is that there are, in fact, simply too many guns in America. And that means the ultimate policy solution, for them, is to take some of those guns away. There aren't exactly policy proposals for Australian-style mandatory buybacks circulating among the progressive pundit class — largely because it's a nonstarter with the current Supreme Court, which has ruled that there is an individual right to own guns (a premise that many liberals still argue with). Instead it's more of an attitude: the sense that there is not actually any such thing as the "responsible gun owner" Trumble talks about, because it is irresponsible to own something so lethal.

#### AND: private ownership in the context of the resolution is a generic noun- it refers to a category.

Debois 15 Danny (TOC champ) “Topic Analysis” Victory Briefs, January/February 2016 LD Brief December 10th 2015 JW

On the last two topics, I was very receptive to the idea that the resolution was about a principled question about the nature of adolescent rights or how jurors should deal with our imperfect legal system, as opposed to a specific policy proposal. Unfortunately for the people who like to card my topic analyses instead of cutting prep against plans, I do actually think this topic does allow much more room for the aff to run plans. Given that ban generally refers to a legal prohibition, I do think the topic is referring to a state of affairs in which there are laws that seek to end private handgun use. That being said, I do not think this topic requires the aff to defend a plan (especially if they derive offense more from why the U.S. should take a principled stand against handgun ownership as opposed to policy advantages to handgun bans), but I do think this topic permits plans in a way that previous topics have not. There is one instance in which I still think generics apply to this topic. “Private ownership of handguns” seems to be a generic noun, as opposed to referring to handgun ownership for specific agents. Narrowing the topic down to just people on the FBI’s terror watch list1⁶ or domestic violence misdemeanants1⁷ adds a level of specification that means that the aff ’s offense does not prove the topic true.

#### Accuracy comes first-the topicality rule is superior and non uniques your offense.

Nebel 15 Jake Nebel (debate coach his students have won the TOC, NDCA, Glenbrooks, Bronx, Emory, TFA State, and the Harvard Round Robin. As a debater, he won six octos-bid championships and was top speaker at the TOC and ten other major tournaments) “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics by Jake Nebel” VBriefly February 20th 2015 <http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/> JW 2/20/15

One reason why LDers may be suspicious of my view is because they see topicality as just another theory argument. But unlike other theory arguments, **topicality** involves two “interpretations.” The first is an interpretation, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the resolution or of some part of it. The second **is a *rule***—namely, that **the aff**irmative **must defend the res**olution.[2](http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/#fn2) If we don’t distinguish between these two interpretations, then the negative’s view is merely that the affirmative must defend whatever proposition they think should be debated, not because it is the proposition expressed by the resolution, but rather because it would be good to debate. This failure to see **what is distinctive about** Topicality leads quickly to the pragmatic approach, by ignoring what the interpretation is supposed to be an interpretation *of*. By contrast, **the topicality rule**—i.e., that the affirmative must defend the resolution—**justifies the semantic approach**. This rule is justified by appeals to fairness and education: **it would be unfair to expect the neg**ative **to prep**are **against anything other than the res**olution, because **that is the only mutually acceptable basis for prep**aration; **the educational benefits** that are unique to debate **stem from clash** focused **on a proposition determined beforehand**. The inference to the priority of semantic considerations is simple. Consider the following argument: We ought to debate the resolution. The resolution means X. Therefore, We ought to debate X. The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. **Pragmatic considerations** for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They might **show that it would be better** or worse***if* the resolution meant X, but** **sentences do not** in general **mean what it would be best for them to mean**. At best, pragmatic considerations may show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. **They are** (if anything) **reasons to *change* the topic, contrary to the topicality rule**. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for the topicality rule, *not* against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above.

Also: key to jurisdiction-the ballot asks you to endorse the better debater in the context of the resolution issued by the tournament rules-if you don’t defend the topic then it’s impossible to vote for you, that’s the most important voter.

#### 2. Limits: they massively underlimit the number of affs—they can cherry pick any group of people in any sector combined with multiple implementation mechanisms and locations-results in a permutation of thousands of affs.

