## 1NC

### K

#### The 1AC’s version of feminism is built upon the tacit absence and explicit exclusion of trans people—this masks the violence of transphobia and transmisogyny

**Cowan 14**

T.L. Cowan (writer, performer, activist and professor of media studies at the University of Toronto, Scarborough). “Transfeminist Kill/Joys: Rage, Love, and Reparative Performance.” TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 4, November 2014.

This essay considers an affective trope that I have come to recognize as “the transfeminist kill/joy”: a set of proliferating dialectics expressed as the rage1 that comes into being through living the violent effects of transphobia and transmisogyny and the practice of transformational love as a struggle for existence.2 While the transfeminist kill/joy might certainly be understood as a politicized aesthetic and form of social action that extends well beyond (cis)gender feminist politics and social life,3 here I read for the poetics of killing trans-absent or transexcluding feminist joy. In this discussion of recent transfeminist critical creative work, I trace how the transfeminist kill/joy works both to spoil feelings of political and social well-being or pleasure that are contingent upon the tacit absence or explicit exclusion of trans women in feminist conceptual and physical spaces and to restructure, claim, and repair feminist happiness through what Chela Sandoval (2000: 180) has called “a hermeneutics of love.” In my framing of the “transfeminist kill/joy,” I hope to signal, as does Sara Ahmed (2010) in her original framing of the feminist killjoy, that the mere presence or arrival of perceived difference can be understood as “threaten[ing] the social bond” (68) within privileged feminist scenarios.4 While Ahmed frames the killing of feminist joy (67) mostly in terms of women of color in white feminist spaces, and certainly racism and transphobia and trans-misogyny are not interchangeable,5 I suggest that trans-absent or trans-excluding feminist political and social scenarios can be understood to experience a similar threat to the “organic enjoyment and solidarity” (67) of the (perceived homogeneity of the) group when forced to deal with the presence or proximity of trans women, since this arrival “exposes not only the unreliableness of the body as a source of their identities and politics, but also the fallacy of women’s universal experiences and oppressions” (Koyama 2006: 704). Put in the terms of Ahmed’s earlier work (2006), the transfeminist kill/joy is an assemblage of affects that reorients feminist happiness toward rather than against trans women,6 and uses anger and love to resist a feminism designed exclusively for non-trans women, not necessarily feminism by all non-trans women.7 Central to my exploration of the transfeminist kill/joy are the following questions: How do I (or can I) inhabit a transfeminist criticality without falling into the patriarchal trap of “recycling the most threadbare of cliche´s: the angry, man-hating lesbian” (Salamon 2008: 125)?8 Is it possible to inscribe the trope of the transfeminist kill/joy without reinscribing the trope of the straw feminist as demonic other? Rather than holding steady in a paranoid position, assured that “no time could be too early for having-already-known, for its having alreadybeen-inevitable, that something bad would happen” (Sedgwick 2003: 132), can this essay, along with the work of the kill/joys I study here, imagine a different inevitability, a reparative temporality constituted by the hopeful inevitability of love? The texts and performances that I think about here—Ryka Aoki’s short story “To the New World”; Mirha-Soleil Ross’s one-woman show, Yapping Out Loud: Contagious Thought from an Unrepentant Whore; and the collaborative Fully Functional Cabaret with Star Amerasu, Ryka Aoki, Annie Danger, Red Durkin, Bryn Kelly, and Shawna Virago—foreground potentiality in the forms of rage and love, recalcitrance and hope, and resist what Eve Sedgwick called “paranoid reading,” in favor of what I am calling “reparative performances” that “succeed in extracting sustenance from the object of a culture—even of a culture whose avowed desire has often been not to sustain them” (Sedgwick 2003: 149). They live in the mobile tension between kill and joy: between the rhetorical, economic, and physical violences and killing logics of coercive gender norms in mainstream US and Canadian cultures and the exclusions and attacks practiced by some feminist communities against trans people, and against trans women especially, and the willfully resistant joy, thrill, love, and hope offered by transfeminist aesthetics, politics, and knowledge production, which make new cultures and sustain living through experiments in polemical sociality.9

