# Case Neg v DebateDrills IndoPak Aff V2

## Realism NC

#### Ethics as an understanding of political thinking is flawed and incorrect –

#### 1] The Agency Fallacy – to think of political institutions as moral institutions misrepresents the entire point of being a moral institution. In order to act as a moral agent, you must make decisions based on your own agency. Political entities are denied this privilege, as they can only make decisions that meet the will of the people. They are denied the ability to act on their own agency, which strips them of any moral obligations.

#### 2] Decision making – political entities have entitlements to a certain group of people, making it impossible to carry out truly utilitarian judgements. If the US had to choose between killing 100 of it’s civilians or 100,000 people in Yemen, they will choose the kill the 100,000 in Yemen, proving that political entities can’t make moral judgements.

#### Only embracing a philosophy of political realism can truly enable us to correctly evaluate the consequences of political decisions.

Rossi and Sleat 14 [Enzo Rossi and Matt Sleat, Philosophy Compass, "Realism in Normative Political Theory - PhilPapers", 2014, https://philpapers.org/rec/ROSRIN] **IV**
Ethics and politics - Realists posit a dichotomy between the realm of human action that is appropriately regulated by morality (or ethics —we use those terms interchangeably for now), and the realm of politics, which requires separate norms. The exact nature of this dichotomy depends on whether one endorses the more or less radical version of the autonomy of the political. But this move is not a stipulative land grab. It is motivated by presently unfashionable considerations that are familiar to political philosophers at least since Machiavelli, Hobbes, Schmitt, and Lenin, if not since Thucydides (Bolsinger 2001; Dyson 2005; Hawthorn 2014). The broadly Hobbesian thought is that, if ethics could effectively regulate behaviour in political communities as it does among (say) friends and acquaintances, we would not require politics. We need politics in part precisely because of the ubiquity of moral disagreements about what we collectively should do, the ends to which political power should be put, and the moral principles and values that should underpin and regulate our shared political association. As such politics cannot be a domain that is straightforwardly regulated by morality. From that follows either the loosely Machiavellian claim that politics has its own normativity (or 'internal logic'), which floats free from personal morality and can be directly at odds with it, or the more complex 2 Perhaps the confusion between realism and non-ideal theory is partly due to the fact that most moralistic political philosophy is also ideal theory. But political moralism can feature in much the same way in non-ideal theory (e.g. Mason 2010 and, for a realist critique, Sleat 2012). 4 yet less radical claim that politics cannot be exhausted by morality and that key political concepts such as legitimacy and authority need to be rethought in conditions of ineradicable moral and political disagreement (Philp 2012; Philp 2007). This position has often been supplemented with some more general remarks regarding the relatively weak motivational force of morality (Geuss 2008: 9-11), and the need to supplement our understanding with a form of what Galston has called 'psychological or motivational realism’ (2010: 398) which also gives due recognition to the role of interests, rhetoric, political leadership (Sabl 2002), appeals to history, and, maybe more controversially, the use of coercive force to generate desired human responses (Stears 2007). Critics of realism respond by arguing that observation of the weak motivational force of morality over politics does not warrant the abandonment of the ‘ethics first’ approach (Estlund 2011; Finlayson 2014). For realists that reply is off the mark: the point is not that morality is only weakly capable of directing politics, but that political moralism reduces political problems to matters of personal morality (see Williams' discussion of humanitarian intervention - 2008: ch. 12), leaving no space for the sort of concerns (e.g. order and stability) or features (e.g. conflict, interests, passions) that ensure politics cannot simply be 'applied moral philosophy'. Morality may be successful at causally influencing politics as any other grand aspiration (cf. Sleat 2013b), but that is not to say that it can purport to guide political behaviour in the same way in which it guides personal conduct nor that it always provides a suitable blueprint for action in a sphere that is constituted by disagreement, contestation, and coercion.

#### Realism understands political actions are purely based on acquiring power

Korab-Karpowicz 18 [Julian Korab-Karpowicz, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Political Realism in International Relations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)", Summer 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/#HansMorgRealPrin] **IV**
Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) developed realism into a comprehensive international relations theory. Influenced by the Protestant theologian and political writer Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as by Hobbes, he places selfishness and power-lust at the center of his picture of human existence. The insatiable human lust for power, timeless and universal, which he identifies with animus dominandi, the desire to dominate, is for him the main cause of conflict. As he asserts in his main work, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (25). Morgenthau systematizes realism in international relations on the basis of six principles that he includes in the second edition of Politics among Nations. As a traditionalist, he opposes the so-called scientists (the scholars who, especially in the 1950s, tried to reduce the discipline of international relations to a branch of behavioral science). Nevertheless, in the first principle he states that realism is based on objective laws that have their roots in unchanging human nature (4). He wants to develop realism into both a theory of international politics and a political art, a useful tool of foreign policy. The keystone of Morgenthau’s realist theory is the concept of power or “of interest defined in terms of power,” which informs his second principle: the assumption that political leaders “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (5). This concept defines the autonomy of politics, and allows for the analysis of foreign policy regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians. Furthermore, it is the foundation of a rational picture of politics. Although, as Morgenthau explains in the third principle, interest defined as power is a universally valid category, and indeed an essential element of politics, various things can be associated with interest or power at different times and in different circumstances. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. In the fourth principle, Morgenthau considers the relationship between realism and ethics. He says that while realists are aware of the moral significance of political action, they are also aware of the tension between morality and the requirements of successful political action. “Universal moral principles,” he asserts, “cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but …they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” (9). These principles must be accompanied by prudence for as he cautions “there can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” (ibid.). Prudence, and not conviction of one’s own moral or ideological superiority, should guide political action. This is stressed in the fifth principle, where Morgenthau again emphasizes the idea that all state actors, including our own, must be looked at solely as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power. By taking this point of view vis-à-vis its counterparts and thus avoiding ideological confrontation, a state would then be able to pursue policies that respected the interests of other states, while protecting and promoting its own. Insofar as power, or interest defined as power, is the concept that defines politics, politics is an autonomous sphere, as Morgenthau says in his sixth principle of realism. It cannot be subordinated to ethics. However, ethics does still play a role in politics. “A man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence” (12). Political art requires that these two dimensions of human life, power and morality, be taken into consideration.

#### Thus, the standard is evaluation through political realism

Spec Issues: Weighing mechanism – we ought to evaluate actions through a lens of realism to decide if the benefits of the aff outweigh the harms of the neg OR if the aff is true ie not a contradiction.

#### Impact Calc

#### 1] External requirements on politics are impossible – political norms are already ingrained in the fabric of political action, which means that regardless of external burdens, politics will continue to function as a means to pursue power over everything else.

#### Now Negate

#### IR is entirely based around power politics, as evidenced by the fight for geopolitical hegemony. Nukes carry a sense of power intrinsically, making it a contradiction to eliminate.

Paul 95 [T.V. Paul, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, "The Paradox of Power: Nuclear Weapons in a Changed World on JSTOR", December 1995, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40644845?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=The&searchText=Paradox&searchText=of&searchText=Power&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3DThe%2BParadox%2Bof%2BPower%26amp%3Bacc%3Don%26amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff%26amp%3Bgroup%3Dnone&ab\_segments=0%2Fbasic\_SYC-4929%2Fcontrol&refreqid=search%3A787b5ad00388f4e015781bf00a70aeac&seq=1#metadata\_info\_tab\_contents] **Tfane23**
The decision to resume nuclear testing by China and France in the summer of 1995, despite intense international opposition, has been motivated to a great extent by their desire to maintain power and status in international politics through the possession of a modernized nuclear weapons force. These decisions came on the heels of an unprecedented agreement by over 185 countries in New York in May 1995 to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in perpetuity. This conference outcome reflected a belief among a large number of nonnuclear states that the possession of atomic weapons would not add much to their power status. Yet the five declared nuclear states and a handful of undeclared states hold on to their nuclear weaponry on the assumption that these capabilities provide them with not only a deterrent against external attacks but a source of power and influence in international politics. It is not only the officials of these states but many international relations theorists, especially so-called realists, who tend to believe that nuclear weapons endow a state with a great amount of power and influence.1 Understanding the assumed linkage between nuclear weapons and power has major policy and theoretical

## CBW Disad

#### The tradeoff is direct --- a shift away from nuclear weapons cause bioweapon acquisition

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Finally, we turn to estimating the effect of both nuclear and chemical weapons pur suit and acquisition on the risk of initiating biological weapons pursuit in models 5 and 6. These results are equally interesting because they provide support for the notion that biological weapons (in addition to chemical weapons) can also be appro priately considered a "poor man's nuclear bomb." Similar to the impact of posses sing nuclear weapons on the probability a state pursues chemical weapons, nuclear weapons possession has a strong negative effect on biological weapons pursuit in both models 5 and 6. After holding the underlying level of demand constant in model 6, simply possessing a nuclear weapon appears to decrease the instantaneous risk that a state will pursue biological weapons to virtually zero (1.44 χ 10~7). This is consistent with the understanding of nuclear weapons as so powerful that they make the possession of other types of WMDs less relevant. Even before countries such as the United States abandoned their chemical weapons programs, for example, they aban doned their biological weapons program. The United States eliminated its offensive BW program under a Nixon administration order in 1969 and had shut down the pro gram by the time it signed the BWC in 1972. France and Great Britain similarly elim inated their offensive BW programs. Russia stands in stark contrast to this argument, however. Evidence revealed after the cold war demonstrated that the Soviet Union maintained a vibrant offensive BW program at the Biopreparat complex through the end of the cold war. This demonstrates that grouping CBWs into a single category may not accurately represent the way countries actually think about them. Biological weap ons, given their greater theoretical destructive capacity, may be considered somewhat differently. This is a potential path for future research.

