Even if our material self changes, the best evidence is that humans possess a distinct even if inseparable soul that grounds identity and continuity. (\_\_) otherwise we could have no epistemic access to introspection. **KREEFT:**[[1]](#footnote-1)4d. Still another power of the soul which indicates that it is not a part or function of the body and therefore not subject to its laws and its mortality is the power to objectify its body. I can know a stone only because I am more than a stone. I can remember my past. (My present is alive; my past is dead.) I can know and love my body only because I am more than my body. As the projecting machine must be more than the images projected, the knower must be more than the objects known. Therefore I am more than my body.

(\_\_) Only an immaterial soul can account for the knowledge of forms. We know universals even though our corporeal self only deals with particular instantiations. The form is immaterial though, thus a green equilateral triangle and a purple isosceles triangle both share the same form even without corporeal similarity and can only be known by an immaterial self.

(\_\_) The properties of the self and the body are distinct. I can doubt that my body exists but not myself, thus I must have a soul that grounds myself separate from my body. **DESCARTES:**[[2]](#footnote-2)

Next I examined attentively what I was. I saw that while I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world and no place for me to be in, I could not for all that pretend that I did not exist. I saw on the contrary that from the mere fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed; whereas if I had merely ceased thinking, even if everything else I had ever imagined had been true, I should have had no reason to believe that I existed. From this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. (6:32–3)

Our need to strive towards goodness creates a transcendental necessary to hold to the immorality of one’s soul. **KANT:**[[3]](#footnote-3) **The production of** the **highest good** in the world **is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law.** **But** in such a will the ***complete conformity*** of dispositions with the moral law **is the supreme condition of the highest good. This** conformity **must therefore be just as possible as its object** is, **since it is contained in the** same **command to promote the object.** **Complete conformity** of the will with the moral law **is**, however, *holiness*, **a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment** of his existence. Since it is **[but] nevertheless required as practically necessary, it can only be found in an *endless progress* toward that complete conformity**, **and** in accordance with principles of pure practical reason **it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will. This** endless progress **is**, however, **possible only on the presupposition of the *existence*** and personality **of the same rational being continuing *endlessly*** (which is called the immortality of the soul). **Hence the highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul**, so that his, **as** inseparably connected with the moral law, is **a postulate of pure practical reason** (by which I understand a *theoretical* proposition, though one not demonstrable as such, insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid *practical* law). The proposition about the oral vocation of our nature, that only in an endless progress can we attain complete conformity with the moral law, is of the greatest usefulness, not merely in regard to the present supplement to the incapacity of speculative reason but also with respect to religion. In default of it, one either quite degrades the moral law from its *holiness* by making it out to be *lenient* (indulgent) and thus conformed to our convenience, or else strains one’s calling as well as one’s expectation to an unattainable vocation, namely to a hoped-for full acquisition of holiness of will, and so gets lost in enthusiastic *theosophical* dreams that quite contradict self-knowledge; in both cases, constant *effort* to observe precisely and fully a strict and inflexible command of reason, which is yet not ideal but true, is only hindered. **For a rational but finite being only endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection is possible.** *The eternal being,* to whom to temporal condition if nothing, sees in what is to us an endless series the whole of conformity with the moral law, and the holiness that his command inflexibly requires in order to be commensurable with his justice in the share he determines for each in the highest good is to be found whole in a single intellectual intuition of the existence of rational beings All that a creature can have with respect to hope for this share is a consciousness of his tried disposition, so that, form the progress he has already made from the worse to the morally better and from the immutable resolution he has thereby come to know, he may hope for a further uninterrupted continuance of this progress, however long his existence may last, even beyond this life; and thus he cannot hope, either here or in any foreseeable future moment of his existence, to be fully adequate to God’s will (without indulgence or dispensation, which do not harmonize with justice); he can hope to be so only in the endlessness of his duration (which God alone can survey). .

Explanation: Goodness is complete conformity with the law which it wills since this is an absolute evaluation of certain actions, not something that comes in degrees – that means complete conformity is a condition of the highest good. We can’t aim at something we can never achieve – you can never work at a job for the purposes of money if you know you’ll never get a paycheck – it is a transcendental contradiction since you cannot will at an end you know you can’t get. It is not possible to achieve absolute goodness in this world so it must occur in the universal – contingences of life will drive us toward being weak.

