# Cripplestan 1AC

#### If there was a country called disabled,

#### I would be from there.

#### I live disabled culture,

#### eat disabled food,

#### make disabled love,

#### cry disabled tears,

#### climb disabled mountains and

#### tell disabled stories.

#### If there was a country called disabled,

#### I would say she has immigrants that come to her

#### From as far back as time remembers.

#### If there was a country called disabled,

#### Then I am one of its citizens.

#### I came there at age 8. I tried to leave.

#### Was encouraged by doctors to leave.

#### I tried to surgically remove myself from

#### disabled country but found myself,

#### in the end,

#### staying and living there.

#### If there was a country called disabled,

#### I would always have to remind myself

#### that I came from there.

#### I often want to forget.

#### I would have to remember…

#### to remember.

#### In my life’s journey

#### I am making myself

#### At home in my country.[[1]](#footnote-1)

#### The political realm is not a safe space for crips, its inherent focus on the public sphere dooms us to be excluded from the discussion, Hedva [[2]](#footnote-2)16,

In late 2014, I was sick with a chronic condition that, about every 12 to 18 months, gets bad enough to render me, for about five months each time, unable to walk, drive, do my job, sometimes speak or understand language, take a bath without assistance, and leave the bed. This particular flare coincided with the Black Lives Matter protests, which I would have attended unremittingly, had I been able to. I live one block away from MacArthur Park in Los Angeles, a predominantly Latino neighborhood and one colloquially understood to be the place where many immigrants begin their American lives. The park, then, is not surprisingly one of the most active places of protest in the city. I listened to the sounds of the marches as they drifted up to my window. Attached to the bed, I rose up my sick woman fist, in solidarity. I started to think about what modes of protest are afforded to sick people – it seemed to me that many for whom Black Lives Matter is especially in service, might not be able to be present for the marches because they were imprisoned by a job, the threat of being fired from their job if they marched, or literal incarceration, and of course the threat of violence and police brutality – but also because of illness or disability, or because they were caring for someone with an illness or disability. I thought of all the other invisible bodies, with their fists up, tucked away and out of sight. If we take Hannah Arendt’s definition of the political – which is still one of the most dominant in mainstream discourse – as being any action that is performed in public, we must contend with the implications of what that excludes. If being present in public is what is required to be political, then whole swathes [portions] of the population can be deemed a-political – simply because they are not physically able to get their bodies into the street. In my graduate program, Arendt was a kind of god, and so I was trained to think that her definition of the political was radically liberating. Of course, I can see that it was, in its own way, in its time (the late 1950s): in one fell swoop she got rid of the need for infrastructures of law, the democratic process of voting, the reliance on individuals who’ve accumulated the power to affect policy – she got rid of the need for policy at all. All of these had been required for an action to be considered political and visible as such. No, Arendt said, just get your body into the street, and bam: political. There are two failures here, though. The first is her reliance on a “public” – which requires a private, a binary between visible and invisible space. This meant that whatever takes place in private is not political. So, you can beat your wife in private and it doesn’t matter, for instance. You can send private emails containing racial slurs, but since they weren’t “meant for the public,” you are somehow not racist. Arendt was worried that if everything can be considered political, then nothing will be, which is why she divided the space into one that is political and one that is not. But for the sake of this anxiety, she chose to sacrifice whole groups of people, to continue to banish them to invisibility and political irrelevance. She chose to keep them out of the public sphere. I’m not the first to take Arendt to task for this. The failure of Arendt’s political was immediately exposed in the civil rights activism and feminism of the 1960s and 70s. “The personal is political” can also be read as saying “the private is political.” Because of course, everything you do in private is political: who you have sex with, how long your showers are, if you have access to clean water for a shower at all, and so on. There is another problem too. As Judith Butler put it in her 2015 lecture, “Vulnerability and Resistance,” Arendt failed to account for who is allowed in to the public space, of who’s in charge of the public. Or, more specifically, who’s in charge of who gets in. Butler says that there is always one thing true about a public demonstration: the police are already there, or they are coming. This resonates with frightening force when considering the context of Black Lives Matter. The inevitability of violence at a demonstration – especially a demonstration that emerged to insist upon the importance of bodies who’ve been violently un-cared for – ensures that a certain amount of people won’t, because they can’t, show up. Couple this with physical and mental illnesses and disabilities that keep people in bed and at home, and we must contend with the fact that many whom these protests are for, are not able to participate in them – which means they are not able to be visible as political activists.

