# A2 LW Cap K

The cap K was really annoying on this topic so we spent a lot of time frontlining it.

## Top Level

### Akhil TL

#### Poverty turns their offense – a living wage empowers the underclass and illustrates the desirability of the alt

Wright 07 [Wright, Erik Olin (American analytical Marxist sociologist, specializing in social stratification, and in egalitarian alternative futures to capitalism. He was the 2012 President of the American Sociological Association). "Guidelines for envisioning real utopias." SOUNDINGS-LONDON-LAWRENCE AND WISHART- 36 (2007): 26] AJ

The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody emancipatory values, but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often depends upon the existence of smaller steps, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values. Institutional proposals which have an all-or-nothing quality to them are less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems if implemented. The catastrophic experience of Russia in the 'shock therapy' approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full-bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below, subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone, One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to iItitute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want, therefore, are intermediate reforms that have two main properties: first, they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller programme of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable; and second, they enhance the capacity for action of people, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and bring people together in problem-solving deliberations for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard. This is what in the 1970s was called ‘nonreformist reforms': reforms that are possible within existing institutions and that pragmatically solve real problems while at the same time empowering people in ways which enlarge their scope of action in the future.

#### Answers all of their links – the aff works within cap but resists its logic, which sets the stage for a full revolution

#### Terminal defense to the alt – their all-or-nothing demands inevitably fail while not addressing real-world harms

#### Empowerment DA – the underclass can’t support a revolution when they can’t survive – aff gives them the tools to resist cap

#### Answers de-radicalization – gradual transitions are the only way to arrive at more radical positions – immediate jumps to radicalism fail so try or die for the perm

#### Perm – use the living wage as a critique of cap. Empirics prove a living wage can affirm anti-capitalist politics – it challenges capitalist ideology and opens space for challenges to cap.

Luce 7 [(Stephanie, Associate Professor of Labor Studies at CUNY school of professional studies) Toward a New Socialism. In “Fighting the Market as God Ideology: Living Wage Campaigns and the Fight for Socialism” Google Books] AT

As socialists, we should be concerned about all of these issues. There are certainly a number of examples of campaigns that have promoted liberal politics and excluded workers. But, l argue that the campaigns don't necessarily have to do this. And with over two hundred campaigns waged so far, many of them provide examples of how to engage in living wage efforts in a way that builds the kind of politics we believe in, as l will discuss below. Challenging Free Market Ideology Many living wage activists are new to politics. They are social workers, students, church-goers, parents of a low-wage worker, or just people concemed about poverty and equality. There is no guarantee that living wage supporters are radical in any sense—they might even oppose public welfare programs, or hold racist notions about the characteristics of low-wage workers. They might simply just believe that it isn't fair that someone working full-time should still live in poverty. They might even believe that the existence of poverty is a drag on communities—if everyone worked and made decent wages, we wouldn’t have homelessness, and wouldn’t need to spend tax dollars on food stamps and indigent medical aid. . But as the living wage campaigns progress, activists of all political persuasions are conﬁonted with the same arguments in every city. Newspaper editori- als proclaim, “It takes a huge ego to imagine that you are smarter than the marketplace.”’ Academics chastise them for their nalvetéz “So what are the effects of increasing minimum wages?” writes economist and New York Times colum- nist Paul Krugman. “Any Econ l0l student can tell you the answer: The higher wage reduces the quantity of labor demanded, and hence leads to unemployment.”' Consistently, living wage opponents rely not on empirical evidence, but on assumptions about capitalism and free markets to dismiss the movement as perhaps well-intentioned, but clearly misguided. Harvard economist Gregory Manltiw even goes so far to argue that “If we could wave a magic wand and help those at the bottom of the economic ladder move up a rung or two, we should do it”—but that unfortunately, the market won't allow it. We cannot “repeal the law of supply and demand and raise wages by ﬁat”! Forced to confront these arguments, living wage advocates must begin to question their own assumptions about the power of markets. Is it true that we cannot intervene in markets for any reason? Can it be that we are all govemed by the “invisible hand” and economic laws that we have no control over? It is here that the potential for this movement to build support for socialist politics is greatest. Although many feel in their gut that this market logic isn’t right, most people in the U.S. have been so thoroughly educated in a capitalist mindset that it takes some work to develop a critique. Jaime Huerta, an organizer with the Pima County Interfaith Council in Tucson, said that their campaign is always looking for good resources to help them “challenge the ‘market is god’ ideology” that is so pervasive among opponents and potential supporters." In other cities, living wage advocates argue that markets are not only about economics, but about politics and morality. In their assessment of the Baltimore campaign, organizers Amie Graf and Jonathan Lange challenged the idea that it is only supply and demand that determine wages." “Declining union power can explain low wages as easily as supply and demand,” they wrote. They add that after Baltimore passed its ordinance, no disastrous effects could be seen. “The market adjusted to political power.” Living wage activists must challenge the fact that “unfettered markets” even exist at all. Conservatives argue that in an ideal capitalist society, the “invisible hand” and the laws of supply and demand can most rationally and fairly distrib- ute goods and services. They say that if people are only allowed to negotiate for themselves, without govemment or union intervention, buyers and sellers will ﬁnd the prices that are satisfactory to both parties. There are a few problems with this approach. First, the theory that these conservatives are relying on-neoclassical economics—makes a lot of assumptions that don’t hold true in reality. For example, neoclassical economics as- sumes that in perfectly competitive markets, all parties have equal access to information. Buyers know what prices all sellers are selling at, workers know what wages their co-workers earn, and consumers know the quality of the product they are buying. But in reality, access to information is distributed unequally, depending on differences in power and resources. Without these assumptions, market “efficiency” no longer holds, even in theory. Another assumption is that all people in a market society act “rationally,” based on their economic self- interest. While its true that people often consider their own economic interest, we have endless evidence that they will also act out of love, compassion, generosity, insecurity, anger, and even confusion. Therefore, assuming rational thought is the sole and primary determinant of human behavior will distort one’s understanding of the world. The second problem with the appeals to the free market is that there is really no such thing as “ﬂee market”—all economies have regulations and inter- vention of some kind. Even under capitalism, governments are needed to regu- late the economy and correct for market failures, such as large fluctuations in the economy, lack of public infrastructure like roads and airports, and discrimination. The problem is that in a capitalist society, governments are usually run by Challenging the “Market as God” Ideology those who have more money and power, and therefore, they are the ones who set those rules and regulations that govem the market. It is a political battle that determines who gets to set the rules. The right-wing has succeeded in equating “free market” with markets where elites set the elite. As socialists, we are not for the elimination of ruIes—we just want them to be set in a transparent fashion by govemments that are elected (truly) democratically, and held accountable to those that elect them. We also want those rules to acknowledge that markets should work for people ﬁrst, not proﬁt. Through living wage campaigns, socialists can highlight the underlying market-based ideologies that are so thoroughly accepted by most people. Oppo- nents’ arguments open a space for living wage advocates to talk about the economy and decision-making, and to assert that there are alternatives. Continues The living wage movement offers an opening for socialists to talk about the economy, wages, and poverty, and the links between a capitalist system and inequality. It’s crucial to ﬁght the relentless pro-market ideology that governs most aspects of our lives. In addition, while living wage gains are still modest, those gains are meaningful to those that obtain them. Although we will face mounting attacks from the opposition, our biggest challenge in this movement is to ﬁnd ways to bring workers themselves into the campaigns in ways that are not tokenistic. In the ﬁght for living wages, just as in the ﬁght for socialism, workers must be in the leadership, working closely with allies and community part- ners. This is our vision for an alternative society, and we must work to make that vision real in our everyday struggles.

#### Perm do the aff as a transition to socialism and the alt – cap is key to generate the material surplus necessary to the alt

Eagleton 11 [TERRY EAGLETON (prominent British literary theorist, critic and public intellectual. He is currently Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, Professor of Cultural Theory at the National University of Ireland and Distinguished Visiting Professor of English Literature at The University of Notre Dame). “Why Marx Was Right.” 2011 by Yale University. New Haven & London] AJ

This raises some thorny moral problems. Just as some Christians accept evil as somehow necessary to God’s plan for humanity, so you can read Marx as claiming that capitalism, however rapacious and unjust, has to be endured for the sake of the socialist future it will inevitably bring in its wake. Not only endured, in fact, but actively encouraged. There are points in Marx’s work where he cheers on the growth of capitalism, since only thus will the path to socialism be thrown open. In a lecture of 1847, for example, he defends free trade as hastening the advent of socialism. He also wanted to see German unification on the grounds that it would promote German capitalism. There are several places in his work where this revolutionary socialist betrays rather too much relish at the prospect of a progressive capitalist class putting paid to ‘‘barbarism.’’ The morality of this appears distinctly dubious. How is it different from Stalin’s or Mao’s murderous pogroms, ex- ecuted in the name of the socialist future? How far does the end justify the means? And given that few today believe that socialism is inevitable, is this not even more reason for re- nouncing such a brutal sacrifice of the present on the altar of a future that might never arrive? If capitalism is essential for socialism, and if capitalism is unjust, does this not suggest that injustice is morally acceptable? If there is to be justice in the future, must there have been injustice in the past? Marx writes in Theories of Surplus Value that ‘‘the development of the capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of the majority of individuals and even classes.’’∞≤ He means that the good of the species will finally triumph in the shape of communism, but that this involves a great deal of ineluctable suffering and injustice en route. The material prosperity that in the end will fund freedom is the fruit of un-freedom. There is a difference between doing evil in the hope that good may come of it, and seeking to turn someone else’s evil to good use. Socialists did not perpetrate capitalism, and are innocent of its crimes; but granted that it exists, it seems rational to make the best of it. This is possible because capitalism is not of course simply evil. To think so is to be drastically one-sided, a fault by which Marx himself was rarely afflicted. As we have seen, the system breeds freedom as well as barba- rism, emancipation along with enslavement. Capitalist society generates enormous wealth, but in a way that cannot help putting it beyond the reach of most of its citizens. Even so, that wealth can always be brought within reach. It can be disentangled from the acquisitive, individualist forms which bred it, invested in the community as a whole, and used to restrict disagreeable work to the minimum. It can thus release men and women from the chains of economic necessity into a life where they are free to realize their creative poten- tial. This is Marx’s vision of communism.

#### Double bind – either the alt can overcome the logic of capital and wage labor, which solves the link, or it fails

#### Fear of co-option radicalizes the alt – only perm solves

Zizek 08 (Slavoj Zizek, professor at the University of Ljubljana, Law and the Postmodern Mind, p. 92 )

Finally, the point about inherent transgression is not that every opposition, every attempt at subversion, is automatically "coopted." On the contrary, the very fear of being coopted that makes us search for more and more "radical," "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that true subver­sion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes, a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejec­tion. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than an out­right atheism or passage to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat. As le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committee is worth more than thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at improving the system, making it more efficient—he nonetheless set in motion its disintegra­tion. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent trans­gression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud's claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows—the System is not only infi­nitely more resistant and invulnerable than it may appear (it can coopt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support), it is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc, can have large unforeseen catastrophic consequences).

### Arjun TL Long

#### 1. Perm do both – that re-appropriates the living wage so it’s no longer used for capitalist purposes. Even if the aff entrenches cap, the alt ensures a revolution which solves the links. If their alt can overcome capitalist elements in the status quo it can also overcome the aff; otherwise their alt doesn’t solve.

#### 2. A living wage builds movements and short-term reform is good

Shalom 14 [Stephen R. Shalom, professor of political science at William Paterson University, “One State or Two States: Prospects, Possibilities, and Politics,” Logos Journal] AZ

Let me begin with an analogy that I hope will illuminate a way to approach these kinds of political questions. Consider the example of the living wage campaigns that are being pursued around the country, demanding that low-paid workers receive enough to provide for their basic needs. Typically these campaigns, supported by leftists, call for local ordinances or policies that set some minimum compensation level, well above the existing minimum wage, for all employees. Now imagine if a labor solidarity activist opposed the living wage campaign, arguing that “The problem is with capitalism and the whole wage system, not the low wages paid by some employers.” I assume we would reply, “Yes, the problem is capitalism, but we’re not going to be able to solve that overnight. People who are hungry today can’t afford to wait until we have brought capitalism down. Unlike total system transformation, a living wage can be won in the near term — not that we will win, but we can win in the near term; ending capitalism, on the other hand, we have no chance of winning for many years. A victory in a living wage campaign would do two things: first, it would provide an immediate improvement in the lives of people who are suffering; and, second, it would show people that change is possible and that there is an alternative to hopeless resignation.” Yes, there are limits to what can be accomplished under capitalism, contrary to the claims of liberal critics of the status quo — and we should always make these limits clear while we participate in struggles to achieve reforms. But it would be thoroughly wrongheaded to refuse to support a living wage campaign in the United States today because it’s not perfectly just or to denounce those who support it as engaged in morally unacceptable behavior. And it would be especially inappropriate for those of us who are not low-paid workers to tell low-paid workers not to accept $15 an hour because they ought to hold out for the end of capitalism. The same logic holds even if one doesn’t support socialism. That is, imagine another hypothetical critic of living wage campaigns who says $15 an hour is a morally repugnant wage and nothing less than $25 per hour ought to be accepted. I assume we would reply, “Yes, merely guaranteeing everyone a living wage is unjust, as indeed any improvement in anyone’s life situation that falls short of our ideal of justice, whatever that happens to be, will be unjust. But our refraining from achieving reforms while we wish for a perfectly just outcome doesn’t bring that outcome any closer. On the other hand, a living wage campaign both improves people’s lives, which is important, and can give the workers and their supporters the sort of victory that helps build a movement that can push for further improvements.” The same logic holds as well for all sorts of political campaigns. On the environment, on women’s rights, and on a whole host of other issues we will often support efforts to achieve some reform that is less than our ideal. We do this because we realize that we can’t yet win our maximum demands, but we want to improve things in the meantime, while building movements that can achieve more.¶ This doesn’t mean that it’s always right to go for limited reforms. One needs to make a serious judgment about what’s possible under the particular circumstances prevailing at each time and place. So in 1968, for example, it was right to criticize the Communist-led unions in France for being bought off by some moderate improvements when the whole capitalist system might have been successfully challenged. Sometimes transformative change is possible. But when your considered judgment tells you that the best you can do is win $15 an hour, then one needs to support that campaign and not refrain from doing so because it falls short of one’s ideal. Does thinking about what seems achievable or realistic make one a counterrevolutionary naysayer? Shouldn’t leftists have faith in people’s potential to change the world? Gramsci’s advice is relevant here: we want to have optimism of the will, but pessimism of the intellect. We believe in people’s abilities to rise above their circumstances and fight to create a better world. But we’d be crazy to lay siege to the White House tomorrow because we think it’s possible that 100 million Americans will rise up and support us. We welcome and hope for unexpected inspirational moments; we don’t count on them.

#### A. Turns their impacts – a living wage temporarily buffers the impact of cap by reducing poverty; the alt alone can’t gain critical mass fast enough to solve their impacts. A direct and significant decrease in poverty outweighs the slight decrease in perm solvency.

#### B. their epistemology is wrong – it comes from the isolated position of wealthy intellectuals and ignore workers’ real struggles so it’s less true

#### C. Withdrawing from capital immediately is impossible since everyone requires capitalist institutions to buy food and shelter and earn money to survive – revolutionary action is possible only when basic needs are met

#### 2. The plan solves their impacts since it solves poverty – their impact ev assumes an exploitative form of cap that lacks a living wage. The plan means cap can’t turn the case since a living wage will still exist.

#### 3. Fear of co-option turns their offense – reforms outweigh

Zizek 08 (Slavoj Zizek, professor at the University of Ljubljana, Law and the Postmodern Mind, p. 92 )

Finally, the point about inherent transgression is not that every opposition, every attempt at subversion, is automatically "coopted." On the contrary, the very fear of being coopted that makes us search for more and more "radical," "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that true subver­sion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes, a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejec­tion. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than an out­right atheism or passage to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat. As le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committee is worth more than thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at improving the system, making it more efficient—he nonetheless set in motion its disintegra­tion. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent trans­gression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud's claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows—the System is not only infi­nitely more resistant and invulnerable than it may appear (it can coopt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support), it is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc, can have large unforeseen catastrophic consequences).

#### 4. Perm combines reforms with revolution which solves their links – a living wage challenges surplus value that sustains capital and unifies class struggle – revolutionary intellectuals should develop feasible political strategies against labor exploitation

Makandal 13 [“Wage Struggles: Reformist or Revolutionary?” Idées Nouvelles Idées Prolétariennes, publishing entity for the popularization of theory and other texts that serve the interests of the working class in their struggle against capital April 16, 2013] AT

In Bangladesh, Haiti, Brazil, China, the U.S. and everywhere, workers are demanding wages that allow them to feed, house, clothe, and educate themselves and their families. Some on the Left argue that wage struggles are inherently reformist. The reality is that they can be either reformist or democratic (the latter as an embedded element of an overall revolutionary struggle). A thin line divides the two. The difference is that the reformist will be satisfied with reforms and stop there, while an autonomous democratic movement that has the potential to contribute to revolution will keep demanding more and more, continuing to weaken (not mechanically) capital and finally challenge its existence. This difference results from a political line and strategy. Revolutionary potential exists when there is a dialectical relationship between revolutionary level and democratic mass level organizations. Struggles waged solely at the mass level, without this relationship, will indeed inevitably lead to reformism. When that relationship does exist, however, wage struggles can weaken capital. This is because capital reproduces itself by extracting surplus value from the exploitation of workers. The struggle for higher wages (forcing capitalists to appropriate less surplus value) can play a crucial role in the development of both a combative working class, and the growth of a mass movement that could ultimately challenge the existence of capital. Surplus Value The capitalist mode of production is characterized by the fundamentally antagonistic social relations on which it depends—capital versus labor in the production of surplus value. The production of surplus value differentiates capitalism from all other modes of production (i.e.: feudalism, slavery). Surplus value is the socially determined worth of the labor power that is used to transform natural materials into commodities (goods for exchange), measured in time. Under capitalism, surplus value is generated in the production process itself, as labor power is incorporated into the process of production, and embodied in the commodity. This is in contrast to feudalist production, which guarantees a surplus by exercising constraint on labor and on consummation exterior to the production process. Under feudalism, peasants toil on the land and the landowners take a guaranteed portion of each harvest, regardless of weather conditions, sometimes leaving the peasant unable to sustain themselves. Under capitalism, workers work a certain amount of time to provide for their own sustenance and reproduction, after which their labor power produces surplus value. For example, if a worker is paid $80 for eight hours of work, but produces goods worth $80 in only two hours, then the rest of that time, s/he is working without pay. During those other six hours, the worker produces $240 of goods. That amount (minus the other costs of running the industry) is surplus value. The capitalist, who privately owns and controls the means of production, appropriates (steals) the surplus value by asserting ownership over the new commodities. The surplus value is turned into profit when the commodities are sold, and a portion is reinvested as capital for the industry to expand. This theft of value is exploitation. A social relationship of domination permits exploitation. The capitalist class dominates the working class in three main ways: 1) economically via their ownership of the means of production (the monopolization of society’s means of subsistence); 2) politically via their state apparatus (including the threat and use of force); and 3) ideologically via their culture (media, religion, education, traditions, etc.). The quantitative forms of surplus value (and profit based on value) are the result, an effect, of these social relations. These dynamics sustain and enrich the capitalists who do not work, while workers struggle to reproduce themselves. The stolen labor-power of the workers is used to fund militaries, hospitals, universities, and everything else which ensures and reproduces capitalism’s existence. Surplus value is class struggle in the process of capitalist production, the struggle of the capitalists to constantly dominate the workers in order to exploit them. It is important that we understand surplus value as a social process. It is not simply an economic phenomenon, which could be resolved within the capitalist framework. It is fundamental to (and allows for the reproduction of) capitalist relations economically, socially, and politically. Wage struggles demand the return of what is stolen from the workers. Wage struggles are important because they strike at the very core of capitalism—surplus value—and its external manifestation of exploitation. The wage struggle is the fundamental aspect of anti-capitalist struggle. This is why it is important to struggle around wages. And during the period of global monopoly capitalism/imperialism (and imperialism’s concrete political form of neoliberalism), it is crucial for the working class to unify internationally against its common enemy. This can be accomplished by organizing and struggling for an international minimum (living) wage. Organizing Wage Struggles Wage struggles tackle the fundamental contradiction of capitalism: capital vs. labor. They help build the militancy of the working class and help train them to take power. Wage struggles seek wage reforms with the goal of abolishing wages altogether. The abolishment of wages is ultimately a political struggle, which requires the role of proletarian revolutionaries to organize revolution. There are two levels of organization: a revolutionary level and a democratic mass level. Both need to function in relative autonomy, but in a dialectical manner. The revolutionary level constructs political rapprochement with the mass level with a goal of struggling among the masses, while being aware of and avoiding capitalist attempts to divert organizing efforts into dead ends. Political rapprochement is a constant back-and-forth dialectical dynamic between the two levels, for the purpose of constructing unity and strategy. The revolutionary level must engage in both kinds of struggles: for reforms (not reformism) and for revolution. We must be serious in theory and in practice, and must construct mass organizations among workers and social categories (such as students). Theory must be dialectically connected to practice; it should allow us to develop a line to engage in practice, so we know what we are doing. We need to have a clear understanding of the contradictions we face, which will make us better organized and more capable of tackling our well-organized enemy: capital. It is crucial that we understand the dynamics of our enemy. In a struggle for wages, we must be aware of and combat reformism and economism, which result in the integration into the capitalist system. For example, the civil rights and the feminist movements were able to be absorbed into bourgeois democracy, because their main focus was on economic integration, “equality” within the marketplace, rather than on the question of fundamental political power. One class did not overthrow another to transform society on a totally new basis; instead the same capitalist class remained in power, while slightly broadening its ranks, and expanding bourgeois democratic rights, for the reproduction of capital. It is the task of proletarian revolutionaries to apply the correct line inside the mass level to avoid these types of deviations. In Haiti, we are waging two levels of struggle. One is a minimum wage adjustment (for inflation), and the other is a struggle for an increased minimum wage. Both are important struggles to organize workers. These struggles are totally against neoliberalism, which actually calls for no standard on wages—a point defended by most presidents in Haiti (who operate the state apparatus in the interest of the dominant classes and imperialism). These struggles are not reformist, because we engaged in them, principally, with the goal of the abolition of wages. But we understand that socialism won’t fall from the sky. We need to be strategic. We must understand, and then use, the reality in front of us in order to engage to transform that reality. Before we can kill capitalism, we have to weaken it and simultaneously strengthen our side. We can only do this if we tactically apply a correct revolutionary strategy, a correct political line. All social classes historically struggle to either reproduce themselves or to transform the reality they are in. Members of the petit bourgeoisie, for example, go to school to learn a skill to guarantee their reproduction. If they want a higher paycheck, they go back to school to serve capital at a higher level, and aspire to become a bourgeois. This is the dominant historical ideological tendency of that class. The fundamental component of that tendency is individualism. In contrast, the dominant tendency of the working class for its reproduction is struggle. The higher form of that struggle is the strike at the mass level, which workers can only do collectively. The dominant historical ideological component of the working class is collectivism, the antithesis of individualism (which ideologically corresponds to private property). The Dead-End Path of Left Populism Global capitalism is attacking every social category among the popular masses (every social and cultural group). This has given rise to a diverse, multi-faceted resistance, seeking to challenge capitalist domination. But though these movements are sometimes combative and significant, they are not based on a class alternative. They are therefore an amorphous amalgam, prone to confusion. Without a class orientation and a corresponding political line, these movements are unable to define clear lines of action aimed at real emancipation. They are unable to go beyond a ‘broad-based, popular’ desire for equality, and are therefore subject to populist drift. This characterizes the radicalized petit bourgeoisie’s response to the adverse situation it finds itself in. The radical petit bourgeoisie spontaneously gravitates toward an ultra-leftist orientation of egalitarianism, which has its underlying foundation in the struggle for economic equality in the marketplace (for their own reproduction as a class). This leads to a mechanical materialist (actually idealist) and economist approach of rejecting unilaterally the economic struggle of the proletariat (a fundamental aspect of the fight against capital for its reproduction). This has fostered a dangerous tendency to develop in popular struggle: left populism that will quickly transition to right populism. This tendency results in the displacement of the struggle against the fundamental aspect of capital (the processes of exploitation of labor power and production of surplus value), to focus instead on secondary aspects (which are produced by the fundamental aspect). The consequence is that all struggles waged against these secondary aspects or effects of capitalism (which are also the effects of any prior class society based on private property)—racism, misogyny, and other forms of oppression and inequalities, plus ecocide—become viewed as anti-capitalist struggles. These secondary aspects have currently become the center pole of mass struggles. They are indeed worth fighting against—capitalism affects society and the environment in many terrible ways that no one should accept. But as justified as these struggles are, they are not materially (concretely) anti-capitalist. They are progressive, but limited, because even with a very high level of radicalism, they cannot stop capitalism. History has already proven to us that they can be recouped by the capitalist class. If these struggles are waged outside of, and disconnected from, a genuine anti-capitalist struggle targeting the fundamental production of surplus value, then the danger is that they can be transitioned into to an enlargement of bourgeois democratic rights, or false “solutions” to problems like ecocide, unintentionally serving the interest of the reproduction of capital. Revolution is the overthrow of one class by another There is only one reality with many alternatives, all detectable and determined by class struggle in our time. We must recognize the fact that the dominant “alternatives” being currently offered are reformist ones. The job of proletarian revolutionaries is to define what must be done to reverse, in our favor, the struggle for alternatives, in order to deal with—and eliminate—the two fundamental aspects of capital: exploitation of labor power and the process of production of surplus value. The abolition of wages is, in principle, the collective appropriation of the means of production by the proletariat. To ignore wage struggles is to deny and avoid the immediate economic struggles of the workers, which are one level of class struggle (others are ideological and political). The working class should not abandon its daily struggle against capital, but should continuously advance it for the objective of its collective appropriation of the means of production. The abolition of wages will inevitably lead to the abolition of classes. However, a necessary precondition for this is revolution. Through liberating itself, the working class liberates all of society from capitalism. The choices to be made in this epic effort to crush capitalism are not simple or mechanical; they are to be found only in the complex reality of class struggle. At the mass democratic level, the fight for wages is one form of struggle for the objective of weakening the system, but it is never a final goal. Our aim is the elimination of classes once and for all. We should never be satisfied!

#### 5. Perm do the aff as a transition to socialism and the alt – cap is key to generate the material surplus necessary to the alt

Eagleton 11 [TERRY EAGLETON (prominent British literary theorist, critic and public intellectual. He is currently Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, Professor of Cultural Theory at the National University of Ireland and Distinguished Visiting Professor of English Literature at The University of Notre Dame). “Why Marx Was Right.” 2011 by Yale University. New Haven & London] AJ

This raises some thorny moral problems. Just as some Christians accept evil as somehow necessary to God’s plan for humanity, so you can read Marx as claiming that capitalism, however rapacious and unjust, has to be endured for the sake of the socialist future it will inevitably bring in its wake. Not only endured, in fact, but actively encouraged. There are points in Marx’s work where he cheers on the growth of capitalism, since only thus will the path to socialism be thrown open. In a lecture of 1847, for example, he defends free trade as hastening the advent of socialism. He also wanted to see German unification on the grounds that it would promote German capitalism. There are several places in his work where this revolutionary socialist betrays rather too much relish at the prospect of a progressive capitalist class putting paid to ‘‘barbarism.’’ The morality of this appears distinctly dubious. How is it different from Stalin’s or Mao’s murderous pogroms, ex- ecuted in the name of the socialist future? How far does the end justify the means? And given that few today believe that socialism is inevitable, is this not even more reason for re- nouncing such a brutal sacrifice of the present on the altar of a future that might never arrive? If capitalism is essential for socialism, and if capitalism is unjust, does this not suggest that injustice is morally acceptable? If there is to be justice in the future, must there have been injustice in the past? Marx writes in Theories of Surplus Value that ‘‘the development of the capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of the majority of individuals and even classes.’’∞≤ He means that the good of the species will finally triumph in the shape of communism, but that this involves a great deal of ineluctable suffering and injustice en route. The material prosperity that in the end will fund freedom is the fruit of un-freedom. There is a difference between doing evil in the hope that good may come of it, and seeking to turn someone else’s evil to good use. Socialists did not perpetrate capitalism, and are innocent of its crimes; but granted that it exists, it seems rational to make the best of it. This is possible because capitalism is not of course simply evil. To think so is to be drastically one-sided, a fault by which Marx himself was rarely afflicted. As we have seen, the system breeds freedom as well as barba- rism, emancipation along with enslavement. Capitalist society generates enormous wealth, but in a way that cannot help putting it beyond the reach of most of its citizens. Even so, that wealth can always be brought within reach. It can be disentangled from the acquisitive, individualist forms which bred it, invested in the community as a whole, and used to restrict disagreeable work to the minimum. It can thus release men and women from the chains of economic necessity into a life where they are free to realize their creative poten- tial. This is Marx’s vision of communism.

#### Social democracy solves better

Berman 09 [Sheri, associate professor of political science at Columbia, “Unheralded Battle: Capitalism, the Left, Social Democracy, and Democratic Socialism,” Dissent, V56 N1, Winter, Project Muse]

At its root, such fears stem from the failure of many on the left to appreciate that capitalism is not a zero-sum game—over the long run the operations of relatively free markets can produce net wealth rather than simply shifting it from one pocket to another. Because social democrats understand that basic point, they want to do what they can to encourage trade and growth and cultivate as large a net surplus as possible—all the better to pay for measures that can equalize life chances and cushion publics from the blows that markets inflict. Helping people adjust to capitalism, rather than engaging in a hopeless and ultimately counterproductive effort to hold it back, has been the historic accomplishment of the social democratic left, and it remains its primary goal today in those countries where the social democratic mindset is most deeply ensconced. Many analysts have remarked, for example, on the impressive success of countries like Denmark and Sweden in managing globalization—promoting economic growth and increased competitiveness even as they ensure high employment and social security. The Scandinavian cases demonstrate that social welfare and economic dynamism are not enemies but natural allies. Not surprisingly, it is precisely in these countries that optimism about globalization is highest. In the United States and other parts of Europe, on the other hand, fear of the future is pervasive and opinions of globalization astoundingly negative. American leftists must try to do what the Scandinavians have done: develop a program that promotes growth and social solidarity together, rather than forcing a choice between them. Concretely this means agitating for policies—like reliable, affordable, and portable health care; tax credits or other government support for labor-market retraining; investment in education; and unemployment programs that are both more generous and better incentivized—that will help workers adjust to change rather than make them fear it

### Palliatives Turn

#### LW also enables success of political action groups – creates a systemic force for positive change

Devinatz 13 [Victor G. Devinatz (Department of Management and Quantitative Methods, Illinois State University). “The Significance of the Living Wage for US Workers in the Early Twenty-First Century.” Employ Respons Rights J (2013) 25:125–134. 24 March 2013] AJ

Furthermore, the fight for living wages has contributed to the development of labor- community coalitions which promote broad progressive political agendas, including labor rights, in cities and communities throughout the nation. Examples of concrete gains from such coalitions include playing a major role in the rejuvenation of a vibrant labor movement in Los Angeles; the creation of a Workers Rights Board as a vehicle for promoting workplace justice for nonunion workers in Tucson; and the development of an intimate relationship between the city’s central labor council and ACORN in Boston (Luce 2004, pp. 200–202, 204–205).

#### Try or die for the link turn – no class consciousness now means we need to build workers’ agendas

Castree 04 [Noel Castree, Neil M. Coe, Kevin Ward and Michael Samers. “Spaces of Work: Global Capitalism and the Geographies of Labour.” SAGE Publications 2004] AJ

What all this emphasizes is that attempts by workers to develop transnational solidarities require a major ideological and organiza- tional effort on their part. A wider inter-place worker consciousness does not automatically spring forth simply because wage workers share a common class position within the structure of global capitalism. Rather, it has to be actively constructed in both thought and practice. One the one side, workers need an idea, an issue or an identity that they can rally-around en masse (the subject of the chapter’s next main section). On the other side, as Chapter 8 showed, workers need the organizational means to make such an idea, issue or identity flesh. Without such organizational capacities, noble thoughts about transnational worker cooperation will remain just that: thoughts that have no real world impact. Even when this combination of issues/ideas/identities and organizational means is achieved, it is important to recognize that reconciling local worker agendas with transnational ones will rarely be a smooth process. Compromises must usually be made. This is what Jonas (1998: 325) calls the ‘local-global￼THE GEOGRAPHICAL DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE 239 paradox’. This paradox arises because what is ‘good’ for one set of workers at one geographical scale may not be good for other workers at other geographical scales. The balance of gain and loss is very much case specific, but is the essence of translocal worker struggles to con- front this difficult balancing act, willingly or not.

