# A2 Trav China Myanmar AC

I <3 Travis chen

## T

### 1NC T

#### Interpretation – Resource extraction is only the removal of resources

Florida Senate 13 [“Title XXVIII NATURAL RESOURCES; CONSERVATION, RECLAMATION, AND USE” 378.403 Definitions. 2013 Florida Statutes] AT

(5) “Extraction” or “resource extraction” means the removal of resources from their location so as to make them suitable for commercial, industrial, or construction use; but does not include excavation solely in aid of onsite farming or onsite construction, nor the process of searching, prospecting, exploring, or investigating for resources by drilling.

#### That means that the aff must implement a policy that only restricts resource extraction. No extra-topicality.

#### Net benefits:

#### Ground – extra T destroys the neg’s ability to run disads and CP’s since the aff can fiat ways to solve them in the 1AC. This destroys the focus of the debate since the aff won’t defend their plan, but the plan in conjunction with ways to solve objections to it

#### Limits – aff destroys topical limits since it’s no longer based in the text of the topic – this means I can’t effectively engage with the aff, which destroys all substantive engagement. This outweighs time skew since the aff can adapt for time skews by going faster or being more efficient but neg can’t change the terms of

## DA

### Peace Process 1NC

#### Pipeline deal key to Myanmar peace process

Schearf 12 [Dan, Staff Writer for Voice of America News, February 8, “China Hosts Burma-Rebel Peace Talks for Economic, Strategic Benefit,” http://www.voanews.com/content/article--china-hosts-burma-rebel-peace-talks-for-economic-strategic-benefit-139060094/168437.html]

Maung Zarni, a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics, says oil and gas pipelines that China and Burma are jointly laying across the country are of even greater importance. When finished, the pipelines will stretch from Burma’s western coast and into China at Ruili, just south of Kachin state and not far from the recent fighting, providing a strategic alternative route for African and Middle East oil to flow to China while avoiding the piracy-prone Strait of Malacca. For China, says Zarni, the pipelines make peace between Burmese authorities and Kachin's rebel armies a strategic imperative. "The Kachin state becomes extremely vital both to the Burmese military and Beijing in terms of ... providing security for the pipeline as well as the cross-border trading post," he said.

#### The impact is the Chinese economy and Chinese energy volatility

Kurlantzick 13 [Joshua Kurlantzick is an American journalist from Baltimore, Maryland, United States. He is a Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.] Myanmar: Sources of Instability and Potential for U.S.-China Cooperation

In addition, over the past decade, Myanmar has become an important economic partner for China. In particular, trade with and investment in Myanmar has become critical for Yunnan province, which has many enterprises operating in Myanmar, particularly in timber, gems, and other extractive industries. Myanmar is developing numerous road networks and ports that will help link Yunnan to other parts of mainland Southeast Asia and eastern India, making it a hub for the new Southeast Asian overland trade networks. No accurate census exists, but some experts estimate that somewhere between several hundred thousand and one million businesspeople from Yunnan and neighboring provinces have moved to Myanmar, where they increasingly dominate construction, retail, shipping, and other industries. Myanmar also has become a growing source of oil and gas for China. Last year, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) began the construction of pipelines from offshore areas of Myanmar to Yunnan and Guangxi provinces that will pump 240,000 barrels of oil per day in its first phase, as well as twelve billion cubic meters of gas per year. When they are operational in 2013, the pipelines will allow China to diversify its petroleum imports away from the Middle East and Africa, and to reduce the percentage of its petroleum shipped through the volatile Straits of Malacca.

