#### These are a couple of the counterplans/disads that I read this topic (some are unbroken)

## Disads

### 1NC---Chevron DA

#### Chevron deference is collapsing – fiat engenders precedent that sustains the doctrine.

Perlis 15 Mark Perlis, 7-6-2015, Mark Perlis is a seasoned energy and environmental attorney with a broad-based federal regulatory and litigation practice encompassing all aspects of the electric utility industry."Supreme Court Decisions Raise Questions about Future Judicial Scrutiny of EPA’s Clean Power Plan", Inside Energy &amp; Environment, https://www.insideenergyandenvironment.com/2015/07/supreme-court-decisions-raise-questions-about-future-judicial-scrutiny-of-epas-clean-power-plan/, Accessed on 10-27-2019 // JPark

Two of the Supreme Court’s major, end-of-term decisions turn on the deference the Court gives to agency determinations of the meaning of ambiguous clauses in complex regulatory statutes, applying the familiar Chevron framework. The Court’s less deferential applications of Chevron raise important questions about the deference courts might be expected to give to the scope of EPA’s exercise, in its Clean Power Plan, of its statutory authority to establish carbon dioxide emission reduction standards for existing fossil-fuel power plants under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. In King v. Burwell, the Court reviewed an Internal Revenue Service regulation that allowed **tax subsidies** under the Affordable Care Act for insurance plans purchased on either a federal or state-created “Exchange.” In Michigan v. EPA, the Court reviewed EPA’s threshold determination under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act that it was “appropriate and necessary” to initiate regulation of hazardous air pollutants emitted by power plants, without consideration of costs at that initial stage of the regulatory process. The outcome in each case depended upon the Court’s review of the regulatory context of the applicable ambiguous statutory clause. Since the context of Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act differs markedly from the contexts of the Affordable Care Act and Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, the outcomes in King v. Burwell and in Michigan v. EPA do not likely portend the outcome of future court challenges of the Clean Power Plan. However, the Court’s application of Chevron deference in these two cases may portend a strikingly less deferential judicial review of EPA’s Clean Power Plan than might have been expected under the traditional two-part test of Chevron. Under Chevron, courts examine first whether a regulatory statute leaves ambiguity and, if so, courts are directed to defer to a federal agency’s reasonable resolution of the ambiguity in a statute entrusted to administration by that agency. All of the Court’s majority and dissenting opinions in King v. Burwell and in Michigan v. EPA (except for Justice Thomas’s lone dissenting opinion questioning the constitutionality of Chevron deference) confirm the applicability of the traditional Chevron framework. What stands out in these cases is that the Court’s majority opinions do not defer to the agency’s resolution of ambiguity. Chief Justice Robert’s opinion for a 6-3 majority in King v. Burwell grounds Chevron in “the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.” But, “in extraordinary cases,” the Court states that Congress may not have intended such an “implicit delegation.” The Court holds the statutory ambiguity before it to be one of those extraordinary cases in which Congress has not expressly delegated to the respective federal agency the authority to resolve the ambiguity and, therefore, seemingly, zero deference is given by the Court to the applicable IRS regulation. The Court explains that whether billions of dollars in tax subsidies are to be available to insurance purchased on “Federal Exchanges” is a question of “deep economic and political significance,” central to the scheme of the Affordable Care Act, such that had Congress intended to assign resolution of that question to the IRS “it surely would have done so expressly,” especially since the IRS “has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.” Eschewing any deference to the IRS interpretation, the Court assumed for itself “the task to determine the correct reading of” the statutory ambiguity. King v. Burwell is the rare case in which the Court accords a federal agency zero deference in resolving statutory ambiguity under Chevron. Notably, the Court left open how appellate courts should determine whether other statutory ambiguities similarly deserve less or no deference to agency interpretations. The Court, perhaps, offered a hint by citing to its much quoted dicta in its 2014 decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA that the Court “typically greet[s] … with a measure of skepticism, … agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy.” Many commenters have opined, even before King v. Burwell, as to whether this dicta has implications for judicial review of the Clean Power Plan, which, it may be argued, has “deep economic and political significance” comparable to the Affordable Care Act. However, EPA surely has longer experience, greater expertise and wider latitude in crafting policy under the Clean Air Act than the IRS has in crafting health insurance policy. Given the Court’s strong precedent establishing that greenhouse gases are expressly within the scope of the Clean Air Act, appellate courts might distinguish King v. Burwell and apply traditional Chevron deference to the final Clean Power Plan. Michigan v. EPA applies Chevron to EPA regulations under a different part of the Clean Air Act. In this case, the Court reviewed EPA’s threshold determination, under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, that it was “appropriate and necessary,” without regard to costs, to regulate hazardous air pollutants, such as mercury, from power plants. The specific mercury emission limits imposed on categories of power plants were established during subsequent phases of EPA’s rulemaking under Section 112 based on EPA’s explicit consideration of costs. Justice Scalia’s opinion for a 5-4 majority strikes down EPA’s determination that it could find regulation of hazardous air pollutants from power plants to be “appropriate and necessary” without consideration of costs. The Court states it was applying the traditional Chevron framework, under which it would normally defer to EPA’s choice among reasonable interpretations of the ambiguous and “capacious” statutory test requiring an EPA finding that regulation be “appropriate and necessary.” But, the Court finds EPA’s interpretation of this test, as not requiring any consideration of costs, to “have strayed far beyond … the bounds of reasonable [statutory] interpretation.” Michigan v. EPA may be the first case in which the Court has applied Chevron to find that EPA adopted an entirely unreasonable resolution of statutory ambiguity in its Clean Air Act regulations. Justice Kagan’s dissent in Michigan v. EPA faults the Court for failing to give due deference under Chevron to EPA’s decision as to when in its regulatory process it gives consideration to the costs involved in regulating hazardous air pollutants from power plants. While all nine Justices seem to agree that EPA must consider costs in its Section 112 rulemakings, and seem also to agree that EPA gave consideration to costs in later stages of its rulemaking, the dissent criticized the majority’s “micromanagement of EPA’s rulemaking,” emphasizing that EPA reasonably determined “that it was ‘appropriate’ to decline to analyze costs at a single stage of a regulatory proceeding otherwise imbued with cost concerns.” It is difficult to predict whether, based upon King v. Burwell and Michigan v. EPA, appellate courts might narrow the deference accorded to EPA’s resolution of statutory ambiguities under Section 111(d). Those ambiguities arise in a quite different context than those considered by the Court. As one example, critics of the Clean Power Plan have argued that two different versions of Section 111(d) appear to have been signed into law, one of which critics claim should prohibit EPA from issuing regulations under Section 111(d) for sources of pollution already covered by other EPA regulations, such as hazardous pollutant regulation under Section 112. EPA sharply disagrees with its critics and defends its interpretation of which statutory version applies and the scope of permissible regulation under either statutory text. A related issue under the statutory version pressed by critics concerns whether the status of the hazardous air regulations under Section 112, during remand after Michigan v. EPA, should alter EPA’s analysis the potentially competing statutory provisions. It remains to be seen what kind of Chevron deference courts will give to EPA’s reasoned interpretations of the different versions of Section 111(d). Critics also point to purported ambiguity in Section 111(d) as to whether EPA may prescribe carbon dioxide performance standards based on so-called “outside the fence” measures, and whether those standards may be determined on an average state-wide basis, rather than for individual sources. EPA’s resolutions of these and related programmatic issues have occasioned widespread commentary and may feature prominently in future court challenges to the Clean Power Plan. Again, it remains to be seen whether the Court’s recent cases will influence the extent of Chevron deference given by appellate courts to EPA’s well-considered interpretation of its authority to craft the details of the Clean Power Plan under Section 111(d).

#### Broadly, Trumpian overreach through executive orders crushes global U.S. diplomatic standing and credibility

Aguire 17 Marcela Aguirre, M.A. in International Affairs from Boston University, 2/6/17, “In Free Fall: America’s Soft Power in Trump Era,” https://chargedaffairs.org/in-free-fall-americas-soft-power-in-trump-era/

Since taking the presidency on January 20th, Trump has signed executive orders that have done more harm than good in the short period of time that they’ve been enacted. These newly signed orders have not only enraged American citizens but have also enraged and shocked the international community—hurting perceptions of the U.S. around the world. Mexicans, for example, recently pressured President Enrique Peña Nieto to cancel his upcoming trip to Washington to meet with Mr. Trump. They did so not only because they think the wall on the U.S.-Mexico border is an idiotic idea, but because they believe that had Peña Nieto met with Trump, then he would have further bullied and stomped all over Mexico, further sending the country into a downward spiral. The last thing they want is for their president to cave into Trump after what he has said and done to the Mexican people. Currently, perceptions of the U.S. in Mexico are at an all-time low—just ask the piñata sellers. Similarly, Muslims across the world are also frustrated and upset with Trump. His ban on immigrants from seven Muslim-majority countries and Syrian refugees is sending the wrong message to people across the Arab world—that non-Christians aren’t welcome to the U.S. By further alienating Muslims, Trump is playing into the narrative of extremist groups like ISIS that the U.S. is waging a war against all Muslims. This in turn could result in more people joining the terrorist group to help wage a war against America and its allies. The recent ban has also sparked the ire of British citizens. Over a million (and counting) have signed a petition asking Prime Minister Theresa May to cancel Mr. Trump’s upcoming visit to the United Kingdom. The British government, however, has been reluctant to comment on the ban. For now, that’s a good thing. The last thing the U.S. needs is losing its special friend and ally. As part of his “America First” strategy, Trump is signing orders that are supposed to “make America great again.” However, he’s weakening the U.S. presence in the world. By disengaging from the world and loosening relations with its closest allies, Trump is signaling that the U.S. needs no one and that he alone can fix its problems. This, of course, is dangerous. When a major superpower isolates itself from the world, it in turn looses its standing as the global leader. Is that really what this new administration wants? Do we really want to lose allies and cozy up to tyrants like Russia’s Putin? With this kind of isolationist mentality, both are national security and economic interests are at risk. At this pace, our ranking as most loved country will drop dead bottom. Remember 2003 and the Iraq War? When President Obama first took office in 2009, America’s image abroad was pretty dismal. However, over the past eight years, President Obama did a lot to repair American perceptions abroad through a more pragmatic and amicable foreign policy that focused more on soft power then that of the previous administration. Soft power—a term coined by Harvard professor Joseph Nye—is a country’s ability to persuade foreign audiences through diplomatic, economic, and cultural means. In other words, it’s a way to influence the views of foreign publics through non-coercion. From the renewal of friendly relations with Cuba to the signing of the Paris Climate Agreement to the TPP and the Iran Deal, it was clear that soft power was at the core of the Obama administration’s foreign policy. It is no wonder the U.S. took the first spot in Portland’s 2016 Soft Power 30 report—a global ranking of soft power around the world. In 2015, the U.K. took the top spot, and the U.S. was ranked third. Might Brexit have caused the U.K. to drop? Perhaps. It’s hard to guess how far the U.S. will drop in rankings on the Soft Power 30 report this year, but I have no doubt it will. However, what is more relevant is that the U.S. can’t afford to have the international community against it because without them, our national interests are at stake. The world is watching Trump’s every move, and with every mishap and misstep, they’ll be quick to judge America as a whole. In this globalized, connected world the U.S. can’t afford to lose its influence in the world.

#### Decline in U.S. standing caused by Trump executive policies triggers U.S. lashout and global war

Sasha Abramsky 17, freelance journalist published in The Nation, The Atlantic Monthly, New York magazine, the American Prospect, Salon, Slate, the New Yorker online, the Los Angeles Weekly, The Village Voice, the Daily Beast, and Rolling Stone, 1/24/17, “Under Trump, American democracy will change – with the whole world at stake,” http://www.newstatesman.com/world/2017/01/under-trump-american-democracy-will-change-whole-world-stake

Nor, on the international stage, is it likely that this troupe of political novices will be able to control the forces of resentment they are unleashing. Trump’s cabinet is full of Islamophobes who believe that the entire Muslim world is now America’s enemy. It is dominated by China-haters and climate change deniers. By the time Trump assumes the presidency, he will have done an almighty job of pissing off swaths of the world’s population. The optimistic scenario is that the world turns its back on an inward-looking America, getting on with the serious business of international affairs while the pre-eminent superpower throws a four-to-eight-year tantrum. It is more likely, however, that there will be a scramble for influence as US soft power wanes and other powerful countries and non-state organisations seek to fill a vacuum created by the dearth of sensible American voices and policies. Such players could range from economic powerhouses such as China and Germany, seeking, or being forced to accept, a bigger military and geopolitical role, to resurgent powers such as Russia – as well as non-state actors ranging from terrorist entities such as Isis to techno-anarchist groups such as WikiLeaks. As America’s image mutates, they will have a growing opportunity either to sow instability or to reshape regions of the world in their own image. The nightmare scenario is that Trump, relying on his instincts in place of the counsel of experts, seeks to shore up America’s declining influence through spasmodic demonstrations of military power – bullying and threatening one country after another, much as fascist regimes did in the 1930s. The consequences could be disastrous: US nationalism unleashed could plunge the world into conflict. Thus we hover on the edge of a catastrophe: a great democracy that has come to be controlled by demagogues, ready to pounce at the slightest provocation, itching for an excuse to implement emergency measures against Muslims and others, convinced that its military might will cow the rest of the world into toeing the Trumpian line.

### 2NR---AT Chevron’s Fine

#### Yes brink -- Chevron deference is collapsing

Kim ’17 (Catherine Y; George R. Ward Term Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina Law School, J.D. from the Columbia University School of Law, B.A. from Cornell University, former clerk on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; 12/1/17; “Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State”; <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872411>; North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 77; accessed 2/1/19; TV)

The Supreme Court has also relied on recent changes to the Chevron doctrine to deny deference to decisions to deport legal residents on the basis of criminal convictions. In Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 177 the Court famously announced its two-step framework for reviewing agencies’ interpretations of statutes they are charged with administering.178 At the first step, courts determine whether Congress has spoken on the issue.179 If the statutory language is silent or ambiguous, courts proceed to the second step of the inquiry, in which they must defer to the agency’s interpretation so long as it was reasonable.180 The Chevron doctrine has evolved considerably since it was first announced, however, narrowing the circumstances under which a reviewing court will defer to an agency. In Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 181 the FDA concluded that tobacco products fall within the statutory meaning of “drugs” subject to the agency’s regulation.182 On review, the Court declined to defer to the agency’s conclusion that the term “drug” encompassed tobacco products.183 In doing so, it suggested that, a reviewing court may deny Chevron deference to agencies even in cases of statutory ambiguity, where the agency decision would result in a policy change of significant “economic and political magnitude.”184 John Manning has characterized the Brown & Williamson decision as “reflect[ing] an evident desire to avoid otherwise serious nondelegation concerns,” by ensuring that Congress, rather than an agency, accepted responsibility for important policy decisions.185 This decision and others denying Chevron deference to agencies signal a growing distrust of agency policymaking and corresponding willingness to exercise meaningful judicial scrutiny to constrain it.186 The Court has employed this gloss on the Chevron doctrine in the immigration context to limit agencies’ power to deport legal residents on the basis of criminal convictions on several occasions. Just this past term, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions187 used this approach to deny Chevron deference to the BIA.188 Esquivel-Quintana had been convicted of statutory rape under California law, which defines the crime as consensual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator.189 The BIA concluded that such as crime constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” within the meaning of the INA’s deportability provisions and accordingly ordered Esquivel-Quintana deported. Vacating that order, the Supreme Court concluded that term “sexual abuse of a minor . . . unambiguously” excludes convictions for statutory rape unless the state law under which the alien is convicted limits the definition of that crime to cases involving victims younger than sixteen years old.190 This willingness to mandate a judicial construction wholly untethered from the statutory text reveals a deep discomfort with the breadth of discretion exercised by agency officials in determining when legal residents can be deported on the basis of criminal convictions. Mellouli v. Lynch191 presents another example of the Court’s willingness to limit the agency’s discretion to deport residents on the basis of criminal convictions. Mellouli pled “guilty to a misdemeanor offense under Kansas law,” which prohibits the use of drug paraphernalia to store or conceal a controlled substance after he was found hiding four Adderall tablets in his sock.192 The BIA ordered him removed pursuant to section 237 of the INA, which provides for the deportation of any alien “convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in § 802 of Title 21).”193 The referenced provision, 21 U.S.C. § 802, defines “controlled substance” as including only those drugs listed in one of five federal schedules.194 The BIA in earlier cases had held that conviction under a state law prohibiting drug possession or distribution would trigger deportation under this provision only if the state law was limited to the controlled substances included in the federal definition.195 It subsequently held, however, that a state law conviction for using drug paraphernalia triggered deportation regardless of any correspondence between the state law and federal definitions of a “controlled substance.”196 The definition of “controlled substance” under Kansas law is broader than the federal definition of that term.197 But because Mellouli had a conviction for drug paraphernalia rather than for possession or distribution, the BIA concluded that the overbreadth of Kansas’s definition of “controlled substance” posed no obstacle to his deportability.198 On review, the Supreme Court summarily denied Chevron deference to the agency’s construction of the statute.199 As in Esquivel-Quintana, the Court placed little reliance on the statutory text, rejecting the BIA’s interpretation on the ground that it “ma[d]e scant sense,” producing the “anomalous result that minor paraphernalia possession offenses are treated more harshly than drug possession and distribution offenses.”200 Mellouli thus conforms to a larger pattern. Far from extending “plenary” deference to administrative decisions relating to the exclusion, detention, or deportation of aliens, the modern Court has repeatedly applied ordinary administrative law rules to deny any deference at all. \* \* \* These cases contextualize the retreat from plenary power principles within a larger administrative law project to constrain the scope of discretion delegated to unelected agency officials. As such, they suggest that contemporary standards of judicial review over immigration cases may owe as much to concerns about administrative power as to any concern for noncitizens’ individual rights. Indeed, some of these cases appear to disavow concern for the individual alien’s interest altogether by expressly declining to rely on any “immigration rule of lenity,” a doctrine directing courts to construe statutes in favor of noncitizens faced with removal.201

#### Yes Chevron decline – Smith v. Berryhill proves.

Sapper 5-31 Arthur G. Sapper, 5-31-2019, Arthur G. Sapper is Senior Counsel in the Washington, D.C. office of Ogletree Deakins, where he practices administrative and regulatory law. Art focuses his practice on all areas of occupational safety and health (OSHA) law and mine safety and health (MSHA) law, including inspections, discrimination investigations, litigation, rulemaking, counseling and lobbying., "Supreme Court Places Another Limitation on Chevron Deference", National Law Review, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-places-another-limitation-chevron-deference, Accessed on 9-10-2019 // JPark

The justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have again limited the reach of Chevron deference. On May 28, 2019, the Court in Smith v. Berryhill carved another exception into what has lately proven to be its least-favored precedent. It held that Chevron deference does not apply to the scope of judicial review. Background Under § 405(g) of the Social Security Act, judicial review is available for “any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing.” After a hearing, an administrative law judge denied Social Security benefits to the petitioner. The Social Security Administration’s (SSA) final decisionmaker, the Appeals Council, dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on timeliness grounds. The petitioner appealed that dismissal to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, which ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the ground that “an Appeals Council decision to refrain from considering an untimely petition for review is not a ‘final decision’ subject to judicial review in federal court.” The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits on whether a dismissal by the Appeals Council was reviewable as a final decision made after a hearing. Before the Supreme Court, it was argued that § 405(g) was ambiguous and that the SSA’s longstanding interpretation was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron doctrine requires federal courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if (1) the statute is ambiguous and (2) the agency interpretation is reasonable. The Supreme Court’s Decision The Supreme Court held that Chevron was inapplicable. It explained that Chevron deference “‘is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.’ . . . The scope of judicial review . . . is hardly the kind of question that the Court presumes that Congress implicitly delegated to an agency.” In concluding that “Congress did not delegate to the SSA the power to determine ‘the scope of the judicial power vested by’ §405(g) or to determine conclusively when its dictates are satisfied,’” it cited Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649–650 (1990), where it declined to defer to an agency’s view of whether a statute foreclosed a private right of action. Wider Implications? The Court’s holding and its use of Adams Fruit might extend to other questions. One example is a statute of limitations. Although usually nonjurisdictional, statutes of limitations are often intended to cabin an agency’s prosecution authority. In AKM LLC v. Secretary of Labor, 675 F.3d 752 (D.C. Cir. 2012), Judge Brown stated in a concurring opinion

### 2NR---AT Chevron Good

#### Their ev can’t take Trump into account – they’ll be worse for every aff impact area if they’re given deference, and decline of Chevron solves comparatively better

Epstein 17 Richard Epstein , the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, 1/16/17, “A Revolution In Administrative Law,” http://www.hoover.org/research/revolution-administrative-law

This compact and straightforward provision, which should be promptly enacted, takes aim at two of the most misguided decisions of administrative law that instructed courts to take a deferential stance toward agency actions interpreting the key statutes and regulations they administer. The first of these cases, Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC (1984), written by Justice John Paul Stevens, insisted that in all ambiguous cases, reviewing courts should defer to an agency interpretation of its governing statute. Auer v. Robbins (1997), written by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, similarly held that for an agency’s “own regulations, [its] interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” The current regime of deference enjoys strong bipartisan support even though it is plainly inconsistent with Section 706, which provided for the de novo review called for in SOPRA. The change is long overdue. It is difficult to describe in a short space the enormous doctrinal refinements of both Chevron and Auer. No one knows quite when any given statute or regulation becomes ambiguous, and there is a futile debate as to whether the same level of deference should be afforded to memoranda and opinion letters as to regulations issued after the more extensive notice and comment procedures the APA calls for in dealing with major regulations. Scholars thus talk about Chevron step zero, step one, and step two in an effort to decide just how much deference is required in any given context. But the implicit assumption that all agencies are neutral and dispassionate enforcers of their own statutes is falsified by the day-to-day actions of agencies. Their heads have strong political agendas to advance on key issues such as labor, education, and environment, all flash points in the Obama administration. The acceptance of high levels of deference lets agencies make hash out of statutes, which is what happened, for example, in the Department of Labor’s ruling that the statutory prohibitions against sex discrimination, passed decades before, meant to apply to modern gender identity cases that no one had even imagined at the time. Deferring to agencies invites huge flip-flops with the change of administration, given their radically different views of how these various relationships could be shaped. It also allows agencies like the Federal Communications Commission to expand their jurisdiction with dubious interpretive strategies, which often upsets the balance initially designed by Congress. That potent combination of intellectual incoherence and institutional instability makes it hard for private businesses and organizations to plan for the future. Concerns for their plans could be effectively moderated if these legal issues were simply decided by courts as they have been for centuries. The fruits of this confusion will become evident the day after the Trump inauguration when major agencies reverse field, an action requiring as little justification as the process that adopted these (dubious) rules in the first place. It is often said about administrative agencies that only they possess the expertise to make sense out of arcane statutory and regulatory language. Nothing could be further from the truth. Most of the really important language consists of words like discrimination and pollution that judges can understand and apply as well as anyone else. The great danger of entrusting these issues to administrative agencies lies in their inherent bias. The independent agencies are in most cases run by commissions of five members, which often divide three-to-two, with the President appointing a chairman from his own party. Bias in administration is not some rare Black Swan event, but is, as standard public choice theory predicts, a common occurrence. This is why the Democrats in Congress are so fiercely opposed to the key Trump appointments mentioned above. Now that they are out of power, the Democrats, who once praised executive and administrative power, will sound the rule of law trumpet loudly. And they should be heard on this point. H.R. 5 is important now because it can be used to restrain the abuse of discretion of Republican administrators, just as it can be used to restrain the abuse of Democratic ones. For the moment at least, the proposed revolution in administrative law will have its greatest impact on the regulatory misadventures of the highly partisan Obama agencies. But in the long run, we need SOPRA to make sure that Republican administrators do not return the favor by hiding behind Chevron and Auer deference in order to impose, by regulation and interpretation, their own dubious decisions. Whether one deals with constitutions, statutes, or regulations, the only safe guide is to try to use text, context, structure, and purpose to determine the correct interpretation of disputed provisions. Gimmicks like Chevron and Auer deference only muddy the waters. In all cases, de novo review of questions of law is a matter of the highest importance for constitutional and institutional safeguards of the rule of law. We need it today.

### 1NC---China DA

#### Rapid decline in US fossil fuel production decks energy security and concedes the global order to China – renewable transitions don’t happen and wouldn’t be enough.