### Acceleration

#### The perm solves best – gives workers a cause to rally around – AND it accelerates the breakdown of capitalism

Sawant and Eidelson 13 [Kshama, Seattle City Council Member, and Josh, Staff Writer for Salon, November 18, “The End of U.S. Capitalism,” http://portside.org/2013-11-19/end-us-capitalism/AKG]

…Now, what [the] Left has to do is to recognize that there is an opening here, there is a hunger among people in the United States, especially young people, young working people…In reality, what has become a dirty word is capitalism. Young people can see that the system does not offer any solutions. They can see that a two-party system is not working for them. But what is the alternative? We have to provide the alternative… Boeing workers…rejected this contract that has been forced on them by Boeing executives [who are] holding the state hostage to their demands…Every few years Boeing demands a massive corporate giveaway from the state, and the state each time gives into it – and this is a Democratic governor of the state who was leading this effort. For Boeing workers, it’s very clear that neither of the two parties is going to stand by them. And so the signal that it sends to the labor movement is that we have to have our own political organization. So what is the most likely path in your view to making the United States more socialist? I wouldn’t call it “more socialist,” in the sense that it doesn’t make sense: It can be either capitalism or socialism. But what we can do, in the journey toward making the economy into something that works for everybody: We have to fight for major reforms under capitalism … We are going to be pushing forward for $15 an hour minimum wage in Seattle in 2014 … The only way we can get that any of these demands to be fulfilled is if we have mass movements of workers and young people coming together in an organized way and demanding these reforms … But we also have to be honest … That’s not going to be enough. Because the system itself is a system of crises … Capitalism does not have the ability to generate the kind of living wage jobs that will be necessary in order to sustain a decent standard of living for the majority … So we have to have a strategy where we not only fight for every reform that we can get, including single payer healthcare, but … It can’t be in isolation from also thinking about fundamental shift in society …

### TL Reps

#### Perm – use the living wage as a critique of cap – this can affirm anti-capitalist politics, and their employment disad is rooted in capitalist assumptions so they link to their kritik

Luce 7 [(Stephanie, Associate Professor of Labor Studies at CUNY school of professional studies) Toward a New Socialism. In “Fighting the Market as God Ideology: Living Wage Campaigns and the Fight for Socialism” Google Books] AT

As socialists, we should be concerned about all of these issues. There are certainly a number of examples of campaigns that have promoted liberal politics and excluded workers. But, l argue that the campaigns don't necessarily have to do this. And with over two hundred campaigns waged so far, many of them provide examples of how to engage in living wage efforts in a way that builds the kind of politics we believe in, as l will discuss below. Challenging Free Market Ideology Many living wage activists are new to politics. They are social workers, students, church-goers, parents of a low-wage worker, or just people concemed about poverty and equality. There is no guarantee that living wage supporters are radical in any sense—they might even oppose public welfare programs, or hold racist notions about the characteristics of low-wage workers. They might simply just believe that it isn't fair that someone working full-time should still live in poverty. They might even believe that the existence of poverty is a drag on communities—if everyone worked and made decent wages, we wouldn’t have homelessness, and wouldn’t need to spend tax dollars on food stamps and indigent medical aid. . But as the living wage campaigns progress, activists of all political persuasions are conﬁonted with the same arguments in every city. Newspaper editori- als proclaim, “It takes a huge ego to imagine that you are smarter than the marketplace.”’ Academics chastise them for their nalvetéz “So what are the effects of increasing minimum wages?” writes economist and New York Times colum- nist Paul Krugman. “Any Econ l0l student can tell you the answer: The higher wage reduces the quantity of labor demanded, and hence leads to unemployment.”' Consistently, living wage opponents rely not on empirical evidence, but on assumptions about capitalism and free markets to dismiss the movement as perhaps well-intentioned, but clearly misguided. Harvard economist Gregory Manltiw even goes so far to argue that “If we could wave a magic wand and help those at the bottom of the economic ladder move up a rung or two, we should do it”—but that unfortunately, the market won't allow it. We cannot “repeal the law of supply and demand and raise wages by ﬁat”! Forced to confront these arguments, living wage advocates must begin to question their own assumptions about the power of markets. Is it true that we cannot intervene in markets for any reason? Can it be that we are all govemed by the “invisible hand” and economic laws that we have no control over? It is here that the potential for this movement to build support for socialist politics is greatest. Although many feel in their gut that this market logic isn’t right, most people in the U.S. have been so thoroughly educated in a capitalist mindset that it takes some work to develop a critique. Jaime Huerta, an organizer with the Pima County Interfaith Council in Tucson, said that their campaign is always looking for good resources to help them “challenge the ‘market is god’ ideology” that is so pervasive among opponents and potential supporters." In other cities, living wage advocates argue that markets are not only about economics, but about politics and morality. In their assessment of the Baltimore campaign, organizers Amie Graf and Jonathan Lange challenged the idea that it is only supply and demand that determine wages." “Declining union power can explain low wages as easily as supply and demand,” they wrote. They add that after Baltimore passed its ordinance, no disastrous effects could be seen. “The market adjusted to political power.” Living wage activists must challenge the fact that “unfettered markets” even exist at all. Conservatives argue that in an ideal capitalist society, the “invisible hand” and the laws of supply and demand can most rationally and fairly distrib- ute goods and services. They say that if people are only allowed to negotiate for themselves, without govemment or union intervention, buyers and sellers will ﬁnd the prices that are satisfactory to both parties. There are a few problems with this approach. First, the theory that these conservatives are relying on-neoclassical economics—makes a lot of assumptions that don’t hold true in reality. For example, neoclassical economics as- sumes that in perfectly competitive markets, all parties have equal access to information. Buyers know what prices all sellers are selling at, workers know what wages their co-workers earn, and consumers know the quality of the product they are buying. But in reality, access to information is distributed unequally, depending on differences in power and resources. Without these assumptions, market “efficiency” no longer holds, even in theory. Another assumption is that all people in a market society act “rationally,” based on their economic self- interest. While its true that people often consider their own economic interest, we have endless evidence that they will also act out of love, compassion, generosity, insecurity, anger, and even confusion. Therefore, assuming rational thought is the sole and primary determinant of human behavior will distort one’s understanding of the world. The second problem with the appeals to the free market is that there is really no such thing as “ﬂee market”—all economies have regulations and inter- vention of some kind. Even under capitalism, governments are needed to regu- late the economy and correct for market failures, such as large fluctuations in the economy, lack of public infrastructure like roads and airports, and discrimination. The problem is that in a capitalist society, governments are usually run by Challenging the “Market as God” Ideology those who have more money and power, and therefore, they are the ones who set those rules and regulations that govem the market. It is a political battle that determines who gets to set the rules. The right-wing has succeeded in equating “free market” with markets where elites set the elite. As socialists, we are not for the elimination of ruIes—we just want them to be set in a transparent fashion by govemments that are elected (truly) democratically, and held accountable to those that elect them. We also want those rules to acknowledge that markets should work for people ﬁrst, not proﬁt. Through living wage campaigns, socialists can highlight the underlying market-based ideologies that are so thoroughly accepted by most people. Oppo- nents’ arguments open a space for living wage advocates to talk about the economy and decision-making, and to assert that there are alternatives. Continues The living wage movement offers an opening for socialists to talk about the economy, wages, and poverty, and the links between a capitalist system and inequality. It’s crucial to ﬁght the relentless pro-market ideology that governs most aspects of our lives. In addition, while living wage gains are still modest, those gains are meaningful to those that obtain them. Although we will face mounting attacks from the opposition, our biggest challenge in this movement is to ﬁnd ways to bring workers themselves into the campaigns in ways that are not tokenistic. In the ﬁght for living wages, just as in the ﬁght for socialism, workers must be in the leadership, working closely with allies and community part- ners. This is our vision for an alternative society, and we must work to make that vision real in our everyday struggles.

## Impact Turns

### TL Impact Strat

#### Turn – the world is rapidly improving by every measure. Cap is the root cause

Heath 13 [Allister Heath. “The world has never had it so good - thanks partly to capitalism.” The Guardian. 29 Oct 2013] AJ

But humanity as a whole is doing better than it ever has: the world is becoming more prosperous, cleaner, increasingly peaceful and healthier. We are living longer, better lives. Virtually all of our existing problems are less bad than at any previous time in history. In How Much Have Global Problems Cost the World, Danish political scientist Bjorn Lomborg documents how on almost all important metrics, the human condition is improving at a dramatic rate; his thesis is backed up by oodles of other data and research. Take war, the worst possible affliction that can befall a society. It is often wrongly argued that armed conflicts are the handmaiden of capitalism; in reality, they are the worst thing that can happen to a liberal economy, destroying lives, families and capital and triggering state control, militarism and deglobalisation. Tragically, there are still far too many conflicts costing far too many lives but overall we live in extraordinarily peaceful times by historical standards. Genghis Khan’s mad conquests in **the** 13th century killed 11pc of the global population at the time, making it the worst conflict the world has ever had the misfortune of enduring; the Second World War, which cost more lives than any other, was the sixth worst on that measure, killing 2.6pc of the world’s population. There has been immense progress since then, especially following the end of the Cold War. The Peace Research Institute Oslo calculates that there were fewer battle deaths (including of civilians) in the first decade of the 21st century than at any time since the Second World War. Uppsala University’s Conflict Data Program found 32 active armed conflicts in 2012, a reduction of five compared with the previous year. The bad news is that the number of deaths shot up again last year as a result of the horrendously bloody Syrian conflict. But that outbreak of barbarism shouldn’t detract from the otherwise dramatically improving trend, which is perhaps the single most important fact about the world today. Instead of fighting, we now trade, communicate, travel and invest; while there is still a long way to go in tearing down protectionist barriers, international economic integration is the great driving force of progress. We are also far less likely to die from the side-effects of economic development and the burning of cooking and heating fuels. In 1900, one person in 550 globally would die from air pollution every year, an annual risk of dying of 0.18pc. Today, that risk has fallen to 0.04 pc, or one in 2,500; by 2050, it is expected to have collapsed to 0.02pc, or one in 5,000. Many other kinds of pollution are also in decline, of course, but this shift is the most powerful. In fact, we are living healthier and longer lives all round, thanks primarily to the remarkable progress made by medicine. Average life expectancy at birth in Africa has jumped from 50 years in 2000 to 56 in 2011; for the world as a whole, it has increased from 64 to 70, according to the World Health Organisation. While people in rich countries can now expect to reach 80, the gap is narrowing and emerging economies are catching up; in India, for example, life expectancy has been increasing by 4.5 years per decade since the 1960s. Medical advances have improved life measurably for any given stage of economic development. Childhood mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa remains far too high, but in 2008 it had fallen to just a third of that in Liverpool in 1870, even though real per capita incomes in that part of the world remain just over half that of Liverpudlians in the 19th century. The probability of a newborn dying before their fifth birthday has dropped from a world average of 23pc in the 1950s to 6pc in the current decade. That’s still nothing to be happy about, of course, but the progress has been remarkable. Child mortality is set to fall from 7.7pc in 2000 to 3.1pc in 2050. One reason is better nutrition. The best proxy for that is height: Latin Americans have been growing taller for years, and since the late 20th century so have young people in Asia, with increased prosperity allowing parents to feed their children more and better food. Better sanitation is also helping: deaths caused by a lack of access to clean water have tumbled from 1.5 per 1,000 people in developing countries in 1950 to 0.4 today and are due to halve again by 2050. Education is another area which has seen huge improvement globally. The UK is a scandalous outlier here, with a recent OECD analysis showing that we are the only rich country in which 55 to 65-year-olds are more proficient in literacy and numeracy than 16 to 24-year-olds, a catastrophic regression. But our educational suicide is unique, and emerging markets have seen revolutionary improvements in recent decades, enhancing educational opportunities for hundreds of millions of young people. Progress has been especially strong from around 1970. While 23.6pc of the world’s population remains illiterate, that is down from 70pc in 1900 and is the lowest it has ever been. The costs of illiteracy have fallen steadily from 12.3pc of global GDP at the start of last century and are set to be just 3.8pc by 2050. Gender equality is also improving. In 1900, women made up only 15pc of the global workforce. By 2012, it reached around 40pc and is expected to hit 45pc by mid-century. Even climate change may have had a much more balanced effect than is usually understood. One of the contributors to Lomborg’s book, Richard Tol, estimates that global warming has so far been beneficial, on balance, to the world – some countries have lost out, but more have gained – but will turn into a net negative later this century, when costs will increasingly outweigh benefits. Tol’s analysis includes agriculture and forestry, sea levels, energy consumption, health and much else besides. This area is contentious and hard to measure. Predictions are exceptionally difficult; as Lomborg himself has argued elsewhere, so far global warming has been below what almost all models had been predicting. We shall see. The only important metric that is unambiguously deteriorating is biodiversity, which declined by 21pc in the 20th century and is continuing to fall. On balance, however, the world is easily in the best place it’s ever been, despite the financial crisis and the threat of terrorism. Thanks to capitalism, globalisation, technology and a reduced tolerance for violence, humanity has never had it so good.

#### Empirics outweigh everything – they take into account every factor, which predictive evidence can’t. Also post-dates their impact evidence and proves the trend I reversing

#### Cap solves war, and creates the least poverty; material resources before anything else

Gregory 11 [Anthony Gregory. “Why Capitalism Is Worth Defending.” MISES DAILY (Austrian Economics Newspaper). August 2, 2011] AJ

It is simply a fact that capitalism, even hampered by the state, has dragged most of the world out of the pitiful poverty that characterized all of human existence for millennia. It was industrialization that saved the common worker from the constant tedium of primitive agriculture. It was the commodification of labor that doomed slavery, serfdom, and feudalism. Capitalism is the liberator of women and the benefactor of all children who enjoy time for study and play rather than endure uninterrupted toil on the farm. Capitalism is the great mediator between tribes and nations, which first put aside their weapons and hatreds in the prospect of benefiting from mutual exchange. "We stand in defense of the greatest engine of material prosperity in human history, the fount of civilization, peace, and modernity: capitalism." A century ago, the Marxists acknowledged the productivity of capitalism and its preference to the feudalism it replaced, but predicted that the market would impoverish workers and lead to greater material scarcity. The opposite has happened and now the leftists attack capitalism mostly for other reasons: it produces too much and is wasteful, hurts the environment, exacerbates social divisions, isolates people from a spiritual awareness of their community, nation, or planet, and so on. But all the higher, more noble, less materialistic aspirations of humankind rest on material security. Even those who hate the market, whether they work in it or not, thrive on the wealth it generates. If Marx's buddy Engels hadn't been a factory manager, he would have lacked the leisure time needed to help concoct their destructive philosophy. Every social-science grad student; every Hollywood limousine liberal; every Christian Left do-gooder; everyone for whom socialism itself is the one religion; and every antimarket artist, scholar, philosopher, teacher, and theologian screams atop a soapbox produced by the very capitalist system he disparages. Everything we do in our lives — whether materialistic or of a nobler nature — we do in the comfort provided by the market. Meanwhile, the very poorest in a modern capitalist system, even one as corrupted by statism as the United States, have it much better than all but the wealthiest people a century ago. These blessings are owed to capitalism, and unleashing it further would finally erase poverty as we know it.

#### Takes out their value-to-life arguments – material stability comes first, so the material effects of cap outweigh their theoretical impacts

#### Cap is structurally the best system – turns their VTL claims

Norberg 01 [Johan Norberg (senior fellow at the Cato Institute). “In Defense of Global Capitalism.” CATO 2001] AJ

Capitalism means that no one is subject to arbitrary coercion by others. Because we have the option of simply refraining from signing a contract or doing a business deal if we prefer some other solution, the only way of getting rich in a free market is by giving people something they want, something they will pay for of their own free will. Both parties to a free exchange have to feel that they benefit from it; otherwise there won’t be any deal. Economics, then, is not a zero-sum game. The bigger a person’s income in a market economy, the more that person has done to offer people what they want. Bill Gates and Madonna earn millions, but they don’t steal that money; they earn it by offering software and music that a lot of people think are worth paying for. In this sense, they are essentially our servants. Firms and individuals struggle to develop better goods and more efficient ways of provid- ing for our needs. The alternative is for the government to take our resources and then decide which types of behavior to encour- age. The only question is why the government knows what we want and what we consider important in our lives better than we ourselves do. Prices and profits in a market economy serve as a signaling system by which the worker, the entrepreneur, and the investor can navigate. Those who want to earn good wages or make a good profit have to seek out those parts of the economy where they can best cater to other people’s demands. Excessive taxes and handouts pervert these signals and incentives completely. Price controls are destructive because they directly distort the necessary price signals. If the government puts a ceiling on prices—if it imposes a lower price than the market would have, as it does for apartment rentals in New York—a shortage will result. People will hang onto the apartments they have, even if they don’t need them for the moment and even if someone else would be willing to pay more for the use of that same apartment. Denied the ability to charge higher rents, landlords find it less worthwhile to invest in the purchase of new buildings, and housing companies stop new construction. Result: housing shortage. If instead the government sets a price floor—that is, deliberately bids up the price of a good higher than the market would have, as many governments do for agricultural products—a surplus will result. When the EU pays more for foodstuffs than the market, more people than necessary will go into farming, resulting in surplus production and wasted resources. Capitalism also requires people to be allowed to retain the resources they earn and create. If you exert yourself and invest for the long term, but someone else appropriates most of the profit, the odds are that you’ll give up. Protection of ownership lies at the very heart of a capitalist economy. Ownership means not only that people are entitled to the fruits of their labors, but also that they are free to use their resources without having to ask the authorities first. Capitalism allows people to explore the economic frontier for themselves. That is not to say that any given person in the market will necessarily be smarter than a bureaucrat. But market participants are in direct touch with their own particular corner of the market, and by responding to price fluctuations, they have direct feedback on supply and demand. Central planners can never collect all this information from all fields, nor are they nearly as motivated to be guided by it. Even if any one person in the market is no smarter than a bureaucrat, a million people together certainly are! Their million different attempts at determining the best uses of resources are generally wiser than a single, centralized solution. If the government decides that all resources are to be committed to a certain kind of collective farming and this fails, the whole of society will be economically affected and, in the worst case scenario, will starve. If, instead, one group of people attempts the same type of farming, they alone will suffer the adverse effects if the enterprise fails, and surpluses elsewhere in the market mean that those effects won’t be as dire as starvation. A society needs this kind of experimentation and innovation to develop, but at the same time the risks of experimentation have to be limited so that the whole society will not be jeopardized by a few people’s mistakes. Therein lies the virtue of individual decisionmaking and individual responsibility. Personal responsibility, no less than personal freedom, is essen- tial to capitalism. A politician or bureaucrat handling huge sums of money for infrastructure investment or a campaign to host the next Olympics is not under the same pressure to make rational decisions as entrepreneurs and investors are. If things go wrong and expenditure exceeds income, it isn’t the politician who foots the bill. People who own their property act on a long-term basis because they know that they will reap the rewards (and bear the costs) of their actions. This is the core of a capitalist economy—people saving part of what they already have in order to create more value for the future. We do the same thing, create ‘‘human capi- tal,’’ when we devote some of our time and energy today to getting a good education that will increase our earning potential in the long run. In the economy, this means that instead of living from hand to mouth we set aside part of what we have and are rewarded with interest or profits by whoever can use the money more efficiently than we can ourselves. Saving and investment elevate the economy to progressively higher levels as they finance new machinery and organizational structures to make the work- force more productive. Organization is important because people can produce far more through voluntary cooperation than they could by doing every- thing single-handed. It may take a single craftsman a week to produce a chair, but if he is especially skilled at constructing the wooden frame, and if he joins forces with someone who can paint and someone else who’s good at sewing chair cushions, together they may be able to turn out one chair a day. With modern machinery, another product of specialization and cooperation, they can make a hundred chairs a day, which augments the value of their labor. Technical progress enabled new machines to manufacture old types of goods less expensively, placing new inventions and goods at people’s disposal. As a result of this continuous improvement of productivity through the division of labor and technical advancement, one hour’s labor today is worth about 25 times more than it was in the mid-19th century. Employees, conse- quently, now receive about 25 times as much as they did then, in the form of better pay, better working conditions, and shorter working hours. When a person’s labor grows more valuable, more firms want to buy it. In order to get it, they then have to raise wages and improve the work environment. If, instead, wages increase more rapidly than productivity, through legislation or union contracts, then jobs will have to be eliminated, because the workers’ input is not worth what the employer is forced to pay for it. In this case, the ‘‘surplus’’ created by the price floor in wages comes in the form of unemployment.

### Best of Worst

#### None of their impact evidence is unique – they need to prove that a better system will replace cap to access any of their impacts. Even if cap has flaws, it’s better than any other system – it prevents war and has historically caused the largest reductions in poverty and inequality.

Weede 2008 [Erich, professor at the Institute for Political Science and Sociology, “Globalization and Inequality” Comparative Sociology 7, p. 415-433]

Globalization refers to an increasing international division of labor and more trade between economies, to cross-border investment and rapid transfers of technology between nations, to global capital ﬂows and, to a lesser degree, to increasing labor mobility. Th ere is as yet no global labor market. Globalization also implies better opportunities to learn from foreigners or strangers. Th e more similar you are to others, the less likely it is that you can learn from them.1 Unfortunately, many people prefer to rely on established routines and resent the challenge of having to learn from others. Globalization is another word for a worldwide expansion of capitalism. It results in international tax competition (Edwards and de Rugy 2002; Mitchell 2005). Globalization is based on some technological and political prerequisites. These include ever cheaper and faster means of communication and transportation as well as an adequate political environment. The global expansion of capitalism requires political fragmentation: markets should be larger than political units.2 This provides an exit option from oppressive government for capital and, to a lesser degree, for qualiﬁed labor. Such an exit option protects economic freedom from ever-increasing state interference and tax burdens. If one state should be much more powerful than all others, as the US currently is, then globalization requires a deeper commitment to capitalism and economic freedom by the hegemon than by other states. Th ese political requirements of globalization are fulﬁlled. Globalization maximizes the size of the market. Since Adam Smith (1776/1976) we know that the size of the market determines the degree of division of labor which promotes productivity. Thus, globalization is beneﬁcial because it increases productivity. This is not only a theoretical claim, but also an empirical statement. For instance, based on data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, yearly economic gains from globalization have been estimated to be somewhere between $1,650 and $3,300 per capita for Americans (Scheve and Slaughter 2007:36–37). Real compensation per hour (including beneﬁts and wages) has also gone up in the past decade, by 22 percent (Griswold 2007:1).3 Since Deng Xiaoping opened China in the late 1970s by introducing reforms which imply creeping capitalism, Chinese agricultural production grew rapidly. Later, China attracted a lot of foreign direct investment. Today China is a major base for manufacturing. By 2005 it was already the third largest exporter, still behind Germany and the US but already ahead of Japan (Th e Economist 2005). By 2008 China is likely to become the biggest exporter in the world. In the early 1980s (but no longer thereafter) even the disparity between urban and rural incomes in China decreased (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003:145). Hundreds of millions of Chinese were taken out of abject poverty. In the ﬁrst two decades of reform, per capita incomes grew fourfold (Bhalla 2002:218). Later, less radical reforms in India led to nearly doubling per capita incomes in a similar period of time and pulled about two hundred million Indians out of abject poverty (Das 2002:360). Since China and India together account for nearly forty percent of mankind and about half of the population living in less developed countries, economic growth in China and India and other Asian countries contributes to the equalization of the global distributions of income between individuals and households. If we are interested in individuals rather than states, then the empirical indicators are clear. Globalization or the global expansion of capitalism has contributed to, or at least been compatible with, an equalization of the size distribution of income between human beings. Since cross-national differences between average incomes are still a more important component of inequality between human beings than intra-national differences in income, it is possible – and currently true – to have the following two trajectories at the same time: growing inequality within many or even most countries amidst some movement towards equality among individuals worldwide (Bhalla 2002; Firebaugh 1999; Goesling 2001; Sala-i-Martin 2007; World Bank 2005). Admittedly, many economies, including the US and China, suffered some deterioration in their domestic income distributions. This is why the legitimacy of capitalism and globalization comes under attack, even in the American citadel of capitalism. This is also why calls for protectionism become louder and louder (Scheve and Slaughter 2007). But critics of globalization tend to forget a basic truth about free trade (Griswold 2007:3): “If workers, capital, and resources can shift within the domestic economy, jobs eliminated by import competition will quickly be replaced by jobs created elsewhere.”4 One should not blame the consequences of institutional sclerosis, or of an unwillingness to adjust, on globalization. Globalization has led to a significant reduction in mass poverty. Although the Chinese distribution of income has become much less equal since the reform process began in the late 1970s, the strong growth performance of China has pulled hundreds of millions out of abject poverty. In India growth has been less spectacular than in China such that the distribution of income has changed less, and yet again hundreds of millions have been pulled out of abject poverty. Although Latin America and Africa have benefitted much less from globalization than Asia has, these continents also cannot match the demographic weight of Asia. Therefore, their comparative lack of success cannot neutralize Asian progress in global perspective. Moreover, one has to keep in mind that winning in the process of globalization presupposes participating in it, not abstaining from it. One may illustrate global change with data provided by Indian economist Surjit Bhalla (2002:187). He deﬁnes people with a daily income between $10–$40 USD as members of the global middle class. In 1960 this class consisted largely of whites; only six percent were Asians. By 2000, however, 52 percent was Asian. Th e era of globalization is one in which Asia is now recovering, after falling for about two centuries further behind the West. Except for Africa abject poverty worldwide is likely to become signiﬁcantly reduced within one or two decades. Th e African share of abject poverty in the world is expected to rise until 2015 from 36 percent to about 90 percent (Bhalla 2002:S. 172).5 Why did so many people in Asia beneﬁt from globalization, whereas Africans did not? A plausible explanation has been oﬀered by Collier (2007:79).6 He points out that about three quarters of the bottom billion7 live in countries which have suﬀered from civil war or long periods of bad governance and poor economic policies. According to Collier (2007:27), “civil war is development in reverse. It damages both the country itself and its neighbors.” Bad governance and poor economic policies distort incentives and misallocate the meager resources of poor countries. Africa has suﬀered from these development traps to a greater degree than other continents. Moreover, one may argue that a focus on income and income distributions is biased towards understating the beneﬁts of globalization. As Goklany (2007:chaps. 2–3) has pointed out, the same income per capita today (in terms of purchasing power) implies higher life expectancies, lower infant mortalities, less malnutrition, healthier lives, and less child labor than it did decades or centuries earlier. Less developed, still poor countries do benefit from the technological progress achieved by developed and rich countries. Thus, even if one disputes the widely held and well-supported view regarding some equalization of individual or house-hold incomes worldwide in recent decades, one should still accept Goklany’s contention (2007:72): “In the aspects of human well-being that are truly critical – life expectancy, infant mortality, hunger, literacy, and child labor – the world is far more equal today than it was a century ago, in large part because of globalization.”8 Another advantage of globalization is that it contributes to preventing war (Russett and Oneal 2001; Weede 2005). Quantitative research demonstrates that the risk of war between nations is reduced if they trade a lot with each other. There is something like a commercial peace or peace by trade. Moreover, economic freedom reduces involvement in military conﬂict and ﬁnancial market openness also reduces the risk of war (Gartzke 2005, 2007). In particular, I want to underline that economic cooperation paciﬁes the geopolitical relationship between rising China and the West.9 Moreover, there is also something like a democratic peace. The risk of war between democracies is extremely small. In my view, one should conceptualize this as a component of a capitalist peace because democracies prosper best in wealthy countries10 and because capitalism or economic freedom and thereby globalization contribute to prosperity (Weede 2005, 2006). Since rising powers tend to challenge the political status quo, it is fortunate that the two demographic giants of this world seem to prosper under global capitalism.

#### Empirics outweigh – none of their evidence outlines a realistic alternative to capitalism

### Solves War

#### Cap key to peace – prefer 40 years of empirics

Mousseau 2009 [Michael, associate professor of International Relations at Koc University in Istanbul, “The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace,” International Security Vol 33 No 4, Spring, Muse]

