# AC

## Framework

Epistemology is an arbitrary starting point for philosophy – ontology comes first.

**Bryant 11** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

In the following paper I would like to attempt a philosophical experiment.1 Traditionally, and especially since the seventeenth century, **philosophy has been obsessed with questions of where to begin in thought**. In particular, this question of beginnings has taken the form of questions about foundations. Since philosophy aims at a particular sort of knowledge, it has been natural since Descartes and Locke to begin philosophical investigation with an inquiry into the nature, conditions, and limits of knowledge. The thesis here would be that prior to any claims about the nature of reality, prior to any speculation about objects or being, we must first secure a foundation for knowledge and our access to beings. Philosophy, the story goes, must begin with an analysis of ourselves. By way of analogy, what could be more obvious than first examining the fitness or suitability of our tools before building something? Where, for Aristotle, metaphysics was first philosophy, for us Moderns and Post-Moderns, epistemology has become first philosophy. Indeed, ‘metaphysics’ itself has become a dirty word. **Philosophy thus becomes** the project of **critique, occupied primarily with** questions of access2 or the **conditions under which knowledge is possible. However,** as promising as this point of entry appears, when we look about the battlefield of contemporary philosophy it very much appears that the project of **critique** today **finds itself at a point of impasse** in which it has largely exhausted its possibilities. Paraphrasing a title of a famous book by Paul Ricoeur, we could say that everywhere we look in both Continental and Anglo-American thought **we encounter a ‘conflict of critiques’, without the means of deciding the truth or priority of these** various critiques and which constitutes the proper point of entry into philosophical thought. The Kantians tell us that we must first reflexively analyze the a priori structure of mind to determine how it conditions and structures phenomena. The phenomenologists tell us that we must first reflexively analyze the lived structure of intentionality and our being-inthe- world to determine the givenness of the given. The Foucauldians tell us that we must analyze the manner in which power and discursive constructions produce reality. The Derrideans and Lacanians tell us that we must analyze the manner in which language produces the objects of our world. The Marxists tell us that we must analyze history and social forces to determine the manner in which the world is produced. The Gadamerians tell us that we must analyze our historically informed understanding inherited through the wandering of the texts through which we are made. The Wittgensteinians tell us that we must analyze ordinary language to determine how it produces the various pseudo-problems of philosophy. **The list could be multiplied indefinitely**. And **among** all of **these orientations we find disputes within each** particular orientation of thought as to how the project of critique is to be properly completed. How is one to choose among all these competing orientations of critique? **Each mode of critique appears equally plausible and equally implausible, such that any choice takes on the appearance of** being **an arbitrary decision based on** temperament, **political orientation**, and interest without any necessitating ground of its own.3 Faced with such a bewildering philosophical situation, **what if we were to imagine ourselves** as proceeding naively and pre-critically **as first philosophers, pretending that** the last three hundred years of philosophy had not taken place or that **the proper point of entry** into philosophical speculation **was not the question of access?** In proceeding in this way we would not deny ourselves the right to refer to the history of philosophy; just as any plant refers to the soil from whence it came, philosophy too comes from its soil. Rather, this experiment would instead refuse the imperative to begin with the project of critique. In short, what if we were to ‘bracket’ the project of critique and questions of access, and proceed in our speculations as the beginning student of philosophy might begin? This, of course, is impossible as the history of philosophy is, as Husserl might put it, sedimented in our consciousness. Nonetheless, we can still attempt such an experiment to see where it might lead. At the very least, such a naive and pre-critical beginning might give us the resources to pose differently the philosophical questions we have inherited, thereby opening up new possibilities of thought and a line of flight from a framework that has largely exhausted itself and become rote. The Question of Beginnings and the Ontic Principle **As first philosophers** that refuse the project of critique and questions of access**, we can begin by asking** ourselves with **what** must we begin? What **is the most fundamental** and general **claim we can make about the nature of beings**? It will be noted that **this question is** already **more basic than** any question about our **knowledge** of beings **for**, as Heidegger made clear, **questions of knowledge are already premised on a pre-ontological comprehension of being**. In posing our question in this way, it is necessary to proceed in the spirit of Alfred North Whitehead with respect to his ‘conceptual scheme’ in *Process and Reality*. As Whitehead remarks, Philosophy will not regain its proper status until the gradual elaboration of categoreal schemes, definitely stated at each stage of progress, is recognized as its proper objective. **There may be rival schemes,** inconsistent among themselves; each with its own merits and its own failures. It will then be the purpose of research to conciliate the differences. **Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic** statements of the obvious**; they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities.**4 Consequently, in asking after the fundamental and the general, we are not making dogmatic statements predicated on claims of absolute certainty or ‘apodicity’, but rather are proposing tentative formulations subject to further clarification, revision, and even falsification. Where critical orientations of thought seek to secure knowledge in *advance*, we speculative, neo-pre-critical philosophers will see any secure foundation we might discover as an *outcome* of inquiry rather than as an αρχή governing our inquiry from the *outset*. In other words, we speculative, neo-pre-critical philosophers will not proceed like Hamlet, demanding that everything be clear before we act.

