# Case Neg – Uganda

The strategy was just the 2 disadvantages and a counterplan that had the federal government do the aff (since the aff actor was the local governments).

## Federalism DA

### Federalism DA

#### First off is UGANDAN FEDERALISM

#### Issues of economic inequality is definitely federal jurisdiction – provincial action disrupts fragile balance of power

Olum 13 [Yasin Olum (associate professor of political science and public administration at Makerere University in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration), “THE FEDERAL QUESTION IN UGANDA,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung] AZ

Sixth, on natural resource imbalance and specifically on national economic management, it is critical that necessary legislation dealing with a number of areas falls under the ambit of the central government’s responsibility: those dealing with money and coinage, currency, treaties on commerce, unity of the customs and trading area, and maintenance of the free movement of goods, services, and capital.89 There should never be widely differing rules in different regions of the federal territory. The variations in influence among the different levels within the federal system are attributable not only to their spheres of responsibility and spending powers, but also the extent that their power is substantially dependent upon their ability to raise funds before they can spend them.90 Under concurrent legislative powers, the federal states are entitled to pass their own legislation, but legislative competence lies with the central government to preserve legal and economic uniformity, especially in matters of socio-economic conditions; it the central government retains powers concerning all taxes and its distribution.91 A percentage has to be determined as to how much revenue accruing from tax collections should be distributed by the central government to the federal states or should be retained by them (e.g., revenue from from oil, minerals, personal income, corporation tax, value-added tax, trade tax, vehicle tax, net worth tax, and real property tax). Furthermore, there are certain areas where the central government is empowered to enact so-called outlining legislation. For instance, the central government might issue general rules relating to civil service regulations, continuing educational institutions, and regional planning. It is also the central government that has the competence to pass legislation laying down certain principles that stipulate standard procedures and definitions that all central, regional, and local authorities are required to follow, for instance, in managing finances. In addition to performing their own legislative functions, the federal states have the opportunity to influence the legislative process at the central government level through representation in the national parliament. In specific terms, they should present their own position in the national parliament on bills tabled by the central government. The federal states involve themselves in the enactment of laws that cannot be passed without their tacit consent, including any proposed changes to the national constitution, changes in funding of federal states, and laws or pieces of legislation affecting the administrative and juridical sovereignty of the federal states. Because of the different functions they perform and their constitutional mandates, the central government and federal states can neither raise equal amounts of revenue nor influence the private sector to the same degree.92 In other words, there are substantial discrepancies in the revenues of individual levels of government. Because of the unequal nature of resources, socio-economic developments tend to produce unequal degrees of prosperity in the regions. In Uganda, for instance, the economic situation in the north (mainly due to more than two decades of civil war) and the east have generally not been favorable compared to other parts of the country, especially the central and western regions.

#### Federal action solves better than the aff - local district action causes regional disparities and sparks resource conflicts

Olum 13 [Yasin Olum (associate professor of political science and public administration at Makerere University in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration), “THE FEDERAL QUESTION IN UGANDA,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung] AZ

The sixth challenge of adopting federalism in Uganda is economic, involving regional imbalances in natural resources. Indeed, inequitable resource bases between rich and less rich regions can cause difficulties in shifting to a federal system. A key concern of federalism is to generate local revenue to compete favorably with more resource endowed areas. Indeed, some depressed areas could find themselves isolated economically and unable to implement their development programs and policies for lack of revenues. In addition, overemphasis on local resource use for local needs can sometimes cause resource-rich areas to deny resources for distribution to resource-deficient areas by the central government (Boadway 2001: 104). The seventh challenge is that less economically prosperous areas will lack sufficient social capital. Because some regions are economically more underdeveloped than others, those that are will find it difficult to attract and retain highly qualified personnel, such as engineers, managers, and medical doctors. Deficiencies in such personnel can deter development and service delivery to the needy as well as cause diseconomies of scale (Kincaid 2001: 92). For example, after the civil war in 1996, Gongolo in Nigeria had no trained administrators to the extent that it had to depend on neighboring states to implement its programs (Hicks 1978: 139). The eighth challenge is how to introduce federalism in Uganda. None of the respondents had suggestions on how to do this. The different conventional methods discussed in chapter two might not be applicable to Uganda. In fact, the incumbent NRM leadership may even resist them altogether. If this were to be the case, what becomes of the sizeable minority who want to be governed under a federal arrangement? The issue is how can a win-win outcome be achieved in a situation whereby those for and against federalism are nearly equally distributed? Does leaving the issue unresolved merely postpone the political question regarding federalism? The ninth challenge is ethnic and cultural in nature. If federalism is not intelligently negotiated and properly managed, it can cause local cultural chauvinism because various communities, especially dominant ones, can overwhelm through their culture (e.g., a favored language). In the minds of some Ugandans, federalism raises the fear of secession or separatism that could damage or fragment the country. The potential for hatred and conflict is certainly rife under such circumstances. Fragmentation is perhaps one of the main reasons why some respondents were strongly opposed to federalism. The tenth and final challenge is the lack of political will by the leadership of the NRM to engage in the federal debate. Instead, the debate is polarized amongst those who advocate federalism to acquire political power versus those who see federalism as a divisive subject. In this sense, political reforms that do not take into consideration the political interests of some politicians at the centre is likely to be aggressively thwarted no matter its merits. Hence, some respondents observed that as part of its strategy to deflect the federal debate, the NRM leadership keeps moving the goalposts by enacting new laws such as decentralization and RTG.

#### Ugandan separatism sparks massive ethnic and religious conflict – mass violence and political instability is the impact

Otunnu 2 [Ogenga Otunnu (Assistant Professor of African History, Refugee Studies and Contemporary Global Issues at DePaul University) , “Causes and consequences of the war in Acholiland,” Conciliation Resources 2002] AZ

Contemporary violent conflicts in the country are directly related to the profound crisis of legitimacy of the state, its institutions and their political incumbents. This crisis, in part, reflects the way the state was constructed through European expansionist violence, manipulation of pre-existing differences, administrative policies of divide and rule and economic policies that further fractured the colonial entity. These policies did not only undermine the faltering legitimacy of the state, but also impeded the emergence of a Ugandan nationalism and generated ethnic, religious and regional divisions that were to contribute in later years to instability and political violence. One significant divide was along the lines of religious affiliation, which can be traced back to the arrival of Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism in Buganda. These religious groups engaged in a ferocious conflict for dominance, and the Protestant faction emerged victorious after the Imperial British East Africa Company intervened in their favour. Anglicans were to late dominate the top positions in the civil service, and this structural inequality was maintained after the colonial era. Consequently, religious beliefs and political party affiliations were to become entangled. Conflicts in the colonial state were exacerbated by the partition of the country into economic zones. For example, while a large portion of the territory south of Lake Kyoga was designated as cash crop growing and industrial zones, the territory north of Lake Kyoga was designated as a labour reserve. This partition, which was not dictated by development potentials, led to economic disparities between the south and the north. The fragmentation of the society was compounded by the economic-cum-administrative policy that left the civil service largely in the hands of Baganda and the army largely in the hands of the Acholi and other northern ethnic groups. These policies also widened the gulf between the socio-political south and the socio-political north. This was further sustained by the administrative policy that relied on the Baganda as colonial agents in other parts of the country. The policy of divide and rule, which rested on so-called ‘indirect rule’, led to widespread anti-Buganda sentiment. Conflicts and fragmentation in post-independent Uganda The post-colonial regime inherited a fractured state. Milton Obote responded to this crisis of legitimacy by forming an alliance between his political party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and the Buganda monarchy party (Kabaka Yekka). With this marriage of convenience, Obote became the Executive Prime Minister and Kabaka Mutesa II became the President and Head of State. However, the alliance collapsed over a conflict over land (the ‘lost counties’) between Bunyoro and Buganda. The ‘divorce’ led to widespread violence in Buganda. Obote responded by detaining five government ministers from the Bantu region, dismissing the President and Vice President and forcing President Mutesa into exile and suspending the 1962 constitution. The government also imposed a state of emergency in Buganda, occupied Buganda’s palace, following the flight of the Kabaka to England, and introduced a republican constitution. Some Bantu-speaking groups perceived this struggle for legitimacy and power as a conflict between the Bantu south and the non-Bantu (Nilotic) north. These difficulties overlapped with the instability generated in the region by the superpowers’ quest for hegemony during the Cold War. These crises were compounded by a conflict between Obote and his army commander, General Idi Amin. In 1971, Amin seized power. Immediately after he came to power, Amin ordered Acholi and Langi soldiers, who constituted the backbone of the army, to surrender their arms. The overwhelming majority of them did so. However, many were subsequently killed. The government extended its conflict with the Acholi and Langi by arresting, detaining and killing highly educated and influential members of the ethnic groups. Over time, Amin began to target people he perceived as disloyal from other parts of the county. To protect the regime which lacked political legitimacy in the country, Amin recruited new soldiers into the national army from West Nile. In addition, he appointed prominent Bantu to important positions in his government. The regime however largely maintained the dominance of southerners in the civil service and commerce, while the northerners largely controlled the government and army. In April 1979, the exiled rebels, who were overwhelmingly from Acholi and Langi, assisted by the Tanzanian army and Yoweri Museveni’s Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), overthrew the Amin regime. Yusuf Lule assumed power. However, ideological and ethnic conflicts within the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the national army led to the collapse of the Lule administration within months. Godfrey Binaisa took over, but was himself deposed in May 1980 by Paulo Muwanga and his deputy Yoweri Museveni. The new administration organized general elections in December 1980, which were won by Milton Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress. But widespread irregularities and political violence undermined the legitimacy of the elections. The main challenger, the Democratic Party (DP), rejected Obote's victory. Museveni also rejected the results. Thereafter, a number of armed groups, including Lule’s Uganda Freedom Fighters, Museveni’s Popular Resistance Army (later they were to merge to form the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A), and Dr Andrew Kayira's Uganda Freedom Movement/Army (UFM/A), declared war against the Obote government. In West Nile, Brigadier Moses Ali’s Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) and General Lumago's Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) also engaged the army and the UPC in bitter armed opposition. Fighting was particularly intense in the Luwero triangle, where the mostly Baganda population was targeted for their perceived support of rebel groups. Many innocent civilians were tortured and murdered by the UNLA. Although the UNLA was a national and multi-ethnic army, the NRM/A held the Acholi exclusively responsible for the atrocities committed, and this disputed perception was to shape subsequent attitudes toward the conflict. In July 1985, conflict between some Langi and Acholi soldiers led to the overthrow of the Obote regime. The coup, which brought General Tito Okello to power, shattered the military alliance between the Acholi and Langi and escalated ethnic violence. The Okello regime invited all fighting groups and political parties to join the military government. Every armed group and political party, with the exception of the NRA, joined the administration. The NRA, however, engaged the regime in protracted peace negotiations held in Nairobi. In December 1985, the Nairobi Agreement was signed under the chairmanship of President Moi of Kenya. However, the Agreement was never implemented and Museveni seized power on the 25th January 1986. The NRA’s seizure of power effectively meant that for the first time, socio-economic, political and military powers were all concentrated in the south. The new administration, which absorbed political and military groups from the south and Moses Ali's UNRF group, engaged in intensive anti-northern propaganda. The administration also discriminated against groups from eastern Uganda and West Nile. This severe alienation and marginalization led to armed conflicts in Teso and West Nile. After much destruction and displacement of the population in Teso, the government negotiated an end to the conflict in the east. Emergence of the conflict in Acholiland By April 1986, the Acholi had largely come to terms with the NRA victory. The majority of former UNLA soldiers also heeded the appeal made by the government to hand over their arms and demobilize. The response by the Acholi ended the armed engagement in the territory. However, after months of relative calm, anxieties escalated when the NRA began to commit human rights abuses in the name of crushing a nascent rebellion. Over time NRA soldiers plundered the area and committed atrocities, including rape, abductions, confiscation of livestock, killing of unarmed civilians, and the destruction of granaries, schools, hospitals and bore holes escalated. These atrocities in Acholiland were justified by some as revenge for the ‘skulls of Luwero’. Against this background of mistrust and violence, in May 1986 the government ordered all former UNLA soldiers to report to barracks. The order was met with deep suspicion, in part, because it was reminiscent of Amin's edict that led to the 1971 massacre of Acholi soldiers. Some ex-UNLA soldiers went into hiding; others fled to Sudan and some decided to take up arms. Soon, these ex-soldiers were joined by a stream of youths fleeing from NRA operations. During this period, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which was perceived by Acholi refugees as an ally of the Museveni government, attacked a refugee camp in southern Sudan. On August 20, 1986, some Acholi refugee combatants, led by Brigadier Odong Latek, attacked the NRA. This armed group, known as the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), was later joined by the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces / Movement (HSMF/HSM), Severino Lukoya's Lord's Army, ultimately to be followed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Why the war has persisted The war has lasted for nearly sixteen years because of a number of interrelated factors. To begin with, the war in Acholi has become an extension of regional and international power struggles. On the regional front, Uganda provided military hardware and sanctuary to the SPLA. In retaliation, the Sudan government provided sanctuary and military hardware to the LRA. On the international front, both the Uganda government and the SPLA received military and political support from the US, in part to curtail the influence of the Islamic government in Khartoum. Another factor perpetuating the conflict has been that the war has become a lucrative source and cover for clandestine income for high-ranking military and government officials and other profiteers. In addition, the unwillingness of the government and the LRA to genuinely pursue a negotiated settlement has sustained the war. Lastly, atrocities committed by the LRA against unarmed civilians and the unwillingness of the rebel group to accept alternative political views on the conflict have prolonged the war. Consequences of the war The horrific and prolonged consequences of this war have devastated the society – a society that has been reduced to ‘displaced camps’, where people languish without assistance and protection. The war has also destroyed the culture and social fabric of the Acholi society. Large numbers of orphans, who fend for themselves, illustrate this tragedy. Furthermore, some children have been abducted by the LRA and forced to torture and kill. Thus, the Rt. Rev. Macleod Baker Ochola II summarized some of the effects the war on Acholiland as follows: ‘Violent deaths of our people in the hands of various armed groups; arson perpetrated on mass scale in our land; rape and defilement of our women and girls; abduction of our young people; forced recruitment of our people into rebel ranks; the prevalence of a general atmosphere of fear and disenchantment amongst our people; mass displacement of our people; creation of protected villages which have become breeding grounds for malnutrition and deaths resulting from cholera, measles, and preventable diseases amongst our people; and destruction of our infrastructures and continuous decline in socio-economic growth.’(KM, 1997) The war has also destabilized other parts of the country and contributed to other regional conflicts in the Great Lakes. The multi-faceted and interrelated causes and consequences of the war should not, therefore, be seen as exclusively an Acholi issue. Nor should the war be treated as merely a humanitarian crisis. It has many dimensions: political, social, economic and humanitarian. As such, durable solutions will need to respond to all of these challenges.