#### Politics coopts our identities, reducing crips to failures, claiming our bodies betray us and we are meant to be excluded from the passing of time and engagement, Ramirez [[3]](#footnote-3)15,

To me, such comments are illustrative of how a certain normative standard of temporality is so consistently invoked, rendered so commonplace, that it is beyond noticeability or scrutiny. Unless we’re confronted with clear, visible instances of a bifurcated futurity in youth—say, someone with a terminable health condition—we generally go about our day with unquestioned and prefabricated assumptions about how human life should unfold across our linear version of time. There are, of course, obvious exceptions and counterarguments, such as that neither youth nor old age are the same for everyone, across all geographical and cultural contexts. We see instances of how standardized periodizations of age are called into question, for example, when examining the culturally divergent definitions of ‘adulthood’—of what it constitutes and when it starts—or the social construction of adolescence. But the dominant time and age-related assumptions are nevertheless there, codified into our social institutions and reproduced in our colloquial expectations. Although we are conditioned into thinking of it as an absolute and natural given, a mere backdrop against which social events unfold, I would agree with others that time, like space, is socially constructed. We’ve made decisions on how to read it–say, along axes of terrestrial movements using a sexagesimal system and a Gregorian calendar—and how such time is to be “spent” (an allusion to the naturalized connection between productivity, consumption, and time). Histories are made and remade, and our relationship to them shapes our sense of the future as well as our identities and experiences in the present. And as with other facets of our social existence, the political economy has been instrumental to the ways we conceptualize time, humanity, and the trajectories of life. It’s worth remembering that the production of our first time-telling instruments was driven, in large part, by the needs of agricultural production. The advent of capitalism accelerated the changes as efficiency, productivity, and time became especially intertwined—a fact that was well noted by the so-called founders of sociology, particularly Marx, Weber, and Simmel. I bring up this social history to highlight the seemingly arbitrary nature of how we temporalize life into discrete parameters and periodizations that are far from “natural.” Capitalist time has performed an incredible feat in measuring [measured] virtually everything against time-based markers of efficiency, a fact seen most cruelly today in the way neoliberal logic uses quantifiable metrics to convert schools into test-taking factories, bodies into malleable overtime engines, and brains into calculating computers. Even in our dominant allopathic healthcare, the logic of capitalist time is used in the treatment of bodies as machines, with an increasing trend toward “specialization” turning organs or bodily systems into isolatable cogs and pinwheels. For people with disabilities or chronic conditions, such parsing of time under this logic continually works against us as our bodies are said to “betray” us. We internalize the idea of failure when we can’t all measure up to the same standards of productivity and efficiency, and rather than devoting our limited energies to living life within a still-enriching range of possibilities, we are punished through de facto institutions of punishment and control: incarceration, hospitalization, or a regulatory “welfare” and its inordinate criteria of eligibility. (Those institutions, as it turns out, have their own alternate temporalities that involve “checking out” from the typical spatial and temporal conditions of the working masses.) That said, when speaking of the ways in which time doesn’t “work in my favor,” I speak of the perverse ways in which social institutions and everyday expectations of normalized life trajectories make it difficult to live life with my particular set of abilities, skills, and interests. Being coerced into making decisions that align with certain pre-planned futurities, I find it difficult to peg any decisions around future-bounded notions of “climbing the ladder” or “starting the journey” of a career—not to mention those temporalized notions of partner-finding and family-making—when I can’t even be certain of my ability to wake up or pull myself out of bed the next morning. Living with a degenerative condition, I exist in a much different temporality marked by daily, sometimes hourly, unpredictabilities–a temporality that relates unevenly with the presumed “willing and able” logic of long-term work projects or social expectations. Given the nature of the condition, I’m unlikely to see the sort of “rewards,” like certain job opportunities or social accomplishments, that capitalist time tells us to wait for. Sure, we can talk about how such “uncertainty” is true for all of us, that we can all get struck by a bus tomorrow. But with a disabling chronic condition, those questions of the future are always weighted against the very real possibilities of a changing body in an unaccommodating world. Although I have dreams for the future like everyone else, when I’m reminded of how my in-pained present was the future at one point, I’m also reminded that the future is far from being a limitless or delayable abstraction. Indeed, it is this tendency toward ‘delay’ that permeates our social life that I see as pivotally hinged to the logic of capitalist time. We justify excessive and exploitative work conditions in the present using obscure promises based on ‘delayed’ rewards and ambiguous futures. (“Don’t worry, you continue working this hard, and you’ll get there.”) We ‘delay’ our attention to issues like climate change or death-promoting destruction in the global south, pointing to all the work that needs to be done before we get to those luxurious issues. If we only had all the time in the world, we would provide that helping hand.

#### And put away your T arguments, the political subject is always by an assumed “able body”. Liberal theory naturalizes ability as an inherent feature of democracy and inevitably excludes crips, Breckenridge and Volger [[4]](#footnote-4)11,

Disability studies teaches that an assumed able body is crucial to the smooth operation of traditional theories of democracy, citizenship, subjectivity, beauty, and capital. By assuming that the normative human is an able-bodied adult, for example, liberal theory can conflate political or economic interests with desires, political representation with having a voice in policy-making, social organization with voluntary association, and so on. Liberal theory naturalizes the political by making it personal. And the “person” at the center of the traditional liberal theory is not simply an individual locus of subjectivity (however psychologically fragmented, incoherent, or troubled). He is an able-bodied locus of subjectivity, one whose unskilled labor may be substituted freely for the labor of other such individuals, one who can imagine himself largely self-sufficient because almost everything conspires to help him take his enabling body for granted (even when he is scrambling for the means of subsistence). However, the mere possibility of a severely cognitively disabled adult citizen disrupts the liberal equations of representation and voice, desire and interest. Advocacy for the severely cognitively disabled is not a matter of voicing their demands. More generally, the intricate practical dialectics of dependence and independence in the lives of many disabled people unsettle ideals of social organization as freely chosen expressions of mutual desire.