Prefer the Ontic Principle, that there is no difference that does not make a difference. Ontological difference, or the physical realities of objects, is a prerequisite to questions of knowledge. **Bryant 11** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Leaving aside, for a moment, the question of what, precisely, difference is, or how this principle is to be understood, we can ask ourselves what consequences would follow were we to adopt this principle? However, prior to asking ourselves what philosophical consequences follow from the Ontic Principle, we can first ask ourselves whether there is any philosophical warrant in treating this principle as a fundamental principle. A. First, it must be granted that **difference has an epistemic priority** in the order of knowledge. In its most naive formulation, prior to any questions of access or the relation between mind and world, subjects and objects, knowledge is concerned above all with questions of difference. **The** naive, incipient **knower** that has never yet heard of critique **first wonders what differences characterize the object or event**, what differences are abiding and what differences are changing, and what relations productive of differences there are between and among objects. In posing the question of knowledge in terms of the relation between subject and object, mind and world, or in terms of questions of access, epistemology forgets that it presupposes difference as the ground of all these distinctions. Paraphrasing Heidegger, it could be said that epistemology always and everywhere proceeds on the basis of a pre-epistemological comprehension of difference. This pre-epistemological comprehension of difference guides and directs both the manner in which the various epistemologies pose the question of knowledge and the sorts of epistemological theories they develop. Consequently, **prior to even posing questions of knowledge**, of how we can know, whether we can know, and what we can know, **the** would-be **knower is** already **situated among differences. Here we encounter** one reason that **the Ontic Principle** is formulated as it is. **Situated among differences,** we must say that **there are** (es gibt, il y a) **differences.** However, **this thereness is indifferent to human existence. It is not a thereness for us, but a thereness of being**. The incipient knower would like to know something of these differences. She would like to know which differences in the object make a difference, what ordered relations there are between differences of differing objects, and so on. It is this ‘thereness’ of difference that first provokes wonder and inquiry into beings. Noting that differences come-to-be and pass-away, the incipient knower wishes to know something of this coming-to-be and passing-away and whether or not there are any enduring differences. Thus, far from difference having a status posterior to questions of knowledge, the thereness of difference is given and is what first provokes inquiry and questions of knowledge. Paradoxically it therefore follows that epistemology cannot be first philosophy. Insofar as the question of knowledge presupposes a pre-epistemological comprehension of difference, **the question of knowledge always comes second** in relation **to** the metaphysical or **ontological priority of difference**. As such, there can be no question of securing the grounds of knowledge in advance or prior to an actual engagement with difference. Every epistemology or critical orientation favors its particular differences that it strives to guarantee, and these differences are always pre-epistemological or of a metaphysical sort. Thus, for example, Kant does not first engage in a critical reflection on the nature and limits of our faculties and then proceed to ground physics and mathematics, but rather first begins with the truth of physics and mathematics and then proceeds to determine how the structure of our faculties renders this knowledge possible. As I will attempt to show further on, difference requires no grounding from mind. B. Second, difference has an ontological or metaphysical priority. Hegel famously argued that when we attempt to think ‘being, pure being’ we end up thinking nothing. 8 Being as such amounts to nothing precisely because it does not offer or donate any differences for thought. Hegel develops a similar critique of Kant’s thing-in-itself in the Phenomenology.9 We disagree with Hegel on two points, while nonetheless retaining the basic lesson of his argument that the concepts of pure being and the concept of things-in-themselves are incoherent. On the one hand, for Hegel the issue is what we are able to think when we attempt to think pure being or things-in-themselves, whereas for us the issue is not what is thinkable but rather what beings and things themselves are regardless of whether or not anyone thinks them. **The question of ontology** and metaphysics **is not the question of what beings are for-us,** nor of our access to beings, **nor of how we relate to being**. No. **Ontology** or metaphysics **asks after the being of beings simpliciter, regardless of whether or not** any **humans relate to beings**. Second, for Hegel our attempt to think pure being leads us to the negation of being or the thought of nothingness. In attempting to think ‘being pure being’ we are led to think nothing. This observation leads Hegel to inscribe negativity in the heart of being. However, this inscription only arises when we begin one step removed from being, treating being in terms of our relation to being rather than in terms of being simpliciter. For us this is an illicit move. Xavier Zubiri makes this point compellingly in his magnificent On Essence.10 Zubiri asks, **can it be said that to be**, that reality itself, **is constitutively affected by negativity? This is impossible. Reality is that which is, and**, in that which is, **there is distilled all its reality, no matter how limited**, fragmentary and insufficient it might be. The negative, as such, has no physical reality whatsoever […] **Of two real things we say**, and we see with truth, **that** the **one ‘is not’ the other. This** ‘is not’ **does not**, however, **affect the physical reality of** each of the two **things, but** it affects this physical reality **only insofar as it is present to an intelligence**, which, when it compares those things, sees that the one ‘is not’ the other.11 The plant does not ‘negate’ the soil or seed from whence it comes, and to speak in this way is to speak metaphorically and without precision. Therefore, we cannot share the thesis that omni determinatio est negatio. **It is only from** the standpoint of **a consciousness** regarding objects and comparing them to one another **that** the **differences** composing objects **are taken by reference to what objects are not. Ontological**, as opposed to epistemic **difference is,** by contrast, **positive**, affirmative, and differentiated without being negative. **The temperature of boiling water is not the negation of other degrees**. Philosophy perpetually conflates these epistemic and ontological registers, requiring us to untangle them with the greatest care if we are to understand anything of the real. Where Hegel demands the inclusion of the subject in every relation—his famous identity of substance and subject—we are content to let difference belong to the things themselves with or without the inclusion of the subject in the relation to things. However, with regard to pure being and things-in-themselves, we have learned Hegel’s lesson. There is no ‘pure being’, no ‘being as such’, for being and beings only are in and through their differences. Likewise, when we are told that the thing-in-itself is beyond all knowledge, that it has none of the properties presented to us in phenomena, this thesis is to be rejected on the grounds that it conceives the things-in-themselves as things making no differences. Yet there can be no coherence in the notion of an in-different being for ‘to be’ is to make a difference.

The Ontic Principle renders anthropocentric ontologies incoherent. Humans are not the only beings that contribute to difference.