One of the most important achievements in the study of international security has been the arrival and broad acceptance of the “democratic peace,” that is, the statistically significant absence of war between democracies. This discovery has produced a broader acceptance of domestic factors in the study of international conflict. It has also influenced public policy: since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have widely embraced democracy as a cause of peace. The extent to which scholars and practitioners can be convinced that democracy causes peace, however, depends on how confident they are in explaining it. Numerous studies have identified democracy as a cause of democratic peace, but none have yielded much meaningful, clear-cut, and nontrivial predictive power—achievements that lie at the heart of scientifically identifying causality. On the contrary, it appears increasingly likely that existing explanations for how democracy causes peace may be incomplete. Several studies have shown that the impact of democracy on peace may depend on the level of economic development.1 No compelling challenges to these findings have been offered, and some scholars who once confirmed the democratic peace now acknowledge the role played by economic conditionality.2 It follows that [End Page 52] democracy, alone, may not be the cause of the peace. Instead, some factor related to economic development either causes the peace or qualifies the impact of democracy on peace. This article advances the understanding of the democratic peace by demonstrating how a particular kind of economic development, contract-intensive development, appears to account for this peace. The economic conditionality of the democratic peace was originally predicted by economic norms theory, which identifies how liberal values may be rooted in the decisionmaking heuristics of a social market economy—that is, one where most people have the opportunity to choose, as individuals in the market, their sources of income and where to spend it.3 In this economy, sometimes called “advanced capitalism,” individuals habitually trust strangers in making contracts and depend on the state to enforce them impartially. They learn to prefer free choice and the equal application of law, and they expect their government to behave accordingly in foreign affairs. As a consequence, contract-intensive societies tend to agree on the preservation of the Westphalian order of sovereign states and the primacy of international law over power politics, and they are in natural alliance against any entity—state or nonstate—that seeks to challenge this order. This study demonstrates that from 1961 to 2001 not a single fatal conflict occurred among nations with contract-intensive economies. In contrast, democracies without contract-intensive economies engaged each other in several fatal conflicts during this period, about the number to be expected if democracy in states without a contracting economy has no impact on foreign policy. These results are highly robust after consideration of many competing causes, few of which have any significant impact on war and peace once the role of the contract-intensive economy variable is considered. The existence of this variable, in contrast, has the strongest impact of all nontrivial variables normally observed in studies of international conflict. Several implications follow from this study. First, this research supports the claims of some critics of the democratic peace who have long argued that a third variable may cause both democracy and peace:4 that variable is a [End Page 53] contract-intensive economy. Second, although challenging the role of democracy as a cause of democratic peace, this study shows that a zone of peace does exist among democratic nations, but it is one that appears to be caused by economic rather than governing institutions. Third, whether or not shared democracy contributes to international peace is an important issue because U.S. leaders’ belief in this proposition has influenced their conduct of foreign policy. President Bill Clinton, for example, supported the United States’ “democratic enlargement” policy because he believed that “democracies don’t attack each other.”5 His successor, George W. Bush, explained that his administration promoted democracy because “democracies don’t go to war with each other.”6 President Barack Obama has asserted that “we benefit from the expansion of democracy” because democracies are “the nations with which we share our deepest values.”7 Although support for democracy may be good for a variety reasons, this article presents compelling evidence that the promotion of peace among nations is not one of them. The article is organized as follows. First, I review the emergence of the democratic peace literature and the evidence linking this peace to economic development. Next, I present several explanations for the role of economic conditionality. I draw out the implications of economic norms theory for explaining stable democracy and peace among nations. After discussing the test conditions, reporting the results, and exploring alternative explanations, I offer a case study of the economic peace involving Greece and Turkey to illustrate the usefulness of the theory. I conclude with several policy implications that follow from the analysis. Two pioneers in the study of the democratic peace were Dean Babst in the 1960s and Rudolph Rummel in the 1970s.8 Key articles by Michael Doyle and [End Page 54] Jack Levy brought increased attention to the concept.9 By the early 1990s, a large number of highly rigorous studies had widely confirmed the proposition that democracies do not go war with each other.10 There are two primary sources of continuing skepticism, however. First, because most explanations for the democratic peace were created after it was first observed—the primary exception being Immanuel Kant in 179511—empirical confirmation for any of them can come only with the observation of novel empirical facts.12 To my knowledge, there are few confirmed, clear-cut, nontrivial, and novel facts that have been explicitly deduced from any explanation for the democratic peace. The closest candidate is the war-winning hypothesis, an expectation deduced from several accounts. The weight of the evidence is mixed as to whether democracies tend to win their wars.13 [End Page 55] Second, the finding that the democratic peace may be conditioned on some level of economic development indicates that democracy, alone, is probably not an independent cause of the peace. The most compelling study in this regard appeared in 2003, when several scholars came together to examine their contending expectations.14 The following four hypotheses were tested: (1) the democratic peace holds firm without any conditions; (2) the democratic peace is conditioned by economic development;15 (3) the democratic peace is conditioned by trade;16 and (4) the interaction of trade and development accounts for the democratic peace.17 The test failed to support hypotheses (1), (3), and (4), and robustly reconfirmed hypothesis (2). Most other studies that have examined the role of economic conditionality have confirmed it, including those of some scholars who had once supported the democratic peace thesis.18 Some scholars have responded to this finding by stressing that the level of economic development at which democracy becomes significant is low enough that, at least in recent years, most democracies are included among [End Page 56] those nations that do not engage in war with each other.19 But in a previous study, I argued that the exact level at which democracy becomes significant is not important, for two reasons. First, the question probably cannot be answered to everyone’s satisfaction. The precise level is highly sensitive to the researcher’s choice of control variables, sample, and measure of economic development.20 Second, without theory, the predicted level of development at which democracy becomes significant poses the danger of the fallacy of induction. Scholars can be much more confident in predictions grounded in theories with established predictive and explanatory power. Not only have all theories of democracy acting alone in causing the peace been unable to produce compelling novel facts, but the economic conditionality of this peace strongly suggests that all of these theories are, at best, incomplete. The issue is not the level of economic development at which democracy becomes a significant force for peace: it is how development causes the peace. Economic Conditionality and Economic Norms Theory Following the first report of the economic conditionality of the democratic peace, several studies sought to explain it. Azar Gat offered a list of factors potentially associated with what he calls economic “modernization,” including industrialization, which has delinked territory from the production of wealth, and a cultural “feminization” of men caused by urbanization and the service economy.21 Erik Gartzke argued that openness of markets may be the cause of the economic peace: nations with freer capital markets are more dependent than others on international investors, who are likely to divest from a country about to engage in war. Policymakers first recognize which nations have free capital markets and which do not, and then give greater credibility to threats made by those with freer capital markets than those with controlled ones. In theory, this can cause countries with freer capital markets to be more peaceful than others. The role of development in the democratic peace is based, presumably, on the assumption that development and capital openness are related.22 [End Page 57] My explanation for the economic peace integrates two long-standing findings in social science.23 First, research in economics and sociology has established the notion of bounded rationality: that is, individuals economize on the costs of decisionmaking by forming cognitive habits—heuristics—for situations they repeatedly encounter.24 Second, studies in economic history and sociology have documented that dependency on ties with friends and families—clientelism—often constitutes significant portions of trade and services in middle- and lower-income countries.25 It follows that divergent everyday routines of individuals in clientelist and contract-intensive societies should give rise to divergent decisionmaking heuristics. In a previous study, I showed how these divergent heuristics can affect political culture and institutions.26 In clientelist economies, individuals depend on group leaders, called “patrons,” who promote loyalty by providing economic and physical security in the form of gifts. To obtain these gifts, clients learn to habitually signal their willingness to abide by all of their patron’s commands with alacrity. When clientelist societies face rapid change and leadership is fluid, political entrepreneurs offer themselves as new group patrons. To increase the demand for security, these political entrepreneurs promote fear of outsiders. This may explain why societies in civil anarchy or in transition between clientelism and advanced capitalism—when high unemployment rates often coexist with clientelist traditions in large cities—tend to give rise to extremist dogmas that fit in-group worldviews, such as nationalist, Marxist, fascist, and militant Islamist ideologies.27 In contract-intensive societies, in contrast, making contracts with strangers promotes loyalty not to patrons but to a state that enforces these contracts with [End Page 58] impartiality and equal application of the rule of law. Because bigger markets offer more contracting opportunities than smaller ones, and because contracts cannot be arranged unless all parties explicitly state their preferences, individuals habitually perceive it as in their interest to respect the preferences and rights of strangers. Compared with voters in clientelist-integrated societies, voters in contract-intensive societies are more likely to support candidates for office who stress individual freedoms, at home and abroad, and who advocate government transparency and equal enforcement of the law. Discussion of the causes of a nation’s transition from a clientelist to a contract-intensive economy is largely beyond the scope of economic norms theory. Exogenous factors include those that make the benefits of trusting strangers in the market greater than the benefits of personalized ties. The theory identifies political factors as the primary cause of economic changes because a contract-intensive economy cannot exist unless government authorities make the decision to enforce contracts with impartiality. But this decision does not guarantee a contract-intensive economy: geographic factors, such as poor harbors or an absence of neighbors with contract-intensive economies, can constrain markets. 28 There is also a likely feedback loop from an emerging market culture to greater opportunities in the market. As increasing numbers of individuals decide to accept the risk of contracting with strangers—as a society approaches the “tipping point”29—the division of labor must grow increasingly complex. This in turn enhances opportunities in the market, causing more individuals to accept the risk of trusting strangers and their states. The shift in loyalty from group leaders to impartial states is not monotonic, however. Acontract-intensive economy can collapse for a variety of reasons, as the nascent capitalist and quasi-liberal political cultures of Classical Athens and Renaissance Italy did after defeats in foreign wars. In the modern era, the feedback loop seems to have started anew in Holland in the fifteenth century (possibly triggered by climate change), and was soon entered into by its neighbors with good harbors: England, northern France, northwestern Germany, and Scandinavia. Over time, contract norms reached more deeply into these societies. By the eighteenth century, however, in only two societies were [End Page 59] these norms in all likelihood highly institutionalized: possibly Switzerland and almost certainly the northern colonies of British North America, led foremost by the Massachusetts Bay Colony.30 By extrapolating from economic history and global migration patterns (because emigration can inversely reflect the level of opportunities in the market), I was able to determine that by the early twentieth century contract-intensive economies were highly institutionalized in all of the previously mentioned regions, as well as in the settler communities of the American West, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. But between World Wars I and II, global economic troubles stalled the diffusion of contracting, causing it to decline in northwestern Germany when hyperinflation wiped out the middle class. Drawing on data discussed below, I found that by the 1960s contract norms were institutionalized throughout much of West Germany, rural France, the southern United States, and northern Italy, as well as Austria, Finland, and Japan.31 By the end of the Cold War, much of the rest of Italy, as well as Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan seemed to have reached the tipping point. Since the end of the ColdWar, the peoples of Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, and Slovenia may have reached it as well. A broad range of research documents the crucial role of economic norms in influencing political and social phenomena. Karl Polanyi’s book The Great Transformation highlights the transition from clientelist to contractual modes of exchange in Europe from the sixteenth to twentieth centuries.32 Studies in anthropology and archaeology document how economic conditions influence political and institutional preferences.33 As predicted by economic norms theory, there exists a correlation between high income and contracting and between low income and clientelism. Experimental studies have confirmed sizable differences in the way individuals from low- and high-income countries react in tests involving economic preferences.34 Studies in comparative politics have confirmed a strong linkage between economic development and stable, liberal [End Page 60] democracy.35 Survey and case studies in sociology and economics have linked in-group norms with collectivist preferences, and economic development with individualist preferences and higher levels of trust among strangers.36 The contract-intensive economy represents only one form of economic development. In the twentieth century, noncapitalist forms of development included fascism, communism, and petro-clientelism. Nations with these forms of development included totalitarian states (command economies—e.g., the Soviet Union), bureaucratic clientelist states (where authorities distributed wealth with an eye toward promoting and maintaining loyalty—e.g., Saudi Arabia), and “hybrid” states involving a mix of clientelism and totalitarianism (e.g., Nazi Germany). To test whether individuals in contract-intensive, higherincome economies think differently from those in other higher-income economies, I obtained data on levels of trust in nations from the World Values Survey project.37 Recall that contract-intensive economies are thought to foster the expectation that strangers will fulfill their contractual commitments, so a crucial prediction of economic norms theory is that, comparatively speaking, nations with contract-intensive economies should tend to have higher levels of impersonal trust than other nations. There are forty-four countries in 1997 with data on all variables. I regressed trust on gross domestic product (logged) and contract-intensive economy (see measure below). The result confirms this expectation: the contract-intensive economy variable, not higher income per se, is associated with higher levels of trust in nations.38 Both economic norms theory and classical liberal theory focus on the role of markets. But their assumptions and implications differ. Classical liberalism assumes that Adam Smith’s “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” is ingrained [End Page 61] in human nature, and that freer markets (less state regulation and more foreign trade) promote economic development.39 Economic norms theory suggests that the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange is learned from the sustained presence of market-based opportunities, and that these opportunities have geographic and political origins. In this way, economic norms theory identifies the origins and popularity of classical liberal and social contract theories in the sustained presence of market-based opportunities. When contracting in the market becomes the way of life, people begin to think of it as natural and conceive of democratic governance too as a “social” contract or as embedded in “natural” law.40 Economic norms theory thus offers an explanation for why the classical liberal, social contract, and natural law traditions emerged when and where they did: in the areas of northwestern Europe that were developing contract-intensive economies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, in contrast to what classical liberalism advocates claim, heavy state regulation of the economy may well be a prerequisite for countries to build and sustain a social market economy. Examples include the Scandinavian countries that have both contract-intensive economies and extensive state redistribution and regulation policies. Economic norms theory predicts that the leaders of contact-intensive nations will be less likely than other leaders to visibly challenge the sovereign rights of other states. This is because the modern interstate system is itself based on contract norms of legal equality: the Protestant Reformation was the consequence of the initial rise of contract norms in northwestern Europe in the sixteenth century; and the Treaty of Westphalia, which settled the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, institutionalized these norms across nations.41 Leaders of contract-intensive nations thus tend to view the continuation of the [End Page 62] Westphalian system of legally equal sovereign states, and the supremacy of international law over brute power politics, as consistent with the values and interests of their domestic populations. At first glance, economic norms theory may seem to imply the monadic expectation that contract-intensive nations should be less likely than other nations to engage in militarized conflict. But nothing in this theory suggests this to be true: rather, it is how they perceive their interests that makes contract-intensive nations different from other nations. Because contract-intensive nations consider the preservation of the Westphalian order to be in their interest, they may engage in wars with non-contract-intensive nations that challenge this order: for example, they may oppose states that threaten other states for economic gain in ways that violate international law. Economic norms theory predicts instead two hypotheses, one dyadic and one conditionally monadic. The dyadic hypothesis predicts a peace among contract-intensive nations; the monadic hypothesis predicts that contract-intensive nations, which are almost always highly democratic, will refrain from fighting other democratic nations. Starting with the dyadic hypothesis, the theory predicts that contract-intensive nations not only will be at peace with each other but are in a natural alliance. The alliance is the result of their fundamental agreement across a range of global issues and their consequent tendency to be on the same side in militarized confrontations.42 When the comparatively rare militarized dispute does occur between two contract-intensive nations, they are more likely than others to settle short of deadly force because their domestic audiences— and domestic opposition leaders—are more likely than their counterparts in non-contract-intensive nations to accept resolution through legal arbitration. The monadic hypothesis is conditioned by democracy. Recall that economic norms theory identifies how a contract-intensive economy can cause a population to value liberal democratic government. It follows that voters in contract-intensive democracies expect their leaders to refrain from fighting other democracies, regardless of the latters’ actions or economic conditions. This expectation accords with Spencer Weart’s view that liberal ideology causes [End Page 63] democratic nations to refrain from attacking other democratic nations.43 The key difference between Weart’s thesis and mine is that I predict that liberal ideology originates in contract-intensive economies, and thus only contract-intensive democracies—not other democracies—are so constrained. In this way, economic norms theory offers an explanation for why the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad appears on the agendas of contract-intensive democracies, but seemingly not on those of democracies that lack contract-intensive economies, or nations with other kinds of political systems. If this monadic thesis is correct, then democratic dyads where at least one state has a contract-intensive economy will be peaceful. Tests that do not control for this pattern would yield misleading results. Constructing the Test Conditions To test my hypotheses, I closely followed the analytic procedures used in a previous study.44 I included all fatal militarized disputes and wars as identified in the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute data set over the years 1961 to 2001.45 I made one modeling change to this previous study by [End Page 64] controlling for the development level of the more developed state in the dyad and its interaction with geographic distance.46 To my knowledge, two sources of direct contracting data across nations are available: investments in stocks and bonds and life insurance policies. Of all economic sectors to gauge, economic securities and life insurance are probably the most informative because it is the essential need for economic security that compels individuals to form loyalties to patrons or liberal states. Unfortunately, national-level data on stocks and bonds include foreign investment, and foreign investment does not reflect a society’s norms. Life insurance contracts, however, are not affected in this way. These contracts should also serve as an accurate indicator of contracting heuristics because, in predominantly clientelist societies, individuals normally protect their families in the event of death through ties with friends and extended families, as children inherit the debts of their parents as well as the favors owed them. In this type of society, few individuals are likely to trust strangers and the state enough to place their family’s welfare in an insurance contract; prevailing heuristics prevent most from even considering it. In societies where contracting is highly institutionalized, in contrast, comparatively few will have the personalized ties that are sufficiently strong and reliable that they will place their family’s security in them; comparatively larger numbers will act on prevailing heuristics and trust their family’s welfare to strangers in the form of life insurance contracts.47 [End Page 65] I gathered cross-national data on active life insurance contracts collected under the auspices of the World Bank from 1960 to 2000.48 Only sixty-five nations are included in the data, however, and many of these only after 1978. It is possible, however, to expand the data to most countries for this period by adopting a binary threshold and assuming that missing data reflect zero contract norms. This assumption follows from economic norms theory: contract-intensive societies are comparatively reliable providers of economic data because contracts must be enforced, and enforcement requires written records. States that promote markets also have an interest in collecting data on contractual transactions, so that they can monitor and promote contractual economic activity as well as tax it. In contrast, recording and tallying clientelist transactions are difficult tasks because they are framed as favors, which is why much more economic data exist on contract-intensive societies than on others, past and present. For instance, we know that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, merchants in Cairo engaged in extensive contracting with merchants in Spain, North Africa, the Levant, and even India, because many of these contracts were later discovered in a repository of Old Cairo called the Geniza.49 The insurance data are most comprehensive for the years 1979 to 2000, so I identified the contract-intensive nations as those with existing insurance policies above the median level over this period. Additional tests show that the choice of threshold has no effect on the results. I also obtained identical results, unreported, using the original continuous data with missing values treated as missing.50 Model 1 in table 1 confirms the findings of previous studies regarding the relationship between democracy and fatal militarized disputes from 1961 to 2001. The coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.10) is negative and highly significant, confirming the expectation of democratic peace when the presence or absence of contract-intensive economy is not considered. The performance of most of the control variables is similar to that found in these earlier studies.51 To test the dyadic hypothesis that contract-intensive nations refrain from engaging in militarized disputes with each other, I constructed a binary indicator for both states having contract-intensive economies, which I call “Both States CIE.” As can be seen in table 1, the test yields a startling result: the Both States CIE variable must be dropped from the estimate because it predicts peace perfectly; that is, in the sample from 1961 to 2001, no fatal militarized disputes occurred between two nations with contract-intensive economies. A bivariate chi-square test indicates that this peace cannot be reasonably attributed to chance (p < 0.001). In contrast, with the binary measure “Both Coherent Democracies,” as defined by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder,52 ten fatal militarized disputes took place between democratic nations that lacked contract-intensive economies. A bivariate chi-square test suggests that this is about the expected number if democracy in countries without a contract-intensive economy does not cause peace among nations (p < 0.715). To test the monadic hypothesis, I distinguished democratic dyads where one state has a contract-intensive economy from those where neither state has one by including the variable “One State CIE” and its interaction with [End Page 68] DemocracyL. As can be seen in model 2 in table 1, the coefficient for the interactive term DemocracyL x One State CIE (−0.20) is negative and significant. This confirms the supplemental monadic hypothesis of a conditional relationship between contract-intensive economy and democracy. Because the coefficients for constituent terms (DemocracyL) in interactive models are meaningful only for cases where the other constituent term (One State CIE) equals zero, the coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.03) in model 2 confirms the results of the bivariate chi-square tests: in countries without a contract-intensive economy, democracy does not cause peace among nations.53 Models 3 and 4 in table 1 repeat the analyses for the onset of war, defined by convention as militarized interstate disputes that include more than 999 battle deaths. The coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.15) in model 3 is negative and highly significant. This confirms the findings of previous studies regarding the relationship between democracy and war from 1961 to 2001. In model 4 all cases where Both States CIE equals one are excluded because this variable predicts peace perfectly. A bivariate chi-square test indicates that this absence of war among contract-intensive nations is probably not the result of chance (p < 0.10). In contrast, the data yield two wars among coherent democracies where both lacked contract-intensive economies over the sample period: Cyprus and Turkey in 1974 and the Kargil war fought between India and Pakistan starting in 1993 (this dispute continued to 1999 when it reached the war level while both countries were still democratic). A chi-square test indicates that this is approximately the number to be expected if democracy without a contract-intensive economy does not prevent wars among nations (p < 0.857).54 The remaining coefficients in model 4 are substantially identical to the results for fatal militarized interstate disputes in model 2. The coefficient for [End Page 69] DemocracyL x One State CIE (−0.30) confirms the supplemental monadic hypothesis of a conditional relationship between a contract-intensive economy and democracy at the war level; the coefficient for DemocracyL (−0.03) confirms that democracy without a contract-intensive economy does not cause peace among nations. Identical results also appear, for fatal militarized disputes and wars, using the dyadic dummy variable for Both Coherent Democracies. One possible explanation for the insignificance of democracy may be that there are too few cases of democracies without contract-intensive economies. The data, however, do not support this conclusion. Economic norms theory predicts that a contract-intensive economy will cause and stabilize democracy: it is thus no surprise that 88 percent of contract-intensive nation-years from 1960 to 2000 are also coherently democratic.55 But non-contract-intensive nations can experiment with democratic government for a host of reasons, and 49 percent of coherent democratic nation-years do not have contract-intensive economies during this period. Because there are about as many democratic nation-years without contract-intensive economies as there are with them, a dearth of non-contract-intensive democratic cases cannot explain the insignificance of the democratic peace. Could the causal arrow point in the opposite direction, with democracy the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economies and peace? The evidence does not support this conclusion. Correlations among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: coefficients show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are excluded. If democracy was a direct cause of both contract-intensive economy and peace, then there would be some variance remaining, after its moderate correlation with contract-intensive economy is excluded, that links democracy directly with peace.56 The insignificance of the DemocracyL coefficients in models 2 and 4 in table 1 indicates that no such direct effect exists. In addition, the scholarly consensus is that higher income per capita, which correlates with the contract-intensive economy variable, is far more likely to cause democracy [End Page 70] than democracy is to cause development.57 Still, the analysis here is not designed to test for reverse causation, though performance of such a test would be a valuable addition to the literature. Robustness tests indicate that in analyses of wars, democracy remains highly insignificant under any examined circumstance. In analyses of fatal disputes, on the other hand, the removal of some control variables can cause democracy to reach significance at the 0.10 level, which is the lowest threshold statisticians normally assign significance. Further tests show that democracy is not significant with the removal of all control variables.58 Nor does democracy become significant under any circumstance when observing only bordering nations. This suggests that if peace exists among non-bordering democracies, it is because non-contract-intensive democracies usually have weak economies and thus refrain from fighting each other because they do not have the capability to do so. The results in table 1 support both aspects of the economic peace: the dyadic unconditional peace and the supplemental monadic peace conditioned by democracy. These patterns conform with the economic norms expectation that a contract-intensive economy promotes liberal values and consolidated liberal democracy. Common preferences and interests cause foreign policy agreement and peace among contract-intensive nations, whereas liberal ideology causes contract-intensive democracies to refrain from using force against other democracies, including those without contract-intensive economies. Democracies that lack contract-intensive economies, on the other hand, have no such constraints and do not perceive common interests within the Westphalian order; thus they tend to fight each other about as often as other nations do. Further calculations indicate that a contract-intensive economy is a powerful force for peace. I could not directly estimate the substantive impact of Both States CIE because it predicts peace perfectly, so I reestimated model 2 after combining the dyadic and monadic measures into a single “super” variable: “One or Both States CIE.” I then included the product of this variable and Both Coherent Democracies to identify cases where both states are democracies and at least one has a contract-intensive economy. The results—unreported for reasons [End Page 71] of space—indicate that, among bordering democracies, a change from neither to one or both states with a contract-intensive economy causes a 97 percent reduction in the probability of fatal dispute onset. None of the remaining variables has an impact of this magnitude.59 Exploration of Alternative Explanations This section examines the possibility that the results discussed above may be explained by variables that I have excluded thus far because economic norms theory predicts that they are at least partly caused by the contract-intensive economy variable. Because correlations among independent variables are not credited to any variable in a multivariate regression, economic norms theory predicts that inclusion of the variables below will reduce the impact of the contract-intensive economy variable. Therefore, this section cannot serve as a test of economic norms theory. Instead, it departs from the theory and examines the possibility that competing theories may account for the results discussed above. Economic norms theory identifies contract norms as a cause of economic development. It is also likely, however, that wealthier individuals are better positioned than poorer ones to engage in contracts. To ensure that the results of model 2 in table 1 are not a function of wealth, I added a control for economic development (see model 1 in table 2). The coefficients for the contract-intensive economy variables hold firmly, and the coefficient for DevelopmentL (0.05) is not significant. This means that the results of this study cannot be attributed to the fact that contract-intensive nations tend to be wealthier than other nations.60 Economic norms theory predicts that individuals in contract-intensive societies will be more likely than individuals in other societies to seek profitable contracts wherever they may find them. Because the nature of governance in contract-intensive nations is expected to reflect the contractualist worldview that good government abets the private pursuit of wealth, it predicts that governments of contract-intensive nations will be more likely than others to encourage foreign trade. Trade per capita is not the same as trade interdependence (trade/gross domestic product), however, and economic norms theory does not predict trade interdependence per se. But contract-intensive nations prefer law over brute force, and thus they are more likely to prefer trade over imperialism in foreign economic policy.61 Richard Rosecrance has argued that the decision to trade rather than to fight is a key factor in explaining peace among trading nations.62 Economic norms theory thus complements Rosecrance’s insights, and the contract-intensive economy variable can potentially account for the pacifying role of trade interdependence in international relations. But the reverse is also possible: trade interdependence may account for peace among contract-intensive nations. This is the view of economic liberals: interstate trade promotes market development, democracy, and peace.63 As can be seen in model 2 in table 2, the coefficient for Trade Interdependence (−0.59) is not significant. It thus appears that contracting is the more likely cause of both trade interdependence and peace among nations. Still, caution must be exercised: the trade variable is close to significant, and this regression model was not designed for resolving this issue. Also, scholars have not settled on how best to gauge trade interdependency.64 Further examination of the impact of trade in conflict is thus warranted. Some explanations for the democratic peace suggest that only democracies with mature or consolidated institutions might be peaceful. In addition, mature democracies may promote contract-intensive economies, suggesting the potential reversal of causation. In model 3 in table 2 the coefficient for Democratic MaturityL (−0.09) is not significant.65 It thus appears that even mature, consolidated democracies are not more peaceful with each other than [End Page 74] other nations. Rather, a contract-intensive economy is the more likely cause of both democratic maturity and the prevailing peace. Economic norms theory predicts that contract-intensive nations will perceive common security interests in the primacy of international law over power politics, causing them to form alliances. Common interests can develop for other reasons, however, and it is possible that alliances may account for the economic peace.66 In model 4 in table 2, the coefficient for Alliance (0.16) is not significant. The evidence thus favors the conclusion that contract-intensive economy partially accounts for the existence of both alliances and peace. As discussed above, Gat has offered several explanations for the peace among developed democratic nations.67 Most of these are broad and unfalsifiable, but he does offer urbanization and size of the service sector as variables, which he suggests make individuals less accustomed to the suffering of war and therefore opposed to it. But a service economy may be a function of contract norms, which encourage the commodification of services as well as of labor and capital. I gauge the variable Service Economy as the proportion of gross domestic product in the service sectors.68 In model 5 in table 2, the coefficient (0.01) is not significant. Analyses of urbanization show that dyads where both states are highly urbanized are significantly more likely than other dyads to engage in fatal disputes. Neither urbanization nor a service economy is thus a likely explanation for the economic peace. Also discussed above, Gartzke argues that free capital markets might explain the developed democratic peace. But these markets could be caused by contract norms, as states promote foreign trade and financial markets diffuse within, as well as across, international borders. Model 6 in table 2 reports the results using Gartzke’s measure. 69 The coefficient for Capital OpennessL (−0.15) is negative and significant, and coefficients for the contract-intensive economy variable also hold firmly. This suggests that, even if there is some causality stemming from the contract-intensive economy variable, free capital markets have an independent impact on the onset of fatal disputes. In short, the data support both Gartzke’s theory and economic norms theory. This result is reasonable, as the theories do not contain incompatible assumptions and are [End Page 75] not mutually exclusive.70 Further tests show that contract-intensive economy is the far stronger variable, with an impact about twice that of capital openness. Subsequent tests for war onsets produced identical results for all variables except Capital OpennessL, which is not significant at the war level. The Greek-Turkish Case An examination of a case study of recent changes in Greece’s economy and its relations with its neighbor Turkey illustrates how economic norms affect the domestic and foreign politics of nations. I chose this case because both countries have experienced many years of “coherent” democracy as defined above: Greece since 1975, with eighty-four years of democracy previously; and Turkey since 1983, with twenty-five years of democracy previously.71 Nevertheless, from 1960 to 2000, twenty militarized interstate disputes occurred between the two countries, five of which resulted in fatalities. If economic norms theory is correct, these tensions were a function of nationalist and xenophobic attitudes of voters on both sides. In 1990 Greece transitioned from a clientelist to a contract-intensive economy. This offers a direct opportunity to test the economic norms expectation that Greece’s transition to a contract-intensive economy should have been followed by substantial moderation and rationalization of Greek domestic and foreign politics, including Greece’s relations with Turkey. As discussed earlier, an increase in the use of contracts is thought to have political and geographic root causes. For Greece, the political roots stem from a desire to join the European Community (EC) and the role played by the EC in giving politicians an “excuse” to make institutional changes, such as the equitable enforcement of banking and trade laws, which favors the transition to a market economy. Geographically, Greece’s entry into the EC was followed by a substantial increase in foreign investment into the country from 1980 to 1995.72 Starting in 1986, the rate of growth in life insurance contracting in Greece increased dramatically; it crossed the global median into contract-intensive status in 1990. Still, in the year 2000 Greece’s level of per capita life insurance [End Page 76] contracting was only one-twenty-fifth that of the contract-intensive standard-bearers Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Most observers agree that the mid-1990s was a turning point in Greek politics. Before then, the two main parties, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND), were primarily agents of bureaucratic clientelism. As economic norms theory would expect, both parties were highly personalist and centered on charismatic leaders prone to populist and ideological bombast.73 Interparty relations were tense and based on opposing social identities and systems of patronage.74 The rule of law was weak,75 and distrust of the state ran deep76; in addition, the people identified with “the political parties rather than governments.”77 In foreign policy there was an “exclusivist notion of ‘Greekness.’”78 In the 1980s and early 1990s, PASOK won elections with the xenophobic, anticapitalist, anti-American, and anti-European rhetoric of its populist leader, Andreas Papandreou. In 1976 Greece confronted Turkey on issues in the Aegean over which the International Court of Justice later ruled the Greeks had no case. When a similar issue arose in 1987, Prime Minister Papandreou asserted that it was time to “teach the Turks a hard lesson.”79 The two countries came close to war in 1976, 1987, and 1996.80 Although during this period Greek and Turkish leaders made frequent attempts to resolve their differences, “these initiatives were not sustainable in the face of an adverse political climate, limited social contacts, high level of biases, and sensationalist press.”81 The watershed moment in Greek politics came in 1996, when Papandreou died and PASOK elected Costas Simitis to replace him. The gulf separating the two leaders was vast. Simitis was elected largely on the platform of [End Page 77] Eksynchronismos (modernization). In the words of Kevin Featherstone, “Simitis and his supporters advocated a greater separation of party from the state” and a break from the “bureaucratic clientelism of the recent past.” Whereas Papandreou “exercised a dominant authority over his party,” Simitis was “more managerial and technocratic.”82 As economic norms theory would expect, PASOK’s choice of a reformer reflected deep-seated changes in Greece’s political culture. The opposition ND also moved to the center, with the nationalist posturing and ideological bravado of both parties largely disappearing from Greece’s political discourse.83 A “cultural shift” occurred,84 as the new rhetoric of reform struck a strong chord with the electorate, which increasingly viewed the leaders of the country’s oldstyle politics as “dinosaurs.”85 Voters began to distance themselves from Greece’s political parties; legal institutions became more central to everyday life; and a “new sense of security changed the way ordinary citizens viewed public life.”86 Reflecting an increased respect for the rule of law, the two leading parties agreed on new protections for individual rights in the constitution. 87 Still, a minority continued to vocalize opposition to what many Greeks called Greece’s growing “Europeanization,” led by Archbishop Christodoulos. Both leading parties also backed fundamental changes in Greece’s foreign policy.88 For Europe, the country that was once viewed as the “black sheep” of European foreign policy had evolved into a more consensual partner.89 Prior to the late 1990s, Greece maintained an uncompromising approach in its relations with Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, and was widely viewed in Europe as the “bully of the Balkans.” In the late 1990s, however, a more cooperative attitude emerged, and Greece’s relations with these countries greatly improved.90 This realignment with other contract-intensive countries following Greece’s own transition to a contract-intensive economy, and its more cooperative attitude toward other democracies, accords with expectations of economic norms theory. [End Page 78] Greece’s foreign policy toward Turkey also underwent fundamental change in the late 1990s.91 Reflecting a change in Greek attitudes, foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos—considered a hard-liner—asserted that “we Greeks must get over the old knee-jerk reaction that if something is bad for Turkey it is good for us.”92 The most significant change occurred in 1999, when Greece moved from perennial obstructer to supporter of Turkey’s membership bid to join the European Union (EU). In all likelihood, this move was not strategic but an outcome of deep-seated shifts in Greeks’ perceptions of their national interest.93 Greek scholars and think tanks have stressed that it is in Greece’s interest to have Turkey in the EU as a partner.94 From 2000 to 2004, Greece and Turkey signed twenty-five major agreements; from 1970 to 2000 there were none.95 It must be recalled, however, that fundamental differences remain over the division of Cyprus and exploitation of the Aegean seabed.96 Resolution of the deeper issues in Greek-Turkish relations would also require change in how Turkish leaders perceive their interests. Unlike Greece, Turkey has not transitioned to a contract-intensive economy. If economic norms theory is correct, then Turkish politics should appear similar to Greek politics before Greece’s transition; this would include strong party loyalties, intense identity issues, and fear of outsiders in the country’s political discourse. In foreign policy, compromise should be difficult, as opposition parties seeking to garner the nationalist identity seize any reason to criticize the government for “giving in” to outsiders. Most observers agree that the above description characterizes Turkish politics today. There is no significant liberal party concerned with individual rights, equal enforcement of the law, or transparency in government. The left is characterized as favoring the elite-led modernization project, which increasingly includes “an intensifying nationalism with an underlying xenophobia”; the right emphasizes communitarian religious identity and social conservatism.97 [End Page 79] Turkey’s national identity includes a strong ethnoreligious dimension, and communitarianism remains a prominent feature: it continues to be a criminal offense to insult Turkishness. The political parties are weakly institutionalized and headed by strong, charismatic leaders who compete over state rents with ideological and populist appeals. Voters identify with parties, and the parties offer competing images of national identity.98 Although Turkey has contributed in many ways to the rapprochement with Greece, domestic core values continue to place constraints on further progress. For instance, Turkey could grant more religious freedom to its Orthodox community. 99 But with the international community, Turks feel that they can rely only on themselves, and the EU concern over Turkey’s human rights record is widely viewed “as part of a design to undermine Turkish national unity.”100 Engagement with Greece is considered risky for any incumbent government because it tends “to generate widespread nationalist sentiments.”101 The opposition can easily brand concessions, even if mutual, as giving in to outsiders and contrary to Turkish interests. Public opinion surveys in Turkey show that there continue to be very low levels of trust in the society, and “popular sentiment towards Greeks tends to be quite negative.”102 Turkey may have engaged with Greece in part due to the “earthquake diplomacy” that occurred after the catastrophic earthquake that struck Turkey in August 1999.103 Consistent with the economic norms expectation of a new universalism in Greek identity, many Greek individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and local authorities, in addition to the Greek government, offered substantial help to the Turks in their time of need. This opened a temporary window of good feeling toward Greece in Turkey that allowed Ankara to sign a number of confidence-building measures with Athens. [End Page 80] An alternative explanation for the improvement in Greek-Turkish relations might be the constraining and moderating role of the EU. It is true that Turkey’s constructive responses to Greek initiatives have been at least partly aimed at satisfying EU conditions for full membership. For instance, after refusing for decades to allow an international solution to the Cyprus dispute, Ankara acquiesced after the EU made doing so a condition of Turkey’s candidacy. In this way, the carrot of the EU acts as political cover for Turkish politicians, just as the EC once did for Greek politicians, offering leaders an “excuse” for “giving in” to the foreigners. Given Greece’s full membership in the EU since 1981, however, EU incentives do not offer a satisfying account for the changes in Greek politics and foreign policy in the 1990s. Recognition of the EC’s role in Greece’s transition to a contract-intensive economy suggests some promise for a more stable peace between Greece and Turkey in the years ahead. Like Greece in the 1980s, after Turkey became an official EU candidate, it experienced an explosion of foreign direct investment. 104 In the 1990s Turkey also experienced a rise in per capita life insurance contracting. If the rate of growth of the 1990s continues, the country will pass the contract-intensive threshold in the year 2019. If the time lag for political change after the economic transition in Turkey is the same as it was in Greece (seven years), significant moderation and individualization of Turkey’s political culture may occur around 2026. If the EU continues to act as an incentive for institutionalizing the market and as a source of foreign investment, Turkey’s change could come sooner.105 Economic norms theory would predict that when this happens, all of Turkey’s security-related issues with Greece will be positively and permanently settled; the enduring rivalry will end; and fatal militarized confrontations in this dyad will be a thing of the past. Conclusion Many policymakers and scholars of international relations believe that the promotion of democracy abroad will enhance global order and the security of the United States and its allies. Yet since the terrorist attacks on New York and [End Page 81] Washington on September 11, 2001, efforts to promote democracy as part of U.S. grand strategy in the Muslim Middle East only increased the influence of anti-U.S. factions in the region, including in Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. This study challenges the strategic assumptions of U.S. policymakers by showing that democracy is not a likely cause of peace among nations. Rather, domestic economic conditions appear to be the main factor in promoting peace. Scholars have erroneously linked democracies with peace because most contract-intensive nations are democratic. But this study showed that about half of all democratic nations lack contract-intensive economies, and these democratic countries are not peaceful. Indeed, all the potential exceptions to the democratic peace—such as the Spanish-American War, the Continuation War of Finland against the Allies during World War II, and the Kargil war between India and Pakistan—are easily accounted for in this study because in each of these wars the democracy on at least one of the sides lacked a contract-intensive economy. This article examined the implications of economic norms theory, which integrates the insights of bounded rationality with research by economic historians to show how voter preferences for democracy and respect for individual rights and equal protection under the law may be rooted in the conditions unique to social market economies, where individuals trust both strangers in making contracts and a state that enforces them with impartiality. In many middle- and low-income countries, in contrast, high structural unemployment encourages dependence on the patronage of friends and family. This dependency can promote the heuristics of identifying and trusting in-groups and their leaders, and distrusting strangers from out-groups and state institutions. The study traced the path of causation from economic norms to interstate peace across levels of analysis and methodologies and found that contract-intensive societies are associated with higher levels of trust. It is not this trust, however, that causes peace among contract-intensive nations: peace is the result of a fundamental agreement among voters and elites in these countries on the Westphalian order of sovereign states, including the primacy of international law over power politics and imperialist bullying. This agreement emerges from the heuristics of their common economic way of life. Leaders of states with contract-intensive economies thus perceive common security interests in defending the global status quo and are in natural alliance against any state or nonstate entity that seeks to challenge it. Although democracies are not inherently peaceful, there is a conditional role for democracy in the economic peace: Because contract-intensive economy [End Page 82] promotes the heuristics that value individual freedom and equitable government, most contract-intensive nations have liberal democratic governments. Valuing democracy, voters and elites in contract-intensive democracies tend to value the promotion of individual rights and democracy abroad. They therefore restrain themselves from fighting other countries perceived as democratic, regardless of their economic or foreign policy behavior. These patterns were confirmed in the quantitative analyses and in a case study of Greece and Turkey.

