I affirm. The ballot in debate is determined relative to who is a better debater which implies the activity is already constrained by an understanding of rules that determine the nature of the activity. As in any competitive activity, the rules would never be changed midway through the game in order to set different criteria to determine the winner. In the NBA Ron Artest would never be able to argue that you get six extra points for elbowing someone in the face because basketball isn’t an activity that prizes fighting. Metta’s argument would only make sense if he proved the nature of basketball was such that fighting was valued. When we attempt to set new rules we must necessarily invoke some higher ideological reason that extends beyond the particular circumstances of the current competitive situation, otherwise we completely invalidate all previous competition such that the winner would be determined by their ability to demonstrate the validity of their arguments in an insular, non-competitive context. This is because rules govern the competitive nature of the activity and without an overarching validity for rules the activity is destroyed and we just do whatever we want in order to win. Debaters must create rules grounded in an understanding of what the activity is instead of in-round abuse because it first has to be proved that avoiding abuse is constitutive of the activity. This means that any negative theory must justify the ideological underpinnings of theory AS A PRACTICE because before we would ascribe value to rules derived from concepts like fairness and education it must be demonstrated that debate is an activity such that those concepts play a role in our understanding of what the activity is. This also means that philosophical claims I make about the world necessarily interact with theory because I posit theory as situated within the context of our world. Thus, if I win that the world is absurd and there is no need for rules, debate would also be an absurd activity because all human action would be meaningless. Additionally, debate is absurd for a variety of other reasons. What happens in round is ultimately transient. Things like fairness and education may provide short-term benefits but if we’re really serious with ourselves, the things debate gives us are not unique to debate nor THAT important. Second, just think about what’s happening: on a Monday morning in Kentucky I’m reading really fast about the way we justify the rules of a high school activity. As super cool as debate is, to ascribe to it the meaning we frequently do and to take it too seriously is ridiculous. This is especially true because…

We’re all going to die. We don’t know what will happen, but we know that it means an end to our natural life. This truth is inescapable. Albert Camus 1 writes [all cards from *The Myth of Sisyphus*, 1941, Ch. 1 “An Absurd Reasoning” except where noted]

**“I come at last to death and to the attitude we have toward it. On this point everything has been said and it is only proper to avoid pathos. Yet one will never be sufficiently surprised that everyone lives as if no one "knew." This is because in reality there is no experience of death. Properly speaking, nothing has been experienced but what has been lived and made conscious. Here, it is barely possible to speak of the experience of others' deaths. It is a substitute, an illusion, and it never quite convinces us. That melancholy convention cannot be persuasive. The horror comes in reality from the mathematical aspect of the event. If time frightens us, this is because it works out the problem and the solution comes afterward. All the pretty speeches about the soul will have their contrary convincingly proved, at least for a time. From this inert body on which a slap makes no mark the soul has disappeared. This elementary and definitive aspect of the adventure constitutes the absurd feeling. Under the fatal lighting of that destiny, its uselessness becomes evident. No code of ethics and no effort[s] are justifiable a priori in the face of the cruel mathematics that command our condition.”**

Death renders the idea that life can have any intrinsic meaning impossible. The world is absurd, because no matter what I do, my life will eventually end. Camus 2

**“Before encountering the absurd, the everyday man lives with aims, a concern for the future or for justification (with regard to whom or what is not the question). He weighs his chances, he counts on "someday," his retirement or the labor of his sons. He still thinks that something in his life can be directed. In truth, he acts as if he were free, even if all the facts make a point of contradicting that liberty. But after the absurd, everything is upset. That idea that "I am," my way of acting as if everything has a meaning (even if, on occasion, I said that nothing has)—all that is given the lie in vertiginous fashion by the absurdity of a possible death. Thinking of the future, establishing aims for oneself, having preferences—all this presupposes a belief in freedom, even if one occasionally ascertains that one doesn't feel it. But at that moment I am well aware that that higher liberty, that freedom to be, which alone can serve as basis for a truth, does not exist. Death is there as the only reality. After death the chips are down.”**

There are two additional warrants for the Absurd. First, it is impossible to truly understand the essence of the world. Camus 3

