#### This was an unbroken NC we wrote primarily to answer agonism affs – Thanks to felix for all the help on this one

## 1NC

### FW

#### Moral agents are inherently relational and interdependent – morally relevant social relationships can exist involuntarily and hold unequal distributions of power. Ethics must be oriented in a way that can explain the way ethical communities arise

Moellendorf and Widdows summarize [Darrel Moellendorf (Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Institute for Health and Social Policy at McGill University, Canada) and Heather Widdows (Professor in the philosophy department at the University of Birmingham, where she teaches moral philosophy, bioethics, global ethics and health and happiness.); “The Routledge Handbook of Global Ethics”; pub: 2014-10-23; Routledge; pp. 52-54; //BWSWJ]

From the perspective of care, caring relations between persons are especially of value. In its earliest formulations, its focus was on the face-to-face interactions of those who give and receive care, especially in such activities as mothering, and some thought it was limited to such contexts. By now, however, it has moved far beyond this. It may be easiest to recognize the values in caring relations in the case of personal relations between members of families or of friends or small groups. But this understanding can be extended to valuing caring relations between all persons in any number of contexts. It can also encompass the moral considerations of justice. Although the emotions so central to care, of empathy, caring and concern for others, may be felt most strongly for those close to us, they can also be felt for distant others. As Hume argued persuasively, we are not indifferent to the pain of those we do not know (Hume [1752] 1957: section V, part II). Instead of building ethics on the model of the independent, self-sufficient liberal individual contracting with his equals, the ethics of care understands persons as inherently relational and interdependent. Instead of assuming that morally relevant social relations are entered into voluntarily, it understands the moral significance of the unchosen relations in which we find ourselves. These are frequently between persons of very unequal power. The ethics of care fosters such practices as responding effectively and with sensitivity to actual needs of embodied persons, and dealing with conflict non-violently. It builds the trust that can only exist between persons, since being trusting when others are untrustworthy may be naïve and ill-advised. It attends as closely to the experience of recipients of care as of care providers, offering guidance for avoiding paternalism and the tendency of the strong to dominate.

#### This necessitates an ethics of care – interpersonal relationships must reflect care to be just. A cooperative pursuit of the good enables ethical communities to be built on a developmental model of respect – that’s key to avoid violence

Moellendorf and Widdows 2 [Darrel Moellendorf (Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Institute for Health and Social Policy at McGill University, Canada) and Heather Widdows (Professor in the philosophy department at the University of Birmingham, where she teaches moral philosophy, bioethics, global ethics and health and happiness.); “The Routledge Handbook of Global Ethics”; pub: 2014-10-23; Routledge; pp. 52-54; //BWSWJ]

Care includes the practices of providing care and being cared for and the values that are reflected in such practices and by which they are evaluated. It is thus both value and practice. Existing practices of care need continual improvement, and the social structures in which care takes place need to be radically transformed so that all persons can be adequately cared for in non-exploitative ways. To the ethics of care, care is a value at least as important as justice, and more fundamental. Its practices incorporate caring values and should be progressively improved. Practices of justice, such as the enforcement of law and distribution of goods, should reflect the values of justice, as practices of care reflect the values of care. Those of care are more essential. One can survive without justice, but no one can survive without having received a great deal of care. The ethics of care is based on experience. One of its strengths is that the experience on which it is built is truly universal, the experience of having been cared for. Every single person everywhere and at any time in history has access to this experience, and most persons also have experience of providing care. The ethics of care thus has no need to appeal to religious views that are divisive. Nor does it rest on the individualistic outlook of theories that only claim to be universal. Care does not assume, as many moral theories do, a context of individuals all seeking their own interests in competition with others doing the same. Nor does it assume that morality typically requires self-sacrifice. It reflects neither the egoistic pursuit of self-interest nor the altruistic denial of self. It promotes the cooperative pursuit of the mutual good of, and caring relation between, care recipients and care providers. Parents characteristically want their children to develop well and children usually want their aged parents to be well cared for. They can aim for what is good for both or all held together by care. This is not to say that care always opposes competition. Much competition between members of a civil community is acceptable to an ethics of care: sports teams compete and persons can, within limits, seek to promote their economic interests. Sometimes such competition represents a lowering of deadly or violent competition between rival groups. However, if there is nothing else than competition in the interactions of persons and groups, persons will not be genuine friends and groups will not form a civil community. There must be some social glue to keep persons and communities together, and this can best be thought of as mutual concern within caring relations. The caring concern we have for strangers and those rather distant from us can be relatively weak. But without any underlying concern for the persons involved, assemblages of persons can easily disintegrate or descend into violence. Within the weaker relations of care that can be formed with relatively distant others, we can well develop legal and political ways to interact. For these particular contexts, more traditional moral theories in which justice is primary can often be suitable. But care and its values should remain fundamental, with caring relations forming the wider and more fundamental context in which particular legal or political interactions occur. We ought to extend caring relations to everyone, enough to care what happens to them and to care that their needs will be met. We can recognize, at the same time, that people are divided into separate societies, and we can seek the norms that should govern their relations with one another within these societies. For their governing institutions, traditional liberal norms may well be suitable. We do not need, however, to wait until the norms recommended within states are universally accepted as valid to accept the restraints of international law. Caring concern for all persons, though weak, should lead us to strongly promote the avoidance of violence between states, as between persons, and the furtherance of the human rights of all persons. Once societies have coherence and can maintain legal and political systems, traditional theories such as Kantian ethics and utilitarianism may be appropriate for problems that can be treated as internal to them. However, legal and political ways of interacting should be seen as embedded within a wider network of caring human relations, for which the ethics of care is a more promising guide. The moral theories appropriate for legal and political interactions have been offered to us as comprehensive moral theories, but they are seriously unsatisfactory beyond legal and political contexts, as attention to care makes clear. For the fundamental evaluation of legal and political practices and the laws and institutions they embody, and for understanding how they ought to be changed and their place in society modified, the ethics of care can offer guidance. And for recommendations on how groups and states ought to behave, and how persons ought to act as members of a global community, and not only citizens of given states, the ethics of care shows promise. We need to care sufficiently for persons distant from us to work for their rights to be respected. We need actually to care for and meet the needs of persons around the globe so that they can survive and improve their lives.