Steeves and Ricardo 16 Brye Butler Steeves and Helton Ricardo, August 2016, Brye Butler Steeves is a journalist, who has worked as reporter, writer, and editor at newspapers, magazines, trade journals, and online. She is also the author of a children’s book. Steeves recently worked as an economics editor for the Federal Reserve, and is now an international affairs writer and editor. Her research interests include renewable energy and interstate competition between China and the United States. Steeves has a bachelor’s degree in journalism from Washington State University in the United States and a master’s degree in international relations from the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC) in Florianopolis, Brazil. Helton Ricardo Ouriques is a professor in the Economics and International Relations Department and in the International Relations Graduate Program at the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC) in Florianopolis, Brazil. He is an economist and holds a PhD in geography. Ouriques is a member of the World-Systems Political Economy Research Group (GPEPSM). He is a professor of economic geography, geopolitics, the evolution of contemporary capitalism, political economy and the development of comparative historical perspective. His recent research interests include: the development processes in the countries of South America and western Asia (China, in particular); the paths of the development of countries on the periphery of capitalism; and the geopolitical issues of natural resources in the 21st Century., "Energy Security: China and the United States and the Divergence in Renewable Energy", No Publication, http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&amp;pid=S0102-85292016000200643&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso&amp;tlng=en, Accessed on 10-26-2019 // JPark

* China is pursuing a balanced energy strategy now
* High fossil fuel consumption puts it perceptually ahead, coupled with slow phase outs to renewables – if the US gives up, it cedes complete leadership to China and causes retrenchment
* US can’t catch up with renewables – only fossil fuels can keep it counterbalancing China

China’s energy landscape China is the world’s largest energy consumer, second largest economy and most populous country with 1.3 billion people. China’s economy has experienced unprecedented growth during recent decades to become a global economic superpower. At the same time, it holds the title of world’s biggest polluter. Its era of energy independence and self-sufficient ideology has ended, replaced by its voracious appetite for energy, which is both the cause and consequence of its fast-growing economy. Today, the success of China’s economic growth is inseparable from its dependence on global markets of the capitalist world. Chinese economic growth over the past three decades has been based on energy consumption, which has exceeded its GDP growth since 2002 (Xing and Clark 2010). China soon became dependent on energy imports, and in 2010 surpassed the United States to become the largest energy consumer in the world. Increasingly, China’s high energy use is both a cause and an effect of its unprecedented economic growth, particularly in the heavy industry sector. China’s demand for all forms of energy is largely due to the production and exportation of goods, and manufacturing materials for construction projects in the domestic market (IEA 2007b: 261). China’s energy matrix has the following characteristics: Coal: Coal represents close to 70 percent of the country’s total primary energy consumption, although China’s coal sources are low quality, dangerous to mine, highly sulfuric and extremely polluting (Cornelius and Story 2007). China’s coal reserves are equivalent to about 12.5 percent of the world’s total reserves, and at current production levels, should last until mid-century. Because coal is an abundant, low-cost native resource, China depends on it as its primary energy source. However, this dependence is the primary cause of China’s energy-related environmental degradation and is cited as the principal factor in high CO2 emissions. The country is investing in technologies in order to use coal in a cleaner manner (Cornelius and Story 2007). Oil: Crude oil accounts for less than one-quarter of the country’s total energy consumption despite its growing dependence on imported oil, placing it among the main issues on its political agenda. A key factor behind this is the rapid expansion of China’s auto fleet. Meanwhile, the country’s reserves are estimated at less than 15 years. China is the world’s fifth largest oil producer, but in 2011 was dependent on imports to meet about 54 percent of its oil demand. Of its oil imports, more than half comes from the Middle East. There are four large state-owned Chinese oil companies; the government regulates the prices for petroleum products (IEA 2012: 6). Gas: China is a net importer of natural gas; that is to say that although it is a gas producer and exporter, its total imports exceed the volume of gas exported. This power source accounted for only 4 percent of China’s total energy consumption in 2011 (U.S. EIA). The country is also exploring shale gas extraction possibilities to reach known sources of gas that it has not yet been able to extract. Alternative Sources: Hydro, wind, solar and nuclear energy sources form a small percentage of China’s energy matrix and are being further developed, but not enough to reduce China’s dependence on fossil fuels (IEA 2007b). However, with its natural endowments of renewable resources, China could meet all its domestic energy demand (Gallagher 2013). ‘Nowhere is China’s global influence greater than in energy markets’ (Cornelius and Story 2007: 7). This applies especially to China’s unquenchable thirst for crude oil, which has more than doubled since the mid-1990s. Today, the Chinese economy is the world’s second largest oil consumer, and with the stagnation in domestic production, its growing import demand is widely seen as a key factor behind the rise in global oil prices. China’s role in global energy development affects its policy formation and interstate relations, environmental protection standards, and the energy efficiency of other global players through the goods it produces and exports. Despite the rapid growth of the country’s demand from all sectors of energy, China’s global emergence has made the world economy become more dependent on oil, via prices, competition for supplies, and safety concerns. To improve the efficiency of vehicles and electrical appliances that China produces and exports, is to improve energy efficiency for the rest of the world (IEA 2007b: 45). As a rising global power and large energy consumer, China is on a trajectory that could potentially reshape the global energy landscape. This may be especially true in the areas of conservation and efficient use of fossil fuels, as well as the subsequent global incorporation of renewable energy sources through China’s own technological advances and emulation by other countries of its clean energy practices. This potential intersection of economic and political rise with the global energy markets is reminiscent of the increased U.S. demand for oil and dependence on imports, which coincided with its growing strategic power during the 20th Century. As China grows economically, it increasingly plays an important role in determining global technical standards and promoting their convergence. China’s growing weight in the global economy can contribute to revolutionizing the world’s energy system (Cornelius and Story 2007: 15). The United States’ energy landscape The United States is currently the world’s largest economy, although there are projections of it being topped by the Chinese economy. With a population of almost 314 million, the United States is the second largest consumer of total energy. The United States is almost entirely dependent on fossil fuels for its energy supply, and renewable sources account for only a small portion of its total matrix. Like China, the United States is self-sufficient in coal and heavily dependent on imported oil. Meanwhile, its demand for energy is expected to continue to increase due to population and economic growth. The latter is driven mainly by an increased demand in the residential and transport sectors, although all areas have seen an increase in demand (IEA 2007a: 15). The U.S. energy matrix includes: Oil: Most of the United States’ energy consumption, about 36 percent, comes from oil. The country is heavily dependent on imported oil, due to increased demand in the residential and transport sectors. The United States is the largest oil importer in the world, followed by China (Gallagher 2013). Gas: Natural gas accounts for about 25 percent of the country’s energy consumption. Energy from shale gas sources in the United States increased by more than 50 percent annually between 2007 and 2012, increasing total U.S. gas production from 5 percent to 39 percent. In light of these shale gas developments, the United States is ‘about to become an energy superpower’ (Blackwill and O’Sullivan 2014). Coal: Nearly 20 percent of U.S. energy consumption is met by coal. Alternative sources: About 8 percent of U.S. energy consumption is powered by nuclear energy and 9 percent by renewable energy, including solar, geothermal, biomass, and hydro sources. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 describes the use of clean energy in the country, especially a strong movement toward nuclear energy (U.S. EIA). The United States also has significant renewable energy sources in a way that has the potential to lead the world in renewable energy despite its natural endowment of fossil fuels. For example, its wind resources could exceed the total of the projected electricity demand for the entire country, and the conditions for solar energy also look promising. Of note is that countries with less favorable conditions for renewable energy, including China and Germany, have approved greater renewable energy policies (Gallagher 2013). Like China, the United States is exerting global influence over the future development of energy. The country has served as a global leader in energy research and development, and has advanced energy technologies. The U.S. government is the largest funder in the world of energy research and development, which historically has promoted the advancement of all energy fields, including fossil, nuclear, and renewable fuels. The government partners with private and educational institutions and international organizations to promote its agenda. The objectives of its policies guide the research and development of energy technologies. These investments in research and development are an important policy tool to meet the country’s energy goals. The U.S. government is also the world leader in international collaboration on technology and participates in international organizations focused on energy best practices, such as the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy. The United States has several research and development strategies that coordinate the investments in research and technology development, including the Climate Change Technology Program, which is an investment program of several billion dollars for the research, development, and implementation of climate-related technologies. Another example, the Advanced Energy Initiative, works to promote energy efficiency technologies and reduce reliance on imports, including investments in cleaner coal plants and alternative and renewable sources (IEA 2007a: 31, 50). Energy security and renewable Energy Non-renewable energy sources provide about 90 percent of the world’s commercial energy, while nuclear power and hydropower provide most of the remaining amount (Podobnik 2002: 253). The problem of energy security can be seen simply as supply and demand: energy needs are growing and showing no signs of slowing yet, at the same time, known sources cannot keep up with this pace of growth. Due to the fact that the world’s largest energy consumers cannot meet their energy needs through domestic supplies, and the global supply seems unable to meet future demands, we can see a shift towards renewable energy sources. While this pressure can, and will likely be, mitigated by technological advances and the discovery of new sources, the shortage resulting from the current rate of consumption will lead to competition for access and control, which will increase tension between states (Podobnik 2002). Both China and the United States are in an unsustainable energy situation. Because of their current high energy consumption, both countries are almost completely dependent on fossil fuels, while renewable sources make up only a small portion of the energy supply. Both countries are self-sufficient in coal, largely self-sufficient in natural gas and heavily dependent on imported oil. Meanwhile, energy demand will continue to increase because of population and economic growth. The latter is mainly driven by increased demand in the residential and transport sectors, although all areas have contributed to the increased demand (IEA 2007a: 15). It is expected that global demand for energy will exceed known sources and most of the major energy consumers in the world will not have a sufficient domestic supply, especially of oil, to meet this future projected demand. Meanwhile, there is considerable political pressure to diversify away from coal consumption because it is considered a major source of pollution and a serious danger to public health. However, governments are also under pressure to promote economic growth in which energy plays a key role. This means that energy security is deeply rooted in foreign policy and is an important factor in relations between states. Therefore, the most important powers in the world are increasing their investments in renewable and sustainable alternatives, including solar, wind, and hydropower. Meanwhile, less powerful states seek to imitate the most powerful states in the world. This is evidenced in some developing nations, like Brazil, India and South Africa, which try to emulate the clean energy policies of the European Union. The high energy consumption of both China and the United States is a threat to global energy security, and therefore one of their most important political challenges seems to be to develop the ability to meet long-term energy needs reliably, safely, economically, and in an environmentally friendly way. Common challenges include pollution and environmental degradation, inefficient and intensive use of energy, and the depletion of non-renewable resources. Both countries are addressing these challenges in a similar way, with political goals aimed at reducing dependence on imports, reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, and increasing energy efficiency. Both China and the United States have implemented the following national energy policies: carbon cap carbon market, renewable energy standard, tax incentives for clean energy efficient standards, feed-in tariffs and green bonds (PEW 2014: 37, 50). Political action to reduce demand, coupled with increased energy efficiency and the development of new sources, particularly renewables, can be an alternative for these two nations. There is an intersection between energy security, national development and states’ policies (Pautasso and Kerr 2008). Most states are challenged by competition for resources, shortages in energy supply, environmental impacts, and the search for energy policy solutions to address these challenges and to promote world order. In general, the objectives of energy policy include ensuring energy supply safety, generating economic growth and facilitating the preservation of the environment. A comparison of the energy policies and scenarios (energy supply, demand and reserves) of China and the United States suggests that a change in the energy policies of these states is critical in order to meet the world’s contemporary energy security needs. While many of the Chinese and U.S. energy policy solutions are similar, the two countries have little in common in terms of collaboration or cooperation. There does seem to be a great opportunity for cooperation between these states in developing and implementing long-term sustainable energy policies. The world would benefit from energy cooperation between China and the United States as well as a potential transition to a predominantly renewable energy system. The effects of clean energy are far-reaching. Renewable energy sources contribute to energy security by diversifying energy sources, both technologically and geographically. They affect the economy through imports, exports, job creation, global energy prices, public health and environmental degradation mitigation (IEA.org; Gallagher 2013). Both China and the United States have enough of their own renewable sources to meet all of their potential demand for domestic energy. In addition, the United States has such a significant endowment of renewable energy resources that it could lead the world in renewable energy (Gallagher 2013), despite its recent boom in shale gas. Fundamental changes in the global energy system occur more easily during the decline of a great power and when the international system is in disarray (Podobnik 2006), as in the current situation of the relative economic decline the United States and the rise of China (Arrighi 2008). The role of the accumulation of resources and state power is evident in hegemonic transition periods, as were the two previous transitions in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Now, China is emerging as a global economic power in the 21st Century. This hegemonic transition prompts competition and innovation around the globe (Podobnik 2002), not just between the powers in transition. Energy security is no exception. Developed countries and developing countries spend billions of dollars annually incorporating renewables into their energy security policies and for the last eight years there has been a growing trend for larger investments by developing countries. In recent years, China has led the world in investment in renewable energy, followed by the United States. Four developing countries were among the 10 largest investors in renewable energy in 2012: China, India, Brazil and South Africa, four of the five BRICS nations. These nations’ billion-dollar investments place them at the level of major powers, like the United States, Germany, Japan, Italy, the U.K. and France. Russia, the remaining BRICS nation, is an exporter of energy that is also incorporating renewable energy into its national policies. Competition for energy resources also seems to be spurring the development of renewable energy as conventional energy prices continue to rise (Podobnik 2002). History shows that a crisis in a dominant source of energy was mitigated by the transition to another energy source, such as the transition from coal to oil in Great Britain during the 19th Century. Podobnik (2006) suggests that the inevitable oil crisis today will, in part, cause a shift towards renewable energy sources. The last two centuries show two major transitions of power during periods of industrial growth: the shift from charcoal to coal in the mid-19th Century, and when oil became the dominant world energy source in the mid-20th Century. Many countries appeared to be self-sufficient in energy until around 1950, when they began to become increasingly dependent on energy imports, leading to the transition to oil. Due to the fact that the major powers did not have significant oil reserves, energy needs were underpinned by imports. This strategy does not seem tenable for future energy needs and also seems to be prompting new, and in some cases, more, investments in renewable energy options. Perhaps the energy transition of the 21st Century will be defined by a shift from non-renewable fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. Hegemonic advancement can be seen during the energy transition periods, including the transitions of 1750-1850 from peat and charcoal to coal, and the 1900-1950 transition from coal to oil. Coal and steam power, in combination with capital and empire, increased ownership and led to an ecological surplus resulting in food, labor, and cheap energy. The cheap coal, and later (after 1945), cheap oil led to increased consumption and a significant expansion of consumer markets. In addition, cheap raw materials, that is, vital goods such as food, raw materials, and energy were instrumental in the creation and maintenance of large waves of accumulation because this ecological surplus reduces production costs and increases the rate of profit (Moore 2013). Today, we see close races for fossil fuels (with the global supply becoming increasingly limited in the medium- and long-term), while countries seek to diversify their respective energy matrices to include alternative sources, such as shale gas extraction and renewable energy to meet their energy needs. It seems that the current global energy system is in transition, with its unsustainable reliance on the use of fossil fuels, including their exhaustion, pollutant nature, and increased demand, as well as the intersection of three systemic dynamics identified by Podobnik (2006) as necessary conditions for a shift in global power. They are: 1) geopolitical rivalry, 2) commercial competition and 3) social conflict. Each of these dynamics is evident today, as we see: 1) competition for existing limited fossil fuels in the world, specifically oil, 2) economic competition for energy technologies, such as foreign investment opportunities and the export of renewable energy, and 3) the chaos that is associated with the hegemonic transition. In sum, China and the United States are competing for resources, striving for market share and fighting against environmental degradation caused by the excessive use of fossil fuels. Now is the time for an energy transition, but whether it will be in the direction of renewable energy is still uncertain. Moreover, it is necessary to monitor in detail whether China, which has so far been unable to replicate the shale gas boom in the United States, will continue to increase its investment in the use of renewable energy sources to help secure its energy security. In other words, it is worth further investigation based on the current divergence of investments in renewable energy by both China and the United States. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS Concerns about the current state of energy security could trigger deep structural changes in the global energy system (Cornelius and Story 2007: 14). Renewable energy offers the long-term promise of sustainability on several fronts for countries around the world (Heiman and Solomon 2004). Currently, the world’s energy needs are growing without showing signs of slowing, while at the same time, known sources of non-renewable energy will not be able to sustain this rate of growth. Although the pressure to meet increasing demands can, and probably will, be mitigated by technological advances and the discovery of new sources (Cornelius and Story 2007), renewable sources appear to be a viable solution to contemporary energy challenges for many countries around the world. As a global power and the world’s highest energy consumer, China is on a path to potentially reshape the global energy landscape, especially in the areas of fossil fuels conservation, more efficient energy use, and the subsequent global incorporation of renewable energy sources. This may be possible through China’s own technological advances and the other countries’ emulation of its clean energy practices. As it grows economically, China will increasingly play an important role in determining overall technical standards and in the promotion of energy convergence. Its growing weight in the global economy could help revolutionize the world’s energy system (Cornelius and Story 2007: 15). Energy challenges in China are no different from other countries with the same problem, but the extent and speed at which change is occurring is unique. Like other countries, China’s energy policy challenges go hand-in-hand with its economic policy objectives. The country needs to maintain its rapid development and economic growth, but in a much less energy-intensive way. This is widely recognized by the Chinese government, but significant changes in energy consumption relative to economic output could mean major changes in its economic structure (IEA 2007b: 271-2). The role of the United States in renewable energy should not be discounted, even if it is incorporating proportionally less than China in this area. The United States is the global leader in energy research and development and, furthermore, has always progressed energy technologies. The U.S. government is the world’s largest contributor to energy research and development, which has historically provided huge advances such as in the energy fields of fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable sources. However, the abundance of shale gas and the increasing reliance on this resource may slow the country’s move towards greater incorporation of renewable sources in its energy matrix. Despite its renewable energy resources and capacity to meet energy demands with these sources, the United States appears set to continue its reliance on nonrenewable energy sources because of its abundant natural endowment of shale gas. Pautasso and Kerr (2008) state that the new world order should be structured based on the symbiotic relationship of the rise of China and the United States’ reaction to this rise. Such a transition could result in a change in the balance of power in the international system toward China. A major factor in this transition is related to energy security, as we have seen in previous hegemonic transitions. Stronger cooperation between China and the United States is vital to address the common challenges of energy security, including market stability and supply, as well as new advances in renewable energy that benefit energy consumption, boost economies, and mitigate environmental impacts. However, China and the United States seem to have a long way to go to achieve their respective policy goals for energy efficiency and environmental sustainability. Energy-related relations between them seem to be characterized by a mixture of cooperation, coexistence and competition. Renewable energy is often portrayed as a zero-sum game, but there are reasons for cooperation (Zweig and Jianhai 2005; Murray et al. 2011). As stated by Murray et al. (2011: 7): ‘It is not uncommon for the terminology to frame the impetus for the development of clean technologies as a war, with the implication that one country will win and others will lose...’ However, other countries ‘can also win by having access to cleaner energy and use energy more efficiently than they would normally, even if the technologies that produce the energy originates in another country’ (Murray et al. 2011). It is important to stress that relations between China and the United States have been characterized by interdependence. These two great powers are both in competition with each other and mutually dependent on each other in, for example, trade and investments. As noted by Morris (2012), the interactions between these two countries are complex and marked by both cooperation and conflict. China is highly dependent on the U.S. consumer market for its exports and the United States, in turn, depends on large volumes of inexpensive goods produced by China as well as Chinese funding for a significant portion of its current account deficits (Arrighi 2008; Ho-Fung 2009). Therefore, it is unlikely that China will directly challenge U.S. energy supply sources – after all, it still depends on U.S. investments and the U.S. market. Taking this into consideration, this article aims to show that China is incorporating and investing in more renewable energy resources, quite possibly with the intent of global leadership in this sector, inclusive of its technological innovations, as highlighted by Klare (2013). In regard to the United States, the race for renewable energy incorporation has already been acknowledged as a challenge by the U.S. government. In 2014, President Barack Obama announced the expansion of the country’s cooperation with China on climate change and clean energy (U.S.- China Joint Announcement 2014). Such an announcement can be understood as the United States’ reaction to China’s prominence in the field of renewable energy, as demonstrated by the data presented in this article. Moreover, as highlighted by Klare (2013), the dynamics of the American political process should also be taken into consideration when considering the country’s investments in renewable energy. For example, as in the present situation, a U.S. congress with a Republican majority probably will not authorize more resources and new projects in the renewable energy sector.3 Because the issue of energy is crucial for the power-capital-accumulation processes, China’s greater use and development of renewable energy, as presented in this article, are indicators that this country, which has led East Asia’ as the most dynamic region in the world economy, also seems to be aiming for world leadership in this strategic sector. Maintaining or even expanding the current scenario described in this article, the divergence between China and the United States in the development, control of, and leadership in renewable energy appears to provide empirical evidence of the end of the American hegemony, defended by Wallerstein and Arrighi. Although it is too premature to make statements about a new hegemony, China, as an emerging global power and the world’s largest energy consumer, is able potentially to reshape the global energy landscape, primarily in the efficient use and conservation of fossil fuels, as well as through the incorporation of renewable energy sources into its energy matrix. However, as highlighted by Arrighi (2008: 392), ‘inspired by others in the Western way of excessive energy consumption, China’s rapid economic growth has not yet created for itself and the world an ecologically sustainable path of development’.

#### The perception of retrechment alone incites interventionism, proliferation, and unchecked nuclear war.

Fay 17 (Matthew; director of defense and foreign-policy studies at the Niskanen Center, Ph.D student in the political-science program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, fellow at George Mason’s Center for Security Policy Studies, M.A. in international relations from American Military University and diplomatic history from Temple University, B.A. degree in political science from Saint Xavier University; 11/16/17; “America Unrestrained?: Engagement, Retrenchment, and Libertarian Foreign Policy”; <https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/America-Unrestrained.pdf>; Niskanen Center; accessed 11/24/18; TV) Yes I know this card is in every 1nc strategy I read but it’s just such a good card so thank you tyler 0 people thus far have questioned the validity of this spicy heg good card woot woot

In a system with more independent states balancing against one another, is war more or less likely? Libertarians are placing a bet that all else would remain equal in international politics if the United States retrenches. While they assume a world where an increased number of states are balancing against one another would remain peaceful, the reality is not entirely clear. Using basic realist premises about state behavior under international anarchy, it is easy to identify a number of scenarios less rosy than the one libertarians assume would occur should the United States retrench. These scenarios might include a world of increased nationalism, eroding norms against military aggression, increased economic autarky, and the further spread of nuclear weapons as states look to produce security for themselves. Some states may also fail to balance against threats in the wake of American retrenchment, increasing the likelihood the United States will be drawn into a major war. Libertarians assume that in the absence of an alliance with the United States, other countries would simply increase their defense spending if they felt threatened. However, internal balancing is not a mechanical process. According to John Mearsheimer, leaders of states facing security competition are likely to use nationalism to garner support from their populations for the necessary regeneration of military capabilities.87 Writing at the end of the Cold War, Mearsheimer suggested that Europe would revert to a pattern of recurrent warfare. The absence of the United States and the Soviet Union would leave Europe, once again, an anarchic multipolar system. The structure of the system would force the states to compete with one another, as they had prior to the Cold War. Mearsheimer argued that pre-1945 “hypernationalism” was a product of “security competition among the European states, which compelled elites to mobilize public support for national defense efforts.”88 American retrenchment could similarly lead to an anarchic, multipolar Europe—thus increasing the chances of war on the continent. Such a system could engender nationalist sentiments among the populations of Europe, heightening animosities between national groups. These heightened animosities could help erode norms against military aggression that have facilitated the decline in interstate war. Nationalist groups within a country can seize on these sentiments to pursue confrontational and expansionist policies.89 Encouraging support for increased military capabilities through nationalism might lead populations to see war as once again a means to national glory or maintaining national honor. Matters of national prestige and honor can lead to the initiation of wars when bound up in territorial claims, while at the same time increasing the intensity and duration of a conflict.90 Nationalism and security competition might also erode the pacifying effects of economic openness. Realism suggests states are concerned about relative gains.91 States in security competition might be wary of trading with one another due to concerns about how a potential rival’s economic gains might provide it with an advantage if translated into military power. They may also adopt autarkic policies for fear of undermining their economic and military self-sufficiency.92 Territorial conquest has become increasing anachronistic in international politics. However, the proliferation of protectionist policies might once again make aggression and preventive war seem like strategically sensible ways for states to secure the resources necessary to reduce the ability of potential rivals to cut them off economically. If the risk of territorial aggression increases, the possession of nuclear weapons would become an attractive option for some states whose security was previously guaranteed by the United States. Nuclear weapons are most useful for deterring major territorial aggression, meaning their potential utility increases as the potential for war does.93 A number of U.S. allies have either previously pursued nuclear weapons or have the capability to do so. They might choose to obtain a nuclear arsenal once responsible for their own security. There are at least two reasons why increasing the number of nuclear weapons states may not have the pacifying effect some realists suggest they do. First, states do not always adopt the second-strike—that is, retaliatory—postures realists assume they will. Recent research shows that even in the paradigmatic case of mutual assured destruction—the Cold War superpower standoff—neither the United States nor the Soviet Union abandoned the search for a first-strike capability.94 Moreover, political scientist Vipin Narang’s research on India-Pakistan nuclear relations has demonstrated that states sometimes adopt risky postures in pursuit of goals other than deterrence.95 Second, an increased number of nuclear weapon states will increase the chances nuclear weapons will be used even if states do adopt second-strike postures. On the one hand, simple organizational pathologies or political instability in a new nuclear state could lead to an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch.96 On the other hand, even for retaliatory postures, effective deterrence requires that states credibly signal that they are willing to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for an attack. To do so requires that nuclear states in competition with one another must maintain a willingness to risk nuclear war. The greater the number of these “competition[s] in risk taking,” as Thomas Schelling called them, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used at some point.97 The situation in Northeast Asia helps illustrate how increasing the number of nuclear weapons states increases the probability that nuclear weapons will be used. Absent U.S. security guarantees, there is a real possibility that Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea would build nuclear arsenals of their own given their concerns about China and North Korea.98 There are currently two nuclear dyads in the region: the United States and China, and the United States and North Korea. If Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea all acquired nuclear weapons, there would be at least five additional dyads: China and Taiwan, China and Japan, China and South Korea, North Korea and South Korea, and North Korea and Japan. Given lingering tensions from its pre-1945 occupation of the Korean Peninsula, a South Korea-Japanese nuclear dyad is entirely plausible as well.99 Each new dyad adds a contest in risk-taking, which increases the chances that nuclear weapons will be used in the region.100 Though America’s geographic isolation insulates it from many the threats of an increasingly competitive and unstable world, it does not provide absolute immunity. As noted above, Christopher Layne rightly highlights the major wars in Europe in which the United States did not become involved. However, the question should not be about frequency of American involvement in major power wars in Eurasia. Instead, it should be about the cost when the United States does become involved in such a conflict. The purpose of insurance is to protect against low frequency, high-cost events. There was a relatively low probability that the Soviet Union would have invaded Western Europe during the Cold War, but the United States invested in deterring an invasion because the costs of an actual war would have been higher.101 While the United States avoided involvement in a number of European wars, the major conflicts the United States did become involved in were high-cost events. At the height of World War II, the United States spent 37 percent of its gross domestic product on its military.102 More than 8 percent of the U.S. population was in uniform at the war’s peak.103 The size of the American state expanded massively during this time.104 The United States did not need a formal military alliance with any of the belligerents prior to either of the world wars to become involved in the conflicts. America’s involvement in World War II suggests that one way the United States might become involved in another major war is if some former U.S. allies fail to build their military capabilities in the face of aggressive powers. Neoclassical realist scholars refer to this problem as “underbalancing.”105 According to this theory, states may fail to internally balance against a threat due to domestic political factors.106 If states fail to check an aggressive power, it could pave the way for the type of hegemonic threat realists believe would require American military action. If such a threat materialized, and if frontline states failed to contain it, the offshore balancing logic underpinning retrenchment recommends the United States regenerate its military capabilities to defeat it. Mearsheimer argues that these periodic military buildups are a feature of offshore balancing strategies. He writes: Offshore balancers like the United Kingdom and the United States tend to maintain relatively small military forces when they are not needed to contain a potential hegemon in a strategically important area… [W]hen it is necessary for an offshore balancer to check a potential hegemon, it is likely to sharply expand the size and strength of its fighting forces, as the United States did in 1917, when it entered World War I, and in 1940, the year before it entered World War II.107 Retrenchment assumes that this process would be somewhat mechanical. The United States, aware of a new threat and the inadequacy of frontline states to counter it, would convert its latent material strength into military power to confront, and if necessary, militarily defeat the threatening state.108 However, the process is unlikely to be as automatic or frictionless as realists suggest. Drawing on America’s economic resources to tap its latent military power would not provide the same advantage it did before World War II for two reasons. First, changes in military technology would make it difficult for the U.S. military to return to regions where it previously positioned forces. While modern technology enables the United States to project military power around the globe, it also makes it easier for potential adversaries to increase the cost of doing so. A number of states hostile to American interests have already procured anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities as a cost-effective means to prevent the U.S. military from operating near their respective territories.109 Second, tapping American economic power to mobilize for war would not be the same as it was before World War II. The economic conditions that obtained before the world wars are no longer with us. There is no great surplus of labor and idle manufacturing capacity as the Great Depression had provided the United States when it converted to a war economy prior to World War II.110 Converting to a war economy today would therefore require far-reaching political and social disruptions. In light of those disruptions, any effort to mobilize the American public for war would require a unifying mechanism. Realists assume nationalism is that mechanism. Ordinary Americans are unlikely to get worked up over the abstract threat of a distant regional hegemon in Eurasia. Confronted with a new military threat in Eurasia, American leaders are likely to rouse what historian Walter Russell Mead refers to as the populist “Jacksonian” tendency in American foreign policy. This tendency, Mead argues, leads to American wars that are particularly violent and destructive.111

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#### Aff causes blackouts – the US power system isn’t ready for renewables.