The soul must be distinct form the body thus persisting even following physical death:

First, knowledge of the body requires separation from it. You cannot look at yourself, because it treats the self as object not subject. But you can look at our body thus your body cannot be coextensive with the self. **KREEFT:**[[4]](#footnote-4)

4d. Still another power of **the soul** which indicates that it **is not a** part or **function of the body** and therefore not subject to its laws and its mortality is the power to objectify its body. **I can know a stone only because I am more than a stone. I can remember my past**. (My present is alive; my past is dead.) I can know and love my body only **because I am more than my body. As the projecting machine must be more than the images projected, the knower must be more than the objects known. Therefore I am more than my body.**

Second, to be able to account for the fact of bodily act and movement, it must be accounted for via an immaterial non-bodily soul. Action cannot be corporeal because it is the principle by which we grasp corporeal movement. If the soul cannot act incidentally and not motivated by corporal reality there is no way to explain humans acting at all. We would be left with just one giant God act. Thomas Aquinas[[5]](#footnote-5)

I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that **the soul is defined as the first principle of life** of those things which live: **for we call** living things "**animate**," [i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is **shown** principally **by** two actions, **knowledge and movement**. The **philosophers of old**, not being able to rise above their imagination, **supposed** that the principle of these **action**s **was** something **corporeal**: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal. **This** opinion **can be proved** to be **false** in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, **based on universal and certain principles**, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body. It is manifest that **not every principle** of vital action **is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision**; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet **nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life.** **For** it is clear that **to be a principle of life**, or to be a living thing, **does not belong to a body** as such; **since**, **if that were the case**, **every body would be** a living thing, or **a principle of life.** Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. **Therefore the soul**, which is the first principle of life, **is not a body, but the act of a body**; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body. Reply to Objection 1. **[Second]] As everything** which is **in motion must be moved** by something else, **a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is moved**. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. **There is**, however, **a**nother **kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally**; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; **such a mover, is the soul**. There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially--namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body. Reply to Objection 2. The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies. Reply to Objection 3. There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.

Third only an immaterial soul can account for the knowledge of forms. We know universals even though our corporeal self only deals with particular instantiations. The form is immaterial though, thus a green equilateral triangle and a purple isosceles triangle both share the same form even without corporeal similarity and can only be known by an immaterial self.

Inferentially you still survive physical death.

Kreeft 2

Still another argument from **the** nature of **soul**, or spirit, is that it **does not have quantifiable,** countable **parts** as matter does. **You can cut a body in half but not a soul;** you can't have half a soul. It is not extended in space. **You don't cut an inch off your soul when you get a haircut.** Since soul has no parts**, it cannot be decomposed, as a body can**. **Whatever is composed** (of parts) **can be decomposed**: a molecule into atoms, a cell into molecules, an organ into cells, a body into organs, a person into body and soul. **But soul is not composed, therefore not decomposable.** **It could die only by being annihilated as a whole. But this would be contrary to a basic law of the universe: that nothing simply and absolutely vanishes**, just as nothing simply pops into existence with no cause. **But if the soul dies neither in** **parts** (by decomposition) **nor as a whole by annihilation, then it does not die.**

Three more warrants are provided by Plato. **SPEAKS[[6]](#footnote-6)** explains Plato but does not endorse the argument**:** Plato is the classical source of philosophical arguments for the immortality of the soul. By calling them ‘philosophical’ arguments I am distinguishing them from arguments which are based on empirical research, like research into near-death experiences, and from arguments which rely on premises taken from a particular religious tradition. We will discuss empirical and religious arguments later. (The line between these is not always sharp. Philosophical arguments can sometimes use premises known by experience, and religious arguments might rely on religious doctrines which can be supported by philosophical arguments which don’t themselves presuppose any religious doctrines.) The reading from Plato is a selection from his dialogue the *Phaedo*, which is his eulogy to his teacher, Socrates, and recounts the last hours of Socrates’ life. The form of the part of the dialogue we read is a conversation between Socrates and his friends before his death, in which he tries to convince them that there is nothing to fear from the death. One thing to keep in mind about these arguments is that they seem, in places, to presuppose a kind of dualist view of the self. You might think that this view of the self makes arguments for immortality unnecessary: if we are immaterial souls, isn’t it obvious that we must survive death? It’s important to see that even though belief in immortality is often linked with belief in the soul, that there’s no immediate route from the latter to the former. I.e., there’s no obvious contradiction in thinking that we are immaterial souls which cease to exist when our bodies do. 1 The argument from generation out of opposites The first of Socrates’ arguments for immortality begins on p. 117: “Let us see whether in general everything that admits of generation is generated in this way and no other — opposites from opposites, wherever there is an opposite ...Let us consider whether it is a necessary law that everything which has an opposite is generated from that opposite and no other source. For example, when a thing becomes bigger, it must, I suppose, have been smaller first before it became bigger?” Socrates next observes that death is the opposite of life. So, if his principle holds, it seems as though “the living have come from the dead no less than the dead from the living. But I think we decided that if this was so, it was a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must exist in some place from which they are reborn.”