#### Thus the standard is promoting an ethics of care. This is not standard virtue ethics – the NC is concerned with relationships between interdependent persons, not the virtues of specific individuals.

#### Additionally prefer

#### Prescriptive claims can’t be derived from descriptive properties like the existence of violence or how we reason. Explanatory meta-ethical accounts of morality commit a conceptual error. Morality exists to explain what is right, not what is so.

Reader Reader, Soren. [Late Professor of Philosophy, Durham University] “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalism, Reasons, and Virtue.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4, Dec. 2000.

What is the alternative? To understand ethics in its own terms. This deprives us of explanatory naturalism. We can’t without error expect to understand ethics in any terms but ethical.This has seemed to many philosophers to be unduly restrictive, and to threaten relativism.8 But in fact it does not lead to these difficulties ? or, more accurately, it doesn't exacerbate them. The problem of **displaying the rationality of ethics** in a compelling wayis real. But it is also general. It **is the same** **as** the problem of displaying **the rationality of** all the other things we do: **playing games**, conducting scientific enquiry, **writing** philosophy **papers.** We might be able to make connections between activities using an analogy with another game, say, to illuminate the game of chess for someone. But all we will ever be able to lay our hands on in the activity of explaining, is more of the same: parts of our life. The idea of our being able to use ‘theworld as it isin itself **to explain** anyof **our activities is** practically **contradictory. And the idea that rationality** supernature, rather than first nature **can** be used to **explain ethics** in this way, **involves a similar error. The way we** think acquire beliefs, deliberate,justify ourselves is also part of our life. It **is** as 'fundamental' in that life as ethics is, but no more so, **no more knowable ‘in itself’**, as Aristotle, in the grip of a similar error to our own, would have put it, **than it is ‘to us,’ here and now, living as we live. So explanatory accounts of ethics**, whetherthey invokefirst-nature or super natural reason, **are mistaken.** Explicatory naturalism is as far as we can go.And as far as we need to go.

#### Liberation – an ethic of care allows us to address material inequalities better than traditional ethics shaped by universalist claims

Moellendorf and Widdows 3 [Darrel Moellendorf (Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Institute for Health and Social Policy at McGill University, Canada) and Heather Widdows (Professor in the philosophy department at the University of Birmingham, where she teaches moral philosophy, bioethics, global ethics and health and happiness.); “The Routledge Handbook of Global Ethics”; pub: 2014-10-23; Routledge; pp. 52-54; //BWSWJ]

Feminism leads us to rethink global realities and the ethics of care suggests new perspectives on global problems. Fiona Robinson has fundamentally reconceptualized human security, bringing in factors of race and class as well as gender. “Relations of care”, she writes, are a central axis around which the security of all people, in the context of webs of relations, revolves ... The ways we think about, describe and act in relation to care must be interrogated. In addition, we must consider the obstacles and inequities which currently serve to hinder the ability of many individuals and institutions (including states) to be attentive to care needs, and which obstruct and prevent the equitable and adequate delivery of care in many contexts around the world. Feminist scholars have turned their attention to various global problems that have been neglected, such as the migrations of care workers from developing countries to developed ones, leaving a serious deficit of care workers in the developing world (Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2003, Mahon & Robinson 2011). Such scholars are examining the way the neo-liberal restructuring of many economies are leaving many women unable to find jobs and unable to care for their families ( Jaggar 2009, Peterson & Runyon 2010). The ethics of care is more suitable than ethical views centred on justice and rights for dealing with many of these issues because of its focus on care work, its attention to gender, and more recently race and class, and its conception of persons as relational (Abu-Laban 2012, F. Robin- son 2011a). It “may allow us to move from consideration of a ‘world of strangers’ to a ‘world of relationships’” in ways more attuned to the realities and moral issues involved (Abu-Laban 2012: 157). The ethics of care leads to different and potentially more persuasive arguments than previous theories for overcoming global poverty and achieving the kind of economic development that will enable people to provide the care all children need, and to improve the health of all (F. Robinson 2011a, 2011b). And it provides guidance for dealing with violence and accepting the restraints of international law as it has developed (V. Held 2011). The following sections will examine some of these developments.