#### Peace resolution in Myanmar also solves the Northeastern insurgency in India

Gong 12 (Lina Gong, Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia, “Regional Implications of National Reconciliation in Myanmar,” March 2012, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/HTML-Newsletter/Alert/pdf/NTS\_Alert\_mar\_1201.pdf)

Over the past decades, the seven states in the North Eastern Region that border Myanmar have witnessed the development of armed movements. The demands of these groups – independence, autonomy, tribal rights – are similar to those of the ethnic nationalities in Myanmar (Routray, 2011:141). India’s ethnic armed groups have sought sanctuary and support from government forces or agencies across the border in Myanmar, and vice versa. For instance, the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces, allowed Indian insurgent groups to build up extensive underground connections in Myanmar’s remote regions, while Indian intelligence agencies offered to help train Myanmar’s Kachin rebels (Egreteau, 2008:940). Moreover, the ethnic insurgent groups on both sides of the India-Myanmar border have reinforced each other’s positions through such activities as smuggling and the distribution of small arms and light weapons (Yhome, 2011:181). Thus, as with China, it is certainly in India’s interests to see that the reforms in Myanmar succeed. The embracing of democracy and freedom by Myanmar’s new government matches mainstream political ideas in India, and this provides a platform for further bilateral communications. The new Myanmar government has also reached out to buyers other than China, opening up new opportunities for India to secure energy. The ceasefire between the Myanmar government and the ethnic nationalities could also help reduce the factors that contribute to the insurgency in India’s North Eastern Region.

#### China is using the insurgency and instability to claim the contested territory from India – continued insurgency makes a Chinese attack inevitable

**Roy 12** (Bhaskar Roy, South Asia Analysis Group, “An India-China Military Conflict? – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, February 10, 2012, http://www.eurasiareview.com/10022012-an-india-china-military-conflict-analysis/)

There have been projections among some Indian experts and think tanks that a limited Chinese attack along the unresolved Sino-Indian border may be imminent. This view cannot be totally faulted. They are based on China’s aggressive official and semi-official postures and warning to India, especially on the sovereignty of Tawang, an important Buddhist pilgrim town in India’s north-east state of Arunachal Pradesh. China claims officially the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its territory. The official Chinese media, have started referring to Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet. This is a very important shift in China’s nomenclature of Arunachal Pradesh. This is an effort to now make this Indian state a historical part of Tibet which China militarily occupied in 1950. With India among other countries in the world having acknowledged the original Tibet as a sovereign part of China, extension of Tibet to Arunachal Pradesh may give China an opening into its sovereignty claim on Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing believes it as another instrument to pressure India. Although historically and according to international law China’s claim on Tibet is legally tenuous and questionable, the political and economic importance of China have won them the battle. But Beijing’s claim on Tawang is the critical issue. Notwithstanding the facetious evidence being presented by China on Tawang’s ownership, the fact is that this town, located in the tri-junction of Tibet, Bhutan and India is of high strategic value to China. Tawang is located near the Siliguri corridor/chicken-neck which connects the larger India by land to its vast north-eastern region. It is now common knowledge that **China continues to** support insurgent **and separatist groups in** north-east India. If Tawang went to China it could garrison its troops there, ignite a major turbulence in north-east India, and roll down from Tawang to engage or cut off the Siliguri chicken-neck, preventing or slowing down Indian military movement. A success of this strategy would be disastrous for India. One can, therefore, understand China’s strong objection and criticism against India’s enhanced force deployment in north-east India.

#### It will escalate to global nuclear war

**Kahn 9** (Jeremy, Pew International Journalism Fellow – Johns Hopkins University and Former Managing Editor – New Republic, “Why India Fears China”, Newsweek, 10-10, http://www.newsweek.com/id/217088)

China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months. Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan. The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It **turns** what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some **barren**, rocky **peaks** hardly worth fighting over **into** a flash point **that could** spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a co**nflict involving India and China could result in a** nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides. Beijing appears increasingly concerned about the safe haven India provides to the Dalai Lama and to tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles, including increasingly militant supporters of Tibetan independence. These younger Tibetans, many born outside Tibet, are growing impatient with the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach—a willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for true autonomy—and commitment to nonviolence. If these groups were to use India as a base for armed insurrection against China, as Tibetan exiles did throughout the 1960s, then China might retaliate against India. By force or demand, Beijing might also seek to gain possession of important Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that lie in Indian territory close to the border. Both politically and culturally, these monasteries are seen as key nodes in the Tibetan resistance to Chinese authority.