#### Bioweapons cause extinction – mathematically outweighs, even if they win mitigation.

Millett & Snyder-Beattie ‘17. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low, the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).9 In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-21 Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record ofstate-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.23,24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.27 Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction.28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released”(quoted in ref. 29). Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons.30 Fortunately, to date, non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows.31,32 What is the appropriate response to these speculative extinction threats? A balanced biosecurity portfolio might include investments that reduce a mix of proven and speculative risks, but striking this balance is still difficult given the massive uncertainties around the low-probability, high-consequence risks. In this article, we examine the traditional spectrum of biosecurity risks (ie, biocrimes, bioterrorism, and biowarfare) to categorize biothreats by likelihood and impact, expanding the historical analysis to consider even lower-probability, higher-consequence events (catastrophic risks and existential risks). In order to produce reasoned estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreats, we bring together relevant data and theory and produce some first-guess estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreat, and we use these initial estimates to compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing existential risks with more traditional biosecurity measures. We emphasize that these models are highly uncertain, and their utility lies more in enabling order-of-magnitude comparisons rather than as a precise measure of the true risk. However, even with the most conservative models, we find that reduction of low-probability, high-consequence risks can be more cost-effective, as measured by quality-adjusted life year per dollar, especially when we account for the lives of future generations. This suggests that despite the low probability of such events, society still ought to invest more in preventing the most extreme possible biosecurity catastrophes.

## Deterrence Disad

#### Nuclear deterrence works – any alternative results in quick conventional wars

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First, as a means for maintaining security, it is difficult to identify a credible alternative to nuclear deterrence. Simply put, nuclear deterrence has worked. Even at the height of the Cold War’s ideological polarization, the world never witnessed the sort of large-scale wars that, in the absence of a nuclear deterrent, were fought in the first half of the 20th century. Policy makers fully recognize the destructive capability of nuclear weapons and have come to understand the complexities inherent in a nuclear world. The concept of mutual assured destruction has provided, and continues to provide, a sound basis for limiting the scope and scale of confrontations between nuclear weapon states. Devoid of a nuclear deterrent, the world would immediately become more dangerous. If military assets were limited to conventional weapons, nations would experience fewer inhibitions against armed conflict. This would hold true even for the major powers. With disincentives to conflict reduced, the renewal of conventional arms races would likely be unstoppable. This would have an important effect on, among other things, national budgets. Today, at least for nuclear weapon states, the existence of a nuclear deterrent allows for drastic reductions in defense spending during times of austerity. In a similar vein, countries that fall under another nation’s extended nuclear deterrence can spend less on conventional military capabilities than they otherwise would; they benefit from a nuclear dividend. So overall, though it may sound paradoxical, nuclear weapons are a force for stability. It is hard to imagine how similar levels of stability could be achieved through any means other than nuclear weapons.

#### Conventional war would be terrible – new tech causes more lives to be lost

Dvorsky 12 [George Dvorsky ‘12 writes - Chair of the Board for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, co-founder and president of the Toronto Transhumanist Association, Gizmodo, "“9 Ways Humanity Could Bring About Its Own Destruction,”", 2012, http://io9.com/5967660/9-ways-humanity-could-bring-about-our-own-destruction ] **IV**

At the end of World War 2, nearly 2.5% of the human population had died. Of the 70 million people who were killed, about 20 million died from starvation. And disturbingly, civilians accounted for nearly 50 percent of all deaths — an indication that war isn't just for soldiers any more. Given the incredible degree to which technology has advanced in the nearly seven decades since this war, it's reasonable to assume that the next global ‘conventional war' — i.e. one fought without nuclear weapons — would be near devastating in scope. The degree of human suffering that could be unleashed would easily surpass anything that came before it, with soldiers using many of the technologies already described in this list, including autonomous killing machines, weaponized nanotech , and in various acts of desperation (or sheer malevolence), some belligerent nations could choose to unleash chemical and biological weapons that would result in countless deaths.

## India-China Disad

#### Relations are passable now, but China’s expansionist tendencies fuel discord and mistrust.

**Lidarev 20**, [Ivan, Masters in Int. Affairs w/ Asia Concentration @ GWU, expert on Chinese foreign policy], 1-19, “Reviewing a passable year in China-India relations”, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/2019-reviewing-a-passable-year-in-china-india-relations/> //pd

To understand China-India relations in the past year, it is necessary to examine the bilateral and geopolitical background that has shaped them. On a bilateral level, the experience of crisis and partial reconciliation in the previous two years fashioned China-India relations in 2019. In 2017, the 73-day Doklam standoff between Chinese and Indian soldiers rocked China-India relations amid fears of military conflict. The greatest bilateral crisis in decades, Doklam erupted amid escalating competition between the two giants in Asia and the Himalayan belt, more assertive Indian policy on the “Tibet issue,” an increasing security dilemma partly fueled by closer U.S.-India relations, and the advancement of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia, as well as tensions over the two sides’ territorial dispute. The Doklam crisis served as a warning to both sides that the tensions caused by their competition and by their unresolved border can easily escalate and derail their relationship. The next year, in 2018, the two sides engineered a badly-needed thaw during the [informal summit at Wuhan](https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/all-that-you-need-to-know-about-pm-modi-xi-s-informal-wuhan-summit-1222279-2018-04-28) between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The summit established a mechanism of informal meetings between the leaders of the two sides, helped them understand and partly assuage each other’s concerns on a number of issues, and refocused relations on cooperation. In short, in the shadow of Doklam the Wuhan summit put relations on an upward trajectory. However, crucially, Wuhan did not resolve any of the underlying sources of tension between Beijing and Delhi. On a geostrategic level, the relationship between China and India in 2019 reflected two larger developments on the international stage in recent years. One is the growing competition between China and the United States. This competition has pushed Beijing to improve relations with New Delhi, both to avoid a potential Indian drift into Washington’s camp and to allow China to focus on the American challenge by keeping its southern flank stable. Nevertheless, China has been careful to not make substantial concessions to India for fear that these would reward New Delhi’s tilt toward Washington and increase India’s demands on Beijing. For New Delhi, the U.S.-China competition presents a mixed bag. On one hand, it undeniably gives India some leverage over its more powerful Chinese neighbor. On the other, it complicated Delhi’s fine balancing act between Washington, a key but overbearing partner needed to hedge against China but carefully kept at arm’s length, and Beijing, a rival which India can ill afford to turn into adversary. The other geostrategic development is the continued, albeit slower, expansion of China’s BRI in South Asia. Inevitably, this expansion increases the tensions between India, which regards the region as its strategic sphere of pre-eminence, and China, which seems interested in integrating some or all of South Asia in its orbit to establish an economic and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean. The BRI’s continued expansion into South Asia and toward the Indian Ocean has also pushed China closer to Pakistan, through which the crucial China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes, at the inevitable expense of its relations with India. Against this bilateral and geostrategic background, three characteristics have marked China-India relations in 2019. First, the two sides have sought to keep the momentum of improving relations that was generated by the Wuhan summit. While the last year has seen this momentum slow, with tensions over issues such as Kashmir and growing disillusionment with the “Wuhan spirit,” China and India have not given up on their improved post-Wuhan relationship, aware that the alternative is the costly and dangerous deterioration of relations. The commitment to improved relations was embodied in the informal [Mamallapuram summit](https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/modi-and-xi-in-mamallapuram-a-new-agenda/), a follow-up to the Wuhan summit, which demonstrated that the informal summit mechanism between the countries’ leaders and their personal relationship will play a central role in managing relations. China and India have also sought to build confidence and expand cooperation by joint international projects. For instance, in June China and India made a tentative attempt to [revive the long-planned Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) corridor](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/kunming-meet-revives-bcim-link-plan/articleshow/69921135.cms?from=mdr), while in November they presided over the second edition of a [joint training program for Afghan diplomats](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/11/c_138546684.htm) agreed during the Wuhan summit. The two sides also made concessions to each other in 2019 to keep the upward trajectory of relations. China took a relatively balanced position during the Indo-Pakistan military crisis that followed the Pulwama attack and might have even [mediated](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2188923/chinese-envoy-islamabad-beijing-tries-mediate-pakistan-india) to de-escalate tensions. Beijing also agreed to stop blocking the UN from listing Masood Azhar as terrorist, a long time Indian complaint, after some hard bargaining and international pressure. For his part, Modi clearly bowed to Chinese sensitivities when he [did not invite](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/no-invite-for-taiwan-representative-and-tibets-govt-in-exile/articleshow/69571515.cms?from=mdr) the political head of the Tibetan government-in-exile and a Taiwan representative to his second inauguration in 2019 as he did to the first one in 2014. Moreover, the Indian government consistently sought to sideline the “Tibet issue” in the past year and remained [completely silent](https://theprint.in/opinion/modi-monitor/why-modi-doesnt-mention-the-dalai-lama-anymore-while-he-rages-against-enemy-pakistan/215845/) of the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s flight to India. Admittedly many of these attempts to keep relations above water are more form than substance. However, as progress on substantive differences has been very small, form matters. It has become a way to build greater confidence, calm nationalist passions, and avoid renewed descent into confrontation. Second, in 2019 China and India worked hard to manage various bilateral points of tensions. Fearful that the many issues on which their interests clash would produce tensions or even a crisis that would disrupt their post-Wuhan thaw, the two sides tried to manage these issues. India’s change of Kashmir’s status in August was the most important point of tension that shook China-India relations in 2019, as Beijing brought the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council and leaned toward Pakistan’s position as India postponed regular talks on the border dispute. However, both sides ensured that tensions would not go out of hand and moderated their positions prior to the Mamallapuram summit. China suggested that Kashmir is a bilateral China-India issue and gradually toned down its position, while [India insisted](https://scroll.in/latest/938453/china-misread-indias-decisions-on-j-ks-status-says-external-affairs-minister-s-jaishankar) that Kashmir’s status and the formation of an union territory in Ladakh has no impact on the China-India territorial dispute, with which Kashmir is connected. The talks for the territorial dispute were rescheduled for December. The disputed China-India border also caused tensions, maybe related to Kashmir, but these were managed very fast. In September a “[scuffle](https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-china-army-ladakh-face-off-confrontation-1598214-2019-09-12)” between Chinese and Indian soldiers took place in Ladakh but unlike many previous times the incident was immediately resolved after delegation-level talks. Similarly, the two sides have made efforts to manage the issue of India’s large trade deficit with China, which has consistently caused indignation in India. Following the Mamallapuram summit a [new mechanism](https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-china-to-establish-new-mechanism-to-discuss-trade-11570870230403.html) under the Indian finance minister and Chinese vice premier was set up to address the deficit and promote Indian exports and investment to China. In all these cases tensions affected relations between Delhi and Beijing but the two sides kept them within tolerable limits that did not threaten to upset the applecart of improved relations Third, China-India relations in 2019 were also marked by the persistence of deep mistrust between the two sides, mistrust that severely limits cooperation and generates competition. Much of this mistrust is rooted in the inability of the two sides to resolve the numerous contentious issues that divide them. Such issues include competition in the Indo-Pacific and especially in South Asia, Beijing’s entente cordiale with Islamabad, India’s expanding rapprochement with the United States and Japan, the “Tibet issue,” the unresolved territorial dispute, the deeply unequal economic relationship between the two sides, China’s opposition to India’s accession to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), and the development of the BRI around India. Tellingly, none of these issues has seen much progress in the last year. Instead they either produced tensions between the two Asian giants, such as those over Kashmir, or served as a subtext of their foreign policies. For example, New Delhi’s deep unease over China’s gradual construction of a China-centered economic order in Asia and its economic penetration in India played a [major role](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/12/17/commentary/japan-commentary/rcep-without-india-isnt-japans-liking/#.XgrQhHd2tpx) in Modi’s decision to pull out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations in November. This unease also explains India’s continued opposition to the BRI, which was exemplified in New Delhi’s nonattendance at the second BRI meeting in April. India’s concern about China’s rise in Asia in 2019 also pushed New Delhi to pursue further development of the Quad as a hedge against China, as signaled by its agreement to upgrade cooperation in the grouping to [ministerial level](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/quads-1st-ministerial-meeting-significant-elevation-of-level/articleshow/71324576.cms?from=mdr). Similarly, China continued in the last year to undermine India’s position in South Asia. In another episode of its quiet competition with India in the Himalayas, China agreed to build a [railway from Tibet to Nepal’s Kathmandu](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3039995/china-nepal-railway-debt-trap-godsend-threat-india-or-just-pie), potentially a game changer for its position in the Himalayan country, and made a new push to establish diplomatic relations with Bhutan. In conclusion, 2019 offers good and bad news for China-India relations. The good news is that the improvement in China-India relations started at Wuhan has been secured and reflects the genuine commitment of the two sides to keep their relationship above water. This offers a rudimentary basis for further improving relations. The bad news is that the continued improvement in China-India relations is based more on the fear of confrontation than on any real agreement and mutual accommodation. Hence, it cannot produce any substantive progress on contentious bilateral issues. However, without such progress, the improvement in relations cannot survive on the long run.