#### Pronouns link—the Ahmed evidence says that “One feminist project could be to give the killjoy back *her* voice”—this pronoun choice perpetuates the structural violence and erasure of non-binary trans folk—the affirmative’s decision to refrain from using the singular “they” is a marker of privilege—changing our language is the first step toward a radical shift in gender culture

**Shlasko 15**

Davey Shlasko (Davey has been writing and teaching about social justice issues since 2000, and is author of the Trans Ally Workbook). “How Using ‘They’ As A Singular Pronoun Can Change The World.” Feministing. February 5th, 2013. <http://feministing.com/2015/02/03/how-using-they-as-a-singular-pronoun-can-change-the-world/>

Hopefully, by now you know that calling people the pronouns they want to be called is a basic and necessary way to demonstrate respect for their identities. This includes learning to use non-binary pronouns, such as singular “they.” But using singular they is far more than a way to respect friends who have gender identities outside the binary. Singular they has exciting potential to be part of a radical shift in the dominant gender culture. Changing the culture may seem like a mighty task for one little pronoun. But actually, it wouldn’t be the first time that a pronoun was near the center of a momentous cultural shift. Cartoon drawing of 3 people in conversation - one says 'He was saying that too!' and another looks down and away. First, a quick review on singular they, for those who need to get caught up: Some people who fall under the broad definition of trans have gender identities other than man or woman. People describe these identities as non-binary, genderqueer, non-gendered, gender-fluid, and many other terms — some recently coined, and some stemming from long-standing traditions in various cultures from around the world. Some (not all) people who experience our genders in these ways ask people to avoid binary gendered language when referring to us, including the third-person pronouns “he” and “she.” To replace “he” and “she,” people have coined a variety of new pronouns. These haven’t caught on much outside queer spaces, for reasons that linguists can explain better than I can. Other people use “they” as a gender-neutral singular alternative, and this has proved comparatively easy for trans allies to respect. Of course, some people still struggle with using they as a singular pronoun, or simply refuse to do it. One of the main excuses that people give for not using singular they, even when someone has specifically asked to be called that, is that it is “grammatically incorrect.” This belief comes less from a nuanced understanding of grammar than from a felt sense that one is doing something wrong by using singular they. As someone told me recently, “It sounds like nails on a chalk board.” image of a blue shirt with a name tag reading 'Hello, my pronouns are they/the,/theirs' Singular they might sound “wrong” because many of us were taught, corrected, and even disciplined in school to stop us from using they as a singular. Our teachers had to go to a lot of trouble to teach us this, because otherwise, we would have used singular they all the time — because despite being frowned upon by so many middle school teachers, it is actually a totally normal thing to do in standard English. Since long before it started being adopted by trans communities, people have used singular they to refer to a hypothetical person whose gender is unknown. It’s especially common in reference to a noun that is syntactically singular but logically plural, like “someone,” “anyone,” and “whoever.” We say things like, “Someone left their umbrella in the meeting room.” We could say, “Someone left his or her umbrella,” but using “their” is more common, easier to understand, and not wrong. Published examples of this usage abound, from as early as Chaucer through the present day. The rule against using singular they is enforced neither because it preserves some consistent, objective grammatical standard, nor because it serves our communication needs. It is enforced because enforcing language norms is a way of enforcing power structures. Our pronoun problem isn’t just about gender — it’s about power. Practically everybody uses singular they in informal settings. (I’ve even heard people use it unconsciously while explaining to me why they refuse to use it.) The skill of avoiding it in formal settings is both a marker of privilege and provides access to further privilege. It’s a marker of privilege because people learn it in school. Knowing the rule requires a level of access to formal education. Caring about the rule requires finding school safe, welcoming, and relevant enough to sustain one’s engagement. Both factors are unevenly distributed across differences of race, class, queerness, dis/ability and so on. Following the rule provides access to further privilege because those who know to avoid