**Bryant 9** write[[3]](#footnote-3)

What then would be the affirmation, the declaration, at the heart of object-oriented philosophy? What the Speculative Realists, and realists and materialist in general, seem to be declaring, regardless of the diversity of their various positions, is an ontic principle about the nature of beings or entities. This principle can be stated in exceedingly simple terms that are nonetheless rife with profound consequences. Very simply it states: The Ontic Principle: **There is no difference that does not make a difference. Alternatively it could be articulated as** “Latour’s Principle”, as Latour is one of the few philosophers to have clearly stated this principle in fundamental terms. As stated by Latour the principle would run: Latour’s Principle: **There is no transportation without translation**. Given the current hegemonic forms of theory reigning today, the importance of the Ontic Principle can be more clearly articulated in terms of Latour’s formulation, for Latour’s formulation– especially as articulated in the magnificent Reassembling the Social –most deeply hits at the heart of basic assumptions about language, culture, and society at the heart of questions asked by the most celebrated theoretical options of our day. **When Latour refers to “transportation” he is referring to the relationship between two “actors”** (Latour’s all purpose word for entities or objects, whether they’re living or physical, human or non-human, animal or mineral, etc.). Thus for example, in Lacanian terms, **transportation might refer to the relation between a signifier and an entity such as the two doors** as described in his famous example from “The Instance of the Letter”. For Lacan, the two doors are **nothing more than** bearers or **vehicles of the signifiers /Ladies/ and /Gentlemen/, such that any talk of** the entities involved, **the doors themselves, the people that use these doors**, etc., is irrelevant. In other words, in a manner similar to the relationship between concepts and intuitions in Kant, the being of the doors is exhausted in their function as bearers of these two diacritically defined signifiers. The doors themselves contribute nothing to being. Just as Saussure argued that the signifier is not to be located in the sound, the articulation, but rather the pure differential among phonemes that has only an ideal existence, the only function served by the doors in Lacan is as a material embodiment or actualization of this ideal, diacritical relation. To be sure, Lacan will argue that there is also the real and the imaginary. Yet in all cases these will be defined negatively as functions of the signifier. As Žižek endlessly repeats, the real is not something other than the symbolic, but is a particular twist within the symbolic itself. plato2A similar moment occurs in Plato’s famous analogy of the divided line as developed in Book VI of the Republic. When Plato articulates the first stage of belief moving beyond doxa into the domain of genuine episteme, the first level of true knowledge is to be found in dianoia and, in particular, mathematical reasoning. The ontological correlate of dianoia or discursive reasoning is to be found in the domain of mathematical objects. However, if Plato places discursive reasoning and mathematical objects beneath noesis or direct intuition of the forms, then this is because in Plato discursive reasoning still relies on diagrams (icons as Peirce would put it), mathematical writing, inscription, etc. Just as Lacan will later renounce the imaginary dimension of mathematics by virtue of its reliance on images, Plato too sees the mathematical as a partially corrupted version of the “real” objects: The Forms. Thus, while each lower level on the divided line does, indeed, contribute some difference, this difference is always articulated in negative terms as a departure from true reality or as something that depends on something else, something mediated through something else, in its being. geo4If eikasia or imagining is the lowest level of knowledge, then this is because it is mediated in a variety of ways, requiring a medium within which the image can be produced (e.g., a pond), a catalyst of reflection (e.g., sunlight), an object to be reflected (e.g., that tree over there), and the form in which the object participates (e.g., the form of a tree). Each mediation is also a degradation, departing further from the Form or true reality which is treated as the only form that matters. Not only, as Deleuze remarks in the sublime eleventh chapter of Expressionism and Philosophy, is the entity (the reflection) reduced to a mere bearer or transport of the Form (what Deleuze there refers to as the “participated”), but this participation is actually treated as a violence or degradation of the form or the only difference that truly matters. When Latour declares that “there is no transportation without translation” his point is that there is no relation between entities that does not involve some labor of translation. To illustrate this declaration– and such principles can only really be declarations or fundamental commitments –we would do well to begin by taking the term “translation” rather literally. Suppose we are discussing Toscano’s translation of Badiou’s Logiques des mondes (pssst, Alberto, when’s it finally coming out?). Logiques des mondes cannot simply be transported into English, but rather English must be made to speak French and French must be made to speak English. The transportation of a text from one language to another language is not a transport that occurs without remainder, without any transformation, but requires an entire labor that produces something new in the process that is a simulacrum of the original (in Deleuze’s sense, not Baudrillard’s sense), but also different as well. The medium of English contributes something that wasn’t there before, just as the French also functions as a catalyst for all sorts of unforeseen adventures in English. **To say that there is no transportation without translation is** to say **that there is no entity**, no being, **that does not contribute a difference in** the process of being transported into something else or in **interacting with something else.** Henceforth, should one adopt the Ontic or Latour’s Principle, it follows that **no entity can any longer be treated as a mere** bearer or **vehicle of another entity. If an entity is treated as a mere vehicle** of another entity**,** whether that entity transporting itself be the symbolic, categories, essences, forms, language, the “transcendental”, the “police”, the social, power, etc., then **we should** immediately consign **the position to flames; recognizing** simultaneously **that the position** in question **is both itself an entity and therefore an actor and** that it **is fundamentally mistaken ontologically**. As a result of this position we are able to articulate the most fundamental anti-humanism yet imagined, for **immediately humans are disbarred from having a** central or **hegemonic position in the order of beings insofar as they only contribute one difference among others. The difference contributed by the human**, whether in the form of a transcendental subject, Dasein, society, or **language is neither more nor less than** the **difference** or translation **contributed in the encounter of a tree and lightning**. As a result, we get an ontology far more exotic than those so far imagined– should it be called an “onticology”? –for difference, that which makes the difference, can come from anything from the smallest particle of matter to a collective naming itself the Aztecs, to the individuals that make up that collective, the pots they use, the rivers in the region, volcanoes, etc., etc., etc.. **All of this must be counted.** If this principle must be called **the Ontic Principle**, then this is because it **sings the hymns of all beings**, rather than striving to reduce all beings to one being, seeing all the others as nothing but derivative corruptions. Granting this– and when has philosophy ever been anything more than a meditation on difference in one form or another? When has the question ever been anything other than “what are the differences”? –philosophy then becomes a meditation on those various ways in which difference makes a difference. For how could difference be difference if it did not first differ from itself?