#### Indian IRMBs are key to deter China—its NFU policy is a paper tiger that doesn’t resolve the risk of nuclear escalation.

**Ghoshal 18**, [Debalina, MA in Int. Studies @ Stella Maris, Research Fellow specializing in nuclear and missile issues @ Centre for Human Security Studies], 8-22-18, “How Agni-V Induction will enhance India’s nuclear deterrence”, https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2018/08/22/How-Agni-5-induction-will-enhance-India-nuclear-deterrence-china.html //pd

Recent reports suggest that India’s Agni-V intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a strike range of 5000kms is ready for induction. The Indian military has always been careful in choosing its words right and any acquisition of weapon systems during peace time is termed as ‘induction’ by the Indian armed forces. Deployment is a more aggressive term that relates to a war time or crisis situation. The missile has the capability of striking the northernmost parts of China and can carry nuclear warheads. Thus, it is a deterrent against China’s nuclear capabilities. Standoffs between India and China are not uncommon. In addition, China’s nuclear policy is clear on the fact that its ‘no-first use’ policy only holds true as long as the territory does not belong to them. China has kept open the option of using nuclear weapons first in a territory they consider their own. Thus concerns remain alive regarding the ‘first-use’ of nuclear weapons in Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state which China considers to be a part of its territory. Hence, India’s nuclear deterrence needs to be credible enough to deter China from attacking any Indian territory with nuclear weapons. New Delhi has been very careful to restrict the range of the missile at the moment to 5000km by keeping the missile’s flight trajectory a depressed one. A depressed and lofted trajectory result in the reduction of range of the missile. There are also reports that the range of the missile was purposely restricted to an IRBM capability due to diplomatic pressures from the United States, though these reports have been denied by the government of India. Agni-V in future would be equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). MIRVs are multiple warheads fitted on a single re-entry vehicle. These warheads are miniaturised nuclear warheads rather than a single warhead. Such systems enable a ballistic missile to evade enemy missile defence system. The missile like the other ones in the Agni category missile system is a solid-propellant missile system that is mobile. One of the key improvements in the Agni-V system is its ability to be canister launched. Canister launched system indicates that missiles could be mated with their warheads. There is a concern therefore that canister launched missile could indicate that India could make a shift from its ‘recessed deterrence posture’ to a ‘ready deterrent posture’. Recessed deterrence posture is a posture in which missiles are not mated with their warheads while in ready deterrent posture the warheads are mated with their delivery systems. Recessed deterrence posture puts lesser burden on the command and control of the nuclear forces, hence, managing a ready deterrent posture could be a challenge for the nuclear command and control in India. However, canister launched missiles can be preserved for years. The missile is reported to use advanced gyroscopes and accelerometers that can improve the accuracy of the missile system. Carbon-to-carbon composites ensure that the payload inside is safe amid the high temperature. The missile has been constantly test fired in order to ensure its operational readiness. Induction of the missile into India's nuclear arsenal would clearly signal that the country is moving towards a ‘credible minimum deterrence’ posture whereby it is developing nuclear deterrent capability that can strengthen deterrence against both Pakistan and China. However, according to the Cold War literature, MIRVs have always been first strike weapon systems. MIRVs on Agni-V can convey a message to China that India has given up on its ‘no-first use’ doctrine, which is highly debated considering that Pakistan does not adopt a ‘no-first use’ doctrine. However, no-first use doctrine by both China and India keeps the nuclear threshold high between the two countries. Hence, it is very important that India is able to convey to China that MIRVs would not be used as a first strike weapon system but only as a deterrent, ensuring India’s counter-strike and second strike capability. Should the United States fear the Agni-V? India has built up a successful partnership with the United States in the recent times. It is also a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). India’s relevance in the Indo-Pacific region is well fathomed by the United States as it sees India as a partner that could help counter the Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In fact in 2012, when India test-fired Agni-V, the United States hardly raised any criticisms against India for doing so. Though the United States urged India to “exercise restraint” on their nuclear capability, the former also praised India then for its strong non-proliferation record. Of course, the United States realised that India would attain capabilities that could reach targets in China so as to keep the Chinese concerned. How it affects China? Having a country whose nuclear capability may put its security at stake does not make the Chinese comfortable. In fact, in 2012, China’s Global Times, a daily that has close connections with the Chinese Communist Party had expressed concerns, “India should not overestimate its strength. Even if it has missiles that could reach most parts of China, that does not mean it will gain anything from being arrogant during disputes with China.” Agni-V is a China specific nuclear deterrent and the decision to induct the missile just within a year after the Doklam standoff is a clear indication to China to not mess with India. The tough stance during the crisis from India’s side helped it gain a diplomatic victory over China. However, there is always a possibility of another Doklam-type standoff between the two countries. Thus, India now needs to be prepared with a credible nuclear deterrence. In the near future, India’s nuclear capability could probably coerce China to agree to India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) that China has been blocking for years, despite the West now showing positive signs of India’s entry into the NSG. Agni-V would surely prove its mettle as a weapon system that enhances India’s nuclear deterrence but could also become a diplomatic weapon that could ensure India’s ability for coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis China.

#### Border clashes cause Sino-Indian war—it goes nuclear and NFU doesn’t check.

**Hartcher 17**, [Peter, political and international editor @ Sydney Morning Herald], 7-25-17, “The China-India clash that could lead to nuclear war”, <https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/the-chinaindia-clash-that-could-lead-to-nuclear-war-20170724-gxh8ie.html> //pd

China has been building a system of roads into the area for years to entrench its position there. For India, it's a super-sensitive zone, as Rory Medcalf explains: "China claims the South China Sea is a core interest. For India, anything that narrows India's space for manoeuvre in the 'chicken's neck' is a core interest." The chicken's neck - Siliguri Corridor - "is the incredibly narrow corridor that connects the main part of India's homeland with its north-eastern states. Every mile that China makes in this region makes India more sensitive that its north-eastern states will be cut off in a crisis." A Chinese military advance of just 130 kilometres would do it. Hence India's alarm. And that leads to the larger equities at stake. China invaded Tibet in 1949-50 to cement control of the outer reaches of its sphere of influence. Today China remains firmly entrenched in Tibet, building vast infrastructure and militarising the Tibetan plateau. It's part of China's expansion across the Himalayas to Central Asia and, together with its One Belt, One Road proposal, all the way to Europe. This is the same reason India conspicuously refused to send a representative to Beijing's launch of One Belt, One Road. Beijing likes to condescend to India. One of its former ambassadors to India, Zhou Gang, said last week: "Both China and India are rising powers, but apparently China's development is faster and it has greater global influence. India is not comfortable with that. They are jealous." And while it's true that India is infuriated by China's disrespect, the real issue for India is simply that it's not interested in yielding any territory or influence to China. Both are proud, and both have a national sense that their time has come. Neither is willing to yield. The two powers increasingly rub up against each other in the Indian Ocean, too. In the worst case, the Doklam dispute could one day lead to a major war. According to a 2012 paper by an Australian army officer, China-India in 2030 by Brigadier Mick Ryan, such a border clash could conceivably escalate to a nuclear one: "Given the high potential for an Indian conventional overmatch in this scenario, the Chinese may consider last resort use of nuclear weapons, notwithstanding their No First Use policy," Ryan wrote.

#### War goes global and nuclear

**Kahn 9**, (Jeremy, Newsweek, “Why India Fears China”, 10-19, 154:16, L/N)

On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China. India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has played out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon." Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines. China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months. Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan. The implications for India's security--and the world's--are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that **could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors**. **And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice--a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in**--either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.