singular they in formal situations come across as proper and educated, and stand to benefit from being perceived that way. The rule functions to differentiate those who follow the rule from those who don’t; those with greater privilege from those with less — in other words, to reproduce power differences. So if you object to singular they on the basis of its correctness, you’re not only dropping the ball on an important trans ally behavior; you’re also supporting a language and power system that you probably don’t agree with. There’s also another, more specific sense in which our pronoun problem is actually a power problem. It’s not only the way the rule is enforced, but also how gendered pronouns work to begin with, that supports oppressive power structures. People with non-binary gender identities continually face situations in which someone feels “forced,” by the language norms they’ve internalized, to call us either he or she — even if they’re not sure which one is right, and sometimes even if they have been told that neither is right. These moments, which seem to be about grammar rules, highlight a gender rule that doesn’t work for us: the rule that everyone must be either a he or a she, a man or a woman; that there are no non-binary genders. Avoiding singular they when talking about someone who has asked to be called “they” contributes to the erasure and delegitimization of non-binary identities, and implicitly supports the physical, emotional, and structural violence that faces too many of us too much of the time. The good news is, singular they is not only coming into more common use but also has the potential to help shift the harmful power structure of binary gender. To explain, it helps to go back to another time when what was considered standard usage for pronouns changed — and it had to do with power then, too. Today, “you” is both a plural and a singular. Originally it was plural (the singular form was “thee”). Beginning in the 16th century, “you” was also used for singular-formal address, when speaking to someone with high social status (i.e., royalty and nobility). Gradually, singular use of “you” expanded, first to any time a speaker addressed someone of higher status than themselves, and then to any situation in which the speaker wanted to flatter or show respect for the person they were addressing. “Thee” gradually fell out of use until it was heard mostly in intimate settings, such as among family members, and in situations of obvious hierarchy, such as a wealthy employer speaking to their servant. To call a stranger “thee” became an insult, because it implied they were of lower status than the speaker. The difference between “you” and “thee” was one of class status. One’s decision to say “you” or “thee” in a given situation had real consequences in terms of status and power. It could highlight and reproduce a status difference and power-over relationship, or it could downplay a status difference and create a tone of equality. One driving force behind the drift from using “you” only for royal/noble address to using “you” for any respectful address was the relatively stable and powerful middle class in England at the time. Merchants and professionals increasingly saw themselves as entitled to respect of a kind that only the ruling class had previously been afforded. Using “you” with each other was a way to manifest that respect. Eventually, “you” became the only second person pronoun in general use. As a result of this shift, the expression of class hierarchy in language became less mandatory. It became possible to construct a normal-sounding and easily understood sentence without knowing the status of the person one was addressing. The shift in language both resulted from and contributed to the shifting class structure. We can use pronouns to shift the gender structure, too. Using singular they means we can construct a normal-sounding and easily understood sentence without knowing or announcing the gender of the person we’re speaking about. We can talk about gender diversity in all its nonbinary complexity, without constantly contradicting ourselves by using binary gendered pronouns. So go ahead — use they. At the least, you won’t be an asshole to your genderqueer friends. At most, we might just change the world.

#### The alternative is to affirm revolutionary forms of joy by centering trans affect.

#### The affirmative’s exclusion of trans affect has material consequences—it is imperative to kill the joy of white feminists as well as white cis dudes—the method of the transfeminist kill/joy accesses revolutionary forms of happiness which the affirmative’s blanket refusal of joy cannot encapsulate

**Cowan 14**

T.L. Cowan (writer, performer, activist and professor of media studies at the University of Toronto, Scarborough). “Transfeminist Kill/Joys: Rage, Love, and Reparative Performance.” TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 4, November 2014.