Hyperobjects, objects that are massively distributed in time and space, have an influence on our physical space, generating a difference that is impossible to ignore. **Morton 13** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

I do not access hyperobjects across a distance, there some transparent medium. **Hyperobjects are here**, right here **in my social** and experiential **space**. Like faces pressed against a window, they leer at me menacingly: their very nearness is what menaces. From the center of the galaxy, a supermassive black hole impinges on my awareness, as if it were sitting in the car next to me at the traffic lights. **Every day**, global **warming burns the skin on** the back of **my neck**, making me itch with physical discomfort and inner anxiety. Evolution unfolds in my genome as my cells divide and mutate, as my body clones itself, as one of my sperm cells mixes it up with an egg. As I reach for the iPhone charger plugged into the dashboard, I reach into evolution, into the extended phenotype that doesn’t stop at the edge of my skin but continues into all the spaces my humanness has colonized. On every right side mirror of every American car is engraved an ontological slogan that is highly appropriate for our time: OBJECTS IN MIRROR ARE CLOSER THAN THEY APPEAR. **Not only do I fail to access hyperobjects at a distance, but** it also becomes clearer with every passing day that **“distance” is** only a psychic **an**d **ideological construct designed to protect me from** the **nearness of things**. There is a reason why they call it “the schizophrenic defense” when someone has a psychotic break. Could it be that the very attempt to distance is not a product of some true assessment of things, but is and was always a defense mechanism against a threatening proximity? So is that environmentalist speech that demands we “get back to Nature”—that is, achieve a greater intimacy with things—only half right? Is there is nothing to “get back to,” since the problem is not that things are truly distant, but that they are in our face—they are our face? Is this very environmentalism caught up in warding off the threatening nearness of things? That the concept Nature is an “object in mirror” whose referents are much, much closer than a view from the front seat of an SUV careering across the Tibetan plateau; or from behind a camera while I stand in the Arches National Park, Utah; or even as I unzip my tent flap in the middle of “it”? In the sections that compose part 1, I attempt to specify hyperobjects with greater and greater accuracy. There is a logic to the sequence, beginning with this section, in which I describe hyperobjects as viscous. While hyperobjects are near, they are also very uncanny. Some days, global warming fails to heat me up. It is strangely cool or violently stormy. My intimate sensation of prickling heat at the back of my beck is only a distorted print of the hot hand of global warming. **I do not feel “at home” in the biosphere. Yet it** surrounds me and **penetrates me, like the Force in Star Wars. The more I know about** global **warming, the more I realize how pervasive it is.** The more I discover about evolution, the more I realize how my entire physical being is caught in its meshwork. Immediate, intimate symptoms of hyperobjects are vivid and often painful, yet they carry with them a trace of unreality. I am not sure where I am anymore. I am at home in feeling not at home. Hyperobjects, not some hobbit hole, not some national myth of the homeland, have finally forced me to see the truth in Heidegger. **The more I** struggle to **understand hyperobjects, the more I discover that I am stuck to them**. They are all over me. They are me. **I feel like Neo in The Matrix, lifting to his face** in horrified wonder **his hand coated in the** mirrorlike **substance into which the doorknob has dissolved**, as his virtual body begins to disintegrate. “Objects in mirror are closer than they appear.” The mirror itself has become part of my flesh. Or rather, **I have become part of the mirror’s flesh, reflecting hyperobjects everywhere.** I can see data on the mercury and other toxins in my blood. At Taipei Airport, a few weeks after the Fukushima disaster, I am scanned for radiation since I have just transited in Tokyo. **Every attempt to pull myself free by** some act of **cognition renders me more** hopelessly **stuck to hyperobjects**. Why?

Thus the standard is **respecting the physical reality of hyperobjects**.

## Advocacy

Developing countries should accept the Precautionary Principle when environmental protection and resource extraction conflict. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until he checks in cross-ex.

## Contention

The PP is key to acknowledging the importance of hyperobjects.

**Morton 13** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

What we need is more like what Judge Nicolas Zambrano finaly did in the case, which was to suspend the endless construction of (necessarily incomplete statistical) data, and specify that **precisely because there is a gap in our knowledge**—what do these heavy hydrocarbons do exactly?—to determine that **the best action is to act as if the threat were real**. To specify them not as assemblages of relations but as a unit, as an entity with unknown powers, a unique entity consisting of all kinds of other entities, all kinds of complex hydrocarbons, but an entity nonetheless, just like any other in its Tardis-like inconsistency. To respect the Kantian gap between phenomenon and thing on which modernity and modern science is based. And yet to respect it still more than the deniers, who endlessly look for more data, more proof. This is a philosophical war, a war that Blake calls a “mental fight.” The tactic of Judge Zambrano was in effect to specify the oil as an entity in its own right rather than as an assemblage or set of relations: an object-oriented tactic. **Precisely because the hyperobject is withdrawn—it is mathematizable to humans as** reams and **reams of data—its appearance is in doubt**: its appearance as cancer, its appearance as sores covering the body of a newborn baby. And **for** precisely **this reason, precaution must be the guiding principle. No further proof is required, since** the **search for proof is** already **contaminated by** an **unwillingness to acknowledge the hyperobject**, an unwillingness we may readily call denial. **The burden of proof is shifted to the defendant**: Chevron must not prove that oil does not have a harmful effect. This is a judo move within a post-Humean age in which scientific causality just is statistical. Toxicity is a category that emerges from the Humean science of statistical causality. You can’t directly specify it since there is no single criterion for it—its object withdraws, yet every day we see people dying of cancer from the mutagenic effects of radiation and hydrocarbons. Moreover, only about twenty-five of the thousands of hydrocarbons in existence on Earth have been studied as to their toxic effects. So Chevron can parsimoniously claim that there is no proof. **Figuring out exactly what the causal links are**, even if possible, **would result in further delay and** further **damage to nonhuman and human life**. It is like Lingis and the cigarette in the sequoia forest. Reasoning as the search for proof only delays, and its net effect is denial. This doesn’t mean that a cigarette is an umbrella, or that the effects of heavy aromatic hydrocarbons are to cause cotton candy to sprout on banana trees. It means that things are liars who tell the truth, like “This sentence is false”; the larger the things are, the more obvious this feature becomes. **Ethics and politics** in a post-modern age after Hume and Kant **must be based in attunement to directives coming from entities, which boils down to accepting** and listening to **true lies**. Any ethical or political decision thus feels like an uncanny leap into a void, where we are unsure of ourselves, precisely because there is so much data.

An object-oriented ethic prioritizes EP. Recognizing our interconnectedness with nature is key to solve extinction.

