#### 2:00 NC, 2:00 response to util AC

# Framework

Ought means logical description. Four warrants:

1. Grammar of normative statements. Consider “frogs ought to have four legs” This does not say frogs have obligations to have 4 legs or it’d be immoral did they not, just that for an object to be a frog, it must have 4 legs. This usage is the case when ought is preceded by a normative concept, as it describes the features of that concept as a whole. If you show me a frog that lost a leg, it doesn’t change that frogs as a concept still have 4. This means because “just governments” is already normative, the ought implies logical description. This makes sense as if this weren’t true, it’d be nonsense because it’d require a normative concept to do a normative actions, but if a government were already a just government, then it’d already do everything of which is constitutive of a just government.
2. Grammar of ought is used in the past subjunctive, but that tense is used in counterfactual if-clauses: “if Tim wanted cookies, he ought to have baked some.” However the resolution clearly is not of that form. So I outweigh on specificity to the resolution. Don’t let the aff functionally change the resolution, because the only reason I’m not talking about the Royals prolific rise to the world series is that the resolution doesn’t say that.s
3. In order to determine a justification of something, we must first have an understanding of the features of that thing which serve to be justified. If I want to justify baking cookies, I must first know what baking cookies means within the context of a certain circumstance. I see its feature of a tasty treat and I see that I want a tasty treat, so baking cookies is justified. However, justifying baking cookies would be impossible were it the case that I did not know its feature of creating a tasty treat or that I wanted a tasty treat. This is also the only way we can create a normative or moral understanding of the world.

**Macintyre** 81 Alasdair MacIntyre, [After Virtue](http://www.amazon.com/After-Virtue-Study-Moral-Theory/dp/0268035040/), 1981

Yet in fact the alleged unrestrictedly general logical principle on which everything is being made to depend is bogus- and the scholastic tag applies only to Aristotelian syllogisms. There are several types of valid arguments in which some element may appear in a conclusion which is not present in the premises. A.N. Prior’s counter-example to this illustrates its breakdown adequately; **from** the premise **‘He is a** sea **captain’; the conclusion may be** validly **inferred** that ‘**He ought to do whatever a** sea-**captain ought to do’**. This counter-example not only shows that there is no general principle of the type alleged; but **it** itself **shows** what is at least **a grammatical truth—**an ‘is’ premise can on occasion entail an ‘ought’ conclusion. **From** such factual premises as **‘This watch is** grossly **inaccurate** and irregular in time-keeping’ and ‘This watch is too heavy to carry about comfortably’, **the** evaluative **conclusion** validly **follows** that **‘This is a bad watch’.** From such factual premises as ‘He gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any farmer in the district’, ‘He has the most effective programme of soil renewal yet known’ and ‘His dairy herd wins all the first prizes at the agricultural shows’, the evaluative conclusion validly follows that ‘He is a good farmer’. Both of these arguments are valid because of the special character of the concepts of a watch and of a farmer. Such **concepts are functional** concepts; that is to say, **we define** both **‘watch’** and ‘farmer’ **in terms of** purpose of **function** which a watch or a farmer are characteristically expected to serve. It follows that the concept of **a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch** nor the concept of a farmer independently of that of a good farmer; and that the criterion of something’s being a watch and the criterion of something’s being a good watch.

1. Adjudicating between conceptions of desirability and morality requires an appeal to a higher set of ‘desirable’ standards. This necessarily leads to an infinite regress as trying to justify one’s definition of a normative framework would require an appeal to the very assumptions attempting to be validated. Unless one can provide an axiomatic definition of desirability able to logically precede all other definitions, it is impossible to establish a non-arbitrary starting point for ought. However, allowing the addition of assumptions outside of those undergirding our ability to reason or communicate would establish a precedent in which the affirmative could claim that any convenient argument must be treated as a necessary assumption for them to access the resolution, turning the debate into an irresolvable contest of who can make more unfalsefiable claims. This precludes any possible theory standard offered by the affirmative as characterizing warrants as only suggested requirements for argumentative validity nullifies any possible purpose to the ac

Thus, the resolution functionally reads “Ensuring a living wage is a necessary feature of just governments,” and it is the sufficient burden of each debater to prove the resolution true or false. I will accept any other definitions of words that allow me to negate.