Reuben Gregg Brewer, 10-19-2014, "How Renewable Energy Could Leave You Mired in Blackouts", Motley Fool, https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/10/19/renewable-energy-could-leave-you-mired-in-blackout.aspx, Accessed on 10-27-2019 // JPark

There are plenty of things to like about renewable power sources like solar and wind. However, these sources, on a large scale, are relatively new to the U.S. electric grid. That has major implications that utilities may not be ready to deal with. And that risks leaving you without power and, thus, in the dark. Zig zag You likely know all about the benefits of solar and wind. The biggest ones being no emissions from burning fossil fuels and minimal costs once they are installed since they are powered by nature. These are huge benefits that can't be, and shouldn't be, dismissed. It makes sense to include such clean-power options in the mix. However, if you get so caught up in the upside of renewable power you might lose sight of the downside. And there are some pretty notable negatives that have big implications for a U.S. power system that hasn't been designed to handle intermittent power. That, in fact, is one of the biggest problems. The sun and the wind can't be controlled. There's no way to tell just how much power you'll get on any given day or at any given moment. This fact has utilities more than a little concerned, since their job is basically to ensure your lights stay on no matter what. SOURCE: U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION Just how big an issue is this? Earlier in the year, the U.S. Energy Information Administration put out a graph showing the swings in wind power supply in Texas. The chart, shown above, is full of peaks and valleys. The spike up can mean the grid has to absorb four times as much power from wind as it does during the lulls. And solar is no better -- and perhaps even worse. Sempra Energy's (NYSE:SRE) San Diego Gas & Electric (roughly 40% of the company's earnings last year), has a rooftop solar penetration rate of around 6% that it expects to double over the next two years or so. Tom Bialek, chief engineer at the San Diego utility, however, points out a problem: "Customers are changing how we view the world just because they are making choices." Why is this such a big deal? Because customers don't need Sempra's consent to make changes, which means that Sempra doesn't know how much new solar to expect. And that's on top of the fact that you can't predict how much the sun will shine on any given day. Utility customers aren't likely to start installing wind farms, so this is an issue unique to solar. In fact, Hawaiian Electric Industries (NYSE:HE) is dealing with a big solar problem right now, as so much solar has been installed, a good portion of which it didn't know about, that peak production times are putting it at risk of overloading circuits. The island state has 20 times the average rooftop solar penetration as the mainland. Every utility could be heading toward this dilemma. SOURCE: REUBENGBREWER, VIA WIKIMEDIA COMMONS Old reliable This is why utilities like controllable power sources like natural gas, coal, and nuclear. There's no question how much power you'll get -- you run the plant at the level you need. But, that's a legacy issue, too, in a world with increasing intermittent, renewable penetration. Most base-load plants are designed to be run constantly. This not only allows for peak efficiency, but means that they weren't designed to be turned on and off. If Texas sees a huge wind power spike it has to pull back on power somewhere. Increasingly that's likely to come from the power plants it can control. Dealing with the complex dance between controllable and intermittent power has been tricky for utilities. Some have simply put up roadblocks to slow the adoption of renewable power, such as Hawaiian Electric, which now requires homeowners to get approval before hooking to the grid. Others, like Edison International (NYSE:EIX), have worked to refocus their businesses around the distribution of power, minimizing the generation aspect. In fact, connecting often remote renewable power sources will require a large amount of new transmission investment and that's actually a big industry opportunity. Overall, however, utilities increasingly have little choice but to upgrade their systems, which is what Sempra's San Diego Gas & Electric has been doing. But upgrading is a costly and time intensive task and Hawaiian Electric's experience shows that time may not be on the industry's side. We take reliable electricity for granted in the United States. The impact of not having power, however, has been on display several times in recent years after natural disasters caused widespread blackouts. Moving too quickly down the renewable road without ensuring a system built for a different time can handle it could cause even more damage. This isn't a suggestion that renewable power is bad or that it shouldn't be an increasing part of the U.S. power system. But it is a word of caution that too much of a good thing could leave you sitting in a blackout.

#### Exacerbates terror

Nye 8-14 David E. Nye, 8-14-2019, David E. Nye is Professor of American History at the University of Southern Denmark. He is the author of several books, including “American Illuminations,” “Electrifying America,” and “When the Lights Went Out,” a trilogy of works that form a collective history of electricity and lighting in the United States., "When the Lights Went Out: On Blackouts and Terrorism", MIT Press Reader, https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/blackouts-terrorism-history/, Accessed on 10-27-2019 // JPark

This article is adapted from David Nye’s book “When the Lights Went Out: A History of Blackouts in America.” The FBI, like many in New York who were still reeling from the September 11, 2001 attacks, shared these concerns. Just the previous year the agency concluded that terrorists were studying weaknesses in power grids. Meanwhile, groups across the country had been preparing for and speculating about doomsday scenarios — scenarios that the first moments of the 2003 blackout mimicked to a disquieting degree. A generation ago, the immediate question when the lights went out was whether a fuse had blown or lightning had struck. But today, when a blackout strikes, time stops, plans fall apart, and fears fill the sudden void. The FBI’s Cyber Division ultimately found no indication that the outage was the result of an attack; a failed power line and crumbling infrastructure were entirely to blame. But what if enemies had targeted the power system to augment a physical or biological attack? The military has long understood the centrality of electricity to society. In World War II, both the Allies and the Axis Powers attacked power plants. During the 1992 siege of Sarajevo, Serb nationalists dynamited four power-transmission lines into the city, taking electricity away from 400,000 people. The U.S. military, meanwhile, has designed weapons specifically to incapacitate electrical networks, including the BLU-114/B “soft bomb,” which supposedly disperses a cloud of graphite filaments and tiny wires that short-circuit transformers and switches (information about the weapon remains classified). When used against Serbia in May 1999, the bomb blacked out 70 percent of the country; a similar weapon had been deployed with success in the 1991 Desert Storm operation against Iraq. Power grids, nuclear power stations, and computer systems are all potential targets for terrorists. An electrical network is built to be resilient, but an attack on certain nodal points might trigger “a cascade of overload failures capable of disabling the network almost entirely,” as two network systems experts found. A terrorist cell that included several senior commanders of the Irish Republican Army and a former U.S. Marine recognized this when, in 1996, they prepared to attack the electrical system of London and southeast Britain. While their plan was ultimately foiled by the British Secret Service, who found in the cell’s possession diagrams of six power substations in a ring around London and enough detonators and fuses to arm 37 bombs, other groups have had more success. Satellite imagery of the Northeastern United States and Eastern Canada taken before and during the August 14, 2003 blackout. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association. Between 1975 and 1995, the National Liberation Front of Corsica struck Corsica’s electrical system on multiple occasions, according to a report issued by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. In the Philippines, the Communist New People’s Army, the Moro National Liberation Front, and the Abu Sayyaf group all attacked the electrical grid. And in South Africa, a military wing of the African National Congress carried out multiple attacks on electrical stations during the apartheid regime. These groups operated inside their own country. Their motivation, the report from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies found, was primarily to embarrass the government without many casualties, which could weaken popular support. In contrast, terrorists who attack countries other than their own generally want to destroy national symbols and to maximize human suffering. They prefer not transmission lines but highly visible locations such as churches in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday. This helps to explain why the power grid has not been a primary terrorist target. Assaults on critical infrastructure have increased worldwide from 42 during the 1960s to more than 25 a year since 1990. Yet assaults on critical infrastructure have increased worldwide from 42 during the 1960s to more than 25 a year since 1990. The targets of major strikes have been oil and gas facilities (50 percent), electrical infrastructure (15 percent), office buildings (8 percent), railways (5 percent), and a wide range of miscellaneous facilities (22 percent). Fifty years ago, religious groups almost never made such attacks, but between 1980 and 2004 Islamist groups alone targeted infrastructure 84 times. Moreover, al-Qaeda members have specifically listed infrastructure attacks as a primary objective when attacking industrialized countries. In fact, computers captured from Afghanistan had been logged on to sites dealing with utility security. After a major blackout in 1965 impacted an estimated 25 million people, the U.S. federal government “focused increased attention on the vulnerability of power systems to disturbance and damage from acts of sabotage,” according to a Federal Power Commission report from the time. But by far the most serious threat remained terrorism directed at nuclear plants or using stolen nuclear fuel. Between 1969 and 1971, explosives were discovered at a research reactor at the Illinois Institute of Technology, for instance, and bombs were detonated in the Stanford University Linear Accelerator, causing substantial damage. Nevertheless, the isolated location, solid construction, and high security surrounding nuclear facilities make them less vulnerable to attack. Far more worrisome are dangerous “dirty bombs” that could spread deadly plutonium over a wide area. The Atomic Energy Commission concluded in 1974 that “the potential harm to the public from the explosion of an illicitly made nuclear weapon is greater than that from any plausible power plant accident, including one which involves a core meltdown.” Perhaps even more unsettling is the threat of an electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, attack. As Lowell Wood, an astrophysicist involved with the Strategic Defense Initiative and former chair of the EMP Commission concluded, EMP “is one of the few ways in which the United States can die as a nation.” It is “not a blackout,” he added, “it is a stayout.” Indeed, the commission noted an attack would paralyze much of the U.S., shutting down radio, television, and the telephone system. The nation would not be able to harvest, store, ship, or market food. Hospitals, schools, factories, and offices would cease to function. It would destroy computer chips embedded in millions of devices, yet leave the physical landscape intact. In theory, EMP damage from one bomb exploded over Kansas could black out most of the United States. Fortunately, vulnerability to EMP can be reduced; it only requires adopting more robust shielding materials. Yet even with the recognition of these threats, little was being done to improve the electrical grid before the 2003 blackout. This despite the North American Electric Reliability Council, an industry group, warning that the grid was not being upgraded fast enough, and concluding that “the question is not whether, but when the next major failure of the grid will occur.” One civilian defense expert concluded that an electromagnetic pulse attack “is one of the few ways in which the United States can die as a nation.” Even in 1936, it was clear that short-lived power outages cause few or no deaths and little destruction, whereas a bomb causes both and is terrifying. Without electricity, society loses most of its critical infrastructure. Yet the U.S. electrical system is hard to protect because of its sheer extent, and though American grids have not been attacked, it is not because they are impregnable. Perhaps Alfred Hitchcock’s 1936 film “Sabotage” suggests why transmission systems are not yet a target of choice. The film begins with a blackout that darkens a whole district of central London. A saboteur has thrown sand into some powerhouse equipment, and it takes an hour to clean and restart the system. The public response to this unexpected darkness, however, is not fear but nonchalance and even considerable laughter. Like the crowds in the 1965 New York blackout three decades later, Hitchcock’s Londoners take it with aplomb. Frustrated at this result, the saboteur then decides to bomb a crowded public place. This seems more likely to cause panic than a blackout. Even in 1936, it was clear that short-lived power outages cause few or no deaths and little destruction, whereas a bomb causes both and is terrifying. Nevertheless, in the popular imagination, a blackout can have dire consequences, leading to spectacular unrest or social collapse. Josef Konvitz, an expert on crisis management, has called this “the myth of terrible vulnerability,” depicting catastrophes that are out of control while ignoring the human ability to improvise solutions and cope with hardships. With worst-case scenarios, popular films and novels depict the electrical system as an ideal terrorist target. After the 1977 New York blackout, Arthur Hailey’s novel “Overload” described a terrorist attack on California’s electrical system during a summer heatwave. It was among the top five New York Times best-sellers of 1979. In his 1987 novel “Patriot Games,” Tom Clancy described an electrical engineer in Baltimore, determined “to hurt America” by “hitting people where they lived.” The character muses that “if he could turn out the lights in fifteen states at once” he would weaken public confidence in the government. A similar theme underlay the 2007 film “Live Free or Die Hard,” in which a disaffected former national security employee, angry because the government has ignored his warnings about the vulnerability of the United States to a computer attack, launches one himself. Electrical engineers have warned that a “determined group of terrorists could likely take out any portion of the grid they desire.” But “Live Free or Die Hard” exaggerates the centralization of the grid. There is no single command-and-control center that can turn off all of the East’s electrical systems. Rather, as the electricity consultant Jason Makansi concluded, the U.S. transmission system in some ways is poorly integrated: “Not only is our electricity grid ‘third world’ in quality, it is actually weakly interconnected.”

#### That causes extinction – terror guarantees retaliation.

Peter **Hayes 18**, PhD from Berkeley, Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney, "NON-STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR", NAPSNet Special Reports, January 18, 2018, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/

**Nuclear terrorism** post-cold war: trigger for **inadvertent nuclear war?** The possible catalytic effect of nuclear terrorism on the risk of state-based nuclear war is not a simple linkage. The multiple types and scales of nuclear terrorism may affect state-nuclear use decisions along multiple pathways that lead to **inadvertent nuclear war**. These include: **Early warning systems fail** or are “tripped” in ways that lead to **launch-on-warning** Accidental nuclear detonation, including sub-critical explosions. **Strategic miscalculation** in crisis, show of force **Decision-making failure** (such as irrational, misperception, bias, degraded, group, and time-compressed decision-making) **Allied or enemy choices** (to seek revenge, to exploit nuclear risk, to act out of desperation) Organizational cybernetics whereby a nuclear command-control-and communications (NC3) system generates error, including the interplay of national NC3 systems in what may be termed the meta-NC3 system. Synchronous and coincident combinations of above.[4] Exactly how, where, and when nuclear terrorism may “ambush” nuclear armed states already heading for or on such a path to inadvertent nuclear war depends on who is targeting whom at a given time, either immediately due to high tension, or generally due to a structural conflict between states. Nuclear armed states today form a complex set of global threat relationships that are not distributed uniformly across the face of Earth. Rather, based on sheer firepower and reach, the nine nuclear weapons states form a global hierarchy with at least four tiers, viz: Tier 1: United States, clear technological supremacy and qualitative edge. Tier 2: Russia, China, global nuclear powers and peers with the United States due to the unique destructive power of even relatively small nuclear arsenals, combined with global reach of missile and bomber delivery systems, thereby constituting a two-tiered global “nuclear triangle” with the United States. Tier 3: France, UK, NATO nuclear sharing and delivery NATO members (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and the NATO and Pacific nuclear umbrella states (Japan, South Korea, Australia) that depend on American nuclear extended deterrence and directly and indirectly support US and US-allied nuclear operations even though they do not host nor deliver nuclear weapons themselves. Tier 4: India, Pakistan, Israel, DPRK. The first two tiers constitute the global nuclear threat triangle that exists between the United States, Russia, and China, forming a global nuclear “truel.” Each of these states targets the others; each represents an existential threat to the other; and each has a long history of mutual nuclear threat that is now a core element of their strategic identity. Tier three consists of states with their own nuclear force but integrated with that of the United States (even France!) that expand the zone of mutual nuclear threat over much of the northern and even parts of the southern hemisphere; and states that host American nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence systems that support US nuclear operations and to whom nuclear deterrence is “extended” (if, for example, Australia’s claim to having an American nuclear umbrella is believed). The fourth tier is composed of smaller nuclear forces with a primarily regional reach and focus. Between most of these nuclear armed states and across the tiers, there are few shared “rules of the road.” The more of these states that are engaged in a specific conflict and location, the more unpredictable and unstable this global nuclear threat system becomes, with the potential for cascading and concatenating effects. Indeed, as the number of nuclear states projecting nuclear threat against each other increases, the notion of strategic stability may lose all meaning. The emergence of a fifth tier—of non-state actors with the capacity to **project nuclear threat** against nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states (although not only these states)—is a critically important possible **catalytic actor** in the new conditions of nuclear threat complexity that already exist today. Such a layer represents an **“edge of chaos”** where the attempts by nuclear armed states to exert absolute “vertical” control over the use of nuclear weapons confront the potential of non-state entities and even individuals (insiders) to engage in **“horizontal” nuclear terrorism**, presenting radically different control imperatives to the standard paradigm of organizational procedures, technical measures, and safeguards of various kinds. This tier is like the waves and tides on a beach that quickly surrounds and then causes sand castles to collapse. In 2010, Robert Ayson reviewed the potential linkages between inter-state nuclear war and non-state terrorism. He concluded: “…[T]hese two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—**are not necessarily separable**. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and **especially an act of nuclear terrorism**, could precipitate a **chain of events** leading to a **massive exchange of nuclear weapons** between two or more of the states that possess them.”[5] How this linkage might unfold is the subject of the next sections of this essay. Are non-state actors motivated and able to attempt nuclear terrorism? A **diverse set of non-state actors** have engaged in terrorist activities—for which there is no simple or consensual definition. In 2011, there were more than 6,900 known extremist, terrorist and other organizations associated with guerrilla warfare, political violence, protest, organized crime and cyber-crime. Of these, about 120 terrorist and extremist groups had been blacklisted by the United Nations, the European Union and six major countries.[6] **Some have argued** that the **technical**, **organizational**, and **funding demanded** for a successful nuclear attack, especially involving nuclear weapons, exceeds the capacity of most of the non-state actors with terrorist proclivities. Unfortunately, this assertion is **not true**, especially at lower levels of impact as shown in Figure 1; but **even at the highest levels** of obtaining authentic nuclear weapons capabilities, a small number of non-state actors already exhibit the **motivation** and **possible capacity** to become nuclear-armed. Ellingsen suggests a useful distinction that nuclear terrorists may be impelled by two divergent motivations, as shown in Figure 2, creating “opportunistic” and “patient” profiles.[7] The requirements for an opportunist non-state nuclear terrorist tend towards immediate use and the search for short-term payoffs with only tactical levels of commitment; whereas the patient non-state nuclear terrorist is able and willing to sustain a long-term acquisition effort to deal a strategic blow to an adversary in a manner that could be achieved only with nuclear weapons. In turn, many factors will drive how a potential nuclear terrorist non-state organization that obtains nuclear weapons or materials may seek to employ them, especially in its nuclear command-and-control orientations. Blair and Ackerman suggest that the goals, conditions, and capacity limitations that shape a possible nuclear terrorist’s posture lead logically to three types of nuclear terrorist nuclear command-and-control postures, viz: pre-determined (in which the leadership sends a fire order to a nuclear-armed subordinate and no change is entertained and no capacity to effect change is established in the field, that is, the order is fire-and-forget); assertive (in which only the central command can issue a nuclear fire order, central control is maintained at all times, with resulting demanding communications systems to support such control); and delegative (in which lower level commanders control nuclear weapons and have pre-delegated authority to use them in defined circumstances, for example, evidence of nuclear explosions combined with loss-of-connectivity with their central command).[8] An example of such delegative control system was the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai that used social media reporting to enable the attacking terrorists to respond to distant controller direction and to adapt to counter-terrorist attacks—a connectivity tactic that the authorities were too slow to shut down before mayhem was achieved.[9] Logically, one might expect nuclear terrorists oriented toward short-term, tactical goals to employ pre-determined nuclear command-and-control strategies in the hope that the speed of attack and minimum field communications avoids discovery and interdiction before the attack is complete; whereas nuclear terrorists oriented toward long-term, strategic goals might employ more pre-delegative command-and-control systems that would support a bargaining use and therefore a field capacity to deploy nuclear weapons or materials that can calibrate actual attack based on communications with the central leadership with the risk of interdiction through surveillance and counter-attack. These differing strategic motivations, timelines, and strategies in many respects invert those of nuclear weapons states that rely on large organizations, procedures, and technical controls, to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authorization; and if they are used, to minimize needless civilian casualties (at least some nuclear armed states aspire to this outcome). The **repertoire** of state-based practices that presents other states with credible nuclear threat and reassures them that nuclear weapons are **secure** and **controlled** is likely to be **completely mismatched with the strengths and strategies of non-state nuclear terrorists** that may seek to maximize civilian terror, are **not always concerned about their own survival** or even that of their families and communities-of-origin, and may be willing to take **extraordinary risk** combined with **creativity** to exploit the opportunities for attack presented by nuclear weapons, umbrella, and non-nuclear states, or their private adversaries. For non-state actors to succeed at complex engineering project such as acquiring a nuclear weapons or nuclear threat capacity demands substantial effort. Gary Ackerman specifies that to have a chance of succeeding, non-state actors with nuclear weapons aspirations must be able to demonstrate that they control **substantial resources**, have a **safe haven** in which to conduct research and development, have their own or procured **expertise**, are able to learn from failing and have the **stamina and strategic commitment** to do so, and manifest **long-term planning** and **ability to make rational choices** on decadal timelines. He identified **five such violent non-state actors** who **already conducted such engineering projects** (see Figure 3), and also noted the important facilitating condition of a global network of expertize and hardware. Thus, **although the skill, financial, and materiel requirements of a non-state nuclear weapons project present a high bar, they are certainly reachable.** Figure 3: Complex engineering projects by five violent non-state actors & Khan network Source: G. Ackerman, “Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts,” Journal of Strategic Security, 9:1, 2016, at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/10/ Along similar lines, James Forest examined the extent to which non-state actors can pose a threat of nuclear terrorism.[10] He notes that such entities face practical constraints, including expense, the obstacles to stealing many essential elements for nuclear weapons, the risk of discovery, and the difficulties of constructing and concealing such weapons. He also recognizes the strategic constraints that work against obtaining nuclear weapons, including a cost-benefit analysis, possible de-legitimation that might follow from perceived genocidal intent or use, and the primacy of political-ideological objectives over long-term projects that might lead to the group’s elimination, the availability of cheaper and more effective alternatives that would be foregone by pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the risk of failure and/or discovery before successful acquisition and use occurs. In the past, almost all—but not all—non-state terrorist groups appeared to be restrained by a combination of high practical and strategic constraints, plus their own cost-benefit analysis of the opportunity costs of pursuing nuclear weapons. However, should some or all of these constraints diminish, a rapid non-state nuclear proliferation is possible. Although only a few non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State have exhibited such underlying stamina and organizational capacities and actually attempted to obtain nuclear weapons-related skills, hardware, and materials, **the past is not prologue**. An **incredibly diverse set** of variously motivated terrorist groups **exist already**, including politico-ideological, apocalyptic-millenarian, politico-religious, nationalist-separatist, ecological, and political-insurgency entities, some of which converge with criminal-military and criminal-scientist (profit based) networks; **but also pyscho-pathological mass killing cults**, lone wolves, **and ephemeral copy-cat non-state actors**. The social, economic, and deculturating conditions that generate such entities are likely to persist and even expand. In particular, rapidly growing coastal mega-cities as part of rapid global urbanization offer such actors the ability to sustain themselves as “flow gatekeepers,” possibly in alliance with global criminal networks, thereby supplanting the highland origins of many of today’s non-state violent actors with global reach.[11] Other contributing factors contributing to the supply of possible non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons include new entries such as city states in search of new security strategies, megacities creating their own transnationally active security forces, non-states with partial or complete territorial control such as Taiwan and various micro-states, failing states, provinces in dissociating, failing states that fall victim to internal chaos and the displacement effects of untrammeled globalization, and altogether failed states resulting in ungoverned spaces. To this must be added domestic terrorist entities in the advanced industrial states as they hollow out their economies due to economic globalization and restructuring, adjust to cross-border migration, and adapt to cultural and political dislocation. In short, the prognosis is for the fifth tier of non-state actors to beset the other four tiers with intense turbulence just as waves on a beach swirl around sandcastles, washing away their foundations, causing grains of sand to cascade, and eventually collapsing the whole structure. Observed non-state nuclear threats and attacks In light of the constraints faced by non-state terrorist actors in past decades, it is not surprising that the constellation of actual nuclear terrorist attacks and threats has been relatively limited during and since the end of the Cold War. As Martha Crenshaw noted in a comment on the draft of this paper: We still don’t know why terrorists (in the sense of non-state actors) have not moved into the CBRN [chemical,biological, radiological or nuclear ] domain. (Many people think biosecurity is more critical, for that matter.) Such a move would be extremely risky for the terrorist actor, even if the group possessed both capability (resources, secure space, time, patience) and motivation (willingness to expend the effort, considering opportunity costs). So far it appears that “conventional” terrorism serves their purposes well enough. Most of what we have seen is rhetoric, with some scattered and not always energetic initiatives.[12] Nonetheless, those that have occurred demonstrate unambiguously that such threats and attacks are not merely hypothetical, in spite of the limiting conditions outlined above. One survey documented eighty actual, planned attacks on nuclear facilities containing nuclear materials between 1961-2016[13] as follows: 80 attacks in 3 waves (1970s armed assaults, 1990s thefts, post-2010, breaches) High threat attacks: 32/80 attacks posed substantial, verified threat of which 44 percent involved insiders. All types of targets were found in the data set—on reactors, other nuclear facilities, military bases leading Gary Ackerman and to conclude: “Overall, empirical evidence suggests that there are sufficient cases in each of the listed categories that no type of threat can be ignored.”[14] No region was immune; no year was without such a threat or attack. Thus, there is a likely to be a coincidence of future non-state threats and attacks with inter-state nuclear-prone conflicts, as in the past, and possibly more so given the current trend in and the generative conditions for global terrorist activity that will likely pertain in the coming decades. Of these attacks, about a quarter each were ethno-nationalist, secular utopian, or unknown in motivation; and the remaining quarter were a motley mix of religious (11 percent), “other” (5 percent), personal-idiosyncratic (4 percent), single issue (2 percent) and state sponsored (1 percent) in motivation. The conclusion is unavoidable that there a non-state nuclear terrorist attack in the Northeast Asia region is possible. The following sections outline the possible situations in which nuclear terrorist attacks might be implicated as a trigger to interstate conflict, and even nuclear war. Particular attention is paid to the how **nuclear command, control and communications systems** may play an **independent and unanticipated role** in leading to **inadvertent nuclear war,** separate to the contributors to inadvertency normally included such as degradation of decision-making due to time and other pressures; accident; “wetware” (human failures), software or hardware failures; and **misinterpretation of intended or unintended signals from an adversary**. Regional pathways to interstate nuclear war At least **five distinct nuclear-prone axes of conflict are evident** in Northeast Asia. These are: **US-DPRK conflict** (including with United States, US allies Japan, South Korea and Australia; and all other UNC command allies. Many permutations possible ranging from non-violent collapse to implosion and civil war, inter-Korean war, slow humanitarian crisis. Of these implosion-civil war in the DPRK may be the most dangerous, followed closely by an altercation at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon where US, ROK, and DPRK soldiers interact constantly. **China-Taiwan conflict**, whereby China may use nuclear weapons to overcome US forces operating in the West Pacific, either at sea, or based on US (Guam, Alaska) or US allied territory in the ROK, Japan, the Philippines, or Australia); or US uses nuclear weapons in response to Chinese attack on Taiwan. **China-Japan conflict** escalates via attacks on early warning systems, for example, underwater hydrophone systems (Ayson-Ball, 2011). **China-Russia conflict**, possibly in context of loss-of-control of Chinese nuclear forces in a regional conflict involving Taiwan or North Korea. **Russia-US conflict**, involving horizontal escalation from a head-on collision with Russian nuclear forces in Europe or the Middle East; or somehow starts at sea (mostly likely seems ASW) or over North Korea (some have cited risk of US missile defenses against North Korean attack as risking Russian immediate response). Combinations of or simultaneous eruption of the above conflicts that culminate in nuclear war are **also possible**. Other unanticipated nuclear-prone conflict axes (such as Russia-Japan) could also emerge with little warning. Precursors of such nuclear-laden conflicts in this region also exist that could lead states to the brink of nuclear war and demonstrate that nuclear war is all too possible between states in this region. Examples include the August 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, in which the United States deployed nuclear weapons to Taiwan, and the US Air Force has only a nuclear defense strategy in place to defend Taiwan should China have escalated its shelling campaign to an actual attack; the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when a US nuclear armed missile was nearly fired from Okinawa due to a false fire order; the March 1969 Chinese-Soviet military clash and resulting consideration of nuclear attacks by both sides; and the August 1976 poplar tree crisis at Panmunjon in Korea, when the United States moved nuclear weapons back to the DMZ and the White House issued pre-delegated orders to the US commander in Korea to attack North Korea if the tree cutting task force was attacked by North Korean forces. Loss-of-control of Nuclear Weapons As is well known, nuclear armed states must routinely—and in the midst of a crisis—ensure that their nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authority, but also ensure at the same time that they are always available for immediate use with legitimate authority. This “always-never” paradox is managed in part by a set of negative and positive controls, reliant upon procedural and technical measures, to maintain legitimate state-based command-and-control (see Figure Four).