#### That escalates to global war

Glick 7 (Caroline – senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, Condi’s African holiday, p. http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568)

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.

#### Secessionism causes civil war – years of empirics prove

Phiri 14 [(DD, has written 25 posts on BNL Times) “Federalism, secession must be understood” Times Media MW OCTOBER 15, 2014] AT

First let me make my position clear about these issues: federalism would be unsuitable for a small state like Malawi, and would most likely aggravate the antipathies that exist between the regions and the communities. Anyone advocating secession is advocating civil war. People who are ignorant of history are prone to repeating foolish mistakes of the past. What happened when the Igbos in Nigeria wanted to secede and form a state called Biafra? Sudan was burdened by civil wars for 50 years because the southerners did not want to be part of Sudan. What sort of news do you read about Ukraine? The Russian speaking part called Crimea wants to secede but the Ukrainian government is trying to subdue the secessionists. Were we all reading about the Tamils in Sri Lanka who for 20 years fought for secession in the name of autonomy? The whole tragedy ended in a pyrrhic victory for the government.

#### Empirically, secessionism can ONLY result in crackdown and tyranny – no chance of success

Obbo 7 [(Charles Onyango-Obbo, ) “EAR TO THE GROUND” Fedsnet September 12] AT

Nearly every time we would ask our parents why there were guns only in Buganda. And they would reply that it was because there was a “state of emergency” there. I didn’t understand what “state of emergency” meant until several years later when I went to secondary school. Anyhow, because of the “troubles” in Buganda, which led to the storming of Kabaka Mutesa’s palace and his exile, and eventually, the abolition of the 1962 constitution, the government suspended a wide range of civil liberties in the region. Some republicans argue that when Mengo passed a resolution ordering the “government of Uganda” to “leave Buganda’s soil”, it declared secession, and sought to return to the “special status” the region enjoyed before independence. If that were the case, then the ultimate irony is that Buganda got a “special status” in Uganda, though not the type it was looking for. Rather it was the government of Uganda that sealed off Buganda, and ruled it as a mini police state, denying citizens there rights other Ugandans enjoyed. Things have remained the same since then.

#### Tyranny sucks

Caplan 06 Department of Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice **06** [Bryan, at George Mason University, “The Totalitarian Threat,” January 06]

It is obviously harder to refine my numbers than it is to refine estimates of the probability of an extinction-level asteroid impact. The regularities of social science are neither as exact nor as enduring as the regularities of physical science. But this is a poor argument for taking social disasters like totalitarianism less seriously than physical disasters like asteroids. We compare accurately-measured to inaccurately-measured things all the time. Which is worse for a scientist to lose: 1 point of IQ, or his "creative spark"? Even though IQ is measured with high accuracy, and creativity is not, loss of creativity is probably more important. Finally, it is tempting to minimize the harm of a social disaster like totalitarianism, because it would probably not lead to human extinction. Even in Cambodia, the totalitarian regime with the highest death rate per-capita, 75% of the population remained alive after three years of rule by the Khmer Rouge. (Margolin 1999b) But perhaps an eternity of totalitarianism would be worse than extinction. It is hard to read Orwell and not to wonder: Do you begin to see, then, what kind of world we are creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid hedonistic Utopias that the old reformers imagined. A world of fear and treachery and torment, a world of trampling and being trampled upon, a world which will grow not less but more merciless as it refines itself. Progress in our world will be progress towards more pain. The old civilizations claimed that they were founded on love or justice. Ours is founded upon hatred. In our world there will be no emotions except fear, rage, triumph and self-abasement. Everything else we shall destroy – everything... There will be no loyalty, except loyalty towards the Party. There will be no love, except the love of Big Brother. There will be no laughter, except for the laugh of triumph over a defeated enemy. There will be no art, no literature, no science. When we are omnipotent we shall have no more need of science. There will be no distinction between beauty and ugliness. There will be no curiosity, no enjoyment of the process of life. All competing pleasures will be destroyed. (1983: 220)

### Budgets DA

#### Next off is the UGANDAN BUDGET TRADEOFFS Disad

#### Education and health policy are policy priorities now – enforcement of labor priorities directly trades off

ILO 12 [(International Labour Office – Geneva) Technical Memorandum Uganda labour administration and inspection needs assessment” January 2012] AT 4/11/15

Local district governments face the same budget and staffing constraints as agencies at the central level and must make choices based on priorities and available resources. MGLSD officials noted that issues such as health and education consistently rank high on the list of policy priorities for district governments, often leaving labour and employment matters on the periphery. Anecdotally, CAOs have been known not to allocate sufficient funding for the functions of labour officers in the districts – a result perhaps of a lack of knowledge on labour and employment issues or the benefit provided by these services. The Ministry of Public Service has instructed CAOs that the costs must be borne by the districts, which has led to a prioritization of resources for other services. Moreover, district LOs sometimes have a dual role as community development officers, which is one of the technical mandates of the MGLSD. Such additional non-labour tasks inevitably dilute the work carried out on labour and employment matters in the districts.

#### Local governments in Uganda has never passed minimum wage bills – the plan would require additional agencies to be built

Imran 14 [Nakuiera Imran Mphil. degree candidate in Labour Law; University of Cape Town. Minimum Wages in Uganda: An analysis of Uganda’s Domestic, Regional, and International Commitments. University of Cape Town. February 26, 2014. ] AT 4/11/15

The first Minimum Wages Board in Uganda was set up in 1934 although the first minimum wage order was only implemented in 1950.57 Uganda’s primary legislation on minimum wage is the Minimum Wages Advisory Boards and Wages Councils Act 1957. 58 This Act is still in force today, in 2014. According to the Minimum Wage Act, the Minister may appoint a minimum wages advisory board (hereinafter referred to as the 'Wage Board’) to fix a minimum wage for any employees or groups of employees in any occupation.59 The composition of the Wages Board should include among other parties, an equal number of employer and employee representatives.60 Recommendations made by the Wage Board on minimum wage rates are to be forwarded to the Minister,61 who can approve the proposals or return the proposals to the Board with comments.63 Once the Minister approves any wage proposals, they should be published and after thirty days from publication the Minister can submit the proposals to the President.64 The President may on receipt of any wages regulation proposals accept or vary the proposals and give effect to the proposals, or may reject the proposals.65 In 1995 a Minimum Wages Advisory Board was established inter alia to review Uganda’s minimum wage which had become ineffective at the time.66 The Wage Board consisted of representatives from government, employers and workers.67 After extensive consultations with various stakeholders, the Wage Board presented its recommendations to the Minister in charge of labour affairs. In 1997, the Wage Board reconvened to consider public comments, after which the Board submitted its recommendations to the Minister. These recommendations were presented to the President in 1998. The President however neither rejected nor accepted the recommended minimum wage. A resolution from parliament requiring the President to expedite the process of giving effect to the minimum wage proposals was not heeded. The minimum wage proposals made by the 1997 minimum wage board have never been endorsed to date (2014). 6

#### Devolving authority is expensive – mismanagement ensures failures and massive spending

WBG 01 [(World Bank Group) “Administrative Decentralization”] AT 4/11/15

Can increase administrative costs: Creating additional layers of government is an expensive proposition, and while the central government - in the best of cases- might reduce its role and shed personnel in the context of decentralization, empirical evidence suggests that these workers are often reabsorbed by local governments. There is thus no net change in public sector employment. In the worst of cases, central government employment remains unchanged, while local government employment grows. Civil Service Reform to Support Decentralization The main questions in assessing the civil service reform priorities parallel those in more general decentralization policies: Under what conditions does one deconcentrate or devolve human resource management or organizational responsibilities to lower tiers of government? What requisite capacity does one need at various levels to make a system work? The twin tasks of building local capacity and adjusting to the changes in intergovernmental coordination needs can be daunting even when budgets allow comprehensive training and all stake-holders support the reforms. The more frequent realities of budget constraints and mixed support, however, practically ensure that large-scale civil service reform will be a long drawn-out, expensive process that does not keep up with the pace of service or sector decentralization. Building Local Capacity Local (or at least sub-national) capacity is one of the most important factors creating a well-functioning decentralized civil service. In countries where local institutions already exist, the challenge will be to reinforce them institutionally and legally as well as to strengthen their personnel management capacities. In places where local government institutions are embryonic or exist only at an informal level, the institutional and legal framework will have to be created before any type of reform of the administration is undertaken.

#### If the plan doesn’t devolve authority, vote neg – the plan would be totally impossible and unenactable which is a massive plan flaw.