**“And here are trees and I know their gnarled surface, water and I feel its taste. These scents of grass and stars at night, certain evenings when the heart relaxes—how shall I negate this world whose power and strength I feel? Yet all the knowledge on earth will give me nothing to assure me that this world is mine. You describe it to me and you teach me to classify it. You enumerate its laws and in my thirst for knowledge I admit that they are true. You take apart its mechanism and my hope increases. At the final stage you teach me that this wondrous and multicolored universe can be reduced to the atom and that the atom itself can be reduced to the electron. All this is good and I wait for you to continue. But you tell me of an invisible planetary system in which electrons gravitate around a nucleus. You explain this world to me with an image. I realize then that you have been reduced to poetry: I shall never know. Have I the time to become indignant? You have already changed theories. So that science which was to teach me everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art. What need had I of so many efforts? The soft lines of these hills and the hand of evening on this troubled heart teach me much more. I have returned to my beginning. I realize that if through science I can seize phenomena and enumerate them, I cannot, for all that, apprehend the world. Were I to trace its entire relief with my finger, I should not know any more. And you give me the choice between a description that is sure but that teaches me nothing and hypotheses that claim to teach me but that are not sure. A stranger to myself and to the world, armed solely with a thought that negates itself as soon as it asserts, what is this condition in which I can have peace only by refusing to know and to live, in which the appetite for conquest bumps into walls that defy its assaults? To will is to stir up paradoxes. Everything is ordered in such a way as to bring into being that poisoned peace produced by thoughtlessness, lack of heart, or fatal renunciations.”**

We are trapped in our own subjectivity. Any sort of analysis of the world can never be from an objective perspective, thus the idea of objective meaning doesn’t make sense. This applies to ethical calculation as well. Talking about the subjective experience of another is incoherent because I have access to my own experience of the world only. As a result, no subjective moral calculation can consider the experience of others and it is our own experience of the Absurd only that matters. And, the extraordinary amount of suffering in the world precludes the idea of any meaning to the world. If this is true, this has to be the basis for all our judgments. Camus 4 [*The Rebel*, 1951, part 2, “Metaphysical Rebellion”]

**“Thus God is useless, since He wants nothing in particular. If He wanted something—and here we recognize the traditional formulation of the problem of evil—He would have to assume the responsibility for "a sum total of pain and inconsistency which would debase the entire value of being born." We know that Nietzsche was publicly envious of Stendahl's epigram: "The only excuse for God is that he does not exist." Deprived of the divine will, the world is equally deprived of unity and finality. That is why it is impossible to pass judgment on the world. Any attempt to apply a standard of values to the world leads finally to a slander on life. Judgments are based on what is, with reference to what should be—the kingdom of heaven, eternal concepts, or moral imperatives. But what should be does not exist; and this world cannot be judged in the name of nothing.”**

The standard is thus **consistency with the acknowledgment of absurdity**.

**I contend** that the moral permissibility of deadly force in response to domestic violence is consistent with the acknowledgment of absurdity.

First, if the world is absurd, everything is permitted. Camus 5 [*Myth* Ch. 2, “The Absurd Man]

**“There can be no question of holding forth on ethics. I have seen people behave badly with great morality and I note every day that integrity has no need of rules. There is but one moral code that the absurd [hu]man can accept, the one that is not separated from God: the one that is dictated. But it so happens that he lives outside that God. As for the others (I mean also immoralism), the absurd [hu]man sees nothing in them but justifications and he has nothing to justify. I start out here from the principle of his innocence. That innocence is to be feared. "Everything is permitted," exclaims Ivan Karamazov. That, too, smacks of the absurd. But on condition that it not be taken in a vulgar sense. I don't know whether or not it has been sufficiently pointed out that it is not an outburst of relief or of joy, but rather a bitter acknowledgment of a fact. The certainty of a God giving a meaning to life far surpasses in attractiveness the ability to behave badly with impunity. The choice would not be hard to make. But there is no choice, and that is where the bitterness comes in. The absurd does not liberate; it binds. It does not authorize all actions. "Everything is permitted" does not mean that nothing is forbidden.”**

This last phrase just means that even though all actions are permitted, on an epistemic level we still cannot ignore the absurd and believe in moral codes even if we want to. This means the resolution is necessarily true because everything is morally permissible.