# Contentions

To demonstrate its falsity, I offer a counterexample. A counter example is a valid way to disprove a statement because it shows directly the statement is false. For example, the statement “all cars are blue” is proved false by a counterexample of a red car.

Counterexample: there can be a society without a need for living wages. Consider a society composed of people who never had to work or buy things or use money. This society could be perfect in literally every other way—perhaps the people have a magic immortality elixir and didn’t work at all—but affirming would hold that government is still unjust, though were it not for that arbitrary constraint of wages, it would seem to be the best possible society.

The reason these counterexamples work is that a just government is a normative term, knowable a priori. Ensuring wages is however a posteriori as it is contingent factor on the specific society we exist in and the necessity of it. But a priori objects by definition are not affected by a posteriori contingencies. That’s why we can know a priori all bachelors are unmarried, because it is so by definition of bachelor, but the statement “all bachelors are unhappy” is false because the happiness of a bachelor is an a posteriori contingency of his state of affairs.

Similarly there are two different types of descriptions: gradable and nongradable. Cold is gradable because there are varying degrees of temperature, but wooden is nongradable, because something can’t be a bit wooden. A “just society” is a nongradable term because a society is either a just society or not a just society. This means that all effects of living wages are wholly irrelevant in affecting the status.

# Overview to the AC

1. Empirics are irrelevant—Ignore any and all empirics from the AC.

Little a is the resolution’s lack of contextualization means empirics are nonsensical because empirics would only be relevant in the first place if they report on how the contextualized state of affairs actually, historically, or scientifically is. This is why statistics about the 19th century Pakastani death penalty aren’t relevant to a contemporary American debate on the death penalty. Empirics cannot speak to the necessary nature of things.

Little b is taint of injustice. Because each government has done things which are unjust by feature of being run by humans, specifying to real world governments is extratopical. Just governments can only exist in the abstract

# A2 util

1. Regardless if other ethical theories can, util uniquely fails to speak normatively about the world. At most it can only provide reasons you’d want it to be true. Nebel

**Parfit distinguishes between *state-given*and *object-given*reasons. State-given reasons are reasons why one should want to be in some state**, such as believing that *p*, or desiring that *q*. For example, **suppose that I offer you $100 if you believe that the world is flat**, or if you desire your best friend’s suffering. Would that be a reason for you to believe that the world is flat, or to desire your best friend’s suffering? Parfit says No. On his view, **this** kind of consequence **can only be a reason for you to *want*to have that belief** or desire; **but it’s not a reason for you to actually *believe***or *desire*accordingly. He calls those state-given reasons because they are reasons to want to be in some state, which don’t really bear on the object of the state (i.e., whether the world really is flat, or whether it’s actually desirable for your best friend to suffer). I won’t explain his argument for the irrelevance of state-given reasons; you can check out the book in the VB Resources Dropbox, if you’re

1. Ought as obligation in normativity becomes impossible to prove a normative state of affairs. Appeals to consequentialism implies an action ought be taken if it produces a net beneficial end state, but they also require a timeframe. Surgery is generally considered good even though there is a short-term harm because it leads to long term benefits. This means it’s impossible a) to non-arbitrarily determine when an action’s effect has ended and thus evaluate its state of affairs and b) to calculate probabilities and of connected events would be impossible because though nuclear war seems intuitively bad, there’s no way of knowing it won’t cause the rise of cockroach people who resurrect humanity and make life heaven. It’s low probability, but it must be considered. And compound this because each action has infinitely many possible reactions which would continue the cycle. Don’t let aff say that we can approximate the future, because there’s no way to know when to limit the approximation. So instead of the problem being the ideal end state, it’s now the ideal approximation to use, which follows the same infinite regress, because we must calculate to know when to stop calculating.
2. The none-such problem: each type of wellbeing—sleeping, eating ice cookies—is qualitatively different, so we can’t quantify and compare pleasures under consequentialism.
3. Even if we could compare types of pleasures, we definitely couldn’t compare between agents because there’s no way to objectively know how much each pleasure is valuable between agents. He may say somethings are inherently better, like life is better than stubbing a toe but this is unverifiable as we don’t know how each agent evaluates what. I may be living a really crappy life or I may be a masochist. This means actions can affect end states in a totally unknowable way
4. Even if we could compare between agents, there could be one agent who could receive 1 util more than everyone else for every action and not experience diminishing marginal returns. This means that everything would go to him, absurd because even though wellbeing is maximized, all but one are suffering.
5. Even if the util monster were impossible, an infinite world has infinite value, so consequentialism fails to prescribe action. Bostrom[[1]](#footnote-1):