### 2NR---AT Nuclear Solves

#### Nuclear power is unlikely – normal means is a shift to renewables.

Samuel 18 Molly Samuel, 7-25-2018, Molly Samuel joined WABE as a reporter in November 2014. Before coming on board, she was a science producer and reporter at KQED in San Francisco, where she won awards for her reporting on hydropower and on crude oil. Molly was a fellow with the Middlebury Fellowships in Environmental Journalism and a journalist-in-residence at the National Evolutionary Synthesis Center. She’s from Atlanta, has a degree in Ancient Greek from Oberlin College and is a co-founder of the record label True Panther Sounds"Study: US Unlikely To See New Nuclear Power Anytime Soon", 90.1 FM WABE, https://www.wabe.org/study-us-unlikely-to-see-new-nuclear-power-anytime-soon/#targetText=Nuclear%20power%20doesn't%20have,there%20are%20major%20policy%20changes.&amp;targetText=A%20fifth%20of%20the%20nation's,number%20of%20plants%20is%20shrinking., Accessed on 10-27-2019 // JPark

Nuclear power doesn’t have much of a future in the U.S., according to a recent paper that says the country is unlikely to see many new reactors in coming decades, unless there are major policy changes. That means the only nuclear reactors under construction in the country right now, which are here in Georgia, could be the last ones built in the U.S. for years. A fifth of the nation’s electricity comes from nuclear power, but the number of plants is shrinking. Some have already closed, and others are scheduled to. Low natural gas prices have made building new nuclear reactors less competitive, and renewable energy is getting more competitive. The troubled outlook for nuclear is bad news to Granger Morgan, a professor in the department of engineering and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, because he said once nuclear plants are up and running they don’t release carbon dioxide. “One of the things, of course, that are really important in the context of climate change is figuring out how to decarbonize the energy system,” he said, “that is how to produce electricity and the other things we need without producing a lot of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.” In a paper he recently co-wrote for the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, he doesn’t find much promise for the U.S. nuclear industry. “Reluctantly, we’ve reached the conclusion that for at least the next few decades, which is the critical period for avoiding serious climate change, nuclear power is probably not going to make much of a new contribution,” he said. That’s because, beyond the existing fleet aging, there’s not much new coming down the line. Morgan said he found that the technology for the next generation of big reactors is lagging, and there’s little market for smaller reactors. Marilyn Brown, who runs the climate and energy policy lab at Georgia Tech, agrees with Morgan that nuclear power is important for addressing climate change, and she said the paper, which she was not involved with, is a fair assessment of the challenges for nuclear. But, she said, her outlook for the future isn’t quite as grim as Morgan’s. She said she would like to see the U.S. build a few more nuclear reactors, but she also believes that renewable sources of energy and battery technology will keep improving. “I think we can manage no new nuclear. I just don’t want to see a bunch of good plants retired,” Brown said The findings in the paper weren’t a surprise to Sara Barczak, regional advocacy director with the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, a group that has been critical of the nuclear expansion at Plant Vogtle in Georgia.

### 1NC---Econ DA

#### The aff causes an energy vacuum – that decks trade and sinks global economies.

Flinn 15 Gallagher Flinn, 6-19-2015, Associate Consultant at H5, PHD Researcher at UChicago "What if we ran out of fossil fuels?", HowStuffWorks, https://science.howstuffworks.com/science-vs-myth/what-if/what-if-ran-out-fossil-fuels.htm, Accessed on 10-26-2019 // JPark

* If modeling is true, it’s an impact magnifier

But let's say that instead of fossil fuels being depleted or people deciding mining causes too much environmental damage, the fuels get very expensive. In our scenario, global economic and population growth have driven demand to the point that technology can no longer keep up. Coal- and oil-fueled power plants shut down, electricity is rationed and a gallon of gasoline costs as much as a car. What are our options? It might be nice to imagine the energy gap could be filled by renewable sources. But solar and wind power, for example, are relatively low-output, high-cost power sources; they couldn't replace fossil fuels as we consume them now. In the event of a catastrophic decrease in fossil fuel supplies, governments would more likely turn to cheap, efficient nuclear energy. In 2015, 443 nuclear plants worldwide were providing about 11 percent of the world's electricity [source: NEI]. If we assume that nuclear plants could be responsible for 100 percent of electricity and that the output of individual plants stays constant, we'd have to build around 4,000 new plants to get up to current energy consumption levels. In our future scenario, a bigger population — including a more energy-hungry China, India and Brazil — might bump that up to 5,000 new plants. Here's where things start to get a little apocalyptic. Nuclear power plants would keep us supplied with electricity, but they wouldn't solve all of our energy problems by a long shot. For one thing, our major transportation systems use fossil fuels. That includes trucking, rail and sea transportation of goods. Without diesel, large-scale international trade would pretty much shut down. While commuter transportation could conceivably convert to electric rail or electric cars reasonably quickly, renewable energy can't power enormous container ships. International trade would grind to a halt, and foreign goods would become exorbitantly expensive or unavailable. National economies that depend on international trade (which is basically all of them) would sink into a deep economic depression. It gets worse. Remember how nuclear power plants were going to solve our electricity problems? There were 66 plants under construction worldwide in 2015, and each plant takes five to eight years to build [source: PRIS]. Unfortunately, we'd need another 4,944 plants to meet world electricity needs. And while it's a bit of a commercial secret how much a nuclear power plant costs, estimates run around $5 billion to $6 billion [source: NEA]. If we're conservative and assume that every plant costs $5 billion to build, meeting the world's energy needs would cost about $24.7 trillion. But with their shattered economies, most countries are too poor to build a single plant. Instead, nations that already rely heavily on nuclear power, such as France, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine, would be in an advantageous position not only to use and sell their expertise to build more plants but also to sell their own output to their neighbors. Even with a hard drive toward nuclear power, the global economy collapses. And while it's hard to predict the results of the twilight of the Industrial Era, there are two places where we can make some guesses: food and the environment. In 2009, the United States imported about 17 percent of its food [source: USDA]. There wouldn't be a lot of starvation, but cutting off global trade would radically change the way we eat. No more tomatoes from Mexico during the winter. No more apples from Argentina in the spring. No more sushi, unless you lived right next to the coast and owned a sailboat. The bulk of food production would have to be local. If you lived in, say, North Dakota, you'd get really used to eating beans. Plastics, which we rely on for packaging and preserving food, would be too expensive to use for transporting goods, and electricity shortages might make refrigerators too expensive to run. Big cities would lose population, as people moved to rural areas to live closer to food sources. Abandoned urban areas would be reclaimed by nature or turned into badly needed farmland.

#### Economic decline devastates international security – causes widespread global conflict, terrorism, organized crime, rising nationalism, protectionism, and rampant poverty.

Muhumed 16 – Muhumed Mohamed Muhumed, Graduate Student in Pursuit of an M.A. in Political Science and International Relations from Instanbul Aydin University, Former Teacher in the Cambridge International School in Hargeisa, M.A. in International Economics from North South University, B.A. in Economics from the University of Hargesa, 2016 (“The Effect of Financial Crisis on International Security,” *Research Gate*, December, Available Online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311867747\_The\_Effect\_of\_Financial\_Crisis\_on\_International\_Security, Accessed 8-18-17)

Financial crisis and international security As we have mentioned earlier, security in the twenty-first century is not only dealing with military issues and states are no longer the main sources of threat. Threats are originating from diverse sources whereby international organizations and non-state actors could be a vital reason of international security to deteriorate. The principal threats to international security in twenty-first century include but not limited to financial crisis and economic mismanagement, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, refugees, poverty and hanger, ethnic polarization, criminal gangs, epidemics, over-population, climate change, water crisis, and globalization per se. Crisis are natural feature of globalization. Due to globalization, different economies and markets are interconnected. Certain markets hence react to changes taking place in other foreign markets or international markets. Net capital flows to emerging markets, for instance, are positively correlated to US economic fluctuations. This correlation results emerging economies to be susceptible to financial, economic and all other external factors. These external factors affect their financial markets, domestic production as well as trade and capital flows between them and other countries including US. Composition of capital inflows and maturity structure of external debt, according to empirical evidences, lead emerging economies to be highly vulnerable to risks of financial crisis (Prasad et. al. 2003). Financial crisis cause substantial fall of economic growth. During the 2008 financial crisis, Asian emerging economies experienced decrease in private investment which contributed to the growth negatively. As a result, foreign trade and net exports declined, followed by lower levels of consumption. In addition, majority of East Asian economies faced extensive currency depreciation against US Dollars (Goldstein and Xie 2009). Financial crisis leads to increasing security threats both nationally and internationally. The reason is that budgets for defense and law enforcement institutions are regularly falling as well as applying strict saving measures. As a result of financial crisis, numerous countries suffered from lower or negative economic growth, higher levels of unemployment, budget deficits, deteriorating balance of payments and other negative effects. In order to survive from these drawbacks and lessen the consequences of crisis, many countries should apply not only monetary and fiscal but also legislative and political measures. Paying more attention to improving economic conditions may cause the government to be too weak to protect the society from potential threats (Ivancik 2011). Crumley and Karon (2009) argue that financial crisis and economic recession cause three principal security threats. Firstly, long-lasting economic recession accompanied with lower levels of production, investment, consumption, government spending as well as higher levels of unemployment and possibly inflation will lead to regime collapse. That vacuum and state failure will therefore give chance to terrorists, pirates and other violent groups. Secondly, crisis is associated with rising nationalism. This can be either rising anti-immigrant movements in developed countries, or promoting protectionism policies in developing countries. This disintegration between economies undermines the possibility of collaboration and economic recovery. Thirdly, due to increasing unemployment, both activities and power of organized criminal groups rises that deteriorates the security in national and international levels. Rogers (2008) also have very close argument. Because of the absence of international-level collective response, financial or economic crisis will remain the biggest threat to international security. The reason is that these crises leave millions and hundreds of millions of people in poverty. Consequently, violent and radical movements will spread among societies, facing strong force from the government. The result will be widespread conflict.

### 2NR---AT No Nuclear

#### Even if it’s not all nuclear – renewables are just as bad.

Reuben Gregg Brewer, 10-19-2014, "How Renewable Energy Could Leave You Mired in Blackouts", Motley Fool, https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/10/19/renewable-energy-could-leave-you-mired-in-blackout.aspx, Accessed on 10-27-2019 // JPark

There are plenty of things to like about renewable power sources like solar and wind. However, these sources, on a large scale, are relatively new to the U.S. electric grid. That has major implications that utilities may not be ready to deal with. And that risks leaving you without power and, thus, in the dark. Zig zag You likely know all about the benefits of solar and wind. The biggest ones being no emissions from burning fossil fuels and minimal costs once they are installed since they are powered by nature. These are huge benefits that can't be, and shouldn't be, dismissed. It makes sense to include such clean-power options in the mix. However, if you get so caught up in the upside of renewable power you might lose sight of the downside. And there are some pretty notable negatives that have big implications for a U.S. power system that hasn't been designed to handle intermittent power. That, in fact, is one of the biggest problems. The sun and the wind can't be controlled. There's no way to tell just how much power you'll get on any given day or at any given moment. This fact has utilities more than a little concerned, since their job is basically to ensure your lights stay on no matter what. SOURCE: U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION Just how big an issue is this? Earlier in the year, the U.S. Energy Information Administration put out a graph showing the swings in wind power supply in Texas. The chart, shown above, is full of peaks and valleys. The spike up can mean the grid has to absorb four times as much power from wind as it does during the lulls. And solar is no better -- and perhaps even worse. Sempra Energy's (NYSE:SRE) San Diego Gas & Electric (roughly 40% of the company's earnings last year), has a rooftop solar penetration rate of around 6% that it expects to double over the next two years or so. Tom Bialek, chief engineer at the San Diego utility, however, points out a problem: "Customers are changing how we view the world just because they are making choices." Why is this such a big deal? Because customers don't need Sempra's consent to make changes, which means that Sempra doesn't know how much new solar to expect. And that's on top of the fact that you can't predict how much the sun will shine on any given day. Utility customers aren't likely to start installing wind farms, so this is an issue unique to solar. In fact, Hawaiian Electric Industries (NYSE:HE) is dealing with a big solar problem right now, as so much solar has been installed, a good portion of which it didn't know about, that peak production times are putting it at risk of overloading circuits. The island state has 20 times the average rooftop solar penetration as the mainland. Every utility could be heading toward this dilemma. SOURCE: REUBENGBREWER, VIA WIKIMEDIA COMMONS Old reliable This is why utilities like controllable power sources like natural gas, coal, and nuclear. There's no question how much power you'll get -- you run the plant at the level you need. But, that's a legacy issue, too, in a world with increasing intermittent, renewable penetration. Most base-load plants are designed to be run constantly. This not only allows for peak efficiency, but means that they weren't designed to be turned on and off. If Texas sees a huge wind power spike it has to pull back on power somewhere. Increasingly that's likely to come from the power plants it can control. Dealing with the complex dance between controllable and intermittent power has been tricky for utilities. Some have simply put up roadblocks to slow the adoption of renewable power, such as Hawaiian Electric, which now requires homeowners to get approval before hooking to the grid. Others, like Edison International (NYSE:EIX), have worked to refocus their businesses around the distribution of power, minimizing the generation aspect. In fact, connecting often remote renewable power sources will require a large amount of new transmission investment and that's actually a big industry opportunity. Overall, however, utilities increasingly have little choice but to upgrade their systems, which is what Sempra's San Diego Gas & Electric has been doing. But upgrading is a costly and time intensive task and Hawaiian Electric's experience shows that time may not be on the industry's side. We take reliable electricity for granted in the United States. The impact of not having power, however, has been on display several times in recent years after natural disasters caused widespread blackouts. Moving too quickly down the renewable road without ensuring a system built for a different time can handle it could cause even more damage. This isn't a suggestion that renewable power is bad or that it shouldn't be an increasing part of the U.S. power system. But it is a word of caution that too much of a good thing could leave you sitting in a blackout.

### 1NC---Impeachment DA

#### Impeachment is possible but requires red-blue cooperation.

Thompson-Deveaux 10-22 Amelia Thomson-Deveaux, 10-22-2019, Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux is a senior writer for FiveThirtyEight, "Why Trump’s Impeachment Might Be Different Than Clinton’s", FiveThirtyEight, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-disapproved-of-clintons-behavior-but-not-enough-to-impeach-him/, Accessed on 10-26-2019 // JPark

So as the Democrats plunge forward with their impeachment inquiry, Clinton’s failed impeachment looms as a cautionary tale. After all, no Republicans at this point have come out in support of an impeachment inquiry, which means Democrats will arguably have even more work to do to convince the public that the allegations against President Trump aren’t merely political. And although support for impeachment is on the upswing, it’s hard to predict if that will last — or if public opinion will just ossify along familiar partisan lines, as it did during Clinton’s impeachment. It’s tempting to think of Trump’s impeachment as a sequel of sorts, but there are already signs that what’s happening today could unfold quite differently. For one thing, the case against Clinton hinged on the findings in Starr’s report. By contrast, today’s Democrats didn’t choose to orient their inquiry around findings in special counsel Robert Mueller’s report that examined misconduct by Trump: They are instead building a case against the president in real time, which makes it harder to predict where the public will ultimately land. And although there’s still a significant risk that the investigation will be perceived as partisan, the nature of the allegations against Trump are quite different. Many Americans saw Clinton’s affair with Lewinsky as a “private matter,” but Trump pressuring Ukraine to investigate the son of Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden is much more clearly tied to his role as commander-in-chief. So it’s entirely possible that the public will be less forgiving this time. Clinton was popular. Impeachment wasn’t. By the time the House of Representatives voted to open an impeachment inquiry against Clinton in October 1998, the allegations against the president had been in the news for months. Clinton had publicly confessed to the affair in August, and in mid-September, Starr delivered his lengthy and salacious report — which included a case for impeaching Clinton — to Congress. At that moment, support for impeachment seemed like it might be on the upswing. A Gallup poll conducted in mid-October, just after the House voted to formally open an impeachment inquiry, found that 48 percent of the public supported the decision to hold hearings. But as the chart below shows, support for impeachment didn’t continue to tick upward. In mid-December, when the House voted to impeach Clinton on two counts of perjury and obstruction of justice, just about 40 percent of the public continued to think he should be impeached — and the same was true in February, when the Senate voted to acquit him. This didn’t stop Republicans from raking Clinton over the coals in the lead-up to the 1998 midterm elections, though. That’s perhaps because there was one segment of the public that did see an uptick in support for impeachment — Republican voters. In mid-August 1998, an ABC News poll found that only 38 percent of Republicans thought Clinton should be impeached and removed from office. But by the time the House had voted to impeach him, about two-thirds of Republicans were on board. The GOP’s attacks, though, didn’t seem to have the effect of boosting overall support for impeachment; if anything, it just resulted in a widening partisan divide. Clinton’s presidential approval ratings were also high when the scandal started to unravel, and they remained remarkably undented throughout the impeachment process. Approval of his job performance had been hovering between 60 and 70 percent through most of 1998, and with the exception of a small dip around the time the Starr report was released in September, they stayed above 60 percent. In fact, according to FiveThirtyEight’s tracker of presidential approval, Clinton’s approval ratings hit 67 percent at the end of December 1998, just after he was impeached by the House. It was among the highest job approval ratings he received at any point in his administration. There were other signs, too, that the public didn’t think Clinton should be removed from office. Republicans’ efforts to impeach Clinton appeared to be dramatically backfiring in real time — after running a slew of ads attacking Clinton in the lead-up to the midterms, they lost seats and House Speaker Newt Gingrich, who had been one of Clinton’s loudest critics, resigned the speakership. That electoral loss has been woven, over the years, into a cautionary fable about the costs of impeachment without broad public support. But, of course, Clinton himself didn’t emerge unscathed — Americans generally disapproved of his handling of the scandal and questioned his integrity, and those sentiments may have hurt Democrats in the 2000 election. So while it’s difficult to evaluate whether the Republicans or the Democrats paid more of a price in the long term, the impeachment process clearly left a mark on both. Some Democrats were unhappy with Clinton, but not enough to support impeachment It wasn’t always clear that Democrats would stand by Clinton. Some distanced themselves from the president in the lead-up to the midterm elections; others even questioned whether he should resign. The initial vote to refer Starr’s report to the House Judiciary Committee for further investigation passed by an overwhelming margin. And when the House voted a few weeks later to open a formal impeachment inquiry, 31 moderate Democrats were in support. “Many Democrats were angry and frustrated that their leader had lied to them,” said Julian Zelizer, a professor of history and public affairs at Princeton University. “That softened them to the idea of at least having an investigation.” But after a fairly brief period, the House was divided once again into familiar partisan camps. By the time the House voted on the articles of impeachment against Clinton just five Democrats voted to impeach the president. And when it was the Senate’s turn to decide whether Clinton should remain in office, only Republicans crossed the aisle, with 10 GOP senators voting to acquit Clinton on at least one of the charges. Why did Democrats fall in line behind Clinton? The Republicans’ aggressive pursuit of impeachment — even in the absence of a clear public consensus — may have pushed Democrats to close ranks. “A significant number of Democrats thought there should be some consequence for Clinton’s behavior, like a formal censure vote,” said Philip Bobbitt, a professor of law at Columbia University and the coauthor of “Impeachment: A Handbook.” “But when it became clear that the Republicans were just going for impeachment, they became much more defensive.” Clinton also did damage control of his own. After first trying to quickly move past the scandal, he delivered an extravagant apology for his conduct on the day Starr’s report was released, saying he had “sinned” and “repented.” That apparent contrition may have helped some Democrats rally around him, although others remained angry with him throughout the process. As late as February, Sen. Dianne Feinstein — who months earlier had said her confidence in Clinton’s credibility was “shattered” by the revelation of the affair — pushed for a bipartisan vote in the Senate to censure Clinton. But as upset as Democrats might have been with Clinton for having the affair, or for trying to conceal it, they continued to support the president, bolstered by the fact that public opinion was largely on their side. “By the end, very few Democrats, even if they disliked Clinton, were willing to say his behavior was worthy of impeachment,” Zelizer said. “And many Republicans in the Senate had the same misgivings.” It’s dangerous to draw too many parallels between what happened then and what’s occurring in Congress now. For one thing, the Democrats are still in the early stages of their inquiry. But experts told me that there are some lessons for today’s Democrats in the story of Clinton’s impeachment. First, there is the risk that, like the Republicans in Clinton’s impeachment, the Democrats’ investigation into Trump could be seen primarily as an attack on a political adversary. Starr’s investigation was seen as politically motivated, and the Republicans relied almost entirely on his findings, without trying to marshal evidence of their own. “This was a process that was perceived as partisan and rushed, with very few hearings and no revelation more shocking than the fact that the president had lied,” Zelizer said. And when House Republicans pressed ahead — even after it was clear from public opinion polls and the results of the 1998 midterms that much of the public just wasn’t convinced by their arguments — it only reinforced the perception that their true motivation was to hurt Clinton. Some of these risks are obviously present for Democrats today. With no committed Republican support so far, it’s very difficult to argue that there aren’t partisan elements to the investigation. And as with the Clinton impeachment, Republicans and Democrats are deeply divided about the president’s conduct, which could make it difficult to build a true consensus around impeachment. The Democrats’ inquiry is different, though, in that they don’t have a completed investigation like Starr’s. Democrats had an opportunity to frame an impeachment inquiry around a completed special counsel investigation after the exhaustive findings in Mueller’s report became public, but only moved forward with impeachment after the Ukraine allegations presented a new scandal and an evolving set of facts to pursue. As a result, they may be able to avoid (or at least mitigate) the perception that they were just looking for an excuse to impeach Trump, especially as new evidence continues to emerge.

