## 1NC

### T

T Any

#### Interp: “Any” is universally defined as the whole quantity – means aff has to defend free speech in all instances

Superior Court of New Jersey,Appellate Division. Nina HUBBARD, as Guardian Ad Litem of Nia Hubbard, her minor child, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph REED, D.D.S, Defendant-Respondent, Robert Kardon, D.D.S., Defendant. Decided: May 15, 2000, ["FindLaw's Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division case and opinions.", http://caselaw.findlaw.com/nj-superior-court-appellate-division/1044397.html] bcr 1-13-2017

 Here, we are satisfied that the plain language of the statute mandates an affidavit of merit in all professional malpractice claims.   The statute requires that plaintiff file an affidavit of merit in “any action for damages ․ resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation.”   N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 (emphasis added).   The statute does not direct that the word “any” be construed in a manner contrary to its ordinary meaning.   Moreover, the context in which the word is used does not indicate a definition other than its ordinary and well-understood meaning.   The word “any” is defined as “all [and] used as a function word to indicate the maximum or whole of a number or quantity.”   Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged 1971).   Thus, as used  in the statute, and given its common meaning, the phrase “any action” refers to all actions governed by the statute, and not expressly excepted by the statute.   Cf. Higgins v. Pasack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 419, 730 A.2d 327 (1999).

#### Violation: plan text only defends anti-war speech

#### Standards:

#### Grammar – the inherent meaning of any is that all forms come under scrutiny which makes the interp most linguistically correct. Grammar sequences all impacts because it creates a common frame of understanding from which side-burdens are conceptualized

#### Real World – The interp indicates any as all is universally recognized and does not imply exceptions making it standard court practice. Real world interps are key to accurate simulations and access to the literature base.

#### Ground – the interp holds the aff to whole res which is key to links on both sides – the aff can still claim advantages off of any free speech while the neg gets their generic links. Parametricizing to one form of speech allows the aff do delink literally all of our topic prep, and forces us to pursue an infinitely vast core of specific links which are impossible to achieve.

#### Voters:

#### A Priori: T is a prior question to substance because you have to set the argumentative table before engaging in questions of normative ethics and scholarship. Drop the arg or re-evaluate the affirmative under the neg interp to preserve substantive clash – their choice preserves reciprocity.

#### Fairness & Education: The pedagogical intent of debate is to offer a balanced route to the ballot and academic take-away – strategies that destroy this should be sidelined

#### Competing Interps: Vote for the interp that’s best for debate based off evaluation of the standards debate – aggregates the best practice and prevents a race to the bottom

1. **No RVIs. I have the right to test stock issues which is a-priori AND RVIs are illogical, don’t vote aff because they’re T AND T equalizes the time skew, RVI kills strat AND RVIs kills vocab and legal education and promote vacuous debate.**

### DA

#### Their reformism fails to disrupt militarism and feeds into traditional security debates which replicates systemic violence – only an anti-politics of refusing military policy making in the first places opens up space for resistance. The aff’s logic of securitizing militaristic speech reproduces their impact. The aff’s logic of reforming the institution through military rhetoric still concedes to the way security debates play out which reproduces militarism.

Mark Neocleous, Critique of Security pp. 185-186, 2008 Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University London, PhD in philosophy from Middlesex University, 2008, [http://www.jstor.org.libsrv.wku.edu/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1r270k] bcr 10/12/16 [\*Modified against violent language]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the ~~fetish~~ [obsession], is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security ~~fetishism~~ [obessiveness] and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the ~~arms~~ [control] of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to ~~blind ourselves to~~ [conceal] the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the ~~debilitating~~ [damaging] effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, ~~debilitating~~ [damaging] in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

Because the ballot has the power to endorse what is considered truthful by virtue of picking a winner, the judge must assume the role of the intellectual, whom has the primary obligation to deconstruct regimes of truth – we do not criticize to assert our own ideology as dominant and “true” but rather criticize to remove the way truth is used by the affirmative. Truth seeking outside of hegemonic forms of knowledge is an intellectual responsibility.