One interpretation of what’s going on here: **[first] if death and life are opposites, and if it follows from this that something could have come to be living only after first having been dead, then it seems that we must, in some sense or other, exist when dead**. But this is what Socrates is trying to show. A criticism of this argument, based on the distinction between coming to exist and acquiring a property. Maybe coming to life is the former rather than the latter; but the argument seems to depend on it being an instance of the latter. 2 The argument from recollection Socrates’ second argument (pp. 120-128) is based on his theory of recollection. That theory was an explanation of how we can come to know the kinds of things that we can. One way to see the motivation for this theory is via the ‘paradox of inquiry’: **[Second] For any question, either you know the answer or you don’t. If you know the answer, then inquiry is unnecessary. If you don’t know the answer, you’ll have no way of recognizing the correct answer** when it presents itself — for if you don’t know what the correct answer is, how will you distinguish it from false answers? So **if you don’t know the answer, inquiry is impossible**. One might take this paradox to support the view that, as Cebes puts it (p. 120) **“what we call learning is really just recollection. If that is true, then surely what we recollect now we must have learned at some time before; which is impossible unless our souls existed somewhere before they entered this human shape. So in that way too it seems likely that the soul is immortal.”** A response to the paradox of inquiry for the case of empirical knowledge, e.g. finding out what is for dinner in South Dining Hall. Why this doesn’t carry over immediately to the case of ‘a priori’ knowledge not obtained by calculation. A second, related argument for recollection: the example of Meno. A third argument: our knowledge of qualities like ‘absolute equality’ (p. 124) which we do not observe by our senses to exist anywhere in the world around us. 3 The simplicity argument This argument leads Cebes to respond, “It seems that we have got the proof of one half of what we wanted — that the soul existed before birth — but now we need also to prove that it will exist after our death no less than before our birth, if our proof is to be complete.” This leads Socrates to another argument for the immortality of the soul: “We ought, I think, to ask ourselves this: What sort of thing is it that would naturally suffer the fate of being dispersed? For what sort of thing should we fear this fate, and for what should we not? When we have answered this, we should next consider to which class the soul belongs; and then we shall know whether to feel confidence or fear about the fate of our souls. Would you not expect a composite object or a natural compound to be liable to break up where it was put together? and ought not anything which is really incomposite to be the one thing of all others which is not affected in this way?” Socrates’ thought here seems to be this: **[third] if a thing is composite, then it can be destroyed by being separated into its parts**; if we observe things being destroyed, this is usually how it goes. **But if something is incomposite, and has no parts, then it cannot be destroyed by being resolved into its parts**. But it seems that **there’s no other way in which a thing could be destroyed. So, if the soul is incomposite, it is indestructible, and so can’t be destroyed by death**. Then the question is: is the soul composite, or incomposite? Socrates asks: “Is it not extremely probable that what is always constant and invariable is incomposite, and what is inconstant and variable is composite?” **Socrates then contrasts things which are constant and invariable — like absolute equality and absolute beauty — with** things which are not, like **the concrete material things around us**. He concludes that in general **things which are invisible are constant and invariable**, whereas things which are visible are inconstant and variable. But it looks like **the body is visible whereas the soul is invisible; so it looks like the soul is more like those things which have been found to be constant and invariable**. But if the soul is constant and invariable, and the body is inconstant and variable, the soul must be less likely to be destroyed by death than the body. But the body is not destroyed by death; so all the more so must the soul be destroyed by death.

 o/w your offense:

a) deals with beliefs needed to hold ethical beliefs, so it has greater relevance

b) you are an immortal dead person forever whereas you are living for only a finite amount of time means that those harms outweigh vastly on duration.

c) We can only value our goods in our lives like happiness consistently or ethically if you first regard as good the ultimate end of your immortal soul, so it takes logically priority over other considerations.

d) takes out the notion that dead people don’t have rights – if you can affect the soul of a person you affect their essence far more than some person’s body coming back together when they get an organ.