#### Carbon policies are incredibly controversial – plan ossifies partisanship.

Nuccitelli 18 Dana Nuccitelli, 7-20-2018, Dana Nuccitelli an environmental scientist and risk assessor "97% of House Republicans foolishly reject carbon taxes", Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/jul/20/97-of-house-republicans-foolishly-reject-carbon-taxes, Accessed on 10-13-2019 // JPark

Yesterday, the House of Representatives voted on an anti-carbon tax Resolution. The Resolution was introduced by Steve Scalise (R-LA) with essentially the same language as he introduced in 2013 and 2016. On those past versions, every Republican House member voted against carbon taxes. This time, six Republicans rejected the Resolution and one abstained, voting ‘Present.’ However, 97% of the House Republicans on the floor voted against carbon taxes. House Democrats have been fairly consistent in their votes on these Resolutions as well. In 2013, 94% voted against the Resolution, and in 2016 and 2018, 96% voted ‘Nay,’ with six to seven pro-fossil fuel Democrats voting ‘Yes.’ Expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy … [and] to American families and businesses, and is not in the best interest of the United States. This week’s Resolution ironically came right on the heels of a comprehensive study showing that a carbon tax whose revenues were returned to taxpayers either via rebate checks or by offsetting income taxes would have a negligible impact on the economy – significantly less than the cost of unchecked global warming. In fact, research has shown that it’s global warming that will seriously slow economic growth. Simply put, the only way to protect the economy is to stop global warming. Accomplishing that will require that virtually every world country implement climate policies aimed at curbing carbon pollution. That was the purpose of the Paris climate accords. Disgracefully, the Trump administration made America the only country in the world whose leadership rejects that international climate agreement. But a carbon tax would be one of the most effective and efficient ways to cut America’s carbon pollution. The text of the Resolution has it exactly backwards – a carbon tax would help protect the American economy by slowing global warming and its detrimental effects on economic growth. Cracks in the Republican anti-climate wall Citizens’ Climate Lobby (CCL) Executive Director Mark Reynolds characterized yesterday’s vote as progress, saying: The fact that six Republicans voted ‘no’ on an anti-carbon tax resolution is an indication that there are cracks in the wall separating Democrats and Republicans on climate change. At the CCL blog, Flannery Winchester also noted that the number of co-sponsors on Scalise’s Resolutions dropped from 155 in 2013, to 82 in 2016, to just 48 in 2018. That’s a nearly 70% decline over five years and an encouraging sign that the number of vehement anti-carbon tax members of Congress is dwindling. Given that the share of the Republican vote against carbon taxes only dropped from 100% in 2016 to 97% in 2018, the cracks are still small, but a crack is better than an unyielding wall of denial. Nevertheless, it’s frustrating that just four of the 43 Republican members of the Climate Solutions Caucus voted against the Resolution (with one more abstaining by voting ‘Present’). Especially given the conditions under which yesterday’s vote happened: Most 2018 primary elections are over, so Republican members of Congress don’t need to worry about challenges from the right-wing for another two years. Climate Solutions Caucus leader Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) plans to introduce a carbon tax bill next week. CCL volunteers lobbied their members of Congress to vote against the Resolution. 62% of Trump voters support taxing and/or regulating carbon pollution. This was a non-binding Resolution that wrongly suggested carbon taxes are necessarily bad. It really should have been an easy ‘Nay’ vote, and yet only a handful of Republicans voted the right way. Climate Solutions Caucus member Darrell Issa (R-CA) explained his ‘Yes’ vote, saying a “carbon tax isn’t the solution” and that the Caucus should focus on policies that can generate bipartisan support, like energy efficiency programs and keeping nuclear power plants open. Those are indeed valid climate policies. They’re also wholly insufficient to tackle global warming, and if Republicans can only support inadequate climate policies, they’re unbefitting the role of governance. The fossil fuel industry still owns the GOP The cracks in the wall should be much bigger by now. A new study by Robert Brulle identified why the CCL volunteer lobbying on this Resolution was relatively ineffective: Professional lobbying organizations are a permanent presence on Capitol Hill. Thus, the vast expenditures and continuous presence of professional lobbyists limit the impact of volunteer climate advocates. Brulle found that over $2bn has been spent lobbying Congress on climate change legislation since 2000 (an average of $125m per year). And an analysis by the Center for American Progress found that in 2009–2010 leading up to a vote on a cap and trade bill, the fossil fuel industry spent over $500m lobbying against it. In Washington DC, money talks, as Brulle noted: We seem to have a public opinion fetish where if we get public opinion to be supportive of climate change legislation, then it’ll happen. My answer to that is, gee, well, we should have gun control legislation then.

#### Trump is escalating the trade war – impeachment distracts is key to distracting Trump and gaining leverage.

Sen 9-25 [Conor Sen, Bloomberg Opinion columnist, September 25, 2019. “Opinion: Impeachment may be just what the stock market needs.” https://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/opinion-impeachment-may-be-just-what-the-stock-market-needs]

With the just-launched impeachment inquiry likely to consume President Donald Trump’s attention for as long as it lasts, one issue is less likely to hold his attention — his trade war with China. For markets, putting the trade war on the back burner may be a more significant catalyst than impeachment hearings, allowing stocks to head higher. Indeed, Trump may find himself playing defence within his own party for the first time. Up until now, Trump has largely been free to pursue his own economic agenda, even if it was at odds with Republican Party orthodoxy and the interests of loyal voters in red districts. Previously, the only weapon Republican members of Congress had against Trump was public disagreement, for which they often paid a price. Former Republican senators Jeff Flake and Bob Corker retired rather than face voters after criticizing Trump, and Michigan Rep. Justin Amash left the Republican Party and became an independent after rebuking Trump. But now, congressional Republicans have some leverage over the president. If Democrats in the House ultimately vote to impeach Trump, it’s possible that 20 Republicans in the Senate could end his presidency. They may pay a price with their own voters if they did that, but it also gives them power they previously haven’t had. Few issues matter more for markets than the trade war with China. Although the U.S. economy continues to hold up reasonably well, the pockets that are suffering — manufacturing and farming — are mainly in Trump-friendly districts in the Midwest. Up until now, Republican elected officials such as Iowa Sen. Joni Ernst have largely defended the president even as they point out the pain it has caused in their states and districts. With global manufacturing in recession, Michigan and Wisconsin — two states Trump narrowly won — have lost manufacturing jobs during the past year. Senate Republicans, should the impeachment process make its way to the upper house, might enjoy their newfound leverage. The president may need to reserve his political capital to shore up his support within his own party rather than pick fights over China. In fact, the president said today that a trade deal with China could be reached sooner than expected. As markets digest the reality of impeachment proceedings, they may welcome the shift. Although markets crashed under the weight of a significant recession — partly the result of the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo — during the impeachment of Richard Nixon, this was not the case during the Bill Clinton impeachment. Those events, which played out from October 1998 through February 1999, saw markets initially stumble only to rally amid the booming economy of the late 1990s. Impeachment may produce even more political gridlock than the 2018 midterm elections did. Although little legislation has been passed this year because of the partisan polarization in Washington, Trump has still been free to escalate his trade war. Impeachment proceedings, by comparison, will consume a tremendous amount of political and media oxygen and leave little time for an all-consuming trade war. Ultimately, markets are going to be driven more by the state of the economy than Washington’s unending political drama. And as we head toward the end of the year, tailwinds for the economy remain. Rather than increase interest rates three or four times this year as the Federal Reserve anticipated in 2018, the Fed has cut twice and may cut rates again at either its October or December meeting. The housing market has improved after showing signs of contraction. Consumption and the labour market remain robust. Manufacturing is sluggish in the U.S. and even weaker abroad. But that sector is cyclical and has been in a slump for a while, leaving open the chance that it could rebound at some point soon. If impeachment proceedings lead to a halt in Trump’s dispute with China while global trade and manufacturing recover, we may have ended up getting the catalyst needed for faster economic growth and a rally in markets.

#### US-China trade war causes nuclear war – escalates and causes miscalc.

Kazianis 18 [Harry, director of defense studies at the Center for the National Interest, Fellow for National Security Affairs at the Potomac Foundation and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the University of Nottingham. "The US-China trade war has begun - a shooting war could be next." 7/6. http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/07/06/us-china-trade-war-has-begun-shooting-war-could-be-next.html]

A trade war broke out Friday between the U.S. and China, when the U.S. imposed tariffs on $34 billion in Chinese products and China slapped tariffs on and equal amount of U.S. products. President Trump has said that would prompt the U.S. to impose up to $500 billion in Chinese products. But things could get worse. The deterioration in U.S.-China relations could escalate and turn into a shooting war between two nuclear armed superpowers. In the worst-case scenario, this could result in massive casualties on both sides that could even lead to nuclear war. Some will call such a statement pure hype – and I wish it was. But the facts lead us to a dark place when it comes to our relationship with China, which is becoming less of a partnership and more like a fight between mortal enemies looking to gain any advantage they can over the other. We are all rightly concerned over North Korea’s nuclear weapons, Iran’s penchant for backing terror, and a rogue Russia that can’t seem to stop causing trouble all over the world. But these problems are nothing when compared to the China challenge. No other nation is as able to challenge American power on the world stage in the coming years. Just look over the current state of affairs in the U.S.-China relationship. We see trade and military stand-offs, territorial disputes, and allies and partners of both nations squaring off or cybersecurity challenges. We see two nations on a collision course that seems more like the Cold War than the 21st century. But before we stare war with China in the eye, let’s consider the budding trade battle between Washington and Beijing. The Trump administration new duties on $34 billion in on Chinese goods amount to a 25 percent tariff. The duties impact items such as X-ray machine parts, water boilers, airplane tires and industrial parts. China slapped its tariffs on $34 billion worth of U.S. products such as soybeans, electric cars, pork and other products. But the Trump administration is not ready to back down, and, in fact, seems itching for a scrap. A senior Trump administration official told me Friday: “We are ready for a trade war. If they want it we are ready to fight it. They need to remember America would win that so-called war, hands-down. Our market is bigger, our consumers richer – we are the global innovator. All we ask is for an even playing field from the Chinese. If they won’t agree to that, then they will have to deal with the consequences.” When I asked what those consequences were, the official was quite clear: “China will pay a price. We will impose costs on them. They need to be ready for that. We are.” And one thing is quite clear: Washington does hold an advantage in a trade fight – the numbers don’t lie. America imports much more from China than China imports from the U.S. And while U.S. consumers and businesses would be hurt in a full-blown trade war, China stands to lose out on a big portion of the $462 billion in goods and services America imports from that nation. Considering the fact that the Chinese economy is already slowing down, Chinese President Xi Jinping would be wise to back off. But something bigger is afoot here – a seismic shift in international affairs that has been dormant, until now. As I have explained in these very digital pages, the U.S.-China relationship was bound to become adversarial as soon the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The Soviet threat was the one thing that brought both China and the U.S. together in the 1970s. Beijing saw the confrontation with America coming, and was already beginning to modernize its armed forces and recalibrate its military posture to take on the looming challenge from across the Pacific. While China certainly did prepare for what it felt was an inevitable encounter with America, time and circumstances seems to put any sort of showdown. Beijing’s ascension to the World Trade Organization in 2001 meant economic ties would grow between both nations quickly – and geopolitical tensions are not good for business. The Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks also meant Washington was forced to shift its attention from Asia and back into the Middle East for over a decade. A true showdown with China was averted – at least for a while. Unfortunately, it seems the chances of a real clash with China – and even a military confrontation – are now spiking. With America less involved in the daily squabbles of the Middle East and no longer keen on letting Beijing take us to the cleaners on trade, any number of issues could see these two superpowers exchange blows. For example, China over the last few years has been pushing absurd claims that seek to turn the waters around its coasts into its own sovereign territory. From the East China Sea all the way to South China Sea, Beijing is determined to ensure that is the master of the seas – and push Washington out of the region for good. To support such claims, Beijing has made some key investments in its military to win a war with America. The centerpiece of this is a missile arsenal that is second to none, and is of such a size that U.S. missile defenses would be overwhelmed many times over. Firing from shore, China would hope to destroy most of America’s military bases around the region as well as sink any warships as far out as Guam. The worst part of all – thanks to treaty commitments with Russia – is that Washington is unable to counter Beijing’s missile weaponry on land. And from there it gets even worse. Backed by a massive militia that is nearly impossible to match, a growing navy armed with aircraft carriers and an air force that is producing fighter planes that strangely look like our very own stealth aircraft – because China stole the technology – Beijing’s claims in Asia are only growing more outrageous. At one point a few years ago, it seemed China was even making veiled claims to Okinawa, a clear part of Japanese territory that is home to a massive U.S. military presence. Such claims have even fostered parody articles saying that China has claimed most of the Pacific and Hawaii, almost fooling an entire conference at Yale University a few years ago. History tells us that nations with divergent interests and competing geopolitical goals with enough proximity tend to clash. In fact, as Harvard Professor Graham Allison reminds us, in 12 out of 16 cases studies where a rising power competed with an established power – think China vs. America – war was the result. Therefore, when talk of a trade war with China heats up, I think of a very different type of war. And you should too.

### 2NR---Overview

#### The Disad turns and outweighs the case

#### 1] Trade war outweighs [x] – it’s most likely to cause extinction because it goes nuclear.

Alt actors check warming – other countries, Greentech companies – warming is slow and better solutions will develop but alt actors can’t stop great power war – negotiations have failed and

Time frame – escalation happens almost immediately –

Reversibility – nukes are use or lose and other nuclear dyads are drawn in – aff causes an avalanche that can’t stop war until the point of nuclear winter.

#### 2] Trump is terrible for the environment – his presidency is definitely worse and winning impeachment will only empower him

Aronoff 17 - writing fellow at In These Times covering the politics of climate change, the White House transition and the resistance to Trump’s agenda [Kate, In these Times “A Very Cautious Left Case for Impeachment Trump must go–and progressives can harness his exodus to build a movement,” 5/20/2017, <http://inthesetimes.com/article/20151/a-very-cautious-left-case-for-trumps-impeachment>, DKP] // RCT by JPark

But is President Pence really a worse option than leaving Trump in office until 2020? Trump has repeatedly pushed the limits of what kinds of suppression are possible in a liberal democracy. He has already barred specific media outlets from White House press briefings. When Trump asked Comey to “let go” of his investigation into former General Michael Flynn, he also asked him to imprison journalists who publish classified information. He goaded his fans to beat up protesters on the campaign trail, and recently brought on Milwaukee Sheriff David Clarke—who likened Black Lives Matter to a terrorist organization, and ran a jail system in which four people inexplicably died in a six-month span—to serve in a top post in the Department of Homeland Security. Clarke will play a critical role in how the country defines and responds to terrorism. And whatever the reality of his ties to the Russian government, Trump and his goons seem to have an abiding affinity for anti-democratic authoritarians, whether in shaking hands with Erdogan, inviting Marine Le Pen to Trump Tower or making one of his first presidential visit to Saudi Arabia. Would a President Pence have the same autocratic aims as Trump? My guess is probably not, given the specific talents and tendencies that make his boss such a textbook case of an aspiring autocrat. Every indication Trump has given is that he’ll strive to make the United States a less democratic and more terrifying place. Possible devolution into a police state aside, however, let’s think for a minute about what three and a half more years of a Trump White House might look like. Within less than four months, Republicans—enjoying more power than they have since 1928—have handed Goldman Sachs and ExxonMobil top cabinet posts. The Senate is one vote away from issuing a near-fatal blow to the administrative state with a bill that would add 53 steps before rules on everything from water quality to education can be made and enforced by federal agencies—a bill that quietly passed in the House in January. As Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) boasted this week, they have detained some 41,000 people since January, up 40 percent from the arrest rates under “deporter-in-chief” Obama. For all his talk of bucking the Republican establishment, Trump has helped it fulfill its long-standing policy priorities in droves. Among those is attempting to strip away three decades of environmental protections. Whether climate catastrophe or nuclear war, a Trump presidency poses environmental threats that would be nearly impossible to reverse.

### 2NR---AT Pence Worse

#### Pence’s agenda isn’t as viable as Trump – he’s less dangerous.

Lobianco 9-25 Tom Lobianco, 9-25-2019, Tom LoBianco is a longtime reporter who has covered Mike Pence from the statehouse to the White House for the Associated Press, CNN, and the Indianapolis Star, "Perspective", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/09/25/sudden-pence-presidency-is-still-unlikely-heres-what-it-would-look-like/, Accessed on 10-26-2019 // JPark

But if it came to that, what would the country get from a hypothetical President Pence? The prospect of Vice President Pence succeeding Trump in office had already sparked fervent argument long before the prospect of impeachment seriously took hold in the House. New York Times columnist Frank Bruni posed the question this way in 2018: “Are you sure you want to get rid of Donald Trump?” And former Trump White House aide Omarosa Manigault said last year, “We would be begging for the days of Trump back if Pence became president.” Based on my reporting for my new biography of Pence, a President Pence would look a lot like a more conservative version of George W. Bush. Pence would probably take the Grand Old Party back to the salad days before Trump flipped over the bowl. But Pence would be far less effective than Bush — and he might even get less accomplished than Trump has. The Pence boogeyman painted by Democrats and progressives stuck in hand-wringing mode over impeachment is a highly skilled manager of government and congressional vote-wrangler who would easily promote conservative priorities like banning abortion and cutting taxes for the upper class and businesses. But Pence’s career path shows him to be unskilled at driving an agenda. In a dozen years in Congress, including two years in leadership, Pence never passed any legislation and never whipped votes. (That was left to former GOP whip Eric Cantor.) A former right-wing radio talk show host, Pence was cultivated by then-Republican leader John A. Boehner as the party’s message man in 2008 — no small task but hardly the post for driving policy. AD I worked for Mike Pence. Being a woman never held me back. In four years as governor of Indiana, Pence struggled to set his priorities or push them through a friendly state legislature packed with like-minded Republicans. As with most things, the reason is multifaceted: He spent much of his time plotting a potential presidential run in 2016 instead of doing the job he had; he rarely articulated clear proposals; he had no skill at political dealmaking; and he developed a surprising arch-nemesis in the state’s House speaker when he boxed him out of running for governor in 2012. And all that was before his career appeared to go down in flames in 2015, following his disastrous performance defending Indiana’s “religious freedom” law. On foreign policy, Pence would generally hew to mainstream Republican orthodoxy. Pence has always been a friend to Israel, opposing a Palestinian state for more than two decades. But don’t count on him to support anything that would spark a war in the Middle East. Longtime Pence friend and Indianapolis journalist Russell Pulliam noted to me that as much as Pence derives his political ideology from the Bible, he also balances it against U.S. regional interests and economic feasibility. When it comes to cultural issues, a President Pence would lead the charge to further limit abortion access in the United States, something well underway in the Trump administration, thanks partly to Pence’s work. Pence has been coordinating efforts to promote a network of crisis pregnancy centers nationwide that push pregnant women away from Planned Parenthood and abortion clinics. And count on Pence to continue to advocate for “religious freedom” measures that would curb protections for LGBTQ people while aiding conservative Christians opposed to same-sex marriage. AD But would he be able to accomplish many of these priorities? Not likely. As governor, he was wrought by indecision, and on his return to Washington under Trump, he has had a hard time finding votes for Trump’s agenda on Capitol Hill. Specifically, his troubles finding votes to repeal Obamacare — even with Republicans in firm control of the House and running the Senate — showed his key weakness. And, as one Pence adviser noted to me, Pence’s style is more muted than Trump’s: He’s the guy who comes in after a major “change agent” like Trump or, on the state level, former Indiana governor Mitch Daniels, and keeps things running after the initial revolution.

### 2NR---AT Lashout

#### No lashout – proceedings distract Trump

Drezner 9/24 [Daniel, prof of international politics @ Tufts, nonresident senior fellow @ Brookings, contributing editor @ Wash Post, "The strategic case for impeaching President Trump," https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/opinion/the-strategic-case-for-impeaching-president-trump/ar-AAHIssJ]

For most of 2019, Pelosi had put the brakes on impeachment. The Ukraine business seems to have tipped the scales, however. Over the weekend, my Washington Post colleagues Philip Rucker, Robert Costa and Rachael Bade reported that Democratic members of the House believe their reticence to move forward on impeachment emboldened Trump to act egregiously: “The push by Trump and his personal attorney, Rudolph W. Giuliani, to influence the newly elected Ukrainian leader reveals a president convinced of his own invincibility — apparently willing and even eager to wield the vast powers of the United States to taint a political foe and confident that no one could hold him back.” In response, more House Democrats — including the more moderate freshman class — are pivoting toward the view that something needs to be done. As the New York Times’s Nicholas Frandos, Jonathan Martin and Maggie Haberman report: In public and in private, many Democrats said the evidence that has emerged in recent days indicating that Mr. Trump pushed the Ukrainian government to investigate Mr. Biden, and his administration’s stonewalling of attempts by Congress to learn more, were changing their calculations about whether to charge him with articles of impeachment. The influential chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, who has resisted such action, said the House might now have “crossed the Rubicon” in light of the new disclosures, and the administration’s withholding of a related whistle-blower complaint. A group of moderate freshman lawmakers who had been opposed to an impeachment inquiry said they were considering changing course, while other Democrats who had reluctantly supported one amplified their calls. Progressives, meanwhile, sharpened their criticisms of the party’s leadership for failing to act. The fast-moving developments prompted Speaker Nancy Pelosi to level a warning of her own to the White House: Turn over the secret whistle-blower complaint by Thursday, or face a serious escalation from Congress. The problem is that Pelosi’s risk-averse political calculus at the start of 2019 has not necessarily changed. Very few Senate Republicans beyond Mitt Romney have said anything about the recent revelations. It is entirely possible that impeachment will be viewed as simply an exercise in partisan politics. What to do? Zero-sum game theory offers some useful advice. In zero-sum games, one actor’s gain is always the other actor’s loss. The optimal strategy to pursue in this instance is called “minimax.” A minimax strategy anticipates that the other actor will adopt the most punishing strategy possible — and, in response to that strategy, takes the course of action that minimizes the damage. What does this have to do with Trump and the Democrats in Congress? It is safe to assume that Trump will continue to abuse the powers of the presidency as long as he is in office. The Ukraine example shows that he is not above using presidential authority for partisan gain. Furthermore, when he is not doing those things, he is pursuing other policies that harm the U.S. economy and the national interest. Would impeachment stop any of that? No, not directly. What it would do, however, is distract the heck out of him. To say that Trump can be easily distracted would be an understatement — his short attention span occupies a healthy portion of the #ToddlerinChief thread. Sharpiegate exemplified how Trump obsessed about a small thing so much that it became a more scandalous thing. As Matthew Dallek noted recently in The Post, one of the reasons Trump is such a micromanager is because the weightier aspects of the job overwhelm him: “Where his predecessors sometimes knew so much that they got obsessed with the details, Trump knows so little that microscopic concerns seem almost to be ends in and of themselves.” So why impeach Trump? Because he will obsess about it. The moment it becomes a live option, the moment a trial in the Senate seems conceivable, he will talk about nothing else. He will rant to his staff and bore foreign leaders about it. He loves a fight. And every moment Trump thinks about impeachment is a moment he is not thinking about doing even more reckless things, like trying to compromise the independence of the Fed, or launching a larger trade war, or stumbling into a real war. Let me be very clear: I am suggesting that the House impeach Trump for two reasons: 1. He has committed high crimes and misdemeanors; and 2. Impeachment will distract Trump from further harming the national interest. This is not a perfect strategy. It will sap the energy of the executive branch, something Alexander Hamilton would dislike. There are some small risks to Democrats in 2020, although an impeachment trial would also highlight Trump’s egregious abuses of power. It is possible that if impeachment happens and then the Senate fails to convict, Trump will feel emboldened. Still, Trump is not going to stop doing what he is doing, unless he gets distracted by something else. In a zero-sum world, it is far better to have him obsess about his political survival rather than, say, nuking a hurricane. In the zero-sum political world that Trump has made, impeaching him is the best possible response strategy to his abuses of power.

### 2NR---AT 2020

#### Dems lose 2020 without impeachment

Ponnuru 9/24/19 [Ramesh Ponnuru is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is a senior editor at National Review, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and contributor to CBS News. "Impeachment Is No Longer a Political Loser for Democrats." https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-24/impeachment-isn-t-a-political-loser-for-democrats]

The good news for Democrats is that for every argument that pushing ahead on impeachment will hurt them, there is another that it won’t hurt much and may even help. For one, the Clinton precedent should not strike fear in Democratic hearts. Less than two years after the Republicans voted to remove Clinton from office, they controlled the White House, the Senate and the House. And the polls provide grounds for Democrats to hope that impeachment will work out better for them than it did for the 1990s Republicans. The Clinton impeachment was so unpopular in part because the public was happy with the national condition and didn’t want to see it disrupted. They were pleased with Clinton’s performance before the impeachment drive began: In mid-January 1998, Gallup showed him with 60% approval and 30% disapproval. Trump is at 43% approval and 54% disapproval according to Gallup. By a two-to-one margin, Americans are dissatisfied with the direction of the country. There’s also a less quantifiable consideration. The Democrats next year will not be running against Trump as a run-of-the-mill failed politician - the way they defeated George H.W. Bush in 1992. The vast majority of Democrats believe Trump is corrupt and unfit for office, and they will almost certainly be waging a campaign that says so. And there is only one action they have in their power to register that view: impeaching Trump. If they went to the election without doing it, they would have undercut the rationale of their own 2020 campaign. In that circumstance, when the Democratic presidential nominee repeated the charges against him, Trump would be able to say that if the rest of the Democrats took them seriously, they would have voted to impeach him. He probably would say it.

#### Only we solve this

Rall 4/27/19 [Ted Rall. Political Columnist for Rasmussen. "Democrats' Refusal to Impeach Could Be the Death of Them in 2020.” <http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/political_commentary/commentary_by_ted_rall/democrats_refusal_to_impeach_> could\_be\_the\_death\_of\_them\_in\_2020]

Trump is in a much better position than he was in 2016. Now, he leads a united GOP. He probably won't face a significant primary challenger. His base adores him. Though many have been left behind, by most measures, the economy is booming. And he hasn't started any big new wars. By historical standards, this feels something like peace. Democrats should not underestimate him again. Presidential elections are referenda on the incumbent. Incumbent Trump is sitting pretty, especially now that he can credibly claim exoneration on allegations of Russian collusion. Unless something big happens, inertia rules; enough Americans go if-it-ain't-broke-don't-fix-it to reelect him. As the party out of power, the Democrats they have to promise a future that's dramatically more appealing as well as practical to create. It's their only chance. Most of the major Democratic presidential contenders have embraced Bernie Sanders' holy trinity: Medicare for All, a $15 minimum wage, free public college tuition. Improvements, to be sure, but exciting enough inducements to defeat a strong incumbent? I doubt it. This is where Frederick Douglass comes in. Democrats have a well-earned reputation for snatching defeat out of the jaws of victory, often due to a failure of nerve. Democrats whine. They preen. But they don't fight. The Republican Senate guarantees Trump wouldn't be removed from office, yet impeaching the president would help assure the Democrats' repeatedly disappointed progressive base that the party's long run of appeasing Republicans had finally come to an end. Democrats don't stand a chance against a unified Republican party without firming up their base, too. Moreover, Democrats have painted themselves into a corner. They pimped the Mueller report and Russian collusion as the road to Trump-B-Gon only to have that narrative evaporate in light of the facts. Douglass was right. Asking the voters to do next year what they're not willing to do themselves this year -- get rid of Trump -- is an invitation for nothing but the brutal contempt of mass indifference.