**Bryant 12** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

I think that Eileen Joy, in a comment over at Alex Reid’s Digital Digs, best articulates what the aims of an object-oriented ethics (OOE) might look like. Responding to one of his recent posts, she writes: For me personally, turning one’s attention to animals, objects, **post**/**humanism** and so on **is** precisely about thickening our capacity to imagine more capacious forms of “living with”; it is precisely **about** developing **more radical forms of welcoming and generosity** to others, who include humans as well as trees, rocks, dogs, cornfields, ant colonies, pvc pipes, and sewer drains; **it is** precisely **about amplifying the ability of our brains to pick up** more **communication signals from more “persons”** (who might be a human or a cloud or a cave) **whose movements, affects, and thoughts are trying to tell us** something **about our interconnectedness** and co-implicated interdependence **with absolutely everything** (or perhaps even about a certain implicit alienation between everything in the world, which is nevertheless useful to understand better: take your pick); it is precisely about working toward a more capacious vision of what we mean by “well-being,” when we decide to attend to the well-being of humans and other “persons” (who might be economic markets or the weather or trash or homeless cats) who are always enmeshed with each other in various “vibrant” networks, assemblages, meshes, cascades, systems, whathaveyou. And just for me — likely, just for me– it is also about love, with love defined, not as something that goes in one direction from one person to another person or object (carrying with it various demands and expectations and self-centered desires), but rather, as a type of collective labor that works at creating “fields” for persons and objects to emerge into view that otherwise would remain hidden (and perhaps also remain abjectified), and which persons and objects could then be allowed the breathing/living room to unfold in various self-directed ways, even if that’s not what you could have predicted in advance nor supposedly what you “want” it to do (in other words: ethics as a form of attention that is directed toward the “for-itself” propulsions of other persons and objects, human and inhuman). So, for me, work in post/humanism, and in **OOO**, **is attentive to the world, which includes and** does not exile (or gleefully kill off) **the human (although it** certainly **asks that we expand our** angles of **vision beyond** just the **human-centered ones**);it is both political and ethical; and it is interested in what I would even call the “tender” attention to and care of things, human and inhuman (I think that the work of Bennett, Bogost, Morton, Harman, Steven Shaviro, Jeffrey Cohen, Stacy Alaimo, Julian Yates, Myra Hird, Freya Matthews, Karen Barad, Donna Haraway, and Levi Bryant, and many, many others who \*never\* get cited in these discussions, especially the women working in materialism, science/gender studies, queer ecology, environmental humanities, etc.) especially exemplifies this “tender” attention to and care of all of the “items” of the world. Any enlargement of our capacity to think about the agential, signaling, and other capacities of as many items/objects/persons, etc. of this world represents, in my mind, an enlargement, and not a shrinking, of our ethical attention. It’s asking for a richer, thicker ontology, which gives is more to be responsible for (after all, that’s partly where the specialness of humans comes in), but also: more to enjoy. It seems to me that the sort of ethico-political vision that Joy here proposes has two faces. On the one hand, there is that face directed towards our contatus, our endeavor to persist in our being and flourish. **Recognizing our interconnection with nonhuman things** and our impact on nonhuman things **is** not simply some hippy-dippy thesis that “we’re one with the universe”. No. It is a matter of self-interest. It’s the **recognition that** 1) **we are dependent on this ecosystem to flourish,** 2) **that these relations** upon which we are dependent are fragile and **can be broken, and** 3) that these **things can also exercise oppressive power over us**, undermining our ability to flourish or live well. As Spinoza saw, **we always act with other bodies**. Some of these bodies enhance our power of acting, while others diminish it. By and large, **ethical thought has been blind to** our **relations with nonhumans, focusing only on** questions of **how we should treat and live with other humans. Yet** this completely obscures our real ethical circumstances or conditions. Today, more than ever, **our collective survival depends on broadening the domain of what counts as sites of political and ethical concern**, and that means taking into account our relationship to nonhumans.

Focusing on hyperobjects is more practical than pure critique and discourse-focus for achieving actual change.