#### Impacts:

A) ground loss-you can pick a specific group that excludes common disads and lets you pick the most desirable slice of the resolution.

B) predictability-I can’t engage in the aff if I can’t predict the specific group you have chosen-you’ll always a have a structural prep advantage over me. This also precludes all education based offense- even if discussion of the aff is good in the abstract I don’t have the necessary prep.

D. Voters. 1. Vote on fairness, debate’s a competitive activity with wins and losses-if the round is skewed towards once debater you can longer test debate skill. 2. Education is a voter since it’s the end goal of debate and provides portable skills-also why schools fund debate in the first place.

Drop the debater on T: 1. Drop the arg is severance from the position of the 1AC-you can just read new arguments in the 1AR or connect parts of the aff to whole res which is equivalent to kicking the aff and reading a new plan in the 1AR-skews my strat since I don’t know what you’ll argue for. 2. Drop the arg discourages the neg from reading T to check back abusive affs since they will lose the portion of the 1nc they spent arguing T, making it more strategic to let the aff get away with their non-topical affs which kills fairness and education since affs will get away with sketchy positions. 3. I had to spend time reading T to check back abuse-dropping the arg means a portion of my 1nc is moot which kills fairness and education.

Competing interps since 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline. Competing interps maximizes fairness and education by fostering good norms for the activity. 2. Reasonability collapses to competing interps-you use an offense-defense paradigm to determine reasonability being good which concedes the authority of competing interps-also means your arguments are infinitely regressive since reasons why reasonability is itself reasonable are circular and illogical.

No RVIs: 1. Illogical- being fair doesn’t mean you should win- otherwise both debaters would win without theory, which would be irresolvable- comes first since every debate needs a winner. 2. Topical clash- once theory is initiated we never go back to substance because its unnecessary so no one engages in the topic.

## Case

### Reflective equilibrium

Induction is impossible.

Bates Jared Bates (Department of Philosophy, Hanover College) “The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium” dialectica Vol. 59, N° 3 (2005), pp. 347–356 JW

The problem of induction was presented in its most urgent form by Hume, who also gave it its inevitable, skeptical solution. 2 He exhorts us to provide the ground for our inductive inferences, our ‘reasoning concerning matters of fact’. The problem involves the logical tension between three individually compelling statements: (1) Inductive inference is not justified a priori. (2) Inductive inference is not justified [or] a posteriori. (3) Inductive inference is (at least sometimes) justified. Assuming that all justification is either a priori or a posteriori, (1), (2), and (3) form an inconsistent triad. Any two of them entails the denial of the other. The tension between claims (1), (2), and (3) is problematic only if we have some inclination to accept them all. And we do. (3) is the most obvious of them. I cannot write this sentence without making countless inductive inferences. You cannot understand this sentence without making countless inductive inferences. We’re strongly inclined to think that most of those inferences are justified. Yet reasons for (1) and (2) are hard to deny. Hume identifies the principle of the uniformity of nature as the principle underlying our inductive inferences. When I have observed sufficiently many green emeralds, and no non-green ones, I may infer that the next emerald I see will be green, or that all emeralds are green. But underlying this inference is the assumption that nature is uniform, that it is subject to immutable laws, that the future will resemble the past. So the question what grounds our inductive inferences reduces to the simpler question what grounds our acceptance of the uniformity principle. And here is where Hume digs in his heels. The uniformity principle is not justified a priori. It is logically possible that regularities that have held up to now will suddenly cease to hold; laws of nature are not after all laws of logic. Nor is the uniformity principle justified a posteriori. We cannot reason from experience that regularities that have held up to now will continue to hold into the future. For such reasoning itself assumes that the future will resemble the past, and so begs the question. Thus, despite our unshakable impulse toward (3), there are good arguments for (1) and (2). For Hume, the solution was clear: The arguments for (1) and (2) are unassailable; he recognized that (1) and (2) together entail the denial of (3); so he was forced to abandon (3), and concluded that inductive inference is irrational.