But if for some reason you think that lack of objective ethics doesn’t matter, any subjective ethic consistent with the absurd would permit any action to continue living.

[Camus 6

**“The absurd enlightens me on this point: there is no future. Henceforth this is the reason for my inner freedom. I shall use two comparisons here. Mystics, to begin with, find freedom in giving themselves. By losing themselves in their god, by accepting his rules, they become secretly free. In spontaneously accepted slavery they recover a deeper independence. But what does that freedom mean? It may be said, above all, that they feel free with regard to themselves, and not so much free as liberated. Likewise, completely turned toward death (taken here as the most obvious absurdity), the absurd man feels released from everything outside that passionate attention crystallizing in him. He enjoys a freedom with regard to common rules. It can be seen at this point that the initial themes of existential philosophy keep their entire value. The return to consciousness, the escape from everyday sleep represent the first steps of absurd freedom. But it is existential preaching that is alluded to, and with it that spiritual leap which basically escapes consciousness. In the same way (this is my second comparison) the slaves of antiquity did not belong to themselves. But they knew that freedom which consists in not feeling responsible.2 Death, too, has patrician hands which, while crushing, also liberate. Losing oneself in that bottomless certainty, feeling henceforth sufficiently remote from one's own life to increase it and take a broad view of it—this involves the principle of a liberation. Such new independence has a definite time limit, like any freedom of action. It does not write a check on eternity. But it takes the place of the illusions of freedom, which all stopped with death. The divine availability of the condemned man before whom the prison doors open in a certain early dawn, that unbelievable disinterestedness with regard to everything except for the pure flame of life—it is clear that death and the absurd are here the principles of the only reasonable freedom: that which a human heart can experience and live. This is a second consequence. The absurd man thus catches sight of a burning and frigid, transparent and limited universe in which nothing is possible but everything is given, and beyond which all is collapse and nothingness. He can then decide to accept such a universe and draw from it his strength, his refusal to hope, and the unyielding evidence of a life without consolation.”]**

Because of the absurd, quantity of experience in one’s life matters above anything else. Camus 7 writes

**“But what does life mean in such a universe? Nothing else for the moment but indifference to the future and a desire to use up everything that is given. Belief in the meaning of life always implies a scale of values, a choice, our preferences. Belief in the absurd, according to our definitions, teaches the contrary. But this is worth examining.**

**Knowing whether or not one can live without appeal is all that interests me. I do not want to get out of my depth. This aspect of life being given me, can I adapt myself to it? Now, faced with this particular concern, belief in the absurd is tantamount to substituting the quantity of experiences for the quality. If I convince myself that this life has no other aspect than that of the absurd, if I feel that its whole equilibrium depends on that perpetual opposition between my conscious revolt and the darkness in which it struggles, if I admit that my freedom has no meaning except in relation to its limited fate, then I must say that what counts is not the best living but the most living. It is not up to me to wonder if this is vulgar or revolting, elegant or deplorable. Once and for all, value judgments are discarded here in favor of factual judgments. I have merely to draw the conclusions from what I can see and to risk nothing that is hypothetical. Supposing that living in this way were not honorable, then true propriety would command me to be dishonorable. The most living; in the broadest sense, that rule means nothing. It calls for definition. It seems to begin with the fact that the notion of quantity has not been sufficiently explored. For it can account for a large share of human experience. A man's rule of conduct and his scale of values have no meaning except through the quantity and variety of experiences he has been in a position to accumulate. Now, the conditions of modern life impose on the majority of men the same quantity of experiences and consequently the same profound experience. To be sure, there must also be taken into consideration the individual's spontaneous contribution, the "given" element in him. But I cannot judge of that, and let me repeat that my rule here is to get along with the immediate evidence. I see, then, that the individual character of a common code of ethics lies not so much in the ideal importance of its basic principles as in the norm of an experience that it is possible to measure. To stretch a point somewhat, the Greeks had the code of their leisure just as we have the code of our eight-hour day. But already many men among the most tragic cause us to foresee that a longer experience changes this table of values. They make us imagine that adventurer of the everyday who through mere quantity of experiences would break all records (I am purposely using this sports expression) and would thus win his own code of ethics.3 Yet let's avoid romanticism and just ask ourselves what such an attitude may mean to a man with his mind made up to take up his bet and to observe strictly what he takes to be the rules of the game.”**