**Bryant 12** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

Here I’m also inclined to say that we need to be clear about system references in our political theorizing and action. We think a lot about the content of our political theorizing and positions, but I don’t think we think a lot about how our political theories are supposed to actually act in the world. As a result, **much contemporary leftist** political **theory** ends up in a performative contradiction. It claims, following Marx, that it’s aim is not to represent the world but to change it, yet it **never escapes** the burrows of academic **journals, conferences, and presses** to actually do so. Like the Rat-Man’s obsessional neurosis where his actions in returning the glasses were actually designed to fail, there seems to be a built in tendency in these forms of theorization to unconsciously organize their own failure. And here I can’t resist suggesting that this comes as no surprise given that, in Lacanian terms, the left is the position of the hysteric and as such has “a desire for an unsatisfied desire”. In such circumstances the worst thing consists in getting what you want. **We on the left need to** traverse our fantasy so as to avoid this sterile and self-defeating repetition; and this entails **shift**ing **from** the position of political **critique** (hysterical protest), **to** political **construction– actually** envisioning and **building alternatives.** So what’s the issue with system-reference? The great autopoietic sociological systems theorist, Niklas Luhmann, makes this point nicely. For Luhmann, there are intra-systemic references and inter-systemic references. Intra-systemic references refer to processes that are strictly for the sake of reproducing or maintaining the system in question. Take the example of a cell. A cell, for-itself, is not for anything beyond itself. The processes that take place within the cell are simply for continuing the existence of the cell across time. While the cell might certainly emit various chemicals and hormones as a result of these processes, from its own intra-systemic perspective, it is not for the sake of affecting these other cells with those hormones. They’re simply by-products. Capitalism or economy is similar. Capitalists talk a good game about benefiting the rest of the world through the technologies they produce, the medicines they create (though usually it’s government and universities that invent these medicines), the jobs they create, etc., but really the sole aim of any corporation is identical to that of a cell: to endure through time or reproduce itself through the production of capital. This production of capital is not for anything and does not refer to anything outside itself. These operations of capital production are intra-systemic. By contrast, inter-systemic operations would refer to something outside the system and its auto-reproduction. They would be for something else. Luhmann argues that every autopoietic system has this sort of intra-systemic dimension. Autopoietic systems are, above all, organized around maintaining themselves or enduring. This raises serious questions about academic political theory. **Academia** is an autopoietic system. As an autopoietic system, it **aims to** endure, **reproduce itself**, etc. It must engage in operations or procedures from moment to moment to do so. These operations consist in the production of students that eventually become scholars or professors, the writing of articles, the giving of conferences, the production of books and classes, etc. All of these are operations through which the academic system maintains itself across time. The horrifying consequence of this is that the reasons we might give for why we do what we do might (and often) have little to do with what’s actually taking place in system continuance. We say that our articles are designed to demolish capital, inequality, sexism, homophobia, climate disaster, etc., but if we look at how this system actually functions we suspect that the references here are only intra-systemic, that they are only addressing the choir or other academics, that they are only about maintaining that system, and that they never proliferate through the broader world. Indeed, our very style is often a big fuck you to the rest of the world as it requires expert knowledge to be comprehended, thereby insuring that it can have no impact on broader collectives to produce change. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that our talk about changing the world is a sort of alibi, a sort of rationalization, for a very different set of operations that are taking place. Just as the capitalist says he’s trying to benefit the world, the academic tries to say he’s trying to change the world when all he’s really doing is maintaining a particular operationally closed autopoietic system. How to break this closure is a key question for any truly engaged political theory. And part of breaking that closure will entail eating some humble pie. Adam Kotsko wrote a wonderful and hilarious post on the absurdities of some political theorizing and its self-importance today. We’ve failed horribly with university politics and defending the humanities, yet in our holier-than-thou attitudes we call for a direct move to communism. Perhaps we need to reflect a bit on ourselves and our strategies and what political theory should be about. Setting all this aside, I think there’s a danger in Wark’s claims about abstraction (though I think he’s asking the right sort of question). The danger in treating hyperobjects like capitalism as being everywhere and nowhere is that our ability to act becomes paralyzed. As a materialist, I’m committed to the thesis that everything is ultimately material and requires some sort of material embodiment. If that’s true, it follows that there are points of purchase on every object, even where that object is a hyperobject. This is why, **given the current** form that power takes or the **age of hyperobjects, I believe that forms of theory such as** new materialism, **object-oriented ontology**, and actor-network theory **are more important than ever** (clearly the Whiteheadians are out as they see everything as internally related, as an organism, and therefore have no way of theorizing change and political engagement; they’re quasi-Hegelian, justifying even the discord in the world as a part of “god’s” selection and harmonization of intensities). The important thing to remember is that **hyperobjects** like capitalism **are unable to function without a material base**. They require highways, shipping routes, trains and railroads, fiber optic cables for communication, and a host of other things besides. Without what Shannon Mattern calls “infrastructure”, it’s impossible for this particular hyperobject exists. Every hyperobject requires its arteries. Information, markets, trade, require the paths along which they travel and capitalism as we know it today would not be possible without its paths. The problem with **so much political theory** today is that it **focuses on** the semiosphere in the form of **ideologies, discourses,** narratives, **laws, etc., ignoring** the **arteries required for** the semiosphere to exercise its **power**. For example, we get OWS standing in front of Wall Street protesting– engaging in a speech act –yet **one wonders if speech is an adequate way of addressing the** sort of **system** we exist in. Returning to system’s theory, **is** the system of **capital based on individual decisions of** bankers and **CEO’s, or does the system** itself **have its own cognition**, it’s own mode of action, **that they’re** ineluctably **trapped in? Isn’t** there a sort of **humanist prejudice embodied in this form of political engagement?** It has value in that it might create larger collectives of people to fight these intelligent aliens that live amongst us (markets, corporations, etc), but it doesn’t address these aliens themselves because it doesn’t even acknowledge their existence. What we need is a politics adequate to hyperobjects, and that is above all a politics that targets arteries. OOO, new materialism, and actor-network theory are often criticized for being “apolitical” by people who are fascinated with political declarations, who are obsessed with showing that your papers are in order, that you’ve chosen the right team, and that see critique and protest as the real mode of political engagement. But it is not clear what difference these theorists are making and how they are escaping intra-systemic self-reference and auto-reproduction. But the message of these orientations is “to the things themselves!”, “to the assemblages themselves!” “Quit your macho blather about where you stand, and actually map power and how it exercises itself!” And **part of this re-orientation of politics**, if it exists, **consists in rendering deconstruction** far **more concrete. Deconstruction would no longer show merely the leaks in a**ny **system** and its diacritical oppositions**, it would go to the things themselves.** What does that mean? It means that **deconstruction would practice onto-cartography or identify** the **arteries** by which capitalism perpetuates itself and find ways to block them. **You want to topple the 1%** and get their attention**? Don’t stand in front of Wall Street and bitch at bankers** and brokers**, occupy a highway**. Hack a satellite and shut down communications. Block a port. Erase data banks, etc. Block the arteries; **block the paths that this hyperobject requires to sustain itself**. This is the only way you will tilt the hands of power and create bargaining power with government organs of capital and corporations. You have to hit them where they live, in their arteries. Did anyone ever change their diet without being told that they would die? Your critique is an important and indispensable step, but if you really wish to produce change you need to find ways to create heart attacks and aneurysms. Short of that, your activity is just masturbation. But this requires coming to discern where the arteries are and doing a little less critique of cultural artifacts and ideologies. Yet choose your targets carefully. The problem with the Seattle protests was that they chose idiotic targets and simply acted on impotent rage. A window is not an artery. It doesn’t organize a flow of communication and capital. It’s the arteries that you need to locate. I guess this post will get Homeland Security after me.

## Theory Preempts

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat advocacy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism.

**Nelson 8** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

1. **Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR time skew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot at substance.

(b) no-risk theory gives him a free source of no-risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

Reject the argument theory also triggers the RVI. It still causes a time skew and allows him to moot the AC at no risk to him.