#### Local management of budgets causes mismanagement which turns aff solvency

WBG 01 [(World Bank Group) “Administrative Decentralization”] AT 4/11/15

The recent international trend toward decentralization has provoked a lively debate about the capacity of local governments and communities to plan, finance and manage their new responsibilities. Assessing, improving, and accommodating varying degrees of local capacity has become more and more important as decentralization policies transfer larger responsibilities as well as budgets from national governments to local governments and communities. While one of the common rationales for decentralization proposes that local governments’ proximity to their constituents will force them to be better than central governments at managing resources and matching their constituents preferences, it is not at all clear that local governments and communities have the capacity to translate this information advantage into a efficiency advantage. Inexperienced, small local governments may not have the technical capacity to implement and maintain projects and they may not have the training to effectively manage larger budgets.

#### Turns case – education and health spending is key to solve structural poverty

Fan 04 [(Shenggen Fan, Xiaobo Zhang, and Neetha Rao) “PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, GROWTH, AND POVERTY

REDUCTION IN RURAL UGANDA” 2004 International Food Policy Research Institute] AT 4/11/15

This section concludes our study by reporting the major findings. It then highlights implications for future government investment priorities, and points out limitations and future research directions. Major Findings Using largely district-level data for 1992, 1995 and 1999, this study developed a simultaneous equations model to estimate the effects of different types of government expenditure on agricultural growth and rural poverty in Uganda. Results show that most government investments, such as agricultural services, rural infrastructure, rural education, and health, have contributed to agricultural productivity growth and reduced rural poverty. However, variations in their marginal effects on production and poverty reduction were large, among different types of spending and across regions. Government spending on agricultural research and extension improved agricultural productivity substantially. This type of expenditure had the largest measured returns to growth in agricultural production. Growth in agriculture is still much needed to meet the food needs of an increasingly larger population. Agricultural research and extension spending also has the largest assessed impact on poverty reduction. Government spending on rural roads also had substantial marginal impact on rural poverty reduction. The impact of low-grade roads such as feeder roads is larger than the impact of high-grade roads such as murram and tarmac roads. The large impact of feeder roads on poverty reduction is mainly through improved agricultural productivity, while murram and tarmac roads had no significant impact on agricultural productivity. The impact of these better roads on poverty reduction is mainly through improved nonfarm employment opportunities. Education’s effects rank after agricultural research and extension, and feeder roads. These poverty-reduction effects appeared to come from growth in agricultural productivity, improved nonfarm employment, and increased rural wages. 48 Government spending on health did not show a large impact on agricultural productivity growth or rural poverty reduction. Four reasons are likely to account for this. First, health investment tends to affect growth and poverty reduction in the long run. Due to the nature of our data set, this aspect could not be captured. Second, a large share of health expenditures is spent on prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS-related diseases, which has obvious significant impacts on long-term growth and poverty reduction and directly affects the well being of poor people. Without these efforts, Uganda would have had a much higher incidence of poverty; however, our model is unable to demonstrate these effects. Third, Uganda achieved great success in containing HIV/AIDS through a very aggressive public campaign whereby the prevalence of HIV/AIDS fell from 30 percent in 1998 to 6 percent today. While Uganda should continue to address HIV/AIDS, future government spending on this problem will likely yield lower returns in productivity and poverty reduction than in the past. Finally, there may be significant inefficiencies in the Ugandan health system, as briefly discussed earlier. Uganda ranks 149 among 191 countries in overall health system performance (Tandon et al. 2002). Additional investments in the northern region contribute most to reducing poverty because this is where most of Uganda’s poor people are now concentrated, and the government has relatively neglected this region in the past. The poverty-reduction effect of investing in infrastructure and education is particularly high in this region. Nonetheless, in terms of increased agricultural productivity, most types of investment have the highest returns in the western region. The results of this study have potentially important policy implications for future government investment priorities in Uganda. As Table 5 showed, education is the largest spending category among all public investments considered in the study, accounting for 35 percent of total expenditure in 1999. At the other extreme, agriculture accounts for only 1.2 percent of total government expenditure. All types of infrastructure (roads, electricity, and telecommunications) together accounted for only 7 percent of total 49 government spending. Health spending accounted for about 7 percent of the total. Are these allocations optimal for maximizing growth and poverty reduction? This study reveals large differentials in the effect of various types of government spending on growth and poverty reduction. The potential gains from reallocating government resources are enormous. The following policy suggestions are offered based on the results of this study: 1. With 86 percent of the population living in rural areas, and about half of rural income coming directly from agriculture, increased investment in agricultural research and extension is urgently needed. Agricultural R&D spending was less than 0.50 percent of agricultural GDP in 1998. This is extremely low compared with many more-developed countries, but it is also low compared with most developing countries. The highest returns in both agricultural growth and poverty reduction shown in this study suggest that increased investment in agricultural research and extension is a ìwinñwinî (growth and poverty) strategy for national development. 2. Rural infrastructure and education should receive higher priority in the public investment portfolio. Investments in infrastructure and education reduce rural poverty mainly by spurring nonfarm employment and growth in agricultural productivity. Roads should receive particular attention among all types of infrastructure, and among all types of roads, low-grade roads such as feeder roads should have higher priority than tarmac or murram roads. 3. In the past, Uganda invested heavily in the health sector and made significant strides in confronting HIV/AIDS through an aggressive public campaign. As a result, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS has fallen from 30 percent of the population five years ago to 6 percent today. Uganda should continue its investments in health care, but future investments should be geared to improving the efficiency of existing public health-care systems. 4. Infrastructure and education investment in the northern region yields the highest returns in terms of reducing rural poverty and promoting agricultural growth. This suggests that the government should drastically increase its investment in this region, governance and security concerns permitting.

#### Ugandan AIDs is low now but has the potential to become an epidemic – continued investment is key

Kron 12 [(Josh, reporter) “In Uganda, an AIDS Success Story Comes Undone” NY Times, AUG. 2, 2012] AT 4/11/15

Uganda’s sharp reduction of its AIDS rate has long been hailed as a Cinderella success story, inspiring a wave of aid programs and public health strategies to fight the disease across the developing world. But as Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton arrived here on Thursday, the news on AIDS in Uganda was not so bright: A new American-financed survey says that Uganda is one of only two African countries, along with Chad, where AIDS rates are on the rise. The reversal is particularly disappointing to health experts given the time and attention that have been focused on AIDS here, and the billions of dollars spent. Nearly a third of Uganda’s population in some areas had once been infected with AIDS or the virus that causes it. An aggressive public awareness campaign that urged medical treatment and monogamous sexual relationships led to a precipitous drop in infection rates in the 1990s. But the coming survey said that H.I.V. infection rates in Uganda have increased to 7.3 percent today from 6.4 percent in 2005. Over roughly the same period, the United States, through its AIDS prevention strategy known as Pepfar, or the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, spent $1.7 billion in Uganda to fight AIDS. The report, the Uganda AIDS Indicator Survey, detailed the health status and sexual behavior of more than 20,000 Ugandans across the country. The results raise questions about the effectiveness of the United States’ AIDS-prevention strategy here. H.I.V. and AIDS rates in Uganda are increasing not only in urban areas, but rural areas too, the survey shows. Adult husbands and wives, not youths or commercial sex workers, are the ones spreading the disease, according to the survey. By their late 30s, roughly one in 10 women now become H.I.V. positive. For men, roughly one in 10 are infected by their early 40s. For both men and women, the survey shows, H.I.V. prevalence increases, rather than decreases, with wealth. Health experts blamed Uganda’s government for becoming complacent since winning international acclaim, and reams of financial aid, for its AIDS efforts. But the survey suggests that development strategists have long misunderstood the nature of Uganda’s H.I.V. epidemic, as well. “Something is not connecting properly,” said Dr. Musa Bungudu, the United Nations’ AIDS chief in Uganda. “There are a lot of sociocultural issues that need to be addressed. These are harsh realities.” Uganda’s early success in battling H.I.V. included grass-roots behavioral change campaigns aimed at reducing the number of sexual partners among Ugandans. The United States shifted its policy in 2003, teaming up with faith-based organizations and adopting Pepfar’s emphasis on abstinence, monogamy and using condoms “for those most at risk.” Billboards promoting that approach can be seen all over the capital, and the Pepfar-sponsored message — “Get Off the Sexual Network” — is published in YouTube videos and on radio. But there has been a miscalculation: the strategy may have merely succeeded in driving certain behaviors further underground in this socially conservative country with close ties to American evangelicals. On one hand, 90 percent of Ugandans today acknowledge sexual fidelity in a relationship as a health imperative, according to the survey results; on the other hand, roughly 25 percent of married men said they had multiple sexual partners. The survey found that 75 percent of Ugandans were knowledgeable about condoms in sexual health but that fewer than 8 percent of married men who were having sex outside their marriage were using condoms. Uganda’s hard-line approach toward homosexuality, which is outlawed here, also fuels the spread of AIDS, experts say. One report indicated that one-third of the male respondents who had sex with other men said they had previously been married to women and fathered children. Fewer than half use condoms. Pepfar’s founding policies barred partnering with organizations that did not condemn prostitution, and called for 33 percent of financing to be spent on abstinence and fidelity programs. “We have messages confusing what is right with what is safe,” says Canon Gideon Byamugisha, a religious leader and AIDS activist in Uganda. “If you have an environment that stigmatizes them, then don’t expect people to use condoms.” Some argue that Uganda’s initial AIDS-prevention success was based on the extreme fear that the disease generated among the population. “A lot of people saw a lot of friends and co-workers die from H.I.V.,” says Shanti Parikh, a medical anthropologist studying sexuality at Washington University in St. Louis who studies Uganda. The effect of risky sexual behavior was “very open and upfront.” Over time, experts said, medical treatment grew more effective and less expensive and the panic faded. The huge inflow of foreign development aid also led to corruption and prompted the government, which contributes roughly one-tenth of its AIDS budget, to rely on outside financing. “They need to go back to square one,” said Dr. Bungudu, the United Nations official. Dr. Christine Ondoa, Uganda’s minister of health, said in a statement that the results indicating AIDS remains “a significant health problem” here presented the government with an “an opportunity to recommit ourselves.”

#### AIDS causes extinction

Tom Kerns 99, professor of philosophy, “AIDS and Apocalyptics for Questioning Millennium Madness

The worst threat to humankind AIDS is "the number one health problem on this planet." (C. Everett Koop, former US Surgeon General) "AIDS is the single greatest threat to well-being facing the world's population today." (Marc Lappé) AIDS is "a messenger of apocalyptic change," as it is spread through "one of the most biologically urgent of human behaviors." - Dr June Osborn (former member of the US Presidential Commission on HIV/AIDS, & professor in U Mich SPH) Economic costs are high "Although it is less than a decade since the virus that causes AIDS was discovered, it has become increasingly evident that this pandemic will have profound economic and social implications for both developed and developing countries. The importance of health as an input to the economic development and growth of a country is well established - a healthier population is more productive and has an increased capacity for learning. The adverse impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic will undermine improvements in health status and, in turn, reduce the potential for economic growth. AIDS is distinct from other diseases, and its impact can be expected to be quite severe.... Its most critical feature, distinguishing AIDS from other life-threatening and fatal illnesses, such as diarrhea (among children in developing countries) or cancer (among the elderly in developed countries), is that it selectively affects adults in their sexually most active ages, which coincide with their prime productive and reproductive years." - in AIDS in the World, 1992, p 195 (Jill Armstrong is an economist in the Eastern Africa Dept of the World Bank, Washington, DC. Eduard Bos is a demographer in the Population, Health, and Nutrition Division of the World Bank's Population and Human Resources Department.) E. "Whatever else AIDS is, it's not just another disease." (Dr June Osborne, former member of the US Presidential Commission on HIV/AIDS) Features that make AIDS unique: \* High morbidity & mortality \* Lifelong infectiousness \* lengthy asymptomatic stage \* highly mutable virus Joshua Lederberg considers the possibility of HIV "learning the tricks of airborne transmission:" "We know that HIV is still evolving. Its global spread has meant there is far more HIV on earth today than ever before in history. What are the odds of its learning the tricks of airborne transmission? The short answer is "No one can be sure." ... [A]s time passes, and HIV seems settled in a certain groove, that is momentary reassurance in itself. However, given its other ugly attributes, it is hard to imagine a worse threat to humanity than an airborne variant of AIDS. No rule of nature contradicts such a possibility; the proliferation of AIDS cases with secondary pneumonia [and TB] multiplies the odds of such a mutant, as an analog to the emergence of pneumonic plague." \* effective modes of transmission \* destroys the immune system \* viral reservoir expanding Dr Barry D Schoub, Director of the National Institute of Virology at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, sums up thus: "[T]he ability of the virus to cause a slow, progressive and permanent infection with permanent infectivity makes it a unique cause of epidemic disease. Thus, with no recovery, no loss of infectivity, no development of either individual or herd immunity, there is no known biological mechanism which can stop the continuing expansion of the disease unless an effective vaccine were to come about, and at present there is no feasible design for such an effective vaccine. The progressive increase in the pool of HIV can, in theory, only lead to an exponential increase in the number of individuals who will become infected until eventually the majority of the sexually active population will be infected unless interventions are at lease moderately successful."