#### Thus our advocacy is that Cripplestan takes an imaginative act and bans the private ownership of handguns

#### We need to crip politics and disrupt the very foundations of democracy. Utopian theorization of imaginative acts is key. Only imagining utopian worlds free of ableism can upheave the very roots of the political’s exclusion of crips, Campbell [[5]](#footnote-5)12,

Difference can be a vexed issue even within modern liberal societies. The tendency for many people is still to emulate or at least appear to refashion normative ways of being. Much of the intellectual traffic for the rethinking of disability in terms of anti-sociality has emerged through debates about the merits of social inclusion and liberal notions of equality and resilience strategies to break the abled stranglehold. Legal theorists like Ruth Colker who argues that anti-subordination rather than integration should be the measure of equality are the exception (Colker, 2006). There is limited work within disability studies, especially in approaches influenced by the social model of disability or social role valorisation theory, that take a trans-integration or post-normalisation perspective. What if we turned our backs on ‘fitting in’ – what would be the opportunities, the consequences and maybe dangers, to give ‘attention to the lived intricacies of embodiment offer[ing] alternatives to normalization efforts aimed at homogenizing social outsiders (Snyder & Fiona Kumari Campbell 223 Mitchell, 2010, 113)’? For this imaginative undertaking it is necessary to turn to the theoretical work by other ‘outsider’ groups – queer theorists. Spearheading the critique of the ‘different but same’ stance of social justice formulations are ‘anti-social’ queer theorists (Bersani, 1986, 1996; Edelman, 2004; Halberstam, 2005, 2008; Muñoz, 2007). This section will outline some of the conceptual drivers of the anti-social argument and their adoption for developing an anti-sociality posture of disability. Leo Bersani’s seminal work (1986, 1996) formulated an anti-social, negative and anti-relational theory of sexuality. These works along with the writings of Edelman (2004), Halberstam (2005, 2008) and Muñoz (2007) set the stage for the decoupling of queer marginality from the liberal projects of tolerance and social inclusion. Before moving into a consideration of how certain conceptual renderings may be applied to the disability situation, it is useful to familiarise ourselves with how the neologism queer is understood by anti-social theorists. Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive does not indicate the parameters of queer, but concludes that ‘queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one’ (2004: 17). Queer, while originating from the purview of diverse sexualities, easily extends to other kindred forms of ontological and corporeal aberrancies and ambiguities (such as disability). So it is right for Halberstam (2005: 6) to embrace a more elastic connotation of queer which refers to ‘non-normative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment and activity in space and time’. From this reckoning, the disabled person is already queered. Queer, then is antitheoretical to the regime of ableist translation. In a world that makes claims to integrity using the argument based on equality as sameness (we are normal, we are everyday people), it would seem a bit bold or offensive to suggest that people with disability are different from the run-of-mill ableist norm emulators. Ahmed (2006) points to an alternate prism, a ‘migrant orientation’ to capture a disorientation faced by queer folk which I extend to include disabled people. The disorientation, a form of radical estrangement propels a lived experience of facing at least two directions: towards a home that has been lost (the desire to emulate ableist norms), and to a place that is not yet home. Regimes of ableism have produced a depth of disability negation that reaches into the caverns of collective subjectivity to the extent that disability negativity is seen as a ‘naturalized’ reaction to an aberration. Not negating queerness or disability can cultivate alternate kinds of liberty that de-identify with the rhetoric of social inclusion. A key marker of the anti-social turn is temporality – contemporarity and futurity – an explication of the current marginal stance and the vision for future. It is this orientation of predicament and utopianism that can speak to the disability realm. For disability, utopianism is a conflicted zone – there is no future existence, disability dreaming is expunged and the utopian drive is a device for promise (of curability), hence extinction of the impairment state. Jose Esteban Muñoz (2007: 453) in speculating about the absence a queer imagination elicits a desire to engage in a queer horizon, a utopian hermeneutics where re-imagining futurity requires that ‘the not quite conscious is the realm of potentiality that must be called upon’. The distance between imagination and potentiality means that ‘queerness is not quite here’. Our imaginations are not yet exhausted. Muñoz explains: to argue that we are not quite queer yet, that queerness, what we will know as queerness, does not yet exist. I suggest that holding queerness, in a sort of ontologically humble state, under a conceptual grid wherein we do not claim to always already know queerness in the world, potentially staves off the ossifying effects of neoliberal ideology. (Muñoz, 2007: 454) How does an alternative horizon for disabled people come to be formulated? Living in the now and not yet, as outsiders, not quite inside, requires a disposition or habit of contemporariness. Contemporariness signifies a relationship with the present but also a distance, a critical space from it. As Agamben explains: Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. They are in this sense irrelevant [inattuale]. But precisely because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own time. (2009: 40) Disabled people are called to live as contemporaries. The queering or cripping of contemporariness is the grasping and holding tight to ambivalence and obscurity so fundamental to the alternate lifestyle which is obtained through fixing the gaze not on our era’s light but the underbelly, or in Agamben’s language ‘darkness’ – which shines into the staree. In this sense, the contemporary queered and cripped person, in touching an elusive imaginary, sees the now and the emergent not as a death drive, but in terms of unlivedness: The present is nothing other than this unlived element in everything that is lived. That which impedes access to the present is precisely the mass of what for some reason … we have not managed to live. The attention to this ‘unlived’ is the life of the contemporary. (Agamben, 2009: 51) The matter of re-imagining a disability or cripped horizon, a future without the stain of ableism, although elusive and out of grasp, is fundamental in order to move to hopefulness and capture that unlived possibility in the lives of many with disability. Can the so-called shadows of a disabled life be sites of invigoration? What is ‘unlived’ in our lives? Crippin’ the human involves a differential gaze – where sometimes signs and gestures predominate, where there is a different mind style such as Tourette’s syndrome or autism, or a centring on visuality or tactility. A grounded earthiness can be ‘different’ through echolocation and waist heightedness. Halberstam (2008) speaks of acts of unbecoming. Through what she describes as ‘wilfully eccentric modes of being’, it is worth conjuring and queering concepts of passivity held against disabled people, as a refusal to live up to ableist expectations of performativity: [I]n a performance of radical passivity, we witness the willingness of the subject to actually come undone, to dramatise unbecoming for the other so that the viewer does not have to witness unbecoming as a function of her own body. (Halberstam, 2008: 151) This radical passivity, for disabled people, would indeed have to be radical, as disabled people already live under the enormous weight of being characterised as passive. It is a tough ask to claw back and produce a cripped notion of passivity. Sunny Taylor does this in her quest for the right not to work: I have a confession to make: I do not work. I am on SSI [social security benefit]. I have very little work value (if any), and I am a drain on our country’s welfare system. I have another confession to make: I do not think this is wrong, and to be honest, I am very happy not working. Instead I spend the majority of my time doing the activity I find the most rewarding and valuable, painting. (Taylor, 2004: 30) Such strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules present alternative temporalities which disability studies scholars have all along known, disrupt the parameters of the human (Halberstam, 2005; Campbell, 2009; McRuer, 2006). Having said this, it is all the more extraordinary that disabled people ha