2. Debating about the PP is key to topic education.

**Schettler and Raffensperger 4** write[[9]](#footnote-9)

**Proof is a value-laden concept that integrates** statistics, **empirical observation, inference**, research design **and research** agendas **in**to **a political** and social **context.** This section discusses the uses and misuses of some of the criteria commonly used to establish proof. Strict criteria may be useful for establishing “facts”, but by the time a fact or causal relationship has been established by rigorous standards of proof, considerable avoidable harm may already have occurred. The effects of lead exposure on children’s brain development or asbestos on lung cancer risk are examples. In each case, people were damaged over many decades, long after substantial evidence of serious health effects was established, while lead and asbestos advocates contested epidemiological “proof” of causation. **Guided by the p**recautionary **p**rinciple**, people are** as **concerned with** the weight of the available evidence as they are with establishing facts by **rigorous standards of proof**. The weight of the evidence can guide preventive action, whereas waiting for proof may allow damage to occur. By convention, a considerable amount of consistent evidence is necessary to establish factual “proof” of a cause-and-effect relationship. Traditionally, in a study of the relationship between two variables, a correlation is said to be statistically significant only if the results show the two to be linked, 5. Why is a precautionary approach needed? 71 independent of other factors, with greater than 95% likelihood that the positive results of the study did not occur by chance. But correlation does not establish causation. In epidemiology, a series of additional criteria, for example, those of Hill (1965), are usually added before causation can be claimed. Hill criteria include not only establishment of a statistically significant correlation between two variables but also require that the causal variable precede the effect, a dose–response relationship, elimination of sources of bias and confounding, coherence with other studies and understanding of a plausible biological mechanism. Tobacco smoking, for example, was known to be associated with lung cancer for more than 50 years before a plausible biological mechanism was finally described. At that point, denying that tobacco “causes” cancer became impossible. People’s adherence to conventions or choices among criteria expresses their willingness to make type I or type II errors. A type I error is the mistake of concluding that an association or phenomenon exists when, in truth, it does not. Conversely, a type II error is the mistake of failing to recognize an association or phenomenon when it does exist. Each kind of error has consequences. Type II errors may, for example, lead people to allow a harmful activity to go forward and are the inevitable result of a consistent bias towards avoiding type I errors. Type I errors will result in invalid concerns about a product or activity and may lead to unnecessary restrictions. Establishing type I and type II error rates is a choice that reflects certain biases and is largely done by convention, often without considering the consequences. For example, by convention, interpretations of scientific data generally favour type II over type I errors. People generally require strong evidence that something is scientifically “true” before being willing to say so. An historical basis for error bias **A general theme that has gained currency** in many countries **is that people** are autonomous individuals who **are free** to live as they wish and **do as they want, provided that they do not cause harm to others.** This concept has set up a tension between the individual and society at large in terms of establishing the limits of tolerance and defining harm. In On Liberty, first published in 1859, John Stuart Mill (1978 (1859)) explored the nature and limits of power that can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. He concluded that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his or her will, is to prevent harm to others. Mill was concerned that, in a democratic society, the majority would set the limits to tolerance – that the majority would interfere with the creative individual’s inclination to invent and develop and to explore new frontiers. He also worried that the majority would go so far as to define “harm”, using inappropriate assertions of “harm” as a blockade to progress. In short, he feared the “tyranny of the majority” and their inclination to favour the status quo. **This** tension **is at the heart of many of today’s policy debates.** Not only must harm be defined but **people** also **have to decide how to act** or how to legitimately exercise power **when** the probability of harm (**risk**) **is uncertain**. Though decisions must be based on what is known at the time, **if “proof”** of harm **is required before** limiting an activity or **choosing an alternative**, as Mill would have, **there is a risk of failing to prevent harm**. Seeing how Mill’s fears are reflected in today’s policies in many countries throughout the world is easy. In general, the burden of proof of harm falls on the general public or individuals who assert that another party has injured them. High standards of “proof” add to this burden, even when the weight of the evidence suggests that harm has occurred or is likely. In other words, a **bias towards type II errors** – established by convention in interpreting scientific data – **has** also **crept into** social, political and judicial **policy. Asking whether such a bias is appropriate for preventing harm** or for choosing among optional human activities **is fully legitimate**. Further, it may be legitimately ask how such a bias is likely to influence the ways that human activities alter complex ecological systems that define the world to be left to future generations **– a consideration at the core of sustainability.**

Topic education comes first. It has an out of round impact.

**Babb 14** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

**We’re actually not all that committed to environmentalism** Though it’s fundamentally beyond the scope of this small contribution, there’s probably something to be said about our underlying attitudes toward the environment. Whether we admit it or not, **we are children of a** very **developed world**. We enjoy the products of environmentally-tainted production on a daily basis. **Our economy and freedom of movement are premised on** a series of **planet-dirtying practices**. On some level, **that has to affect our willingness to tell the story of environmentalism**, to re-issue the edicts that publicly temper our very real commitments to development. We’re all aware of what’s happening to the environment, but we’re only sometimes willing to do very much about it. The difference between the Right and Left on this point is far more a function of ideology than output. Despite the stark disagreements between the two sides, **there remains** a **near**ly **universal unwillingness to seriously alter** our **daily routines** on behalf of the environment. What little we do is often done for us by corporations steered by consumer choice. Indeed, the most effort we typically exert on behalf of the environment is choosing one brand over another. **So** maybe **it shouldn’t be** all that **surprising that debaters are choosing strategy over the environment. The topic has given** our community **a ready-made soapbox for** the **reaffirmation of the environmentalist creed.**

3. Err aff on theory because of time skew. This also means presume aff if presumption matters. If the theory debate takes more than six minutes to evaluate, vote aff since I had to overcome structural skews so the round was close.