### Federal CP

#### Text: The Republic of Uganda should require employers in the agricultural estate sub-sector to pay a living wage to employees and establish all necessary measures to enforce business compliance with the minimum wage. The Republic of Uganda should repeal section 6(6) of the Minimum Wage Act. I reserve the right to clarify.

#### The perm has no net benefit – doing both is redundant since it passes the same law twice from two different actors

#### It also competes through net benefits – federal action ALONE is the only way to preserve the system of federalism in Uganda

#### Only central action solves – doing the plan through local governments can’t solve

The Independent 10 [(The Independent Uganda) “Why federalism can work in Kenya but fail in Uganda” 08 September 2010] AT

In Uganda, by contrast, there is almost no pressure on the centre to reform. There is dissatisfaction with government among those who do not benefit directly from its largesse or who nurse historical grievances. But this doesn’t manifest as fiddle-proof election majorities or civil unrest. Public debate is preoccupied with changing the people who run the system instead of changing the system itself. The last experiment with giving real power to local government failed after 1993 because districts were too poor to deliver on the short term expectations of participants, leaving the centre to re-colonise the localities with increased transfer of grants and increased administrative supervision. One reason this is so is political. Until last year Kenya had 254 districts but now has 46 because a High Court ruling in September 2009 invalidated the creation of 208 districts after 1992, claiming there was no constitutional basis for it. The population of Kenya is about 40 million people, and its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is about 63.5 billion dollars or 1,600 dollars per head per year.Â Each of Kenyaâ€™s 46 districts can thus muster an average of around 1.4 billion dollars and 869,000 people in economic and political power.Â The distribution of people and money by district isnâ€™t uniform, and not everybody in a district is an opponent of the central government. But the point is that it was precisely this power which forced the new constitution through Kenyaâ€™s parliament in April and through the referendum in August. It’s different here in Uganda. Uganda has 101 districts with 10 others waiting approval, and far from pressure to limit the total there is little standing in the way of increasing it by administrative fiat.Â Uganda’s population is around 33 million people, who support a GDP at PPP of about 43.2 billion dollars or 1,300 dollars per person annually. Those 101 districts account for about 416 million dollars and 327,000 people on average in economic and political power. That’s about one third the pressure on the centre in Uganda compared to Kenya. When you also consider that for almost three decades the power of religious, ethnic and cultural institutions was systematically repressed here â€“ instead of manipulated openly as in Kenya â€“ itâ€™s easier to see how civil society in Uganda is less able to balance the power of the state than it is in Kenya. In conditions like that federalism can’t work. Not for lack of enthusiasm or sophisticated proposals for reform â€“ those are abundant â€“ but for the lack of the right tools. This means that the most urgent task of the Ugandan federalist isn’t the winning of an election or writing of a new constitution but economic development outside of Kampala. Elections and constitutions are important, but they must arrive together with economic power directed to the same end if they are to be successful.Â Thatâ€™s the point â€“ you need both but they have to arrive together, and in Uganda we have a long way to go before the districts can make the centre feel their muscle.

### Case Defense W/ Federalism CP

#### There is zero enforcement capacity for the aff

Imran 14 [Nakuiera Imran Mphil. degree candidate in Labour Law; University of Cape Town. Minimum Wages in Uganda: An analysis of Uganda’s Domestic, Regional, and International Commitments. University of Cape Town. February 26, 2014. ] AT 4/11/15

Article 4(1) of Convention 26 requires effective supervision and imposition of sanctions, to ensure that minimum wages are paid while Article 4(2) seeks to ensure that covered workers can recover unpaid minimum wages due to them. The Minimum Wage Act sets out the supervisory mandates and penalties for non compliance with the minimum wage. 212 Unfortunately, Uganda’s capacity to supervise and implement minimum wages does not meet the requirements of Convention 26. Labour Inspection powers in Uganda are primarily vested in Labour Officers.213 The Employment Act provides that every district is supposed to have a labour officer.214 Dissapoiningly, while Uganda adopted a fully fledged and capable labour adminstration at Independence in 1962, 215 by December 2010, only 36 labour officers existed out of 112 districts in the country.216 Even the few availabe Labour Officers lack appropriate technical training,217 this also contravenes article 7(3) of ILO Convention No. 81 which is also ratified by Uganda.218 Uganda’s implementation shortfalls mainly originate from the government’s decentralisation process that put labour adminstration matters to the districts which are autonomous from the central govenrnment in terms of priorities, reosurce allocation and hiring staff.219 In this situation, the government’s reluctance to set the minimum is aslo supported by a lack of capacity to supervise and enforce the country’s labour laws in general.

#### The aff can’t solve – regional governments don’t have sufficient governance to do anything – only increasing centralization can solve their impacts

Kashambuzi 13 [(Eric, Ugandan political commentator) “We are restoring federalism in Uganda” United Democratic Ugandans March 16, 2013] AT 4/11/15

The Commission noted that given their small population size (Toro with 350,000), Ankole (500,000) and Bunyoro (125, 000), a full federal system would be too weak and expensive. The Commission recommended a semi-federal relationship with the central government. The non-federal districts favored a strong central government. These districts expressed a strong desire for “a strong unitary state, which will nevertheless encourage the growth of local authorities and look after the interests of poor and backward districts. Karamoja, a backward district, and Kigezi, an over populated district, were particularly anxious to be united with the rest of the country in order to share in its greater prosperity”. These districts did not have the capacity and history for a more or less independent government such as a federal state or province. However, the desire to emulate kingdoms and create a level playing field was demonstrated through the demand for ceremonial heads in those non-kingdom districts, implying that they didn’t rule out a federal arrangement in the future. It was underscored that “Ceremonial heads, within their own districts, might take precedence over all except the Head of State of Uganda”.

#### Decentralization gives local governments discretion not to enforce the aff – recentralization is key

ILO 12 [(International Labour Office – Geneva) Technical Memorandum Uganda labour administration and inspection needs assessment” January 2012] AT 4/11/15

The CEACR has noted on several occasions the negative effects of the decentralization on human resources and on logistical and material resources of labour inspection and observed with concern that this had resulted in discretionary power for local government authorities to decide to maintain or quite simply to abolish a labour inspection service. Officials suggested to the 2009 ILO mission that decentralization could have been effective had it been accompanied by the decentralization of the civil servants. The transfer and distribution of adequate human and material resources was one of the preconditions for the implementation and success of the decentralization process. However, resources had not been transferred, and those derived from district taxation were distributed among the departments in accordance with the priorities of each district. According to the officials of the Ministry of Local Government, it is for the central government to allocate funds for the operation of the labour administration. With regard to inspection staff, the Acting Labour Commissioner stressed the difficulty of districts recruiting labour officers. Even with the favourable provision under the Employment Act (2006), the Minister’s repeated reminders to district authorities in this regard have had no effect. District authorities do not always recognize the value of labour officers and district resources are too limited for things to be otherwise. The way in which decentralization was carried out appears to have had an overall negative impact on the provision of labour-related services in the districts (labour inspection, employment services, dispute resolution etc.). The Permanent Secretary mentioned that the MGLSD’s approach now was to try to recentralize those functions of labour administration and employment. This marks a change of approach from what the Ministry told the 2009 ILO mission when it said that recentralizing the labour inspection function was not one of the Ministry’s priorities.

### A2 Perm Both

#### Net benefit to the CP is the federalism disad. The issue of a living wage is an economic issue which is completely within the central government’s jurisdiction in Uganda. The plan, by including regional action, strips power from the federal government, which emboldens secessionist claims and weakens the ability of the central government to respond to them. The perm obviously links to the net benefit since it still includes regional action.

#### Absent an explanation of why the perm avoids the DA, default neg since there was a disad in the 1NC they haven’t answered

#### More reasons the perm links to the net benefit that were DROPPED from the 1NC Olum evidence

#### Including state action in an issue that is CLEARLY a question of federal jurisdiction is sufficient to tip the balance – that’s the Olum evidence in the CP shell. Only doing federal action ALLOW preserves the balance

#### Their plan allows for regional variations both in the quantity of the wage given and in the mechanism used to implement a living wage. The plan only mandates the end goal – a living wage – which means each region sets their own standard. That destroys the UNITY required for Ugandan stability. Regional differences in basic economic conditions allow regions to set their own standard on other issues, which ultimately results in secessionism.

#### Err neg – any risk that the plan triggers the disad means the counterplan is net better than the aff – the balance of power is FRAGILE now and you should err towards preserving it. The HIGH MAGNITUDE of the disad impact means even a small risk of the disad outweighs since the counterplan solves NEARLY ALL of the case even if they have some solvency deficits

#### Additional disads to the perm -

#### Overbuilding DA – passing 2 separate living wages from 2 separate actors makes it harder to comply with living wage policy since the actual living wage level becomes unclear – tanks aff solvency

Bobertz 95 [Bradley C.Bobertz, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. “Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory.” Texas Law Review, Volume 73, Number 4, March 1995. Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org) Wed Dec 25 23:49:03 2013 SW]

The phenomenon of environmental scapegoating helps to foster the massiveness, disorganization, and incomprehensibility that plague environmental law.17 When lawmakers react to a social problem by enacting legislation that hinges on a distorted picture of reality, a legal regime that lacks appropriate formative principles is an unsurprising result. Moreover, a law that depends on false diagnoses will grow in complexity as its legal suppositions come into increasing conflict with the facts." As a coping strategy, lawmakers opt to adjust (and complicate) legislative programs only enough to accommodate the current problematic factors instead of starting fresh with new models that conform more accurately to the true problem. 178 The Clean Air Act's "nonattainment program" (a euphemistic name for a failing system) provides a good example. Its length and complexity increased geometrically between its initial enactment in the mid-course correction amendments of 1977 and its second, monstrously intricate iteration in the 1990 amendments. 79 Explaining the nonattainment provisions and other aspects of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments to lawyers ordinarily accustomed to reading and understanding statutory law continues to provide lucrative business opportunities for continuing legal educators. 1t8 Overcomplexity in the law by itself imposes costs on society. Initially, regulated entities must add to their ordinary cost of compliance the cost of simply understanding what the law requires them to do. Complicated laws also increase the likelihood of noncompliance,"' undermining the attainment of environmental goals and creating pressures for extending deadlines and raising permissible emission levels-a pattern endemic in environmental law." Even more troubling is the fact that unnecessary legal complexity deprives society at large of a common, comprehensible vocabulary for debating environmental policy. A system of democratic rule implies discourse not only among a select group of experts, but also among the voting public. Environmental law has swollen into a fortress of specialized concepts and jargon practically impregnable to ordinarily informed and aware citizens." Creating barriers to public understanding of, and involvement in, environmental law frustrates the theoretical virtues of democratic self-rule and also engenders a problem of more practical import-a spirit of confusion and anger that characterizes most public encounters with environmental problems and the laws erected to correct them.1 Such encounters typically result in resignation and apathy toward the law, qualities that impoverish any legal system directed toward social reform."