ve not yielded to this repression but have resisted docility and engaged in transgressive ways of living disability. Ableism is founded on a utopian hermeneutics of the desirable and the disgusting and therefore it is, as Halberstam (2008: 153) puts it, necessary to inculcate alternative political imaginaries. McRuer (2008) drew my attention to the way Halberstam’s perspective can incorporate disability as also outside the lifecycle: I try to use the concept of queer time to make clear how respectability, and notions of the normal on which it depends, may be upheld by a middle-class logic of reproductive temporality. And so, in Western cultures, we chart the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation; and we create longevity as the most desirable future, applaud the pursuit of long life (under any circumstances), and pathologize modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity. Within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be desirable, and people who live in rapid bursts (drug addicts, for example) are characterized as immature and even dangerous. (Halberstam, 2005: 4–5) Cripped time can be staggered, frenzied, coded, meandering and be the distance between two events. Some of our time is shaped according to another’s doing – service time – the segmenting and waiting on assistive agencies. Aside from service time, there is a transient time whereby our cripped selves rub up against biology, environmental barriers and relationality. Like queerness, the lifecycle refuses patterning – there is a different vision with localised goals. Instead of proposing argument based on normalisation and similarity to the heteronormative (and by extension ableist normativity), Edelman (2004) proposes a politics of negativity, on the basis that queers, as outsiders, are embodied differently having counter-intuitive, queered forms of negative knowing (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Edelman implores queers to be norm resisters, to come out from normative shadows and fess up to futurist ‘inability’: ‘instead of fighting this characterization by dragging queerness into recognition, he proposes that we embrace the negativity’ (Halberstam, 2008: 141). Relinquishing the norm as a lost cause enables an outlaw flowering of beingness that is anti-social. The disabled life puts out fear and possibility. This is a conflict over liminality that many disabled people experience. How does the person with a disability negotiate the expectations and compulsions of ableism? In other words, do they choose to conform to or hypermimic ableism or do they go it alone and explore alternative ways of being? People with impairments have impairment – mediated proprioceptive ways of experiencing being in the world. In contrast there is the unspeakability of communality and commonality where disabled people can, as Overboe does in his spasms ‘give [him] great joy… [becoming] a life-affirming presence’ (2007, 221). Elsewhere I have argued that disabled people ‘are in effect strangers in ableist homelands – who because of their strangeness have the possibility of a new vision or orientation’ (Campbell, 2009: 161). Reading ‘disability’ in a positive (anti-social) light requires an apriori negotiation with what Foucault (1976) refers to as the effects of the ‘implantation of perversions’, the consolidation of erratic desiring. Foucault’s’ thinking about desire suggests that a desire towards emulation of the ableist subject mitigates against the development of an anti-social framing of disability outside the realms of the perverse. The challenge then is to take up these ‘implantation of perversions’, to develop as Foucault puts it ‘the thought of the outside’, a thought at the queer margins: A thought that stands outside subjectivity, setting its limits as though from within, articulating its end, making its dispersion shine forth, taking in only its invincible absence; and that, at the same time, stands at the threshold of all positivity, not in order to grasp its foundations or justification but in order to regain the space of its unfolding, the void serving as its site, the distance in which it is constituted and into which its immediate certainties slip the moment they are glimpsed. (1998, Orig 1966: 150) Slippages in certainties do create precariousness but also the possibility to (re)imagine the circumstances of disability. It is in between these conflicted traces of subjectivity that the perverse inkling of anti-social disability, an outlaw ontology, lurks. For Foucault, ‘the thought of the outside’ contains a double imperative: (negative) desire reaches into our (disabled) interiority, the emptiness, and the state of be-ing outside: ‘the fact that one is irremediably outside the outside … infinitely unfold[ing] outside any enclosure’ (Foucault, 1998: 154). Director Hara Kazuo’s 1972 film Goodbye CP, a stark black and white portrayal of Green Lawn, a Japanese activist group of people with cerebral palsy, includes a scene where the central character Yokota Hiroshi who walks on his knees because it is faster than a wheelchair is followed, in handing out leaflets. Hiroshi remarks: I walk slow and look pathetic. What’s wrong with that? ... We are outsiders. We really are. We can never be insiders. Those who think they are insiders may end up being outsiders. Why don’t they realize that? That’s the point we are trying to make. (Hiroshi, in Kazuo, 1972) Foucault is correct that we can never really ‘know’ the outside, the liminal margins because its ‘essence’ remains inherently unknowable and ambiguous. To step outside the normative trajectories of negativity not only destabilises the conception of disability, but also confuses and disrupts the processes of subjectification by confronting the ‘goodness’ of disability. Hiroshi is emblematic of the anti-sociality stance of disability. Such an act is subversive as Hiroshi positions his impaired body as queered and perverse. He is perverse because Hiroshi in effect does not ‘give a damn’ about presumed appearances – he is his own man in his embrace of outsiderness. I propose that at an ontological level the disabled body as a body is perverse; it is in effect anti-social in its departure from ableist normativity. A word of caution, in rejecting norm emulation the anti-social body still exists and lives under normative shadows. Anti-sociality can be about being on guard, reminding of, removing, resisting and rectifying the consequences of ableism.: 35). In this sense, Chapter Seven turns a corner in the dissertation by marking out sites of resistance to technologies of ableism.