The infinite case is fundamentally different. Suppose the world contains an infinite number of peopleand a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite.Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that **a[n]** canonically **infinite world contains** an **[both] infinite** quantity of **positive**value **and** an infinite quantity of **negative value.**This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. **We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet**in cardinal arithmetic,**adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every** possible **act** of ours **therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad**in a canonically infinite world**: none whatsoever.**Aggregative **consequentialist theories are threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to implythat**if the world is canonically infinite then**it is always ethically indifferent what we do**. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferentwhether we cause another holocaustor prevent one from occurring. If any non‐contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.

# Potential Turns

1. Vacuous truth means you affirm because just because the government doesn’t have, need, or know about ensuring wages doesn’t meant they can’t still require them as a concept. This means that his counterexamples aren’t necessarily unjust because all the wages they ensure are a null set
2. He misrepresents util because it holds some a priori truths from axioms. Util holds saving a life who wants to be saved by taking organs from the deceased is necessarily good because dead people don’t count as agents so only agents directly benefit. It doesn’t matter if family are stressed because that’s a contingent harm from the act of finding out, not of taking the organs.
3. Its semantically meaningless. Our definition of justice could just require organ proreument for an arb reason, hes not definitngn what it is or why its good to be that way

# A2 Ought implies Util/desirability

A is the counterinterp: neither debater may say ought theoretically means util. This means either debater may run ought means logical description, if it is substantially justified

I’ll show offensive reasons to prefer my interp under his shell. Go there now.

First, I meet, because my NC shows what’s desirable, it’s just contextualized that to mean description.

Overview: If I win any of the reasons why ought means logical description then I win the interp debate because it’s obviously bad to require us to debate under an incoherent standard. This also means that his shell was a counterinterp to my interp in the NC that says ought is description. This means if he claims this is a voter, it’s bidirectional

## On Harris

1. Alt cause of using “we ought to treat children kindly” for desirability, because there could other reasons such as a deontic maxim for us to treat them kindly

2. Ought obviously has different contexts, and per the NC the context of the resolution is of logical description. Correct context is key because words only make sense given their context. For example, perm could mean hair styling or doing a plan and a CP, but our context of debate allows us to differentiate.

3. Unverifiable. Harris says we intuitively think ought is max well being, but a) no way to confirm that and b) no impact of intuitive. Arguments must be verifiable to prove things are actually true.

4. ATTACK AUTHOR QUALS—WHO THE FUCK IS HARRIS. SOME DUDE BOB OVARIES LOVES—PROBABLY NOT LEGIT.

## On Text

1. CA my first 2 FW justifications which show text flows neg
2. TURN—the resolution is only coherent under logical description if there’s a normative actor
3. No reason aff gets to define, this would mean he could define anything anyway which kills neg strat bc its inherently unpredictable. No reason he couldn’t say \_\_\_\_ means \_\_\_\_, which is bad. Also turns back his text std bc aff def isn’t necessary meaning of text
4. Empirically denied—your argument is tantamount to saying all non-util affs read in the last 5 years are non-textual, which is absurd.

## On Topic Education

1. TURN—CA my FW justification of \_\_\_\_, this means that aff interp is incoherent. This negates bc if we’re forced to debate under incoherent conceptions of the resolution, our education is being actively harmed
2. TURN—he can only access the benefits of empirics if he beats back the arg that they don’t apply on this topic.
3. TURN—any loss of topic education is more than made up by phil ed bc my def is uniquely investigating the topic at hand. Phil ed is more important than topic ed bc it frames the substance that’s relevant—empirically verified bc it’s why we have values and standards
4. TURN—I increase topic ed by going about the topic in a different manner—no reason why the topic is just about “living wages” and not about the other words in the resolution
5. No abuse—debating substance isn’t necessary for topic ed bc we already got it through our research--reading blocks at each other isn’t where we’re educatd
6. NUQ—there are other rounds and layers of the debate where we have topic education. The strength of link from requiring all debates to be util to topic ed is tiny—he conflates util being one way with it being the only way
7. TURN—requiring all debates to be under util decreases topic ed bc it restricts ed to just one form. We disallow what the deontologists or others what they have to say