**Foucault 1984,** [Michel Foucault, “Power and Knowledge,” 1980, Print.]

It seems to me that what must now be taken into account in **[T]he intellectual is not the ‘bearer of universal values.’** **Rather**, it’s **the person** occupying a specific position – but **who**se specificity **is linked**, in a society like ours, **to** the general functioning of an apparatus of **truth**. In other words, the intellectual has a three-fold specificity: that of his class position (whether as petty-bourgeois in the service of capitalism or ‘organic’ intellectual of the proletariat); that of his conditions of life and work, linked to his condition as an intellectual (his field of research, his place in a laboratory, and political and economy demands to which he submits of against which he rebels, in the university, the hospital, etc.); lastly, the specificity of the politics of truths in our societies. And **it’s with this** last **factor that [their]** his **position can take on** a general **significance** and that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectorial. The intellectual can operate and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth which is so essential to the structure and functioning of our society. **There is a battle** ‘for truth,’ or at least **‘around truth’** – it being understood once again that by truth I do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,’ but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’, it being understood also that it’s not a matter of a battle ‘on behalf’ of the truth, but of a battle about the status of truth **and the** economic and political **role it plays**. It is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of ‘science’ and ‘ideology’, but in terms of ‘truth’ and ‘power’. And thus the question of the professionalization of intellectuals and the division between intellectual and manual labour can be envisaged in a new way. All this must seem very confused and uncertain. Uncertain indeed, and what I am saying here is above all to be taken as a hypothesis. In order for it to be a little less confused, however, I would like to put forward a few ‘propositions’ – not firm assertions, but simply suggestions to be further tested and explained. **‘Truth’ is** to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is **linked** in a circular relation **with** system of **power**s **which** produces and **sustain** it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. **A regime** of truth. This regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. And it’s this same regime **which [is], subject to** certain **modification**s, operates in the socialists countries (I leave open here the question of China, about which I know little). **The** essential political problem for the **intellectual** **is not to criticize** the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or **to ensure that his own** scientific **practice is** accompanied by a **correct** ideology, **but** **that of ascertaining the possibility of** constitution a **new** politics of **truth.** The problem is not changing people’s consciousness’s – or what’s in their heads – but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth. **It’s** not **a matter** of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but **of detaching the power of truth from** the forms of **hegemony**, social economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.

### Advocacy

#### Affs fails to outline specifics on plan implementation – they should be able to answer necessary questions like What is the legal penalty? / What is the retribution? / How do they remove restrictions? How is military criticism classified? / remember, it’s their job to demonstrate a burden of proof for aff solvency – only way to demonstrate they solves their advantage links which is how they justify the aff as a good idea.

#### Vote Neg – plans that fail to incorporate specific details can’t be evaluated because

#### No blueprint for bureaucrats to enact plan which empirically leads to serial policy failure

#### No way to solidy examine consequences of each step and element of plan so there’s no debate

#### C – CX spec doesn’t solve because that claims adherence to just defuse criticism which recreates bureaucratic inertia

Gary M. Galles, Orange County Register, 3-3-2009, professor of economics at Pepperdine University, where he has taught for thirty years. He received his PhD in economics from UCLA in 1988. His research focuses on public finance, public choice (better termed, “the economics of government”), the theory of the firm, the organization of industry, and the role of liberty, including the views of many classical liberals (now called libertarians), echoed by many of America’s founders. In addition to journal articles, he has been involved in many economics textbook projects and has published over a thousand popular articles and opinion pieces. He has made multiple appearances on television and radio programs. His focus is primarily on using economics tools to understand the “real world,” rather than creating theoretically elegant but misleading models divorced from it. ["The Orange Grove: Obama health plan; we need details", http://www.ocregister.com/articles/details-25757-proposals-obama.html] bcr