Yapping Out Loud highlights the ways that abolitionist/savior feminist and religious-based organizations get precedence in the fight for the decriminalization of sex work.16 It also unsettles the (moral) certainty of abolitionist feminism through the spoofing of feminist zealots and by foregrounding trans and sex-worker love as a sustaining reality—an inconceivable (or inconvenient) reality in the righteous savior imaginary. In a monologue by “Mirha-Soleil Ross” midway through the performance, Ross speaks with tenderness and compassion about her clients and turns the tables on abolitionist feminists, whose lack of tenderness and compassion are the subtext of Yapping: “For the most part, it is their courage to see me, a transsexual woman, again and again, because yes, in this culture, it takes courage for a man to get so close, so intimate with an individual whom a large portion of the population considers a freak” (Ross 2002b: 15). This transfeminist kill/joy affect might be understood as a trans (re)structuring or disorienting affect, as it holds antitrans and anti-sex-work feminists accountable for the violences and lack of love of their politics, while offering a repaired love as a model of transformative resistance and demanding that audiences feel implicated in this tension and feel the potential of rage and love not as irreducible affects but as a full politics. Koyama (2006: 702) notes, “It is not the lack of knowledge or information that keeps oppression going; it is the lack of feminist compassion, conscience and principle.” And in her exploration of transformational feminism, bell hooks (1989: 26; emphasis added) writes, “In reconceptualizing and reformulating strategies for future feminist movements, we need to concentrate on the politicization of love, not just in the context of talking about victimization in intimate relationships, but in a critical discussion where love can be understood as a powerful force that challenges and resists domination. As we work to be loving, to create a culture that celebrates life, that makes love possible, we move against dehumanization, against domination.” The kill/joy affect of Yapping Out Loud offers an opportunity to politicize love and joy, to politicize jouissance, as a critical framework and methodology. As Chela Sandoval (2000: 140) argues, taking up Roland Barthes, “The act of falling in love can thus function as a ‘punctum,’ that which breaks through social narratives to permit a bleeding, meanings unanchored and moving away from their traditional moorings.” We can “understand ‘love’ as a hermeneutic, as a set of practices and procedures that can transit all citizen-subjects, regardless of social class, toward a differential mode of consciousness and its accompanying technologies of method and social movement” (139); love is a methodology through which we become that “drifting being . . . where political weapons of consciousness are available in a constant tumult of possibility” (140). As an expression of love and pleasure, Sandoval reinscribes jouissance as a political position: “It is coming to a utopian nonsite, a no-place where everything is possible—but only in exchange for the pain of crossing” (140). Ross’s Yapping Out Loud performs this pain of crossing, reveals the political damages of denied love, and unanchors the possibility for love and pleasure as a social-justice methodology. Stryker has emphasized the importance of understanding transgender studies as knowledge production, and I want to make a connection here between Stryker’s vision and Audre Lorde’s (1984: 53) understanding of love, joy, and the erotic as knowledge production, as a “source of power and information within our lives,” and anger, which she figured similarly as “loaded with information and energy” (127).17 Stryker (2006: 8–9) writes, “Epistemological concerns lie at the heart of transgender critique, and motivate a great deal of the transgender struggle for social justice. Transgender phenomena, in short, point the way to a different understanding of how bodies mean, how representation works, and what counts as legitimate knowledge. These philosophical issues have material consequences for the quality of transgender lives.” The dialectical structure of transfeminist kill/joy scenarios that call out the ways in which we “participate, knowingly or otherwise, in [our] sister’s oppression” (Lorde 1984: 128) and acknowledge anger, love, joy, and the erotic as transformative sources/sites of power and knowledge, creates the possibility for change and reminds us that we are not stuck in current conditions.18 Significantly, these transfeminist moments of joy are not examples of what Ahmed (2010: 84) would call the obscuring act of taking cover “by looking on the bright side . . . to avoid what might threaten the world as it is,” but rather, this is love as resistance tactic, performing the powerful material consequences of loving trans women.