#### The judge should endorse our disruption of politics and debate itself. The crippled body is in and of itself a challenge to dominant modes of knowledge production and our performances in debate provide liberatory potential for the space itself,

#### Campbell in 03[[6]](#footnote-6),

**Our discussion engages the imagination by playing** dangerously(yet cautiously) **with maters of ‘disability ‘**desire’, ‘pride’, ‘culture’ and a transgressive aesthetic. It is a vulnerable conversation, a speaking otherwise about ‘disability’. **By adopting the ‘thought of the outside’ (**as expressed by Foucault, 1988, Orig 1966) **and repositioning our gaze it maybe possible to open up ‘spaces’ for** oppositional technologies **of self that posit ‘disability’ as a positive erotic, grounds for subjugated celebratory experiences of ‘disability’.** As Cheryl Wade puts **“what is missing [is].. a true esteeming of the** Cripple **[disabled] body”** (1994

#### Your role is an educator whose job is to challenge dominant ableist mindsets, endorsing our methodology causes a spillover into our everyday lives. We need to crip debate and focus our discourse on challenging hegemonic conceptions of normality which exclude disabled bodies from engagement, Beckett in 2013[[7]](#footnote-7),

#### Serious and systemic disability discrimination provides powerful justification for¶ disability-focused anti-oppressive pedagogy (Beckett 2009), but such pedagogy is also¶ critical to the development of a more ‘innovative and aggressive conception of¶ inclusive education’ (Slee 2011, i). If inclusive education is to help build an inclusive¶ society (Armstrong and Barton 2008), then in addition to meaningful inclusion of¶ disabled students within mainstream settings (itself, likely to do much to challenge¶ disability), schools’ teaching and learning strategies must challenge disability as a¶ form of oppression.¶ Proposed here is a form of ‘inclusive pedagogy’, but not as currently understood.¶ Inclusive pedagogy is usually defined in terms of rethinking curricula and teaching¶ practices to include everyone (Florian and Black-Hawkins 2011). This is vital and a¶ prerequisite for the anti-oppressive pedagogy proposed herein: inclusion, in all¶ regards, being ‘a prerequisite of a democratic education’ (Slee 2011, i).¶ The connection between ‘inclusive’ and ‘democratic’ education, although well¶ established, has been reworked by authors in ‘Disability Studies in Education’¶ (Danforth and Gabel 2006). For example, Goodley (2011) calls for dialogue between¶ critical pedagogy and disability politics. To this end, Baglieri and Shapiro (2012),¶ Gabel and Connors (2009) and Ware (2002) suggest incorporating Disability Studies¶ into the curriculum within US schools. Overall, this work implies that strategies¶ encouraging/supporting students to challenge disability as one form of oppression¶ ought to be part of education for all.¶ If non-disabled students are not encouraged to recognize and challenge disability¶ oppression, then as adults they may **reinforce** and legitimize **disabling ideas and practices** (Rieser and Mason 1990). Disabled students need to be supported to¶ recognize and understand the nature of their oppression and acquire skills to resist¶ this (Mason 1990). Arguably, they also need to be included in such initiatives because¶ relationships between disabled people can be marked by oppression (Wendell 1996).¶ We need to view all students as potentially having a ‘foot in both camps’ i.e.¶ ‘oppressed’ and ‘privileged’.