#### Proves that even if the alt is better it causes transition wars – prefer empirics

### No Alt

#### Social democracy is undoubtedly the best system – aff adjusts cap to make it work, while alternatives consistently fail

Rose 12 [Gideon, Editor of Foreign Affairs and the Peter G. Peterson chair at the Council on Foreign Relations, January/February, “Making Modernity Work,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136776/gideon-rose/making-modernity-work/AKG]

We are living, so we are told, through an ideological crisis. The United States is trapped in political deadlock and dysfunction, Europe is broke and breaking, authoritarian China is on the rise. Protesters take to the streets across the advanced industrial democracies; the high and mighty meet in Davos to search for "new models" as sober commentators ponder who and what will shape the future. In historical perspective, however, the true narrative of the era is actually the reverse—not ideological upheaval but stability. Today’s troubles are real enough, but they relate more to policies than to principles. The major battles about how to structure modern politics and economics were fought in the first half of the last century, and they ended with the emergence of the most successful system the world has ever seen. Nine decades ago, in one of the first issues of this magazine, the political scientist Harold Laski noted that with "the mass of men" having come to political power, the challenge of modern democratic government was providing enough "solid benefit" to ordinary citizens "to make its preservation a matter of urgency to themselves." A generation and a half later, with the creation of the postwar order of mutually supporting liberal democracies with mixed economies, that challenge was being met, and as a result, more people in more places have lived longer, richer, freer lives than ever before. In ideological terms, at least, all the rest is commentary. To commemorate Foreign Affairs 90th anniversary, we have thus decided to take readers on a magical history tour, tracing the evolution of the modern order as it played out in our pages. What follows is not a "greatest hits" collection of our most well-known or influential articles, nor is it a showcase for the most famous names to have appeared in the magazine. It is rather a package of 20 carefully culled selections from our archives, along with three new pieces, which collectively shed light on where the modern world has come from and where it is heading. THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN In the premodern era, political, economic, and social life was governed by a dense web of interlocking relationships inherited from the past and sanctified by religion. Limited personal freedom and material benefits existed alongside a mostly un-questioned social solidarity. Traditional local orders began to erode with the rise of capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as the increasing prevalence and dominance of market relationships broke down existing hierarchies. The shift produced economic and social dynamism, an increase in material benefits and personal freedoms, and a decrease in communal feeling. As this process continued, the first modern political ideology, classical liberalism, emerged to celebrate and justify it. Liberalism stressed the importance of the rule of law, limited government, and free commercial transactions. It highlighted the manifold rewards of moving to a world dominated by markets rather than traditional communities, a shift the economic historian Karl Polanyi would call "the great transformation." But along with the gains came losses as well—of a sense of place, of social and psychological stability, of traditional bulwarks against life's vicissitudes. Left to itself, capitalism produced long-term aggregate benefits along with great volatility and inequality. This combination resulted in what Polanyi called a "double movement," a progressive expansion of both market society and reactions against it. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, therefore, liberalism was being challenged by reactionary nationalism and cosmopolitan socialism, with both the right and the left promising, in their own ways, relief from the turmoil and angst of modern life. The catastrophic destruction of the Great War and the economic nightmare of the Great Depression brought the contradictions of modernity to a head, seemingly revealing the bankruptcy of the liberal order and the need for some other, better path. As democratic republics dithered and stumbled during the 1920s and 1930s, fascist and communist regimes seized control of their own destinies and appeared to offer compelling alternative models of modern political, economic, and social organization. Over time, however, the problems with all these approaches became clear. Having discarded liberalism's insistence on personal and political freedom, both fascism and communism quickly descended into organized barbarism. The vision of the future they offered, as George Orwell noted, was "a boot stamping on a human face—forever." Yet classical liberalism also proved unpalatable, since it contained no rationale for activist government and thus had no answer to an economic crisis that left vast swaths of society destitute and despairing. Fascism flamed out in a second, even more destructive world war. Communism lost its appeal as its tyrannical nature revealed itself, then ultimately collapsed under its own weight as its nonmarket economic system could not generate sustained growth. And liberalism's central principle of laissez faire was abandoned in the depths of the Depression. What eventually emerged victorious from the wreckage was a hybrid system that combined political liberalism with a mixed economy. As the political scientist Sheri Berman has observed, "The postwar order represented something historically unusual: capitalism remained, but it was capitalism of a very different type from that which had existed before the war— one tempered and limited by the power of the democratic state and often made subservient to the goals of social stability and solidarity, rather than the other way around." Berman calls the mixture "social democracy" Other scholars use other terms: Jan-Werner Miller prefers "Christian Democracy," John Ruggie suggests "embedded liberalism," Karl Dietrich Bracher talks of "democratic liberalism." Francis Fukuyama wrote of "the end of History"; Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset saw it as "the end of ideology." All refer to essentially the same thing. As Bell put it in i960: Few serious minds believe any longer that one can set down "blueprints" and through "social engineering" bring about a new Utopia of social harmony. At the same time, the older "counter-beliefs" have lost their intellectual force as well. Few "classic" liberals insist that the State should play no role in the economy, and few serious conservatives, at least in England and on the Continent, believe that the Welfare State is "the road to serfdom." In the Western world, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism. Reflecting the hangover of the inter-war ideological binge, the system stressed not transcendence but compromise. It offered neither salvation nor Utopia, only a framework within which citizens could pursue their personal betterment. It has never been as satisfying as the religions, sacred or secular, it replaced. And it remains a work in progress, requiring tinkering and modification as conditions and attitudes change. Yet its success has been manifest— and reflecting that, its basic framework has remained remarkably intact. THE ONCE AND FUTURE ORDER The central question of modernity has been how to reconcile capitalism and mass democracy, and since the postwar order came up with a good answer, it has managed to weather all subsequent challenges. The upheavals of the late 1960s seemed poised to disrupt it. But despite what activists at the time thought, they had little to offer in terms of politics or economics, and so their lasting impact was on social life instead. This had the ironic effect of stabilizing the system rather than overturning it, helping it live up to its full potential by bringing previously subordinated or disenfranchised groups inside the castle walls. The neoliberal revolutionaries of the 1980s also had little luck, never managing to turn the clock back all that far. All potential alternatives in the developing world, meanwhile, have proved to be either dead ends or temporary detours from the beaten path. The much-ballyhooed "rise of the rest" has involved not the dis-crediting of the postwar order of Western political economy but its reinforcement: the countries that have risen have done so by embracing global capitalism while keeping some of its destabilizing attributes in check, and have liberalized their polities and societies along the way (and will founder unless they continue to do so). Although the structure still stands, however, it has seen better days. Poor management of public spending and fiscal policy has resulted in unsustainable levels of debt across the advanced industrial world, even as mature economies have found it difficult to generate dynamic growth and full employment in an ever more globalized environment. Lax regulation and oversight allowed reckless and predatory financial practices to drive leading economies to the brink of collapse. Economic inequality has increased as social mobility has declined. And a loss of broad-based social solidarity on both sides of the Atlantic has eroded public support for the active remedies needed to address these and other problems. Renovating the structure will be a slow and difficult project, the cost and duration of which remain unclear, as do the contractors involved. Still, at root, this is not an ideological issue. The question is not what to do but how to do it—how, under twenty-first-century conditions, to rise to the challenge Laski described, making the modern political economy provide enough solid benefit to the mass of men that they see its continuation as a matter of urgency to themselves.

#### There is NO ALT to capitalism – socialism fails and the vagueness of their alt proves it’s a *baseless fantasy* – only cap can feasibly plan economies

Roberts 13 [(Paul Craig Roberts, American economist and a columnist for Creators Syndicate. He served as an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan Administration and was noted as a co-founder of Reaganomics) Book Review of “From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic Calculation” La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1992, 424 pp.] AT

But as Steele shows in his book, “all arguments against capitalism fail unless there is some feasible alternative which can do better.” The Marxists and socialists acted out of conviction alone. Steele argues that this conviction was based on misconceptions, misinterpretations, and a general lack of depth in thinking. For example, he shows how central planning seemed inescapable to people who believed that capitalism could not last because the number of firms must become ever smaller until the whole economy became a single dominant firm. That same kind of thinking prevented socialists from realizing that it was “the anarchy of production” that solved the economic calculation problem, something that “conscious planning” was never able to do. As F. A. Hayek, the student of Ludwig von Mises, who launched the calculation debate in 1920, stressed, information is decentralized in society, and Marxist attempts to eliminate “anarchy” made economic calculation impossible. Steele’s revisit of the debate sets out the issues in it and shows how each one was avoided or fuzzed over in order to escape the conclusion that there was not even a theoretical alternative to the market for a modern society. A primitive native tribe might operate without “com- modity production” (production for market), but not an industrial society. The possible combinations of inputs and outputs are simply too large to be controlled by anything but market demand. Steele’s book would have gained in interest by suggesting why so many scholars gave socialism and the Soviet economy the benefit of the doubt while they wrote theoretical articles about “The Anatomy of Market Failure.” Market economies do not use more valuable inputs to produce less valuable outputs, but Soviet gross output planning did, Economists should have instantly perceived the inherent failure of the Marxist approach. I remember from my graduate school days that when one left microeconomic topics and took up Soviet economics or comparative economic systems, the standards of evidence and argument changed dramatically. In the latter classes, emotion-based standards of truth existed. It was an intellectual arena in which truth rested upon images and feelings and not on knowledge born of experience. The attitude was that if socialism did not exist, we would have to invent it because capitalism was so awful. The “socialist debate” was a politically correct one, Those critical of socialism in theory or practice demonstrated a moral backwardness that was unwelcome on academic faculties. The study of alternative economic systems became an inbred activity producing fantasy. Consequently, the experts were not prepared for the sudden collapse of communism. In May 1981, President Reagan at Notre Dame University dismissed communism as “a sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written.” The experts went berserk. Columbia University professor Seweryn Bialer, for example, confidently contra- dicted Reagan in Foreign Affairs: “The Soviet Union is not now nor will it be during the next decade in the throes of a true systemic crisis, for it boasts enormous unused reserves of political and social stability that suffice to endure the deepest difficulties.” “Openness to argument,” Steele writes, “is a wonderful virtue,” but it did not characterize the academic study of socialism.

#### Academic critiques divorced from concrete action fail to solve – there’s no successful alt to capitalism

Bryant 12 (levi, prof of philosophy at Collins college, Critique of the Academic Left)

The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil, the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way. This is the sort of critique we’re always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not have. To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations, a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an “onto-cartography”). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities.¶ Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:¶ The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this:¶ Phase 1: Collect Underpants¶ Phase 2: ?¶ Phase 3: Profit!¶ They even have a catchy song to go with their work:¶ Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows:¶Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique¶Phase 2: ?¶Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation!¶Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing?¶ But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done!¶ But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.¶ What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you? Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (there’s a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent, not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. We’re not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle.¶ I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students? What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother listening to you if you aren’t proposing real plans? But we haven’t even gotten to that point. Instead we’re like underpants gnomes, saying “revolution is the answer!” without addressing any of the infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation.¶ “Underpants gnome” deserves to be a category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not because critique isn’t important or necessary– it is –but because we know the critiques, we know the problems. We’re intoxicated with critique because it’s easy and safe. We best every opponent with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us, however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce. Good luck with that.

#### The alt alone represents an impossible process which justifies suffering and genocide

Žižek 12 [Slavoj, All-Around Badass Philosopher, June 8, “Don’t Act, Just Think,” http://bigthink.com/ideas/45126/AKG]

Slavoj Zizek: Capitalism is . . . and this, almost I’m tempted to say is what is great about it, although I’m very critical of it . . . Capitalism is more an ethical/religious category for me. It’s not true when people attack capitalists as egotists. “They don't care.” No! An ideal capitalist is someone who is ready, again, to stake his life, to risk everything just so that production grows, profit grows, capital circulates. His personal or her happiness is totally subordinated to this. This is what I think Walter Benjamin, the great Frankfurt School companion, thinker, had in mind when he said capitalism is a form of religion. You cannot explain, account for, a figure of a passionate capitalist, obsessed with expanded circulation, with rise of his company, in terms of personal happiness. I am, of course, fundamentally anti-capitalist. But let’s not have any illusions here. No. What shocks me is that most of the critics of today’s capitalism feel even embarrassed, that's my experience, when you confront them with a simple question, “Okay, we heard your story . . . protest horrible, big banks depriving us of billions, hundreds, thousands of billions of common people's money. . . . Okay, but what do you really want? What should replace the system?” And then you get one big confusion. You get either a general moralistic answer, like “People shouldn't serve money. Money should serve people.” Well, frankly, Hitler would have agreed with it, especially because he would say, “When people serve money, money’s controlled by Jews,” and so on, no? So either this or some kind of a vague connection, social democracy, or a simple moralistic critique, and so on and so on. So, you know, it’s easy to be just formally anti-capitalist, but what does it really mean? It’s totally open. This is why, as I always repeat, with all my sympathy for Occupy Wall Street movement, it’s result was . . . I call it a Bartleby lesson. Bartleby, of course, Herman Melville’s Bartleby, you know, who always answered his favorite “I would prefer not to” . . . The message of Occupy Wall Street is, I would prefer not to play the existing game. There is something fundamentally wrong with the system and the existing forms of institutionalized democracy are not strong enough to deal with problems. Beyond this, they don't have an answer and neither do I. For me, Occupy Wall Street is just a signal. It’s like clearing the table. Time to start thinking. The other thing, you know, it’s a little bit boring to listen to this mantra of “Capitalism is in its last stage.” When this mantra started, if you read early critics of capitalism, I’m not kidding, a couple of decades before French Revolution, in late eighteenth century. No, the miracle of capitalism is that it’s rotting in decay, but the more it’s rotting, the more it thrives. So, let’s confront that serious problem here. Also, let’s not remember--and I’m saying this as some kind of a communist--that the twentieth century alternatives to capitalism and market miserably failed. . . . Like, okay, in Soviet Union they did try to get rid of the predominance of money market economy. The price they paid was a return to violent direct master and servant, direct domination, like you no longer will even formally flee. You had to obey orders, a new authoritarian society. . . . And this is a serious problem: how to abolish market without regressing again into relations of servitude and domination. My advice would be--because I don't have simple answers--two things: [First,] (a) precisely to start thinking. Don't get caught into this pseudo-activist pressure. Do something. Let’s do it, and so on. So, no, the time is to think. I even provoked some of the leftist friends when I told them that if the famous Marxist formula was, “Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the time is to change it” . . . thesis 11 . . . , that maybe today we should say, “In the twentieth century, we maybe tried to change the world too quickly. The time is to interpret it again, to start thinking.” Second thing, I’m not saying [that while] people are suffering, enduring horrible things, that we should just sit and think, but we should be very careful what we do. Here, let me give you a surprising example. I think that, okay, it’s so fashionable today to be disappointed at President Obama, of course, but sometimes I’m a little bit shocked by this disappointment because what did the people expect, that he will introduce socialism in United States or what? But for example, the ongoing universal health care debate is an important one. This is a great thing. Why? Because, on the one hand, this debate which taxes the very roots of ordinary American ideology, you know, freedom of choice, states wants to take freedom from us and so on. I think this freedom of choice that Republicans attacking Obama are using, its pure ideology. But at the same time, universal health care is not some crazy, radically leftist notion. It’s something that exists all around and functions basically relatively well--Canada, most of Western European countries. So the beauty is to select a topic which touches the fundamentals of our ideology, but at the same time, we cannot be accused of promoting an impossible agenda--like abolish all private property or what. No, it’s something that can be done and is done relatively successfully and so on. So that would be my idea, to carefully select issues like this where we do stir up public debate but we cannot be accused of being utopians in the bad sense of the term.

### Inevitable

#### Cap inevitable - evolution means we are all selfish

Thayer 2000 Bradley A., Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, Associate Professor of Defense & Strategic Study, Missouri State University, International Security, 01622889, Fall2000, Vol. 25, Issue 2 “"Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International Politics"

Evolutionary theory offers two sufficient explanations for the trait of egoism. The first is a classic Darwinian argument: In a hostile environment where resources are scarce and thus survival precarious, organisms typically satisfy their own physiological needs for food, shelter, and so on before assisting others.[41] In times of danger or great stress, an organism usually places its life its survival--before that of other members of its group, be it pack, herd, or tribe. For these reasons, egoistic behavior contributes to fitness. Evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins's selfish gene theory provides the second sufficient explanation for egoism. A conceptual shift is required here because Dawkins's level of analysis is the gene, not the organism. As Dawkins explains, at one time there were no organisms, just chemicals in a primordial "soup."[42] At first, different types of molecules started forming by accident, including some that could reproduce by using the constituents of the soup--carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen. Because these constituents were in limited supply, molecules competed for them as they replicated. From this competition, the most efficient copy makers emerged. The process, however, was never perfect. Sometimes mistakes were made during replication, and occasionally these accidents resulted in more efficient replication or made some other contribution to fitness. One such mistake might have been the formation of a thin membrane that held the contents of the molecule together--a primitive cell. A second might have involved the division of the primitive cell into ever larger components, organs, and so on to create what Dawkins calls "survival machines." He explains, "The first survival machines probably consisted of nothing more than a protective coat. But making a living got steadily harder as new rivals arose with better and more effective survival machines. Survival machines got bigger and more elaborate, and the process was cumulative and progressive."[43] From a genetic perspective, there is no intentionality in this process, but it continued nonetheless because of evolution. Dawkins makes clear, however, that the interests of the gene and the organism need not coincide at different stages in an organism's life, particularly after reproduction.[44] In general, however, the selfishness of the gene increases its fitness, and so the behavior spreads.

#### Humans inevitably seek power over others – the alternative to cap is militarism and violence

Wilson, 97 (James, professor of Government at Harvard, “The morality of capitalism,”)

Critics of capitalism argue that wealth confers power, and indeed it does, up to a point. Show people the road to wealth, status, or power, and they will rush down that road, and many will do some rather unattractive things along the way. But this is not a decisive criticism unless one supposes, fancifully, that there is some way to arrange human affairs so that the desire for advantage vanishes. The real choice is between becoming wealthy by first acquiring political or military power, or getting money directly without bothering with conquest or domination. If it is in man’s [human] nature to seek domination over other men, there are really only two ways to make that domination work. One is military power, and that is the principle upon which domination existed from the beginning of man’s time on this earth to down about two hundred years ago, when it began to be set aside by another principle, namely the accumulation of wealth. Now you may feel that men should not try to dominate other men – although I do not see how you could believe this in Australia given the importance attached to sports. You may like to replace man’s desire to dominate other men, and in a few cases it is prevented by religious conversion or a decent temperament. But as long as the instinct persists, you only have two choices, and if you choose to compete economically you will reduce the extent to which one group of men will tyrannise over another by the use of military might or political power.

#### Empirically verified with communist movements – Stalinism and Maoism ended in mass violence – proves political attempts to replace capitalism inevitably are worse

### A2 Socialism

#### Socialism fails – kills incentives to work and causes abuse of power

Zermop 12/11 [Bob Zermop. “Why Capitalism Works and Socialism Doesn't.” Hug Pages, Politics and Social Issues. 12/11/14] AJ

Far left socialism is no less dangerous. Though I think the socialist ideal of a worldwide and local cooperation is good, the socialist model is not the way to do it. The problem with the really far left model, involving equal work and equal distribution, has already been discussed in depth by many, so I will only cover it briefly. I suppose that it once seemed like a better alternative to capitalism-gone-wild (it prevents the wealth gap and the consequent abuse of the $ owned government), but the society based on this model quickly collapses. Look at Communist China, Cuba, or to a certain extent, today's Europe. Europe is still great, but the cracks are starting to show. The two major reasons are 1.) Socialism discourages work and effort by shifting consequences (positive and negative) onto others. 2.) Socialism restricts freedom of the individual. I'll begin by addressing the first. By having a "security net" so secure that it's easier to not work than to work, nobody (well, few) will work. In a future world of more resources, perhaps that will become possible. But we are not even close to being there yet, and this system is unsustainable as it takes from those who would advance society and gives to those who don't. The entire point of a security net is to make sure those who are deserving have the ability to exercise their potential (Note: I am aware that the ultimate point is to allow the happiness of everyone. I mean in the sense of its function in a developing society.). Why work your hide off to drag along those who are just kicking back? This system encourages laziness, and after a while even those who naturally would work will stop because of their unjust load. This problem with socialism has a solution: move towards the center. By arranging society so that those who work harder, smarter, more creatively, and more productively are rewarded, all of society will ultimately benefit from their advances. If a safety net is retained, and it should be, downward spirals can be prevented and a basic standard of living can be available to all. However, problem 2 (Socialism restricts freedom of the individual.) is not so easily solved. In fact, I can't think of a solution at all. I believe this is socialism's fatal flaw, and it's basically the reason I am capitalist. I will address this in detail later on, when it flows more appropriately.

#### Continues:

Zermop 12/11 [Bob Zermop. “Why Capitalism Works and Socialism Doesn't.” Hug Pages, Politics and Social Issues. 12/11/14] AJ

I'll move on to the flaws I see in socialism. I'm certainly not the first to point these out, but it doesn't hurt to reiterate them. Let's begin with problems involving government. The most apparent problem today is democratic government not being democratic, whether because of corrupt politicians or the machinations by the rich. (I think that's resolvable through a great amount of time and effort, but, like mentioned above, that's for another hub.) But even if we assume that the democratic government is functioning as it should, fairly and (most importantly) transparently, there is still a problem if there is no private property. This problem is that the society will have no protection of individual rights and will denigrate into a tyranny of the majority over the minority. This was exactly what America's founding fathers were trying to prevent with a representative democracy. Because the "common hordes" were "uneducated and incapable" of placing the "correct" vote, representatives would help them along. Now, I think the "common hordes" are ready to truly evolve into a democracy, but this would not be a good thing if the evolution was done without safeguards. Too much power leads to abuse, whether intentionally or unintentionally; in this case, it would be too much power in the hands of the majority. Whether a direct democracy is a good idea or not is for another discussion (I think it's an idea that has potential in today's world.), but abolishing private property is a terrible idea. Clearly if the majority (with transparency, this would be effectively the same thing as the government) would destroy individual rights if it had control over individual property. Let's leave aside means of production for now. Simplistic example: Individual enjoys black licorice, while the majority does not enjoy black licorice. The majority is not altruistic or doesn't understand the individual's love of black licorice. The individual is unable to get black licorice, as the ingredients and means of production belong to the group, and therefore the majority controls the black licorice. For the socialist model to work, the majority has to be both altruistic and empathetic. I'm not saying that's impossible, or that it doesn't sometimes happen. But I don't think it is a good idea to place responsibility and consequences of individual actions onto all, as that causes 1.) lack of motivation to work, 2.) lack of freedom, and consequently 3.) lack of happiness in the society. To do so makes the society incredibly unstable. I can't think of a way for freedom and individual autonomy to survive in a society where all are one, and consequences and rights are not conferred onto the individual, where I wholeheartedly believe they belong.

### A2 Environment

#### Capitalism is sustainable – regulations will solve environmental problems

Fleisher 2009 [Chris, Valley News Business Writer, “Is Capitalism Sustainable?” http://www.vnews.com/01182009/5326844.htm]

And there is the physical melting of the polar ice caps amid rising temperatures, leading to warnings of global peril if climate change is not addressed immediately. The two problems are related, according to many who attended a conference at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business last week. In fact, the health of capitalism and the environment are intertwined, and must be managed together if either is going to survive. “Capitalism is sustainable in every sense of the term,” said Anant Sundaram, a professor of business administration at Tuck, during the opening chat last week. “With extremely important caveats.” The conference, which ran Thursday and Friday, posed the question of whether capitalism is sustainable, as an economic system and force on the environment. In panel discussions, professors, consultants, investment analysts and other corporate leaders considered the question and did their best to offer a way forward. Even if the economic circumstances surrounding the question are not pleasant, most of the panelists agreed with Sundaram that capitalism could function without destroying the natural world. But it might not be sustainable in its current form. If it is going to survive as a system of production and exchange, it would have to change, become much more forward thinking and acknowledge new restrictions to keep from gobbling itself whole. The question is more than a conversation topic for a Tuck-sponsored salon. It is being considered by plenty of people in the Upper Valley every day. “One thing that comes immediately to mind when you talk about the topic is our whole floodplain on 12A is covered with buildings,” said Judy Macnab, chairwoman of the Lebanon Conservation Commission, in reference to the Upper Valley's most notorious commercial strip. That development along the Connecticut River is what happens when capitalist impulses are given unchecked access to the natural environment, and a testament to the need for strong zoning laws, she said. Commercial interests are at stake, too. Poor design and heavy traffic have made West Lebanon's Route 12A an unpleasant place to visit, she said, driving shoppers away whenever possible. A better approach would be the path two other developers have taken in Lebanon. One is David Clem of Lyme Timber Co., she said, who has solicited feedback from residents in redeveloping the former Bailey Brothers building on Route 10. Another is a project planned near the crest of Route 120. The landowner, L-A Suncook LLC, owns 289 acres off the eastern side of Route 120, behind the former Wilson Tire building. Suncook, a Philadelphia-based private equity firm, intends to set aside 223 acres for preservation and develop the rest for offices and a hotel. “Both of those are much appreciated for their willingness to work with us, instead of push things down our throats,” Macnab said of the two projects. The incentive to do something that the community wants has some real economic value, according to P.K. Knights, local operating partner of L-A Suncook. The company might realize a higher profit if it were to pack all 289 acres with single-family homes, but there is also value in avoiding a long fight with the city by doing something the community wants. “It might be better to create something the community accepts and move forward in the near future,” Knights said. Going Green More than proper land use, however, there are the buildings themselves. Sustainable development, as it relates to so-called “green building,” was the subject of one Friday morning panel at Tuck. Environmentally sustainable construction is yet another area where profit motives and environmental concerns are becoming increasingly aligned, even during a recession, according to the panelists. “Growth (in the industry) is unbelievable,” said Jim Boyle, founder and CEO of Sustainability Roundtable Inc., a sustainable real estate consultant. The value of green building construction was estimated at $12.3 billion in 2008, according to the U.S. Green Building Council, and projected to be $60 billion in 2010. Dartmouth College has supported a number of sustainable projects and has three buildings on campus certified under the U.S. Green Building Council's LEED program, a benchmark for green buildings. There are different certification levels that consider a building's energy efficiency, use of native materials and other initiatives to reduce its environmental impact. LEED certification has become attractive to companies that want to advertise sensitivity to the environment. But beyond the marketing opportunities, it doesn't always make sense to get certified, said Paul Olsen, of Dartmouth's Real Estate office, who was one of the panelists. Getting certified is expensive, costing as much as $100,000 for a project. “In order to be a green building, it doesn't have to get certified,” Olsen said. “That money could be better spent.” The financial advantages of going green are something Wayne Bonhag considers every day as a principal of Bonhag Associates. His Lebanon-based engineering firm is working on several LEED projects for Southern New Hampshire University, which is watching its bottom line carefully amid the recession. “We are very much aware that we don't want to spend any more money on the capital side of things that won't be coming back to us in the short term,” Bonhag said. Sometimes it doesn't make sense, he said. One industrial client in New Hampshire wanted to line its roof with solar panels. But when Bonhag crunched the numbers, solar just didn't seem to make sense. It was too expensive. However, he was able to find another renewable energy option. “In this particular case, I was able to negotiate a wind purchase,” Bonhag said. “It's still green, and yet we were able to do this so they can buy power.” Not every problem is so neatly resolved. Especially in the financial sector. Socially responsible investing has grown in popularity in the past few years, but has been tested in this recession. The Wilderhill New Energy Global Innovation Index -- a benchmark for green investing -- is down 56 percent since June 30. By comparison, the S&P 500 was down 31 percent over the same six months. Carey Callaghan manages the Energy Alternatives Fund, a mutual fund through American Trust Co. in Lebanon. As its name suggests, the fund invests in companies that, in one way or another, address the twin concerns of climate change and energy supply shortages. Since it was launched last June, the fund has declined 44 percent, Callaghan said. The financial crisis has hurt short-term prospects for some of his companies, as addressing climate change takes a back seat to other pressing concerns. The collapse in energy prices has also affected perceptions about the need to develop alternative fuel. Still, he believes the need for solar technology and alternative fuel sources will not go away. And new regulations that result from this crisis -- for fuel standards, emissions and energy consumption -- could play to his advantage. If the crisis has resulted in anything, he said, it is a healthy skepticism of unbridled capitalism and calls for tighter regulation. “The blind faith of many adherents to capitalism has been put to the test because it's clear capitalism has flaws,” he said. “You need to impose some limits on capitalism.” Impure Capitalism The panelists at Tuck largely agreed. One speaker -- Greg Hintz of the consulting company McKinsey & Co. -- began his introduction with a couple straw polls. First, he asked the audience of about 60 whether capitalism -- simply as a system of exchanging goods -- was sustainable. Most raised their hands in agreement. Then, he wondered whether capitalism, in its pure form -- an open-market free-for-all, with no regulation -- was sustainable in terms of social and environmental needs, able to regenerate the resources upon which it fed. The other panelists wouldn't let him get that far. “No regulation?” Sundaram asked. Pure capitalism, Hintz repeated. The discussion broke down into a series of qualifying questions. No regulation at all? No contracts? Nothing? The question never made it to a vote, and Hintz moved on with his talk. But the provocative suggestion of “pure capitalism” never went away. Later, regulation came up again, and Hintz suggested that if capitalism relied so much on rules and law, then the answer to the conference's question was “no.” Capitalism wasn't sustainable. “I completely disagree,” Sundaram said. It is a system that needs regulation to function, even to establish a clearinghouse where trade can happen, the other panelists suggested. It requires policing to keep its practitioners' safe from their own worst impulses. The economic system upon which our modern world relies would be unworkable otherwise. “I won't accept a definition of capitalism that doesn't have a regulatory component,” said Michael Dworkin, a professor at Vermont Law School. “It becomes meaningless.”