#### Sphere of jurisdiction DA – two actors passing the same action in Uganda sparks conflicts over which actor has legitimate authority to pass the law, which encourages states to secede and pass conflicting laws as a challenge to central authority

### A2 Federalism Good

#### the debate isn’t about whether federalism is good or bad – but rather HOW MUCH power Uganda’s central government should have. Uganda already has a federal system which makes all their offense non-unique – the question is whether the provinces should take over an issue traditionally held by the center.

#### Federalism doesn’t solve – that’s The Independent evidence

#### Decentralization sucks

WBG 01 [(World Bank Group) “Administrative Decentralization”] AT 4/11/15

The process of decentralization: Disperses power, both geographically and institutionally: Decentralization inevitably changes the location of power and jobs. Movement geographically or across tiers of government is often impeded by issues related to statute, prestige and poor labor mobility. In the Eastern European transition economies, for example, de-legitimation of the central state and the emergence of representative government at local and intermediate levels of government has complicated human resource allocation. Incentive programs and mechanisms for inter-post mobility, which compound the costs of decentralization, may be required in order to introduce flexibility. Creates new responsibilities for inexperienced actors: Decentralization creates more opportunities for local autonomy and responsiveness to more specialized constituencies, but it also gives subnational governments more room to fail if specific steps are not taken to build local technical and managerial capacity. Can disperse scale economies/expertise groups: The need for specialized personnel is related in part to the size of the territory covered by the entity. Below a certain size, it might be counterproductive or cost inefficient to have specialists or technical personnel. There are methods which can be used to address this issue, one of which is to allow in the context of the decentralization schemes the possibility of empowering local self-governments units to form associations and pool their resources in order to cover activities requiring specialized personnel. Introduces more levels into the state: Decentralization, especially political decentralization creates a class of government workers which, based on the specific information which they receive (feedback from their constituencies) may have different preferences than workers at the next higher level. This divergence in views and convictions can create conflict within the civil service that will require mechanisms to manage effectively.

### A2 Secession

#### Counterplan would prevent secession

Kashambuzi 11 [(Eric, Ugandan political commentator, Member of FTWC) “Federalism will save Uganda from falling apart” United Democratic Ugandans 2011] AT 4/11/15

It is not a secret that some regions or groups within Uganda regions are working towards secession because the central government hasn’t delivered adequate goods and services. Uganda government has enough revenue to enable regions to meet basic needs of the people if the revenue was appropriately apportioned by the central government to regions to be managed by the regions themselves. Corruption, sectarian and mismanagement at the central government level has consumed government revenue leaving very little for spending at lower levels like districts.

### A2 Solvency Deficit – Bargaining Power

#### Counterplan’s second plank is designed to shield this – the CP repeals the section of the law that allows the government to repeal minimum wage bills

Imran 14 [Nakuiera Imran Mphil. degree candidate in Labour Law; University of Cape Town. Minimum Wages in Uganda: An analysis of Uganda’s Domestic, Regional, and International Commitments. University of Cape Town. February 26, 2014. ] AT 4/11/15

Article 20(2) of the Constitution guarantees that the government shall respect, uphold and promote rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Section 6(6), however negates this commitment by allowing the President to trample on the bargaining framework under the Minimum Wage Act without the need for justification. This unreasonably prevents employers and employees from determining their preferred terms and conditions of employment, a further infringement on the constitutional right to collective bargaining and the right to carry on any lawful occupation trade or business. 162 It is based on the above infringements that we proceed to assess the validity of section 6(6), this assessment will inevitably rely on the standard set for limiting constitutional rights.163 Article 43 of the Constitution provides that rights may be limited if the exercise of such rights prejudices public interest or the rights of other persons. Such limitation should however fall within what is ‘acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.’164 The Constitution being the supreme law, section 6(6) would be void to the extent that it is found inconsistent with the standard set by article 43 of the Constitution. 166

## Cash Transfers CP

### 1NC Cash Transfers

#### Text: The Ugandan Republic will require employers in the agricultural estate sub-sector to pay cash transfers to employees at about 21,000 shillings per month.

#### Solves better than the perm and none of your disads apply – empirics prove

Sender 09 [Sender, John, and Erik von Uexkull. A rapid impact assessment of the global economic crisis on Uganda. ILO, 2009.] AZ

Existing social protection and social assistance programmes exclude a high proportion of the labour force. The cost of a rapid scale up of cash transfers need not be excessive and does not entail profligate or “populist” fiscal policies. The commonly expressed fear of a “dependency culture” is also misplaced.78 If such transfers are set at a level comparable to the level in other Sub-Saharan African programmes, i.e. at about 1.5 times the per capita consumption level of those in the lowest income decile, or 21,000 shillings per month, then affordability and sustainability will not be endangered. The administrative costs of covering vulnerable members of the labour force through cash transfers have been shown to be very much lower than contributory schemes or other targeted methods of social assistance; the cost as a proportion of GDP of the pilot Uganda scheme is estimated at about 0.6 % of GDP, and this cost will fall over time.

#### Cash transfers are a comparatively better way to reduce poverty – prefer my ev

Gindling 14 [T.H. Gindling, “Does increasing the minimum wage reduce poverty in developing countries?”, IZA May 2014] AZ

First, a large share of workers is not covered by minimum wage legislation. • And second, higher minimum wages do not affect all low-income households the same way: minimum wages pull some households out of poverty, but may push others into poverty. Given the potential for negative impacts on the employment status and incomes of some of the poorest families, raising minimum wages is an inefficient tool for reducing poverty.

#### Continues:

For example, Brazil’s conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Familia, was more effective than higher minimum wages at reducing poverty and income inequality using an identical amount of resources [11]. Conditional cash transfers to low-income households have the additional benefit of providing part of a social safety net for households when workers lose their jobs because of higher minimum wages. Labor supply incentives, particularly the earned income tax credit, have also been shown to be effective in increasing both the employment and earnings of low-income workers in the US.

#### Your author concedes – this a policy priority and solves 100% of the aff

Sender 09 [Sender, John, and Erik von Uexkull. A rapid impact assessment of the global economic crisis on Uganda. ILO, 2009.] AZ

The report argues in favour of the proposed expansion of cash transfers. This initiative is welcomed because the existing distribution of social assistance and social protection excludes the majority of vulnerable people. Experience elsewhere suggests that affordable cash transfers can also be designed to improve female educational outcomes in low income African countries.

### Informal Sector DA

#### Higher minimum wage pushes workers into informal sector – this also takes out aff solvency since the wage law can’t apply to the informal sector

Gindling 14 [T.H. Gindling, “Does increasing the minimum wage reduce poverty in developing countries?”, IZA May 2014] AZ

Impacts on wages and employment in the informal sector also influence the effect on poverty The impact of the minimum wage on wages and employment—and poverty—also depends on what happens in the informal sector. More than half of workers in low- and lower-middle-income countries work in this sector, which is not covered by minimum wage legislation (see Figure 1). This complicates the picture. A large informal sector can cushion the effect on poverty of a higher minimum wage if workers who lose jobs or who cannot find formal sector jobs as a result of the increase find work in the informal sector—even low wages are better than no wages. But the effect could be just the opposite for some workers. Higher minimum wages might force more workers out of the formal sector and into the informal sector, and the lower wages could push their households below the poverty line.

#### Also takes out aff solvency – the majority of people would be pushed into the informal sector, which is worse than low formal wages in the status quo.

#### Minimum wage causes a shift to the informal sector—specific to developing countries

Boeri 08 [Tito Boeri (Italian economist, currently professor of economics at Bocconi University, Milan ) and Jan van Ours (Professor of Labor Economics, Tilburg University). “The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets.” Princeton University Press, 2008] AJ

Minimum wages may not have negative effects on employment in dual labor markets where the minimum wage does not apply to the secondary or informal labor market. Under these conditions there are important spillover effects between the two sectors. As pointed out by Gramlich (1976), Mincer (1976) and, Welch (1976), after a minimum wage increase, workers displaced in the formal sector move to the uncovered sector. Hence, as depicted in figure 2.4, wages in the informal sector fall (fromwoI tow1I),and labor supply in the formal sector declines (shifting the Ls curve to the left). The minimum wage then reallocates jobs from the formal to the informal sector, increasing the difference between formal and informal wages. This adjustment mechanism prevents employment losses only insofar as there is perfect labor mobility between the two sectors.

#### Informal sector kills growth, productivity, and competitiveness – turns case

Farrell 04 [Diana Farrell. “The hidden dangers of the informal economy.” McKinsey Quarterly, July 2004] AJ

In Portugal and Turkey, informality accounts for nearly 50 percent of the overall productivity gap with the US. Around the world, these informal players operate at just half the average productivity level of formal companies in the same sectors and at a small fraction of the productivity of the best companies. As a result, informal companies persistently drag down a country's overall productivity and standard of living. MGI's investigation also found that the substantial cost advantage that informal companies gain by avoiding taxes and regulations more than offsets their low productivity and small scale. Competition is therefore distorted because inefficient informal players stay in business and prevent more productive, formal companies from gaining market share. Any short-term employment benefits of informality are thus greatly outweighed by its long-term negative impact on economic growth and job creation.

### --- Fishing Link

#### Informal sector shift forces people to fish on Lake Victoria

East African 9/25 [By SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT in Mwanza. Overfishing sounds the death knell for Nile perch in Lake Victoria. 9/25/14. <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Overfishing-sounds-death-knell-for-Nile-perch-in-Lake-Victoria/-/2558/2464674/-/item/1/-/rhadk2/-/index.html>] AJ

As the demand for Nile perch soared in Europe, so did the number of boats and fishing nets on the lake. From fishermen to factory owners, everybody was in a rush to make a killing – and the government opened the door to what Mr Kulinda says was “uncontrolled fishing”. From beach seines to small-size fishing nets that catch immature fish, nobody cared – it was survival of the fittest. Mr Kulinda says the problem started in 1995 – two years after the first fish processing factory was opened in Mwanza – followed by more plants in Kagera and Mara regions. “The fish processors started to buy Nile perch in bulk at very attractive prices. Fish agents built huge boats that could carry up to 20 tonnes of Nile perch. There were hundreds of these kinds of boats, which collected fish from small-scale fishermen.” Mr Kulinda says at that time when he had 30 fishing boats, some of his colleagues had up to 80 boats, turning fishing into a free-for-all affair as thousands of fishermen scrambled for the rich pickings. He says that at the time, fishing of immature Nile perch was minimal because there were plenty of mature Nile perch weighing between three and 200 kilogrammes.

### --- Fishing Impact

#### Status quo overfishing in Lake Victoria is massively unsustainable – protections are key to prevent a decline in biodiversity causes a chain effect that destroys the ecosystem.