#### To clarify, the NC does not identify care as gendered or argue females are uniquely caretakers – rather it identifies the ethic as a valuable tool to oppose universalist ethics that do not account for unequal power relationships

### Contention

#### Hate speech is situated within a reality of racism and bigotry – this context gives it force and ability to harm. This is the direct antithesis of an ethic of care – hate speech has no role in empathetic relations between interdependent persons.

Cornwell 98 [Cornwell, N. (1998). Rethinking Free Expression in the Feminist Classroom: The Problem of Hate Speech. Feminist Teacher, 12(2), 107-118. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40545815> //BWSWJ]

The ethic of care is particularly useful for understanding hate speech in that it is formulated around the same contextual, situated, interpreted and interconnected descriptions of reality that also define hate speech. The very aspects of hate speech that frustrate liberal attempts to seize it, and to make sense of it, fall precisely within the sphere of values that make up the ethic of care. Caring about hate speech means squarely facing the contextual, situated reality of such communication. Caring about hate speech means recognizing the particular and discrete nature of hate speech's harm, the reality of which is, at best, indeterminate from a liberal perspective. The ethic of care recognizes that the harm of hate speech may not be easily quantified, empirically measured, visually observed, or even causally linked to a specific hate speech act. A caring approach to hate speech recognizes that hate speech is a form of communication that creates meaning through a context of racism and bigotry. That context is what provides hate speech with its force and its ability to harm. Allowing harm to others goes against the central imperative of the ethic of care. The ethic of care takes a social constructionist approach to the problem of hate speech. From this perspective, external factors in human life participate in the formation of the internal factors that define individual identity. Therefore, the external, implicit, societal endorsement of hate speech (even if only through a lack of explicit condemnation) is part and parcel of the internal construction of racism and sexism and other expressions of hate and bigotry. And, if individuals are who they are through their social relations with others, then the language of hate speech constructs a "truth" about the victims of hate speech that invariably impacts on their liberty (West 764).

#### Complicity is still a link – the importance of empathy means the ‘bystander’ excuse is unacceptable. An institution whose role is to provide a safe educational space cannot take a ‘neutral’ stance on hate speech.

#### This justifies a prohibition – within a framework of care state action is key– liberal values of freedom don’t apply

Farell and Corrigan 11 [Richard H Corrigan; Mary E Farrell. (2011). Ethics: A university guide. Gloucester England: Progressive Frontiers Press. <https://books.google.com/books?id=foz-x-ou2S8C&pg=PA98&lpg=PA98> //BWSWJ]

What emerges from the research taking place in the applied field is that the adoption of an ethics of care has implications for the kinds of moral judgements we generate. Significantly, in changing from a justice based moral orientation to a care based moral orientation we find that not only has the process of moral thinking changed, but so too has our assessments of various moral actions. Take for example the case of allowing a neo-Nazi March to pass through a predominantly Jewish neighbourhood. The liberal right to free speech is tightly bound to autonomy which is a key value for this approach. However, under the relationship model envisaged by ethics of care hate speech and the harm it does to others in the name of free speech would not be permitted. Any act, including the banning of hate speech, would be deemed right or wrong depending on whether it exhibited a caring or uncaring attitude/motivation on the part of the agent (Stole, 2007). The justice system need not be guided by impartial rules and procedures. As Stole argues, we can speak of institutions and laws as caring or exhibiting empathy. In our moral assessment of laws, as well as social customs and practices, we can say that they are just if they reflect or express "empathically caring motivation towards their compatriots on the part of the legislative group that is responsible for passing it" (Stole, 2007, 95). We find then that in both the private and public realms ethics of care assess judgment in terms of empathic caring. Similarly, in stressing human dependence through a relational view of the self, the concept of citizen utilized in social policy is transformed. To be regarded as a good citizen on a care framework, we must place mutual obligations and relations of trust above self-reliance and autonomy.

## AT - Agonism

### Weighing Overview

Omitted

### Framework Answers

Omitted

### Case

Omitted