### A2 Unsustainable

#### Free market capitalism has survived and will survive again

The Australian, 09 (Staff Writer, “The Case for Capitalism,” 6-25 http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25685611-16382,00.html)

THE way Australians are selling out of shares will delight doomsayers, giving them additional evidence for their argument that capitalism has failed and that only the state can save us from privation. The number of shareholders has slumped by 14 per cent from 2004, when more than half of us had portfolios. But the problem with the cassandras' commentary is that while they are obviously accurate in pointing to the damage down by the global financial crisis, they have misunderstood the nature of the disease and are peddling a snake oil solution to an imaginary malady. Whatever critics, including Kevin Rudd, claim, there was no crisis in capitalism last year; the laws of market economics did not suddenly stop operating - to suggest they did is the equivalent of arguing that the principles of physics are optional. The immutable rule of supply and demand did not disappear in October, the way wealth is created did not change. In the real world, entrepreneurs continued to produce products and supply services to sell for a profit, just as they have done since humanity first grasped that free exchange on open markets is the only just way to create wealth. Last year's disaster on stock exchanges and in credit markets around the world had nothing to do with capitalism. Rather, it was caused by the folly of financial alchemists, who thought they could con investors that it was possible to make money from trading what were ultimately promissory notes based on the supposed value of bundles of loans. And it was also caused by the incompetence of regulators charged with stopping such market manipulation. According to Financial Times journalist Gillian Tett, the collapse of the $US12,000 billion market for these so-called securities precipitated the much broader slump. In the US, where regulators once required banks to hold reserves of $US800 million to cover loans with a face value of $US10bn, the amount required was reduced to just $US160m. This sort of exposure meant disaster was inevitable, and beyond the global scope of the problem there was little to distinguish last year's crisis from other get-rich-quick schemes throughout history. But critics, such as the Prime Minister in his now-famous essay in which he argued that the state must regulate the economy to protect ordinary people from the ravages of capitalism, miss the point. While the world requires efficient regulation to protect the gullible from corrupt credit markets, this is very different from constraining capitalism itself.

### A2 Ahmed

#### The study is nonsense – their assumptions are unproven, NASA denied it, and all evidence goes aff

Angus 3/31 [Ian Angus. What did that ‘NASA-funded collapse study’ really say? Climate and Capitalism, 3/31/14. <http://climateandcapitalism.com/2014/03/31/nasa-collapse-study/>] AJ

On March 20, NASA publicly denied that it had “solicited, directed or reviewed” the paper, calling it “an independent study by the university researchers utilizing research tools developed for a separate NASA activity.”[2] The paper is signed by three U.S. academics. Lead author Safa Motesharrei is a PhD candidate in mathematics and public policy at the University of Maryland; his co-authors, Eugenia Kalnay and Jorge Rivas, are professors at the University of Maryland and the University of Minnesota, respectively. The only connection to NASA anyone has identified is a general research grant NASA gave to Professor Kalnay’s department. If the original blog post had made that clear, the study wouldn’t have attracted much attention – as the headlines show, it was the supposed NASA connection that drew media interest. Normally I’d ignore a paper like this: many graduate students write papers, some get published, and most are quickly forgotten. But this one has been widely publicized, so it requires review, if only to understand its argument. After all, if the authors really have proved that western civilization is on the brink of collapse that only greater equality and a shift to renewables can prevent, ecosocialists should be eager to publicize it! Unfortunately, far from being “a highly credible wake-up call,” this much-hyped article adds nothing to our understanding of the causes and solutions of the global environmental crisis. The inclusion of egalitarian proposals should not blind environmental activists to its fundamental flaws. We’re told that the paper has been accepted by an academic journal, but it hasn’t been published yet. Two somewhat different drafts have been circulated on the net: my comments refer to the more recent version, dated March 19, 2014. I’ll refer to it as “the paper” or by the abbreviated title “Human and Nature Dynamics.”[3] A universal model of social collapse The paper’s ambitious goal is to propose a mathematical model that explains why societies in general collapse. After listing several dozen complex societies that no longer exist – from the ancient Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Chinese empires to the Mayan civilization in Central America and Cahokia in the Mississippi valley – they write that “although many different causes have been offered to explain individual collapses, it is still necessary to develop a more general explanation.” Others have tried to do that. Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History, a massive 12-volume work published between 1934 and 1961, claimed to have identified common factors in the fall of 26 major world civilizations. Others have focused on fewer cases: Edward Gibbon filled six large volumes in an effort to explain just one, in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. So the authors of “Human and Nature Dynamics” can only be termed ambitious for attempting to identify “a mechanism that is not specific to a particular time period of human history, nor a particular culture, technology, or natural disaster” – and even more ambitious for claiming not just that they have succeeded, but that they can express that mechanism in just four equations: two for population, one for “nature,” and one for accumulated wealth. They accomplish that astonishing feat by accepting, without reservation, the Malthusian claim that the decline of past societies – which they call “collapse,” a term they don’t define – was caused by population growth and/or mass consumption of limited resources. They identify several sources for that view, most notably Jared Diamond’s Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail (Viking 2005) and William Catton’s Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change (University of Illinois Press, 1980). They seem unaware that the views of their preferred authors are, to say the least, controversial. Jared Diamond’s arguments, for example, were thoroughly debunked by experts on each of the societies he described, in the excellent anthology Questioning Collapse.[4] The authors call their four equation model “HANDY,” short for “Human and Nature DYnamics.” It is based on the so-called predator-prey model, created by mathematicians Alfred Lotka and Vito Volterra in the 1920s to show how interaction between competing species can affect population. It says, for example, that if there are many rabbits but only a few wolves in an area, the wolf population will rise because food is plentiful, and the rabbit population will fall because they are being eaten. Eventually there will be too many wolves and too few rabbits, so most of the wolves will starve to death. With fewer predators remaining, the rabbit population will increase, and the cycle repeats – lots of rabbits, then lots of wolves, then …. That sounds reasonable, but, as population ecologist Daniel Botkin writes, both laboratory experiments and real world observations have shown that “predator and prey do not oscillate as would a Lotka-Volterra set.”[5] That suggests Motesharrei and his co-authors are trying to explain 50 centuries of history using formulas that don’t accurately describe a closed system containing just two kinds of animals. Botkin’s book is not listed in the bibliography, and there is no indication that the authors are aware that their fundamental formula may not be valid. They simply adopt it and declare: “We can think of the human population as the ‘predator,’ while nature (the natural resources of the surrounding environment) can be taken as the ‘prey,’ depleted by humans,” and proceed. But nature isn’t a thing you can count, so how do you put it into an equation? The authors finesse that problem by replacing it with an imaginary currency they call eco-Dollars, undifferentiated units that somehow reduce nature’s variety and complexity to a single number. They don’t explain how that could conceivably be done in the real world. To their credit, the authors recognize that human societies are more complex than the simplistic predator-prey equations allow, so they have modified them to incorporate accumulated wealth (saved eco-Dollars) and social inequality. These additions make the model more complex, but they don’t fundamentally change it. With humans as “predators” and eco-Dollars as “prey,” the formulas produce an oscillation: when lots of eco-Dollars are available, the human population rises; when the eco-Dollars are depleted, the human population falls. Accumulated wealth can delay the population decline and elite overconsumption can accelerate it, but the pattern remains. Thought experiments Having reduced the complexity of human-nature interaction to four equations, the authors devote most of their paper to “thought experiments” about scenarios that they say represent “three distinct types of societies.” In the Egalitarian scenario, everyone consumes and works equally. In the Equitable scenario, everyone consumes equally, but some do not work, so workers must work harder. In the Unequal scenario, non-working Elites consume 10 to 100 times as much as Commoners, who do all the work. For each case they calculate a “carrying capacity” – the maximum number of people that a given number of “eco-Dollars” can support indefinitely. Although they list Joel Cohen’s authoritative work on this subject in their bibliography, they don’t mention his conclusion that “the question ‘How many people can the earth support?’ has no single numerical answer, now or ever.”[6] In each case, depending on how the variables are set, a graph shows whether the carrying capacity will never be exceeded, or will be exceeded intermittently in boom-and-bust cycles, or will be permanently exceeded, leading to total collapse. Although the authors don’t say so, it turns out that in the long run the only variables that really matter are total population and total consumption – because that’s how the formulas are defined. Their much quoted statement, that for an unequal society, “collapse is very difficult to avoid and requires major policy changes, including major reductions in inequality and population growth rates,” isn’t a political or sociological judgment, it’s a mathematical abstraction. Although the model purports to include all of nature as humanity’s “prey,” it becomes clear that by “nature” the authors mean “food,” because each case of collapse is caused by hunger – either everyone starves because food production declines, or Commoners starve because the Elite eat more than their share. As economist Christopher Freeman said of an earlier attempt to predict the future with computer models, this is a case of “Malthus in, Malthus out.”[7] Where’s the beef? One of the most surprising features of the “Human and Nature Dynamics” paper is the absence of empirical data. That’s right – a paper that some say proves the imminent collapse of western civilization contains no evidence at all. It fails to show that any past society collapsed from overpopulation and mass or elite consumption, let alone that those are the causes of the environmental crises of the 21st century. In fact, very little such evidence exists. In 2006, noted anthropologist Joseph A. Tainter, author of The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge University Press, 1988) surveyed the subject for the peer-reviewed Annual Review of Archaeology (ARA). After summarizing and evaluating all the studies he could find, Tainter wrote: “When the ARA Editorial Committee invited me to address the topic ‘Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse,’ I assumed I could review only part of a voluminous literature. Although I have extensively read the collapse literature … I was surprised to realize that the literature has produced few cases that postulate overshoot of population and/or mass consumption, followed by degradation and collapse. … Within the small overshoot literature, many of the most ardent proponents are outside archaeology…. “There does not presently appear to be a confirmed archaeological case of overshoot, resource degradation, and collapse brought on by overpopulation and/or mass consumption.”[8] [emphasis added] Those few sentences fatally undermine the fundamental basis of all the equations and graphs in “Human and Nature Dynamics.” Tainter’s article is not listed in the paper’s bibliography. Back to the real world There is massive evidence that the existing social order is inflicting massive harm on humanity and the rest of nature, and the case for radical social change as the only permanent solution is very strong. The authors of the HANDY Model deserve respect and commendation for focusing on that, and for including social inequality as an important factor. My criticism of their work has nothing in common with the reactionaries and science-deniers who have loudly condemned them as dangerous radicals. The problem is not that “Human and Nature Dynamics” is radical, but that it is not. Radical means going to the root, but this analysis remains on the surface, dealing with appearances, with things that can be counted and plugged into formulas. Not society but population; not nature but eco-Dollars; not history and class struggle, but graphs. Ahistorical formulas substitute for investigation of the specific social, economic, cultural and technological processes that have brought our particular society to this time of crisis. As the British environmentalist and poet Paul Kingsnorth has written, this is a common failing of mainstream greens: “They offer up remarkably confident predictions of what will happen if we do or don’t do this or that, all based on mind-numbing numbers cherry-picked from this or that ‘study’ as if the world were a giant spreadsheet which only needs to be balanced correctly.”[9] I’m reminded of a letter that Friedrich Engels wrote in 1890, criticizing self-proclaimed Marxists for whom historical materialism “serves as an excuse for not studying history.” “But our conception of history is above all a guide to study, not a lever for construction after the manner of the Hegelian. All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be examined individually before the attempt is made to deduce them from the political, civil law, aesthetic, philosophic, religious, etc., views corresponding to them.”[10] Engels could have been addressing our modern Malthusians: abstract formulas and assumptions about population and consumption in general cannot substitute for thorough examination of the concrete issues facing specific societies. Academic economic theory has been described as pure mathematics based on unproven axioms. That’s a pretty good description of this paper. Every one of the thought experiments should be preceded by a disclaimer like this: IF the factors we have identified are the right ones, and IF there are no countervailing factors, and IF the formulas we have produced are valid and sufficient to explain the process, THEN the these graphs may be worthy of consideration.

## Link Turn Strategy

The links they have:

-state link

-palliative link

-wage labor link

-pits workers against each other

Important: if their only impact is poverty, “perm other instances” is a game winner – it solves cap everywhere else; in the plan country, the plan solves the impact to cap – even if cap is generally bad, the plan would create a mediated form of cap that does not lead to poverty while simultaneously avoiding extinction, which their alt can’t do

### ---Compiled---

### TL Link---Alt Fails

#### Perm combines reforms with revolution which solves their links – a living wage challenges surplus value that sustains capital and unifies class struggle – revolutionary intellectuals should develop feasible political strategies against labor exploitation

Makandal 13 [“Wage Struggles: Reformist or Revolutionary?” Idées Nouvelles Idées Prolétariennes, publishing entity for the popularization of theory and other texts that serve the interests of the working class in their struggle against capital April 16, 2013] AT

In Bangladesh, Haiti, Brazil, China, the U.S. and everywhere, workers are demanding wages that allow them to feed, house, clothe, and educate themselves and their families. Some on the Left argue that wage struggles are inherently reformist. The reality is that they can be either reformist or democratic (the latter as an embedded element of an overall revolutionary struggle). A thin line divides the two. The difference is that the reformist will be satisfied with reforms and stop there, while an autonomous democratic movement that has the potential to contribute to revolution will keep demanding more and more, continuing to weaken (not mechanically) capital and finally challenge its existence. This difference results from a political line and strategy. Revolutionary potential exists when there is a dialectical relationship between revolutionary level and democratic mass level organizations. Struggles waged solely at the mass level, without this relationship, will indeed inevitably lead to reformism. When that relationship does exist, however, wage struggles can weaken capital. This is because capital reproduces itself by extracting surplus value from the exploitation of workers. The struggle for higher wages (forcing capitalists to appropriate less surplus value) can play a crucial role in the development of both a combative working class, and the growth of a mass movement that could ultimately challenge the existence of capital. Surplus Value The capitalist mode of production is characterized by the fundamentally antagonistic social relations on which it depends—capital versus labor in the production of surplus value. The production of surplus value differentiates capitalism from all other modes of production (i.e.: feudalism, slavery). Surplus value is the socially determined worth of the labor power that is used to transform natural materials into commodities (goods for exchange), measured in time. Under capitalism, surplus value is generated in the production process itself, as labor power is incorporated into the process of production, and embodied in the commodity. This is in contrast to feudalist production, which guarantees a surplus by exercising constraint on labor and on consummation exterior to the production process. Under feudalism, peasants toil on the land and the landowners take a guaranteed portion of each harvest, regardless of weather conditions, sometimes leaving the peasant unable to sustain themselves. Under capitalism, workers work a certain amount of time to provide for their own sustenance and reproduction, after which their labor power produces surplus value. For example, if a worker is paid $80 for eight hours of work, but produces goods worth $80 in only two hours, then the rest of that time, s/he is working without pay. During those other six hours, the worker produces $240 of goods. That amount (minus the other costs of running the industry) is surplus value. The capitalist, who privately owns and controls the means of production, appropriates (steals) the surplus value by asserting ownership over the new commodities. The surplus value is turned into profit when the commodities are sold, and a portion is reinvested as capital for the industry to expand. This theft of value is exploitation. A social relationship of domination permits exploitation. The capitalist class dominates the working class in three main ways: 1) economically via their ownership of the means of production (the monopolization of society’s means of subsistence); 2) politically via their state apparatus (including the threat and use of force); and 3) ideologically via their culture (media, religion, education, traditions, etc.). The quantitative forms of surplus value (and profit based on value) are the result, an effect, of these social relations. These dynamics sustain and enrich the capitalists who do not work, while workers struggle to reproduce themselves. The stolen labor-power of the workers is used to fund militaries, hospitals, universities, and everything else which ensures and reproduces capitalism’s existence. Surplus value is class struggle in the process of capitalist production, the struggle of the capitalists to constantly dominate the workers in order to exploit them. It is important that we understand surplus value as a social process. It is not simply an economic phenomenon, which could be resolved within the capitalist framework. It is fundamental to (and allows for the reproduction of) capitalist relations economically, socially, and politically. Wage struggles demand the return of what is stolen from the workers. Wage struggles are important because they strike at the very core of capitalism—surplus value—and its external manifestation of exploitation. The wage struggle is the fundamental aspect of anti-capitalist struggle. This is why it is important to struggle around wages. And during the period of global monopoly capitalism/imperialism (and imperialism’s concrete political form of neoliberalism), it is crucial for the working class to unify internationally against its common enemy. This can be accomplished by organizing and struggling for an international minimum (living) wage. Organizing Wage Struggles Wage struggles tackle the fundamental contradiction of capitalism: capital vs. labor. They help build the militancy of the working class and help train them to take power. Wage struggles seek wage reforms with the goal of abolishing wages altogether. The abolishment of wages is ultimately a political struggle, which requires the role of proletarian revolutionaries to organize revolution. There are two levels of organization: a revolutionary level and a democratic mass level. Both need to function in relative autonomy, but in a dialectical manner. The revolutionary level constructs political rapprochement with the mass level with a goal of struggling among the masses, while being aware of and avoiding capitalist attempts to divert organizing efforts into dead ends. Political rapprochement is a constant back-and-forth dialectical dynamic between the two levels, for the purpose of constructing unity and strategy. The revolutionary level must engage in both kinds of struggles: for reforms (not reformism) and for revolution. We must be serious in theory and in practice, and must construct mass organizations among workers and social categories (such as students). Theory must be dialectically connected to practice; it should allow us to develop a line to engage in practice, so we know what we are doing. We need to have a clear understanding of the contradictions we face, which will make us better organized and more capable of tackling our well-organized enemy: capital. It is crucial that we understand the dynamics of our enemy. In a struggle for wages, we must be aware of and combat reformism and economism, which result in the integration into the capitalist system. For example, the civil rights and the feminist movements were able to be absorbed into bourgeois democracy, because their main focus was on economic integration, “equality” within the marketplace, rather than on the question of fundamental political power. One class did not overthrow another to transform society on a totally new basis; instead the same capitalist class remained in power, while slightly broadening its ranks, and expanding bourgeois democratic rights, for the reproduction of capital. It is the task of proletarian revolutionaries to apply the correct line inside the mass level to avoid these types of deviations. In Haiti, we are waging two levels of struggle. One is a minimum wage adjustment (for inflation), and the other is a struggle for an increased minimum wage. Both are important struggles to organize workers. These struggles are totally against neoliberalism, which actually calls for no standard on wages—a point defended by most presidents in Haiti (who operate the state apparatus in the interest of the dominant classes and imperialism). These struggles are not reformist, because we engaged in them, principally, with the goal of the abolition of wages. But we understand that socialism won’t fall from the sky. We need to be strategic. We must understand, and then use, the reality in front of us in order to engage to transform that reality. Before we can kill capitalism, we have to weaken it and simultaneously strengthen our side. We can only do this if we tactically apply a correct revolutionary strategy, a correct political line. All social classes historically struggle to either reproduce themselves or to transform the reality they are in. Members of the petit bourgeoisie, for example, go to school to learn a skill to guarantee their reproduction. If they want a higher paycheck, they go back to school to serve capital at a higher level, and aspire to become a bourgeois. This is the dominant historical ideological tendency of that class. The fundamental component of that tendency is individualism. In contrast, the dominant tendency of the working class for its reproduction is struggle. The higher form of that struggle is the strike at the mass level, which workers can only do collectively. The dominant historical ideological component of the working class is collectivism, the antithesis of individualism (which ideologically corresponds to private property). The Dead-End Path of Left Populism Global capitalism is attacking every social category among the popular masses (every social and cultural group). This has given rise to a diverse, multi-faceted resistance, seeking to challenge capitalist domination. But though these movements are sometimes combative and significant, they are not based on a class alternative. They are therefore an amorphous amalgam, prone to confusion. Without a class orientation and a corresponding political line, these movements are unable to define clear lines of action aimed at real emancipation. They are unable to go beyond a ‘broad-based, popular’ desire for equality, and are therefore subject to populist drift. This characterizes the radicalized petit bourgeoisie’s response to the adverse situation it finds itself in. The radical petit bourgeoisie spontaneously gravitates toward an ultra-leftist orientation of egalitarianism, which has its underlying foundation in the struggle for economic equality in the marketplace (for their own reproduction as a class). This leads to a mechanical materialist (actually idealist) and economist approach of rejecting unilaterally the economic struggle of the proletariat (a fundamental aspect of the fight against capital for its reproduction). This has fostered a dangerous tendency to develop in popular struggle: left populism that will quickly transition to right populism. This tendency results in the displacement of the struggle against the fundamental aspect of capital (the processes of exploitation of labor power and production of surplus value), to focus instead on secondary aspects (which are produced by the fundamental aspect). The consequence is that all struggles waged against these secondary aspects or effects of capitalism (which are also the effects of any prior class society based on private property)—racism, misogyny, and other forms of oppression and inequalities, plus ecocide—become viewed as anti-capitalist struggles. These secondary aspects have currently become the center pole of mass struggles. They are indeed worth fighting against—capitalism affects society and the environment in many terrible ways that no one should accept. But as justified as these struggles are, they are not materially (concretely) anti-capitalist. They are progressive, but limited, because even with a very high level of radicalism, they cannot stop capitalism. History has already proven to us that they can be recouped by the capitalist class. If these struggles are waged outside of, and disconnected from, a genuine anti-capitalist struggle targeting the fundamental production of surplus value, then the danger is that they can be transitioned into to an enlargement of bourgeois democratic rights, or false “solutions” to problems like ecocide, unintentionally serving the interest of the reproduction of capital. Revolution is the overthrow of one class by another There is only one reality with many alternatives, all detectable and determined by class struggle in our time. We must recognize the fact that the dominant “alternatives” being currently offered are reformist ones. The job of proletarian revolutionaries is to define what must be done to reverse, in our favor, the struggle for alternatives, in order to deal with—and eliminate—the two fundamental aspects of capital: exploitation of labor power and the process of production of surplus value. The abolition of wages is, in principle, the collective appropriation of the means of production by the proletariat. To ignore wage struggles is to deny and avoid the immediate economic struggles of the workers, which are one level of class struggle (others are ideological and political). The working class should not abandon its daily struggle against capital, but should continuously advance it for the objective of its collective appropriation of the means of production. The abolition of wages will inevitably lead to the abolition of classes. However, a necessary precondition for this is revolution. Through liberating itself, the working class liberates all of society from capitalism. The choices to be made in this epic effort to crush capitalism are not simple or mechanical; they are to be found only in the complex reality of class struggle. At the mass democratic level, the fight for wages is one form of struggle for the objective of weakening the system, but it is never a final goal. Our aim is the elimination of classes once and for all. We should never be satisfied!

#### Perm do both – if their alt can overcome capitalist elements in the status quo it can also overcome the aff; otherwise their alt doesn’t solve.

#### Perm – use the living wage to transition to socialism and then to full communism. The living wage provides abundance and is compatible with their alt which also proves no link

Jones 07 [Shane Jones. “A Minimum Wage Versus a Living Wage.” Socialist Appeal. 30 January, 2007.] AJ

A living wage differs from a minimum wage in that a minimum wage is simply a set level or dollar figure i.e. 25 cents, $5.15, $7.25 etc. On the other hand, a living wage is a positive right to a decent standard of living. It is nothing more than a legally set real wage, tied to inflation. That is, the purchasing power of wages are tied to the real prices of other commodities. For example, as food prices rise, so do wages. A living wage maintains the standard of living and provides economic stability for working people. It is impossible to simply reform capitalism to make it more “fair”. At its core, capitalism is a system of exploitation of labor for profit. This makes a living wage for all an impossibility, as it would bring out all the contradictions of capitalism. So while Marxists support every material and social gain won by workers under capitalism, at the same time we realize that these limited gains are not an end in and of themselves, but function within the limited bounds of capitalism. Under pressure from below, the ruling class offers a crumb here and there in order to keep order. We think working people deserve more than crumbs. Yes to a minimum wage increase! Yes to a thousand and one of them! But the story cannot end there. We need a living wage - one where workers do not have to wait in economic limbo for decades. Working people don’t need periodic token rewards tailored to placate and win votes. Rather, we deserve stability, dignity and access to all the requirements of social life: a real living wage.

#### That’s key to communism – bringing down cap now means their alt doesn’t solve; including a living wage equalizes wealth which moves to communism

Eagleton 11 [TERRY EAGLETON (prominent British literary theorist, critic and public intellectual. He is currently Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, Professor of Cultural Theory at the National University of Ireland and Distinguished Visiting Professor of English Literature at The University of Notre Dame). “Why Marx Was Right.” 2011 by Yale University. New Haven & London] AJ

This raises some thorny moral problems. Just as some Christians accept evil as somehow necessary to God’s plan for humanity, so you can read Marx as claiming that capitalism, however rapacious and unjust, has to be endured for the sake of the socialist future it will inevitably bring in its wake. Not only endured, in fact, but actively encouraged. There are points in Marx’s work where he cheers on the growth of capitalism, since only thus will the path to socialism be thrown open. In a lecture of 1847, for example, he defends free trade as hastening the advent of socialism. He also wanted to see German unification on the grounds that it would promote German capitalism. There are several places in his work where this revolutionary socialist betrays rather too much relish at the prospect of a progressive capitalist class putting paid to ‘‘barbarism.’’ The morality of this appears distinctly dubious. How is it different from Stalin’s or Mao’s murderous pogroms, ex- ecuted in the name of the socialist future? How far does the end justify the means? And given that few today believe that socialism is inevitable, is this not even more reason for re- nouncing such a brutal sacrifice of the present on the altar of a future that might never arrive? If capitalism is essential for socialism, and if capitalism is unjust, does this not suggest that injustice is morally acceptable? If there is to be justice in the future, must there have been injustice in the past? Marx writes in Theories of Surplus Value that ‘‘the development of the capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of the majority of individuals and even classes.’’∞≤ He means that the good of the species will finally triumph in the shape of communism, but that this involves a great deal of ineluctable suffering and injustice en route. The material prosperity that in the end will fund freedom is the fruit of un-freedom. There is a difference between doing evil in the hope that good may come of it, and seeking to turn someone else’s evil to good use. Socialists did not perpetrate capitalism, and are innocent of its crimes; but granted that it exists, it seems rational to make the best of it. This is possible because capitalism is not of course simply evil. To think so is to be drastically one-sided, a fault by which Marx himself was rarely afflicted. As we have seen, the system breeds freedom as well as barba- rism, emancipation along with enslavement. Capitalist society generates enormous wealth, but in a way that cannot help putting it beyond the reach of most of its citizens. Even so, that wealth can always be brought within reach. It can be disentangled from the acquisitive, individualist forms which bred it, invested in the community as a whole, and used to restrict disagreeable work to the minimum. It can thus release men and women from the chains of economic necessity into a life where they are free to realize their creative poten- tial. This is Marx’s vision of communism.

#### Social democracy solves better than bringing down cap

Berman 09 [Sheri, associate professor of political science at Columbia, “Unheralded Battle: Capitalism, the Left, Social Democracy, and Democratic Socialism,” Dissent, V56 N1, Winter, Project Muse]

At its root, such fears stem from the failure of many on the left to appreciate that capitalism is not a zero-sum game—over the long run the operations of relatively free markets can produce net wealth rather than simply shifting it from one pocket to another. Because social democrats understand that basic point, they want to do what they can to encourage trade and growth and cultivate as large a net surplus as possible—all the better to pay for measures that can equalize life chances and cushion publics from the blows that markets inflict. Helping people adjust to capitalism, rather than engaging in a hopeless and ultimately counterproductive effort to hold it back, has been the historic accomplishment of the social democratic left, and it remains its primary goal today in those countries where the social democratic mindset is most deeply ensconced. Many analysts have remarked, for example, on the impressive success of countries like Denmark and Sweden in managing globalization—promoting economic growth and increased competitiveness even as they ensure high employment and social security. The Scandinavian cases demonstrate that social welfare and economic dynamism are not enemies but natural allies. Not surprisingly, it is precisely in these countries that optimism about globalization is highest. In the United States and other parts of Europe, on the other hand, fear of the future is pervasive and opinions of globalization astoundingly negative. American leftists must try to do what the Scandinavians have done: develop a program that promotes growth and social solidarity together, rather than forcing a choice between them. Concretely this means agitating for policies—like reliable, affordable, and portable health care; tax credits or other government support for labor-market retraining; investment in education; and unemployment programs that are both more generous and better incentivized—that will help workers adjust to change rather than make them fear it

#### The alt fails and causes violence. The aff challenges free market ideology but avoids the alt’s radicalism

Zizek 12 [Slavoj, All-Around Badass Philosopher, June 8, “Don’t Act, Just Think,” AKG]

Slavoj Zizek: Capitalism is . . . and this, almost I’m tempted to say is what is great about it, although I’m very critical of it . . . Capitalism is more an ethical/religious category for me. It’s not true when people attack capitalists as egotists. “They don't care.” No! An ideal capitalist is someone who is ready, again, to stake his life, to risk everything just so that production grows, profit grows, capital circulates. His personal or her happiness is totally subordinated to this. This is what I think Walter Benjamin, the great Frankfurt School companion, thinker, had in mind when he said capitalism is a form of religion. You cannot explain, account for, a figure of a passionate capitalist, obsessed with expanded circulation, with rise of his company, in terms of personal happiness. I am, of course, fundamentally anti-capitalist. But let’s not have any illusions here. No. What shocks me is that most of the critics of today’s capitalism feel even embarrassed, that's my experience, when you confront them with a simple question, “Okay, we heard your story . . . protest horrible, big banks depriving us of billions, hundreds, thousands of billions of common people's money. . . . Okay, but what do you really want? What should replace the system?” And then you get one big confusion. You get either a general moralistic answer, like “People shouldn't serve money. Money should serve people.” Well, frankly, Hitler would have agreed with it, especially because he would say, “When people serve money, money’s controlled by Jews,” and so on, no? So either this or some kind of a vague connection, social democracy, or a simple moralistic critique, and so on and so on. So, you know, it’s easy to be just formally anti-capitalist, but what does it really mean? It’s totally open. This is why, as I always repeat, with all my sympathy for Occupy Wall Street movement, it’s result was . . . I call it a Bartleby lesson. Bartleby, of course, Herman Melville’s Bartleby, you know, who always answered his favorite “I would prefer not to” . . . The message of Occupy Wall Street is, I would prefer not to play the existing game. There is something fundamentally wrong with the system and the existing forms of institutionalized democracy are not strong enough to deal with problems. Beyond this, they don't have an answer and neither do I. For me, Occupy Wall Street is just a signal. It’s like clearing the table. Time to start thinking. The other thing, you know, it’s a little bit boring to listen to this mantra of “Capitalism is in its last stage.” When this mantra started, if you read early critics of capitalism, I’m not kidding, a couple of decades before French Revolution, in late eighteenth century. No, the miracle of capitalism is that it’s rotting in decay, but the more it’s rotting, the more it thrives. So, let’s confront that serious problem here. Also, let’s not remember--and I’m saying this as some kind of a communist--that the twentieth century alternatives to capitalism and market miserably failed. . . . Like, okay, in Soviet Union they did try to get rid of the predominance of money market economy. The price they paid was a return to violent direct master and servant, direct domination, like you no longer will even formally flee. You had to obey orders, a new authoritarian society. . . . And this is a serious problem: how to abolish market without regressing again into relations of servitude and domination. My advice would be--because I don't have simple answers--two things: [First,] (a) precisely to start thinking. Don't get caught into this pseudo-activist pressure. Do something. Let’s do it, and so on. So, no, the time is to think. I even provoked some of the leftist friends when I told them that if the famous Marxist formula was, “Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the time is to change it” . . . thesis 11 . . . , that maybe today we should say, “In the twentieth century, we maybe tried to change the world too quickly. The time is to interpret it again, to start thinking.” Second thing, I’m not saying [that while] people are suffering, enduring horrible things, that we should just sit and think, but we should be very careful what we do. Here, let me give you a surprising example. I think that, okay, it’s so fashionable today to be disappointed at President Obama, of course, but sometimes I’m a little bit shocked by this disappointment because what did the people expect, that he will introduce socialism in United States or what? But for example, the ongoing universal health care debate is an important one. This is a great thing. Why? Because, on the one hand, this debate which taxes the very roots of ordinary American ideology, you know, freedom of choice, states wants to take freedom from us and so on. I think this freedom of choice that Republicans attacking Obama are using, its pure ideology. But at the same time, universal health care is not some crazy, radically leftist notion. It’s something that exists all around and functions basically relatively well--Canada, most of Western European countries. So the beauty is to select a topic which touches the fundamentals of our ideology, but at the same time, we cannot be accused of promoting an impossible agenda--like abolish all private property or what. No, it’s something that can be done and is done relatively successfully and so on. So that would be my idea, to carefully select issues like this where we do stir up public debate but we cannot be accused of being utopians in the bad sense of the term.

#### Perm do the aff as a means towards their alt. Solve the links – it re-appropriates the living wage so it’s no longer used for capitalist purposes. Even if the aff entrenches cap, the alt ensures a revolution.