### Malacca 1NC

#### Only Myanmar can provide vital resource links for the Chinese economy – it also solves China’s reliance on the Strait of Malacca

O’Reilly 13 (Brendan O’Reilly, China-based writer and educator, author, “China Steps into Kachin Conflict,” Asia Times, February 7, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/OB07Ad02.html)

However, China's active involvement in Myanmar may indicate a significant policy shift. China has extensive interests in the country, and cannot risk an escalation of ethnic conflicts near China's culturally heterogeneous border regions. Furthermore, by investing political capital and prestige in resolving the conflict, China is giving a signal to other concerned global powers that Myanmar remains well within its strategic orbit. China's interests Many of China's motives in ending the fighting in northern Myanmar are entirely obvious. Kachin State borders southwestern China's Yunnan province. Already thousands of refugees have crossed the border into China. Furthermore, stray rockets and bombs launched by Myanmar's army have landed in Chinese territory. China is obviously highly motivated to maintain internal stability in the ethnically diverse southwest regions and avoid any violent spillover. As always, economic considerations are an indispensable component of China's Myanmar policy. Chinese corporations, hungry for raw materials, dominate northern Myanmar's markets for tropical hardwood and minerals. Newly liberalizing Myanmar also represents a potentially massive consumer market for Chinese manufactured goods. Strategic objectives must also be factored into China's increasingly proactive stance in Myanmar. After decades of isolation, the government of Myanmar is opening up to Western powers. The West has praised Myanmar's domestic reforms - especially the release of opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Aung San Suu Kyi. President Barack Obama made a historic visit to Myanmar last year. Myanmar's leaders are publicly flirting with the United States at the same time that American political and military assets are increasingly focused on countering China's regional influence. Of course these dynamics of China's involvement in Myanmar - the political, the economic, and the strategic - cannot be viewed as entirely independent elements. Rather, there are important parallels and influences linking these trends. For example, local concerns about an extensive copper mine - jointly owned by Myanmar's military and a Chinese firm - have recently erupted in emotional protests that met a violent state response. On the positive side for China, Myanmar provides an excellent avenue for expanding China's strategic depth. By June, an oil pipeline is due to link Myanmar's Indian Ocean coast with Kunming, the provincial capital of China's Yunnan. **This** vital energy link **will give China much-desired** regional maneuverability. At present, nearly all of China's massive and growing oil and energy imports must pass through the strategic bottleneck of the Strait of Malacca and the contested South China Sea. China's official Xinhua news outlet reports that the pipeline through Myanmar will help satisfy "China's new strategic energy channels" and avoid the "risk-prone Strait of Malacca". In the unlikely event of open hostilities in the region, China's energy imports through Myanmar could be a lifeline offering some degree of economic and geopolitical operating space. Myanmar is an increasingly central factor in the developing Sino-American great power rivalry.

#### Chinese dependence on the Strait of Malacca makes US-Sino war inevitable because of escalating miscalc

Glaser 11 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser\_-\_EnergySecurity-AUGUST-2011.docx)