Reflective equilibrium dies to the problem of induction.

Bates 2 Jared Bates (Department of Philosophy, Hanover College) “The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium” dialectica Vol. 59, N° 3 (2005), pp. 347–356 JW

I said in the beginning that the reflective equilibrium method, under current views, cannot provide a Goodman-style dissolution of the problem of induction. It is almost time to show why this is the case. But before I do, I want to attend to an apparent ‘way out’ of the conclusion I am about to draw. That is, if, as I will argue, current views of reflective equilibrium lead to the demise of dissolving the problem of induction, then it might be regarded as a cogent strategy to part company with Goldman and his ilk by maintaining that reflective equilibrium is not at all an empirical methodology akin to hypothetico-deductivism, but rather a purely a priori, conceptual methodology. If this strategy is cogent, then the dissolution of the problem of induction remains available to those who endorse the strategy, whatever the consequences for a sufficiently naturalized reflective equilibrium. 5 In the remainder of this section, I want to offer some reason to think that Goldman and company are right that reflective equilibrium is an empirical methodology in virtue of the fact that evidence provided by our linguistic intuitions is straightforwardly empirical evidence, and therefore cannot guarantee a priori results. Initially, this point is simply made. Consider Goodman again on reaching a point of agreement between deductive rules and our particular judgments about cases of deduction: ‘A rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend’ (Goodman 1955, 68). Whether we are unwilling to accept an inference and whether we are unwilling to amend a rule are both empirical matters. That is, it is an empirical fact, if it is a fact at all, that we are unwilling to reject (or revise) modus ponens in light of purported counterexamples. There is a fact of the matter about what are our inclinations or dispositions, and this matter is empirical. Empirical evidence cannot certify a priori results. To this it may be responded that while it may be an empirical matter whether anyone in particular has certain linguistic dispositions – for example, a disposition to call a particular inference ‘valid’ – it is a non-empirical matter whether a competent speaker of the language has certain linguistic intuitions. On this view, while it may be an empirical matter whether anyone in particular is disposed to apply ‘bachelor’ to someone she knows to be married, it is not an empirical matter whether a competent speaker of the language is disposed to apply ‘bachelor’ to someone she knows to be married. On this view, we know – and crucially we know non-empirically – that a competent speaker of the language is not inclined to apply ‘bachelor’ to someone she knows to be married. Or perhaps more to the point, competent speakers themselves know, and know non-empirically, that ‘bachelor’ does not apply to someone who is married. Thus, if we return to the Goodman passage quoted above, and substitute ‘competent speaker’ for ‘we’, we get an importantly different view: ‘A rule is amended if it yields an inference [competent speakers] are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule [competent speakers] are unwilling to amend’. The reflective equilibrium test described in this version of the passage is non-empirical if it is a non-empirical matter what competent speakers’ linguistic dispositions are – at least, if it is a non-empirical matter from the competent speakers’ perspective. However, I doubt seriously the view that competent speakers’ linguistic dispositions can be known non-empirically, even from the perspective of competent speakers themselves. This view raises the question what constitutes linguistic competence. I take it that competence is determined, at least in part, by the extent to which a speaker’s linguistic dispositions coincide with the linguistic dispositions of others in her linguistic community