#### Even conventional war sucks—fuels an economic crisis and domestic unrest.

**Mizokami 19**, [Kyle, cofounder @ Japan Security Watch, published in Foreign Policy, The Daily Beast], 8-8-18, “How to Kill Billions of People: If China and India Went to War”, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-kills-billions-people-if-china-and-india-went-war-72236 //pd

A war between the two countries would, unlike the 1962 war, involve major air action on both sides. Both countries maintain large tactical air forces capable of flying missions over the area. People’s Liberation Army Air Force units in the Lanzhou Military Region would fly against Punjab, Himchal Pradesh and Uttarakhand and from the expansive Chengdu Military region against India’s Arunachal Pradesh. The Lanzhou district is home to J-11 and J-11B fighters, two regiments of H-6 strategic bombers, and grab bag of J-7 and J-8 fighters. A lack of forward bases in Xinjiang means the Lanzhou Military Region could probably only support a limited air campaign against northern India. The Chengdu Military Region is home to advanced J-11A and J-10 fighters but there are relatively few military airfields in Tibet anywhere near India. Still, China does not necessarily need tactical aircraft to do great damage to India. China could supplement its aerial firepower with ballistic missiles from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces. The PLARF overseas both nuclear, conventional and dual-use ballistic missiles, and could conceivably move up to two thousand short- and medium-range DF-11, DF-15 and DF-21 ballistic missiles into positions adjacent to India. These missiles could be used to blitz Indian strategic targets on the ground, at the cost of making them unavailable for contingencies in the South and East China Seas. Meanwhile, India’s air forces are in a better position to contest the skies than their Chinese counterparts. While the war would take place on China’s sparsely manned frontier, New Delhi is only 213 miles from the Tibetan frontier. India’s air fleet of 230 Su-30Mk1 Flankers, sixty-nine MiG-29s and even its Mirage 2000s are competitive with or even better than most of China’s aircraft in theater, at least until the J-20 fighter becomes operational. India likely has enough aircraft to deal with a two-front war, facing off with Pakistan’s Air Force at the same time. India is also fielding the [Akash medium-range air defense missile system](http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/revealed-indias-newest-air-defense-system/) to protect air bases and other high-value targets. While India could be reasonably confident of having an air force that deters war, at least in the near term, it has no way of stopping a Chinese ballistic-missile offensive. Chinese missile units, firing from Xinjiang and Tibet, could hit targets across the northern half of India with impunity. India has no ballistic-missile defenses and does not have the combined air- and space-based assets necessary to hunt down and destroy the missile launchers. India’s own ballistic missiles are dedicated to the nuclear mission and would be unavailable for conventional war. The war on the ground between the Indian and Chinese armies might at first glance seem like the most decisive phase of the war, but it’s actually quite the opposite. Both the western and eastern theaters are in rugged locations with little transportation infrastructure, making it difficult to send a mechanized army through. Massed attacks could be easily stopped with artillery as attacking forces are funneled through well-known valleys and mountain passes. Despite the enormous size of both armies (1.2 million for the Indian Army and 2.2 for the Chinese Army) fighting on the ground would likely be a stalemate with little lost or gained. The war at sea would be the decisive front in a conflict between the two countries. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean, India lies on China’s jugular vein. The Indian Navy, with its force of submarines, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and surface ships could easily curtail the the flow of trade between China and Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It would take the Chinese Navy weeks to assemble and sail a fleet capable of contesting the blockade. Even then, the blockade would be hard to break up, conducted over the thousands of square miles of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, shipping to and from China would be forced to divert through the western Pacific Ocean, where such diversions would be vulnerable to Australian, Japanese, or American naval action. 87 percent of the country’s petroleum needs are imported from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Africa. [China’s strategic petroleum reserves](http://www.businessinsider.com/biggest-strategic-petroleum-reserves-countries-2017-3), once completed sometime in the 2020s, could stave off a nationwide fuel shortage for up to seventy-seven days—but after that Beijing would have to seek an end to the war however possible. The second-order effects of the war at sea would be India’s greatest weapon. War jitters, the shock to the global economy, and punitive economic action by India’s allies—including Japan and the United States—could see demands for exports fall, with the potential to throw millions of Chinese laborers out of work. Domestic unrest fueled by economic troubles could become a major problem for the Chinese Communist Party and its hold on the nation. China has no similar lever over India, except in the form of a rain of ballistic missiles with high-explosive warheads on New Delhi and other major cities. A war between India and China would be nasty, brutal and short, with far-reaching consequences for the global economy. The balance of power and geographic constraints means a war would almost certainly fail to prove decisive. Both sides have almost certainly concluded this, which is why there hasn’t been a war for more than fifty years. We can only hope it stays that way.

## No First Use Counterplan

#### CP Text: The Republic of India and The Islamic Republic of Pakistan ought to adopt a credible no first use policy and abide by it, and should de-alert it nuclear weapons by at least de-maitng warheads from delivery mechanisms.

#### Solves

Tannenwald, 18 -- Director, International Relations Brown, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University

[Nina, “The Great Unraveling: The Future of the Nuclear Normative Order,” MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW NUCLEAR AGE: EMERGING RISKS AND DECLINING NORMS IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND CHANGING NUCLEAR DOCTRINES, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2018, p. 27-29]

The cornerstone of a renewed regime of nuclear restraint would be strengthening the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons through the adoption of a declared no-first-use policy by all the nuclear powers. There have been increasing numbers of proposals for the United States to adopt a no-first-use policy in recent years, with compelling analyses. However, the case can be made more strongly for common declared no-first-use policies as the linchpin of a renewed regime of nuclear restraint among the nuclear powers.

A no-first-use policy means that nuclear powers would rely on nuclear weapons only to deter nuclear attacks.87 Adoption of no-first-use would not simply be “mere words,” but rather both doctrinal and operational issues would follow from it.88 An operational no-first-use doctrine would eliminate first-strike postures, preemptive capabilities, and other types of destabilizing warfighting strategies. It would induce restraint in targeting, launch-on-warning, alert levels of deployed systems, procurement, and modernization plans. In other words, it would help shape the physical qualities of nuclear forces in a way that renders them unsuitable for missions other than deterrence of nuclear attacks.89 A no-first-use policy also would reduce the risk of accidental, unauthorized, mistaken, or preemptive use. The removal of threats of a nuclear first strike would strengthen strategic and crisis stability.90 It would also make absolute the boundary between nuclear and conventional weapons. Finally, by reducing the overall risk of nuclear dangers, no-first-use policies would move toward addressing humanitarian concerns and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons.91

As others have argued, no-first-use could be adopted unilaterally or as part of an international agreement. It would move Russia and Pakistan away from their high-risk doctrines and reduce a source of Russia-NATO tensions. For Russia to consider no-first-use, its concerns about U.S. ballistic missile defenses, imbalances in conventional forces, and issues of NATO enlargement would need to be addressed. The United States would need to address the issue of extended deterrence with its allies and move toward conventional extended deterrence.92 India and Pakistan would need a modus vivendi on Kashmir. The United States and North Korea would need a nonaggression pact.

What are the prospects for this? Skeptics will object that the geopolitical preconditions are not ripe for a no-first-use policy at this time. Russia and North Korea are hostile. The Obama administration choked at the last minute on declaring a no-first-use policy, largely because of pushback from allies who are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And restraint is not a word normally associated with President Trump, who trades in excess. But the threat to defend allies such as South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons these days is hardly credible. In Europe, Russia is busy cutting military spending as its oil revenues shrink, with plans to cut the defense budget by 30 percent.93 This is not the sign of a country poised to invade the Baltics. Trump could act on his desire for better relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin to begin rolling back both countries’ nuclear posturing in Europe. Adoption of a no-first-use policy will require close consultation with allies, but the U.S. administration should begin this task.

The United States could unilaterally adopt a no-first-use policy, asking other nuclear-armed states to do the same. This would constitute formal adoption of what is already essentially de facto U.S. policy.94 As even card-carrying realists such as the “four horsemen” recognized, given overwhelming U.S. conventional capabilities on the battlefield, there exists no plausible scenario in which nuclear first use would be in the interest of the United States. A U.S. no-first-use policy would create political space for Russia to follow suit. A common no-first-use policy would also help anchor the existing no-first-use policies of China and India and implicitly acknowledge their leadership in this area, a virtue when middle-power states are feeling disenfranchised from the global nuclear order.

As an initial step on the way to no-first-use and a regime of nuclear restraint, the U.S. administration should consider the recent proposal by Jeffrey Lewis and Scott Sagan that the United States should declare it will not use nuclear weapons “against any target that could be reliably destroyed by conventional means.”95 This policy would not solve the larger problem of the unhappy entangling of conventional and nuclear deterrence (for example, U.S. hypersonic weapons targeted against China). Nevertheless, it would represent an initial important declaratory statement of nuclear restraint.

#### De-alerting completely eliminates risk of accidents

Steinbruner, 9 -- University of Maryland Center for International and Security Studies director

[Dr. John, Arms Control Association board chair, "Reframing De-Alert," 2009, http://www.ewi.info/system/files/Steinbruner.pdf]

Most individuals not embedded in the contemporary security bureaucracies and even some who are readily identify an inherently superior configuration of deterrent forces involving hundreds rather than thousands of weapons that are not programmed for attack, are held in secure storage and are never put on immediately available alert status unless their actual use is immediately required. Suitably designed and supported by continuous monitoring, that configuration of forces would render any residual disparity in preemptive capacity far less threatening, would essentially eliminate the risk of catastrophic accident and would provide robust deterrent potential that could be specifically activated in any situation that appeared to require it. Moreover, by putting all nuclear weapons into secure, continuously monitored storage, that force configuration would also establish much higher standards of protection against unauthorized access.

## Virtual Nuclear Arsenal Counterplan

#### CP text: States ought to shift to virtual nuclear arsenals by

#### Deconstructing all existing and future nuclear weapons.

#### Keeping the parts.

#### Virtual nuclear arsenals prevent miscalculation by increasing time for communication and by lessening the immediate consequences of accident and error.

**Gill 19**[Associate Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Nottingham], David. “Better Late than Never: Considering a Virtual Nuclear ...” *Esharp*, Esharp, 2019, www.gla.ac.uk/media/media\_107566\_en.pdf.