### TL Link---SV first

#### Perm do both

#### A living wage builds movements and short-term reform is good

Shalom 14 [Stephen R. Shalom, professor of political science at William Paterson University, “One State or Two States: Prospects, Possibilities, and Politics,” Logos Journal] **AZ**

Let me begin with an analogy that I hope will illuminate a way to approach these kinds of political questions. Consider the example of the living wage campaigns that are being pursued around the country, demanding that low-paid workers receive enough to provide for their basic needs. Typically these campaigns, supported by leftists, call for local ordinances or policies that set some minimum compensation level, well above the existing minimum wage, for all employees. Now imagine if a labor solidarity activist opposed the living wage campaign, arguing that “The problem is with capitalism and the whole wage system, not the low wages paid by some employers.” I assume we would reply, “Yes, the problem is capitalism, but we’re not going to be able to solve that overnight. People who are hungry today can’t afford to wait until we have brought capitalism down. Unlike total system transformation, a living wage can be won in the near term — not that we will win, but we can win in the near term; ending capitalism, on the other hand, we have no chance of winning for many years. A victory in a living wage campaign would do two things: first, it would provide an immediate improvement in the lives of people who are suffering; and, second, it would show people that change is possible and that there is an alternative to hopeless resignation.” Yes, there are limits to what can be accomplished under capitalism, contrary to the claims of liberal critics of the status quo — and we should always make these limits clear while we participate in struggles to achieve reforms. But it would be thoroughly wrongheaded to refuse to support a living wage campaign in the United States today because it’s not perfectly just or to denounce those who support it as engaged in morally unacceptable behavior. And it would be especially inappropriate for those of us who are not low-paid workers to tell low-paid workers not to accept $15 an hour because they ought to hold out for the end of capitalism. The same logic holds even if one doesn’t support socialism. That is, imagine another hypothetical critic of living wage campaigns who says $15 an hour is a morally repugnant wage and nothing less than $25 per hour ought to be accepted. I assume we would reply, “Yes, merely guaranteeing everyone a living wage is unjust, as indeed any improvement in anyone’s life situation that falls short of our ideal of justice, whatever that happens to be, will be unjust. But our refraining from achieving reforms while we wish for a perfectly just outcome doesn’t bring that outcome any closer. On the other hand, a living wage campaign both improves people’s lives, which is important, and can give the workers and their supporters the sort of victory that helps build a movement that can push for further improvements.” The same logic holds as well for all sorts of political campaigns. On the environment, on women’s rights, and on a whole host of other issues we will often support efforts to achieve some reform that is less than our ideal. We do this because we realize that we can’t yet win our maximum demands, but we want to improve things in the meantime, while building movements that can achieve more.¶ This doesn’t mean that it’s always right to go for limited reforms. One needs to make a serious judgment about what’s possible under the particular circumstances prevailing at each time and place. So in 1968, for example, it was right to criticize the Communist-led unions in France for being bought off by some moderate improvements when the whole capitalist system might have been successfully challenged. Sometimes transformative change is possible. But when your considered judgment tells you that the best you can do is win $15 an hour, then one needs to support that campaign and not refrain from doing so because it falls short of one’s ideal. Does thinking about what seems achievable or realistic make one a counterrevolutionary naysayer? Shouldn’t leftists have faith in people’s potential to change the world? Gramsci’s advice is relevant here: we want to have optimism of the will, but pessimism of the intellect. We believe in people’s abilities to rise above their circumstances and fight to create a better world. But we’d be crazy to lay siege to the White House tomorrow because we think it’s possible that 100 million Americans will rise up and support us. We welcome and hope for unexpected inspirational moments; we don’t count on them.

#### A. Turns their impacts – a living wage temporarily buffers the impact of cap by reducing poverty; the alt alone can’t gain critical mass fast enough to solve their impacts. A direct and significant decrease in poverty outweighs the slight decrease in perm solvency.

#### B. their epistemology is wrong – it comes from the isolated position of wealthy intellectuals and ignore workers’ real struggles so it’s less true

#### Perm do the aff and then the alt. Withdrawing from capital immediately is impossible since everyone requires capitalist institutions – buying food and shelter, earning money – to survive; only after a living wage meets basic needs, revolution becomes possible.

Occupy 12 [(In solidarity with Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Midsummer is a global day of festival on June 20th, 2012 to demand a universal living wage) “Why Demand The Living Wage?” June 20, 2012: Global Festivals for the Universal Living Wage] AT

Because it centers the needs of the people who are already most exploited by capitalism and would tangibly improve our lives. Because we work too much. Because the rent is too damn high and wages are too damn low. Because executive bonuses have eight or nine digits, but working full time for an entire year at minimum wage is worth just $14,500 (before taxes). Because Obama promised to raise the minimum wage and didn´t and Romney isn´t ¨concerned about the very poor.¨ Because imagine what we could do if revolutionaries didn’t have to spend half our time worrying how to feed one another. Because poor people have a direct stake in this struggle. Because 78% of New York State voters support raising the minimum wage. Because we deserve a world without want; a world without poverty, exploitation, debt, criminalization, racism, or war. Because it would unite us all. For there to be real justice for the crimes committed by Wall Street, we must make systemic changes to ensure it never happens again. The people, the 99%, must never again be forced from our homes or driven to destitution because of the greed of the 1%. It is clear that no matter how much we try to reform the financial system, the true workings of it will be obscured from public knowledge, and that the greedy will find ways to exploit us. The system is set up to reward and encourage this behavior. So long as power is concentrated in the hands of a few and ¨progress¨ is only considered a by-product of the quest for profit that justifies immense imbalance in wealth, we will never be safe from the next Great Recession or Depression. A universal living wage is only one step toward liberation, but it would ensure that we never again pay for the banker´s profits while we ourselves struggle to put food on the table. It is not our only demand. A wage system with a living wage is still a wage system. Like foreclosure moratoriums, legalization for undocumented immigrants, and the abolition of student debt, this is just one demand out of the many that have emerged and will emerge organically from the democratic conversations spurred by the Occupy movement. The living wage is the quintessential “non-reformist reform” — e.g. “Reform which is attentive to immediate social needs and at the same time moves toward further gains, and eventually, wholesale transformation.” (wikipedia). It’s radical reform that goes to the very root of economics: if people can’t survive the economy, then the economy can’t survive the people.

#### Survival before revolution – Resistance requires addressing material realities; critiquing the living wage shuts down true alt solvency

Rex 14 [(runs F Yeah Anarchists Stickers and contribute to Anarchist Communism) “OMNIA SUNT COMMUNIA”] AT

The reason I am so “fixated” with pretending to be a post-leftist calling people reformist is because that is pretty much the entirety of post-left praxis. Those on the post-left are so fixated with critiquing other members of the left (because you are still a member of the left yourself whether you like it or not) that they ignore the material realities of those actual struggling against capitalism. You can say that fighting for a living wage isn’t revolutionary (which brings me right back to my original point) but for somebody who is living on the breadline being able to afford to eat is pretty revolutionary. What are you going to say to those starving due to low wages? Or dying due to poor working conditions? “Sorry your cause isn’t revolutionary enough for me”. What’s your alternative? “Do something more revolutionary!” Well what the fuck is it? Because I’ve not heard anything from post-leftists that doesn’t amount to “full communism now” without any suggestion of how we get from where we are now to that stage. Good luck gaining support with that “full communism or nothing” attitude, but oh I forgot, you don’t care about getting public support because it doesn’t matter if things change or not because you’re so comfortable the way things are it really doesn’t bother you. If that wasn’t the case you wouldn’t be claiming that fighting for better rights were not revolutionary enough. Of course they won’t bring about the downfall of capitalism, but then will neither reading Kevin Tucker and pissing and moaning about the left. People learn through struggle, and if we ever want to have an effect we need to start getting ~~fucking~~ organised. Not critiquing every person who just wants to feed their families.

### ---Individual Turns---

### Rally-Around

#### LW also enables success of political action groups – creates a systemic force for positive change

Devinatz 13 [Victor G. Devinatz (Department of Management and Quantitative Methods, Illinois State University). “The Significance of the Living Wage for US Workers in the Early Twenty-First Century.” Employ Respons Rights J (2013) 25:125–134. 24 March 2013] AJ

Furthermore, the fight for living wages has contributed to the development of labor- community coalitions which promote broad progressive political agendas, including labor rights, in cities and communities throughout the nation. Examples of concrete gains from such coalitions include playing a major role in the rejuvenation of a vibrant labor movement in Los Angeles; the creation of a Workers Rights Board as a vehicle for promoting workplace justice for nonunion workers in Tucson; and the development of an intimate relationship between the city’s central labor council and ACORN in Boston (Luce 2004, pp. 200–202, 204–205).

#### Try or die for the link turn – no class consciousness now means we need to build workers’ agendas

Castree 04 [Noel Castree, Neil M. Coe, Kevin Ward and Michael Samers. “Spaces of Work: Global Capitalism and the Geographies of Labour.” SAGE Publications 2004] AJ

What all this emphasizes is that attempts by workers to develop transnational solidarities require a major ideological and organiza- tional effort on their part. A wider inter-place worker consciousness does not automatically spring forth simply because wage workers share a common class position within the structure of global capital- ism. Rather, it has to be actively constructed in both thought and practice. One the one side, workers need an idea, an issue or an identity that they can rally-around en masse (the subject of the chapter’s next main section). On the other side, as Chapter 8 showed, workers need the organizational means to make such an idea, issue or identity flesh. Without such organizational capacities, noble thoughts about transnational worker cooperation will remain just that: thoughts that have no real world impact. Even when this combination of issues/ideas/identities and organizational means is achieved, it is important to recognize that reconciling local worker agendas with transnational ones will rarely be a smooth process. Compromises must usually be made. This is what Jonas (1998: 325) calls the ‘local-global￼THE GEOGRAPHICAL DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE 239 paradox’. This paradox arises because what is ‘good’ for one set of workers at one geographical scale may not be good for other workers at other geographical scales. The balance of gain and loss is very much case specific, but is the essence of translocal worker struggles to con- front this difficult balancing act, willingly or not.

### Workers’ Struggles

#### Perm combines reforms with revolution which solves their links – a living wage challenges surplus value that sustains capital and unifies class struggle – revolutionary intellectuals should develop feasible political strategies against labor exploitation

Makandal 13 [“Wage Struggles: Reformist or Revolutionary?” Idées Nouvelles Idées Prolétariennes, publishing entity for the popularization of theory and other texts that serve the interests of the working class in their struggle against capital April 16, 2013] AT

In Bangladesh, Haiti, Brazil, China, the U.S. and everywhere, workers are demanding wages that allow them to feed, house, clothe, and educate themselves and their families. Some on the Left argue that wage struggles are inherently reformist. The reality is that they can be either reformist or democratic (the latter as an embedded element of an overall revolutionary struggle). A thin line divides the two. The difference is that the reformist will be satisfied with reforms and stop there, while an autonomous democratic movement that has the potential to contribute to revolution will keep demanding more and more, continuing to weaken (not mechanically) capital and finally challenge its existence. This difference results from a political line and strategy. Revolutionary potential exists when there is a dialectical relationship between revolutionary level and democratic mass level organizations. Struggles waged solely at the mass level, without this relationship, will indeed inevitably lead to reformism. When that relationship does exist, however, wage struggles can weaken capital. This is because capital reproduces itself by extracting surplus value from the exploitation of workers. The struggle for higher wages (forcing capitalists to appropriate less surplus value) can play a crucial role in the development of both a combative working class, and the growth of a mass movement that could ultimately challenge the existence of capital. Surplus Value The capitalist mode of production is characterized by the fundamentally antagonistic social relations on which it depends—capital versus labor in the production of surplus value. The production of surplus value differentiates capitalism from all other modes of production (i.e.: feudalism, slavery). Surplus value is the socially determined worth of the labor power that is used to transform natural materials into commodities (goods for exchange), measured in time. Under capitalism, surplus value is generated in the production process itself, as labor power is incorporated into the process of production, and embodied in the commodity. This is in contrast to feudalist production, which guarantees a surplus by exercising constraint on labor and on consummation exterior to the production process. Under feudalism, peasants toil on the land and the landowners take a guaranteed portion of each harvest, regardless of weather conditions, sometimes leaving the peasant unable to sustain themselves. Under capitalism, workers work a certain amount of time to provide for their own sustenance and reproduction, after which their labor power produces surplus value. For example, if a worker is paid $80 for eight hours of work, but produces goods worth $80 in only two hours, then the rest of that time, s/he is working without pay. During those other six hours, the worker produces $240 of goods. That amount (minus the other costs of running the industry) is surplus value. The capitalist, who privately owns and controls the means of production, appropriates (steals) the surplus value by asserting ownership over the new commodities. The surplus value is turned into profit when the commodities are sold, and a portion is reinvested as capital for the industry to expand. This theft of value is exploitation. A social relationship of domination permits exploitation. The capitalist class dominates the working class in three main ways: 1) economically via their ownership of the means of production (the monopolization of society’s means of subsistence); 2) politically via their state apparatus (including the threat and use of force); and 3) ideologically via their culture (media, religion, education, traditions, etc.). The quantitative forms of surplus value (and profit based on value) are the result, an effect, of these social relations. These dynamics sustain and enrich the capitalists who do not work, while workers struggle to reproduce themselves. The stolen labor-power of the workers is used to fund militaries, hospitals, universities, and everything else which ensures and reproduces capitalism’s existence. Surplus value is class struggle in the process of capitalist production, the struggle of the capitalists to constantly dominate the workers in order to exploit them. It is important that we understand surplus value as a social process. It is not simply an economic phenomenon, which could be resolved within the capitalist framework. It is fundamental to (and allows for the reproduction of) capitalist relations economically, socially, and politically. Wage struggles demand the return of what is stolen from the workers. Wage struggles are important because they strike at the very core of capitalism—surplus value—and its external manifestation of exploitation. The wage struggle is the fundamental aspect of anti-capitalist struggle. This is why it is important to struggle around wages. And during the period of global monopoly capitalism/imperialism (and imperialism’s concrete political form of neoliberalism), it is crucial for the working class to unify internationally against its common enemy. This can be accomplished by organizing and struggling for an international minimum (living) wage. Organizing Wage Struggles Wage struggles tackle the fundamental contradiction of capitalism: capital vs. labor. They help build the militancy of the working class and help train them to take power. Wage struggles seek wage reforms with the goal of abolishing wages altogether. The abolishment of wages is ultimately a political struggle, which requires the role of proletarian revolutionaries to organize revolution. There are two levels of organization: a revolutionary level and a democratic mass level. Both need to function in relative autonomy, but in a dialectical manner. The revolutionary level constructs political rapprochement with the mass level with a goal of struggling among the masses, while being aware of and avoiding capitalist attempts to divert organizing efforts into dead ends. Political rapprochement is a constant back-and-forth dialectical dynamic between the two levels, for the purpose of constructing unity and strategy. The revolutionary level must engage in both kinds of struggles: for reforms (not reformism) and for revolution. We must be serious in theory and in practice, and must construct mass organizations among workers and social categories (such as students). Theory must be dialectically connected to practice; it should allow us to develop a line to engage in practice, so we know what we are doing. We need to have a clear understanding of the contradictions we face, which will make us better organized and more capable of tackling our well-organized enemy: capital. It is crucial that we understand the dynamics of our enemy. In a struggle for wages, we must be aware of and combat reformism and economism, which result in the integration into the capitalist system. For example, the civil rights and the feminist movements were able to be absorbed into bourgeois democracy, because their main focus was on economic integration, “equality” within the marketplace, rather than on the question of fundamental political power. One class did not overthrow another to transform society on a totally new basis; instead the same capitalist class remained in power, while slightly broadening its ranks, and expanding bourgeois democratic rights, for the reproduction of capital. It is the task of proletarian revolutionaries to apply the correct line inside the mass level to avoid these types of deviations. In Haiti, we are waging two levels of struggle. One is a minimum wage adjustment (for inflation), and the other is a struggle for an increased minimum wage. Both are important struggles to organize workers. These struggles are totally against neoliberalism, which actually calls for no standard on wages—a point defended by most presidents in Haiti (who operate the state apparatus in the interest of the dominant classes and imperialism). These struggles are not reformist, because we engaged in them, principally, with the goal of the abolition of wages. But we understand that socialism won’t fall from the sky. We need to be strategic. We must understand, and then use, the reality in front of us in order to engage to transform that reality. Before we can kill capitalism, we have to weaken it and simultaneously strengthen our side. We can only do this if we tactically apply a correct revolutionary strategy, a correct political line. All social classes historically struggle to either reproduce themselves or to transform the reality they are in. Members of the petit bourgeoisie, for example, go to school to learn a skill to guarantee their reproduction. If they want a higher paycheck, they go back to school to serve capital at a higher level, and aspire to become a bourgeois. This is the dominant historical ideological tendency of that class. The fundamental component of that tendency is individualism. In contrast, the dominant tendency of the working class for its reproduction is struggle. The higher form of that struggle is the strike at the mass level, which workers can only do collectively. The dominant historical ideological component of the working class is collectivism, the antithesis of individualism (which ideologically corresponds to private property). The Dead-End Path of Left Populism Global capitalism is attacking every social category among the popular masses (every social and cultural group). This has given rise to a diverse, multi-faceted resistance, seeking to challenge capitalist domination. But though these movements are sometimes combative and significant, they are not based on a class alternative. They are therefore an amorphous amalgam, prone to confusion. Without a class orientation and a corresponding political line, these movements are unable to define clear lines of action aimed at real emancipation. They are unable to go beyond a ‘broad-based, popular’ desire for equality, and are therefore subject to populist drift. This characterizes the radicalized petit bourgeoisie’s response to the adverse situation it finds itself in. The radical petit bourgeoisie spontaneously gravitates toward an ultra-leftist orientation of egalitarianism, which has its underlying foundation in the struggle for economic equality in the marketplace (for their own reproduction as a class). This leads to a mechanical materialist (actually idealist) and economist approach of rejecting unilaterally the economic struggle of the proletariat (a fundamental aspect of the fight against capital for its reproduction). This has fostered a dangerous tendency to develop in popular struggle: left populism that will quickly transition to right populism. This tendency results in the displacement of the struggle against the fundamental aspect of capital (the processes of exploitation of labor power and production of surplus value), to focus instead on secondary aspects (which are produced by the fundamental aspect). The consequence is that all struggles waged against these secondary aspects or effects of capitalism (which are also the effects of any prior class society based on private property)—racism, misogyny, and other forms of oppression and inequalities, plus ecocide—become viewed as anti-capitalist struggles. These secondary aspects have currently become the center pole of mass struggles. They are indeed worth fighting against—capitalism affects society and the environment in many terrible ways that no one should accept. But as justified as these struggles are, they are not materially (concretely) anti-capitalist. They are progressive, but limited, because even with a very high level of radicalism, they cannot stop capitalism. History has already proven to us that they can be recouped by the capitalist class. If these struggles are waged outside of, and disconnected from, a genuine anti-capitalist struggle targeting the fundamental production of surplus value, then the danger is that they can be transitioned into to an enlargement of bourgeois democratic rights, or false “solutions” to problems like ecocide, unintentionally serving the interest of the reproduction of capital. Revolution is the overthrow of one class by another There is only one reality with many alternatives, all detectable and determined by class struggle in our time. We must recognize the fact that the dominant “alternatives” being currently offered are reformist ones. The job of proletarian revolutionaries is to define what must be done to reverse, in our favor, the struggle for alternatives, in order to deal with—and eliminate—the two fundamental aspects of capital: exploitation of labor power and the process of production of surplus value. The abolition of wages is, in principle, the collective appropriation of the means of production by the proletariat. To ignore wage struggles is to deny and avoid the immediate economic struggles of the workers, which are one level of class struggle (others are ideological and political). The working class should not abandon its daily struggle against capital, but should continuously advance it for the objective of its collective appropriation of the means of production. The abolition of wages will inevitably lead to the abolition of classes. However, a necessary precondition for this is revolution. Through liberating itself, the working class liberates all of society from capitalism. The choices to be made in this epic effort to crush capitalism are not simple or mechanical; they are to be found only in the complex reality of class struggle. At the mass democratic level, the fight for wages is one form of struggle for the objective of weakening the system, but it is never a final goal. Our aim is the elimination of classes once and for all. We should never be satisfied!

### LW As a Kritik [Luce]

#### Perm – use the living wage as a critique of cap. Empirics prove a living wage can affirm anti-capitalist politics – it challenges capitalist ideology and opens space for challenges to cap.

Luce 7 [(Stephanie, Associate Professor of Labor Studies at CUNY school of professional studies) Toward a New Socialism. In “Fighting the Market as God Ideology: Living Wage Campaigns and the Fight for Socialism” Google Books] AT

As socialists, we should be concerned about all of these issues. There are certainly a number of examples of campaigns that have promoted liberal politics and excluded workers. But, l argue that the campaigns don't necessarily have to do this. And with over two hundred campaigns waged so far, many of them provide examples of how to engage in living wage efforts in a way that builds the kind of politics we believe in, as l will discuss below. Challenging Free Market Ideology Many living wage activists are new to politics. They are social workers, students, church-goers, parents of a low-wage worker, or just people concemed about poverty and equality. There is no guarantee that living wage supporters are radical in any sense—they might even oppose public welfare programs, or hold racist notions about the characteristics of low-wage workers. They might simply just believe that it isn't fair that someone working full-time should still live in poverty. They might even believe that the existence of poverty is a drag on communities—if everyone worked and made decent wages, we wouldn’t have homelessness, and wouldn’t need to spend tax dollars on food stamps and indigent medical aid. . But as the living wage campaigns progress, activists of all political persuasions are conﬁonted with the same arguments in every city. Newspaper editori- als proclaim, “It takes a huge ego to imagine that you are smarter than the marketplace.”’ Academics chastise them for their nalvetéz “So what are the effects of increasing minimum wages?” writes economist and New York Times colum- nist Paul Krugman. “Any Econ l0l student can tell you the answer: The higher wage reduces the quantity of labor demanded, and hence leads to unemployment.”' Consistently, living wage opponents rely not on empirical evidence, but on assumptions about capitalism and free markets to dismiss the movement as perhaps well-intentioned, but clearly misguided. Harvard economist Gregory Manltiw even goes so far to argue that “If we could wave a magic wand and help those at the bottom of the economic ladder move up a rung or two, we should do it”—but that unfortunately, the market won't allow it. We cannot “repeal the law of supply and demand and raise wages by ﬁat”! Forced to confront these arguments, living wage advocates must begin to question their own assumptions about the power of markets. Is it true that we cannot intervene in markets for any reason? Can it be that we are all govemed by the “invisible hand” and economic laws that we have no control over? It is here that the potential for this movement to build support for socialist politics is greatest. Although many feel in their gut that this market logic isn’t right, most people in the U.S. have been so thoroughly educated in a capitalist mindset that it takes some work to develop a critique. Jaime Huerta, an organizer with the Pima County Interfaith Council in Tucson, said that their campaign is always looking for good resources to help them “challenge the ‘market is god’ ideology” that is so pervasive among opponents and potential supporters." In other cities, living wage advocates argue that markets are not only about economics, but about politics and morality. In their assessment of the Baltimore campaign, organizers Amie Graf and Jonathan Lange challenged the idea that it is only supply and demand that determine wages." “Declining union power can explain low wages as easily as supply and demand,” they wrote. They add that after Baltimore passed its ordinance, no disastrous effects could be seen. “The market adjusted to political power.” Living wage activists must challenge the fact that “unfettered markets” even exist at all. Conservatives argue that in an ideal capitalist society, the “invisible hand” and the laws of supply and demand can most rationally and fairly distrib- ute goods and services. They say that if people are only allowed to negotiate for themselves, without govemment or union intervention, buyers and sellers will ﬁnd the prices that are satisfactory to both parties. There are a few problems with this approach. First, the theory that these conservatives are relying on-neoclassical economics—makes a lot of assumptions that don’t hold true in reality. For example, neoclassical economics as- sumes that in perfectly competitive markets, all parties have equal access to information. Buyers know what prices all sellers are selling at, workers know what wages their co-workers earn, and consumers know the quality of the product they are buying. But in reality, access to information is distributed unequally, depending on differences in power and resources. Without these assumptions, market “efficiency” no longer holds, even in theory. Another assumption is that all people in a market society act “rationally,” based on their economic self- interest. While its true that people often consider their own economic interest, we have endless evidence that they will also act out of love, compassion, generosity, insecurity, anger, and even confusion. Therefore, assuming rational thought is the sole and primary determinant of human behavior will distort one’s understanding of the world. The second problem with the appeals to the free market is that there is really no such thing as “ﬂee market”—all economies have regulations and inter- vention of some kind. Even under capitalism, governments are needed to regu- late the economy and correct for market failures, such as large fluctuations in the economy, lack of public infrastructure like roads and airports, and discrimination. The problem is that in a capitalist society, governments are usually run by Challenging the “Market as God” Ideology those who have more money and power, and therefore, they are the ones who set those rules and regulations that govem the market. It is a political battle that determines who gets to set the rules. The right-wing has succeeded in equating “free market” with markets where elites set the elite. As socialists, we are not for the elimination of ruIes—we just want them to be set in a transparent fashion by govemments that are elected (truly) democratically, and held accountable to those that elect them. We also want those rules to acknowledge that markets should work for people ﬁrst, not proﬁt. Through living wage campaigns, socialists can highlight the underlying market-based ideologies that are so thoroughly accepted by most people. Oppo- nents’ arguments open a space for living wage advocates to talk about the economy and decision-making, and to assert that there are alternatives. Continues The living wage movement offers an opening for socialists to talk about the economy, wages, and poverty, and the links between a capitalist system and inequality. It’s crucial to ﬁght the relentless pro-market ideology that governs most aspects of our lives. In addition, while living wage gains are still modest, those gains are meaningful to those that obtain them. Although we will face mounting attacks from the opposition, our biggest challenge in this movement is to ﬁnd ways to bring workers themselves into the campaigns in ways that are not tokenistic. In the ﬁght for living wages, just as in the ﬁght for socialism, workers must be in the leadership, working closely with allies and community part- ners. This is our vision for an alternative society, and we must work to make that vision real in our everyday struggles.

#### Double bind – either the alt can overcome other links like welfare and current minimum wages, and can overcome the links, or it can’t overcome the links and fails inevitably.

#### Outweighs- their ev is just an assertion, mine cites empirics that a living wage doesn’t de-radicalize and is a path to socialism

### Non-Reformist Reform

#### Perm do both – the aff is a necessary middle step towards the alt – non-reformist reforms that illustrate the need for broader reform while empowering the underclass are a prerequisite to radical change

Wright 07 [Wright, Erik Olin (American analytical Marxist sociologist, specializing in social stratification, and in egalitarian alternative futures to capitalism. He was the 2012 President of the American Sociological Association). "Guidelines for envisioning real utopias." SOUNDINGS-LONDON-LAWRENCE AND WISHART- 36 (2007): 26] AJ

The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody emancipatory values, but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often depends upon the existence of smaller steps, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values. Institutional proposals which have an all-or-nothing quality to them are less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems if implemented. The catastrophic experience of Russia in the 'shock therapy' approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full-bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below, subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone, One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to iItitute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want, therefore, are intermediate reforms that have two main properties: first, they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller programme of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable; and second, they enhance the capacity for action of people, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and bring people together in problem-solving deliberations for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard. This is what in the 1970s was called ‘nonreformist reforms': reforms that are possible within existing institutions and that pragmatically solve real problems while at the same time empowering people in ways which enlarge their scope of action in the future.

#### Answers all of their links – the aff works within cap but resists its logic, which sets the stage for a full revolution

#### Terminal defense to the alt – their all-or-nothing demands inevitably fail while not addressing real-world harms

#### Empowerment DA – the underclass can’t support a revolution when they can’t survive – aff gives them the tools to resist cap

#### Answers de-radicalization – gradual transitions are the only way to get to the radical change the alt fails to achieve. Try or die for the perm

### ---A2 Links---

### A2 Cap Turns Poverty

#### The plan itself solves poverty – that’s all the evidence in the aff. This outweighs:

#### Durable fiat means cap wouldn't reverse plan solvency. They have no warrant for how cap would cause poverty if a living wage exists – prefer my specific empirics

#### Their ev also assumes exploitative features of unregulated capitalism like low wages, which a living wage would solve – it answers their impact evidence

### A2 Wage Labor Link

#### 1. Perm is a double bind – minimum wages exist now, if the alt can overcome this it can overcome a living wage. The quantity of a wage doesn’t affect the system of wage labor

#### 2. Demands for a living wage are a form of resistance to capital valorization

Barchiesi 12 [Franco Barchiesi. “Liberation of, through, or from w ork? Postcolonial Africa and the problem w ith “job creation” in the global crisis.” Interface, Volume4 (2): 230 – 253 (November 2012)] AJ

Moving, instead, from a normative terrain to one of critical analysis would require one to recognize that at stake is not only (or not necessarily) whether “decent” work is preferable to “indecent” jobs, or whether a reduction in the rate of unemployment can constrain capital’s options, or whether having a job can make the difference between extreme, paralyzing, despairing and tolerable, resilient, and self-activating poverty. In fact, contrary to normative rationality, critical analysis has to recognize the complexities of emancipative, progressive discourse as characterized by the indissoluble knot of liberation and subjection and the simultaneous enabling and foreclosing of possibilities. Then demands for “job creation” can be tackled from a different angle: as they strive to negotiate capitalist relations of production they miss how capital valorizes itself not only by directly employing people but by turning into property, profit, and rent the social cooperation of living labors that capital does not “create” but nonetheless continuously appropriate. Defining this as a “job creation” issue would mean that social cooperation is relevant and politically visible only once it has been incorporated in the creation of capital-reproducing value. The result would be to subordinate imaginations and practices of liberation to the capitalist dream of freezing the social into the production of commodities while rendering all exceeding autonomy of living labor invisible and speechless. As a condition of political possibility that problematizes work-centered normativity and productivist views of emancipation, precarity discloses instead radically alternative terrains of imagination and claims. It allows us, for example, to think decommodification and redistribution, including forms of non-work related universal income, neither as incentives to work, as neoliberalism and part of the left celebrate, nor as “handouts”, as they deprecate. They would rather constitute a reappropriation at a society-wide level of livelihoods that otherwise capital appropriates at no cost. At stake would thus be a shift from “welfare” to “commonfare” as a horizon of contestation to reopen across the social fabric the battle deferred (when not lost) at the point of production (Fumagalli 2007). As Mario Tronti (1980) once argued, the old factory working class effectively challenged capital when it struggled to abolish itself as a producer and deliverer of capital, not when it allowed to be idealized under the keywords of work ethic, occupational pride, citizenship, and productivity. Demands for a “living wage” were about refusing the compatibilities of capital as a regulatory principle of life. Those who fought for the eight-hour working day did so as a response to what was then called “wage slavery”, not for the sake of orderly industrial relations and collective bargaining. As the subjugation of living labor worldwide is reverting to the extremes of that age, social struggles are thus coalescing around the question of what the “living wage” of precarious multitudes would look like today.

#### Context determines the direction of the link – the aff is a critique of capitalism that advocates a living wage since it’s good for workers, not because it’s good for industry

#### 2. A living wage provides independence from employers since people can economically sustain themselves, which is the first step to transcend the wage labor relation

#### 3. the aff doesn’t valorize wage-labor – it merely recognizes that they exist, and as a pragmatic option we must make the system less exploitative by allowing people to survive within it

### A2 State Link

#### Turn – a living wage allows workers to control the state democratically, which takes the state from the capitalists

Heck 2/28 [(John, Minnesota 4-H Foundation Fellow at the National 4-H Center, worked for the late Congressman Bruce F. Vento and presently serves on the Saint Paul Charter Commission, publisher) “Minnesota 2020 Journal: Increasing Minimum Wage Increases Democracy” Minnesota 2020 Journal 2014] AT

On Tuesday, inside the State Capitol, Minnesotans rallied for a minimum wage hike. It was a rollicking good time with great speeches, music, call-and-response exhortation and lots and lots of signage. Participants made the case for a minimum wage increase’s positive economic impact on workers’, families’ and communities’ lives. Notably absent from the rally? A lot more minimum wage-earning workers. Why? Because they can’t afford to take the time off from work to advocate for democratic change. This raises an interesting, troubling question. If low and modest wage workers are too financially stressed to cast a ballot, attend a community meeting or advocate for policy change, are the resulting elections, meeting outcomes and policy proposals truly representative? Democracy requires citizen participation. We don’t enjoy pure democracy, where everyone gets together and decides everything. In a nation of 300-plus million and a state of 5.3 million, the pure Athenian democracy is functionally unworkable. Instead, we practice representative democracy. We hold regular elections, choosing leaders to create public policy and enact laws on our behalf. Our nation’s founding fathers were not terrifically concerned with the political participation of anyone outside of their class. Democracy, to them, meant men of means creating public laws that treated men of means equally. Wealth and property were understood to be reasonable requirements of citizenship’s responsibilities and rights. The North American landed gentry weren’t completely oblivious to the rising mechanics’ and small farmers’ concerns. Suffrage, the right to vote gained through democratic process, accommodated voting rights expansion. Still, the right to vote and casting a vote, much less broadly participating in our democracy’s time consuming nuance, are two very different things. Democracy theory is easy. Everyone has the right to vote, therefore everyone should vote. Electoral outcome legitimacy flows from this faith. That’s the theory. Practice, on the other hand, is not. Voting participation positively correlates with wealth, home ownership, education and age. Young people don’t vote to the same degree that older people vote. If you’re over 30, own a home, hold a college degree and earn at least the median income, you vote. Begin eliminating those factors and voting participation drops. Low income, no post-secondary education and renting shelter reflect economic barriers to individual, family and community stability. Voting, for someone living on the margins, becomes a luxury rather than a civic responsibility. Minnesota’s legislature is considering a bill that raises Minnesota’s minimum hourly wage from $6.15, past the federal $7.25 minimum to $9.50. It will affect almost 360,000 Minnesota workers. Better than half of those are women. $9.50 an hour increases family income but it won’t significantly reduce the draw on public social safety net programs for low income, working Minnesotans. That step requires an annual income north of $30,000, translating to $15/hour or more. Last month, the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry updated its minimum wage report, reflecting 2013 wage data. It reveals, in ways small and large, minimum wage work’s reality. The most significant, big-picture-economy finding observes that minimum wage’s inflation adjusted purchasing power has declined by over 30 percent since 1974. This means that for people performing minimum wage work, climbing out of poverty, based on full-time minimum wage work’s purchasing power is almost a third harder today than it was 40 years ago. Mountains are supposed to crumble over time, not grow taller. The DLI report finds that an increasingly smaller number of Minnesota workers earn the $7.25/hour minimum wage. That’s good news but the problem is that a growing number of workers aren’t earning much beyond minimum. Minnesota’s food service industry employs 125,000 hourly workers. About one third of those were paid minimum wage or less. Almost half of Minnesota’s minimum wage-earning hourly work force work in eating and drinking establishments. Among all Minnesota hourly wage employees, 6.6 percent are women. Roughly calculated, working 40 hours a week at $7.50 an hour results in $300 in gross earnings. That’s not take-home pay but money earned before taxes and withholding. And on top of this, low and minimum wage workers off-set reduced earnings purchasing power by working an additional part-time job or two. Consequently, asking a minimum wage worker to join a State Capitol advocacy rally means relinquishing income. Four hours away from work, at minimum wage, is $30. That might not seem like much to folks earning Minnesota’s $57,000 median family income but $30 is ten percent of $300 of weekly gross earnings. Structurally, minimum and low wage hourly pay reduces the likelihood of participating in voting, advocacy, opposition and the exercise of democracy’s promise. It further concentrates the impact of higher income interests through disproportionately representative concentration. Our democracy becomes, as a result, less democratic.