The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision has to be based on specific proposals. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one - including those proposing a "reform" - can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the president wants approval for a $634 billion proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike salesmen, however, a politician's product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth-in-advertising laws, they have fewer competitors keeping them honest, and they face "customers" - voters - far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than consumers spending their own money. These differences explain why politicians' "sales pitches" for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the details will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his "solution" to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right - a prospect that, given the painful lessons of history, should attract few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan's details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If details of a plan made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide them; they would be trumpeted at every opportunity as proof he really had the answers. Claiming adherence to elevated principles while keeping detailed proposals from sight also has a strategic advantage: It defuses criticism. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying "that was not in our proposal" or "we have no plans to do that" or similar retorts. It also allows a politician to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if they were his [their] idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don't spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, it virtually ensures bad policy.

#### Turns case – generalism is how militarism sustains itself.

Levi Bryant, in his blog Larval Subjects, Sept. 15 2012 professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice [“War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table, <https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/>] bcr 11-18-2016

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively.  We can call them questions of “military logistics”.  We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions.  Military logistics asks two questions:  first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc.  Military logistics maps all of these things.  Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine.  In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc?  What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function?  These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene.  If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target.

### Case General

#### Your call to produce through the university is what increases state power over knowledge – The University’s relationship with the state ensures biopolitical control over who can produce truth – this directly answers your academics and professors internal links.

Stephen Matthias HARNEY, Fred MOTEN, in The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, in 2013 [http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6024&context=lkcsb\_research, pg 26-28, 2/8/17]

“To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment. In the face of these conditions one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of – this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graf. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the undercommons of enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say teaching, one would be performing the work of the university. Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of that onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the state” that Jacques Derrida calls the Universitas. But it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters. The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with THE UNIVERSITY AND THE UNDERCOMMONS 27 and thereby erased by it. It is not teaching that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But it is teaching that brings us in. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” But what would it mean if teaching or rather what we might call “the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance? And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority? Certainly, the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste. But their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the enlightenment. The waste lives for those moments beyond teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase – unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps the biopower of the enlightenment knows this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must. But even as 28 THE UNDERCOMMONS it depends on these moles, these refugees, it will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic – why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons – this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act. And it is at the same time, the only possible act. In that undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualisation of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond of teaching is really about is not fnishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unft for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood.

#### Aff can’t solve – delegating authority to the university fails to overcome ideologue adminstrators and tenure

KURTZ 17 Stanley Kurtz, is a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center. National Review, 4-12-2017, ["Understanding the Campus Free-Speech Crisis", http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/446634/campus-free-speech-crisis] bcr 4-20-2017

So there are important reasons to believe that today’s free-speech crisis is locked-in and unchangeable in the absence of outside intervention. The alliance of radical students with dominant sections of the faculty (precisely those faculty members who reject classical liberalism) means that few C. Vann Woodwards remain to pressure administrators into defending free speech. Meanwhile, the ideologically based “studies” programs (various ethnic studies, women’s studies, and environmental studies majors) have grown to challenge the conventional academic departments in size and influence. This creates a large and permanent faculty and student constituency schooled in suspicion of classic liberalism. Ultimately, the public has granted the academy certain rights and privileges — special financial and policy protections (especially tenure) — on the understanding that institutions of higher education will pursue truth under conditions of free inquiry and fairness to all points of view. There is a kind of implicit bargain or social contract here, and the academy has so consistently and persistently violated its side of the bargain that public action is now necessary. In particular, the tenure system, designed to ensure freedom of speech and secure the marketplace of ideas, has been abused to create an illiberal intellectual monopoly. And precisely because of this monopolistic abuse of the unique privilege of academic tenure, along with the unresolved, decades-long crisis of campus free speech, the traditional policy presumption in favor of local control can no longer be sustained in this sector.