4. Aff should defend a principle, not a particular EP policy. This is the most accurate interp of the topic.

**Nebel 14** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

I hear that many affirmatives on this topic defend the implementation of a particular policy or set of policies in developing countries. The classic framing of this issue has been in terms of an Aims vs. Implementation dichotomy, which has carried over from the Jan/Feb 2013 topic about valuing rehabilitation above retribution. In this article, I’ll explain why I think that is a false dichotomy, and how you can strategically get past this framing of the issue. The most important word in the resolution, for the purposes of this disagreement, is ‘prioritize.’ This is because a topical affirmative advocacy has to do the thing that the resolution says ought to be done. In this case, that’s prioritization. Now, if you just stop there, you might have the following thought: if a topical advocacy just needs to prioritize environmental protection (EP) over resource extraction (RE), then implementing some particular policy that prioritizes EP over RE is, ceteris paribus, topical. But that’s not a good inference. The reason is that what has to do the prioritizing in order to be topical is the agent. Your advocacy must be that the agent prioritize EP over RE, whatever that means. In this case, that agent is ‘developing countries.’ **Just because an agent implements some policy** or set of policies that prioritize EP over RE **does not mean that the agent** itself **prioritizes EP over RE**. This may seem like a picky distinction, but consider some examples. **Suppose I chose to spend time with my friends tonight, rather than work on a paper**. This choice might prioritize friendship over work. But this choice does not make it the case that I prioritize friendship over work. **I might actually** be the kind of person who **prioritize**s **work over friendship, so that I almost always choose to write a paper** when I could instead hang out with friends**, but this** night **is the rare opportunity when I hang out with my friends**. So, just because some choice or action prioritizes one thing over another does not entail that the agent prioritizes one thing over another. If we assume that an advocacy is topical only if it makes it the case that the agent does what the resolution says it ought to do, then this means that implementing a particular policy that prioritizes EP over RE is not enough to be topical. (That is, absent evidence about this policy having the effect of changing developing countries’ priorities as a whole. But then this advocacy might only be effects-topical.) People might respond with a definition of EP or RE in terms of policies. This definition might show that the objects to be prioritized are sets of policies, or some common feature of policies, rather than an abstract aim. But the relevant question is not Aims vs. Implementation: that framing of the topic only persists because of Jan/Feb 2013, on which people defined 'rehabilitation' and 'retribution' as either an aim or a kind of policy. But Aims vs. Implementation is not the correct contrast. The correct contrasts are Aims vs. Policies, and Prioritization vs. Implementation. The point is that prioritizing some kind of policy is not the same as implementing some policy from that set. Aims vs. Policies is a matter of the direct object, whereas Prioritization vs. Implementation is a matter of the verb. **We can agree that EP and RE are sets** or kinds **of policies, but** think **that the resolution is about which we ought to prioritize, not** which we ought to **implement**. However, this does not mean that the anti-policy side completely wins. People who wish to defend an anti-policy interpretation often make their interpretations too strong, by **suggesting** that **no questions of implementation are relevant**. That **seems** to me **false**. To see why, consider a variation on my earlier example about hanging out with my friends or writing a paper. Suppose I used to prioritize work over friendship, but I now prioritize friendship over work. It seems that I am now more likely to spend time with my friends, when this trades off with writing a paper, than I used to be. This is because **an agent’s priorities shape her decisions**. They don’t guarantee that an agent will always choose any particular action that better reflects those priorities. But they will lead to different patterns of actions on the whole. If this is right, then **the most accurate Aims-based interp**retation of the topic **allows that the aff**irmative **advocacy leads to** the **implementation of policies that prioritize EP over RE as an effect**, although the affirmative can’t advocate any particular policy. Implementation of particular policies is an effect, which can be used to garner advantages or disadvantages, but cannot be the affirmative advocacy. And any particular effect of that kind can only be known with some uncertain probability; it cannot be assumed to occur as a matter of fiat.

5. Gutcheck against dumb theory. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory, killing substantive education. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates and checking the judge’s paradigm before the round means you won’t get screwed on theory.

6. Wiki solves predictability. It’s the TOC. I’ve been reading PP for four months, so you should have cards by now.

1. Levi Bryant (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, he coined the term “object-oriented ontology” in 2009). “The Ontic Principle: Outline of an Object-Oriented Ontology.” The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman. 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Levi Bryant (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, he coined the term “object-oriented ontology” in 2009). “The Ontic Principle: Outline of an Object-Oriented Ontology.” The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman. 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Levi Bryant (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, he coined the term “object-oriented ontology” in 2009). “The Ontic Principle: The Fundamental Principle of Any Future Object-Oriented Philosophy.” Larval Subjects. January 9th, 2009. http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2009/01/09/the-ontic-principle-the-fundamental-principle-of-any-future-object-oriented-philosophy/ [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Timothy Morton (Rita Shea Guffey Chair of English at Rice University). “Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World.” Pgs. 27 and 28. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Timothy Morton (Rita Shea Guffey Chair of English at Rice University). “Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World.” Pgs. 27 and 28. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Levi Bryant (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, he coined the term “object-oriented ontology” in 2009). “Flat Ontology/Flat Ethics.” Larval Subjects. June 1st, 2012. http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/06/01/flat-ontologyflat-ethics/ [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Levi Bryant (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College). “McKenzie Wark: How Do You Occupy an Abstraction?” 2012. http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/mckenzie-wark-how-do-you-occupy-an-abstraction/ [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Adam F. Nelson, J.D.1. Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate. 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Ted Schettler (SEHN's Science Director, received his MD from Case-Western Reserve University and a masters degree in public health from the Harvard School of Public Health. He practiced medicine for many years in New England.Ted has worked extensively with community groups and non-governmental organizations throughout the US and internationally, addressing many aspects of human health and the environment. He has served on advisory committees of the US EPA and National Academy of Sciences.) and Carolyn Raffensperger (executive director of the Science and Environmental Health Network. In 1982 she left a career as an archaeologist in the desert Southwest to join the environmental movement. She first worked for the Sierra Club where she addressed an array of environmental issues, including forest management, river protection, pesticide pollutants, and disposal of radioactive waste. She began working for SEHN in December 1994. As an environmental lawyer she specializes in the fundamental changes in law and policy necessary for the protection and restoration of public health and the environment). “Why is a precautionary approach needed?” The precautionary principle: protecting public health, the environment and the future of our children. WHO. 2004. http://www.euro.who.int/\_\_data/assets/pdf\_file/0003/91173/E83079.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Stephen Babb (cares about the environment a lot). “What Happened to Environmentalism Impacts?” Victory Briefs. January 17th, 2014. http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2014/1/what-happened-to-environmentalism-impacts [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Jake Nebel (TOC semifinalist in 2009, philosophy student at Oxford, winner of the Marshall Scholarship from Princeton University). “Topicality, Implementation, and What We Ought To Prioritize.” January 28th, 2014. http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2014/1/topicality-implementation-and-what-we-ought-to-prioritize [↑](#footnote-ref-11)