### 2NR---AT Infighting

#### No infighting – focus now.

Fandos 9-26 [Nicholas Fandos, writer for the New York Times, September 26, 2019. “Complaint in Hand, Democrats Aim for a Fast, and Focused, Impeachment Inquiry.” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/us/politics/trump-impeachment-democrats.html]

WASHINGTON — A crucial cache of evidence in hand, House Democrats moved quickly on Thursday with an impeachment inquiry they said would be focused tightly on President Trump’s dealings with Ukraine, using an incendiary [whistle-blower complaint](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/26/us/politics/whistle-blower-complaint.html?module=inline) as a road map for their investigation. The complaint landed like a bombshell on Capitol Hill on Thursday morning after its release by the House Intelligence Committee, and Democrats quickly seized on its narrative of allegations against Mr. Trump — chock-full of potentially damning detail, intriguing threads and characters who could become witnesses in the nascent inquiry — as an outline for their work. After months of plodding investigating to determine whether they had grounds to impeach Mr. Trump, Democrats were working feverishly to build a case on the Ukraine matter, with some lawmakers saying they could move within a month or six weeks, possibly drafting articles of impeachment by the end of October. “This is a cover-up,” said Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Democrat of California, who after months of resisting the move made it clear that she was determined to follow through with a formal impeachment inquiry. She read aloud from a portion of the document describing an attempt by White House officials to quickly “lock down” records of a phone call in which Mr. Trump asked the Ukrainian president to investigate former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. The complaint detailed charges that the president “is using the power of his office to solicit interference from a foreign country in the 2020 U.S. election,” and that officials took pains to conceal evidence of that effort. “We are at a different level of lawlessness that is clear to the American people,” Ms. Pelosi said. The speaker said the growing impeachment case would be centered around the Ukraine matter and investigative action mostly lodged in the House Intelligence Committee, which first received and publicized the complaint. That means the House Judiciary Committee, which had been leading the charge on impeachment for months, will temporarily idle the public aspects of its inquiry. The panel had been working on its own investigation of the findings of Robert S. Mueller III, the special counsel who investigated Russia’s election interference in 2016, and the president’s attempts to disrupt his work. Those topics could still come into play if and when Democrats draft impeachment articles. The Intelligence Committee was quickly lining up investigative targets. Speaking to reporters on Thursday, Representative Adam B. Schiff, the committee’s chairman, said that the complaint provided a clear “road map” for congressional investigators in the coming weeks and that his committee would work through Congress’s two-week recess that begins on Friday.

#### Turn – the plan is a huge distraction from impeachment – drains focus.

McPherson 9-24 [Lindsey McPherson, writer for Roll Call, September 24, 2019. “Pelosi announces formal impeachment inquiry, but leaves some questions.” https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/pelosi-announces-formal-impeachment-inquiry]

Speaker [Nancy Pelosi](https://www.rollcall.com/members?35&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink) announced Tuesday that the House will move forward with a formal impeachment inquiry, but Democrats said it was not clear what form that inquiry will take or how quickly it will lead to a decision on whether to vote to impeach President Donald Trump. “I’m directing our six committees to proceed with their investigations under that umbrella of impeachment inquiry,” the California Democrat said in televised remarks Tuesday after a meeting of House Democrats. Pelosi’s directive seemed to override the claims of House Judiciary Chairman [Jerrold Nadler](https://www.rollcall.com/members?346&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink) and other panel Democrats that they’ve been engaged in a formal impeachment inquiry for months. But she also offered no indication of any forthcoming changes to Judiciary’s impeachment investigation or the oversight work of five other committees — Intelligence, Oversight and Reform, Foreign Affairs, Financial Services and Ways and Means — that are all looking into Trump’s alleged misdeeds and abuses of power. For now, the impeachment inquiry seems to be more of a rhetorical reframing than a procedural one. Pelosi did not say whether the full House would vote to formalize the impeachment inquiry or whether the six committee investigations would be condensed into a single probe. Despite the ambiguity about next steps, several Democrats said moving forward with an impeachment inquiry, as blessed by Pelosi, is a significant step because the caucus was unified behind the decision. On the same page Just before making her statement to reporters Tuesday, Pelosi briefed the Democratic Caucus on her plans for advancing the House’s investigations into Trump following allegations that the president pressured Ukraine to open an investigation into former Vice President [Joe Biden](https://www.rollcall.com/members?101&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink), a potential 2020 opponent. No one in the room objected to moving to an informal impeachment inquiry, according to members present. “It just shows there’s no question that the entire Democratic caucus is on the same page,” Judiciary member [Steve Cohen](https://www.rollcall.com/members?1762&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink) of Tennessee said, noting “there was some question about that” before. At least a few Democrats remained undecided on whether they would personally support an impeachment inquiry. “I’m trying to figure that out,” Oregon Rep. [Kurt Schrader](https://www.rollcall.com/members?28551&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink) said, telling reporters to ask him again Wednesday. Last week, Schrader, who chairs the political arm of the centrist Blue Dog Coalition, told CQ Roll Call he couldn’t support an impeachment effort that didn’t have bipartisan support. For most Democrats, however, the notion that Trump sought Ukraine’s help in digging up dirt on a political foe was the push they needed. More than three dozen Democrats who’d previously declined to endorse an impeachment inquiry — including several moderate freshmen who were key to House Democratic success in 2018 — offered their support for such a move on Monday and Tuesday. Pelosi did not provide details to the caucus on what the impeachment inquiry process would look like moving forward, several members said after the meeting. And she didn’t take questions from reporters during her remarks. House Democratic Caucus Chairman [Hakeem Jeffries](https://www.rollcall.com/members?45647&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink) told members they shouldn’t get bogged down by the procedure, which prompted some pushback. “A lot of people wanted to know exactly how it would work, but I don’t think they’ve figured [it] out,” Kentucky Rep. [John Yarmuth](https://www.rollcall.com/members?25798&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink) said. On the table Some Democrats have called for a select committee to handle the impeachment inquiry, but others disagree with that approach. Pennsylvania Rep. [Susan Wild](https://www.rollcall.com/members?117833&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink) favors a select committee, saying she believes the impeachment investigation deserves singular treatment. “It’s very important that something of this level of importance be conducted by members who have the most expertise in the fields of national security, intelligence,” she said. During the caucus meeting, Wild also raised the idea of canceling the two-week October recess to pursue the impeachment inquiry uninterrupted, acknowledging that her suggestion was met with a mix of cheers and groans. “To go home for two weeks to me just doesn’t seem like the right message,” she said. “If our intent is to act expeditiously, how can we justify going home for two weeks?” Indeed, despite the lack of details from leadership on next steps, most members left the caucus meeting with the impression the inquiry would move quickly. “We have to strike while the iron is hot,” Pelosi told the caucus, according to a senior Democratic aide who was in the room. Several members leaving the meeting used the phrase “full steam ahead.” One of them was California Rep. [Jared Huffman](https://www.rollcall.com/members?45186&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink), but he admitted, “I still need to know what our leadership believes is the fastest, most effective way for us to advance our unity on this one issue.” “I will support them, whatever they decide,” Huffman said. “What we can't have is just sort of a muddling, we’ll sort of think about writing some letters and threatening some subpoenas. But I don’t think that’s where we are. I think we are fundamentally in a new place.” Some members still think the caucus needs to do a better job messaging on impeachment and need to frame the inquiry properly moving forward. Michigan Rep. [Elissa Slotkin](https://www.rollcall.com/members?104452&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink), one of the moderates newly embracing proceedings, said she thinks the caucus should singularly focus on the Ukraine allegations, which are easier for the public to understand than some of the other matters Democrats had been investigating. “We haven’t done a great job as a caucus in communicating clearly what the real problem is, and what we’re trying to investigate,” she said. “We have many committees, all having many hearings and subpoenas and frankly a lot of people have lost the thread. So it’s important to me that as we bring people along, they can understand the story — not just the procedural issues but the story. And this story is understandable and clear.”

### 2NR---Yes Impeachment

#### Impeachment is increasingly likely now – new moderate Democratic support for proceedings gives Pelosi political cover to act

Smith 9-24 (Allan, NBC News, "More Dems back impeachment action amid reports Trump ordered Ukraine aid frozen," https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/growing-list-150-house-members-backing-some-action-trump-impeachment-n1057986)

One hundred and fifty House Democrats — well over half the 235-member caucus — now back some type of impeachment action in light of President Donald Trump's burgeoning Ukraine scandal. The fast-expanding list includes 13 lawmakers who have come out in favor of action since reports last week that the president pushed Ukraine to investigate the Biden family. Some on this list have called for an impeachment inquiry or hearings, some believe the House Judiciary Committee is already undertaking an inquiry and are supportive of that investigation, while others have gone further and called for drafting articles of impeachment. Lawmakers are using different terms when they talk about the issue. In addition to the 151 House Democrats backing some type impeachment action, Rep. Justin Amash, a Michigan independent, also favors an impeachment investigation, bringing the total number to 152. In a Monday night Washington Post op-ed article, seven freshman House Democrats called for impeachment hearings in response to the Ukraine scandal, which three sources told NBC News may give House Speaker Nancy Pelosi the "cover" she needs to back a formal impeachment proceeding against the president which she has not done to date. "This is major. It seems to me like it's an inflection point," one source said. In the op-ed article, Reps. Elaine Luria, D-Va., Gil Cisneros, D-Calif., Jason Crow, D-Colo., Chrissy Houlahan, D-Pa., Mikie Sherrill, D-N.J., Elissa Slotkin, D-Mich., and Abigail Spanberger, D-Va., said their experiences in the military, defense and U.S. intelligence agencies helped shape their decision. "These allegations are stunning, both in the national security threat they pose and the potential corruption they represent," wrote the seven freshmen. A senior aide to a House Democrat told NBC News on Tuesday that 20 to 30 or more Democrats may announce support for impeachment action through the day. "I think we may have critical mass by the end of the week, assuming the administration continues to refuse on the whistleblower docs," the source said, citing the whistleblower complaint that sparked the wave of scrutiny regarding the president and Ukraine.

#### Impeachment has momentum now - Ukraine scandal has turned moderate Dems in favor of action

Caygle, Ferris, and Bresnahan 9-23 (Heather, Sarah, and John, Politico, "‘Seismic change’: Democratic hold-outs rush toward impeachment," https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/23/democrats-impeachment-trump-ukraine-1508224)

Twelve Democratic lawmakers have come out in favor of moving ahead with impeachment — either conditionally or outright — since Monday afternoon. That includes vulnerable freshmen, as well as long-time Pelosi supporters who had previously refused to stray beyond her message. Freshman Democratic Rep. Dean Phillips of Minnesota became the first centrist lawmaker to announce support for Trump’s ouster if the president did indeed encourage the Ukrainian government to investigate his political rival. Phillips was followed quickly by another swing-district Democrat — Rep. Angie Craig, also of Minnesota — delivering a shot of momentum to the caucus' increasingly vocal pro-impeachment wing. By Monday night, seven freshmen with backgrounds in national security published a joint op-ed calling the new allegations "a threat to all we have sworn to protect." The members represent some of the toughest seats in the country: Reps. Gil Cisneros of California, Jason Crow of Colorado, Chrissy Houlahan of Pennsylvania, Elaine Luria of Virginia, Mikie Sherrill of New Jersey, Elissa Slotkin of Michigan and Abigail Spanberger of Virginia. Crow had already endorsed impeachment. Long-time Pelosi allies, like Reps. John Larson and Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut, also said Monday night that they would back impeachment proceedings if Trump does not comply with congressional oversight demands, as did Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-Mich.). Joseph Maguire, the acting director of national intelligence, will appear before the Intelligence panel Thursday after blocking Congress’ effort to learn more details of a whistleblower complaint that Trump allegedly urged the newly elected Ukrainian president to investigate Biden’s son. Pelosi — who fired her own warning shot at Trump on the matter on Sunday — has for months remained steadfastly against impeachment, buoyed by dozens of vulnerable Democrats who worry it could cost them reelection. Pressure escalated throughout the weekend. Multiple lawmakers — including freshman Democrats who have so far resisted calls for impeachment — held calls over the weekend to discuss the reports, according to people familiar with the calls. One freshman Democrat, who declined to speak publicly, described it as a “seismic change in mood.”

#### Impeachment is extremely likely – investment oddsmakers agree

Frack 9-24 Thomas Franck, Investment Reporter, Sep 24, 2019https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/24/cowen-says-base-case-is-house-impeaches-trump---bill-clinton-2point0.html

One of Wall Street’s top brokerages on Tuesday announced that its base case for President Donald Trump is impeachment. Cowen Washington policy strategist Chris Krueger advised clients a formal accusation by the House of Representatives now seems fated and sets the stage for what he called “Bill Clinton 2.0.” Our base case is that “the House impeaches Trump, though the Senate does not convict,” Krueger wrote. “Pelosi may also create a new Committee to study the Ukraine/Biden/Whistleblower issue.” “But whatever the path chosen, an impeachment vote now appears to be a question of when, not if — and more than likely by the end of this week.” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is expected to announce a formal impeachment inquiry into President Donald Trump on Tuesday, two sources familiar with the situation tell CNBC. Earlier Tuesday, Pelosi said that Democrats are “ready,” when asked whether she and her caucus will take steps toward Trump’s impeachment. “That’s why I’ve said as soon as we have the facts, we’re ready. Now we have the facts, we’re ready … for later today,” Pelosi said at The Atlantic Festival in response to a question about impeachment.

### 2NR---Yes Partisan

#### Climate consumes floor time – that causes partisan infighting.

Gillis 18 Justin Gillis, 12-27-2018, Mr. Gillis is a former New York Times environmental reporter and a contributing opinion writer., "Carbon Tax Climate Change", New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/opinion/carbon-tax-climate-change.html, Accessed on 10-23-2019 // JPark

Yet the put-a-price-on-it mantra is proving, in practice, to be a political failure. The Democrats could not get such a policy through Congress even when they had big majorities in the first two years of the Obama administration. Efforts to sell Republicans on the idea that this is the most market-friendly approach to the emissions problem have failed miserably, and will continue to fail. Proponents of carbon pricing like to point out that variants of the idea have spread all over the world, including to all the countries of the European Union and several American states and Canadian provinces. This is true, but when you look at how these systems have worked in practice, the picture grows murky. Invariably, huge political capital was spent to push through a carbon price too low to spur the rapid reductions in emissions that we need. Cases that are held up as demonstrating the purported success of carbon pricing, like a tax in British Columbia, mostly prove that if you slap on a modest carbon price, you will get a modest economic response. That people may get used to paying the low tax does not seem to make it much easier, in these jurisdictions, to raise the price to a level where it will really bite. The basic political problem is that the climate movement still does not have the strength of numbers to overcome entrenched opposition and put in the kind of stiff-and-rising taxes we would need to do the job. The oil companies may claim they want carbon pricing, but a subset of them spent more than $30 million in Washington State to kill the tax proposal there, twice as much money as the proponents were able to raise in support of their intelligent, carefully designed plan. Damn the oil companies if you will, but they persuaded 56 percent of the voters to take their side, carrying every county in the state but three. What that vote, and the French protests, tell us is that any proposal to raise energy prices is going to run into a buzz saw of opposition, including from working-class people who already feel like they are being mistreated. Yet the put-a-price-on-it mantra is proving, in practice, to be a political failure. The Democrats could not get such a policy through Congress even when they had big majorities in the first two years of the Obama administration.

#### Singular focus is necessary.

Heer 9-25 [Jeet Heer, writer for the Nation, citing Nate Silver, September 25, 2019. “The Case for Keeping Impeachment Clean and Simple.” https://www.thenation.com/article/impeachment-trump-ukraine/]

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has been a slow convert to impeaching Donald Trump. But she’s finally found religion by announcing on Tuesday that she’ll support an impeachment inquiry based on Trump’s alleged attempt to get the Ukrainian government to fabricate election dirt on Joe Biden: The actions of the Trump presidency revealed the dishonorable fact of the president’s betrayal of his oath of office, betrayal of our national security, and betrayal of the integrity of our elections. Therefore, today I’m announcing the House of Representatives is moving forward with an official impeachment inquiry. What’s even more surprising, given Pelosi’s foot-dragging, is that she seems to have an expansive view of what needs to be done. Asked if Donald Trump’s decision to release the transcripts of his call with the Ukrainian president will change anything, Pelosi [replied](https://twitter.com/mviser/status/1176564588831281153): “No. This is about the constitution of the United States. We have many other candidates for impeachable offenses.” This reference to “many other candidates” hints at the next big decision facing Democrats: Do they use impeachment to hold Trump accountable for his innumerable transgressions—or narrowly focus on the easy-to-grasp Ukrainian scandal? The extremely clear-cut nature of the Ukrainian scandal is what overcame Pelosi’s skepticism about the political wisdom of impeachment. CNN [reports](https://twitter.com/brianstelter/status/1176546572299100160) that Pelosi told her caucus “she thinks this issue is understandable for the American public, and they get it.” The Ukrainian scandal has the merit of simplicity, clarity, and urgency: If the allegations hold up, then Trump abused his office in order to use a foreign power to poison the 2020 election. It’s a stark case of a president abusing his power in a way that threatens democracy itself. It’s hard to describe it as anything other than tinpot dictator behavior. But Trump has done many other acts that violate the basic norms of democracy: He’s profited from the presidency as political supporters and foreign dignitaries poured money into his businesses; he’s obstructed justice, as documented in the Mueller report. And even though the Mueller report didn’t find he’d colluded with Russia in a way that reached the level of a criminal conspiracy, there were arguably still enough improper contacts documented between the Trump campaign and Russia to merit impeachment. Some Trump opponents want to use the current impeachment moment to go after Trump for his full array of misconduct. As Tom Nichols of the US Naval War College [tweeted](https://twitter.com/RadioFreeTom/status/1176575410315911169), “I think the House impeachment articles should list everything from obstruction to the Ukraine call. GOP Sens will then have to either acquit on \*everything\*, or find him guilty on one of the many things of which he’s guilty. An or up-or-down on 1 or 2 articles won’t do it.” Fordham law professor Zephyr Teachout made a similar point, [writing](https://twitter.com/ZephyrTeachout/status/1176570398634364929): “Articles of impeachment must include the violations of the Emoluments Clauses, two critical anti-corruption clauses of the Constitution. Trump keeps taking substantial money from the Saudi Government…. That’s impeachable.” The appeal of an expansive impeachment is that it would force the Republicans in the Senate to be accountable for all that Trump has done to date. It would, in theory, be harder for senators to absolve Trump without themselves being implicated in his sleaziness and criminality. But a truly expansive impeachment—one that included obstruction, Russian collusion, and emoluments as well as the Ukrainian scandal—would also run the risk of getting bogged down in details, with Trump allowed to rehearse his familiar claim of a partisan witch hunt. Partisanship is in fact the only thing that is keeping Trump viable. If Democrats go after Trump with everything but the kitchen sink, the public might well have a harder time remembering the specific facts of the most damaging scandal. Republicans might more easily conclude that the goal is to get Trump on anything the Democrats can find. Further, an expansive impeachment would drag on, with Trump and his allies doing everything to slow down the process. In contrast, polling maven Nate Silver [laid down the rules](https://twitter.com/NateSilver538/status/1176573840312418305) for a simple impeachment: “1. Be narrow and specific; focus on Ukraine, not other stuff. 2. Don’t overpromise on details unless you can deliver. 3. Emphasize the threats to election integrity. 4. Stay unified. 5. Work quickly & urgently.”

### 1NC---Infrastructure DA

#### Infrastructure’s bipartisan and passes now absent political fights.

Pearce 10-10 Tim Pearce, 10-10-2019, "Congress wants infrastructure legislation but impeachment battle looms", Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/congress-wants-infrastructure-legislation-but-impeachment-battle-looms, Accessed on 10-23-2019 // JPark

Republicans and Democrats have signaled a willingness to work together in recent history. The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee unanimously approved a $287 billion highway funding bill in July. In April, President Trump met with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, agreeing to a $2 trillion infrastructure spending plan. Left out of the discussion was how Congress would pay for it. Impeachment has raised tensions between the White House and Democrats just months after special counsel Robert Mueller finished his two-year investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election. Critical deadlines are looming for federal infrastructure investment. A five-year highway law expires in September 2020 and requires congressional reauthorization to continue. The Highway Trust Fund disburses funding for most major national highway construction and maintenance projects across the country. It is on track to run out of funds in the next two to three years. On top of the fixed deadlines and looming insolvency of crucial programs, infrastructure in the United States continues to age and deteriorate while repairs have slowed. In 2018, the repair rate of bridges hit the slowest pace in five years, according to the American Road and Transportation Builders Association. Accidents involving public transit rose by 13% from 2015 to 2018, and the amount of damage done to property because of those incidents rose by 20% over the same period, according to the National Transit Database. Democrats have spoken openly about tending to legislative priorities on one hand while cranking the impeachment gear with the other. Asked how she plans to succeed at the balancing act, Pelosi said in an Oct. 2 press conference that "they have nothing to do with each other." "We have a responsibility to uphold our oath of office to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. We also have a responsibility to get the job done for the American people," Pelosi said. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell made a similar pledge days earlier in a Sept. 30 interview with CNBC. "We're going to do a transportation bill, maybe later this year," McConnell said. "It probably won't be as bold as the president was talking about, because it would inevitably, if it were that bold, involve a whopping gasoline tax increase which is very regressive, it hits medium and low-income people very hard." While politicians pay lip service for continuing bipartisanship, they may be downplaying the reality of how large, highly partisan fights such as impeachment affect Capitol Hill. Pelosi says legislation and congressional investigations into the president are separate issues to pursue at the same time. But her track record balancing the two has yet to yield any significant results. After Trump met with Pelosi and Schumer in April, the trio's $2 trillion infrastructure deal fell apart after Pelosi accused Trump of engaging in a "cover-up" in the Russian collusion investigation. The president responded later that day and said he was cutting off talks with Democratic leaders.

#### Climate consumes floor time – that causes partisan infighting.

Gillis 18 Justin Gillis, 12-27-2018, Mr. Gillis is a former New York Times environmental reporter and a contributing opinion writer., "Carbon Tax Climate Change", New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/opinion/carbon-tax-climate-change.html, Accessed on 10-23-2019 // JPark

Yet the put-a-price-on-it mantra is proving, in practice, to be a political failure. The Democrats could not get such a policy through Congress even when they had big majorities in the first two years of the Obama administration. Efforts to sell Republicans on the idea that this is the most market-friendly approach to the emissions problem have failed miserably, and will continue to fail. Proponents of carbon pricing like to point out that variants of the idea have spread all over the world, including to all the countries of the European Union and several American states and Canadian provinces. This is true, but when you look at how these systems have worked in practice, the picture grows murky. Invariably, huge political capital was spent to push through a carbon price too low to spur the rapid reductions in emissions that we need. Cases that are held up as demonstrating the purported success of carbon pricing, like a tax in British Columbia, mostly prove that if you slap on a modest carbon price, you will get a modest economic response. That people may get used to paying the low tax does not seem to make it much easier, in these jurisdictions, to raise the price to a level where it will really bite. The basic political problem is that the climate movement still does not have the strength of numbers to overcome entrenched opposition and put in the kind of stiff-and-rising taxes we would need to do the job. The oil companies may claim they want carbon pricing, but a subset of them spent more than $30 million in Washington State to kill the tax proposal there, twice as much money as the proponents were able to raise in support of their intelligent, carefully designed plan. Damn the oil companies if you will, but they persuaded 56 percent of the voters to take their side, carrying every county in the state but three. What that vote, and the French protests, tell us is that any proposal to raise energy prices is going to run into a buzz saw of opposition, including from working-class people who already feel like they are being mistreated. Yet the put-a-price-on-it mantra is proving, in practice, to be a political failure. The Democrats could not get such a policy through Congress even when they had big majorities in the first two years of the Obama administration.

#### Infrastructure solves ag shortages – spills over globally.

**GHI 17** (Global Harvest Initiative; private-sector voice for productivity growth throughout the agricultural value chain to sustainably meet the demands of a growing world; 5/18/17; “#TimeToBuild America’s Infrastructure For Agricultural Trade”; <http://www.globalharvestinitiative.org/2017/05/timetobuild-americas-ag-trade-infrastructure/>; accessed 12/22/17; TV)

Ninety-five percent of the market for U.S. goods is outside the United States. As worldwide demand for agricultural products increases, U.S. farmers and aggregators must be able to supply food, feed and fiber to agro-processors and consumers across the nation and overseas. It takes well-constructed, properly-maintained and interlinked infrastructure to move goods to markets efficiently, while conserving freshness, quality and safety of food and other agricultural products. With its large geographic area and long distances from rural production areas to markets, the United States has a high level of freight activity. In 2014, U.S. food and agricultural exports reached a record $150 billion, supporting more than 1 million jobs.[1] Exports grew by 8 percent on average annually from 2000 to 2014, while imports increased by 7.8 percent. As a result, the U.S. agricultural trade surplus widened to $38.8 billion in 2014. [2] Modernization and maintenance of this infrastructure and the transportation network is critical for ensuring smooth functioning agricultural value chains and expanded trade capacity. Unfortunately, U.S. government infrastructure investment is lagging behind other major agricultural exporting countries. The U.S. invests less than 2 percent of GDP, the lowest level since World War II. Other countries are investing more as a percent of GDP: Canada invests 4 percent, Mexico 4.5 percent, Europe 5 percent, India 8 percent and China 9 percent.[3] Aging U.S. port terminals are not equipped to handle multiple ships holding 8,000 to 14,000 20-foot containers per vessel, which is common with today’s large ocean-going cargo ships. Outdated and insufficient infrastructure, poor connectivity to rail and highway networks, and inefficient operations created massive congestion in 2014–2015 at West Coast ports, slowing and at times halting the delivery of cargo. Without immediate investments to modernize and upgrade these systems and to handle larger ships and the growing amount of trade, the situation will worsen. Navigable inland waterways have traditionally been the low-cost means of moving agricultural products within the United States. Barges on the Mississippi River system move cargo from the upper Midwest and center of the country to southern and eastern states and ports. But the system has become less reliable and more expensive as the locks and dams on the Illinois, Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, built in the 1930s, have deteriorated. At the same time, roads and railways that allow trucks and railcars to quickly move agricultural goods are in need of repair and modernization. The American Society of Civil Engineers estimated that U.S. surface transportation infrastructure faces a funding gap of about $94 billion a year.[4] Solutions must be found to increase investment levels for all modes of transportation infrastructure. Funding must strategically target not only various parts of the system (road, rail, waterways, locks, dams, and ports), but also the transportation bottlenecks that occur at intermodal connections, where multiple modes of transport come together. Infrastructure improvements will reduce costs across the agricultural value chain, ensure that farmers and the producers of agricultural products have efficient, affordable access to global markets, and reduce post-harvest losses of valuable agricultural commodities.