The problem that China faces is that its sea lanes of communication for transporting this oil are dominated by the U.S. navy. Chinese experts are well aware of the potential implications of this vulnerability. The following statement by a Chinese scholar succinctly captures the situation: China cannot have control over development goals without corresponding control over the resources to fuel the economy. The simple fact is that China does not possess that control. More than half of U.S. oil imports are shipped via the sea lanes. The crucial difference is that China is almost helpless to protect its overseas oil import routes. This is an Achilles heel to contemporary China, as it has forced China to entrust its fate (stable markets and access to resources) to others. Therefore, it is imperative that China, as a nation, pay attention to its maritime security and the means to defend its interests through sea power (a critical capability in which China currently lags behind). In fact, the key danger facing China is likely not during peacetime, but instead during a severe crisis or war. Another Chinese scholar observes, “In the scenario of war across the Taiwan Straits, there is no guarantee that the United States would not enlist the assistance of its principal ally in northeast Asia (Japan) and other lesser allies (Singapore, the Philippines, and South Korea) to participate in another oil blockade against China.” Although China has been modernizing its navy for a couple of decades, it not only remains quite far from having the ability to challenge U.S. control of the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca, but the programs it could build in the medium term (10-15 years) would still leave this mission beyond reach. The near-term focus and top priorities for China’s naval modernization have been improving its ability to blockade Taiwan, and to deny and deter U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict. Beyond these top priorities, acquiring the ability to protect its SLOCs to the Persian Gulf is among the rationales for China’s naval modernization. However, apparently China’s leaders are still deciding whether to devote massive resources to this mission. There is the possibility that China could start to challenge U.S. dominance in the Indian Ocean by developing a string of land-based capabilities from which it could both launch attacks and base naval forces; China has started to develop the type of base structure required for these capabilities. In addition, China could try to weaken U.S. naval dominance by deploying sea-based assets that threaten, but do not match, U.S. forces—for example, a large attack submarine force. In any event, well before China’s navy can reach effectively into the Indian Ocean, its efforts to protect Taiwan and its territorial claims in the East China and South China Seas will pose a threat to U.S. allies, including Japan. The extent of U.S. concernaboutChina’s growing naval capabilitieswilldepend on future Chinese decisions about how much to invest in protecting its SLOCs, as well as the overall state of U.S.-China relations. Assuming that the United States retains its commitment to security and stability in Northeast Asia, some increased U.S. insecurity seems likely even if China does not make a large commitment to protecting its Indian Ocean SLOCs. On the other hand, a major Chinese investment in this mission will generate greater U.S. insecurity and likely larger U.S. reactions. The United States will question whether China’s investment reflects purely defensive motives or instead a desire to expand its influence throughout Asia and the Middle East, and will adjust it assessment of China’s motives accordingly. Arguably, this type of concern is already taking hold. In recent congressional testimony, the U.S. admiral who heads Pacific Command noted that “China’s interest in a peaceful and stable environment that will support the country’s development goals is difficult to reconcile with the evolving military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region or exercise aggression or coercion of its neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and partners.” The result could be a negative political spiral in which military actions and reactions lead both the United States and China to conclude the other is more likely to be a greedy hostile state. Especially in combination with other possible strains in U.S.-China relations, a shift toward more negative assessments of each other’s motives could increase the probability of crisis and war. Most obviously, China will see the United States posing a larger threat to its goal of unification with Taiwan, which could further harden China’s policies, including its deployment of anti-access capabilities for preventing U.S. intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict. At the same time, the United States could become more determined to protect Taiwan, among other reasons because the importance of preserving its credibility for defending allies would grow with its assessment of China’s greed and because control of Taiwan would increase Chinese military capabilities, not only by extending its geographical reach, but also by freeing up its military forces for other missions. Consequently, although China’s oil dependence drives this security dilemma, the increased probability of conflict would be over issues not directly related to oil.

#### Nuclear war

O’Hanlon 07 (Michael, adjunct professor at John Hopkins and lecturer at Princeton and Bush, “A war like no other: the truth about China's challenge to America”, p. 99-100)