#### **And a focus on crips is an epistemic prerequisite to literally everything, embodiment shapes the way we think about and view the world. Crips alter our epistemological lenses, our very existence challenges hegemonic conceptions of “normal”, Snyder and Mitchell**[[8]](#footnote-8)**,**

Consequently, disability studies has formulated the problem of the medicalized body in a manner similar to that undertaken earlier in body studies, taking up medical institutions (and the ancillary administering of diagnosis, sequestration, and case study) as the primary locus of its critique. The pathologization of human differences is theorized as an imposition on the body—a regulatory effort to standardize inherent dynamism. But while body studies provided a foundation for a more general model of critique around the categories of illness, health, pathology, and even bioethics, disability studies moves beneath these terms to encounter disability directly in the experiences of human populations which were merely referenced euphemistically by those more general terms. Disability studies narrows the focus of its investigation to the social implications for bodies deemed excessively aberrant. In doing so, scholars have expanded the domain of cultural understandings about disability beyond the walls of its scientific management. For disability studies, the disabled body is neither a matter of individual malfunction—as cast by medicine—nor an effect of the abstraction of the body within the health professions. Instead, disability translates into a common denominator of cultural fascination (if not downright obsession)—one that infiltrates thinking across discursive registers as a shared reference point in deciding matters of human value and communal belonging. In this emergent field, the able body is no longer characterized as merely a false quantitative ideal, as it had been in body studies, but rather as an aesthetic product of cultural forces that oppress those categorized as disabled. This subtle shift in emphasis allows humanities scholars in disability studies to extend the discussion of bodily deviance from the context of rehabilitative institutions to that of wider ranging cultural locations. For instance, Lennard J. Davis (1995) analyzes the role of institutions for the Deaf in the historical development of disability activism and community in eighteenth-century Europe. Martin Pernick (1996) analyzes the influential role of public health films in the promotion of eugenics in Chicago prior to World War II. Through readings of nineteenth- and twentieth-century U.S. literary texts and cultural spectacles such as the freak show, Rosemarie Garland Thomson (1997) argues that disabled people’s bodies have been represented as unassimilable within a normalizing biological ideology that marks the disabled body as the inferior contrast to an able-bodied, white, masculine citizenry. Paul K. Longmore (1997) assesses television genres, such as disease-of-the-week movies and telethons, to dissect mainstream representations of disability as tragedies in need of eradication or overcoming. In our own Narrative Prosthesis (Mitchell and Snyder 2000), we theorize the pervasive utility of disability to literature in Europe and the United States by discussing the longstanding artistic recourse to disability as a staple feature of characterization. Disability studies scholars have also analyzed the opportunistic use of corporeal metaphors to emblematize societal weaknesses in literary and philosophical figurations of disability. Ultimately, these analyses of the pervasive dependency upon textual and visual representations of disability in various cultural media have forced a reformulation of a theory of marginality itself within disability studies. This is one site at which disability studies diverges from the approach established by other civil rights–based programs. While many minority movements have argued that their social devaluation occurs as a result of their marginal presence in representational media, disability studies has formulated an analysis of social depreciation targeting the perpetual recourse to images of disability in narrative and visual mediums. As a result, disability studies follows a figuration of marginality as the expression of an “overheated symbolic organism” that conveys potent meanings as a result of its palimpsest-like discursive history (cf. Stewart 1993). Theaters of Repression The work of disability studies scholars consolidated the argument that bodily and cognitive differences were integral to various registers of meaning-making within culture. While the earliest research in the field kept returning to a denunciation of three prominent literary figures—Shakespeare’s Richard III, Melville’s Captain Ahab, and Dickens’s Tiny Tim—the growing body of historical research called for wider ranging methodologies. As with later developments in race and gender studies, disability studies outgrew its denunciations of stereotypes; instead, theorists began to argue that disability represented a deep-seated, yet uninterrogated, cultural conflict. If the able body proved a utopian fiction of abstract bodily norms, disabled bodies occupied the phantasmic recesses of the cultural imaginary. The different body was more than a site for public scapegoating—cognitive and physical aberrancies acted as reminders of Others in our midst who challenged beliefs in a homogeneous bodily order. Out of these efforts to elucidate the constructed nature of disabled bodies in history, disability studies set out to diagnose the investments of an ableist society in disability’s various incarnations. Cultural efforts to medicalize or domesticate disability effectively repressed the power of aberrancy to unmoor notions of the body as a matter of norms, averages, and deviations. Locating disabled bodies as rare examples of extraordinary deviance essentially cordoned off disability from the differences that characterize typical biological diversity. For disability studies, the impersonal was the political. Such a sequestration evidenced the mainstream desire to reduce the different body’s (or mind’s) ability to destabilize normative models of health.