## On Exclusion

1. TURN—large schools will have an edge bc a) they’ll have more and better evidence bc they have better access to coaches and journals and b) it makes the round more predictable on terms they already are prepped on, which ensures their prep advantage wins
2. TURN—potential debaters will quit or turn away from debate bc heavy util debates are intimidating, empirically verified bc policy is dying in AZ for this very reason
3. Link defense—lots of other links into exclusion, yours isn’t anywhere close to the biggest one meaning the size of your link is tiny at best

## ON predictability

1. TURN—being harder to understand is better because you have to think critically about it. Ie, in school, we don’t just color, we challenge ourselves. This has the strongest link to education bc you only learn by thinking about new things

## On weighing

1. NonUQ: we can weigh under other standards like stringency of violation of probability of truth
2. No impact—there’s no impact for being able to weigh
3. No abuse—if standards can’t be weighed under, turns just take out the original offense in the first place

## A2 Truth testing bad

1. I meet, we each have a world: yours is where the statement is true, mine is where it’s false. Just because we don’t rely on effects to determine whos world is better doesn’t mean it’s incomparable
2. I meet, my burden isn’t to disprove aff, it’s to prove the statement is false. This proves no abuse bc abuse comes from neg ability to go for skep, but a) that’s not the same as proving false b) I don’t do that and c) if skep is true, you affirm under a vacuous truth
3. [a2 neg has infinite ground]—this is nonsense, even if were an infinite amount of ways to negate, they’re limited by their quality and viability. Consider “all bachelors are unmarried” there are no quality ways to show that’s false. Quality is before quantity bc it doesn’t matter how much I say if it’s gibberish

## A2 clearest way is impacts

1. TURN—clearest way is if someone doesn’t respond to an arg, which is able under my world
2. TURN—clearest way depends on the judge, a deontic judge or a theory hack wouldn’t to resolve a util debate
3. TURN—judge intervention more likely with wieghin bc 2 legit claims for weight is impossible to believe one effectively inherently unless the judge already likes that argument
4. NUQ—debates are bound to get muddled. Empirically verified bc even util heavy debates are intervened against

# A2 Converse theory

A is the counter interp

 On the 2014 Jan-feb topic, so long as the neg has an advocacy, he may choose not to defend the converse of the resolution

I’ll show offensive reasons to prefer my interp under his shell. Go there now.

 [his shell]

1. I meet—I will defend/advocate the converse even if I don’t explicitly mention it, just as an AC plan could defend DA links into the resolution. He should have asked me in CX. Hold him to the text of his advocacy because it codifies his position and prevents a shift. Especially needed on 1ar theory because else he could shift in the 2ar where I cant respond to

Overview:

 If I show substantial turn ground exists, I win the interp debate bc it empirically denies his shell and makes my NC functionally the same as the converse. There are a bunch of turns that he could have made: one he could have said you affirm because if the society doesn’t have or need living wages then it can always be true as a necessary function by null set logic; two he could have said that his AC normatively justifies why just governments a priori need to ensure no poverty for their citizens. Third he could have said “just governments” is knowable not a priori but a posteriori. Four, he could have said that my NC destroys the meaning of words and that justice now just becomes a definition but disassociated from what’s “good”

[line by line]

## On reciprocity

1. No warrant as to why I’m not reciprocal. Don’t accept generic AC args saying that there’s a qualitative difficulty between proving one thing false versus him showing all true because a) that’s completely nonfalsifiable meaning you can’t vote on it because there’s no way to debate it. It’s why we don’t debate whether God exists or not. B) turn: showing the statement true is easier, all the possible turns in the overview show why.
2. It doesn’t matter if I had the choice to advocate the converse and also not the converse because a) I only can choose one so it is 1:1 and b) it doesn’t matter because he can run and practice the same AC every round and be prepped on extending and applying that
3. Reject his link into fairness, he’s not doing enough work on it. Just because something is reciprocal doesn’t mean it’s fair and just because I’m unreciprocal doesn’t mean I’m unfair, ie, he argued presume aff/we have a different amount of speeches.
4. Specifically my NC wasn’t unreciprocal as to beat me he could either beat back my framing of ought OR win the caselevel.

