#### The standard is consistency with the sovereign’s authority. Prefer:

#### The sovereign is impossible to avoid. All persons want to become meaning creators and eventually a sovereign will be formed.

**Parrish** [Derrida`s Economy of Violence in Hobbes` Social Contract, Richard Parrish]

But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues **that in the state of nature persons must** not only try to control as many objects as possible -- they must also **try to control as many persons as possible**. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, **by force** or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among [persons in the state of nature] there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. **Persons,** as rationally self-interestedbeings **who** "measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and **value themselves above all others, attempt to force that valuation on others.** "**The human desire for 'glory'**, which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," **is** therefore primarily **about subsuming others beneath one's own personhood, as direct objects** or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that **this discursive struggle rapidly becomes physical** by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 **The ultimate violence, the surest and most complete way of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all**. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning.

#### This outweighs:

#### individuals are always ontologically self-interested, meaning we are key to ethical motivation.

**Mercer 01** [In Defence of Weak Psychological Egoism.: Mark Mercer. Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 55, No. 2 (2001), pp. 217-23]

To begin: To understand what another has done is both to have a particular sort of true description of the [his] action he has performed, one that reveals it to be intentional, and to know the agent's [his] practical reason for performing that action. In turn, to know an agent's reason for performing particular action involves understanding [their] motivation in doing it. An interpreter cannot, though, really understand an agent's motivation in performing an action unless she sees that motivation as a motivation, unless she is cognizant of its force as a motivation. It is not enough, that is to say, to understand what a person who intentionally sips from a saucer of mud has done to note merely that he had the desire to sip from a saucer of mud, and believed himself both possessed of a saucer of mud and able to sip from it. An interpreter has also to comprehend what in desiring to sip from a saucer of mud was attractive to him. Now usually, of course, there is no problem in our comprehending what it is in the desires had by people around us that attracts them as desirable. The people around us are more or less like us in many if not most of their desires, wants and wishes, and few of them desire to sip from a saucer of mud, so in our day to day life we do not often have cause to turn our attention explicitly to the question from whence arrives the motivational force of their desires. Still, it is not exceedingly uncommon for us, even for those of us who are not psychologists, sociologists, or anthropologists, to be stumped by some piece of what we take to be behaviour. How are we to make sense of some such piece of strange behaviour? One way is to connect that piece of behaviour to one or more of the strange agent's self-regarding ends. If we can see in sipping from a saucer of mud a way of maintaining self-respect, or even a way to delight in the taste of mud, we can understand the desire the agent had to sip from [the] a saucer of mud. We need not connect his self-regarding end to an intention to realize that end in or through his action; we need only, I think, connect it to an expectation of realizing it. But is this the only way we can make sense of desires we ourselves do not share and cannot, at first at least, imagine sharing? I think that it is. Without our perceiving a connection to an intention or an expectation of realizing some self-regarding end, we cannot see in any consideration we attribute to an agent a motivation to act.

#### b) Non-uniques disads to the framework. The sovereign exists regardless or not.

#### 2. The state’s only purpose is to do as it wishes.

Hobbes Thomas -- philosopher, historian, ethicist, geometrician, squarer of the circle -- *Leviathan*, selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, ed. w/ intro by Edwin Curley, Hackett. p. 213

XXIX [9] A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth is this: That he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws. It is true that sovereigns are all subject to the laws of nature, because such laws be divine, and cannot by any man or commonwealth be abrogated. But to those laws which the sovereign himself, that is, which the commonwealth maketh, [it] he is not subject. For to be subject to laws is to be subject to the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to [it]self, which is not subjection, but freedom from the laws. Which error, because it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish him, which is to make a new sovereign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion and dissolution of the commonwealth

#### Outweighs: the resolution talks about what a state ought to do, not individuals. Specificity comes first since different actors have different obligations.

#### 3. The state constitutively was created for the purpose of controlling morality.

Koch Andrew M. Koch, “Dionysian Politics: The Anarchist Implications of Nietzsche’s Critique of Western Epistemology” I am not Man, I am Dynamite!: Fredriech Nietzsche and the Anarchist Tradition, ed. John Moore