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. 6 However, it is an entirely empirical matter what the community’s shared linguistic dispositions are and to what extent the speaker shares them. In this way, I know that I am competent with ‘bachelor’, because I know that my linguistic dispositions connected with ‘bachelor’ are similar to the linguistic dispositions of others in my speech community. And although I take this as quite obvious, something I can ascertain upon a moment’s reflection, it is nevertheless straightforwardly empirical and not at all a priori. (This is why Jackson can consistently recommend using opinion polls in this step of conceptual analysis.) This is, of course, only one partial view of what makes for linguistic competence; but it seems an essential part. The conclusion of this section, then, is that on contemporary views reflective equilibrium is treated as just an instance of hypothetico-deductivism, and it is the hypothetico-deductive model itself that gives reflective equilibrium the legitimacy it has needed in the wake of Quine’s attacks on a priori conceptual analysis. Moreover, this view of reflective equilibrium as an empirical methodology seems quite plausible, after considering the nature of the evidence brought to bear in applications of reflective equilibrium. However, there is a serious difficulty with treating reflective equilibrium as just an instance of hypothetico-deductivism. It is now time to consider the implications this view of reflective equilibrium has on the status of the problem of induction. 3. The old problem reconstituted Goodman identified hypothetico-deductivism as the principle of induction and then claimed that it can be justified by being brought into reflective equilibrium with our inductive intuitions. Recent philosophers argue that the method of reflective equilibrium is itself an empirical method and that its legitimacy depends on its being an instantiation of hypothetico-deductivism. The implication of this analysis is now clear: Hume’s circularity charge retroactively applies to Goodman’s justification of induction. Hume argued that the uniformity principle cannot be justified a posteriori because all such reasoning relies on the soundness of the uniformity principle and so begs the question. A precisely parallel point holds against Goodman’s dissolution: The hypothetico-deductive model cannot be justified by reflective equilibrium, as conceived by recent philosophers, because that method relies on the soundness of hypothetico-deductivism and so begs the question. If Hume’s objection to experimental proofs of the uniformity principle is decisive, then the same reasoning shows that hypothetico-deductivism cannot be justified by reflective equilibrium. This is because, testing the hypotheticodeductive model against our common intuitions is itself an exercise in hypothetico- deduction, as Jackson might have put it. If this assessment is correct, then Goodman’s proposed dissolution must be reversed, and the old problem of induction is reconstituted.

### Fwk

#### Abstract reasoning empirically spurs social change- changes hearts and minds.

Goldstein 14 Rebecca Newberger Goldstein (Former professor of Philosophy at Rutgers and Columbia, PhD from Princeton). “Why Study Philosophy? 'To Challenge Your Own Point of View'.” 27 February 2014. http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/02/why-study-philosophy-to-challenge-your-own-point-of-view/283954/t

It’s amazing how long it takes us, but we do make progress. And it’s usually philosophical arguments that first introduce the very outlandish idea that we need to extend rights. And it takes more, it takes a movement, and activism, and emotions, to affect real social change. It starts with an argument, but then it becomes obvious. The tracks of philosophy’s work are erased because it becomes intuitively obvious. The arguments against slavery, against cruel and unusual punishment, against unjust wars, against treating children cruelly—these all took arguments. Which philosophical arguments have you seen shifting our national conversation, changing what we once thought was obvious? About 30 years ago, the philosopher Peter Singer started to argue about the way animals are treated in our factory farms. Everybody thought he was nuts. But I’ve watched this movement grow; I’ve watched it become emotional. It has to become emotional. You have to draw empathy into it. But here it is, right in our time—a philosopher making the argument, everyone dismissing it, but then people start discussing it. Even criticizing it, or saying it’s not valid, is taking it seriously. This is what we have to teach our children. Even things that go against their intuition they need to take seriously. What was intuition two generations ago is no longer an intuition; and it’s arguments that change it. We are very inertial creatures. We do not like to change our thinking, especially if it’s inconvenient for us. And certainly the people in power never want to wonder whether they should hold power.

# 2NR

## T

### A2 Leslie

1. Leslie talks about syntax but not semantics. Even if specification is permissible in some instances, sentences like “the tiger migrated from Asia” have definite singulars but are still generic generalizations so you can’t affirm by specifying a dog.

2. Prefer Nebel. Its debate specific-more tailored to the resolution which ensures consistency with what we’re actually debating-he’s also specifically qualified since he coaches a lot so he’s good at interpreting topic. Supercharged by the fact that Leslie indicates there is controversy in the literature surrounding this issue

3. Leslie talks about examples of things like animals but it never answers the normative question of just governments.

1. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate [↑](#footnote-ref-1)