#### Thinking about gender through the lens of alterity is essential for the academy—centering trans affect is key to a better epistemology through which to understand women’s issues—that means the alt solves the case

**Drabinski 11**

Kate Drabinski (Lecturer of Gender and Women’s Studies, and she is also the Director of the Women Involved in Learning and Leadership (WILL) program, a co-curricular program and Living-Learning community sponsored by GWST. She received her Ph.D. in Rhetoric with a graduate certificate in Gender, Women, and Sexuality Studies from the University of California, Berkeley in 2006). “Identity Matters: Teaching Transgender in the Women’s Studies Classroom.” Radical Teacher 92, Winter 2011.

Talking Transgender The readings I assign aim explicitly **to center alterity as key to thinking about gender**, and yet reading alone is not enough to break students from the gender dichotomy that is so natural to so many of us. How do we get students to see beyond this easy dichotomy in a way they can get in their guts? I organize my class discussions to **get students to feel gender**. I begin by asking students to tell me how they know if someone is male or female. The answers are usually slow in coming, as students seem to think it is a rather silly question. We all know what makes a boy a boy and a girl a girl, or so they think, and the first answers are usually related to body parts: breasts, vaginas, penises, and the occasional Adam's apple. I point out that we are not usually privy to the privates of our acquaintances, **and yet we still think we always know.** I point out that gender is also in our names (I review enrollments before each semester, and I am usually fairly certain how many men versus how many women I will have in class), how we sit in seats in public (I model this by sitting "like a girl," legs crossed, upright, and then "like a boy," splayed out, taking up a lot of space), what happens to our voices when we give answers in class (women students often have that questioning lilt at the end of each statement), and the list goes on: what we wear, the bags we carry, what razors we use and where on our bodies we use them, what kind of car we drive, what movies we are supposed to want to watch, the games we play-and watch-in our free time, and on and on and on. My goal with this opening exercise is to get students to see that gender is not only more than what we assume to be "real" biological sex, but that **it is all-pervasive, shaping our experiences of ourselves** down to our very bodily comportment, each other in our relationships, **and the social and political world**. I make this point by showing my students the difference in how women and men tend to sit on public transportation, an example most students can relate to. I sit upright with my arms pulled in and my legs crossed tight, and then I make that gendered switch, slumping down, opening my legs, taking up space. I am just sitting here, but **in my sitting, I am doing gender**. This exercise always gets a laugh because the difference is immediately recognizable, though for most students, it is not something they have articulated before. I ask students if they fully identify with everything on one or the other list of male/female attributes, and invariably they do not. They look around the room and see women slumped down and spread out, women with short hair, men with purses at their feet, and they see in a real way that when it comes to gender, everybody is doing it, but nobody is doing it exactly "right." I want students to see immediately that for all of us, there is a gap between gender ideals and the realities of our lived experiences. This sets the students up to better understand Stryker's claims in their next reading that rather than thinking in terms of transgender people, we would do well to think in terms of transgender phenomena as practices and acts rather than identities. Stryker defines transgender phenomena as any practice or act that steps outside the boundaries of gender normativity as against an understanding of transgender as a contemporary practice of identity. Stryker's theoretical intervention widens not only the scope of transgender issues, but also the category of gender; as she writes, "**transgender makes the category of woman more interesting**" (83). Such various acts as women wearing bloomers and riding bicycles to playing sports to men wearing makeup and dancing freely can all be considered part of the transgender spectrum. I teach students to think about transgender issues in these terms precisely to move away from the "special guest" paradigm and **to center transgender issues, experiences, and history** in a discussion of gender that is both deeply personal and entirely structural. Although this approach helps center rather than marginalize transgender issues, it risks reaffirming gender as a natural category of identity that is open to free choice; I can choose to wear a skirt or pants, and it is this choice that determines whether or not I am subject to violent gender discipline or not. Students regularly make choices about whether to shave or not, to dress up or not, to wear makeup or not, and I do not want to level out those experiences with the experiences of transpeople for whom choice simply does not have the same meaning. In order to do this, I next focus my students on gender not as an attribute of identity-though it certainly is that-but as **a structural category that can be removed from the human body altogether and that moves through social life as a tool of normativity**. For most students, this is a terrifically radical move. For them, as, I would argue, for most people, gender is something taken for granted as a natural part of the self. It is one of the first things we notice about people we meet, but we hardly ever notice that we are noticing it until we are forced to by either our own experience of an incongruity between the gender we are told we are and how we think about ourselves, or by meeting someone whose looking. Part of being intelligible to ourselves and to others is to be intelligible in terms of gender, and as a result, gender has become completely and utterly naturalized; that does not mean, however, that gender is natural.

