# Pansychism

#### I negate: Permissibility and Presumption flow neg: A) If I know nothing about P, under a world where presumption flowed aff, I would presume both P and not P true without positive justification causing a contradiction B) Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### Panpsychism or the view that everything has its own mind is true.

#### [1] Evolution- throughout the course of historical development one of the following must be true, either every entity has always had a mind since the dawn of existence or there is a point in time when life transformed into a lifeform that evolved into one with a mind. If the first scenario is true, then panpsychism must be true since everything has a mind. If the second is true, we must be able point to the exact moment where we have developed a mind in history. Given that this is impossible as species are constantly evolving, everything must have mind since it would be immoral and illogical to deny that nothing could think.

#### [2] Something cannot come from nothing- A object cannot be created from a substance that doesn’t have the properties to create it. (ie we cannot create a wooden door without wood) therefor in order for a mind to be created it must be formed of mind like structures, if this is the case, everything that has a mind must be created from substances that also have minds, therefor it is either the case that nothing has a mind and it was never created, or it is the case that everything has a mind- since we agree that humans have a mind, every object made of the same particles a mind is, must have minds in and of themselves.

#### [3] Panpsychism is the most logically and scientifically consistent theory: three warrants.

Goff, Philip, Seager, William and Allen-Hermanson, Sean, Summarize "Panpsychism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/spr2012/entries/panpsychism/#4.1> ///AHS PB Note this is an archived file from SEP 2012, I couldn’t find a new one and stumbled on this on google scholar also bracketed for clarity

But still another analogical argument which draws upon quantum physics is much more promising. The analogy in this case involves the relation between consciousness and information. It is natural to think that among the functions of [first] consciousness is the integration of diverse fields of information and the monitoring of various external and internal states. The consciousness of pain, for example, at least involves the monitoring and processing of information about significant states of the body.[11] In a recent work on consciousness which emphasizes the informational and monitoring functions of consciousness, William Lycan comes surprisingly close to a form of panpsychism when he states that “one little monitor does make for [is] a little bit of consciousness. More monitors and better integration and control make for more and fuller consciousness” (1996, p. 40). This is only intended by Lycan to be part of an account of how consciousness emerges which is then forced to allow that consciousness is rather more ubiquitous than untutored intuition might expect. But it follows from this view that if information monitoring is a fundamental and pervasive feature of the world at even the most basic levels, then consciousness too should appear at those levels. It is then highly suggestive that one of the central features of [second] quantum mechanics is the existence of informational but non-causal relations between elements of systems. These relations are non-causal insofar as they are modulated instantaneously over any distance and do not involve the transfer of energy between the parts of the system. But they are informational in the sense that the changes of state of one part of the system seems in some way to be communicated to the other. There is no doubt whatsoever that such quantum systems can exist (they have been created in the laboratory) although the interpretation of them in terms of information exchange is contentious. For example, it is possible to create pairs of photons with correlated polarization states, such that, while neither photon is in a definite state of polarization prior to measurement, they must be discovered to be in opposite polarization states when a measurement takes place, no matter how far apart they are when the measurements occur. Such correlated particles are said to be “entangled”. It does not seem unreasonable to regard two such entangled photons as effectively [and] monitoring each other's state of polarization. We can then use a theory of consciousness such as Lycan's to argue that a little monitoring [which] makes for a little bit of consciousness. Furthermore, while entangled states are normally very delicate and susceptible to “decoherence” caused by environmental disturbance, there might be certain systems that can resist decoherence and it has been conjectured that these systems are the physical foundation of more complex states of consciousness (see Hameroff and Penrose 1996; Hameroff, at least, is willing to entertain a panpsychist interpretation of this work). To follow this line of thought even further, the decoherence argument evidently collapses for the universe as a whole, which by definition cannot be disturbed by any outside force, so presumably the total universe is in one immensely complex entangled state. Given a link between consciousness, monitoring and information exchange, this leads to a view highly reminiscent of Leibniz's monadology, with centres of (perhaps rudimentary) consciousness, or at least mind, at the foundation of the world. Michael Lockwood has developed a highly interesting and well worked out version of this panpsychist view combining quantum mechanical considerations with the intrinsic nature argument, to be considered below, which endorses “a conception of the world as … a sum of perspectives” (1991, p. 177). 4.3 Intrinsic Nature Arguments Another possible argument for panpsychism [third] is neither genetic nor analogical but instead depends on the idea that every actual thing, or kind of thing, must have an intrinsic nature. The objects studied by physics, it is claimed, are described in purely dispositional terms. That is, while an electron, for example, is said to possess “spin”, all this amounts to is that the electron has certain dispositions to behave in certain ways under certain circumstances. It is arguable that dispositions must be grounded in some intrinsic, non-dispositional attributes, but we have no conception whatsoever of what the intrinsic nature of matter might be. In fact, the only intrinsic nature with which we are familiar is consciousness itself. The qualities of conscious experience (to take simply sensory experience: the smell of a rose, the taste of a strawberry, etc.) seem not to be reducible to relations amongst non-experiential states nor entirely specifiable without remainder in terms of their causal powers to produce behavior (and other mental states). They seem instead to possess (or be) intrinsic and irreducible characteristics. If this is the only idea of intrinsic nature we possess, and matter must be assigned some intrinsic nature, it seems that [thus] matter must be granted a mentalistic intrinsic nature. The core idea of this argument can be traced back to Leibniz who felt forced to ascribe mentalistic attributes to his monads as the only possible feature which could make intelligible the active forces that seemed to be required in an adequate physics, and which finally laid to rest the dream of a purely mechanical world view. In his discussion of this difficulty, Whitehead describes all “modern cosmologies” as having to admit a “mysterious reality in the background, intrinsically unknowable” (1933/1967, p. 133) and notes that Leibniz “explained what it must be like to be an atom” (1933/1967, p. 132). See Sprigge (1983) for a defense of this argument within an extended discussion of the virtues of panpsychism (for another brief summary of the argument see Sprigge 1999). Another, less idealist, version of the argument is developed in Lockwood (1991), based upon ideas taken from Russell's later philosophy, married to an interpretation of quantum physics. Although far from demonstrative this is, in the words of Timothy Sprigge (1999), “a hypothesis worth exploring as the only alternative to saying that matter is unknowable in its inner essence, and as likely also to cast light on the mind-body or mind-brain relationship.” The currently most extensive discussion of this form of argument in favor of panpsychism, based upon a critique of the conception of causation, can be found in Rosenberg (2005).

#### That Negates:

#### [1] If everything has the equal capability for agency, its impossible to value the rights of one agent over that of another agent. Further, if everything is agent, value judgments are illogical, for this reason.

#### [2] Its constitutively impossible to know another agent because that agent is defined by not being me. Insofar as everything is an agent, a right to know is impossible and privacy is inescapable.

#### [3] Panpsychism creates a paradox of obligations- we either accept every obligation that exists to every object and therefor never take an action since we would inevitably violate a mind which turns the ac or we reject every obligation premised on the concept of a mind which means we reject the obligation of the 1ac.

[4] if its like Kant shit we can nevrer act cuz that’s like a violation

# Psychialism

# Big move