Science Daily 12 [Science Daily. “Coral Reef Study Traces Indirect Effects of Overfishing.” Feb. 27, 2012. <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/02/120227132835.htm>] AJ

A study of the tropical coral reef system along the coastline of Kenya has found dramatic effects of overfishing that could threaten the long-term health of the reefs. Led by scientists at the University of California, Santa Cruz, the study was published in the journal Coral Reefs. The researchers found that the loss of predatory fish leads to a cascade of effects throughout the reef ecosystem, starting with an explosion in sea urchin populations. Excessive grazing by sea urchins damages the reef structure and reduces the extent of a poorly studied but crucially important component of the reefs known as crustose coralline algae. Coralline algae deposit calcium carbonate in their cell walls and form a hard crust on the substrates where they grow, helping to build and stabilize reefs. They also play a crucial role in the life cycle of corals. "Some coralline algae produce a chemical that induces coral settlement, in which the larval stage in the water settles on the ocean floor to grow into an adult. This settlement must happen for reefs to recover after disturbance," said lead author Jennifer O'Leary, a research associate with the Institute of Marine Sciences at UC Santa Cruz. The ability of coralline algae to induce the settlement of coral larvae has been well studied in the laboratory, but few studies have been done to investigate this relationship in the field. O'Leary set out to study the role of coralline algae in reef ecosystems as a UCSC graduate student working with Donald Potts, professor of ecology and evolutionary biology and a coauthor of the paper. In Kenya, O'Leary teamed up with Tim McClanahan, a UCSC alumnus who now heads the Wildlife Conservation Society's marine programs in Kenya. The researchers compared the types of coralline algae and the number of juvenile corals on Kenyan reefs under three different management conditions: closed, gear-restricted, and open access. On fished reefs (both those open to all fishing and those with gear restrictions), sea urchin populations were much higher than on closed reefs, resulting in lower abundance of crustose coralline algae and lower coral densities. "Outside the protected areas, we're seeing the ecosystem collapse," O'Leary said. "When you look at the effects of fishing, you can't just think about the species that are being removed. You have to look at how the effects are carried down through the ecosystem." Most of the young corals found in the surveys were growing on crustose coralline algae. Juveniles of four common coral families were more abundant on coralline algae than on any other settlement substrate. The results suggest that fishing can indirectly reduce coral recruitment or the success of juvenile corals by reducing the abundance of settlement-inducing coralline algae. "The loss of crustose coralline algae has huge implications for regeneration of coral reefs," O'Leary said. "In our surveys, we found no difference between gear-restricted areas and fully fished areas, so gear restrictions are not working to keep urchin populations down. We need to consider ecosystem-wide effects as we develop new management strategies." Potts said he hopes the new study will raise awareness of the role that coralline algae play in the health of coral reefs, especially in developing countries. "Most managers and conservationists, and even many scientists, are unaware of the existence, abundance, and importance of coralline algae, so management regimes intended to enhance the health of reefs may actually be detrimental," he said.

#### AND, a loss of reefs specifically causes extinction – collapse is quick and devastating

Craig 3 [Robin Craig, Indiana University, Robin Kundis, Winter, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155, p. 264-266]

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that **more diverse ecosystems are more stable**." Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the biosphere with us**.** The Black Sea is almost dead, its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique. The Black Sea is a microcosm of what is happening to the ocean systems at large. The stresses piled up: overfishing, oil spills, industrial discharges, nutrient pollution, wetlands destruction, the introduction of an alien species. The sea weakened, slowly at first, then collapsed with shocking suddenness. The lessons of this tragedy should not be lost to the rest of us, because much of what happened here is being repeated all over the world. The ecological stresses imposed on the Black Sea were not unique to communism. Nor, sadly, was the failure of governments to respond to the emerging crisis. Oxygen-starved "dead zones" appear with increasing frequency off the coasts of major cities and major rivers, forcing marine animals to flee and killing all that cannot. Ethics as well as enlightened self-interest thus suggest that the United States should protect fully-functioning marine ecosystems wherever possible - even if a few fishers go out of business as a result.

#### East African aquatic ecosystems are a biodiversity hotspot – collapse also destroys the economy – turns case

UNEP 2000 [(United Nations Environment Programme) “The environment of Eastern Africa”] AT

The Eastern African region covers four coastal countries along the East African coast (Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Somalia), one large island state (Madagascar), three smaller archipelagic states (Comores, Mauritius and Seychelles), and the territories of France in the southwest Indian Ocean (La Réunion). The environment here defies generalization, and encompasses several biogeographic provinces. Ecotypes include coastal dry forestss, coastal dunes, coastal floodplains, fresh and brackish water marshes,mangvoe forests, coral reefs, reef-back lagoons, sandy beaches and seabird rookeries (sea cliffs and nearshore islands). These areas function as essential habitat for local species including fish and migratory birds, as shoreline stabilizers, and as buffers again coastal erosion. The coast of Eastern Africa is bathed by the great current systems of the Indian Ocean, which vary greatly with the seasonal monsoons. The Indian Ocean has particularly narrow continental shelves along this coast, and thus lower biological productivity than many coastal regions. The coast is rich in varieties and numbers of marine life forms, however. Extensive and highly diverse coral reefs fringe its narrow shelves shores. Species-rich mangroves with their commercially important oysters, crabs and mullet abound near river estuaries and along the coasts, particularly those of Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya and southern Somalia. The region's people are dependent to a significant extent on coastal resources. Fisheries rely on the trawlable inter-reef areas and the species-rich mangroves with their commercially important oysters, crabs and mullet. Coastal ecosystems are important economically for tourism and recreation. Threats In 1981 a UNEP fact-finding mission to East Africa identified large-scale erosion, oil pollution, damaged coral reefs, ruined mangrove swamps, pollution from fertilizers and threats to precious marine animals as the major environmental problems in the region. The list of threats to the environment has changed little since then. A workshop in 1997 listed domestic sewage, solid domestic waste, habitat degradation, agrochemical pollution and industrial waste pollution. The region remains characterized by vulnerable economies, large populations with a high rate of population growth, and areas subject to environmental stress. Pollution The important and heavily fished reef zone close to shore is particularly vulnerable to pollution and silting. Oil is a major pollution threat to coastal ecosystems, owing to the heavy use of the tanker route along the East African coast. On any given day there are hundreds of tankers in the Region, many of them Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs). Slicks are brought in from spills in the open ocean by coastal currents, while operational discharges from ships and refineries add to the load. In recent decades, the growth of industry has brought an increasing volume of effluents to coastal waters. The use of agricultural chemicals has continued to grow, and sewage treatment continues to be inadequate in many parts of the region. Some species of marine animals are already endangered as a result of human activities, particularly the dugong or manatee, which is often caught in fishing nets and drowned. Marine turtles continue to decrease in numbers as their eggs are poached and the adults are killed for their meat and decorative shells. Eastern Africa is also undergoing an extraordinary rate of urbanization. As the cities have become overcrowded, water supplies have proven insufficient, and systems for drainage, sewerage and refuse disposal inadequate. Domestic sewage is discharged directly into rivers and in some cases the sea. Although industrialization remains slow relative to other parts of the world, it takes place without proper environmental impact assessments legislative controls, leading to further pressure on the environment. Rivers, creeks and the sea have become dumping sites for industrial wastes. Industries of major environmental concern in the region include textiles, tanneries, paper and pulp mills, breweries, chemical factories, cement factories, sugar factories, fertilizer factories, and oil refineries. In some countries, slaughter houses near the sea are a serious source of marine pollution. Desertification Long drawn out droughts, over-grazing and poor agricultural practices, deforestation and reclamation of wetlands for agriculture are all combining to bring about desertification in the coastal areas of East Africa. The continued high population growth rate is placing pressure on land beyond its carrying capacity, and driving out the traditional nomadic practices which allowed for environmental recovery. Livestock development is seldom accompanied by proper pasture management, leading to desert conditions in areas of concentration. When these destructive pressures occur in semi-arid areas with shallow soils, desertification and desert encroachment can becomes irreversible. The semi-arid parts of Eastern Africa are particularly vulnerable. Coastal degradation and erosion Human encroachment and activities such as animal husbandry and agriculture are rapidly degrading the coastal environment of Eastern Africa, resulting in deforestation, destruction of mangroves and disappearance of other vegetation; a decline in soil fertility, and the death of wildlife. Marine resources are directly threatened by these activities. Mangroves were once common in sheltered bays and estuaries, providing shelter to many important fish species and prawns. They are now threatened by intensive cropping to provide firewood, poles, tannin, medicinal products, paper pulp and timber, and to open up new space for aquaculture and salt production. Mangrove swamps are also threatened by fluctuations in the amount of fresh water and sediment reaching them caused by upstream hydraulic works, and indirectly by destruction of protective reefs.poles, firewood and by large-scale clearing for salt production. Coral reefs have been damaged by excessive siltation resulting from poor agricultural practices, deforestation along riverbanks, and the dredging and and dumping associated with harbour development. Many were damaged by fishing with dynamite and poison, especially before these methods were outlawed in part of the region. Tourists collect coral as souvenirs. More recently the bleaching of corals has become a severe problem. The shoreline in most of the region is receding as a result of coastal erosion: the shoreline retreat over parts of Tanzania has been estimated at between three and five metres per day. Barrier islands are particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels. Climate change A task team report on the implications of climate change for the Eastern African region (see UNEP: Potential impacts of expected climate change on coastal and near-shore environment. UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies No.140 (UNEP, 1992.) concluded that the region's low-lying coastal areas and marine ecosystems, water resources, terrestrial ecosystems and human settlements and coastal infrastructure are at risk as a consequence of climate change impacts. The economies of the region are dominated by agriculture. Fishing is an important source of food and contributes to the economy of the majority of the countries. Tourism is an important activity. The effects of climate change will be felt everywhere, perhaps most obviously in altered patterns of rainfall, coastal weathering, atmospheric pressure and evaporation. The spatial and temporal distribution of storms and cyclones will change their paths and frequency, and could well increase in intensity: Some scientists believe the terrible floods of early 2000 in Mozambique are but a taste of worse to come. Besides the direct toll on human lives, there will be impacts on coastal habitats such as coral reefs, lagoons, and mangroves. The reefs will be vulnerable to wave action and sea-level rise as well as sedimentation. Their destruction will lead to a decline in natural coastal defences and further encourage coastal erosion. The quality and quantity of water available from rainfall, rivers and ground water will be affected by changes in the distribution and amount of rainfall, evapo-transpiration, surface runoff, river discharge, recharge, and aquifer volumes. Drier and hotter conditions would place an inordinate pressure on water resources. Ecosystem effects could include latitudinal and altitudinal shifts in plant and animal species as well as, loss of biodiversity due to water scarcity and arid soil conditions. While agriculture might benefit somewhat from a global increase in CO2, moisture deficits would lower crop yields and require additional irrigation. Sea-level rise would increase the intrusion of saline water up river mouths and also decrease the area available for cultivation on low-lying coastal areas and river estuaries. Fisheries would be affected by changes to the breeding and migratory habits of most fish, hence, year to year variability of stocks could increase leading to a planning and management problems. Socio-economic activities, and infrastructure such as port facilities, waste disposal, roads, are already under stress. Climate change would create additional stress, hence reducing economic performance and growth. The human factor A critical problem in the region is the rapid rate of human population growth in some countries. Infrastructure has a hard time keeping up, with resulting strain on educational facilities as well as resources. Much of the population resides in the coastal areas, employed by the light industry located along the coast and others in the tourist industry. Most of the region's economies rely on agriculture and tourism which together contribute close to 50% of the gross domestic product. Tourism specifically is a main earner of foreign exchange in the coastal parts of most of the countries in the region. The population is unevenly distributed over the region. Northern Mozambique and Merca northwards of Somalia are almost uninhabited due to extreme climate conditions. Both mainland and island populations are concentrated on the coasts, where population growth is higher than average for the region as a whole, largely owing to migration, urbanization and favourable employment opportunities. The majority of these populations are employed by the light industry located along the coast and others in the tourist industry. Most of the economies rely on agriculture and tourism which together contribute close to 50% of the gross domestic product. Tourism specifically is a main earner of foreign exchange in the coastal parts of most of the countries in the region. The extremely rapid rate of population growth in some of the countries in the region is a critical factor, and the resulting pressure on social amenities, notably in the coastal cities, has become very high. The infrastructure is unable to keep pace with the population growth rate; educational facilities are no longer adequate and the resource base to support the required expansion programme meagre. There is great disparity in per capita income in the countries of the region for a variety of political and environmental reasons.