#### Turns their offense – an elite state can crush any anti-capitalism revolution since it controls massive economic and military resources; political equality is a prerequisite to revolution

### A2 Pallative Link

#### This assumes conflict theory, which is wrong – positive growth increases chances of a successful movement. Economic uncertainty decreases willingness to take risks and means the alt fails

Berman 09 [Sheri, associate professor of political science at Columbia, “Unheralded Battle: Capitalism, the Left, Social Democracy, and Democratic Socialism,” Dissent, V56 N1, Winter, Project Muse]

The most important and influential of the finde siècle proto-social democrats was Eduard Bernstein. Bernstein was an important figure in both the international socialist movement and its most powerful party, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). He argued that capitalism was not leading to the immiseration of the proletariat, a drop in the number of property owners, and ever-deepening crises, as orthodox Marxists had predicted. Instead, he saw a capitalist system that was growing ever more complex and adaptable. This led him to oppose "the view that we stand at the threshold of an imminent collapse of bourgeois society, and that Social Democracy should allow its tactics to be determined by, or made dependent upon, the prospect of any forthcoming major catastrophe." Since catastrophe was both unlikely and undesirable, he argued, the left should focus on reform instead. The prospects for socialism depended "not on the decrease but on the increase of social wealth," together with socialists' ability to generate "positive suggestions for reform" that would improve the living conditions of the great masses of society: "With regard to reforms, we ask, not whether they will hasten the catastrophe which could bring us to power, but whether they further the development of the working class, whether they contribute to general progress." Perhaps Bernstein's most (in)famous comment was, "What is usually termed the final goal of socialism is nothing to me, the movement is everything." By this he simply meant that talking constantly about some abstract future was of little value; instead socialists needed to focus their attention on the long-term struggle to create a better world.

### A2 Wages exploit surplus value

#### Profiting from surplus value isn’t exploitative, and labor is only as valuable as employers will pay for it

Spector 6 [(Horacio, Dean and Professor of Law, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.) “PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR LAW” FSU Law review VOLUME 33 SUMMER 2006 NUMBER 4] AT

This argument is exposed to many objections. First, it is important to notice that the charge of exploitation has normative force only if we assume an ideal of equity condemning unequal exchange. Though some interpreters think that Marx eschewed a normative theory of justice, the use of exploitation to criticize capitalism and justify socialism or interventions in the market must assume that exploitation is wrong or unjust. Even if Marxists do not endorse a theory of justice, they must hold some ideal of equity if the concept of exploitation is to serve a normative purpose. But the argument leaves unexplained why, even if the capitalist expropriates the surplus, the labor contract involves unequal exchange. The capitalist pays a wage for the labor power, and this wage is, by hypothesis, equated with the value of the labor power. Because the laborer does not sell the product but just his [her] labor power, the fact that the product gives a surplus does not imply that the capitalist exploits the laborer. The existence of surplus is not inconsistent with equality of exchange holding be- tween labor power and wage. Another objection is that the argument assumes an absolute theory of value that is inconsistent with mainstream neoclassical theory. As Robert Nozick persuasively puts it, “Marxian exploitation is the exploitation of people’s lack of understanding of economics.”63 He provides a simple example: Suppose a person works on something absolutely useless that no one wants. For example, he spends hours efficiently making a big knot; no one else can do it more quickly. Will this object be valued by the hours invested? 64 In neoclassical competitive equilibrium, workers are paid a wage that is equivalent to the value of the marginal product they produce. Since marginal productivity determines the price of labor, exploitation can only occur when workers are not paid the full value of their marginal product.

#### This argument proves the minimum wage will increase employment

Spector 6 [(Horacio, Dean and Professor of Law, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.) “PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR LAW” FSU Law review VOLUME 33 SUMMER 2006 NUMBER 4] AT

The exploitation argument can be best served by leaving Marx- ian economics and turning to neoclassical accounts of exploitation. Exploitation has no place in competitive markets, because, in an ideal situation of perfect competition, the product demand curve and the labor supply curve are perfectly elastic; therefore, eco- nomic agents have no power to fix prices or wage rates. Every producer can sell any quantity of a commodity at the competitive price, and every employer can hire labor at the competitive wage rate. However, the ability to set prices and wages, that is, bar- gaining power, does exist in imperfectly competitive markets. Joan Robinson has discussed two main classes of labor exploita- tion in her seminal book The Economics of Imperfect Competi- tion.69 Robinson distinguishes these classes as arising out of (1) monopoly conditions in the market for the product and (2) imper- fections in the labor market.70 Robinson calls the former “monopo- listic exploitation,” and the latter “monopsonistic exploitation.”71 Monopolistic exploitation occurs because, under monopoly condi- tions, the marginal revenue is (not equal to but) less than the price, because the firm cannot discriminate prices and, conse- quently, must lower the price across all its production to sell more units.72 This means that a worker produces an additional unit whose (new) price is greater than the marginal revenue this unit generates. Since the wage is determined by the marginal revenue (not by the price), workers are paid a wage that is less than the value of their marginal product.73 Monopsonistic exploitation typically occurs when there is a sin- gle employer for a given labor input. In this case, the employer confronts an upward-sloping labor supply curve, and therefore, he must pay higher wages to hire more workers.74 This means that the marginal cost of labor exceeds the wage rate. The employer will hire labor up to the point where the marginal revenue prod- uct is equivalent to the marginal cost.75 Because the wage paid is less than the marginal revenue product, there is exploitation. In such a case, a minimum wage law can drive wage rates up and, at the same time, increase employment.76

### Socialism Transition

#### Perm – use the living wage to transition to socialism and then to full communism. The living wage provides abundance and is compatible with their alt which also proves no link

Jones 07 [Shane Jones. “A Minimum Wage Versus a Living Wage.” Socialist Appeal. 30 January, 2007.] AJ

A living wage differs from a minimum wage in that a minimum wage is simply a set level or dollar figure i.e. 25 cents, $5.15, $7.25 etc. On the other hand, a living wage is a positive right to a decent standard of living. It is nothing more than a legally set real wage, tied to inflation. That is, the purchasing power of wages are tied to the real prices of other commodities. For example, as food prices rise, so do wages. A living wage maintains the standard of living and provides economic stability for working people. It is impossible to simply reform capitalism to make it more “fair”. At its core, capitalism is a system of exploitation of labor for profit. This makes a living wage for all an impossibility, as it would bring out all the contradictions of capitalism. So while Marxists support every material and social gain won by workers under capitalism, at the same time we realize that these limited gains are not an end in and of themselves, but function within the limited bounds of capitalism. Under pressure from below, the ruling class offers a crumb here and there in order to keep order. We think working people deserve more than crumbs. Yes to a minimum wage increase! Yes to a thousand and one of them! But the story cannot end there. We need a living wage - one where workers do not have to wait in economic limbo for decades. Working people don’t need periodic token rewards tailored to placate and win votes. Rather, we deserve stability, dignity and access to all the requirements of social life: a real living wage.

#### That’s key to communism – bringing down cap now means their alt doesn’t solve; including a living wage equalizes wealth which moves to communism

Eagleton 11 [TERRY EAGLETON (prominent British literary theorist, critic and public intellectual. He is currently Distinguished Professor of English Literature at Lancaster University, Professor of Cultural Theory at the National University of Ireland and Distinguished Visiting Professor of English Literature at The University of Notre Dame). “Why Marx Was Right.” 2011 by Yale University. New Haven & London] AJ

This raises some thorny moral problems. Just as some Christians accept evil as somehow necessary to God’s plan for humanity, so you can read Marx as claiming that capitalism, however rapacious and unjust, has to be endured for the sake of the socialist future it will inevitably bring in its wake. Not only endured, in fact, but actively encouraged. There are points in Marx’s work where he cheers on the growth of capitalism, since only thus will the path to socialism be thrown open. In a lecture of 1847, for example, he defends free trade as hastening the advent of socialism. He also wanted to see German unification on the grounds that it would promote German capitalism. There are several places in his work where this revolutionary socialist betrays rather too much relish at the prospect of a progressive capitalist class putting paid to ‘‘barbarism.’’ The morality of this appears distinctly dubious. How is it different from Stalin’s or Mao’s murderous pogroms, ex- ecuted in the name of the socialist future? How far does the end justify the means? And given that few today believe that socialism is inevitable, is this not even more reason for re- nouncing such a brutal sacrifice of the present on the altar of a future that might never arrive? If capitalism is essential for socialism, and if capitalism is unjust, does this not suggest that injustice is morally acceptable? If there is to be justice in the future, must there have been injustice in the past? Marx writes in Theories of Surplus Value that ‘‘the development of the capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of the majority of individuals and even classes.’’∞≤ He means that the good of the species will finally triumph in the shape of communism, but that this involves a great deal of ineluctable suffering and injustice en route. The material prosperity that in the end will fund freedom is the fruit of un-freedom. There is a difference between doing evil in the hope that good may come of it, and seeking to turn someone else’s evil to good use. Socialists did not perpetrate capitalism, and are innocent of its crimes; but granted that it exists, it seems rational to make the best of it. This is possible because capitalism is not of course simply evil. To think so is to be drastically one-sided, a fault by which Marx himself was rarely afflicted. As we have seen, the system breeds freedom as well as barba- rism, emancipation along with enslavement. Capitalist society generates enormous wealth, but in a way that cannot help putting it beyond the reach of most of its citizens. Even so, that wealth can always be brought within reach. It can be disentangled from the acquisitive, individualist forms which bred it, invested in the community as a whole, and used to restrict disagreeable work to the minimum. It can thus release men and women from the chains of economic necessity into a life where they are free to realize their creative poten- tial. This is Marx’s vision of communism.

#### Social democracy solves better than bringing down cap

Berman 09 [Sheri, associate professor of political science at Columbia, “Unheralded Battle: Capitalism, the Left, Social Democracy, and Democratic Socialism,” Dissent, V56 N1, Winter, Project Muse]

At its root, such fears stem from the failure of many on the left to appreciate that capitalism is not a zero-sum game—over the long run the operations of relatively free markets can produce net wealth rather than simply shifting it from one pocket to another. Because social democrats understand that basic point, they want to do what they can to encourage trade and growth and cultivate as large a net surplus as possible—all the better to pay for measures that can equalize life chances and cushion publics from the blows that markets inflict. Helping people adjust to capitalism, rather than engaging in a hopeless and ultimately counterproductive effort to hold it back, has been the historic accomplishment of the social democratic left, and it remains its primary goal today in those countries where the social democratic mindset is most deeply ensconced. Many analysts have remarked, for example, on the impressive success of countries like Denmark and Sweden in managing globalization—promoting economic growth and increased competitiveness even as they ensure high employment and social security. The Scandinavian cases demonstrate that social welfare and economic dynamism are not enemies but natural allies. Not surprisingly, it is precisely in these countries that optimism about globalization is highest. In the United States and other parts of Europe, on the other hand, fear of the future is pervasive and opinions of globalization astoundingly negative. American leftists must try to do what the Scandinavians have done: develop a program that promotes growth and social solidarity together, rather than forcing a choice between them. Concretely this means agitating for policies—like reliable, affordable, and portable health care; tax credits or other government support for labor-market retraining; investment in education; and unemployment programs that are both more generous and better incentivized—that will help workers adjust to change rather than make them fear i

### ---more ev

#### Perm use the living wage to transition to socialist democracy and then to full communism. The living wage meets basic needs and provides socialist protections – this is the only way to move to communism, and can be achieved within the state

Huberman 68 [(Leo, American socialist writer. In 1949 he founded and co-edited Monthly Review with Paul Sweezy) "Introduction to Socialism," Monthly Review http://www.marxmail.org/faq/socialism\_and\_communism.htm] AT

Socialism and communism are alike in that both are systems of production for use based on public ownership of the means of production and centralized planning. Socialism grows directly out of capitalism; it is the first form of the new society. Communism is a further development or "higher stage" of socialism. From each according to his ability, to each according to his deeds (socialism). From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs (communism). The socialist principle of distribution according to deeds— that is, for quality and quantity of work performed, is immediately possible and practical. On the other hand, the communist principle of distribution according to needs is not immediately possible and practical—it is an ultimate goal. Obviously, before it can be achieved, production must reach undreamed of heights—to satisfy everyone’s needs there must be the greatest of plenty of everything. In addition, there must have developed a change in the attitude of people toward work—instead of working because they have to, people will work because they want to, both out of a sense of responsibility to society and because work satisfies a felt need in their own lives. Socialism is the first step in the process of developing the productive forces to achieve abundance and changing the mental and spiritual outlook of the people. It is the necessary transition stage from capitalism to communism. It must not be assumed, from the distinction between socialism and communism, that the political parties all over the world which call themselves Socialist advocate socialism, while those which call themselves Communist advocate communism. That is not the case. Since the immediate successor to capitalism can only be socialism, the Communist parties,-like the Socialist parties, have as their goal the establishment of socialism. Are there, then, no differences between the Socialist and Communist parties? Yes, there are. The Communists believe that as soon as the working class and its allies are in a position to do so they must make a basic change in the character of the state; they must replace capitalist dictatorship over the working class with workers’ dictatorship over the capitalist class as the first step in the process by which the existence of capitalists as a class (but not as individuals) is ended and a classless society is eventually ushered in. Socialism cannot be built merely by taking over and using the old capitalist machinery of government; the workers must destroy the old and set up their own new state apparatus. The workers’ state must give the old ruling class no opportunity to organize a counter-revolution; it must use its armed strength to crush capitalist resistance when it arises. The Socialists, on the other hand, believe that it is possible to make the transition from capitalism to socialism without a basic change in the character of the state. They hold this view because they do not think of the capitalist state as essentially an institution for the dictatorship of the capitalist class, but rather as a perfectly good piece of machinery which can be used in the interest of whichever class gets command of it. No need, then, for the working class in power to smash the old capitalist state apparatus and set up its own—the march to socialism can be made step by step within the framework of the democratic forms of the capitalist state. The attitude of both parties toward the Soviet Union grows directly out of their approach to this problem. Generally speaking, Communist parties praise the Soviet Union; Socialist parties denounce it in varying degrees. For the Communists, the Soviet Union merits the applause of all true believers in socialism because it has transformed the socialist dream into a reality; for the Socialists, the Soviet Union deserves only condemnation because it has not built socialism at all—at least not the socialism they dreamed of. Instead of wanting to take away people’s private property, socialists want more people to have more private property than ever before. There are two kinds of private property. There is property which is personal in nature, consumer’s goods, used for private enjoyment. Then there is the kind of private property which is not personal in nature, property in the means of production. This kind of property is not used for private enjoyment, but to produce the consumer’s goods which are. Socialism does not mean taking away the first kind of private property, e.g. your suit of clothes; it does mean taking away the second kind of private property, e.g. your factory for making suits of clothes. It means taking away private property in the means of production from the few so that there will be much more private property in the means of consumption for the many. That part of the wealth which is produced by workers and taken from them in the form of profits would be theirs, under socialism, to buy more private property, more suits of clothes, more furniture, more food, more tickets to the movies. More private property for use and enjoyment. No private property for oppression and exploitation. That’s socialism.

#### Outweighs:

#### Turns their links – even if the aff is on face capitalist, it is compatible with a move to socialism, which then transitions to their alt. The aff’s capitalist elements are a first step to a full transition that is more likely than their alt because it has NO DESCRIPTION of a material strategy to solve cap

#### Turns the palliative link –intermediary transition to socialism is the only path to communism, if this fails there is no possible alt to cap. Also, workers will realize property is exploitative and transition to full communism once demands are met.

#### Socialism independently solves their impacts. Even without a transition to communism, the aff solves their impacts and mine

#### Social democratic approaches solve the environment – cap is self-checking

Jacobs 13 [(Michael, Journalist) “Green social democracy can rescue capitalism from itself” New Statesman 19 JANUARY, 2013] AT

In this sense, the environmental crisis must now – finally – be regarded not merely as a crisis of ecosystems, or of human values, but as a crisis of capitalism, in the sense that the dynamics of capitalist growth are now undermining themselves. In the face of this new reality, the left needs to enlarge its understanding of both capitalism and social democracy. Modern social democracy came into being in the 20th century to manage a capitalism which was unable to manage itself. When the financial crisis of 1929 hit, capitalism fell into a slump and could not get out of it without state support – in the US through Roosevelt’s New Deal, in Europe through rearmament and ultimately war. After 1945, social democrats rescued this failing capitalist system from itself by creating welfare states, secondary and tertiary education and national health systems, through strong trade unions and Keynesian fiscal and monetary policy. Once again it is only governments which can rescue capitalism from the slump into which it has fallen. But the traditional social democratic programme will now not be enough. Today we also need to manage the environmental impacts of a system rapidly destroying the foundations on which it rests. In the past this would not have been easy. Traditionally the left saw environmental protection as a luxury which could only be afforded once wealth had been generated. Environmental policies which imposed costs on industry risked damaging growth and destroying jobs. Environmentalism was a minority middle class movement, with no economic interests underpinning its politics. But that is no longer true. Today the most powerful voices in favour of environmental protection are arguably not the traditional green NGOs but the major corporations in the rapidly growing green economy. The UK’s share of this market is the sixth largest in the world, at nearly 4 per cent. Now worth over £120bn, the UK sector is itself growing at around 4 per cent per annum – one of the few major sectors currently doing so. It already sustains just under a million jobs. This change in the economics of environmental protection is of vital importance to social democrats. For it changes the politics. When social democracy rescued 20th century capitalism from itself it did so through a powerful coalition of forces. At its base was the working class, organised through trade unions and social democratic and labour parties. But critical too was the support of a significant proportion of the business community, and the middle classes who worked in it. The business class by no means universally supported social democratic parties and governments in the post-war period, but enough of them split apart from their ideologically backward-looking peers to create decisive support for the Keynesian programme and the creation of the welfare state. Yes, this involved giving a larger share of their profits to the workers and to the state in taxes; but the benefits in terms of the growth of demand for the goods and services they produced more than outweighed the cost. Exactly the same phenomenon is happening now over environmental policy. The traditional business view can still be heard – such policy is bad for business, growth and jobs. But it is now matched by the voice of businesses who will benefit from it, and who understand that their self-interest is best served by an economy that is not fatally undermined by rising resource prices and the impacts of climate change. So just as social democrats in the 20th century forged a cross-class, cross-industry coalition in favour of the welfare state, so social democrats today need to forge a comparable alliance in favour of the environmentally-based economy. Green politics is no longer simply about a middle class environmental movement: it is now joined by powerful economic interests. Social democrats have to learn from how they built the welfare state economy in the 20th century in order to do it again for the green economy of the 21st.

### Material Change O/w

#### A living wage builds movements and short-term reform is good

Shalom 14 [Stephen R. Shalom, professor of political science at William Paterson University, “One State or Two States: Prospects, Possibilities, and Politics,” Logos Journal] **AZ**

Let me begin with an analogy that I hope will illuminate a way to approach these kinds of political questions. Consider the example of the living wage campaigns that are being pursued around the country, demanding that low-paid workers receive enough to provide for their basic needs. Typically these campaigns, supported by leftists, call for local ordinances or policies that set some minimum compensation level, well above the existing minimum wage, for all employees. Now imagine if a labor solidarity activist opposed the living wage campaign, arguing that “The problem is with capitalism and the whole wage system, not the low wages paid by some employers.” I assume we would reply, “Yes, the problem is capitalism, but we’re not going to be able to solve that overnight. People who are hungry today can’t afford to wait until we have brought capitalism down. Unlike total system transformation, a living wage can be won in the near term — not that we will win, but we can win in the near term; ending capitalism, on the other hand, we have no chance of winning for many years. A victory in a living wage campaign would do two things: first, it would provide an immediate improvement in the lives of people who are suffering; and, second, it would show people that change is possible and that there is an alternative to hopeless resignation.” Yes, there are limits to what can be accomplished under capitalism, contrary to the claims of liberal critics of the status quo — and we should always make these limits clear while we participate in struggles to achieve reforms. But it would be thoroughly wrongheaded to refuse to support a living wage campaign in the United States today because it’s not perfectly just or to denounce those who support it as engaged in morally unacceptable behavior. And it would be especially inappropriate for those of us who are not low-paid workers to tell low-paid workers not to accept $15 an hour because they ought to hold out for the end of capitalism. The same logic holds even if one doesn’t support socialism. That is, imagine another hypothetical critic of living wage campaigns who says $15 an hour is a morally repugnant wage and nothing less than $25 per hour ought to be accepted. I assume we would reply, “Yes, merely guaranteeing everyone a living wage is unjust, as indeed any improvement in anyone’s life situation that falls short of our ideal of justice, whatever that happens to be, will be unjust. But our refraining from achieving reforms while we wish for a perfectly just outcome doesn’t bring that outcome any closer. On the other hand, a living wage campaign both improves people’s lives, which is important, and can give the workers and their supporters the sort of victory that helps build a movement that can push for further improvements.” The same logic holds as well for all sorts of political campaigns. On the environment, on women’s rights, and on a whole host of other issues we will often support efforts to achieve some reform that is less than our ideal. We do this because we realize that we can’t yet win our maximum demands, but we want to improve things in the meantime, while building movements that can achieve more.¶ This doesn’t mean that it’s always right to go for limited reforms. One needs to make a serious judgment about what’s possible under the particular circumstances prevailing at each time and place. So in 1968, for example, it was right to criticize the Communist-led unions in France for being bought off by some moderate improvements when the whole capitalist system might have been successfully challenged. Sometimes transformative change is possible. But when your considered judgment tells you that the best you can do is win $15 an hour, then one needs to support that campaign and not refrain from doing so because it falls short of one’s ideal. Does thinking about what seems achievable or realistic make one a counterrevolutionary naysayer? Shouldn’t leftists have faith in people’s potential to change the world? Gramsci’s advice is relevant here: we want to have optimism of the will, but pessimism of the intellect. We believe in people’s abilities to rise above their circumstances and fight to create a better world. But we’d be crazy to lay siege to the White House tomorrow because we think it’s possible that 100 million Americans will rise up and support us. We welcome and hope for unexpected inspirational moments; we don’t count on them.

#### A. Turns their impacts – a living wage temporarily buffers the impact of cap by reducing poverty; the alt alone can’t gain critical mass fast enough to solve their impacts. A direct and significant decrease in poverty outweighs the slight decrease in perm solvency.

#### B. their epistemology is wrong – it comes from the isolated position of wealthy intellectuals and ignore workers’ real struggles so it’s less true

#### No alt – cap is totally entrenched now. Material gains from living wage outweigh the risk of overthrowing cap

Castree 04 [Noel Castree, Neil M. Coe, Kevin Ward and Michael Samers. “Spaces of Work: Global Capitalism and the Geographies of Labour.” SAGE Publications 2004] AJ

Knowledgeable readers will have noticed that we’ve made no men- tion of the classic Marxist idea that wage-workers need to instigate a revolution to topple capitalism. Though in Chapter 8 we consider cases where workers are organizing internationally and globally against capital, the possibilities of replacing global capitalism – and thus wage labour along with related un- and underemployment – strike us as immensely slim. This is partly because of the scale of dilemmas confronting workers, which we explore in Chapter 9. David Harvey, one of the most uncompromising Marxist critics writing today, has recently pleaded for an ‘optimism of the intellect’ (2000: 17), even when circumstances seem unpropitious for progressive change. Though sympathetic to Harvey’s injunction not to cave in to reformism, we feel that many workers have considerable ‘wiggle room’ within the confines of capitalism to improve their situation. Using this wiggle room to an advantage is a fundamentally geographical project. In Chapters 6–8 we pinpoint the different elements of this wiggle room and argue that agitating within – rather than against – global capitalism does not mean that wage-workers have somehow ‘sold out to the enemy’. Even Marx, capitalism’s most penetrating critic, didn’t see this now dominant system as an unmitigated evil. For millions of workers a more just post-capitalist future might be preferable to a fre- quently unjust capitalist present. But in the meantime, it’s important to locate opportunities for progressive change within the existing system. There is simply too much misery and injustice in this world (as we show in Chapter 5) for labour to pin its hopes on some utopian global project to slay capitalism. Much can be done in the here-and- now.

### Survival > Revolution

#### Perm do the aff and then the alt. Withdrawing from capital immediately is impossible since everyone requires capitalist institutions – buying food and shelter, earing money – to survive; only after a living wage meets basic needs, revolution becomes possible.

Occupy 12 [(In solidarity with Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Midsummer is a global day of festival on June 20th, 2012 to demand a universal living wage) “Why Demand The Living Wage?” June 20, 2012: Global Festivals for the Universal Living Wage] AT

Because it centers the needs of the people who are already most exploited by capitalism and would tangibly improve our lives. Because we work too much. Because the rent is too damn high and wages are too damn low. Because executive bonuses have eight or nine digits, but working full time for an entire year at minimum wage is worth just $14,500 (before taxes). Because Obama promised to raise the minimum wage and didn´t and Romney isn´t ¨concerned about the very poor.¨ Because imagine what we could do if revolutionaries didn’t have to spend half our time worrying how to feed one another. Because poor people have a direct stake in this struggle. Because 78% of New York State voters support raising the minimum wage. Because we deserve a world without want; a world without poverty, exploitation, debt, criminalization, racism, or war. Because it would unite us all. For there to be real justice for the crimes committed by Wall Street, we must make systemic changes to ensure it never happens again. The people, the 99%, must never again be forced from our homes or driven to destitution because of the greed of the 1%. It is clear that no matter how much we try to reform the financial system, the true workings of it will be obscured from public knowledge, and that the greedy will find ways to exploit us. The system is set up to reward and encourage this behavior. So long as power is concentrated in the hands of a few and ¨progress¨ is only considered a by-product of the quest for profit that justifies immense imbalance in wealth, we will never be safe from the next Great Recession or Depression. A universal living wage is only one step toward liberation, but it would ensure that we never again pay for the banker´s profits while we ourselves struggle to put food on the table. It is not our only demand. A wage system with a living wage is still a wage system. Like foreclosure moratoriums, legalization for undocumented immigrants, and the abolition of student debt, this is just one demand out of the many that have emerged and will emerge organically from the democratic conversations spurred by the Occupy movement. The living wage is the quintessential “non-reformist reform” — e.g. “Reform which is attentive to immediate social needs and at the same time moves toward further gains, and eventually, wholesale transformation.” (wikipedia). It’s radical reform that goes to the very root of economics: if people can’t survive the economy, then the economy can’t survive the people.

#### Resistance requires addressing material realities – survival before revolution

Rex 14 [(runs F Yeah Anarchists Stickers and contribute to Anarchist Communism) “OMNIA SUNT COMMUNIA”] AT

The reason I am so “fixated” with pretending to be a post-leftist calling people reformist is because that is pretty much the entirety of post-left praxis. Those on the post-left are so fixated with critiquing other members of the left (because you are still a member of the left yourself whether you like it or not) that they ignore the material realities of those actual struggling against capitalism. You can say that fighting for a living wage isn’t revolutionary (which brings me right back to my original point) but for somebody who is living on the breadline being able to afford to eat is pretty revolutionary. What are you going to say to those starving due to low wages? Or dying due to poor working conditions? “Sorry your cause isn’t revolutionary enough for me”. What’s your alternative? “Do something more revolutionary!” Well what the fuck is it? Because I’ve not heard anything from post-leftists that doesn’t amount to “full communism now” without any suggestion of how we get from where we are now to that stage. Good luck gaining support with that “full communism or nothing” attitude, but oh I forgot, you don’t care about getting public support because it doesn’t matter if things change or not because you’re so comfortable the way things are it really doesn’t bother you. If that wasn’t the case you wouldn’t be claiming that fighting for better rights were not revolutionary enough. Of course they won’t bring about the downfall of capitalism, but then will neither reading Kevin Tucker and pissing and moaning about the left. People learn through struggle, and if we ever want to have an effect we need to start getting ~~fucking~~ organised. Not critiquing every person who just wants to feed their families.

#### No link and turn – Living wage is a first step and independently good for workers’ rights, which also de-links the K

Jones 07 [Shane Jones. “A Minimum Wage Versus a Living Wage.” Socialist Appeal. 30 January, 2007.] AJ

A living wage differs from a minimum wage in that a minimum wage is simply a set level or dollar figure i.e. 25 cents, $5.15, $7.25 etc. On the other hand, a living wage is a positive right to a decent standard of living. It is nothing more than a legally set real wage, tied to inflation. That is, the purchasing power of wages are tied to the real prices of other commodities. For example, as food prices rise, so do wages. A living wage maintains the standard of living and provides economic stability for working people. It is impossible to simply reform capitalism to make it more “fair”. At its core, capitalism is a system of exploitation of labor for profit. This makes a living wage for all an impossibility, as it would bring out all the contradictions of capitalism. So while Marxists support every material and social gain won by workers under capitalism, at the same time we realize that these limited gains are not an end in and of themselves, but function within the limited bounds of capitalism. Under pressure from below, the ruling class offers a crumb here and there in order to keep order. We think working people deserve more than crumbs. Yes to a minimum wage increase! Yes to a thousand and one of them! But the story cannot end there. We need a living wage - one where workers do not have to wait in economic limbo for decades. Working people don’t need periodic token rewards tailored to placate and win votes. Rather, we deserve stability, dignity and access to all the requirements of social life: a real living wage.