### Case

#### Group the case—

#### 1. The aff is a double turn—a true killjoy would not read theory pre-empts which pander to white cis men who read T—by asserting that the aff is “fair,” they have not truly killed the joy of debate

#### 2. Black feminism DA—the affirmative gives you the impression that they disrupt anti-blackness, but this is only because their Ahmed evidence claims to provide a space for black feminism—I have two indicts to this method

#### Black feminism allows white women to claim the microphone--when black women seek political and economic justice, white women want to talk about personal identity—the 1AC is proof of the co-option and distancing tactics of white feminism

**Patricia Hill Collins 96**

What's in a name? Womanism, black feminism, and beyond. By: Collins, Patricia Hill, Black Scholar, 00064246, Winter/Spring96, Vol. 26, Issue 1

SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES accompany the use of the term "black feminism." One involves the problem of balancing the genuine concerns of black women against continual pressures to absorb and recast such interests within white feminist frameworks. For example, ensuring political rights and economic development via collective action to change social institutions remains a strong focal point in the feminism of African American women and women of color. Yet the emphasis on themes such as personal identity, understanding "difference," deconstructing women's multiple selves, and the simplistic model of the political expressed through the slogan the "personal is political," that currently permeate North American white women's feminism in the academy can work to sap black feminism of its critical edge. Efforts of contemporary black women thinkers to explicate a long-standing black women's intellectual tradition bearing the label "black feminism" can attract the attention of white women armed with a different feminist agenda. Issues raised by black women not seen as explicitly "feminist" ones, primarily issues that affect only women, receive much less sanction. In a sense, the constant drumbeat of having to support white women in their efforts to foster an anti-racist feminism that allows black women access to the global network of women's activism diverts black women's energy away from addressing social issues facing African American communities. Because black feminism appears to be so well-received by white women, in the context of dichotomous racial politics of the United States, some black women quite rightfully suspect its motives.

#### 3. Western privilege DA—Ahmed’s account of happiness relies on a Western binary framework—their method can only be accessed by people who *already have privilege*

**Angela 10**

University of Minnesota, "Class Reflection 4/28: The Feminist Killjoy," <http://blog.lib.umn.edu/puot0002/8190/2010/05/class-reflection-428-the-feminist-killjoy.html>