#### Don’t give them any root cause or magnitude claims – free speech violations are ultrarare

MASCIOTRA 17 Professor David Masciotra, is the author of "Mellencamp: American Troubadour" (University of Kentucky Press), and is currently at work on a collection of personal essays for Agate Publishing. Columnist @ Salon, 4-23-2017, ["The truth about the campus “free speech wars”", http://www.salon.com/2017/04/23/the-truth-about-the-campus-free-speech-wars/] bcr 4-24-2017

The current hysteria and paranoia over “free speech wars” on college campuses is one of the most absurd and illustrative examples. There are 4,140 institutions of higher education in the United States and more than 17 million students enrolled in classes at the college level. Bitter disputes over Halloween costumes and cultural appropriation at Yale or arguments over cafeteria sushi at Oberlin are rare and extreme aberrations that actually contradict the reality of the typical day at any university. They are far from emblematic of any larger reality. To evaluate the status of speech on campus according to observations made at a protest transformed into a riot at the University of California, Berkeley is the equivalent of predicting the life expectancy of young Americans by examining the dangers facing soldiers in combat.

#### No impact – students don’t care enough to speak up

MASCIOTRA 17 Professor David Masciotra, is the author of "Mellencamp: American Troubadour" (University of Kentucky Press), and is currently at work on a collection of personal essays for Agate Publishing. Columnist @ Salon, 4-23-2017, ["The truth about the campus “free speech wars”", http://www.salon.com/2017/04/23/the-truth-about-the-campus-free-speech-wars/] bcr 4-24-2017

My most battering battle in the campus free speech wars is attempting to get the students to speak. Speech, of any kind, would come as a welcome change from the blank stares I’m accustomed to receiving from my students when I ask for reaction to the previous night’s reading assignment. Many right-wing paranoiacs accuse the professorate of attempting to “indoctrinate” the student body according to a Marxist agenda of critical race theory and intersectionality. I would settle for someone raising his hand and saying, “I liked the Hemingway story.” Far from feeling under threat from students who enforce their increasingly sensitive and hostile ideology on their surroundings, the only complaints I have received are grade protests. “Why did I get a C?” doesn’t quite have the drama or make for compelling “news at 9” flashing banners on television, as a trash can flying through a window in Berkeley, California, or a protest aimed at Ann Coulter, but the grade complaint is typically the only petition a student will file and professor will field. I might actually throw a party to celebrate receiving a complaint against a political statement I made in a lecture because such an objection from a student would imply that the plaintiff was paying attention.

#### Free speech is irrelevant – college campuses are an echo chamber that replicate the impacts

VENKER 17 Suzanne Venker, A former teacher-turned-social critic, Suzanne Venker is an author and speaker on politics, marriage, parenting, and the culture. A well-known commentator on cultural issues, Suzanne has appeared on ABC, CNN, FOX, Huff-Po Live and C-SpanDaily Caller, 4-24-2017, ["Campus Free Speech Is The Least Of It: What I Learned From My Visit To Bard", http://dailycaller.com/2017/04/24/campus-free-speech-is-the-least-of-it-what-i-learned-from-my-visit-to-bard/] bcr 4-24-2017

This was met with even greater shock. It was as though I were an alien from another planet who couldn’t understand the way things work on earth. It was the students’ job to enlighten me, in other words, rather than the other way around. And so I find myself conflicted about my time at Bard. Yes, the silencing of speech is a huge problem on campuses today—and Bard did indeed rise above the fray. But as MacDonald adds, and as my visit to Bard proves, the silencing of speech is just a symptom of a much larger phenomenon on college campuses: a “profound distortion of reality.” At the end of the day, then, it doesn’t matter whether speakers are silenced or not. Because American universities are so divorced from reality they can’t fathom a word of what those speakers would say.