War between China and Taiwan is a distinct possibility. Such a war could easily drag in the United States, pitting the worlds only superpower against its main rising power and thus leading to the first serious conflict in history between nuclear weapons states. It seems inconceivable, in this day and age, that the United States and China could really wind up in war. Their mutual interests in cooperating are so strong, their economies are so intertwined, the dangers of war are so enormous, and the number of other problems for them to worry about is so great that it would seem the height of foolishness for the two huge powers ever to come to blows. There is much truth to this, Indeed, as we have argued in chap- ter three, most of the reasons whv China and the United States could theoretically fight do not in the end hold water. But the Taiwan problem is different. Not only does it involve a third actor over which neither Beijing nor Washington has control. Not only does it involve a territory that China sees as an integral part of its own nation and that the United States sees as a long-standing, stalwart, and democratic friend. In addition, the way that a China-Taiwan crisis could begin and escalate would hold the inherent potential for escalation to direct superpower war. This chapter explains whv. The- next chapters get into the dynamics of what could happen if that war began, how it might be terminated before getting extremely serious—but also why it could be tough to control. The overall message is sobering. Even if the chances of war between the United States and China are less than 25 percent— indeed, even if they are less than 10 percent—they are far from zero. And given the enormous consequences of any such war, in terms ol immediate danger as well as lasting effects on the interna- tional system, every effort must be made to prevent it. World War I did not seem very likely to most world leaders in 1912 or 1913 either; certainly a horrible four-year struggle, followed two decades later by an even worse world war, was not predicted. We must avoid dire mistakes of that era and take seriously the possibility of a war that, even if unlikely already, must be rendered more unlikely still. In short, the reasons whv that war could occur, are as follows: First. China really does consider Taiwan its own, and even as it has arguably adopted a more subtle and sophisticated approach to the Taiwan challenge in recent years, it has explicitly kept the threat of force on the table.1 Second, Chinas military capabilities are growing last even as Taiwan's begin to stagnate, meaning that Beijing could sense an opportunity—if it can keep the United States out of the light Third, Taiwan could push the sovereignty' issue in a way that China interprets as the pursuit of full independence. While China would probably be wrong in reaching any such con- clusion, perceptions could matter more than reality in such a situation. Fourth, while Washington's commitment to Taiwan is long- standing, it is also somewhat ambiguous, so leaders in China might convince themselves that the United States real!)' would sit out a China-Taiwan war.

### Disease Impact

#### Refugee overflows and Burmese organized crime spikes are two additional internal links – external impact of Chinese disease outbreaks – only the peace process can solve

Gong 12 (Lina Gong, Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia, “Regional Implications of National Reconciliation in Myanmar,” March 2012, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/HTML-Newsletter/Alert/pdf/NTS\_Alert\_mar\_1201.pdf)

Moreover, national reconciliation in Myanmar is in China’s interest. The resolution of the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar would restore peace and stability along the China-Myanmar border. Clashes between government armed forces and ethnic armed groups, such as the 2009 Kokang incident, have threatened China’s security, in terms of traditional as well as non-traditional threats. In the Kokang incident, two Chinese citizens were killed and another fifteen injured. More than 37,000 refugees fled into China’s side of the common border (Li, 2011:114). The influx of refugees imposed logistical and financial burdens on Yunnan province, one of China’s less developed regions. In addition, **the unstable border allows** transnational crimes **in both directions.** The drug trade has been the major revenue source for the northern ethnic armed groups. The Special Regions in Shan State and the Kokang autonomous region are the primary source of various drugs (UNODC, 2010:115). Sanctions imposed on Myanmar by Western countries have further weakened state capacity, encouraging some military officers to engage in illicit drug smuggling and natural resource extraction to generate income (Englehart, 2005:641). The drug trade originating from Myanmar has become a major problem that affects China’s social and economic development. China now has the largest number of injecting drug users. This proliferation of drug use has in turn led to the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV and Hepatitis C and B (UNODC, 2011:30). In addition to drug trafficking, the porous border areas have also become a venue for smuggling, illegal migration and other criminal activities (Li and Lye, 2010:184). With Myanmar’s new government moving to reconcile with the pro-democracy movement and the country’s ethnic nationalities, Western countries have accordingly lifted the sanctions on the country. A socially reconciled Myanmar is in a better position to build its governance capacity and would be more capable of cracking down on transnational crimes. Hence, national reconciliation in Myanmar is desirable to China, and China is supportive of the process. Over the past three months, China had hosted several rounds of peace talks between the Kachin Independence Organization and the government of Ruili, a Chinese town bordering Myanmar (Feng, 2012).