## On time skew,

1. NonUnique—Optimizing time tradeoffs is key to strat. Good arguments are those which take more time to respond to than to make. This means even if neg has to converse, then there’s still time skew. Group with predictability as good args are those which are less predictable
2. No Brightline—He never showed how much time I skewed or how much is necessary to trigger a voter, is one second enough? One minute? Also no brightline to know when something is predictable. Without a brightline you can’t vote on it because it’d set an impossible burden on me if I could never know before I argued what is abusive.
3. Quality time isn’t necessarily skewed because he doesn’t have to collapse on my NC substance if he doesn’t want to. This means there are other avenues for him to have outs
4. Turn: he could have just conceded my framing and then gone 4min in the 1ar for turns. This maximizes the value of his time and means I can’t nullify his 1ar because it’s the only thing left

## On predictability

1. It’s nonfalsifiable because I don’t know what cases he’s seen or what people have told him. He could just be lazy and not want to clash. CA why you can’t vote on what’s nonfalsifiable
2. No brightline: there’s no possible way to determine the edge of predictability or even quantify it. Crossapply why you can’t vote on something without a brightline.
3. Wiki disclosure checks. My case is up there, don’t punish me if he doesn’t take a minute and see what’s on my page.
4. Turn: if I am less predictable, the education is improved because he can’t just read the same blocks, he’ll actually have to think about what’s going on. Strongest link into education because by discussing we have to be active and only can we be sure to have understood it

Underview:

1. Ground—little a is quality: the neg having to defend the converse of the resolution isn’t as viable on this topic because util substantively flows aff because probably preventing poverty is a huge deal. This means regardless of whether converse is good in general, on this topic the neg would uniquely have worse ground.

Little b is quantity: neg inability to advocate anything but the converse kills most of neg ground in general because it’d mean stock positions like Deon, DAs, or Ks are excluded because they’d only show the aff is worse, and kills neg ground specifically on this topic because the core of neg topic lit is rejecting harms associated with the policy shift of presuming consent. This means I turn back topic lit because his interp kills neg access to lit and I check predictability because if there’s research supporting me it’s reasonable to expect. Ground is the first link to fairness because it’s axiomatically the foundation for debate, it’s where every argument stems from. Key to education since our ability to critically argue and develop presupposes the access of ground to do so.

1. Breadth—Allowing me to negate without the converse increases discussion, because the neg is able to introduce various philosophical concerns that may not necessarily be functional under the converse. This allows us to discuss more concepts such as theories on truth rather than just if something is true or not. This means I also link to phil ed because the breadth allows greater phil discussion.This increases education because people are exposed to new concepts that wouldn’t come up if only I could defend the converse, and fairness because it allows the aff the ability to collapse on more issues in his next speech.

Attach an RVI because if I show my interp is better for debate, the semantic distinction between a counter interp and interp is meaningless. This is just like if he ran a K but I turned the impact, then you’d vote for me. RVIs just allow for offense on the highest level of the debate—it’d be ridiculous if he tried to claim that I couldn’t turn his case. I don’t win because I am fair, I win because I have stronger offense.

# A2 NIBs Bad

I meet.

1. My NC standard holds its sufficient for him to prove the statement true, it’s sufficient for me to prove the statement false
2. If I show substantial turn ground exists, I win the interp debate bc it empirically denies his shell, ie, there’s turn ground, so it’s sufficient for both of us. There are a bunch of turns that he could have made: one he could have said you affirm because if the society doesn’t have or need living wages then it can always be true as a necessary function by null set logic; two he could have said that his AC normatively justifies why just governments a priori need to ensure no poverty for their citizens. Third he could have said “just governments” is knowable not a priori but a posteriori. Four, he could have said that my NC destroys the meaning of words and that justice now just becomes a definition but disassociated from what’s “good”
1. Bostrom, Nick [Professor at University of Oxford, director of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, PhD from London School of Economics]. *The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics*. 2008. <http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)