#### Escalates every hotspot.

Castellaw 17 (John; Founder and CEO of Farmspace Systems LLC, a provider of precision agricultural aerial services, former President of the non-profit Crockett Policy Institute, member of the Center for Climate and Security’s Advisory Board and the National Security Advisory Council of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition; 36-year Lieutenant General in the United States Marine Corp; 5/1/17; “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security”; <https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-national-security>; AgriPulse; accessed 11/11/18; TV)

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy. An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability. The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom. Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs. This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. Too often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being. Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security

### 1NC---LNG DA

#### Europe’s LNG exports high now – plan decks US supply.

Zaretskaya 7-29 Victoria Zaretskaya, Principal Fuels Analyst at Exelon Generation, 7-29-2019, "U.S. Lng Exports To Europe Increase Amid Declining Demand And Spot Lng Prices In Asia", No Publication, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40213, Accessed on 10-27-2019 // JPark

U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) have been growing steadily and reached a new peak of 4.7 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in May 2019, according to the latest data published by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Fossil Energy. This year, the United States became the world’s third-largest LNG exporter, averaging 4.2 Bcf/d in the first five months of the year, exceeding Malaysia’s LNG exports of 3.6 Bcf/d during the same period. The United States is expected to remain the third-largest LNG exporter in the world, behind Australia and Qatar, in 2019–20. U.S. LNG exports have increased as four new liquefaction units (trains) with a combined capacity of 2.4 Bcf/d—Sabine Pass Train 5, Corpus Christi Trains 1 and 2, and Cameron Train 1—came online since November 2018. Although Asian countries have continued to account for a large share of U.S. LNG exports, shipments to Europe have increased significantly since October 2018 and accounted for almost 40% of U.S. LNG exports in the first five months of 2019. LNG exports to Europe surpassed exports to Asia for the first time in January 2019. A warm winter in Asia and declining price differentials between European and Asian spot natural gas prices led to increased volumes of U.S. LNG exports delivered to Europe. Europe’s total LNG imports in the winter of 2018–19 averaged 10.2 Bcf/d, 60% higher than in the previous two winters and the highest winter average since at least 2013, according to CEDIGAZ LNG data. LNG imports to Europe have been relatively low in recent years, but they are expected to grow as new LNG supply comes online and European countries continue to increase natural gas consumption as part of their decarbonization initiatives. Total LNG imports in the three largest global LNG markets—Japan, China, and South Korea—started to decrease in February 2019 amid a milder-than-normal winter and, in Japan, the restart of nuclear power plants. China, which became the world’s second-largest LNG importer in 2017 (surpassing South Korea) and the world’s largest importer of total natural gas in 2018 (surpassing Japan and Germany), continued to increase LNG imports. Its LNG imports were 20% (1.3 Bcf/d) higher in the first five months of 2019 compared with the same period last year as the country continued to expand LNG import capacity and implement coal-to-gas switching policies. LNG from the United States accounted for 7% of China’s total LNG imports in the first six months of 2018. In September 2018, China imposed a 10% tariff on LNG imports from the United States, and in the months since then (October 2018 through May 2019), U.S. LNG has accounted for 1% of China’s LNG imports. Because no long-term contracts between suppliers of U.S. LNG and Chinese buyers exist, LNG from the United States is supplied to China on a spot basis. Spot LNG shipments are dispatched based on the prevailing global spot LNG and natural gas prices, and the tariff made LNG imports from the United States to China less competitive. Recent declines in price differentials between European pricing benchmarks (including National Balancing Point (NBP) in the United Kingdom and Title Transfer Facility (TTF) in the Netherlands) and Asian spot LNG prices (including Japan LNG spot prices) have affected the flow of flexible (i.e., without a fixed destination specified in an offtake LNG contract) U.S. LNG exports. Because the round-trip transportation costs from the U.S. Gulf Coast to Europe are about $1.50 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) lower than those to Asian markets, a sufficiently narrow price spread between European and Asian spot natural gas/LNG prices will make Europe the preferred destination for exporters of U.S. LNG. The spread between Japan spot LNG and NBP/TTF prices was about $1.00/MMBtu in December 2018 and January 2019, and it reached a low of $0.60/MMBtu in April, which supported continued high U.S. LNG exports to Europe. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) expects U.S. LNG exports will continue to increase in 2019 as the first trains at the two new liquefaction facilities (Freeport LNG in Texas and Elba Island LNG in Georgia) come online in the next few months. In its latest Short-Term Energy Outlook, EIA forecasts U.S. LNG exports will average 4.8 Bcf/d in 2019 and 6.9 Bcf/d in 2020 as new liquefaction trains at Cameron, Freeport, and Elba Island are commissioned in the next 18 months. By 2021, six U.S. liquefaction projects are expected to be fully operational. Another two new U.S. liquefaction projects (Golden Pass in Texas and Calcasieu Pass in Louisiana) that started construction this year are expected to come online by 2025. By that time, EIA projects that the United States will have the world’s largest LNG export capacity, surpassing both Qatar and Australia.

#### LNG is necessary for European energy security and independence from Russia.

Grigas 18 Agnia Grigas, 3-15-2018, Agnia Grigas is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council., "Commentary: How to derail Russia's energy war", U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-grigas-energy-column/commentary-how-to-derail-russias-energy-war-idUSKCN1GR045, Accessed on 10-27-2019 // JPark

As another energy conflict is erupting between Russia and Ukraine, Moscow seeks to start construction of the second branch of the Nord Stream pipeline to deliver Russian natural gas directly to Germany. While the European Union countries remain divided, the United States needs to maintain its consistent and principled position to reduce Europe’s over-dependence on Russian natural gas. On March 2, Russian state gas company Gazprom announced that it would terminate all gas contracts with Ukraine’s energy company Naftogaz after a Stockholm arbitration court ordered Gazprom to pay more than $2.5 billion to Naftogaz for failing to uphold contractual obligations regarding volumes of transit gas through Ukraine. Gazprom’s apparent reprisal has increased European fears of a possible gas war in the midst of a cold winter; Ukraine has already closed schools to conserve energy and the EU is worried about its own gas supplies. These fears could play into Gazprom’s efforts to push through its Nord Stream 2, which Moscow presents as a simple business project to ensure Europe’s gas supply. To buy into this line of thinking, however, is to misunderstand the rationale for this project. Gazprom is not a commercial entity, but the right hand of the Kremlin, and Russia today is no ally of Europe but rather a sanctioned state engaged in war on the continent and bent on destabilizing the EU and NATO. Nord Stream 2 may give the Russian military a freer hand in Ukraine, impede the EU’s foreign policy and energy strategy, and increase Moscow’s influence over Germany’s political and business elites, thus aggravating divisions between Europe and the United States. Initially conceived in Moscow as a means of eliminating uncooperative transit countries from its gas business, the Nord Stream project gained momentum when Kiev started turning toward the West in the years following its 2004 Orange Revolution. The first Nord Stream pipeline was completed in 2011 and, following the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, Moscow has vowed to limit gas flows through Ukraine by the end of 2019. The Nord Stream 2 infrastructure would enable Gazprom to cut Ukraine out of gas transit traffic, which could cost the country about $2 billion in transit fees (the equivalent of nearly 6 percent of its projected budget for 2018). Revenues aside, as Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki recently stated in Berlin, the real danger lies in the fact that Russia can launch a massive land offensive against Ukraine without fear of damaging Ukraine’s pipeline infrastructure and interrupting Gazprom’s exports to Western countries. German Chancellor Angela Merkel disagrees with Morawiecki, saying that Nord Stream 2 is an economic project that poses no danger to energy diversification. German business interests see economic benefits if the country becomes a key European gas distribution hub for Russian gas. Likewise, Germany wants to ensure its gas supply as it is phasing out nuclear power. Unfortunately, completing Nord Stream 2 would go counter to the main principles of the EU’s energy and foreign policy strategy. It would challenge nearly two decades of Brussels’ efforts of trying to boost EU energy security by offering alternatives to Russian gas, such as pursuing the Southern Gas Corridor pipeline to bring Caspian gas to Europe, investing in LNG import terminals and pipeline interconnections, and increasing reliance on renewables, as well as supporting Ukraine and maintaining unity vis-à-vis Moscow. Germany does not seem to have learned any lessons from its history. As I write in my newest book on the geopolitics of gas, when German Chancellor Willy Brandt signed the country’s first gas contract with the Soviets in 1969, he considered such gas trade as part of his Ostpolitik: an economic policy toward the East that could reduce Cold War tensions and help reestablish contact with communist East Germany. But it was Washington’s military spending and containment policy – not the German marks that went to Moscow – that eventually bankrupted the Soviet Union and brought down the Berlin Wall. Washington should recall its own efforts during the Cold War era, when it tried to discourage its European allies from dependence on Soviet gas. President Ronald Reagan imposed sanctions on the USSR in late 1981 in response to Soviet martial law in Poland and also to block Soviet construction of the Urengoy-Uzhgorod pipeline that would have brought vast quantities of Siberian gas to Germany and Western Europe. In 1982 the administration extended sanctions to American energy equipment so it would not be used for the pipeline’s construction. Yet the effort failed to convince Europe and by late 1982 Washington canceled the sanctions while the pipeline was built. Today, the United States faces a similar predicament. Washington’s July 2017 Russia sanctions threatened to target Nord Stream 2 but the most recent sanctions implemented in January 2018 did not do so explicitly. More recently, Poland has called for Nord Stream 2 to be included under U.S. sanctions. There is still time for President Donald Trump to try to achieve what Reagan could not and derail Russian pipeline plans. American sanctions against Nord Stream 2 would not be easy to implement given the resistance from countries like Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and France. German support for future Russia sanctions is crucial, but getting Merkel to agree to add Nord Stream 2 to these measures seems unlikely. Instead, Washington should push Brussels to take a harder look at Nord Stream 2’s compliance with EU energy policy. While Washington today has less sway over its European allies than it did during the height of the Cold War, the United States can now offer Europe an alternative to Russian gas – American liquefied natural gas (LNG). American LNG has been exported to Europe since 2016 and expanded to include countries like Poland and Lithuania last year. The abundance of gas in the global markets due to the booming global LNG trade makes Nord Stream 2 less commercially or strategically necessary for Europeans. Already opinions have shifted in Europe. Denmark initially accepted Nord Stream, but has had a change of heart about its second phase. Danish legislators passed a law this year that could allow the government to ban Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from going through its waters for security reasons. Based on this new law, the Danish Energy Agency will likely release its decision on Nord Stream’s 2 application for permission to pass through Danish waters by the end of March. However as Danish sources told me on a recent visit, Copenhagen wants the EU to take the lead on any pipeline decision. This would prevent Denmark from damaging its relations with Germany and the United States and incurring the wrath of Russia. It would also prevent Russia from developing an alternative route to bypass Danish waters and eliminate the division emerging in the EU as some member states — the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia — oppose the project. Fifty years since the first Soviet pipelines were laid to supply Western European countries with Soviet gas, the EU stands again at a crossroads in its energy policy. While security considerations and economic interests divide the EU countries, Washington should continue to make its opposition clear. Nord Stream 2 has no place in Europe’s long-term security and energy strategy.

#### Independence is key to stop war – control over energy emboldens Russia.

Adams 15 Mike Adams, 3-23-2015, Mike Adams (aka the "Health Ranger") is a best selling author (#1 best selling science book on Amazon.com) and a globally recognized scientific researcher in clean foods. He serves as the founding editor of NaturalNews.com and the lab science director of an internationally accredited (ISO 17025) analytical laboratory known as CWC Labs. There, he was awarded a Certificate of Excellence for achieving extremely high accuracy in the analysis of toxic elements in unknown water samples using ICP-MS instrumentation. Adams is also highly proficient in running liquid chromatography, ion chromatography and mass spectrometry time-of-flight analytical instrumentation., "Why Greece is the lynchpin that could unleash economic collapse, domestic martial law and global war", NaturalNews, https://www.naturalnews.com/049094\_Greece\_European\_Union\_economic\_collapse.html, Accessed on 10-27-2019 // JPark

I wish I could download to your brain everything you need to know about the European Crisis unfolding right now. The possibility of the breakup of the European Union could be the spark that sets off the global debt implosion that leads to violent conflict across the globe. The actions of Greece, it turns out, could set off a chain reaction that leads directly to a Wall Street panic and the "bail-in" seizure of your savings accounts at your favorite hometown bank. It could also radically destabilize Eastern Europe, heightening the risk for conflict between Russia and Western European nations (including NATO members like the United States). To understand why this is, we first need to grasp the basics of European history. The average American, unfortunately, knows virtually nothing about European history. But that might be asking too much, since the average American also knows nothing about American history, either. Fortunately, this article is written for exceptional Americans who are far better informed than the average Joe. What most Americans don't realize is that Europeans have very long memories of crimes against their people. These memories are passed down from generation to generation and can't simply be greenwashed out of the history books. The European Union was formed on the hope and assumption that people from an incredibly diverse array of cultural backgrounds might forgive the past and surrender to cultural homogenization as "Europeans." But the hope turned out to be false. The people of Greece in 2015 still remember the crimes of Nazi Germany from 1943, even long after they have been officially absorbed into the European Union. And now that memory may very well result in the shattering of the European Union itself. If the European Union crumbles, Europe will see a wave of regional wars breaking out over so-called "borderlands" and strategic nations like Ukraine. The fall of the European Union, in fact, would likely embolden Russia to be even more assertive in the Ukraine as it attempts to defend itself from America's ever-encroaching military bases which now occupy most of Russia's border states. (Why did Putin put his country so darn close to all our military bases? Geesh...) Russia, you see, must maintain strategic control over these border states in order to export its primary resource: energy. Germany, meanwhile, must maintain strong economic ties with wealthy nations that can afford to import Germany's high cost value added exports -- the backbone of the German economy. A shattering of the European Union would destabilize both Germany and Russia for these two reasons (exports of energy and exports of manufactured goods), reigniting the same sort of fears and insecurities that drove the German invasion of Russia in World War II. That invasion was a strategic move to occupy Stalingrad not for the city itself, but because the city was a gateway to the enormous energy and strategic resources of Mother Russia, which Hitler needed to fuel his thirsty war machine. NATO and Germany are militarily weak Today, Germany has no military to speak of. Russia, on the other hand, is re-emerging as a very powerful military force with considerable leverage throughout Western Europe due to its energy pipelines. NATO, meanwhile, exists in name only and is primarily backed by the threat of military force from America, a nation bogged down in endless (and pointless) military action in the Middle East. While America was defusing roadside bombs in Afghanistan, Russia was busy occupying the "strategic high ground" of the North Pole, as described in this article by Dave Hodges. This places Russia in a position where it can credibly threaten all of Western Europe and North America with nuclear strikes (if it ever comes to that). Russia, too, is populated by strong, rugged, durable people who are used to surviving with little in the way of material goods. They can endure war far more readily than wealthy, pampered nations like America or the UK. As a matter of record, young Americans are now so obese that even the U.S. military must reject almost a quarter of all applicants due to excessive body weight. Economic warfare will likely precede military warfare On the economic side, Russia has joined forces with China to erect its own alternative to the SWIFT inter-bank money transfer system. China has been accumulating a massive amount of gold reserves to back its currency, while Russia has been selling off the U.S. dollar and bypassing western sanctions in creative ways by selling energy in exchange for physical gold. The dollar itself is headed for a global collapse for the simple reason that it isn't backed by anything other than (dwindling) faith. President Nixon removed the gold backing of the dollar in 1971, and ever since, America has been headed toward a day of reckoning where the dollar would eventually collapse as all fiat currencies do. Faith in the dollar is eroding by the day as the Fed keeps printing more money, diluting the existing money supply and silently stealing wealth from those people foolish enough to still be holding dollars when the music stops (i.e. all U.S. wage earners and taxpayers). Fort Knox, meanwhile, isn't filled with gold but rather IOUs. Most of the physical gold has been quietly but diligently accumulated by China over the last two decades. The stage is now set for a global economic war aimed at America and the dollar hegemony I'm barely touching the highlights of the global dynamics at play here, but what's really taking shape is a global economic and military war, waged by China and Russia against the Western powers of the United States, NATO, the European Union and Germany in particular. Greece now plays the role of the lynchpin in all this, as its exit from the European Union could loosen the knot that unravels the empire of debt upon which Western nations are now based. An economic implosion leads to systemic weakness which invites more aggressive economic warfare actions on the part of Russia and China. If a combined economic action by Russia and China were to take place -- for example, China announcing a fire sale of U.S. debt while Russia cuts off energy supplies to Western Europe -- the economic implications for Europe and America would be beyond catastrophic. They might be terminal. We would see the U.S. government, for example, instantly unable to sell any new debt to foreign nations. The only option is to print more money to finance the debt -- a form of economic suicide -- and with the loss of the dollar's global currency reserve status, this would lead very quickly to accelerating money debasement and price hyperinflation in consumer goods. Think Venezuela: price controls, biometric scanning requirements to purchase groceries. Armed guards at grocery stores. Food shortages, street riots, etc. It wouldn't be long before the U.S. government would be forced to stop funding entitlement programs such as EBT cards and pensions. This would almost immediately lead to massive riots in the streets and the wholesale destruction of large cities such as St. Louis and Chicago.

### 2NR---Link Renewables

#### Independently, improvements in renewables trigger the link

Weiss 16- \* Principal at the Brattle Group, a climate change focused consulting firm with a PhD in Business Economics from Harvard, \*\* Principal at the Brattle Group with over 20 years of experience in the field, \*\*\* Associate at the Brattle Group with a PhD in Engineering Systems from MIT, \*\*\*\* Senior Associate at the Brattle Group with an MBA from MIT (\*Jurgen Weiss, \*\* Steven Levine, \*\*\* Yingxia Yang, \*\*\*\* Anul Thapa, 1/15/16, “LNG and Renewable Power,” <http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/005/249/original/LNG_and_Renewable_Power_-_Risk_and_Opportunity_in_a_Changing_World.pdf?1452804455>)

The above analysis shows that renewable energy may be able to compete with imported LNG under a number of conditions in the near future and most likely during the lifetime of the longterm LNG contracts supporting new LNG export infrastructure (i.e., contracts that have already been negotiated for new export terminals now under construction as well as contracts being pursued by export terminals currently in the development phase). Advances in renewable energy technology and related cost improvements, which are further helped by an increasingly mature supply chain, economies of scale and increased competition, could result in renewables putting competitive pressure on LNG as a source of fuel in the electric generation sector in many target markets for North American LNG. Such competitive pressure could lead to lower demand for LNG relative to current forecasts, and lower prices for LNG in world markets, all else equal.

### 2NR---Link Russia Deterrence

#### Yes deterrence – LNGs are key.

Perry 16 Mark Perry, 9-8-2016, Mark J. Perry is a scholar at The American Enterprise Institute and a professor of economics at the University of Michigan, "Maintain America's Energy Lead", US News &amp; World Report, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-09-08/smart-energy-policies-will-keep-america-in-the-lead-on-natural-gas, Accessed on 10-27-2019 // JPark

U.S. LIQUEFIED NATURAL gas exports are reshaping the global energy landscape. As U.S. LNG cargoes make their way to Europe, South America, the Middle East and East Asia, once hard and fast assumptions about the future trade of LNG have been turned upside down. As a result, we are only just beginning to understand the benefits afforded by America's shale revolution and our emergence as the world's largest natural gas producer. Not so long ago, the U.S. was expected to rival Japan as the world's largest importer of LNG. Russia, Iran and Qatar seemed so dominant in the international natural gas marketplace, it was feared they might form an LNG cartel along the lines of OPEC. Those fears have been put soundly to bed by the amazing shale revolution. Instead of being a major LNG importer, the U.S. is on track to become one of the world's largest exporters. Once constrained, the global LNG marketplace is now booming. Although only one U.S. LNG export terminal is currently in operation – several more are currently under construction – Citigroup believes the U.S. Gulf Coast could soon become a major, if not the world's leading, LNG-trading hub. This development is tremendously important for the U.S. economy and our commitment to global trade as well as the energy security of our allies. Political Cartoons on the Economy View All 244 Images The construction of new LNG export terminals is already pumping billions of dollars into U.S. ports. As U.S. LNG export volumes grow, it's likely that an increase in this country's natural gas production will ensue, providing increased investment and economic activity along the Gulf Coast and in U.S. shale fields from Pennsylvania to Texas to Alaska. The emergence of U.S. LNG exports is also creating a more transparent and competitive global marketplace for LNG. That's a considerable win for consumers and a significant blow to traditional gas exporters that used their tight hold on supply to exert undue geopolitical power. Take Russia's stranglehold on Europe's natural gas supplies. Already, the emergence of U.S. LNG in the global marketplace has increased our allies' bargaining power with Gazprom, Russia's sole producer and exporter of natural gas. For example, Lithuania recently built an offshore LNG import terminal in a move to diversify its sources of supply. Even the potential of LNG imports provided the Lithuanians leverage to renegotiate gas supply contracts with Gazprom at a 25 percent discount. As a study from Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy predicts, access to U.S. LNG will likely save European gas consumers $20 billion per year and cost Russia roughly the same in reduced sales revenues. Less revenue in Vladimir Putin's coffers and decreased Russian leverage on European countries is certainly a most welcome development. As the global LNG marketplace continues to grow, and gas importers gain increased faith in their ability to access needed supply through the market, potential for conflict over energy supplies could be reduced. That is certainly the hope as Beijing continues its island-building policy in the South China Sea. Just last month the first U.S. LNG cargo arrived in China. An increasingly robust, affordable and reliable marketplace for LNG could help convince Beijing it can achieve desired energy security through the market as opposed to aggressive resource command-and-control policies. U.S. leadership in the world's LNG marketplace is clearly in our national interest. We have in our hands the remarkable prospect to help reshape and guide global energy markets for decades to come. Policymakers should recognize the historic opportunity America now has due to an abundance of shale resources that have only recently become recoverable. Credit for this goes to the country's petropreneurs and made-in-the-USA drilling and extraction technologies. But to facilitate and maintain our new leadership position in world energy markets, we need to get domestic energy policies right. That will likely mean having the wisdom to let U.S. natural gas producers compete more easily with foreign producers who face less cumbersome regulatory procedures. There's a lot at stake – jobs, national security and geopolitical power. More than ever before, we need sensible energy policies in the pursuit of our goals.

### 2NR---Yes Extinction---Russia

#### Russia will over-rely on nuclear threats in response to conventional crises --- triggers nuclear war.

Payne & Foster 17 – \*Keith, PhD in IR @ USC, Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Mo State, \*\*John, PhD, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (“Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict,” *Comparative Strategy*, 36.1)//BB