#### Free speech protections are irrelevant – people’s isolated worldviews and self-censorship overwhelm

MCLAUGHLIN 17 Eliott C. Mclaughlin, Senior Writer Since 2005 Eliott has served as writer, producer, field reporter, blogger, newsdesk editor and Southeast Bureau liaison. He's now a CNN Digital senior writer.CNN 4-20-2017, ["War on campus: The escalating battle over college free speech", http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/us/campus-free-speech-trnd/] bcr 4-20-2017

Assaults on college free speech have been waged for decades, but they used to be top-down, originating with government or school administrators. Today, experts say, students and faculty stifle speech themselves, especially if it involves conservative causes. Harvey Klehr, who helped bring controversial speakers to Emory during his 40 years as a politics and history professor, said the issues college students rally around today come "embarrassingly from the left." Oppose affirmative action or same-sex marriage and you're branded a bigot, he said. Where debate once elevated the best idea, student bodies are now presented slanted worldviews, denying them lessons in critical thinking, he said. "History is full of very, very upsetting things. ... Grow up. The world is a nasty place," he said. "If you want to confront it, change it, you have to understand the arguments of nasty people." Berkeley political science professor Jack Citrin began attending UCB in 1964 during the advent of the free speech movement, when Berkeley students "viewed ourselves as a beacon of the ability to handle all points of view." Universities expose young people to ideas and challenge what they believe about science, politics, religion or whatever. But many students today exist only in the bubble of what they believe, he said. "It's an indicator of the erosion of the commitment to open exchange and a retreat into psychobabble," Citrin said.

#### The defense of free speech empowers the academic elite – they hide behind it to justify their agendas and silence critics

GOLDBERG 17 Jonah Goldberg, senior editor Jonah Goldberg is a bestselling author and columnist and fellow of the National Review Institute. His nationally syndicated column appears regularly in scores of newspapers across the United States. National Review, 4-24-2017, ["What The Free Speech Debate Misses", http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/446998/campus-censorship-isnt-issue] bcr 4-25-2017

In other words, the problem isn’t a lack of commitment to free speech (though that is a problem). The free speech argument is downstream of the real dilemma: The people running what should be citadels of civilizational confidence have turned against our civilization. Maybe some atheist speaker has been banned because he would hurt the feelings of religious students, but I’ve not heard about it. In other words, these administrators aren’t principally concerned with the sensitivities of “students” or even “students of color” or female students, but of particular students who adhere to a specific ideology. The administrators use them as props and excuses to justify their ideological, quasi-religious, agenda. The irony comes when the defenders of these totalitarian enclaves must defend their stance to the larger society. Normal people and other elite critics shout “What about free speech?” And so the secular priests contort themselves into pretzels trying to make the case that their censorship is somehow consistent with some nonsensical notion of a “higher principle” of what free speech is. They can’t be honest and say, “We have a heckler’s veto for anything that smacks of heresy and we’re not afraid to use it.”

#### Enforcement of free speech rules means penalties – that in turn silence free speech

HS 17 Editorial Board, The Herald-Sun (NC), 4-20-2017, ["Let campuses handle campus speech", http://www.heraldsun.com/opinion/article145715569.html] bcr 4-26-2017

Today, we’re in the throes of debate over whether some voices are being drowned out by official sanction, or by official negligence in the face of disruptive efforts to prevent some viewpoints from being espoused on a campus. In some states, including North Carolina, efforts by national groups such as the Goldwater Institute have attracted legislative attention, seeking defense against perceived curtailment of conservative voices on presumably liberal-tilted campuses. This is tricky territory, and it’s worth acknowledging that some have carried distaste for certain conservative speakers to troubling lengths -- essentially shouting down a conservative speaker at the University of California at Berkeley, for example. In the wake of that incident, UC-Berkeley officials canceled a scheduled speech by conservative firebrand Ann Coulter this week because of safety concerns. On the day the college reached that conclusion, an N.C. House committee was considering a “campus free speech” bill that would instruct administrators at UNC campuses on how to deal with free-speech issues. The bill would “prescribe a range of disciplinary sanctions” for anyone on campus “who interferes with the free expression of others.” We don’t disagree that interfering with others’ expression is generally the wrong response, but this is an arena from which legislators should keep their distance. When lawmakers start dictating campus speech policies, ill results are likely to ensue, perhaps most infamously in North Carolina with the “speaker ban” of the 1950s which banned communists from speaking on UNC campuses and was eventually ruled unconstitutional. On the other hand, area campuses can point to some dramatic stands for the value of academic freedom and free campus speech, dating to the earliest days of the 20th century. UNC Senior Vice President and General Counsel Tom Shanahan cautioned that the legislation could dampen free speech and pointed out the system takes the issue seriously. “Our staff on our campuses work with students every day to help them be able to protest, get their thoughts out and debate,” Shanahan told the House Rules and Operations Committee.