#### Chinese disease outbreaks leads to extinction – uniquely likely to spread because of information suppression

Parker 03 (Randall Parker, Political Commentator, “Chinese Government Faulted For Making SARS Outbreak Worse,” Future Pundit, April 4, 2003, http://www.futurepundit.com/archives/001104.html)

China is the place where the holding back of information on epidemic outbreakspromises to be most threatening to the world as a whole. Because of the millions of people (tens of millions? hundreds of millions?) in Southern China who live in close proximity with pigs, ducks, and other fowl China is like a big experiment for the mixing of DNA across different virus strains that normally infect different species. In the case of SARS it is likely that a human coronavirus coinfected a cell (probably in a human) at the same time a coronavirus from another species did as well. Genes were exchanged and the result was a coronavirus that is more lethal to humans. This also happens with influenza viruses. The most lethal influenza viruses are either viruses that jumped over from other species or which exchanged DNA with viruses from other species. Because China has such ideal conditions for gene swapping between virus strains from different species it is more likely than any place on Earth to be the source of the next killer virus whose lethality would rank up there with the 1918-1919 Influenza pandemic that killed 20 to 40 million people. The authoritarian impulses of the Chinese authorities to control and hush up bad news, as they have done with the SARS pathogen, put the rest of the world at much greater risk to every new disease that first shows up in China. This impulse on the part of the Chinese government deserves to be widely and loudly criticised. The rest of the world needs to make it clear to China that this kind of "hush it up" reaction to disease outbreaks will not be tolerated because it creates an unacceptable risk to the health of all of humanity.

### CCP Collapse impact

#### CCP collapse causes multiple global nuclear wars

Perkinson 12 – Jessica Perkinson, Master School Of International Service American University , “The Potential For Instability in the PRC: How The Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark”