#### Biodiversity loss in specific hotspots causes extinction

Howard 11 [(lead of Ecosystem Service and Poverty Alleviation Project, Wageningen Univ. Department of Social Sciences Faculty) “Tipping Points and Biodiversity Change: Consequences for Human Wellbeing and Challenges for Science and Policy” Draft Prepared for the Kavli Seminar“Addressing Global Tipping Points”13-15 March 2011] AT

In the 20 th century, we became aware that the fate of biodiversity and the fate of humans are intimately interconnected. Before this, only some religions (and a few philosophers) predicted the end of life onEarth or human extinction through different versions of Armageddon, which was generally caused by thedivine consequences of wayward human behaviour. Darwin’s theory of evolution provided the means to un-derstand continual species extinctions, and scientists began to unearth the evidence of previous mass extinc-tions. However, the idea that extinction might extend to the human species was not taken up until the 20 th century, when it was argued that all species invariably become extinct (Raup 1991). Scientists came to un-derstand that the human species could disappear through catastrophic natural events, much as the dinosaursdisappeared, as a result of bolide impacts or large-scale volcanism. A secular concept of self-annihilationemerged less than 50 years ago with the spectre of global nuclear holocaust, which would also render muchother life on Earth unviable (see e.g. Robock et al. 2007), and where the life that remained would be distinct-ly antithetical to humans. Many now argue that there are other catastrophic threats to the human species,some of which threaten life on Earth more generally (Rees 2003, Posner 2004, Bostrom & Cirkovic 2008,Al-Rodhan 2009). We can only speculate whether the sixth mass extinction of species that appears to be un-derway has implications for the continued evolution of the human species, but we do know that it is the syn-ergies and feedbacks between global environmental change and biodiversity change, combined with mala-daptive human responses to that change (e.g. global nuclear conflict; unintended effects of technological re-sponses), that leads to the most catastrophic scenarios.Critical questions that arise when considering biodiversity change, the threats that it poses to humanwellbeing, and the challenges that it presents for mitigation and human adaptation, are whether there are crit-ical thresholds or ‘tipping points’ related to biodiversity change, and whether such tipping points can lead or contribute, directly or indirectly to global tipping points or whether they ‘only’ have implications at local or regional scales. If there are such tipping points, what types of implications do they have for human wellbe-ing? For whom, where, and when? Further, can such tipping points be avoided, and are we prepared to dealwith (adapt to) them if they cannot?With biodiversity change, there are a number of vulnerabilities to which the majority of the globe’s human population are exposed not only because they are impacted by this change at local level, but also because even local changes can have global repercussions due of global interdependencies. One is the rapidemergence and transmission of new infectious diseases and pests that both threaten plants and animals (and thus the humans that depend upon them), as well as humans directly (e.g. Chivian & Bernstein 2008, Pong-siri et al. 2009, Keesing et al. 2010, Sharma 2010). A second is invasive species, where species disperse be-yond their ‘normal’ range, invade many different regions on different continents, affecting the invaded eco-systems in highly unpredictable ways (e.g. GISP n.d., Walther et al. 2009, Perrings et al. 2010). Both maycontribute strongly to a third such vulnerability, which is addressed here, presented by tipping points that may emerge at regional scale, such as the loss of the Amazon rainforest or the collapse of coral reefs, that can have extra-regional or even global repercussions not only due to the loss of species and ecosystems, but as well due to the loss of some of the ecosystem services that these provide e.g. as CO 2 sinks, which creates synergies with phenomena such as climate change and ocean acidification. Finally, the fourth vulnerability is posed by human maladaptation to any of these dynamics, where maladaptation can exacerbate biodiversity change and can lead to other negative effects for human welfare and ecosystems. Conflict over dwindling biological resources and ecosystem services is likely to become pervasive, and conflict over the understand-ing of the causes and effects of such change are likely to be just as serious. The global security implications of climate change are of great concern and are being assessed (e.g. GACGC 2007) but, to our knowledge, no such assessment exists for biodiversity change. Many of the global, regional, and national institutions that inthe past have evolved to manage human-biodiversity relations have so far been shown to be relatively inef-fective in stemming biodiversity loss (see e.g. CBD 2010) and thus they are likely to be even more ineffec-tive in dealing with surprises or with the large-scale repercussions of the loss of benefits, e.g. of food, andnew institutions will have to emerge if such threats are not to translate into local, regional, and even global,catastrophe. I argue that to successfully adapt to tipping points requires major changes in values, priorities, andinstitutions, particularly economic institutions: some of this change may be forthcoming but much is unlikelyto change quickly or profoundly enough to avoid such tipping points. A first step is to recognise the implica-tions of biodiversity change and potential tipping points for human wellbeing, which is currently impeded bycultural, cognitive and political barriers. A second is to prepare for such change, and a third is to prepare po-tential responses. II. Biodiversity Change and Tipping PointsA. Types, magnitudes and drivers of biodiversity change Aside from numerous potential sources of global catastrophe that could have such implications for life onEarth, we also find ourselves in a period when rates of species extinctions are estimated at 50-500 times background, which is the highest rate in the past 65 million years. The effects of ongoing rapid decline of biomes and homogenisation of biotas have been summarised as:changes in species geographic ranges, genetic risks of extinction, genetic assimilation, naturalselection, mutation rates, the shortening of food chains, the increase in nutrient-enriched nich-es permitting the ascendancy of microbes, and the differential survival of ecological general-ists. Rates of evolutionary processes will change in different groups, and speciation in thelarger vertebrates is essentially over…Whether the biota will continue to provide the dependa- ble ecological services humans take for granted is less clear…Our inability to make clearer predictions about the future of evolution has serious consequences for both biodiversity andhumanity (Woodruff 2001: 5471).The consequences for biodiversity and humanity depend in part on the timescale in reference. Some scien-tists argue that the Earth’s sixth extinction has already arrived, where an estimated loss of over 75% of spe-cies can be expected, possibly within 250 to 500 years (Barnosky et al. 2011), although others highlight thefact that projections of species extinction rates are controversial (Pereira et al. 2010). A mass extinction hardly bodes well for humans given the changes in the biosphere, in biomes and ecosystems, the associated pest and disease outbreaks, etc. that are associated with the different drivers of biodiversity change and the possi- ble critical thresholds or tipping points discussed below and in other papers presented here. Thus, the impli-cations of what is laid out below are magnified many fold and their effects become increasingly synergisticover time – 500 years is a very short period when we consider that Homininae appeared 8 million years ago, Homo sapiens 500,000 years ago, and modern humans 200,000 years ago – effectively, it constitutes only.25% of modern human history. Were humans to have a council of elders to deliberate the impact of our ac-tivities on future generations, it would certainly be extraordinarily alarmed and calling for radical transfor-mations as, indeed, are many scientists today.What is extraordinary about this possible 6 th extinction of species is that, since it is human-induced,it is not inevitable and depends, for example, on rates of climate and land-use change (Pereira et al. 2010).For the first time in the Earth’s history, a species is actually in a position to change the course of evolutionwrit large (Western 2001). This is reflected in the range of projected changes in biodiversity, which is very broad both because ‘there are major opportunities to intervene through better policies, but also because of large uncertainties in projections’ (Pereira et al. 2010: 1496). The possibilities and constraints to doing so arediscussed below and in other papers. Many scientists consider that the probability that we will change thecourse that evolution is currently on is low or very low without radical and immediate transformations invalues, knowledge, behaviour, markets, and governance. 3The causes of species extinctions and related change in biodiversity and ecosystem services can becharacterised as ‘synergistic stressors’ – climatic change coupled with ‘abnormally high ecological stressors’and ‘unusual interactions’ (e.g. between human-induced climate change, habitat fragmentation, pollution,over-harvesting, invasive species, pathogens and, some would add, the ‘expanding human biomass’ (Bar-nosky et al. 2011) although one could just as easilyadd ‘the expanding livestock biomass’ or ‘expanding biofuels production’)(Steinfeld et al. 2010, Wise et al.2009). Beyond this, humans have had a massive im- pact on the productivity, composition, and diversity of terrestrial ecosystems by changing the rates of supplyof major nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus, and atmos- pheric CO 2 ), changing regional fire frequencies, [and]relaxing biogeographic barriers to species dispersal’(Tilman & Lehman 2001: 5433).Many human-dominated ecosystems are char-acterised by high natural resource extraction, shortfood chains, food web simplification, habitat and land-scape homogeneity, heavy use of petrochemicals andfossil fuels, convergent soil characteristics, modifiedhydrological cycles, reduced biotic and physical dis-turbance regimes, and global mobility of people, goodsand services (Western 2001) which give rise to theeffects in Box 1. In sum, humans are currently ‘appro- priating more than a third of all terrestrial primary production and, in so doing, have simplified or de-stroyed large portions of some types of ecosys-tems…many human environmental impacts are pro- jected to be two to three times stronger within 50years’ (Tilman & Lehman 2001: 5433). Notwithstand-ing their global significance, and not all human-dominated ecosystems are the same, not all humansare having the same impacts on biodiversity and eco-systems, which will also be taken up again below.According to the Millennium Ecosystem As-sessment (MEA) (Mace et al. 2005), at present habitatchange and fragmentation are the most important drivers of species extinctions, whereas invasive species andover-exploitation are the next most common, and disease, climate change, and pollution follow these in im- portance. Until recently, scientists generally agreed that species extinctions are principally due to habitat change and fragmentation, where it is human-induced land use changes such as agricultural expansion and especially tropical deforestation that have been the most important drivers, particularly since species richness is highest in tropical forests. As a result, most conservation activity has focused on reducing habitat loss andits impacts (Lewis 2006). Nevertheless, the major drivers of change in biodiversity vary per ecosystem type(Mace et al. 2005). For example, in tropical forests, habitat change has had a very high impact on biodiversi-ty over the past 100 years, followed by over-exploitation, whereas climate change, invasive species, and pol-lution have played minor roles. This is not the case in boreal forests, where nitrogen and phosphorus pollu-tion have been the major drivers.Since about the 1990s, however, there has been growing evidence that climate change is both interact-ing with these drivers and increasingly as a driver of biodiversity change in and of itself, to the point wheremost experts now agree that climate change will surpass habitat loss and fragmentation as the principle driv-er of species extinctions (Hannah et al. 2005, Thomas 2004, van Vuuren 2006). Climate change is not onlyincreasingly driving species extinctions: it also affects species composition in any given ecosystem throughchanges in range (distribution) of species, changes in timing of reproductions, and changes in the length of the growing season for plants (CBD 2007 and below). Today, scientists consider that it is the synergy be-tween habitat change and fragmentation and climate change that is the most threatening to biodiversity, giv-en that habitat loss and fragmentation can prohibit species from migrating and colonising new areas in re-sponse to climate change (Lovejoy & Hannah 2005).