### Adv 1

### Adv 2

## 2NR - Antipolitics

### 2NC Lx/Alt – Abolition Key

#### Vote negative to adopt abolitionist politics – only total rejection of [the war machine] allows transformative movements and their reformism only masks power structures while killing resistance

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Abolition is the collective practice of productive refusal. It is an immoderate rejection of white supremacy (and whiteness itself), patriarchy, hetero-normativity, ableism, settler-colonialism, border imperialism, political hierarchy, and the rule of capital. It is a politics of discomfort, constant reflection, continuous analysis, and what Alisa Bierria has eloquently named, a practice of “subversive proposition.” It is a demand that those at the center take on what the late Iris Marion Young calls the fearless practice of “respectful listening” to those relegated to the margins (which also means starting from a serious skepticism about anything said about abolition by folks like myself). It is an insistence to actively support and center those most targeted by intersecting axes of oppression and domination. It must be all of these things, not in spite of, but because abolitionist projects necessarily focus on specific institutions and practices in order to be concrete and meaningful material projects. Of course, by focusing narrowly (on prisons, police, the death penalty, etc.) we also run the risk of abolishing institutions and practices but allowing their functions to thrive in a new and more deeply entrenched form. As Angela Davis reminds us, invoking W.E.B. Du Bois, the current state of incarceration in the United States is a direct result of the “abolition” of chattel slavery. Having only negatively abolished slavery without positively enacting the social, political, and economic institutions promoting black liberation, hetero-patriarchal white supremacy was easily retrenched in convict leasing, lynch law, and the entire criminal punishment system. This is to remember, as Joy James reminds us, that chattel slavery was abolished in the United States not just with an explicit exception as punishment for crime, but through this exception in law. We have not simply failed to achieve Du Bois’ abolition-democracy, but we have seen abolitionist projects fail through their own success, shoring up the wages of whiteness, colonialism, and masculinity. This implies internal refusals as well: a refusal to grant the premise that we can abolish the prison without abolishing white supremacy, a refusal to believe that we can end white supremacy without the death of hetero-patriarchy, a refusal to accept that we can destroy hetero-patriarchy without rejecting colonialism, and imperialism, and capitalism, and ableism, and so on, and so on… In this way, we realize that the particular narrow foci of abolitionist projects are in fact always already broadly focused if they are truly to be transformative and not reformist. We must think and live abolition broadly, always recognizing that our targets are produced and maintained by interlocking and intersecting conditions that must themselves be refused, rejected, and abolished. These are both the strategic and substantive locations to do the work, to think reflectively about the freedom of others, and to build a world that is otherwise.

### 2NC MPX – Ontology

#### Working within the violent ontology of traditional security debates supports a security paradigm that makes war, oppression, and exploitation inevitable – confronting violent ontologies should be to focal point of this round as only alternatives from the outside prevent impact replication

Anthony Burke—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales 2007 [ “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory and Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, Project MUSE]cdm

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant’s moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy — that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community — my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, ‘does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.’87 What I take from Heidegger’s argument — one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security — is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity — militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction — derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, ‘empirical’ discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers’ choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, ‘rationality’ is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning’s very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints — available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate — and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger’s analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies — especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions — are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of ‘enframing’ and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly’s insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more ‘primal truth’ of being — that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger’s unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a ‘questioning’, ‘free relationship’ to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical — his faith in ‘art’ and the older Greek attitudes of ‘responsibility and indebtedness’ offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon ‘questioning’ as such — on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of ‘interests’) and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?