Kant’s argument for God and immortality. ROHLF[[7]](#footnote-7): Consider first Kant's moral argument for belief in immortality. The highest good, as we have seen, would be a world of complete morality and happiness. But Kant holds that it is impossible for “a rational being of the sensible world” to exhibit “complete conformity of dispositions with the moral law,” which he calls “holiness,” because we can never extirpate the propensity of our reason to give priority to the incentives of inclination over the incentive of duty, which propensity Kant calls radical evil (5:122, 6:37). But Kant claims that the moral law nevertheless requires holiness, and that it therefore “can only be found in an endless progress toward that complete conformity,” or progress that goes to infinity (5:122). This does not mean that we can substitute endless progress toward complete conformity with the moral law for holiness in the concept of the highest good, but rather that we must represent that complete conformity as an infinite progress toward the limit of holiness. Kant continues: “This endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposition of the existence and personality of the same rational being continuing endlessly (which is called the immortality of the soul). Hence the highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul, so that this, as inseparable with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason” (ibid.). Kant's idea is not that we should imagine ourselves attaining holiness later although we are not capable of it in this life. Rather, his view is that we must represent holiness as continual progress toward complete conformity of our dispositions with the moral law that begins in this life and extends into infinity. Kant's moral argument for belief in God in the Critique of Practical Reason may be summarized as follows. Kant holds that virtue and happiness are not just combined but necessarily combined in the idea of the highest good, because only possessing virtue makes one worthy of happiness — a claim that Kant seems to regard as part of the content of the moral law (4:393; 5:110, 124). But we can represent virtue and happiness as necessarily combined only by representing virtue as the efficient cause of happiness. This means that we must represent the highest good not simply as a state of affairs in which everyone is both happy and virtuous, but rather as one in which everyone is happy because they are virtuous (5:113–114, 124). However, it is beyond the power of human beings, both individually and collectively, to guarantee that happiness results from virtue, and we do not know any law of nature that guarantees this either. Therefore, we must conclude that the highest good is impossible, unless we postulate “the existence of a cause of nature, distinct from nature, which contains the ground of this connection, namely the exact correspondence of happiness with morality” (5:125). This cause of nature would have to be God since it must have both understanding and will. Kant probably does not conceive of God as the efficient cause of a happiness that is rewarded in a future life to those who are virtuous in this one. Rather, his view is probably that we represent our endless progress toward holiness, beginning with this life and extending into infinity, as the efficient cause of our happiness, which likewise begins in this life and extends to a future one, in accordance with teleological laws that God authors and causes to harmonize with efficient causes in nature (A809–812/B837–840; 5:127–131, 447–450). Both of these arguments are subjective in the sense that, rather than attempting to show how the world must be constituted objectively in order for the highest good to be possible, they purport to show only how we must conceive of the highest good in order to be subjectively capable both of representing it as possible and of fulfilling our duty to promote it. But Kant also claims that both arguments have an objective basis: first, in the sense that it cannot be proven objectively either that immortality or God's existence are impossible; and, second, in the sense that both arguments proceed from a duty to promote the highest good that is based not on the subjective character of human reason but on the moral law, which is objectively valid for all rational beings. So while it is not, strictly speaking, a duty to believe in God or immortality, we must believe both in order to fulfill our duty to promote the highest good, given the subjective character of human reason.

To see why, consider what would happen if we did not believe in God or immortality, according to Kant. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seems to say that this would leave us without any incentive to be moral, and even that the moral law would be invalid without God and immortality (A813/B841, A468/B496). But Kant later rejects this view (8:139). His mature view is that our reason would be in conflict with itself if we did not believe in God and immortality, because pure practical reason would represent the moral law as authoritative for us and so present us with an incentive that is sufficient to determine our will; but pure theoretical (i.e., speculative) reason would undermine this incentive by declaring morality an empty ideal, since it would not be able to conceive of the highest good as possible (5:121, 143, 471–472, 450–453). In other words, the moral law would remain valid and provide any rational being with sufficient incentive to act from duty, but we would be incapable of acting as rational beings, since “it is a condition of having reason at all [...] that its principles and affirmations must not contradict one another” (5:120). The only way to bring speculative and practical reason “into that relation of equality in which reason in general can be used purposively” is to affirm the postulates on the grounds that pure practical reason has primacy over speculative reason. This means, Kant explains, that if the capacity of speculative reason “does not extend to establishing certain propositions affirmatively, although they do not contradict it, as soon as these same propositions belong inseparably to the practical interest of pure reason it must accept them [...,] being mindful, however, that these are not its insights but are yet extensions of its use from another, namely a practical perspective” (5:121). The primacy of practical reason is a key element of Kant's response to the crisis of the Enlightenment, since he holds that reason deserves the sovereign authority entrusted to it by the Enlightenment only on this basis.

1. Peter Kreeft. The Case for Life After Death. <http://www.peterkreeft.com/topics-more/case-for-life-after-death.htm>. No date [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. René Descartes Found on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosphy. Section 3.4. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes/#MinRel> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Immanuel Kant Critique of Practical Reason. 5:122-3. Edited by Mary Gregor. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Peter Kreeft. The Case for Life After Death. <http://www.peterkreeft.com/topics-more/case-for-life-after-death.htm>. 1274. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. Question 75. <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1075.htm#article1>. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Platonic arguments for the immortality of the soul PHIL 20208  Jeff Speaks November 28, 2006 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Rohlf, Michael, "Immanuel Kant", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/kant/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)