That means that striving to live *more* is always permissible. Camus 8

**“Breaking all the records is first and foremost being faced with the world as often as possible. How can that be done without contradictions and without playing on words? For on the one hand the absurd teaches that all experiences are unimportant, and on the other it urges toward the greatest quantity of experiences. How, then, can one fail to do as so many of those men I was speaking of earlier—choose the form of life that brings us the most possible of that human matter, thereby introducing a scale of values that on the other hand one claims to reject? But again it is the absurd and its contradictory life that teaches us. For the mistake is thinking that that quantity of experiences depends on the circumstances of our life when it depends solely on us. Here we have to be over-simple. To two men living the same number of years, the world always provides the same sum of experiences. It is up to us to be conscious of them. Being aware of one's life, one's revolt, one's freedom, and to the maximum, is living, and to the maximum. Where lucidity dominates, the scale of values becomes useless. Let's be even more simple. Let us say that the sole obstacle, the sole deficiency to be made good, is constituted by premature death. Thus it is that no depth, no emotion, no passion, and no sacrifice could render equal in the eyes of the absurd man (even if he wished it so) a conscious life of forty years and a lucidity spread over sixty years. Madness and death are his irreparables. Man does not choose. The absurd and the extra life it involves therefore do not depend on man's will, but on its contrary, which is death. Weighing words carefully, it is altogether a question of luck. One just has to be able to consent to this. There will never be any substitute for twenty years of life and experience.”**

As a result deadly force would always be a permissible response to domestic violence because any action that aims at allowing one to live longer is permissible. There is always a risk that domestic violence will be fatal. Repeated violence very frequently ends in murder. External help is often impossible. Janet Johnson writes [Pace Law Review

Volume 20 Issue 2 Spring 2000 Death by Intimacy: Risk Factors for Domestic Violence Janet A. Johnson Victoria L. Lutz Neil Websdale]

**“Taking multiple domestic homicide cases as a whole, they constitute roughly one-third of all the domestic violence related deaths in the State of Florida.21 This is a very important category of offense. I want to distinguish multiple homicides from single homicides. Let us look for a moment at the background history and the characteristics of these cases as they develop. The idea is to look at the antecedents to the killing. What happened? Not with a view to establishing risk and prediction, be- cause I do not believe that you can predict lethal outcomes. The whole language of prediction to me is problematic. Focusing first on multiple domestic homicides in which the perpetrators were male, we found common themes. We went through these cases; we looked to the homicide file; we inter- viewed people and we compiled information. In forty-seven cases of multiple killings in which the male was the perpetra- tor, there were 104 victims. 22 The first and foremost characteristic of these cases was a history of domestic violence. In all but one of these cases, there was classic woman battering.23 In the one case in which battering did not occur, the children killed their parents.24 In seventy-two percent of the cases that we could identify, there was an escalating history of domestic violence accompanied by a number of important forms of victimization. 25A characteristic of these relationships was that there was increasing entrapment of women, to the point where some women felt un- able to call law enforcement, to resort to the courts or to other sources of assistance such as shelters..”**

Domestic violence poses a clear threat to survivors. If we accept that the world is absurd, then we have no choice but to let themselves prolong their lives by whatever means necessary, even if this means lethal force. And, it’s not necessary to win this card. A right to prolong one’s life means an inalienable right to choose what would prolong it. Garrath Williams concludes [IEP article on Hobbes]