The character of the nation-state, and the validity of its foundations, represent another matter. If the nation-state arose out of conditions that are historical and dependent upon the material conditions of life then, obviously, there can be no link between the exercise of power and any transcendental notion of collective essence, human or social teleologies, or moral foundations. There is still a question, however, regarding the "will to structure" as part of the "will to power." What is the origin of the process that initiates the construction of a political structure? The will to any structure is, for Nietzsche, Apollonian will. Nietzsche's position is that the relationship between human beings and the world of nature was essentially an aesthetic relationship. The world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon? This claim has several facets. The world requires interpretation. Human beings do not engage in uncovering any hidden transcendental truths. Science does not uncover truth, but is only a form of interpretation that takes place within a strict syntactical structure, The "objectivity" it seeks to bring to interpretation produces an outcome of a lower order than the artistic.10 Science's real character is actually the suspension of "will" in its interpretation." The condition of artistic creation is the highest condition for the human being. The Apollonian and Dionysian are the two forces whose tension produces art. Nietzsche uses the metaphors of "dream" and "intoxication" to indicate what he means by these two concepts." The Apollonian is an aesthetic will to construct an illusion, a fantasy, that brings beauty and order. Through the construction of an image we interpret our place and activities in relation to the world. "lf we could imagine an incarnation of dissonance-and what is man if not that?-that dissonance, in order to endure life, would need a marvelous illusion to cover it with a veil of beauty. This is the proper artistic intention of Apollo...""˜3 We are redeemed through these illusions." The illusions give us identity, purpose, and connection. Nietzsche argues that this fantasy has its origins in necessity.15 Necessity initiates the construction of the illusion, but that alone is insufficient to validate the tentative and contingent outcome as corresponding to the "true." This is important because it establishes the foundationless character of all political structure**.** If the origin of structure is aesthetic rather than "essential" or even "scientific," then the tentative and contingent nature of any structure is more apparent. As Nietzsche puts it, art is not an imitation of nature but its metaphysical supplement, raised up beside nature to overcome it.'6 The construction of a political order is precisely the type of product that Nietzsche describes as the outcome of Apollonian will. A political structure is the residue of the "will to power" as it seeks to bring order to the world by constructing an image of its structure. This drive gives rise to the formation of an illusion. The origin of the "political" is the need to create order and structure, to raise human beings out of the dissonance of nature. In political terms, the will to construction, driven by necessity, has generated the representation of "human nature" as a fixed reference point for a deductive process of political application. Once a definition of the human character can be asserted, a political structure emerges as a logical outcome. This is the case regardless of the content of that representation. Nietzsche's rejection of the Western philosophic tradition would, therefore, also constitute a rejection of the Western political traditions. From the perspective of genealogy, the characterizations of human nature that have served as the foundation for political prescriptions from Plato to Hobbes, Locke, Kropotkin, and Marx" have their origins in specific historical and contextual necessities. Human nature was represented in order to provide a basis for an Apollonian construction, the need to bring order and structure. The practice of politics is the application of that illusion.

#### I contend that under a Hobbesian framework, restrictions are justified:

#### **Not only do we have no rights under the NC framework, the sovereign has a unique obligation to quiet dissent.**

Parkin 12 (Jon, University of York, “Thomas Hobbes and the Problem of Self-Censorship,” *History of European Ideas*)

Hobbes saw the unregulated public expression of controversial beliefs and opinions as the root of civil strife. Hobbesian subjects therefore have no right to the free public expression of their beliefs, and are obliged to conform their public statements to whatever is required of them by the sovereign. This view was elaborated unapologetically in chapter 42 of Leviathan, where Hobbes confronted the potentially hard case of religious believers who were required by their sovereign to subscribe publicly to beliefs that they privately found intolerable. In response, Hobbes points out that any command to a Christian which forbids belief in Christ will simply be ineffective because belief cannot be commanded. On the other hand, if a Christian is required to say that he does not believe in Christ, Hobbes counsels that ‘Profession with the tongue is but an externall thing’, and is no more than a gesture signifying obedience to the sovereign. Therefore a Christian commanded to repudiate Christ has the same liberty as Naaman the Syrian in the Book of Kings who, after he had converted to the God of Israel, was still required to worship in the temple of Rimmon and did so (or so Hobbes claimed) with the approval of the prophet Elisha.

#### And, decisions made by public colleges are indeed state decisions, meaning that public colleges are legally the sovereign.

Buchter 73, Jonathan. “Contract law and the student-university relationship.” *Indiana Law Journal,* vol. 48, issue. 2, article 5, Winter 1973.

“This theoretical mixture was applied in student-university litigation until Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education was decided in 1961. Dixon held, generally, that a public university’s actions were state actions and therefore subject to constitutional restraints and, more particularly, that a student must be afforded procedural due process prior to expulsion. However, the state action doctrine in Dixon has not replaced the implied contract theory. Courts still view the student-university relationship as one of contract with certain constitutional protections required if the institution is public. Thus, there may currently be some limits on what the public university may demand from the student. For example, a public university may not be able to deny a student certain first amendment rights. However, since the Dixon holding is limited to public institutions, a private university may be able to contract in such a way as to limit these constitutional rights.”