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who has the best methodology to exposing, understanding, and disrupting ableist mindsets.

#### The classroom should be a space of liberatory discourse. Dreaming with disability studies produces an active engagement in the classroom. Exploring utopian alternatives to disability opens up the revolutionary pedagogical potential this space has, and allows us to explore alternatives that have real impacts on crips, Erevelles [[9]](#footnote-9)14,

Dreaming, then, with a critical disability studies is dreaming about accountability. But why accountability in critical disability studies? Because to do disability studies is to "come-in" to accountable community. Here "membership" is not a noun but an active verb. Here "different" is not an adjective, but a noun. Here "community" swaps cohesiveness for disruption, swaps the romance of "homecoming" for the unpredictability of wanderings, swaps the satisfying embrace of safety for the risky promise of vulnerability. Why accountability in disability studies? Because a disability studies working at the intersections is committed to revolutionary and accountable praxis that can make for radical and exciting pedagogy at the borders. It forces students to think outside the edges while imagining precarious possibilities. Because it asks questions about the very practices of pedagogy that produce damaging and sometimes death- making effects for bodies deemed non-normal. Because it insists on recognitions that pedagogical practices would rather ignore. Why be accountable? Because a transnational materialist critical disability studies is not only about "theorizing life" but also about "living theory." To "leave evidence" (Mingus, 2009). To live with struggle. To imagine a hopeful future notwithstanding a painful yet revolutionary present. To think with disability studies and hold it accountable to the lives it purports to represent. All of us. Yes, all of us in all our difference(s).

#### This space is key- it is a starting point for embodied knowledges making challenging ableist mindsets necessary to evaluate any other layer of the flow, Ervelles [[10]](#footnote-10)2K,

For example, critical theorists of education have begun to describehow **bodies are inscribed by** the **dominant cultural practices** of schools **through** a process that Peter McLaren has called **“**enfleshment**.” To be “**enfleshed**,”** McLaren explains**, is to be marked by discourses that** not only sit on the surface of the fleshbut **are,** on the other hand, **embedded in the flesh such that we learn “a way of being in our bodies**…that is we are taught to think about our bodies and how to experience our bodies.” **One context where students learn to experience their bodies is education,** where students learn the importance of disciplining their bodies so as not to distract from the “mental efforts” of the mind**. In an attempt to control these “**disruptive excesses**” of unruly bodies, schools have** elaborate **practices that support the rigid organization of classroom space** and time, the overriding emphasis on discipline, and the careful monitoring of the curriculum. **So entrenched are these practices that** Ursula Kelly has argued that **“education is the body and education territorializes the body” since “the notion of *mind/ing bodies* bespeaks** most accurately and succinctly **about how the intersection of** knowledge**, power**, anddesire **craft[s] [subjectivity] as the cultural project of schools.”**

#### And an analysis of crips is a prior question to any other form of discourse, understanding why bodies are excluded from discursive spaces is necessary to have meaningful dialogue to begin with, Boys in 08[[11]](#footnote-11),

This shifts the inquiry from representations (on the body, in the space) to relationships, processes and contexts. Any encounter is **necessarily** mediated by who is there, [and] who is not, why they are there **(or why not), what they bring to the situation and what they take away.** Such events involve meanings-in-the-making through a process in space and over time. **Importantly** encounters are not just a space of sharing and recognition but also of conflict, differentiation and negotiation. They involve interpretations, talk, gestures, bodily relationships, and actions. **So how do encounters** work? **In each case we now have two questions which allow the exploration of disability beyond being a stereotypical marker of identity or difference. What embodied knowledge and experience do we the participants bring to the encounter? What are the routine social and spatial practices which frame the encounter?** Here, disabled and ‘non-disabled’ participants are not separated out; all have parity in the space of the encounter itself. But the impact of framing disabled people in ways not of their making remains central to the investigation. **As Davis write**s**:** Disability is not so much the lack of a sense or the presence of a physical or mental impairment as it is the reception and construction of that difference.