**“The worst that can happen to us is violent death at the hands of others. If we have any rights at all, if (as we might put it) nature has given us any rights whatsoever, then the first is surely this: the right to prevent violent death befalling us. But Hobbes says more than this, and it is this point that makes his argument so powerful. We do not just have a right to ensure our self-preservation: we each have a right *to judge* what will ensure our self-preservation. And this is where Hobbes’s picture of humankind becomes important. Hobbes has given us good reasons to think that human beings rarely judge wisely. Yet in the state of nature no one is in a position to successfully define what is good judgment. If *I judge* that killing you is a sensible or even necessary move to safeguard my life, then – in Hobbes’s state of nature – I have a right to kill you. Others might judge the matter differently, of course. Almost certainly you’ll have quite a different view of things (perhaps you were just stretching your arms, not raising a musket to shoot me). Because we’re all insecure, because trust is more-or-less absent, there’s little chance of our sorting out misunderstandings peacefully, nor can we rely on some (trusted) third party to decide whose judgment is right.”**

This functions as sufficient offense into the Camus cards because it establishes the necessary consequence of the permissibility to pursue life that he describes.

And, if both sides have offense on theory and neither side is winning definitively you must affirm for \_\_ reasons

1) If I go all in on theory due to the time disadvantage, evaluating substance just turns theory into a functional no risk issue if the neg can make the theory debate indecisive.

2) If I am fully mitigating the theory this necessarily means I am the better debater because I am neutralizing more arguments in less time, especially because they had the ability to initiate.

3) This is the only way to give me the benefit of the doubt if I am controlling the links on the abuse story by articulating a better understanding of content in round. There is no way to quantify the strength of the violation of the interp via the standards so default aff if I control the abuse story.

4) The neg is choosing to run theory against me rather than engage the substance of the AC because they just think I am going to win the philosophy debate. Don’t force me to also be a better theory debater- if they evade the philo debate and theory is a tie, affirm.

5) This action sets better norms for the activity because it adds a risk to the theory blip spread. If you run a bunch of theory as a time suck and then muddle with 6 minutes in the 2nr you can always completely destroy my strategy. Vote aff on inconclusive competing theory offense to rectify this problem.

Extension framing: [This all serves as procedural weighing on the theory debate which comes before anything because it functions at the layer that couches our understanding of theory. We will both have partial violations of fairness- now here is how we weigh this.

Don’t take the easy out- the negative is running and muddling theory as a strategic tool. I debated better, I deserve to win.]

And, theory is an RVI for the aff [for 2 reasons]:

( ) When they run theory this becomes a game over issue and the only way for me to establish reciprocity is to make this shell a game over issue for them as well. If I can only win defense off of theory, their strategy becomes a complete time suck, taking up most of my 1ar so I can’t win on substance. I devote a huge amount of time to developing the counter-interp, and as a result I ought to win the round if I am winning the theory debate.

( ) RVIs are key to checking the proliferation of disengagement from substance via theory. This is key to fairness because it horribly skews aff strat if answering theory offers no offensive advantage and key to education because it shifts focus to pointless procedural stuff instead of the topic.

Don’t let them say that RVIs discourage true theory because 1) the claim is non-falsifiable- we don’t know what shells would have been run and 2) would justify straight-up intervention for “true” shells because good theory debaters debating well against them would also discourage bad theory debaters from running them.

Thus, I affirm.

AT PROPORTIONALITY:

Obviously extend Camus 5 arg to show everything permissible- comes before their legal args or whatever. Absurd precludes idea that man-made concepts like legal precepts have value.

Then extend Camus version of self-defense. No constraints at foundational level b/c my life is only thing that matters. Ridiculous to introduce a priori concepts to constrain it. Nothing beyond our experience matters when faced with death.

Extend the Williams card also to show that self-defense can’t be constrained by objective principles because proportionality etc are always third-person judgments but in the real world that can never actually happen in any sort of trusted way.

AT RETARDED EXCUSE ARG

1) I argue that everything is permissible. This isn’t a matter of excusing an action because of something. Camus 5 specifically uses the language of permissibility. My judgment is categorical, not circumstantial.

2) The self-defense arg isn’t an excuse, it’s saying that if anything is good, then defending your life is. It is proactively good to kill people who are threatening your life.