This thought lead Shannon to ask about the place that naïveté, knowledge, and ignorance play in the feminist killjoy. If we take Ahmed's definition of the feminist killjoy to be someone who interrupts a moment of uncritical acceptance/performance of a socially constructed notion of "happiness," Shannon, Becky, Sophie and Raechel want us to link this to the idea that "ignorance is bliss" and that the feminist killjoy is ending a privileged kind of naïveté. Like she has in many other discussions, Sophie then asked us to address the theoretical definition of the terms we were using and the terms the theorist was interrogating. For Sophie, and I agree with her, Ahmed was working with "happiness" in a very binary framework throughout the "Killing Joy" piece. In Sophie's understanding of it, the happiness Ahmed was speaking of was a very particular heteronormative, socially validated, happiness, and asking feminists to embrace the opposite, not the "unhappy" but the "non- happy." I believe we all agreed that Ahmed was indeed speaking of this particular kind of happiness, and felt equally troubled by the seemingly binary depiction of happy and non happy that were positioned as options. For Sophie this is nothing new, and for Sara it is a direct response to the growing, but undeniable Aristotelian, discourse on our pursuit of happiness. This lead to me to express my frustration with the Western framework that Ahmed was using. Certainly, she was answering to a specific genealogy of thought, and we cannot fault her from not referencing another framework, but I agree with Sophie in that none of this is new. In fact, her entire argument and call for the significance of the feminist killjoy, is what Buddhist/Eastern philosophy understands as The Middle Path, The EightFold Path, The Four Noble Truths, and essentially the circle of Nirvana and Namsara. I will spare you all my crazy connections here, but its real. lol. Raechel turned our conversation to the other Ahmed article we read and the idea of unhappiness in terms of a queer politics. After Elizabeth's anecdote about her sister's wedding we discussed how this script of happiness pervades everything, and how queers do or do not interrupt that script. Raechel (brilliantly, I think) connected this to "Judy B's" ideas of intelligibility and livability. I asked us to also think about "non-happiness" in terms of "being beside oneself". Although these connections and questions were raised we really didn't go much farther into this, other than saying that we wished both JB and Ahmed did more to connect theory to practicality. I am certain we could have gone on and on about the theoretical overlap and difference here, but we got distracted with our plans to get " I <3 JB" and "WWJBD" tattoos. (Which should really happen, BTW). Sara cleverly pivoted our tattoo aspirations into a discussion of her dissertation project on virtue ethnics. Becky proclaimed that in light of this conversation the "whole order of things" needs to shift, (how we understand the purpose of life, happiness, etc) asking, "how we got here" as a culture. And I again expressed my frustration that Ahmed was presenting these thoughts as something new, when these exactly conceptions and questions have been being asked (and answered) in the "east" for thousands of years. You all know how I am. Sophie wondered if this entire conversation was misguided to begin with, because really no one is actually happy. We all thought a moment about this, and seemed to agree but continued the dicussion unwaveringly. Raechel then raised questions in terms of how privilege is related to the feminist killjoy. Do killjoys have a certain amount of privilege that distances them from the oppression they are invoking and allows them to invoke it? And/or do those whose joy is killed have a certain amount of privilege to allow them to ignore the oppression the killjoy invokes? As always we concluded that the answer is complicated and complex. Our discussion then turned to idea of being a killjoy on accident, simply by existing. We wondered if this was the same kind of killjoy or different in some way than an intentional killing of joy. This brought us around again to intention, because we had yet to decide if feminists were intending to kill joy or trying to do something else. Becky and Sophie began to talk about how guilt was connected to having your joy killed, and Raechel, Sara, and Elizabeth joined the conversation by discussing the productive and/or nonproductive aspects of guilt. Lastly, we returned to my brother's "19 and drunk" humor and how humor can both be killed by feminists and used by feminists to raise consciousness. Although we did not come to many conclusions, our conversation as a whole was quite productive (even with Mr. Roboto, tattoo planning, and references to the Vagina Monologues and Steven Colbert). I think it is safe to say that we understand the feminist killjoy as a troublemaker, if indeed an important and often problematic one. All of us had personal experiences as the feminist killjoy, and our lasting questions seemed to revolve around the lived-reality, and utility of the killjoy and the related state of "non-happiness." I wont speak for the rest of you, but our conversation sparked a number of ideas for me that I plan on exploring futher, in a critically "non-happy" manner.