There are a number of areas of concern among China’s immediate regional neighbors and partners, including those on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Japan, and India. Though China currently adheres to a strict foreign policy regime based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence151 and has been able to significantly advance their own interests internationally using this method, the potentially destabilizing effect that forced political reform could have on the country may derail their relations and security with their neighbors. Chief among these regional concerns are North Korea’s dependence on China’s exports, South Korea’s dependence on China’s North Korea deterrence and trade, the security and stability of the Taiwan Strait, Japan’s reliance on Chinese trade and message consistency regarding territorial disputes, and stability of the Sino-Indian border area. First, the stability of the Korean Peninsula rests in large part on the stability of China’s political system. Both North and South Korea have vested interests in the continued stability of the CCP for their own security. As is generally well-known in the international community, North Korea relies in large part on China superseding international trade sanctions not only for luxury goods, but for basic needs such as food and oil. For example, the United States led the charge and enacted its first set of sanctions against North Korea over two decades ago in response to the existence of fissile material on the Korean Peninsula and its risk for proliferation.152 Over time, these sanctions have been expanded upon and have attracted the support and participation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Specifically, these sanctions have included blocked property and interests in property, banned transactions involving North Korean vessels and bans on reception of imports originating in North Korea.153 Though these sanctions have not encouraged the North Korean regime to change its policies (and in some cases have made them more militant), they have unfortunately had a devastating effect on the North Korean people, including depravation of access to critical resources such as medication, food and water and energy supplies such as oil.154 In addition, due to a succession of floods and droughts and the refusal of the international community to intervene in a country violating international laws, pervasive malnutrition has led to “up to one million excess deaths since the 1990’s.155 In order to maintain stability on the Peninsula and prevent the North Koreans from becoming desperate, China continues to export both luxury goods and basic commodities into North Korea. For example, in 2005, China accounted for 53% of North Korea’s international commerce. However, this has increased rapidly since sanctions have become stricter and have increased pressure in the country. In 2009, China accounted for 79% in North Korea’s international commerce and as of 2010 was up to 83% of North Korea’s $4.2 billion in trade156 in order to ease the effect of the existing international sanctions. In addition, China has been a facilitator of the Six-Party Talks, the primary international diplomatic forum for handling tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Countries involved in the Six-Party Talks include China, North Korea, Russia, the United States, South Korea and Japan, and the first round of talks was initiated and hosted by China, taking place in Beijing in August 2003.157 During the talks, China served as a moderator between the US and North Korea during tense times of debate, also insisting on certain thresholds of success before members could leave the talks, such as the drafting of diplomatic agreements158. Though the talks have remained in an on-and-off pattern over the last decade, China still makes consistent efforts to bring North Korea back to the diplomatic negotiations over their nuclear regime.159 South Korea’s dependence on China’s continued stability is twofold. Not only does South Korea rely on China’s continued deterrence of North Korean aggression both through diplomacy and satisfaction of their trade needs, but they also rely on China as a trade partner. For example, on November 23, 2010, North Korea fired dozens of missiles onto the South’s Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean soldiers, significantly escalating tension on the Peninsula as South Korea threatened military retaliation for the attack.160 In response, China focused their energy on deterring an armed response by the South Koreans, which could have potentially led to protracted civil war between the two countries. Though the international community has expressed deep disagreement with China’s soft-line approach toward North Korea, it appears their understanding, ‘big-brother’ style of handling North Korean aggression toward South Korea has at least prevented a violent, protracted conflict, though not necessarily further North Korean acts of aggression.161 Not only does South Korea rely on the continued intervention of the Chinese in North-South relations, but they have a deep economic integration and dependence on Chinese trade. For example, in 2010, South Korea was China’s fourth-largest trading partner, exchanging goods of $207.2 billion, up 32.6% over 2009.162 In other words, both North and South Korea rely heavily on China not only for their continued economic prosperity, but also for the survival of their people and territorial security. Should the Chinese government undergo a period of reform and instability great enough to interrupt these benefits to the Korean Peninsula, the international system may be faced with a serious nuclear and conventional military conflict between North and South Korea. A second region that relies heavily on the continued stability of China’s government is the island of Taiwan. Because China and Taiwan have a long history of conflict over the status of Taiwan’s sovereignty, maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait continues to be an issue of critical interest to the international community as a whole. For example, in 1995, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in response to what may seem like a small event to the international community, but what was viewed by the Chinese as a grave threat to their sovereignty. In 1995, then-US President Bill Clinton allowed Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui to come and visit his alma-mater at Cornell University. Though the visit alone sparked some controversy between the US, China and Taiwan, the remarks made at Cornell by Lee Teng-Hui during an address tipped the security balance on the Taiwan Strait. In his address, Lee referred to Taiwan as the “Republic of China” on multiple occasions, and made references to “nation” and “country”.163 These events led the Chinese leadership to believe that the US was making overtures toward Taiwanese independence from the mainland. The following year, the PLA fired missiles off the coast of Taiwan, nearly drawing the international community – including the US – into a conflict on the Strait.164 Some scholars argue this was to deter the US from developing closer ties with Taiwan.165 However, since that incident, the Strait has remained relatively calm and stable, as the Taiwanese leadership under Ma Ying-jeou