The British government strongly adheres to the idea that fully constructed and operationally deployed nuclear weapons remain fundamental to national security (Browne 2007). The nuclear weapon status quo is thus reinforced and self-perpetuated. This conception of national security, however, fails to adequately address the lingering and inherent dangers posed by Britain’s continued reliance on nuclear weapons. This threat is comprised of several distinct, but interrelated, dangers. Of particular importance is the small lead-time between the decision to use, and the launch of, nuclear weapons. Separating nuclear warheads from their delivery 5 esharp Issue 12: Technology and Humanity vehicles, as proposed in the adoption of a VNA, would virtually eliminate the dangers of accidental launch. Moreover, this could be achieved without requiring the tremendous political advancements necessary for full nuclear disarmament (Glaser 1998, p.118). It has been argued that the accidental use of nuclear weapons is somewhat doubtful (Quinlan 1993, p.488). Although well considered and eloquently argued, serious doubts emerge regarding basic assumptions that nuclear war can only occur when political leaders decide it to be in their interests. Scott D. Sagan has convincingly highlighted the inherent dangers residing in the maintenance of nuclear weapons (1995). First, it is impossible to guarantee the mental stability of each and every individual responsible for managing nuclear weapons. Second, the majority of the critical decisions leading to accidental launch occur at lower operational levels. Decisions can therefore occur without the full and prior consent of political authorities. Any nuclear weapons state operates with inherent dangers, both in command and control, which are exacerbated in times of stress. A VNA could better dilute such structural dangers by allowing more time for communication in stressful periods and by lessening the immediate consequences of accident and error. To be sure, it is impossible to accidentally launch or steal a nuclear missile if one is largely deconstructed. Indeed, even those sceptical of a VNA have conceded this point (Gray 1999, p.86; Booth & Wheeler 1992, p.32; Waltz 1997, p. 310).

#### Virtual nuclear arsenals continue deterrence

**Ichimasa 12**[**Senior Fellow, Policy Studies Department, Defense Policy Division at the national Institute for Defense]**, Sukeyuki. “The Concept of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals and ‘a World ...” *NIDS Journal of Defense and Security*, NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, 13 Dec. 2012, www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2012/bulletin\_e2012\_3.pdf.

Then, in the actual process of dismantling nuclear weapons in accordance with this roadmap, what changes would nuclear deterrent undergo? Mazarr explains that the deterrence of a virtual nuclear arsenal regime works through two mechanisms. In the first mechanism, virtual nuclear weapon states would always monitor each other to ensure that other states do not develop nuclear weapons secretly; should it be confirmed that nuclear weapons were developed or nuclear arsenals were reconstructed, other virtual nuclear powers would also swiftly reconstruct nuclear arsenals, and thereby, states would deter one another from nuclear attack. In the other mechanism, virtual nuclear weapon states would deter other states from non-compliance through psychological threat, i.e., the undeniable possibility that if there is non-compliance with the virtual nuclear arsenal agreement, former nuclear weapon states would withdraw from the virtual nuclear arsenal regime and reconstruct all of their nuclear arsenals.33 In order to secure the viability of deterrence, the critical elements become the lead-time required for reconstructing nuclear arsenals and the scale of the reconstructed nuclear arsenals. For the reason that establishing a certain time lag for the reconstruction of nuclear arsenals leads to strategic stability, Schell notes that a delayed response of at least eight weeks to load 200 nuclear warheads onto cruise missiles or six weeks to load 100 nuclear warheads onto military aircrafts is necessary.34

#### This solves the entirety of the AFF – functional disbarment with the net benefit of keeping deterrence. View our CP through a lens of solvency – if we solve enough of the AFF and have a unique net benefit – then we have a proven a better policy option – thus you negate.

## Theory – Implementation

#### A. Interpretation- the affirmative must specify what is included in a nuclear arsenal, what the timetable is, and what verification measures they allow

Harvey, PhD, 09

(Cole, Disarmament Efforts Get New Impetus, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009-03/disarmament-efforts-get-new-impetus)

In a major disarmament step, Russia and the United States appear poised to negotiate a significant new agreement on strategic arms reduction as the clock ticks toward the December 2009 expiration of the 1991 START. At the same time, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a report detailing proposed steps for an eventual ban on all nuclear weapons. Speaking at the 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy Feb. 7, Vice President Joe Biden reiterated the Obama administration's commitment to a new strategic arms agreement with Russia. The two countries should "renew the verification procedures in the START...and then go beyond existing treaties to negotiate deeper cuts in our arsenals," he said. The Russian response to Biden's address and to other overtures from the Obama administration on the issue has been largely positive. After meeting with Biden in Munich Feb. 8, Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov said that the new administration's stance "inspires optimism." Ivanov agreed with Biden that Russia and the United States should extend the START verification procedures and agree to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Working out the details of a new arms agreement between Russia and the United States promises to be a thorny process. Ivanov, in his address to the Munich conference, argued that any new agreement should limit delivery vehicles as well as warheads and should ban the deployment of strategic weapons beyond national borders. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in her Jan. 13 confirmation hearing that the Obama administration "will seek deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons-whether deployed or nondeployed, strategic or nonstrategic." U.S.-Russian relations have been strained by the Bush administration's plan to install elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, presenting an obstacle to any new arms deal. In his Munich speech, Ivanov claimed that the European sites of the U.S. missile defense program are part of a system "aimed at deterring Russia's nuclear missile potential." U.S. officials have maintained that the system is intended to counter a potential nuclear attack from Iran. Obama administration officials have not explicitly backed away from deploying missile defenses in Europe but have indicated that the previous administration's policies are up for review. In his Munich address, Biden declared that the United States will continue to develop missile defense capabilities "provided the technology is proven to work and cost effective." Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns, in a Feb. 13 interview with Interfax in Moscow, held out the possibility of a revised missile defense policy in exchange for Russian cooperation on Iran's nuclear program. Burns stated that the Obama administration could reevaluate the need for missile defense systems in Europe if "through strong diplomacy with Russia and our other partners, we can reduce or eliminate [the Iranian] threat." Burns also declared that the administration is open to the possibility of "new missile defense configurations" that incorporate Russian assets as well as those of NATO allies. In a joint press conference with the Czech foreign minister on Feb. 10, Clinton reiterated that the United States reserves the right to develop a missile defense capability in Europe if the threat from Iran continues to mount. "If the Iranians continue on this path," she said, "one of the options of free countries...is to defend ourselves." Separately, the British Foreign Office released a report Feb. 4 detailing proposed steps to rid the world of nuclear weapons. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, noting that Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Obama have each pledged to work toward a world free of nuclear weapons, wrote that the time has come to move from "a decade of deadlock to a decade of decisions." The British report lays out six "attainable" steps toward abolishing nuclear weapons. These steps are designed to curb proliferation, decrease stockpiles, and build confidence. The international community must agree to more stringent measures to prevent proliferation, according to the report, while working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to help states develop peaceful nuclear technology. Next, the report urges Russia and the United States to make substantial reductions in their total nuclear stockpiles, not simply in deployed weapons. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei echoed this call in a Feb. 16 editorial in the International Herald Tribune, suggesting that Russia and the United States could reduce their stockpiles to as few as 500 warheads each. Fourth, the British Foreign Office calls for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the Obama administration supports. In her Jan. 13 testimony, Clinton said that she and President Barack Obama are "strongly committed to Senate approval of the CTBT and to launching a diplomatic effort to bring on board other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force." The CTBT has been ratified by 148 countries, but the United States and eight other specific states must still ratify the treaty before it can take effect. In order to lay the groundwork for an eventual ban on nuclear weapons, the report also calls for the negotiation and implementation of a treaty banning the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. Lastly, the report urges those states possessing nuclear weapons to begin a strategic dialogue to explore the political and security issues that would arise during the transition from low numbers of nuclear weapons to zero nuclear weapons. The British government has proposed a 2009 conference of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to discuss these issues. As Russia and the United States seem prepared to negotiate substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals and with the Obama administration supportive of the CTBT, there is an emerging consensus on many of the points listed in the British plan. As Ivanov noted in Munich, however, "[T]he devil is in the details."

#### Specifying the scope of nuclear prohibition is key to precision- there’s no consensus on what the plan means

Holdren 98

(John P. Holdren, Teresa and John Heinz Professor of Environmental Policy Co-Director, Science, Technology and Public Policy Program Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs President Obama's Science Advisor and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (January 2009 – January 2017), GETTING TO ZERO: Is Pursuing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Too Difficult? Too Dangerous? Too Distracting? Chapter for a book, Ending War: The Force of Reason, honoring Sir Joseph Rotblat on his 90th Birthday, April 1998, <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/getting_to_zero_john_holdren.pdf>, JKS)