#### As a judge, you are an educator and have an obligation to protect students and make rounds inclusive, Smith [[12]](#footnote-12)’13,

**“**It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of **social control**, the reality ofracism **in debate is constituted by** the singular **choices that** institutions, **coaches**, and students **make** on a weekly basis. I have watched countless rounds where competitors attempt to win by rushing to **abstractions** to **distance the conversation from the** material **reality** that black **debaters** are forced to **deal with every day.** One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. **Community norms** would **have competitors** do intellectual gymnastics or **make up rules to accuse** black **debaters of breaking to escape hard conversations** but as someone who understands that experience, **the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed**, engage the discussion from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, **and** then find strategies to **deal with the issues at hand.** It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally. **A student should not**, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, **have to justify why oppression is bad. Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential.** Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape. Current **coaches** and competitors alike **[that] dismiss concerns of** racism and **exclusion, won’t teach other students anything** about identity in debate **other than** how **to shut down** competitors who engage in **alternative** styles and **discourses**, and refuse to engage in those discussions even outside of a tournament setting. A conversation on privilege nd identity was held at a debate institute I worked at this summer and just as any theorist of privilege would predict it was the h eterosexual, white, male staff members that either failed to make an appearance or stay for the entire discussion. No matter how talented they are, we have to remember that the students we work with are still just high school aged children. **If those who are responsible for participants and** the creation of accessible **norms won't risk a better future** for our community, **it becomes harder to explain to students who look up to them why risking such an endeavor is necessary.”**

#### Debaters must be held accountable for the discourse they produce in round. Judges need to be active allies and engage in a process of disrupting the flow in light of a teachable moment, Vincent [[13]](#footnote-13)13,

**Debaters must be held accountable for the words they say in the round.** We should no longer evaluate the speech. Instead we must begin to evaluate the speech act itself. Debaters must be held accountable **for more than winning the debate. They must be held accountable for the implications of that speech.** **As educators and adjudicators in the debate space we** also **have an ethical obligation to foster an atmosphere of education. It is not enough for judges to offer predispositions suggesting that they do not endorse [oppressive] racist, sexist, homophobic discourse, or justify why they do not hold that belief, and still offer a rational reason why they voted for it. Judges have become complacent** in voting on the discourse, **if the other debater does not provide a clear enough role of the ballot framing, or does not articulate well enough why the racist discourse should be rejected.** Judges must be willing to foster a learning atmosphere by holding debaters accountable for what they say in the round. **They must be willing to vote against a debater if they endorse [oppressive] racist discourse. They must be willing to disrupt the process of the flow for the purpose of embracing that teachable moment. The speech must be connected to the speech act.** We must view the entire debate as a performance of the body, instead of the argument solely on the flow.

1. Disabled Country by Neil Marcus

   https://utmedhumanities.wordpress.com/2014/10/12/disabled-country-neil-marcus-2 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Johanna Hedva, xx-xx-xxxx, "Sick Woman Theory," Mask Magazine, http://www.maskmagazine.com/not-again/struggle/sick-woman-theory [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. CAPITALISM, CHRONIC PAIN, DISABILITY, TIME

   Reflections on Disability, Capitalism, and Time

   In Crip Politics / Disability Politics, Philosophical Musings on March 23, 2015 at 9:00 AM

   KRYS MÉNDEZ RAMÍREZ [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Breckenridge and Volger 11 (Carol Appadurai is an Associate Professor of History, The New School Candace Vogler is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, where she teaches ethics, social and political philosophy, and gender and sexuality studies., "The Critical Limits of Embodiment: Disability's Criticism", Public Culture, Volume 13, Number 3, Fall 2011) DR 15 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. (Fiona Kumari Campbell, Associate Professor in Law for Griffith Law School, and a Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies at the University of Kelaniya. "Stalking Ableism: Using Disability to Expose 'Abled' Narcissism." In the book "Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions." Chapter 13. Palgrave McMillan, 2012.) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Fiona Anne Kumari Campbell, The Great Divide: Ableism and Technologies of Disability Production, 2003 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Beckett 13’- Angharad Anti-oppressive pedagogy and¶ disability: possibilities and challenges, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds- [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Snyder & Mitchell 1 [Sharon L. Snyder (assistant professor in the Department of Disability and Human Development at the University of Illinois at Chicago), & David T. Mitchell (associate professor and director of graduate studies in the Ph.D. in Disability Studies Program at the University of Illinois at Chicago), “Re-engaging the Body: Disability Studies and the Resistance to Embodiment”, Public Culture 13(3): 367–389, 2001, http://publicculture.dukejournals.org/content/13/3/367.full.pdf] [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Home > Vol 34, No 2 (2014) > Erevelles Thinking with Disability Studies Nirmala Erevelles Professor, Social and Cultural Studies in Education, The University of Alabama E-mail: nerevell@bamaed.ua.edu [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Educating Unruly Bodies: Critical Pedagogy, Disability Studies, and the Politics of Schooling, Nirmala Ervelles Educational Foundations, Leadership, and Technology Auburn University 2000 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. (Jos, “challenging the 'normal': towards new conceptual frameworks”, <http://www.sowhatisnormal.co.uk/challenging>) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. [“A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate” By Elijah J. Smith 9/4/13.] [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Chris Vincent, October 26th 2013, Re-Conceptualizing our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate)KJT/Wardn [↑](#footnote-ref-13)