### Alt Fails – Zizek

#### The alt fails and causes violence. The aff challenges free market ideology but avoids the alt’s radicalism

Zizek 12 [Slavoj, All-Around Badass Philosopher, June 8, “Don’t Act, Just Think,” http://bigthink.com/ideas/45126/AKG]

Slavoj Zizek: Capitalism is . . . and this, almost I’m tempted to say is what is great about it, although I’m very critical of it . . . Capitalism is more an ethical/religious category for me. It’s not true when people attack capitalists as egotists. “They don't care.” No! An ideal capitalist is someone who is ready, again, to stake his life, to risk everything just so that production grows, profit grows, capital circulates. His personal or her happiness is totally subordinated to this. This is what I think Walter Benjamin, the great Frankfurt School companion, thinker, had in mind when he said capitalism is a form of religion. You cannot explain, account for, a figure of a passionate capitalist, obsessed with expanded circulation, with rise of his company, in terms of personal happiness. I am, of course, fundamentally anti-capitalist. But let’s not have any illusions here. No. What shocks me is that most of the critics of today’s capitalism feel even embarrassed, that's my experience, when you confront them with a simple question, “Okay, we heard your story . . . protest horrible, big banks depriving us of billions, hundreds, thousands of billions of common people's money. . . . Okay, but what do you really want? What should replace the system?” And then you get one big confusion. You get either a general moralistic answer, like “People shouldn't serve money. Money should serve people.” Well, frankly, Hitler would have agreed with it, especially because he would say, “When people serve money, money’s controlled by Jews,” and so on, no? So either this or some kind of a vague connection, social democracy, or a simple moralistic critique, and so on and so on. So, you know, it’s easy to be just formally anti-capitalist, but what does it really mean? It’s totally open. This is why, as I always repeat, with all my sympathy for Occupy Wall Street movement, it’s result was . . . I call it a Bartleby lesson. Bartleby, of course, Herman Melville’s Bartleby, you know, who always answered his favorite “I would prefer not to” . . . The message of Occupy Wall Street is, I would prefer not to play the existing game. There is something fundamentally wrong with the system and the existing forms of institutionalized democracy are not strong enough to deal with problems. Beyond this, they don't have an answer and neither do I. For me, Occupy Wall Street is just a signal. It’s like clearing the table. Time to start thinking. The other thing, you know, it’s a little bit boring to listen to this mantra of “Capitalism is in its last stage.” When this mantra started, if you read early critics of capitalism, I’m not kidding, a couple of decades before French Revolution, in late eighteenth century. No, the miracle of capitalism is that it’s rotting in decay, but the more it’s rotting, the more it thrives. So, let’s confront that serious problem here. Also, let’s not remember--and I’m saying this as some kind of a communist--that the twentieth century alternatives to capitalism and market miserably failed. . . . Like, okay, in Soviet Union they did try to get rid of the predominance of money market economy. The price they paid was a return to violent direct master and servant, direct domination, like you no longer will even formally flee. You had to obey orders, a new authoritarian society. . . . And this is a serious problem: how to abolish market without regressing again into relations of servitude and domination. My advice would be--because I don't have simple answers--two things: [First,] (a) precisely to start thinking. Don't get caught into this pseudo-activist pressure. Do something. Let’s do it, and so on. So, no, the time is to think. I even provoked some of the leftist friends when I told them that if the famous Marxist formula was, “Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the time is to change it” . . . thesis 11 . . . , that maybe today we should say, “In the twentieth century, we maybe tried to change the world too quickly. The time is to interpret it again, to start thinking.” Second thing, I’m not saying [that while] people are suffering, enduring horrible things, that we should just sit and think, but we should be very careful what we do. Here, let me give you a surprising example. I think that, okay, it’s so fashionable today to be disappointed at President Obama, of course, but sometimes I’m a little bit shocked by this disappointment because what did the people expect, that he will introduce socialism in United States or what? But for example, the ongoing universal health care debate is an important one. This is a great thing. Why? Because, on the one hand, this debate which taxes the very roots of ordinary American ideology, you know, freedom of choice, states wants to take freedom from us and so on. I think this freedom of choice that Republicans attacking Obama are using, its pure ideology. But at the same time, universal health care is not some crazy, radically leftist notion. It’s something that exists all around and functions basically relatively well--Canada, most of Western European countries. So the beauty is to select a topic which touches the fundamentals of our ideology, but at the same time, we cannot be accused of promoting an impossible agenda--like abolish all private property or what. No, it’s something that can be done and is done relatively successfully and so on. So that would be my idea, to carefully select issues like this where we do stir up public debate but we cannot be accused of being utopians in the bad sense of the term.

### Economic Democracy Turn

#### Perm – do the plan and institute economic democracy. The plan forces capital to bow down to labor

Adams 6 [(Roy J. Adams, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus McMaster University) “Labor’s Human Rights: A Review of the Nature and Status of Core Labor Rights as Human Rights” working paper no. 36 Oct 2006] AT

Below we consider mechanisms through which greater compliance with both the right to organize and bargain collectively as well as other worker rights might be achieved. Before we do so, however, it is first necessary to consider the argument by some writers (Pateman 1970, Gould 1988, Gewirth 1996) that economic democracy, a more radical revision of contemporary institutions than universal collective bargaining, is the preferred way to protect and promote worker dignity and freedom7. Economic democracy is defined by some writers as a system of enterprise governance under which those who direct the enterprise have essentially the same relation to the work force as democratic government has to the electorate. As under political democracy, the enterprise’s managers are chosen by and are responsible to the workers. The human rights object of economic democracy is the same as that of collective bargaining – to secure the dignity of the worker by ensuring that he or she is not the victim of arbitrary control. It is certainly a more robust form of industrial democracy than is collective bargaining qua Social Partnership in which democracy is practiced in the worker organization but with regard to conditions and organization of work the right that is secured is the right to negotiate not the right to control. Under collective bargaining management retains the right to control subject to the terms of the negotiated agreement. Economic democracy reduces the property right of capitalists to that of receiving a return on their investment. Capital is placed in the “take it or leave it” position of the worker under prevailing conventions. Investors may retain their investment in the firm or cash out and invest it elsewhere. They have, however, no right to a say over the organization and direction of the firm, or more precisely, the actions of the people who bring the firm to life (Ellerman 1999). One of the justifications for this form of industrial democracy is the logic of the labor theory of value which holds that labor rights supersede property rights because labor is the ingredient that adds value to all commodities including capital (Abrahamsson and Broström 1980). That theory is challenged by the, currently dominant, subjective theory of value which holds that the sole determinant of the value of any commodity is supply and demand.

#### It’s a compromise between labor and capitalism

Adams 6 [(Roy J. Adams, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus McMaster University) “Labor’s Human Rights: A Review of the Nature and Status of Core Labor Rights as Human Rights” working paper no. 36 Oct 2006] AT

Labor rights are intricately bound up with property rights. During the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries the convention became generally established that capitalist entrepreneurs, those who supplied the capital and initiated enterprise, owned the final product of the production process. A labor contract system came into being under which individual workers sold or hired their labor to the capitalist in return for wages (Atiyah 1985). Although by convention the entrepreneur “owned” the final product, by about 1800 it was generally conceded that the primary ingredient transforming raw materials to more valuable products was labor (Abrahamsson and Broström 1980). According to that theory, if one started with a tree and finished with a chair the value of the wood would have increased primarily because labor had been “mixed in” to the final product3. In the course of the industrial revolution, feudal norms that gave peasants rights to remain on the land and receive a sufficient amount of the product to feed, clothe and house their family broke down. Free labor was on its own, and, although many entrepreneurs adopted paternalistic policies, their only fundamental responsibility was to fulfill the wage contract. Since individual workers had bargaining power much inferior to that of the capitalists the wage bargain commonly resulted in conditions of poverty and insecurity (Abrahamsson and Broström 1980). It was out of these conditions that “the labor movement” emerged. Spontaneous demonstrations, riots, and political and social movements of free laborers became a common and growing phenomenon in the 19th century. The dominant stream of this movement had two major objectives – democracy and socialism (Adams 1995). Democracy in the political sphere would come to mean government elected by and responsible to the governed (Therborn 1977). Socialism meant that the productive capacity of society would be owned by the state in the name of the people and, instead of being a vehicle for producing profit for capitalists, would be managed to the benefit of all. The labor movement’s goal of democracy, defined as a vote for all adults regardless of sex, wealth or level of education would, by the late 20th century, become the norm (Therborn 1977). Forms of state socialism were tried in Russia, Eastern Europe and parts of Asia and Latin America but by the end of the 20th century most had been judged failed experiments. In Western Europe national settlements between labor and capital were worked out in most countries (Adams 1995). In the most common form of these settlements, labor recognized that capital had the right to organize and direct production, the right to ownership of the product and the right to make a profit. In turn, capital recognized the right of labor to associate and to negotiate collectively through representatives of its own choosing the terms of its contract as well as the right at the national level to co-decide with capital and the state economic and social policy. Labor and Capital were said to have become Social Partners. No such agreement was achieved in the United States or Canada or in most other countries. Nevertheless, operating through the aegis of the International Labor Organization, a similar global “settlement” came about when labor, business and government representatives at the ILO’s Annual Labor Conference came to agreement about that organization’s Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining conventions. Since then the principles in those conventions have been endorsed by nearly all of the world’s nations and have been actively promoted by the ILO. In short, according to ILO standards, labor has the right to organize and bargain collectively its terms and conditions of work and the right to participate in the making and administration of economic and social policy.

### Geography Turn

#### Sweeping generalizations about revolution ignore past failures, heterogeneity of working conditions, and needlessly dismiss constructive worker gains right now

Castree 04 [Noel Castree, Neil M. Coe, Kevin Ward and Michael Samers. “Spaces of Work: Global Capitalism and the Geographies of Labour.” SAGE Publications 2004] AJ

The first criticism is that we are insufficiently critical! That is, some readers might charge us with ‘status quo criticism’. To understand what this is we can distinguish between ‘reformist’ and ‘revolution- ary’ forms of analysis and action. Karl Marx, one of the theorists who has inspired our analysis, was very much a revolutionary. That is, he wanted to overthrow capitalism, seeing this as the only way that work- ing people and communities could enjoy a full and rewarding life. Clearly, we have not recommended the kind of transformative politics that Marx favoured over a century ago. Instead, we have tried to identify the kinds of non-revolutionary actions that wage workers can undertake at different geographical scales in order to improve the life conditions of some or many of them. We have departed from several other Left-wing labour analysts by refusing to make sweeping generalizations about the state of most wage workers today. Our argument has been that there is ample ‘wiggle room’ for workers in a capitalist word (albeit unevenly distributed) and that socio-geographical context matters. Workers are not ‘dupes’ but nor can they readily topple the capitalist mode of production; equally, understanding how and what workers do demands an attention to the contingencies of their social and geographical location. Does this mean that revolutionary action is impossible and/or undesirable? And does the kind of reformist action we have explored through case studies amount to an ineffectual ‘tinkering’ with the machinations of global capitalism? To take each question in turn, it seems to us that revolutionary action is, at this moment in history, not a viable option for the labour movement. We said as much at the start of this book (see Preface). Notwithstanding the wider ground swell of opposition to capitalism in its neoliberal form – as seen in Seattle, Genoa, London and else- where – the forces ranged in defence of the system are just too strong to be dislodged. In part, as we have shown, these forces lie within the labouring classes themselves! Many wage-workers and their depen- dents enjoy real benefits living and labouring in a capitalist universe. These benefits cannot be underestimated. But even if revolution were an option – which is often is during moments of rationality/legitimation/ fiscal crisis (see Chapter 2) – it would not deliver some post-capitalist utopia overnight (or, perhaps, ever). The twentieth-century experiments in communism (in the USSR and elsewhere) and recent thought experiments in imagining a socialist economy (for example, Sayer, 1995) both suggest that immense practical problems lie in the path of fashioning a non-capitalist future. In light of this, it seems to us that it is wrong to dismiss pro-worker action within the parameters set by capitalism as mere ‘tinkering’. The case studies of worker agency we have presented each, in different ways, show the palpable and some- times life-changing gains that can be made when labour fights back within the current economic system. A particularly powerful example of this, which we have not considered in this book, is the Zapatista movement in Mexico. Though not strictly a labour movement – it began life in 1994 as an armed uprising by indigenous (or first nation) peasants in the province of Chiapas, in southern Mexico – it shows what can be done when those marginalized by capitalist society hit back aggressively at those in power. In early 2001, after several unsuc- cessful military attempts to suppress the Zaptistas, the Mexican President formally acknowledged their right to have their concerns addressed by the national and provincial state. In this case, armed guerilla action by a discontented group was both necessary and suc- cessful in effecting positive action, albeit within the parameters of capitalism in Mexico (see Castells, 1997: Chapter 2).

### Z MORE

#### That’s key to transition to full communism – outweighs their alt solvency on probability

Huberman 68 [(Leo, American socialist writer. In 1949 he founded and co-edited Monthly Review with Paul Sweezy) "Introduction to Socialism," Monthly Review] AT

Socialism and communism are alike in that both are systems of production for use based on public ownership of the means of production and centralized planning. Socialism grows directly out of capitalism; it is the first form of the new society. Communism is a further development or "higher stage" of socialism. From each according to his ability, to each according to his deeds (socialism). From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs (communism). The socialist principle of distribution according to deeds— that is, for quality and quantity of work performed, is immediately possible and practical. On the other hand, the communist principle of distribution according to needs is not immediately possible and practical—it is an ultimate goal. Obviously, before it can be achieved, production must reach undreamed of heights—to satisfy everyone’s needs there must be the greatest of plenty of everything. In addition, there must have developed a change in the attitude of people toward work—instead of working because they have to, people will work because they want to, both out of a sense of responsibility to society and because work satisfies a felt need in their own lives. Socialism is the first step in the process of developing the productive forces to achieve abundance and changing the mental and spiritual outlook of the people. It is the necessary transition stage from capitalism to communism. It must not be assumed, from the distinction between socialism and communism, that the political parties all over the world which call themselves Socialist advocate socialism, while those which call themselves Communist advocate communism. That is not the case. Since the immediate successor to capitalism can only be socialism, the Communist parties,-like the Socialist parties, have as their goal the establishment of socialism. Are there, then, no differences between the Socialist and Communist parties? Yes, there are. The Communists believe that as soon as the working class and its allies are in a position to do so they must make a basic change in the character of the state; they must replace capitalist dictatorship over the working class with workers’ dictatorship over the capitalist class as the first step in the process by which the existence of capitalists as a class (but not as individuals) is ended and a classless society is eventually ushered in. Socialism cannot be built merely by taking over and using the old capitalist machinery of government; the workers must destroy the old and set up their own new state apparatus. The workers’ state must give the old ruling class no opportunity to organize a counter-revolution; it must use its armed strength to crush capitalist resistance when it arises. The Socialists, on the other hand, believe that it is possible to make the transition from capitalism to socialism without a basic change in the character of the state. They hold this view because they do not think of the capitalist state as essentially an institution for the dictatorship of the capitalist class, but rather as a perfectly good piece of machinery which can be used in the interest of whichever class gets command of it. No need, then, for the working class in power to smash the old capitalist state apparatus and set up its own—the march to socialism can be made step by step within the framework of the democratic forms of the capitalist state. The attitude of both parties toward the Soviet Union grows directly out of their approach to this problem. Generally speaking, Communist parties praise the Soviet Union; Socialist parties denounce it in varying degrees. For the Communists, the Soviet Union merits the applause of all true believers in socialism because it has transformed the socialist dream into a reality; for the Socialists, the Soviet Union deserves only condemnation because it has not built socialism at all—at least not the socialism they dreamed of. Instead of wanting to take away people’s private property, socialists want more people to have more private property than ever before. There are two kinds of private property. There is property which is personal in nature, consumer’s goods, used for private enjoyment. Then there is the kind of private property which is not personal in nature, property in the means of production. This kind of property is not used for private enjoyment, but to produce the consumer’s goods which are. Socialism does not mean taking away the first kind of private property, e.g. your suit of clothes; it does mean taking away the second kind of private property, e.g. your factory for making suits of clothes. It means taking away private property in the means of production from the few so that there will be much more private property in the means of consumption for the many. That part of the wealth which is produced by workers and taken from them in the form of profits would be theirs, under socialism, to buy more private property, more suits of clothes, more furniture, more food, more tickets to the movies. More private property for use and enjoyment. No private property for oppression and exploitation. That’s socialism.

## Alt/Framework

### A2 Giroux

#### Debates about pro-social state action in educational spaces combat depoliticization and prevent government actors from controlling politics.

Giroux 6 [(Henry, sociologist) “The abandoned generation: The urban debate league and the politics of possibility” from America on the Edge] AT

￼The decline of democratic values and informed citizenship can be seen in research studies done by The Justice Project in 2001 in which a substantial number of teenagers and young people were asked what they thought democracy meant. The answers testified to a growing depoliticization of American life and largely consisted of statements along the following lines: "Nothing," "I don't know," or "My rights, just like, pride, I guess, to some extent, and paying taxes," or "I just think, like, what does it really mean? I know its our, like, our government, but I don't know what it 6 technically is." The transition from being ignorant about democracy to actually sup- porting antidemocratic Tendencies can be seen in a number of youth surveys that have been taken since 2000. For instance, a survey released by the University of California, Berkeley, revealed that 69 percent of students support school prayer and 44 percent of young people aged fifteen to twenty-two support government restric- tions on abortions. A 2004 survey of 112,003 high school students on First Amendment rights showed that one third of students surveyed believed that the First Amendment went too far in the rights it guarantees and 36 percent believed that the press enjoyed too much freedom. This suggests not just a failing of education, but a crisis of citizenship and democracy. ￼One consequence of the decline in democratic values and citizenship literacy is that all levels of government are being hollowed our, their role reduced to dismantling the gains of the welfare state as they increasingly construct policies that ￼criminalize social problems and prioritize penal methods over social investments. When citizenship is reduced to consumerism, it should come as no surprise that people develop an indifference to civic engagement and participation in democratic public life. Unlike some theorists who suggest that politics as critical exchange and social engagement is either dead or in a state of terminal arrest, I believe that the current depressing state of politics points to an urgent challenge: reformulating the crisis of democracy as a fundamental crisis of vision, meaning, education, and political agency. Central to my argument is the assumption that politics is not simply about power, but also, as Cornelius Castoriadis points out, "has to do with political judgments and value choices," meaning that questions of civic education—learning how 8 to become a skilled citizen—afe central to democracy itself. ￼Educators at all levels need to challenge the assumption that politics is dead, or the nature of politics will be determined exclusively by government leaders and experts m the heat of moral frenzy. Educators need to take a more critical position, arguing that knowledge, debate, and dialogue about pressing social problems offer individuals and groups some hope in shaping the conditions that bear down on their lives. Public civic engagement is essential if the concepts of social life and the public sphere are to be used to revitalize the language of civic education and democratization as part of a broader discourse of political agency and critical citizenship in a global world. Linking the social to democratic public values represents an attempt, however incom- plete, to link democracy to public action, as part of a comprehensive attempt to revitalize civic activism and citizen access to decision-making while simultaneously addressing basic problems of social justice and global democracy. ￼Educators within public schools need to find ways to engage political issues by making social problems visible and by debating them in the political sphere. They also need to be at the forefront of the defense of the most progressive historical advances and gains of the state. 1-rcnch sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is right when he calls for collective work by educators to prevent those who arc mobilized against the welfare state from destroying the most precious democratic conquests in labor legis- lation, health, social protection, and education.'' At the very least, this would suggest that educators should defend schools as democratic public spheres, struggle against the de-skilling of teachers and students that has accompanied the emphasis on teach- ing for test-taking, and argue for pedagogy grounded in democratic values rather than testing schemes that severely limit the creative, ethical, and liberatory potential of education.

### A2 Trifonas

#### Goes aff –

#### Here’s the small text – “perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for liberation; it must become the motivating force for liberating action” – that means perm is better since questioning alone is useless

#### Another quote – “Although the dialectical relations of men with the world exist independently of how these relations are perceived (or whether or not they are perceived at all)” – perception is important only as it influences action

#### It’s out of context – the card is about “teaching against the grain” and how colorblind treatment in classrooms is bad – it doesn’t even mention policy focus or discuss discursive/methodological focus

#### This isn’t debate functional since deciding who better “poses the difficult questions” is impossible – questioning is not enough – Trifonas specifically says praxis involves “reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it”

#### Topical debate also necessitates the impact Trifonas appeals to, since it forces us to reconsider the assumptions behind notions of punishment and responsibility, which permeates almost any layer of social or political interaction. Trifonas doesn’t claim to be solving any impacts of political marginalization, so if debating is a matter of developing critical skills then it collapses to comparison of the way we want to change the system.

#### The judge’s primary obligation is to adjudicate the round in terms of the topic, not intervene to prefer certain types of argumentation. This serves as at least a minimal constraint on the arguments we can run since there would be no unique value to debate if we just created classroom-like discussions that didn’t encourage competition. Competitive success is empirically what motivates debaters to participate in the activity and glean its educational benefits – if you don’t believe me, let my opponent concede the round.

#### Restraints on arguments are good since otherwise we wouldn’t be able to substantively engage one another, since there would be no limits on debate beyond “going against the grain.” The topic serves as a predictable limit that facilitates clash since otherwise the most strategic thing for debaters to do would be to outdo each other in social criticism rather than engage in clash.

## WIP

### Perm Solvency

#### The perm solves best – gives workers a cause to rally around – AND it accelerates the breakdown of capitalism

Sawant and Eidelson 13 [Kshama, Seattle City Council Member, and Josh, Staff Writer for Salon, November 18, “The End of U.S. Capitalism,” http://portside.org/2013-11-19/end-us-capitalism/AKG]

…Now, what [the] Left has to do is to recognize that there is an opening here, there is a hunger among people in the United States, especially young people, young working people…In reality, what has become a dirty word is capitalism. Young people can see that the system does not offer any solutions. They can see that a two-party system is not working for them. But what is the alternative? We have to provide the alternative… Boeing workers…rejected this contract that has been forced on them by Boeing executives [who are] holding the state hostage to their demands…Every few years Boeing demands a massive corporate giveaway from the state, and the state each time gives into it – and this is a Democratic governor of the state who was leading this effort. For Boeing workers, it’s very clear that neither of the two parties is going to stand by them. And so the signal that it sends to the labor movement is that we have to have our own political organization. So what is the most likely path in your view to making the United States more socialist? I wouldn’t call it “more socialist,” in the sense that it doesn’t make sense: It can be either capitalism or socialism. But what we can do, in the journey toward making the economy into something that works for everybody: We have to fight for major reforms under capitalism … We are going to be pushing forward for $15 an hour minimum wage in Seattle in 2014 … The only way we can get that any of these demands to be fulfilled is if we have mass movements of workers and young people coming together in an organized way and demanding these reforms … But we also have to be honest … That’s not going to be enough. Because the system itself is a system of crises … Capitalism does not have the ability to generate the kind of living wage jobs that will be necessary in order to sustain a decent standard of living for the majority … So we have to have a strategy where we not only fight for every reform that we can get, including single payer healthcare, but … It can’t be in isolation from also thinking about fundamental shift in society …

#### The alt alone represents an impossible process which justifies suffering and genocide

Žižek 12 [Slavoj, All-Around Badass Philosopher, June 8, “Don’t Act, Just Think,” http://bigthink.com/ideas/45126/AKG]

Slavoj Zizek: Capitalism is . . . and this, almost I’m tempted to say is what is great about it, although I’m very critical of it . . . Capitalism is more an ethical/religious category for me. It’s not true when people attack capitalists as egotists. “They don't care.” No! An ideal capitalist is someone who is ready, again, to stake his life, to risk everything just so that production grows, profit grows, capital circulates. His personal or her happiness is totally subordinated to this. This is what I think Walter Benjamin, the great Frankfurt School companion, thinker, had in mind when he said capitalism is a form of religion. You cannot explain, account for, a figure of a passionate capitalist, obsessed with expanded circulation, with rise of his company, in terms of personal happiness. I am, of course, fundamentally anti-capitalist. But let’s not have any illusions here. No. What shocks me is that most of the critics of today’s capitalism feel even embarrassed, that's my experience, when you confront them with a simple question, “Okay, we heard your story . . . protest horrible, big banks depriving us of billions, hundreds, thousands of billions of common people's money. . . . Okay, but what do you really want? What should replace the system?” And then you get one big confusion. You get either a general moralistic answer, like “People shouldn't serve money. Money should serve people.” Well, frankly, Hitler would have agreed with it, especially because he would say, “When people serve money, money’s controlled by Jews,” and so on, no? So either this or some kind of a vague connection, social democracy, or a simple moralistic critique, and so on and so on. So, you know, it’s easy to be just formally anti-capitalist, but what does it really mean? It’s totally open. This is why, as I always repeat, with all my sympathy for Occupy Wall Street movement, it’s result was . . . I call it a Bartleby lesson. Bartleby, of course, Herman Melville’s Bartleby, you know, who always answered his favorite “I would prefer not to” . . . The message of Occupy Wall Street is, I would prefer not to play the existing game. There is something fundamentally wrong with the system and the existing forms of institutionalized democracy are not strong enough to deal with problems. Beyond this, they don't have an answer and neither do I. For me, Occupy Wall Street is just a signal. It’s like clearing the table. Time to start thinking. The other thing, you know, it’s a little bit boring to listen to this mantra of “Capitalism is in its last stage.” When this mantra started, if you read early critics of capitalism, I’m not kidding, a couple of decades before French Revolution, in late eighteenth century. No, the miracle of capitalism is that it’s rotting in decay, but the more it’s rotting, the more it thrives. So, let’s confront that serious problem here. Also, let’s not remember--and I’m saying this as some kind of a communist--that the twentieth century alternatives to capitalism and market miserably failed. . . . Like, okay, in Soviet Union they did try to get rid of the predominance of money market economy. The price they paid was a return to violent direct master and servant, direct domination, like you no longer will even formally flee. You had to obey orders, a new authoritarian society. . . . And this is a serious problem: how to abolish market without regressing again into relations of servitude and domination. My advice would be--because I don't have simple answers--two things: [First,] (a) precisely to start thinking. Don't get caught into this pseudo-activist pressure. Do something. Let’s do it, and so on. So, no, the time is to think. I even provoked some of the leftist friends when I told them that if the famous Marxist formula was, “Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the time is to change it” . . . thesis 11 . . . , that maybe today we should say, “In the twentieth century, we maybe tried to change the world too quickly. The time is to interpret it again, to start thinking.” Second thing, I’m not saying [that while] people are suffering, enduring horrible things, that we should just sit and think, but we should be very careful what we do. Here, let me give you a surprising example. I think that, okay, it’s so fashionable today to be disappointed at President Obama, of course, but sometimes I’m a little bit shocked by this disappointment because what did the people expect, that he will introduce socialism in United States or what? But for example, the ongoing universal health care debate is an important one. This is a great thing. Why? Because, on the one hand, this debate which taxes the very roots of ordinary American ideology, you know, freedom of choice, states wants to take freedom from us and so on. I think this freedom of choice that Republicans attacking Obama are using, its pure ideology. But at the same time, universal health care is not some crazy, radically leftist notion. It’s something that exists all around and functions basically relatively well--Canada, most of Western European countries. So the beauty is to select a topic which touches the fundamentals of our ideology, but at the same time, we cannot be accused of promoting an impossible agenda--like abolish all private property or what. No, it’s something that can be done and is done relatively successfully and so on. So that would be my idea, to carefully select issues like this where we do stir up public debate but we cannot be accused of being utopians in the bad sense of the term.

### Social Democracy

#### Problems are not ideological but political – social democracy has brought the most viable system and avoids the problematic practices they critique

Rose 12 [Gideon, Editor of Foreign Affairs and the Peter G. Peterson chair at the Council on Foreign Relations, January/February, “Making Modernity Work,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136776/gideon-rose/making-modernity-work/AKG]

We are living, so we are told, through an ideological crisis. The United States is trapped in political deadlock and dysfunction, Europe is broke and breaking, authoritarian China is on the rise. Protesters take to the streets across the advanced industrial democracies; the high and mighty meet in Davos to search for "new models" as sober commentators ponder who and what will shape the future. In historical perspective, however, the true narrative of the era is actually the reverse—not ideological upheaval but stability. Today’s troubles are real enough, but they relate more to policies than to principles. The major battles about how to structure modern politics and economics were fought in the first half of the last century, and they ended with the emergence of the most successful system the world has ever seen. Nine decades ago, in one of the first issues of this magazine, the political scientist Harold Laski noted that with "the mass of men" having come to political power, the challenge of modern democratic government was providing enough "solid benefit" to ordinary citizens "to make its preservation a matter of urgency to themselves." A generation and a half later, with the creation of the postwar order of mutually supporting liberal democracies with mixed economies, that challenge was being met, and as a result, more people in more places have lived longer, richer, freer lives than ever before. In ideological terms, at least, all the rest is commentary. To commemorate Foreign Affairs 90th anniversary, we have thus decided to take readers on a magical history tour, tracing the evolution of the modern order as it played out in our pages. What follows is not a "greatest hits" collection of our most well-known or influential articles, nor is it a showcase for the most famous names to have appeared in the magazine. It is rather a package of 20 carefully culled selections from our archives, along with three new pieces, which collectively shed light on where the modern world has come from and where it is heading. THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN In the premodern era, political, economic, and social life was governed by a dense web of interlocking relationships inherited from the past and sanctified by religion. Limited personal freedom and material benefits existed alongside a mostly un-questioned social solidarity. Traditional local orders began to erode with the rise of capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as the increasing prevalence and dominance of market relationships broke down existing hierarchies. The shift produced economic and social dynamism, an increase in material benefits and personal freedoms, and a decrease in communal feeling. As this process continued, the first modern political ideology, classical liberalism, emerged to celebrate and justify it. Liberalism stressed the importance of the rule of law, limited government, and free commercial transactions. It highlighted the manifold rewards of moving to a world dominated by markets rather than traditional communities, a shift the economic historian Karl Polanyi would call "the great transformation." But along with the gains came losses as well—of a sense of place, of social and psychological stability, of traditional bulwarks against life's vicissitudes. Left to itself, capitalism produced long-term aggregate benefits along with great volatility and inequality. This combination resulted in what Polanyi called a "double movement," a progressive expansion of both market society and reactions against it. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, therefore, liberalism was being challenged by reactionary nationalism and cosmopolitan socialism, with both the right and the left promising, in their own ways, relief from the turmoil and angst of modern life. The catastrophic destruction of the Great War and the economic nightmare of the Great Depression brought the contradictions of modernity to a head, seemingly revealing the bankruptcy of the liberal order and the need for some other, better path. As democratic republics dithered and stumbled during the 1920s and 1930s, fascist and communist regimes seized control of their own destinies and appeared to offer compelling alternative models of modern political, economic, and social organization. Over time, however, the problems with all these approaches became clear. Having discarded liberalism's insistence on personal and political freedom, both fascism and communism quickly descended into organized barbarism. The vision of the future they offered, as George Orwell noted, was "a boot stamping on a human face—forever." Yet classical liberalism also proved unpalatable, since it contained no rationale for activist government and thus had no answer to an economic crisis that left vast swaths of society destitute and despairing. Fascism flamed out in a second, even more destructive world war. Communism lost its appeal as its tyrannical nature revealed itself, then ultimately collapsed under its own weight as its nonmarket economic system could not generate sustained growth. And liberalism's central principle of laissez faire was abandoned in the depths of the Depression. What eventually emerged victorious from the wreckage was a hybrid system that combined political liberalism with a mixed economy. As the political scientist Sheri Berman has observed, "The postwar order represented something historically unusual: capitalism remained, but it was capitalism of a very different type from that which had existed before the war— one tempered and limited by the power of the democratic state and often made subservient to the goals of social stability and solidarity, rather than the other way around." Berman calls the mixture "social democracy" Other scholars use other terms: Jan-Werner Miller prefers "Christian Democracy," John Ruggie suggests "embedded liberalism," Karl Dietrich Bracher talks of "democratic liberalism." Francis Fukuyama wrote of "the end of History"; Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset saw it as "the end of ideology." All refer to essentially the same thing. As Bell put it in i960: Few serious minds believe any longer that one can set down "blueprints" and through "social engineering" bring about a new Utopia of social harmony. At the same time, the older "counter-beliefs" have lost their intellectual force as well. Few "classic" liberals insist that the State should play no role in the economy, and few serious conservatives, at least in England and on the Continent, believe that the Welfare State is "the road to serfdom." In the Western world, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism. Reflecting the hangover of the inter-war ideological binge, the system stressed not transcendence but compromise. It offered neither salvation nor Utopia, only a framework within which citizens could pursue their personal betterment. It has never been as satisfying as the religions, sacred or secular, it replaced. And it remains a work in progress, requiring tinkering and modification as conditions and attitudes change. Yet its success has been manifest— and reflecting that, its basic framework has remained remarkably intact. THE ONCE AND FUTURE ORDER The central question of modernity has been how to reconcile capitalism and mass democracy, and since the postwar order came up with a good answer, it has managed to weather all subsequent challenges. The upheavals of the late 1960s seemed poised to disrupt it. But despite what activists at the time thought, they had little to offer in terms of politics or economics, and so their lasting impact was on social life instead. This had the ironic effect of stabilizing the system rather than overturning it, helping it live up to its full potential by bringing previously subordinated or disenfranchised groups inside the castle walls. The neoliberal revolutionaries of the 1980s also had little luck, never managing to turn the clock back all that far. All potential alternatives in the developing world, meanwhile, have proved to be either dead ends or temporary detours from the beaten path. The much-ballyhooed "rise of the rest" has involved not the dis-crediting of the postwar order of Western political economy but its reinforcement: the countries that have risen have done so by embracing global capitalism while keeping some of its destabilizing attributes in check, and have liberalized their polities and societies along the way (and will founder unless they continue to do so). Although the structure still stands, however, it has seen better days. Poor management of public spending and fiscal policy has resulted in unsustainable levels of debt across the advanced industrial world, even as mature economies have found it difficult to generate dynamic growth and full employment in an ever more globalized environment. Lax regulation and oversight allowed reckless and predatory financial practices to drive leading economies to the brink of collapse. Economic inequality has increased as social mobility has declined. And a loss of broad-based social solidarity on both sides of the Atlantic has eroded public support for the active remedies needed to address these and other problems. Renovating the structure will be a slow and difficult project, the cost and duration of which remain unclear, as do the contractors involved. Still, at root, this is not an ideological issue. The question is not what to do but how to do it—how, under twenty-first-century conditions, to rise to the challenge Laski described, making the modern political economy provide enough solid benefit to the mass of men that they see its continuation as a matter of urgency to themselves.