 The variations and ambiguities begin with the terms employed to describe what is being sought: the “abolition” of nuclear weapons (a term often favored by the more philosophical writers, such as Schell [14]); their “elimination” (the term usually favored by diplomats, from the first UN resolution in 1946 [4] to the Canberra Commission in 1996 [23]); their “prohibition” (a term favored by those of legal bent [29] and, most recently, by the National Academy of Sciences’ 1997 nuclear weapons study [27]); and “nuclear disarmament” (which crops up in all kinds of treatments of the subject). Are there actually differences in meaning here, the sorting out of which could add precision or other insight to the discussion of “getting to zero”? Are some of these terms more useful — by virtue of being more precise or appropriate to the use to which they are being put in this context — than others? I believe the answer to both questions is “yes”. Specifically, “prohibit” in this context clearly means to “forbid by authority of law”, that is, to make illegal (30). This term is both unambiguous and clearly not synonymous with “eliminate”, which means to cause the disappearance of something, to get rid of it entirely. Thus, for example, the United States imposed a prohibition on alcoholic beverages with the 18th Amendment to the US Constitution (lasting from 1919 to 1933), but these were far from eliminated. A prohibition on handguns, similarly, would represent an attempt to drastically reduce the numbers of these in use by making them illegal, although no one would expect it to quite lead to their elimination. “Abolish” means to “do away with wholly” or “put an end to”. It embodies both the legal connotation of “prohibit” and much of the sense of permanence and comprehensiveness of “eliminate”. But it is more often (and some would argue more appropriately) applied to laws, customs, and institutions (such as slavery, capital punishment, or war) than to physical objects (such as nuclear weapons). Moreover, thinking about this word’s most familiar usage, which is in relation to the abolition of slavery, suggests some ambiguity about whether complete effectiveness is implied: abolition certainly deprived slavery of its legitimacy, one presumes permanently, and disposed of the institution in its most conspicuous form; but still some forms of slavery persist (such as the selling of girls and young women into sexual slavery, which although illegal occurs quite routinely in a number of societies). “Nuclear disarmament”, finally, is even more ambiguous: it can and often does mean merely reducing or limiting one’s forces, not necessarily reaching zero. The usual approach to reducing this ambiguity is resort to more cumbersome (and nonetheless still ambiguous!) formulations such as “complete nuclear disarmament” or “comprehensive nuclear disarmament”. These considerations figured in the preference expressed in the National Academy of Sciences’ 1997 nuclear weapon study for the word “prohibition” to describe an approach to the NWFW issue that ultimately could be accepted as both desirable and feasible. This choice has the attraction of avoiding both ambiguity and the common objection, made against “elimination” or “abolition”, that these goals are unattainable insofar as (a) there would never be certainty that every last weapon was gone and (b) the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons — hence the possibility of reconstitution of nuclear arsenals — cannot be eradicated. Prohibition, as a matter of law, is certainly possible in principle; the main argument is about what it would actually accomplish. There is also the question, of course, of exactly what is to be prohibited or eliminated in a NWFW. The candidates include, in order of increasing comprehensiveness and stringency: (a) nuclear weapons deployed with means for their delivery; (b) intact nuclear weapons in all conditions and locations; (c) (b) plus all nuclear-weapon components; (d) (c) plus all military stockpiles of directly bomb-usable nuclear-explosive materials (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium); (e) (c) plus all stockpiles of directly bomb-usable nuclear-explosive materials, civilian and military; (f) (e) plus all facilities capable of producing directly bomb-usable nuclear-explosive materials; (g) (e) plus all nuclear-energy facilities. At each of these levels, moreover, there is a choice among: (i) prohibiting/eliminating these items altogether; (ii) prohibiting their possession by states but allowing possession by an international authority; and (iii) allowing their possession by states but only under dual control with an international authority. And there is the question of what other measures would need to accompany the nuclear prohibition, whatever its details, in order for it to be effective. That is: Is it necessary that chemical and biological weapons also have been convincingly eliminated? Conventional forces (or just the subset of these powerful enough to threaten the existence or independence of states)? All possibility of armed conflict between states? Would deployment of effective national defenses against ballistic missiles help with a nuclear ban, or hurt, or make little difference?

#### Turns the case

Pifer 16

(Steven Pifer is director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and a senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. He served more than 25 years as a career Foreign Service officer, including assignments as U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia on the National Security Council, and with the U.S. delegation to the negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces., Nuclear Arms Control Choices for the Next Administration, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series Paper 13 • October 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/acnpi_20161025_arms_control_choices_final.pdf>, JKS)

In May 2002, Bush and Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). A two-page agreement with no agreed definitions, counting rules or verification measures, SORT constrained each side to no more than 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads, the Bush administration’s planned number for U.S. strategic forces.8 SORT was set to expire by its terms on December 31, 2012—the day that the limits were scheduled to take effect. Moreover, the treaty did not limit the number of strategic missiles and bombers (though those were still constrained by the START I Treaty, whose terms lasted until 2009). Under SORT, the United States counted the actual number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs plus the number of bombs and nuclear-armed ALCMs at nuclear-capable bomber bases as “operationally deployed.” It is not clear that the Russians employed the same counting rules; some analysts suggested that Moscow did not count bomber weapons as those weapons were not deployed on the aircraft. START I remained in force until December 2009. Toward the end of the Bush administration, U.S. and Russian experts discussed whether some arrangement in addition to SORT might be agreed as START I lapsed in order to maintain some of START I’s monitoring provisions. The U.S. side, however, was not prepared to consider limits on strategic delivery vehicles, which the Russian side sought. No agreement was reached.

#### B. Violation – none of that is in the 1AC.

#### C. Reasons to prefer

#### 1. Neg Ground- timeframe effects links to time sensitive disads like politics or regional security arguments like deterrence. What is included determines the *magnitude* of the link as does the process-these also effect substantive arguments like solvency presses

#### 2. Plan text is key- it’s the only way to provide textual competition for counterplans, as well as pre tournament and pre round prep

#### 3. Specification is inevitable- the 1AR can reclarify the plan to dodge our links making being neg impossible. Proven by Tej fiating the plan solves rearm through IAEA enforcement. Forcing them to take a position in the 1AC provides a stable stasis point for debate

#### 4. Vote negative on presumption- arms control efforts fail when all sides can’t agree on the specifics

#### D. Evaluate the round through competing interpretations, its not what you do its what you justify. The affirmative must win offense for why plan vagueness is key to solve.

#### NC theory outweighs – lexical priority means your abuse necessitated neg abuse and it outweighs on scope.

## Case

### Framework

#### Use epistemic confidence—modesty invites arbitrary judge intervention because there’s no way to determine the magnitude of an impact back to a framework and even if you use it our offense outweighs because any contradiction is infinite

#### Actor spec flows neg – only political realism can effectively provide an evaluation of political models.

#### Your understanding of policymaking is suspect due to it’s moralism – you assume policymakers actually care about lives, when they constantly gamble the lives of innocents for more money and power. NRA and Big Oil lobbying proves.

#### They don’t get to weigh case if we win framing – our framework proves that the model of their advantage is true, but they gain no benefit from affirming because affirming in itself is too idealistic.

#### Fiat is illusory – 1] Falls victim to the critique of realism as it is an idealistic way of viewing policymaking. 2] No out-of-round impact bc the aff doesn’t pass this policy in real life. 3] No portable skills – fiat just teaches us to imagine a utopian world, which wrecks any logical decision-making process. 4] No good heuristic – teaches us to believe in “happily-ever-afters” without ever questioning how to get there.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the truth or falsity of the resolution. Affirm means to prove true and Negate means to deny the truth of.

#### A] Text – our burdens come directly from the rules of debate. Any other burden of debate is fundamentally skewed towards a form of debate that can be exclusionary for the activity.

#### B] Constitutivism – only truth testing is a constitutive quality of debate. Literally the way debate functions is from the proving true of the resolution under some ethical standard and the negative proving that false. Any other burden structure takes away from the activity of debate.

#### C] Cooption – All other ROB’s are self serving and arbitrary – only truth testing takes into account all forms of debate to allow for every style to be argued on a uniform platform for debate.

#### Induction fails

Vickers 14, John Vickers, 2014, The Problem of Induction, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/

The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that “instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved.

#### Negate means to deny the truth of. I’m denying the aff’s truth value. Permissibility and presumption negate – a] we presume statements to be false without empirical facts, is the basis of passcodes on logins and recognition technology. Outweighs presume statements true – we always presume false with issues of extreme importance b] Science is in the business of disproving, not proving which means that it is empirically impossible to prove something c] The aff is an action and the neg is an omission, and an omission is more permissible than an action.

### Advantage – IndoPak War

#### No Indo-Pak war or miscalc – MAD, economic considerations, and de-mated state

Nath 19 – Master’s degree in Geopolitics and International Relations from Manipal University, India, working as a CBRN analyst at Jane’s by IHS Markit.

Sarbhanu Nath, “Why We Do Not Need to Worry About a Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan,” The Geopolitics, 9/13/19, https://thegeopolitics.com/why-we-do-not-need-to-worry-about-a-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan/

Following India’s revocation of the special status for Kashmir, there was a lot of brouhaha over the risk of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. While neither country sees eye to eye over a lot of issues and have engaged in several armed conflicts in the past, the risk of a nuclear exchange between them remains very low at best. There are a number of factors which ensure that the two neighbors will not be coming to nuclear blows any time soon.

The first and most important factor being that both countries have democratic governments which are beholden to the people and there are numerous checks and balances in place to ensure that extreme decisions like that of one to use nuclear weapons will not be taken unilaterally and casually. Democratic governments generally tend to have a greater degree of accountability and responsibility.

Secondly, India follows a policy of “No First Use” when it comes to nuclear weapons which nullifies the possibility that India will be the one to initiate a nuclear strike. India is a responsible power and has exercised considerable restraint in past crisis situations, notable examples being – the non-escalation of the Kargil conflict and engaging in dialogue with Pakistan rather than a military response after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. Therefore, it can be reasonably expected that a nuclear strike will not come from the Indian side, unless of course it is attacked first with a nuclear weapon.

Third, both India and Pakistan possessing nuclear warheads reinforces the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction and ensures that there will be no winners in a nuclear war. Thus, there is no tangible incentive for either country to risk a nuclear conflict. The primary goal of any entity is to ensure its well-being and survival and India and Pakistan being rational actors will not whimsically risk their very survival over issues that can be dealt with in much simpler terms. It is also not in the interest of the international community to risk massive destabilization in the South Asian region.

With a population of nearly 2 billion people, South Asia is one of the most densely populated regions of the planet and almost all of these people will be adversely affected by nuclear war between India and Pakistan, both through direct impact of the weapons and the subsequent spread of nuclear fallout. The ramifications of nuclear war will not be limited to just India and Pakistan but will acquire global dimensions and have global impacts as well. And in today’s interconnected and interdependent world such a situation cannot and will not be allowed to come to pass. In the past, almost every conflict and escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan have seen offers from the international community for mediation and de-escalation. These offers are not likely to stop in case of future incidents as the importance of peace in South Asia cannot be understated.

Despite making veiled threats about using nuclear weapons in case of increasing tensions, the Pakistani leadership will not act upon it simply because that would be a suicidal move. There can be no doubt that India’s response, when it comes, will be massive and punitive. India also possesses a nuclear triad capability, and this means that a first strike will not be able to nullify India’s retaliatory capability. So, it is safe to expect that any nuclear saber-rattling will remain limited to that only and not go beyond threats.

But there are a number of risk factors to consider as well. Pakistan is believed to possess tactical nuclear weapons which are meant for battlefield use. Thus, a large-scale war between India and Pakistan sees a greater chance of tactical nuclear weapons being deployed. But such a situation is unlikely to come about as it is in neither country’s interest to engage in such a large-scale conflict as it is simply not feasible, and the resources required would put unmanageable strains on the economies of both India and Pakistan. As it is, the economy in Pakistan is tottering and engaging in a war will push it over the edge – simply put, Pakistan cannot afford war.