#### 4. Normalization DA—the feminist killjoy cannot escape the social forces which regulate the “proper” ways of being unhappy—the aff is encoded by the debate norms which they critique

**Lloyd 13**

M.S. Lloyd. “Book Review of Sara Ahmed, The promise of happiness.” Loughborough University. 2013. <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/19673/1/Review%20essay%20-%20The%20Promise%20of%20Happiness.pdf>

Next, one of the most provocative and compelling features of Ahmed’s discussion is her consideration of those social forms (such as family, marriage, whiteness) that have already acquired the status of legitimate or recognised happiness-causes. In Chapter Three, Ahmed offers a reading of the final film in the three-part movie If These Walls Could Talk 2, which tells the tale of two women, Fran and Kal, who want a child together. The thrust of Ahmed’s interpretation is that their desire to have a child to be recognized as a family requires that they must minimize their queerness. In turn, this generates a form of homonormativity based on queer families approximating ‘happy heterosexuality’. This appears to suggest that the family form is irredeemably heterosexual and, as such, cannot be converted or reshaped in any way. What would be required, if this is the case, is its complete rejection and the development of alternative, queer kinship forms. What is not clear is whether, because of its imbrication in narratives of normative gender (the happy housewife and mother) and heterosexuality (happy families), the desire to have children is to be regarded itself as always a problem and whether queer reproductive happiness (assuming such a thing is possible) depends on its utter repudiation, because it purportedly advances social forms ‘in which other queers will not be able to participate’ (112). Or, whether it is possible to desire children in an ‘unhappy’ or a ‘happily queer’ 8 fashion, and, if so, whether such queer reproductive desire is able to avoid generating constraining affective norms of its own; where being ‘happily queer’ means desiring children in an appropriately queer way. Ahmed does not, of course, only contest the privilege given to ‘happiness’, she also actively seeks to champion the political potential inhering in unhappiness and other purportedly negative emotions, most especially the anger of black women (see also Lorde 1984). I am deeply sympathetic to this approach. First, because it requires that we acknowledge what is at stake in the delegitimation of certain affective responses: in what is enabled by dismissing feminists as killjoys or black women as angry or queers as spreading unhappiness. Secondly, and equally importantly, because it works against a recent trend in affect theory that privileges the role of positive sentiments, such as generosity, in advancing political struggles (specifically democratic struggle). It does so by drawing attention to the capacity of negative affects to mobilise action and to drive political demands. Nevertheless, there is a difficulty here if the happiness-unhappiness binary simply posits happiness as problematic, because aligned with oppression and normalisation, and unhappiness as positive, because tied to (the potential for) contestation and freedom. It merely reverses the dualism that Ahmed is justifiably critical of: where happiness is cast as a good feeling that allows for openness to the future, while unhappiness is presented as a bad feeling that consists in an inability to let go of the past. This risks overlooking both the fact that unhappiness itself might be normatively encoded – that there might be right and wrong ways historically of being unhappy – and that there will surely be occasions when collective unhappiness closes down futural possibilities rather than opens them up.

### 2NR AT Perm

#### No permutation—

#### Ahmed’s method relies on a critique of happiness writ large—that precludes revolutionary forms of happiness like trans affect

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Ahmed is surely right that tying happiness to certain forms of behaviour or social institution is normalising (though she tends not to use this word). Indeed, this is one of the most powerful insights of the book. The contention that unhappiness might, nevertheless, be a potential well-spring for challenging the values and orientations that one is expected to conform to is also largely persuasive; that unhappiness or anger might be a catalyst for change rather than affective states that inhibit action as they are so often typified. 7 Nevertheless, there are aspects of Ahmed’s argument that trouble me. First, it is not clear if she is opposed to happiness per se or only to normative happiness. Her argument often appears to incline to the former because of the constant stress that she places on the immanent coerciveness of happiness. If this is her contention, and it is not entirely clear that it is, then it would seem to indicate that any experience of happiness will necessarily be oppressive. By implication, this further suggests that ‘happiness’ as such cannot be transformed in more productive directions and that affect aliens cannot pursue or develop alternative forms of happiness – because happiness itself is the problem. Although Ahmed demonstrates very effectively the deficiencies of ‘normative’ happiness, I am unconvinced it follows that happiness itself as an emotional state has to be construed as inherently inappropriate or in need of renunciation.