has remained very moderate in their stance on China-Taiwan relations and has been very careful not to make any inflammatory statements that could set off conflict on the Strait. However, a period of significant reform within the CCP could lend itself to instability on the Taiwan Strait. There is no guarantee that pro-independence factions within Taiwan would not take advantage of the CCP and PLA’s distraction with their own transformation to take dramatic, perhaps militaristic, steps toward independence. For example, during Taiwan’s most recent election cycle, the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-wen, though she lost the election, garnered enough support to make the government in mainland China nervous about her rise in support.166 The potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait could spell disaster for the entire region, as other countries and allies could be pulled into a protracted conflict between the two regions. A third region that has a deep interest in China’s political stability is their neighbor Japan. Not only is Japan deeply integrated economically into the Chinese trade system, it also has a number of ongoing territorial disputes with the country. For example, in January 2007, total trade between China and Japan was $18.1 million. That amount spiked to $344.9 million in December, 2011 (an 1808.1% increase)167, a clear indicator that China and Japan are growing their trade dependence at an astounding rate. In addition, Japan and China continue to disagree over the status of some hotly contested territories, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Not only do both countries have a territorial claim to the islands, but the area contains vast amounts of oil and natural gas resources that both countries want to develop. For example, it is estimated that the Japanese side of the disputed East China Sea area contains up to 500 million kiloliters of crude oil volume.168 As China is the world’s second-largest consumer of oil and Japan third, with Chinese demand for oil expected to rise 14% by 2025, these oil deposits are of crucial national security interest to both countries.169 Tension in the region has been rising as China has continued to press closer to the median line that Japan has drawn around the islands, at one point coming as close as five kilometers from the line.170 The consistency of the Chinese message on the status of these disputed territories, though tense and combative for the Japanese, have at least lent a level of predictability to China’s stance and actions. However, should the CCP undergo a period of instability and reform, and if their message or actions were to change regarding the status of these islands, it could cause a significant conflict over these territories between China and Japan, and could severely destabilize an already weakened Japanese economy. Much like the potential destabilization of the Taiwan Strait, the destabilization of the East China Sea region could draw the countries’ regional neighbors and international partners into a protracted conflict between the two nations. A fourth region that would be negatively affected by political destabilization in China is their southern neighbor, India. Though China and India are becoming increasingly reliant on one another economically, they still suffer from a number of serious areas of conflict, including a hotly contested border area and India’s support of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. In 1962, the PLA invaded India through the Arunachal Pradesh region, laying claim to portions of the Himalayas that had previously been under Indian control in what became known as the Sino-Indian War. Though the Chinese eventually called a cease-fire and withdrew from the region171, the conflict over it remains tense for a number of reasons, including access to water resources, forestry resources and China’s enduring theme of territorial integrity. Similar to the destabilization of the two regions mentioned above, the inconsistency of China’s message during a time of political destabilization or reform could lead the Indian military to either panic from the unpredictability of China’s potential actions or move to take the Arunachal Pradesh region by force. Not only could political instability in China cause a border conflict between India and China, but it could also cause an influx of Tibetans into the country, as India’s government is sympathetic to the Tibetan plight. Though China has labeled the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile a separatist force working to separate Tibet from mainland China, India has provided the group sanctuary in Dharamsala, India.172 Abroad, the Dalai Lama continues to draw supporters from around the world, occasionally attracting Tibetans inside Tibet to make the treacherous journey across the Himalayas to Dharamsala. China, in turn, has taken up guarding this area in an attempt to prevent flows of Tibetans out of Tibet and into India to reach the Dalai Lama.173 However, should the CCP undergo a period of significant political reform, this could encourage Tibetans to either take advantage of the CCP’s distraction to seek independence by force, or could cause massive immigrant flows across the Sino-Indian border. Both China and India already have a regional example of destabilization due to immigrant flows, as China already suffers from this issue on its border with North Korea. In addition, any political stability within the CCP would spell disaster for the Indian economy, which is becoming increasingly reliant on China as a trading partner. Partially as a counterweight to the two nations’ conflict, India and China have been dramatically growing their bilateral trade in the last three decades. Though this has served to promote peace in the region and between the two giants in particular, it has also made India increasingly reliant on China’s continued stability for its economic prosperity. For example, in 1990, trade between India and China had bottomed out at near $0. However, this figure shot up drastically between 2000 and 2008 to around $35 billion174, with no sign of leveling off. It is obvious from these statistics that the two nations continue to build their trade dependency and that India’s economy is deeply intertwined with China’s. The consistency of China’s message on the contested border area, as well as the fairly stable environment surrounding the Tibetan dispute, lend at least some predictability to the disagreement between the two nations. However, if China were to undergo a period of political instability, this series of predictable messages and actions from China on these disagreements could change, and cause aggression from either side, destabilizing the region and India’ economy in the process. Outside of China’s immediate vicinity, there exist a number of countries that would be challenged by political instability in China. Due to intense and growing economic and military integration between China, the East Asian region and the world, these other countries have a significant reliance on the continued stability of the CCP. Chief among these global concerns are China’s growing integration with European countries and its continued commitment of foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries, primarily on the African continent.