One more factor to consider, even though it is a distant possibility, is that if the governmental system of either country collapses and there is a complete breakdown of law and order. Then there are higher chances of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands who would have no qualms about using them. But the launching of nuclear weapons is a complex process and both India and Pakistan, reportedly keep their nuclear weapons in a de-mated state, that is to say, the warheads are stored separate from the launchers. This reduces the aforementioned risk somewhat and it is very likely that should there be such an eventuality where there is a collapse of the government of a nuclear armed country, the international community will step in immediately to stop nuclear weapons and weapon materials from getting misplaced. A similar example exists if one were to look at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the collapse of which created widespread fears about the safety of the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons possessed by the country. But timely and proper action and cooperation between the United States and the new Russian government, both of whom were ideological enemies for so many decades, allayed those fears and allowed for all those weapons to be secured in a safe manner.

So, considering all these factors, one can rest assured that we do not need to worry about a nuclear apocalypse caused by India and Pakistan lobbing nuclear weapons at each other. Despite all the political rhetoric and scare-mongering, we will not be living in a nuclear winter any time soon.

#### On Counterforce –

#### Krzyzanik depends on the fact that India won’t keep up its NFU – that’s completely wrong.

Abhijnan Rej 17, a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, "India is Not Changing its Policy on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons", War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/india-is-not-changing-its-policy-on-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/

Everything you know about South Asian pink flamingos is false, a prominent nuclear-weapons expert has recently warned. Pakistan’s expanding nuclear arsenal has been a matter of considerable concern to the international community in the recent years. Its adoption of short-range, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons in the face of India’s conventional military superiority have pointed to the possibility where Pakistan uses a nuclear weapon against Indian conventional armed forces to stave off imminent military defeat. “This is how nuclear first use would unfold in South Asia, right? Well, maybe not so fast,” wrote Vipin Narang, a professor at MIT, in a set of remarks prepared for the recent Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference. Narang made a startling claim: There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first. And that India’s opening salvo may not be conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theater, but a full “comprehensive counterforce strike” that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons so that India does not have to engage in iterative tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its own cities to nuclear destruction. The possibility that India might use nuclear weapons first directly contradicts the key pillar of Indian nuclear thinking since the publication of its official nuclear doctrine in 2003: a no first-use policy. Successive prime ministers — including Narendra Modi, not exactly a dove — have affirmed this. Indeed, a major revision of India’s public doctrine will fly in the face of its long history as a reluctant nuclear power. On the other hand, the evidence Narang marshals to support this astounding claim is scant and centers around a couple of paragraphs from a book by a former Indian national security advisor Shivshankar Menon who retired three years ago, before Modi came to power. Despite Narang’s claims, we still do not have sufficient evidence that India has reversed its no first-use policy or — for that matter — any other major tenets in its public nuclear doctrine. Indeed, at a time when there are growing calls inside India to revisit its nuclear doctrine, it is worth keeping in mind that India’s doctrine already allows considerable space for innovation. As Menon put it to a journalist, “India’s nuclear doctrine has far greater flexibility than it gets credit for.” In other words, India’s extant doctrine can absorb the consequences of future Pakistan-related contingencies without any major changes. Restraint and Resolve in India’s Nuclear Doctrine India’s nuclear weapons strategy is simple. By relying on a minimal arsenal for deterrence, India offers a credible threat of a massive retaliation against an adversary that strikes first with nuclear weapons. India’s commitment to nuclear deterrence (as opposed to compellence, the other tool of strategic coercion) rules out threats of nuclear use to shift the course of a conventional conflict. Indeed, India’s a no first-use stance should be read as a pledge to not use nuclear compellence as an instrument of statecraft. India’s nuclear arsenal is as small as it can be to make the threat of a massive retaliation as credible as possible. As such, the size of the arsenal will vary with time depending on the requirements of credibility, a fact that was emphasized by a former Indian foreign minister. What makes a deterrent strategy effective? It is, argues the Nobel-winning game theorist Roger Myerson, a combination of “restraint” and “resolve” in pursuing the same. Following Thomas Schelling, Myerson defines restraint as a “reputational commitment to act cooperatively” in pursuit of a deterrent strategy. Resolve, for Myerson àpres Schelling, is a similar commitment, but to act aggressively when deterrence demands it. India’s public doctrine — in what it says and what it does not — seeks to do both. It is a statement of restraint in two ways. First, it conveys the impression that India is a responsible nuclear power with a public pledge to not use nuclear weapons first. Second, by explicitly laying down India’s nuclear red-lines coupled to its no first-use pledge, India effectively promises any adversary that it will cooperate in terms of not using nuclear weapons first — as long as the adversary too chooses to do the same by not crossing those redlines. But the doctrine is also a statement of resolve in that it deliberately does not spell out what follows deterrence failure beyond a promise of some kind of massive retaliation. Regarding the targets of such a retaliation, India’s public nuclear doctrine is ambiguous. If India leaves out the exact details of its retaliatory response, potential adversaries will imagine the “worst” possible outcome. Taking Pakistan as an example of an adversary, what “worst” means in Islamabad’s mind alone and could change during the course of a conflict. Indeed, both India and Pakistan may have different conceptions of what the latter values the most, and hence wants to protect. For example, India might think Pakistan values its population centers the most, but Islamabad may in fact value its “crown jewels” more. Therefore, if India was to keep its retaliatory responses ambiguous beyond the fact that there will be a massive response, its commitment to act aggressively — India’s resolve — will be enhanced in Pakistan’s mind, irrespective of whether India has any intention of doing what Pakistan thinks it would. Indeed, as Lawrence Freedman put it, “To Schelling the value of nuclear weapons lay in the persuasive threat they posed to an adversary, even if little of value could accrue to oneself by implementing this threat.” What matters is that Pakistan now has to consider a range of retaliatory responses from India. On the other hand, if India was to promise Pakistan a fixed response, but Pakistani leaders did not believe it, Islamabad may be tempted to ignore India’s threats of what follows should deterrence break down. “Massive” Retaliation or “Massive Retaliation”? Narang’s claim that India’s no first-use posture may be eroding follows from his interpretation of a recent book by a highly-respected former Indian national security advisor Shivshankar Menon. It that capacity, Menon was a member of the executive council of the Nuclear Command Authority, the highest non-political body that supervises India’s nuclear weapons and their potential deployment. As such, he must have been privy to India’s choice of second-use targets should deterrence fail. In Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, Menon devotes a chapter to India’s nuclear weapons doctrine and posture. The general thrust of his argument becomes clear from the title of that chapter alone: “Why India pledges no first use of nuclear weapons.” He indeed goes to justify and defend the thinking behind a no first-use pledge, and the foreign policy circumstances that shaped it. The passage that caught Narang’s attention lies a few pages into the chapter: What would be credible would be the message India conveyed by how it configures its forces. If Pakistan were to use tactical nuclear weapons against India, even against Indian forces in Pakistan, it would effectively be opening the door to a massive Indian first strike, having crossed India’s declared red lines. There would be little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response, since that would only invite further escalation by Pakistan. India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other words, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan. His use of the phrase “comprehensive first strike” is indeed striking (forgive the pun). A first strike in nuclear strategy means something very specific: a disarming nuclear weapons attack that severely degrades the adversary’s ability to retaliate with the same. In other words, a comprehensive first-strike is a “counter-force” strategy aimed at the adversary’s nuclear arsenal and not its population centers. But it is clear from the paragraph that Menon is talking about a second strike, the first being Pakistan using a tactical nuclear weapon against Indian forces. So why the use of the word “first”? One explanation is that this is a problem with how one counts attacks and counter-attacks. If you do not count the hypothetical tactical nuclear weapons use by Pakistan that marks deterrence breakdown as first-use, and instead focus on a possible Pakistani response to an Indian massive retaliation, then this a scenario with two steps: India’s retaliation and Pakistan’s (possible) counter-retaliation. If you do count the tactical nuclear attack as a first use, then your deterrence calculations should factor the possibility of a third use of nuclear weapons by the adversary, as Menon says it must.

#### Counterforce solves the aff – 1AC Krzyzanik concedes that counterforce will not attack population centers but rather just nuclear facilities. Shuts down the Pakistan nuclear threat and ends chances for nuclear war.

#### On Kashmir – uniqueness overwhelms the link. The evidence concedes that even now, the highest point in tensions was the Kargil crisis, and nukes weren’t used. Also, all their dialogue about nuclear use is in the cotext of what happened in February last year, and all of that has dissipated as of right now.

#### On Terrorism – eliminating nuclear weapons does not solve conflict. Nationalist groups will still fight, meaning that the aff doesn’t resolve ethnic violence. In addition, the dismantlement of nuclear weapons makes them easier to steal for nuclear terror. Independently turns the aff and eliminates all solvency.

Sarkar 16 [Jayita Sarkar, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Three concrete steps toward South Asian nuclear stability", September 13, 2016, https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/how-to-reduce-south-asias-nuclear-dangers/] **Tfane23**
Improving nuclear security. An ongoing concern in South Asia is that terrorist groups might gain access to nuclear materials, either to use these materials in attacks or to use them as bargaining chips against either New Delhi or Islamabad. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative and its Nuclear Security Index, both India and Pakistan do a poor job of safeguarding nuclear materials. But in recent months, both countries have taken some promising steps. Ahead of the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit, which began in March, Islamabad ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. At the summit itself, New Delhi made commitments regarding nuclear smuggling and other issues. And in June, India committed to an important initiative known as the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. Still, India and Pakistan both face risks regarding the security of the nuclear materials within their territories.