### --- BioD Disease Impact

#### Biodiversity loss increases disease vulnerability

Matt and Gebser 11 – Florian and Ronny, citing Keesing et al. 2010, biologist at Bard College in Annandale, New York, “Biodiversity decline can increase the spread of infectious diseases like Hantavirus,” <http://www.eea.europa.eu/atlas/teeb/biodiversity-decline-can-increase-the/view>)//a-berg

What is the problem? Intuitively one might expect that higher overall biodiversity leads to greater diversity and abundance of pathogens and thus more incidences of the transmission of diseases. Therefore, species-rich environments might be seen to exhibit a higher infection risk than anthropogenic disturbed environments with a low biodiversity. However, research results show the opposite. Several studies suggest that with the loss of biodiversity the transmission of diseases increases (Keesing et al. 2010). Thus biodiversity loss causes the loss of an important ecosystem service: buffering the spreading of infectious diseases to humans, animals and plants (Pongsiri et al. 2009). The decline of biodiversity might lead to a faster rate of emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases, such as the Hantavirus, and therefore the infection of a greater proportion of the human population (Keesing et al. 2010, Pongsiri et al. 2009, Suzan et al. 2008, Peixoto and Abramson 2006). Regionally different genotypes of Hantaviruses cause hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) in Asia and Europe and the Hantavirus pulmonary syndrom (HPS) in the Americas (Pongsiri et al. 2009). Which ecosystem services were examined? And how? The examination of circumstances of recent Hantavirus outbreaks, transmitted from host animals to humans, so called zoonoses, showed that all outbreaks occurred in anthropogenic highly disturbed habitats with reduced biodiversity (Pongsiri et al. 2009, Suzan et al. 2008). Host species of Hantaviruses are rodents and the viruses are transmitted to humans by aerosolized rodent excreta or by direct contact with the animals. Among rodents, the virus spreads through physical contacts (aggressive encounters). In general, each Hantavirus genotype is associated with a certain rodent (host) species. Therefore, the probability that a certain Hantavirus genotype infects other rodent species successfully is very low. A study in Utah, USA, found a negative correlation between small-mammal diversity and Sin Nombre Hantavirus (SNV) infection prevalence in deer mice (Clay et al. 2009). High mammalian species diversity reduced the infection prevalence mainly by reducing the intraspecific encounters rather than by reducing host density. A result also supported by experiments. Deer mouse population density was not statistically associated with SNV infection prevalence. This suggests that high diversity reduced intraspecific encounters rather than host abundance (Clay et al. 2009). There seems to be evidence that in recent outbreaks the rodent species transmitting the virus was a generalist species (Suzan et al. 2008). Generalist species have a high adaptability to a wide range of habitats and can subsist on a variety of food sources. Keesing et al. (2010) speculate that species usually amplifying pathogens tend to invest less energy into immune defence and are more vulnerable to pathogens. In contrast, specialist species are highly adapted to a narrowly defined habitat and require one or a few specific food resources and may invest more into immune defence and hence buffering pathogens (Keesing et al. 2010). Anthropogenic disturbance to natural ecosystems frequently results in extensive simplification of the environment. Often, many specialist species become locally extinct whereas the population density of certain opportunistic species rises dramatically due to their better adaptability to a changing environment and the decrease of competitive pressure. Reduced diversity of rodent species subsequently means that the virus spreads most efficiently as there are fewer encounters with other species. Thus, it can be expected that Hantaviruses are transmitted and spread most efficiently within host communities of low diversity. Furthermore, the population of a generalist species tends to increase when species biodiversity decreases in highly disturbed regions, resulting in a higher risk of disease transmission to humans (Suzan et al. 2008). Hence, if biodiversity decreases, transmission events rise due to an increase in encounter rates among infected and between infected and susceptible hosts. Assuming that a rodent has a certain amount of aggressive encounters during its life, it transmits the virus in more cases if the small-mammal diversity is low, since aggressive encounters happen more often within the same species. A recent experimental field study conducted on wild rodent populations of different species in southwestern Panama backs this view. It showed that the relative abundance of Hantavirus hosts increases with a decrease in small-mammal species diversity (See figure below from Keesing et al. 2010). This in turn increases human infection risk (Pongsiri et al. 2009, Suzan et al. 2008). As a consequence of these findings Montira et al. (2009) suggest supporting policies that maintain or enhance biodiversity rather than trying to support or eliminate a certain species. Focusing on one species can have unexpected implications such as enhancing further biodiversity loss when eliminating a rodent species that might serve as food for others or as a buffer for diseases. Keesing et al. (2010) discuss that for certain diseases it can be considered to add a species (i.e. natural enemy or competitor) in order to control the host of the disease. It is also essential to reduce antibiotic overuse in order to avoid adaptation and resistance of pathogens. Further, it is important to identify potential emergence hotspots. The conservation of natural habitats can provide protection against emerging pathogens as it does not only foster biodiversity but also helps to reduce human-wildlife contact. It is also suggested to reduce contact between domestic animals and wildlife. However, the elimination of disease hotspots has the risk to “backfire” by resulting in pathogen transmission (Keesing et al. 2010).

#### Specifically, zoonotic diseases lead to extinction

Casadevall 12 – Prof @ Department of Microbiology and Immunology and the Division of Infectious Diseases of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine Arturo. (“The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology, p. 584-5)

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Tayloret al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

### --- Turns Case

#### Turns case – Lake Victoria is on the brink and it’s a key source of income for Ugandans

IRIN 08 [1 August 2008 (IRIN). “UGANDA: Lake Victoria degradation threatening livelihoods.” <http://www.irinnews.org/report/79568/uganda-lake-victoria-degradation-threatening-livelihoods>] AJ

KAMPALA, 1 August 2008 (IRIN) - A few years ago, Charles Kyagaba used to sell up to 300kg of fresh fish at the Gaba landing site near the Ugandan capital of Kampala each day, but now the situation is markedly different. "These days, you sometimes go out there and come back empty-handed," he said. "My income has declined by over 70 percent and the impact on my family’s livelihood is serious. I am struggling to make ends meet, trying to establish other businesses to balance the situation." Generally, Kyagaba said, there was now less fish in the lake. "I have had to change my children's schools to ones that I can afford," he told IRIN. "The fishing business is no longer sustainable and many of my friends feel frustrated. I am thinking about selling some of my assets to diversify my options; I am beginning to fail to provide some essential needs for my family." Kyagaba is not alone. According to environmentalists, over-fishing, pollution and other human activities along Lake Victoria as well as climate change are threatening to destroy Africa's largest freshwater lake resource. Lake Victoria is the second-largest freshwater lake in the world, covering nearly 68,800 sqkm. It is shared by Kenya (6 percent by area), Uganda (43 percent) and Tanzania (51 percent). Its basin, according to specialists, has the fastest-growing population in East Africa - more than 30 million people. Much of this population derives its livelihood directly or indirectly from the lake.

#### Outweighs –

#### Spillover – the lake affects bordering countries like Kenya and Tanzania as well

#### Jobs – even if they’re paid a living wage, nobody can get jobs to begin with

## Case

### Case D

#### No solvency – regulatory mechanisms fail

Benassi 11 [Benassi, Chiara (PhD student in Employment Relations and Organisational Behaviour, London School of Economics). The implementation of minimum wage: Challenges and creative solutions. No. 12. Global Labour University Working Paper, 2011] AJ

A review of academic literature reveals the same gap in the research: the minimum wage issue is widely debated as a matter of policy, but its implementation is often left out. Some authors deal with the question of legitimacy of minimum wage from a philosophical and legal perspective, discussing the minimum wage in reference to the ideal of social justice and of civil rights in different societies (Levin-Waldman 2009; Gaski 2004). The majority of the debate over minimum wage however mainly focuses on its macroeconomic effects. The effect of minimum wage on employment at the national level, as well as its application to specific groups (e.g. youth) or the informal sector represent some of the most controversial matters. Adopting different theoretical approaches, some authors support the negative correlation between employment and minimum wage, while others find no correlation or even positive effects of minimum wage.1 Parallel and equally controversial debates have been conducted on the impact of minimum wage on prices2 as well as on income distribution3. Despite the aforementioned ongoing controversies, discussions about effective minimum wage implementation must also take shape. The research on this issue is still at a very early stage despite the practical relevance of this aspect; however, there are some studies conducted in developing and industrialized countries that report that the presence of legal provisions for minimum wage does not guarantee that it will actually protect the workforce (i.a. Jones 1997; Strobl and Walsch 2001; BIS 2010a). These findings suggest that minimum wage needs further implementation mechanisms besides the traditional legislative top-down approach in order to serve as useful regulation tool.

## wip

### Fism bad

#### president opposes – Parliamentary ptx da to the cp

Imran 14 [Nakuiera Imran Mphil. degree candidate in Labour Law; University of Cape Town. Minimum Wages in Uganda: An analysis of Uganda’s Domestic, Regional, and International Commitments. University of Cape Town. February 26, 2014. ] AT 4/11/15

In response to the recent calls for setting the minimum wage, President Museveni during the 2013 Labour Day celebrations is quoted to have said that minimum wage is not a priority and that emphasis should be on lowering the cost of production to attract investors. The President reasoned that ‘...with today’s fewer jobs, an employer can sack you but another person can accept to do the same job at a much lower salary. So, the best option is to have a lot of investors and increase the demand for jobs and the wage will rise.’93 On the outlook, the above statement seems logical, from an economic point of view, there is general consensus on the correlation between demand and supply as expressed by the President.94 However, although the statement above seems deductively valid, it is also tainted by circular reasoning. Reviewed literature reveals that the purpose of an effective minimum wage includes protecting workers from unfair wage reductions such as those described by the President above in justifying why a minimum wage is not needed. 95 Nonetheless, numbers do not lie. The President’s concern on the few jobs within the country is line with the current unemployment statistics. For instance only 20% Of the 480,000 students that leave the education system each year find employment. 96 In a study of 17,000 Ugandans, about half said that getting a job was their top priority.97 Many respondents also raised the need for better social protection, especially in the informal sector. 98 Against this backdrop the President’s concern on the current number of jobs and how minimum wage will affect these jobs seems justified.

#### Yeah pres opposes

Imran 14 [Nakuiera Imran Mphil. degree candidate in Labour Law; University of Cape Town. Minimum Wages in Uganda: An analysis of Uganda’s Domestic, Regional, and International Commitments. University of Cape Town. February 26, 2014. ] AT 4/11/15

Government’s focus is on boosting infrastructural development and not salary increases as demanded by various trade unions... whoever feels unsatisfied can try out employment in organized places like Tanzania, where trade unions achieve most of what they champion for.’124 Accordingly, this study submits that the various opinions of government officials on the minimum wage highlighted above, not only symbolize the government’s emboldened conviction on its anti-minimum wage position but also the depressing possibility that this position could be based on a deficient analysis (or a deliberate lack of appreciation) of the true purpose, benefits and consequences of setting a minimum wage. Barya, notes that the Ugandan government is engrained to a neo-liberal

economic policy, which involves dismantling of price controls, retrenchment

of public servants and privatization of public enterprises. 125 This policy has

led to redundancies, wage cuts for existing staff and widespread

casualisation of labour.126 In the advancement of this policy, the setting of a

minimum wage (and perhaps the enforcement of labour legislation as a

whole) is viewed as unwarranted market interference.

In addition to the above, COFTU has lamented the government’s lack of

political will to defend workers’ interests,

‘The biggest challenge in the country is the fact that

leaders do not appreciate the workers’ contribution to the

economy...’

127

This assertion is consistent with the overall view of work as merely as factor

of production and wages as a production cost. A case in point, Uganda’s

Labour Ministry is poorly funded,

128and thereby lacks the capacity

supervise and effectively enforce labour laws within the country.129 In

addition to this, there has been previous intimidation of the Industrial

Court,130 and the reluctance to appoint a judge to this court has rendered it

inactive since the year 2006.131

#### more ev

Imran 14 [Nakuiera Imran Mphil. degree candidate in Labour Law; University of Cape Town. Minimum Wages in Uganda: An analysis of Uganda’s Domestic, Regional, and International Commitments. University of Cape Town. February 26, 2014. ] AT 4/11/15

However, further examination of events and rhetoric surrounding the minimum wage debate in Uganda reveals the colouration of a deliberate, unrelenting and increasingly explicit anti-minimum wage position from government. This position seems catalysed by fears of the potential negative impact that the setting of a minimum wage will have on the economy. However such fears may be overstated as they are not based on evidence specific to Uganda, but rather seem borne from varying broad perceptions about minimum wages in general. Regardless of the above, these fears seem to have been cemented by the country’s current high unemployment statistics, raising the need to attract investors and the uncompromising desire for economic growth. As a result, the President Museveni has pontificated that a minimum wage in Uganda is unnecessary. Uganda’s minimum wage setting legislation gives the President overall authority of endorsing or rejecting the minimum wage. 140 Basing on the discussions above, the setting of a minimum wage in Uganda’s near future seems unlikely.