#### On Aggression – This means literally nothing – the two countries have been ‘aggressive’ forever and all of our other warrants disprove this

Ganguly, PhD, ‘19

(Sumit, PoliSci/IR@IllinoisUniveristyUrbanaChampaign, ProfPoliSci@IndianUniversity, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-03-05/why-india-pakistan-crisis-isnt-likely-turn-nuclear>, March 5) BW

No one can say for sure, but history suggests that there is cause for optimism. During the Kargil War, India worked to contain the fighting to the regions around Pakistan’s original incursions and the war concluded with no real threat of nuclear escalation. Less than two years later, the two countries plunged into crisis once again. In December 2001, five terrorists from the Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Tabia and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the parliament building in New Delhi with AK-47s, grenades, and homemade bombs, killing eight security guards and a gardener. In response, India launched a mass military mobilization designed to induce Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. As Indian troops deployed to the border, terrorists from Pakistan struck again. In May 2002, three men killed 34 people in the residential area of an Indian army camp in Kaluchak, in Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions spiked. India seemed poised to unleash a military assault on Pakistan. Several embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad withdrew their nonessential personnel and issued travel advisories. The standoff lasted for several months, but dissipated when it became apparent that India lacked viable military options and that the long mobilization was taking a toll on the Indian military’s men and materiel. The United States also helped ease tensions by urging both sides to start talking. India claimed victory, but it was a Pyrrhic one, as Pakistan failed to sever its ties with a range of terrorist organizations. Other nuclear states have also clashed without resorting to nuclear weapons. In 1969, China, then an incipient nuclear weapons state, and the Soviet Union, a full-fledged nuclear power, came to blows over islands in the Ussuri River, which runs along the border between the two countries. Several hundred Chinese and Soviet soldiers died in the confrontation. Making matters worse, Chinese leader Mao Zedong had a tendency to run risks and dismissed the significance of nuclear weapons, reportedly telling Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that even if half of mankind died in a nuclear war, the other half would survive and imperialism would have been razed to the ground. Yet despite Mao’s views, the crisis ended without going nuclear, thanks in part to the efforts of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who took the first step by travelling to Beijing for talks. There’s reason to believe that the current situation is similar. Pakistan’s overweening military establishment undoubtedly harbors an extreme view of India and determines Pakistan’s policy toward its neighbor. The military, however, is not irrational. In India, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a jingoistic disposition, he, too, understands the risks of escalation, and he has a firm grip on the Indian military. Another source of optimism comes from what political scientists call the “nuclear revolution,” the idea that the invention of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Many strategists argue that nuclear weapons’ destructive power is so great that states understand the awful consequences that would result from using them—and avoid doing so at all costs. Indian and Pakistani strategists are no different from their counterparts elsewhere. Even Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, a political neophyte, underscored the dangers of nuclear weapons in his speech addressing the crisis last week. And Modi, for all his chauvinism, has scrupulously avoided referring to India’s nuclear capabilities. The decision by India and Pakistan to allow their jets to cross the border represents a major break with the past. Yet so far both countries have taken only limited action. Their principal aim, it appears, is what the political scientist Murray Edelman once referred to as “dramaturgy”—theatrical gestures designed to please domestic audiences. Now that both sides have gone through the motions, neither is likely to escalate any further. Peering into the nuclear abyss concentrates the mind remarkably.

#### On Officials – Kashmir doesn’t escalate and Pakistan doesn’t start war – Pakistani’s foreign minister– this ev post dates theirs

Keralakaumudi Daily, 9-1-19, "Pakistan takes U-turn; War is not an option to deal with Kashmir issue, says Pak minister," https://keralakaumudi.com/en/news/news.php?id=150021&u=pakistan-takes-u-turn-war-is-not-an-option-to-deal-with-kashmir-issue-says-pak-minister-150021

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that war is not an option to deal with the Kashmir issue amidst fresh Indo-Pak tensions over New Delhi revoking Jammu and Kashmir's special status. His remarks came at a time when Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan has been repeatedly threatening the possibility of a nuclear war with India over Kashmir after his efforts to internationalise the matter failed to gain any traction.

Asserting that abrogation of Article 370 was its internal matter, India has strongly criticized Pakistan for making "irresponsible statements" and provocative anti-India rhetoric over issues internal to it. In an interview to BBC Urdu published on Saturday, Qureshi said Pakistan never followed an aggressive policy and always preferred peace, adding that the current government of Pakistan has repeatedly offered India to start talks because the two nuclear-armed neighbours cannot take the risk of going on a war. War was not an option to deal with the issue of Kashmir, the Pakistani foreign minister emphasised. He reiterated that Kashmir is an international issue and not just a bilateral affair between Pakistan and India.

#### On Perception - India and Pakistan are bound in stable nuclear deterrence networks – elimination causes rapid escalation.

Trenin 19 (Dmitri, PhD @ Russian Academy of Sciences and director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, 3-21-2019, "Strategic Stability in the Changing World," Carnegie Moscow Center, [https://carnegie.ru/2019/03/21/strategic-stability-in-changing-world-pub-78650)](https://carnegie.ru/2019/03/21/strategic-stability-in-changing-world-pub-78650%29) AG

* Feel free to delete any part of the first bit of the tag depending on what aff you’re debating – this card talks about NATO-Russia war, China-US war, and Indo-Pak

Reliable communication lines between the major powers can prevent armed conflicts or stop their escalation. But there are no technological guarantees that can completely rule out the use of force by rational actors in such cases. And it’s impossible to prevent political conflicts that may lead to armed clashes without a system of inclusive security communities, which is unlikely to be created in the foreseeable future. Hope hinges, then, on the very possibility that **knowing a local conflict could escalate** into a regional war will restrain geopolitical adversaries from becoming enemies in combat. This dynamic is **already on display between Russia and NATO**. It’s hard to imagine a nuclear-armed state attacking any member of an alliance headed by another nuclear power. It’s equally hard to imagine a large-scale NATO attack on nuclear-armed Russia. Neither actor can be completely confident that it could enjoy a conventional military advantage, local or general, without the risk of incurring a nuclear counterstrike. Therefore, nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States fully extends to Washington’s allies in NATO. In some ways, the situation between **China and the U**nited **S**tates and its allies is similar to Russia’s relationship with NATO. China attacking Japan is as improbable as U.S. aggression against China. At the same time, a number of developments in the Asia Pacific lack such obvious clarity, such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea or the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. nuclear umbrella doesn’t extend that far, and the risk of escalation is fully present in both situations. Channels of communication between the U.S. and Chinese military headquarters, as well as appropriate political contacts between Beijing and Washington, are necessary to prevent escalation. Relations between China and India already include an element of **nuclear deterrence**. This doesn’t eliminate the possibility of military conflict between Beijing and New Delhi, but it deters both sides from the use of nuclear weapons and, by extension, **reduces the likelihood of a large-scale war.** Since they acquired nuclear weapons, **India and Pakistan** have learned how to coexist under conditions of nuclear deterrence. The relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad is far from stable, but India and Pakistan **haven’t gone to war since 1999**. The most recent serious military incident between the two countries, in February 2019, was **swiftly de-escalated**. Functioning communication channels between top military commanders and a top-level political dialogue may further strengthen regional stability in South Asia.

#### Don’t buy nuke winter stories – theirs are confirmation-bias laden and repeatedly disproven

S. Fred **Singer 18**. Professor emeritus at the University of Virginia and a founding director and now chairman emeritus of the Science & Environmental Policy Project, specialist in atmospheric and space physics, founding director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, now part of NOAA, served as vice chair of the U.S. National Advisory Committee on Oceans &amp; Atmosphere, an elected fellow of several scientific societies, including APS, AGU, AAAS, AIAA, Sigma Xi, and Tau Beta Pi, and a senior fellow of the Heartland Institute and the Independent Institute. 6-27-2018. "Remember Nuclear Winter?." American Thinker. https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2018/06/remember\_nuclear\_winter.html

Nuclear Winter burst on the academic scene in December 1983 with the publication of the hypothesis in the prestigious journal Science. It was accompanied by a study by Paul Ehrlich, et al. that hinted that it might cause the extinction of human life on the planet. MCANW stands for Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons. Photo via Wellcome Images. The five authors of the Nuclear Winter hypothesis were labeled TTAPS, using the initials of their family names (T stands for Owen Toon and P stands for Jim Pollak, both Ph.D. students of Carl Sagan at Cornell University.) Carl Sagan himself was the main author and driving force. Actually, Sagan had scooped the Science paper by publishing the gist of the hypothesis in Parade magazine, which claimed a readership of 50 million! Previously, Sagan had briefed people in public office and elsewhere, so they were all primed for the popular reaction, which was tremendous. Many of today's readers may not remember Carl Sagan. He was a brilliant astrophysicist but also highly political. Imagine Al Gore, but with an excellent science background. Sagan had developed and narrated a television series called Cosmos that popularized astrophysics and much else, including cosmology, the history of the universe. He even suggested the possible existence of extraterrestrial intelligence and started a listening project called SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence). SETI is still searching today and has not found any evidence so far. Sagan became a sort of icon; many people in the U.S. and abroad knew his name and face. Carl Sagan also had another passion: saving humanity from a general nuclear war, a laudable aim. He had been arguing vigorously and publicly for a "freeze" on the production of more nuclear weapons. President Ronald Reagan outdid him and negotiated a nuclear weapons reduction with the USSR. In the meantime, much excitement was stirred up by Nuclear Winter. Study after study tried to confirm and expand the hypothesis, led by the Defense Department (DOD), which took the hypothesis seriously and spent millions of dollars on various reports that accepted Nuclear Winter rather uncritically. The National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences published a report that put in more quantitative detail. It enabled critics of the hypothesis to find flaws – and many did. The names Russell Seitz, Dick Wilson (both of Cambridge, Mass.), Steve Schneider (Palo Alto, Calif.), and Bob Ehrlich (Fairfax, Va.) (no relation to Paul Ehrlich) come to mind. The hypothesis was really "politics disguised as science." The whole TTAPS scheme was contrived to deliver the desired consequence. It required the smoke layer to be of just the right thickness, covering the whole Earth, and lasting for many months. The Kuwait oil fires in 1991 produced a lot of smoke, but it rained out after a few days. I had a mini-debate with Sagan on the TV program Nightline and published a more critical analysis of the whole hypothesis in the journal Meteorology & Atmospheric Physics. I don't know if Carl ever saw my paper. But I learned a lot from doing this analysis that was useful in later global warming research. For example, the initial nuclear bursts inject water vapor into the stratosphere, which turns into contrail-like cirrus clouds. That actually leads to a strong initial warming and a "nuclear summer."