The year 2014 was a major turning point in post-Cold War history when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and engaged in an expanded war in Eastern Ukraine with the objective of extending Russian control and possibly creating a land bridge to Crimea. As noted previously, President Toomas Ilves of Estonia has pointed out, “Everything that has happened since 1989 has been predicated on the fundamental assumption that you don’t change borders by force, and that’s now out the window.”62 It was also a turning point in the Russian use of nuclear threats. In 2014 and 2015, Russia injected nuclear weapons into the Ukraine crisis, threatening a nuclear response in the event of a NATO counter attack. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Work has observed, “ …senior Russian officials continue to make irresponsible statements regarding Russia’s nuclear forces, and we assess that they are doing it to intimidate our allies and us.”63 In his August 2014 Yalta speech on Ukraine, Putin referenced Russia’s large and growing nuclear capabilities, and warned that NATO should not “mess” with Russia.64 In September 2014, then-Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel General Valeriy Heletey said that Russia threatened on several occasions across unofficial channels to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine.65 In a March 2015 “documentary” marking the one year anniversary of the Russian annexation of Crimea, Putin said he was willing to put Russian nuclear forces on alert during the invasion.66 As Colonel (ret.) Vladimir Yevseyev, Director of the Center for Social and Political Research wrote, “Putin is saying that under certain conditions, Russia will be ready to use nuclear weapons to defend Crimea.”67 Putin reportedly has made nuclear threats through unofficial channels over Crimea and the Baltic republics. According to the London Times, Russian generals present at a meeting in Germany who said they were speaking for the Russian government indicated that “any military move by the West on Crimea would trigger a Russian response, possibly involving nuclear force. ‘The United States should also understand it would also be at risk,”’ the generals reportedly said, and the paper noted that “President Putin is using the threat of a nuclear showdown over the Baltic states to force NATO to back away from Russia’s border.”68 The fundamental difference in these statements and past Russian nuclear threats is that Russia is now talking about the first use of nuclear weapons in support of Russian aggression and expansion, not only in response to an attack on Russia. This is an important shift. As Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy NATO military commander, has noted, Eastern European NATO states face the risk of a Russian conventional attack backed by the threat of nuclear “escalation” which would be used to prevent “reestablishment of territorial integrity.”69 Such overt manifestations of hostility support the foreign policy goals of restoring Russia’s position as a military force to be reckoned with, expanding Russian dominance in Europe, and creating opportunities for dissension within the NATO alliance. Nuclear bomber patrols In 2007, Putin announced the start of bomber “patrols,” stating, “Combat alert has begun today. Twenty strategic missile carriers are taking part in it. The planes that have scrambled will be in the air for 20 hours with refueling and in interaction with the Navy.”70 These patrols continue to this day and Russian nuclearcapable bombers are deliberately being flown into the air defense identification zones of the U.S., Canada, NATO Europe, and Japan. The intent of these flights is clearly to intimidate.71 In July 2015, Sputnik News, a Russian state-run news agency, stated the Tu-95 heavy bomber “is capable of striking the United States with nuclear bombs,” and the purpose of the flights was to “survey the skies around Russian borders reminding everyone that Russia is a power to be reckoned with.”72 In May 2015, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg declared, “Russia has also significantly increased the scale, number and range of provocative flights by nuclear-capable bombers across much of the globe. From Japan to Gibraltar. From Crete to California. And from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.”73 He revealed that NATO had to intercept Russian military aircraft 400 times in 2014, twice the number that took place in 2013.74 Sweden has reported “‘unprecedented’ Cold War-era levels of activity by Russian military bombers and fighter aircraft over the Baltic Sea area.”75 UK Defense Minister Michael Fallon said Russia was playing a “provocative and dangerous” game that could result in the destruction of an airliner over the UK.76 Russia has even said it will send nuclear-capable bombers to patrol the Gulf of Mexico.77 These flights have become a serious threat to air navigation safety because the aircraft reportedly fly without notification or transponders functioning.78 In April 2015, there was a particularly serious bomber incident. The UK press reported that two Russian Tu-95 bombers flying over the English Channel were carrying at least one “nuclear warheadcarrying missile, designed to seek and destroy a Vanguard [strategic ballistic missile] submarine.”79 The UK protested this flight, reportedly over the threat it posed to air navigation.80 On July 4, 2015, two Russian Tu-95 bombers reportedly flew within 40 miles of the U.S. and taunted the U.S. pilots saying, “Good morning American pilots, we are here to greet you on your Fourth of July Independence Day.”81 Since 2013, there has been a significant increase in threatening flights by nuclear-capable bombers against Japan, including a reported over-flight of a Japanese island.82 In 2015, Reuters reported that the Japanese Air Force announced that “Russian bombers and patrol planes often enter Japan’s air space close to Japan’s northern Hokkaido island and close to four smaller islands which are claimed both by Japan and Russia,” and that Japanese fighter scrambles against Russia and Chinese aircraft had returned to peak Cold War levels.83 These flights are indicative of an increasingly hostile and provocative posture toward both the West and Japan, intended to strengthen Russia’s political and military standing in support of Moscow’s national objectives. Russian nuclear exercises While Russian nuclear exercises are discussed in more detail in the next chapter, their increasing frequency and aggressiveness is a reflection of growing hostility toward the West. They also demonstrate Russian views concerning the linkage of nuclear weapons to Russia’s expansionism and war planning. Russian exercises, which mainly focus on fighting the U.S., NATO and Japan, appear to emphasize nuclear warfighting, starting with Russian first use of a small number of nuclear weapons and escalating to general nuclear war.84 The Russians routinely stage major strategic nuclear exercises and theater war exercises simulating the use of nuclear weapons.85 In addition to the normal training role these exercises serve, they likely are intended to influence the actions of NATO states through the intimidating effect they create. The unusual high-profile publicity given to nuclear exercises in Russia appears designed to reinforce this effort at intimidation. According to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, “Russia’s recent use of nuclear rhetoric, exercises and operations are deeply troubling.”86 Moreover, he noted that Russia has avoided reporting on these exercises as required by the Vienna Document, agreed to by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and intended to enable confidence-building measures that reduce the risk of hazardous incidents that can lead to inadvertent conflict. 87 In the same year that the draft Russian nuclear doctrine was made public, Russia conducted the Zapad [West]-1999 theater war exercise, in which then-Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev said Russia simulated the first use of nuclear weapons: “Our Army was forced to launch nuclear strikes first which enabled it to achieve a breakthrough in the theater situation.”88 Alexander Golts wrote that “the enemy looked just exactly like NATO did in Yugoslavia.”89 Russian press accounts stated that Russia responded with limited nuclear strikes using cruise missiles launched from Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers “against countries from whose territories the offensive was launched.”90 The use of strategic bombers with nuclear cruise missiles was repeated in later Zapad exercises.91 In 2009, the London Daily Telegraph reported, “The [Russian] armed forces are said to have carried out ‘war games’ in which nuclear missiles were fired and troops practiced an amphibious landing on the country’s [Poland’s] coast.”92 In this case, the weapon reportedly used was a tactical nuclear weapon.93 A senior NATO official told Reuters that Russia’s Zapad exercise in 2013 was “supposed to be a counter-terrorism exercise but it involved the (simulated) use of nuclear weapons.”94 The Russians have also reportedly simulated first use of nuclear weapons in the Vostok [East] exercises and in exercises conducted in the Indian Ocean.95 Russian strategic nuclear exercises have become larger and, since 2012, have been presided over personally by President Putin. In 2013, while Putin hosted a meeting of the G-20 Presidents and Prime Ministers at St. Petersburg, Russia announced it was conducting a large ICBM force exercise–the timing of which was hardly coincidental.96 The simulated first use of nuclear weapons is consistent with Russian concepts of conflict “deescalation,” which was part of the theoretical basis of Putin’s nuclear first-use doctrine.97 Writing in May 1999, Major-General V.I. Levshin, Colonel A.V. Nedelin, and Colonel M. Ye Sergeyev described the concept of “de-escalation of military operations” as follows: “Fulfilling the de-escalation concept is understood to mean actually using nuclear weapons both for showing resolve as well as for the immediate delivery of nuclear strikes against the enemy ….It seems to us that the cessation of military operations will be the most acceptable thing for the enemy in this case.”98 The 2014–2015 European security crisis triggered by the Russian invasion of the Ukraine has resulted in a dramatic increase in both nuclear and conventional Russian military exercises. Russian exercises and what Russia calls “snap drills” reportedly will reach astounding levels in 2015 (an announcement of 4,000 planned in 2015, including 120 involving the ICBM force).99 The senior U.S. Army general in Europe, Lt. General Ben Hodges, says Russia has demonstrated the capability to deploy 30,000 troops and 1,000 tanks “really fast.”100 Early in the Ukraine crisis, in March 2014, the Russian Strategic Missile Troops conducted a nuclear exercise which reportedly involved a “massive” nuclear strike.101 In May 2014, Russia announced a very large strategic nuclear exercise involving live launches of tactical and strategic nuclear missiles and missile and bomber defense interceptors. Russia again said the exercise—in which a number of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Presidents participated—ended in a “massive” nuclear strike.102 In February 2015, Russia conducted what was characterized as the largest ICBM exercise ever,103 involving 30 ICBM regiments operating in six regions of Russia.104 In March 2015, Russia conducted “snap drills” involving strategic nuclear missile submarines, strategic bombers, and the forward deployment of nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad. Noted Russian journalist, Pavel Felgenhauer, wrote that the exercise was intended to send “a clear message: Moscow is not ready to stand down and is threatening the use of force, including nuclear weapons.”105 Russia’s theater exercises with simulated nuclear weapons use have also threatened Japan. The Russian Vostok [East]-2010 exercise reportedly simulated the use of tactical nuclear weapons and, in part, was fought in the Kuril Islands claimed by Japan.106 Despite Japan’s protest, the Vostok-2014 exercise, also reportedly involved fighting in the Kuril Islands and was a nuclear exercise.107 Russia did not even try to hide the fact that the exercise was directed against the U.S. and Japan.108 Russian sources called it the largest exercise in Russian history.109 These types of exercises go beyond simple defensive military training. The extent of the simulated use of nuclear weapons is unprecedented and the geographical reach of these exercises is clearly designed to send a strong message to the West and Japan. Forward deployment of nuclear-capable systems Russian officials have frequently made threats to forward deploy nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad (a Russian enclave on the border with Poland). For example, President Dmitry Medvedev threatened to do so the day after Barack Obama was elected U.S. President.110 Russia appears to believe that the forward deployment of nuclear systems makes the threat more credible and, thus, enhances Russian political and military leverage with the states that are threatened. The likely goal is to convince these states that defending themselves against a Russia willing to employ nuclear weapons to attain its foreign policy objectives is a losing proposition and that accommodation with Russia is the better part of valor. In fact, Russia reportedly already has deployed nuclear-capable delivery vehicles to Crimea, including Backfire bombers and Iskander missiles.111 Russia’s most modern nuclear-capable fighter bomber, the Su-34, also appears to have been deployed near Crimea.112 And, it is possible that Russian nuclear weapons have also already been deployed there—the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security Council has stated that Russia is in the process of doing so.113 Earlier this year, Russia’s nuclear weapons handling organization, the 12th Main Directorate of the General Staff, announced that Russia is deploying a nuclear weapons handling unit to Crimea.114 Additionally, according to Russian press accounts, Russia is deploying advanced nuclear-armed equipment to Kamchatka, the area of the Russian mainland nearest Japan, including the new Borei class nuclear ballistic missile submarine and the S-400 advanced air defense weapon.115 The Russian military buildup The growing militarization of Russia is a manifestation of its growing hostility toward the West. Russian expatriate Alexei Bayer notes that Russia today is “bursting with negative energy, hatred of the outside world and enthusiasm for confrontation.”116 Confrontation requires military capability, and Moscow is channeling a significant amount of resources and energy toward investing in and building up this capability, with military expenditures now reported to be nine percent of Russian GNP.117 According to former Duma member, Vladimir Ryzhkov, the Russian media “promotes the idea that Russia exists in a hostile environment, that it is locked in a confrontation with the United States and the West—because of which the country must remain on the constant war footing of a ‘besieged fortress,’ arm itself against foreign aggressors and crack down on domestic enemies ranging from the intelligentsia to ordinary discontents.”118 Russian modernization and expansion of its conventional and nuclear capabilities (described in Chapter Four) enhance Russia’s ability to implement its provocative threats, particularly in light of the defense spending reductions that have been underway in the United States and virtually every NATO state.119 This situation is more ominous in light of the asymmetry in approaches to nuclear weapons and the West’s lack of emphasis on nuclear deterrence. In 2005, then-Chief of the Russian General Staff General Baluyevski stated, “at present and in the foreseeable future the threat to Russia’s security from abroad is fairly small,” and hence, he added, Russia would not “increase the number of our deployed missiles and the weapons they carry” because “this would have taken us nowhere …”120 That policy was reversed by 2011. Russia is now expanding its strategic nuclear forces both quantitatively and qualitatively.121 This force buildup appears intended to support Russian expansionism via nuclear coercion, not the West’s Cold War concept of stable mutual deterrence.122 Arms control policies, which are discussed in Chapter Five, have contributed to the feasibility and the intimidation potential of the Russian nuclear buildup. The New START Treaty has made it economically possible for the Russians to match and then exceed U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities in numeric terms. As former Vice Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Aleksei Arbatov has observed, “It is essentially a treaty on limiting the American strategic forces ….If we want our strategic nuclear forces—as the basis of the country’s defense capability and of its status in the world—to have equality with the United States and if parity is important to us, then the new START Treaty makes it much easier for us to maintain it.”123 As is detailed in Chapter Five, Russia has used arms control and arms control noncompliance to help obtain nuclear capabilities that underpin Russian coercive nuclear threats. As the U.S National Intelligence Council observed in a December 2012 report, not only is Russia expanding and modernizing its strategic and tactical nuclear forces, but Russia is “pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy,” while the U.S. is going in the opposite direction.124 Among these concepts reportedly are precision low-yield nuclear weapons and special low collateral damage weapons.125 These are the types of weapons that Russia reportedly will have a monopoly, or near-monopoly on, and which are well suited to Russia’s strategy of nuclear intimidation.126 A now-declassified CIA report in 2000 links Russian nuclear doctrine to its new nuclear weapons: “Moscow’s military doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons has been evolving and probably has served as the justification for the development of very low-yield, high-precision nuclear weapons.”127 It also noted that the potential use of subkiloton nuclear weapons by Russia “could include artillery, air-toair missiles, ABM weapons, satellite weapons, or multiple rocket launchers against tanks or massed troops.”128 In 1998, Russian journalists Vladimir Kucherenko and Aleksey Podymov reported the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry was working to “create highly accurate ‘clean’ third-generation nuclear weapons …which can be very compact by containing the equivalent of several dozen or hundreds of metric tons of TNT.”129 There are now reports by well-known Russian journalists concerning Russian deployment of such weapons on its new strategic nuclear missiles.130 In April 2009, Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, stated, “There is no longer any need to equip missiles with powerful nuclear warheads ….We can install low-yield warheads on existing cruise missiles.”131 And in 2014, Russian Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu said, “Given the role and significance of long-range precision weapons in strategic deterrence, the number of precision-weapon delivery vehicles is expected to increase fourfold before 2021.”132 These weapons appear to buttress Russian nuclear threats, including nuclear first-use threats, and Russian efforts to coerce its neighbors into accepting a renewed Russian-dominated sphere of influence.133 Russia appears to believe it can exploit the West’s fear of war, particularly nuclear war, to force Eastern Europeans to accept Russian dominance and “Russification”134—with Western Europe’s coerced acceptance. Correspondingly, the abrogation of arms control agreements and the development and deployment of new weapons, both nuclear and conventional, appear intended to intimidate.135 Russia, for example, has recently given considerable publicity to the claimed capabilities of its new Armata tank and new infantry combat vehicles which were recently shown in the Moscow Victory Day parade.136 Large displays of modern Russian military equipment are made in the annual Victory Day military parades, 137 and there is constant reporting in the Russian state-run media on new and supposedly unmatched Russian weapons capabilities, including a new long-range, underwater drone weapon armed with a largeyield nuclear warhead.138 The July 2015 Russian disclosure that “more than eighty warships and support vessels of various classes” were on duty at sea is another example of this type of signaling.139 Conclusion Moscow’s confrontational approach toward the West, including Japan, is a manifestation of Russia’s overall grand strategy as outlined in Chapter One and its expressed threat perceptions. The aim of this policy is to recover the great power status of the Soviet Union by creating a Russian sphere of domination over former Soviet territory. Mounting Russian hostility toward the West is reflected in increasing Russian suppression of democracy, the Russian nuclear and conventional military buildup, its constant military threats, its nuclear threats and exercises, its military aggression in Ukraine, and its intensifying pressure on smaller states and neutrals. Russia seeks to exploit the Western fear of war, particularly nuclear war, by a variety of nuclear threats, doctrinal statements about the first use of nuclear weapons, predictions of war, including nuclear war, well-publicized military exercises involving first use of nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies, threatened and actual forward deployment of nuclear systems, threats to deploy new types of super weapons, threats to abrogate arms control agreements, and actual Russian violations of existing agreements. The upgrading of Russian military power and the advertisement of its capabilities by publicity, military exercises, provocative aircraft flights, and military threats are a key part of this strategy. In light of current Russian economic and conventional military weakness, nuclear weapons and nuclear threats play a central role in this Russian strategy of intimidation. The potential for miscalculation, crises, and conflict are fully apparent in this combination of Russian goals and strategies.

## Counterplans

### 1NC---Tribes CP

#### Counterplan: the [aff actor] should:

* Return and support sovereignty over environmental and resource concerns on reservations to Indigenous tribes
* Provide fossil fuel production subsidies to tribes for resource extraction on reservations
* Eliminate all other production subsidies for fossil fuels

Ludvig 14 (Szonja Ludvig, The Tribes Must Regulate: Jurisdictional, Environmental, and Religious Considerations of Hydraulic Fracturing on Tribal Lands, BYU Law Review Vol 2013 Is 3, Jan 1 2014)

Instead of throwing more responsibility to agencies like the EPA and BLM, the federal government should empower tribes to regulate environmental statutes—and thus, fracking—on their own. Granted, it will not be easy for the tribes to develop a “comprehensive environmental regulatory code that would cover its air shed, its waters, its wildlife, as well as its traditional cultural resources.”177 Therefore, the federal government must assist tribes with financial and administrative support to strengthen their ability to create and enforce their own environmental laws because this will further congressional policies of self-determination and self-governance. It will give the tribes the ability to regulate the environment at the level they find appropriate. This is not a radical proposal. The EPA itself affirms in its Indian Policy that the agency should “take affirmative steps to encourage and assist tribes in assuming regulatory and program management responsibilities for reservation lands.”178 Congress has also recognized that tribal sovereignty means increased control over resources. ITEDSA provides for TERAs, and most environmental statutes provide for TAS provisions, which all purport to give tribes mo re responsibility for their environmental laws. Agencies must make it a priority to support tribes in attaining TERA and TAS. While the proposed ITEDSA amendments may help more tribes achieve the ability to obtain TERA, it is still uncertain whether it will be passed into law. In the meantime, the federal government should not attempt to regulate fracking on tribal lands. It must give tribes more funding to reach TAS standards, so that they will be eligible for the same funding programs given to states in statutes such as the CAA and SDWA. If tribes are empowered to develop their own environmental laws, they will be equipped to address new challenges brought on by emerging technologies, such as the combination of fracking and horizontal drilling, based on the tribal land’s unique geological composition. Only with greater authority over their energy development will Congress’s goals of increasing tribal sovereignty be truly achieved.

#### It’s the most feasible way for Indigenous communities to break out of cycles of poverty – which has numerous other impacts and outweighs on scope – federal control stifles production

Regan 14 (Shawn Regan is a research fellow and the director of publications at PERC. He is the executive editor of PERC Reports. His writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Outside, Quartz, High Country News, National Review, Reason, Regulation, Grist, and Distinctly Montana, and his research has been published in journals such as the Natural Resources Journal, Journal of Energy Law & Resources, and Breakthrough Journal, Unlocking the Wealth of Indian Nations: Overcoming Obstacles to Tribal Energy Development, PERC, 2014)

Introduction The Crow Nation sits above one of the largest coal reserves in the United States. An estimated nine billion tons of coal lie beneath the tribe’s reservation in southeastern Montana—a vast landscape of rolling hills at the edge of the Powder River Basin. Oil, natural gas, and various minerals are also found on the reservation, but it is coal that offers the greatest economic opportunity for the impoverished tribe. Yet the tribe’s 13,000 members have little to show for their massive energy reserves. Although half of the tribe’s revenue comes from coal, most of it remains underground. Where development does occur, the process is slow and cumbersome. Unemployment approaches 50 percent on the reservation, and tribal members suffer from high rates of homelessness, crime, and inadequate housing. This policy report focuses on why tribes such as the Crow struggle to capitalize on their energy resources. As energy production in the United States reaches record levels, tribes find themselves missing out on a revolution that is bringing economic opportunities to countless communities across the nation. The energy resources beneath Indian lands are hardly trivial. Reservations contain almost 30 percent of the nation’s coal reserves west of the Mississippi, 50 percent of potential uranium reserves, and 20 percent of all known oil and gas reserves in the United States.1 The Council of Energy Resource Tribes, a tribal energy consortium, estimates Indian energy resources to be worth nearly $1.5 trillion.2 But federal control of Indian lands largely deprives tribes of the opportunity to benefit from such wealth. Throughout Indian Country, the vast majority of energy resources are undeveloped. Indian lands are managed in trust by the federal government. Any attempt to explore or develop resources on tribal lands must endure a costly rigmarole of bureaucracy and regulations. Making matters worse, the legacy of the federal trusteeship of Indian lands has left most tribes with complicated property institutions that are virtually anathema to economic growth. The consequences are that even tribes with significant energy resources remain locked in a poverty trap. Their resources amount to “dead capital”—unable to generate benefits for tribal communities or the broader economy.3 Policy reforms that enable tribes to more easily convert their resources into “live capital” are sorely needed. Energy development is just one of many strategies tribes may pursue to generate economic development. But its challenges are similar to the development challenges experienced throughout Indian Country. Understanding why tribes are often unable to control their own resources—and looking closely at a few tribes that are succeeding—provides insights into how tribes can unleash the tremendous wealth of Indian nations. Native Americans lag behind other U.S. citizens on economic, educational, and social outcomes American Indian reservations are some of the poorest communities in the United States. Thirty-nine percent live in poverty; unemployment is four times higher than the U.S. average; and incomes are less than half those of other U.S. citizens.4 Few economic opportunities exist in Indian Country, and many reservations rely almost entirely on federal support. Basic services that other Americans take for granted are often in short supply on reservations. Native Americans also lag behind on almost every measure of economic and social wellbeing. Indians experience some of the shortest life expectancies and lowest levels of education of any group in the United States. Rates of violent crime and infant mortality are twice as high as the national average. Access to electricity, indoor plumbing, and adequate housing on reservations are at rates far below those of other U.S. households. Most Native American communities lack even the basic infrastructure necessary to support a functioning economy.5 Poverty persists even though many reservations contain valuable natural resources Indian poverty persists despite the fact that many Native American reservations contain considerable energy wealth. The Department of the Interior recently estimated that Indian lands have the potential to produce 5.35 billion barrels of oil, 37.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 53 billion tons of coal. According to another estimate, Indian energy resources amount to 30 percent of the nation’s coal reserves west of the Mississippi, 50 percent of potential uranium reserves, and 20 percent of known oil and gas reserves.6 These resources can provide substantial economic opportunities for Native Americans if they choose to pursue energy development. In 2009, the Council of Energy Resource Tribes estimated that, at existing prices, the value of energy resources on Indian lands amounted to nearly $1.5 trillion.7 Recent technological advancements in hydraulic fracturing have only increased this potential value. For many tribes, energy development is the primary revenue generator to fund education, infrastructure, and other public services on tribal land. Some also view energy development as a path to promoting tribal self-determination. Revenue from coal development on the Crow reservation in Montana, for instance, enables the tribe to control more of its own affairs apart from the federal government’s trusteeship of Indian lands. Most tribal lands with energy resources remain undeveloped Indian lands contain tremendous resource wealth, but the vast majority of tribal lands with energy resources remain undeveloped. The Department of the Interior estimates that energy development is taking place on only 2.1 million acres of Indian lands while an additional 15 million acres with energy potential remain untapped. In other words, 88 percent of Indian lands with energy potential have yet to be developed.8 The Fort Berthold reservation, for instance, is located at the center of the shale oil boom in North Dakota. Since 2010, hundreds of wells have been drilled on Fort Berthold, generating more than $40 million per month for the affiliated tribes in 2013. Just outside the reservation, however, roughly twice as many wells have been drilled per square mile. Lease payments to mineral owners are also higher off the reservation compared to tribal lands, leading many tribal members to question why they are not able to take full advantage of the energy boom occurring around them.9 American Indian Reservations There are 565 federally recognized tribal governments in the United States today, 337 of which are located in the continental United States. These reservations range in size from the 20-acre Cedarville Rancheria in California to the Navajo Reservation in Arizona, which is roughly the size of West Virginia. All Indian land is held in trust by the U.S. government, which is responsible for managing the land for the benefit of Native Americans. Thirty-nine percent of people in the lower 48 states who self identify as American Indian live on reservations. Federal control makes it difficult for tribes to capitalize on their energy wealth Nearly every aspect of Indian energy development is controlled at some level by the federal government. The Secretary of the Interior must review and authorize all leases and agreements. Federal agencies also collect royalty payments on behalf of tribes and individual Indians and then redistribute them as royalty disbursements to Indian mineral owners. The government’s authority over Indian lands traces its roots to the federal trusteeship established in the early nineteenth century. In 1831, Chief Justice John Marshall described tribes as “nations within a nation,” unable to negotiate treaties with foreign nations but implying that they retained the power to govern themselves. Marshall, however, went on to describe the relationship between tribes and the United States as “that of a ward to his guardian.”10 From this conception, the federal government became the trustee of Indian lands. The government holds the legal title to all Indian lands and is required to manage those lands for the benefit of all Indians. Underlying the federal trust responsibility is the notion that tribes are incapable of managing their own lands. For much of the twentieth century, tribes had little or no control over their energy resources. Royalties and other payments were historically set by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The agency consistently undervalued Indian resources and, by all accounts, did a poor job of negotiating and collecting royalty payments.11 In 1977, the Indian Policy Review Commission concluded that “the leases negotiated on behalf of Indians are among the poorest agreements ever made.”12 In practice, the federal trusteeship of Indian lands limits opportunities for tribal resource development and self-determination. Although tribes have gradually been granted more control over energy development decisions on their reservations, tribes still must acquire approval for every lease, a process that is notoriously slow and cumbersome. Many investors and energy companies simply avoid Indian lands altogether. In addition, Indians themselves are often skeptical of energy development due to past abuses and mismanagement by the government.

#### Uniform solutions like the aff are bad – tribes can take subsidies or leave them, but they have the best means to make that decision

Ludvig 14 (Szonja Ludvig, The Tribes Must Regulate: Jurisdictional, Environmental, and Religious Considerations of Hydraulic Fracturing on Tribal Lands, BYU Law Review Vol 2013 Is 3, Jan 1 2014 – brackets in original)

However, in this case, there is a high risk of overregulation, especially since there are many myths about the true environmental impacts of fracking. In fact, there is almost no knowledge about the true risks of the practice. Especially when the economic rewards of fracking are so great, the risks of overregulation can be devastating,128 especially to tribes. Compliance with the proposed BLM rule will be prohibitively expensive for many tribes. The Western Energy Alliance estimated that the cost for new permits and workovers could range from $1.499 billion to $1.615 billion annually.129 This money will divert resources away from energy development, job creation, and economic growth in states and on tribal lands.130 Even more detrimental for Indian tribes is the delay caused by permits and paperwork. This, in turn, leads to significant costs for operators and investors, precluding them from developing additional resources on impacted land.131 Moreover, state, local, and tribal fracking regulations are simply more desirable to federal regulation. The president of the Independent Petroleum Association of America pointed out that the federal regulations would mandate a one-size-fits-all rule on fracking operations, which is illogical.132 Oil and gas deposits and water tables are found at different depths, and surface characteristics are different depending on the formation.133 Such geographic characteristics of oil and gas reserves vary from state to state, and state officials are more knowledgeable about local and regional production techniques than federal agencies.134 On-the-ground knowledge leads to more effective regulation—regulation that is more specifically tailored to the characteristics of reserves in the location.135 Because state officials are politically accountable to local residents, they will likely be more receptive to local concerns.136 Similar to state officials, tribal leaders are armed with more information about the true significance of a site, the environmental impacts noticed over time, and the economic needs of a tribe. The environmental and social costs of fracking on tribal lands differ from tribe to tribe—and often within each tribe. For example, while many tribal leaders support fracking, there has been solid opposition by those who worry about both religious and environmental consequences. On the Blackfeet reservation, both the Waters of the Blackfeet137 and the Blackfeet Anti-Fracking Coalition138 host Facebook pages with information about the dangers of fracking, updates on fracking operations on tribal lands, and details about events and meetings. Opinions on fracking on Indian lands are hardly uniform, although it is paternalistic to believe that tribes will not be able to resolve these conflicts without the federal government. In the words of the chairman of the University of Montana’s Native American Studies program, tribes are more sensitive to the need to “balance environmental protection, cultural preservation and economic development” when it comes to fracking.1392. The proposed BLM rule improperly ignores the doctrine of selfdetermination Many tribal representatives commented during the note-andcomment period of the proposed rule that increased federal regulation violates tribal sovereignty because Indian lands are not public lands.140 In the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,141 Congress charged the BLM with authority to regulate oil and gas activities on public lands, but not on Indian lands. The BLM’s assertion of jurisdiction over tribal lands is an overextension of its authority and contradicts Congress’s policy of self-determination and self-governance for tribes.142 It does not make sense to impose more federal regulations and more bureaucracy when congressional policy has favored greater tribal control. Throughout the twentieth century, Congress has continuously expanded tribal control over energy resources.143 By eliminating the Secretarial approval for energy development, ITEDSA and the proposed ITEDSA Amendments take away some control that the Secretary of the Interior had over leasing on tribal lands. While there has not been a challenge to ITEDSA, it is likely that courts will hold it more comparable to the coal leasing statutes in Mitchell because like the coal leasing statutes in that case, ITEDSA does not have elaborate control over natural resources. Thus, the United States likely has no affirmative duty to manage fracking to the benefit of the tribes and thus, tribes can manage it on their own. Congress’s intent to increase self-governance was blatantly disregarded in the rulemaking process. Tribes were inadequately consulted in the proposed BLM rulemaking process, violating federal statutes that mandate their participation in such decisions.144 The BLM recognized that it needed to consult with Indian tribes, although its efforts were minimal. The agency held four tribal consultation meetings, inviting over 175 tribes.145 Twenty-four tribes ended up attending the meetings, and most tribal officials dismissed them as “mere ‘informational sessions’ that didn’t give them a chance to contribute to the rulemaking.”146 Response from tribes has been overwhelmingly negative during the two comment periods allotted to evaluating the proposed rule and at congressional hearings. At a congressional hearing in front of the House Natural Resource Committee’s Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs, every native tribe testified that they do not want the proposed rule to apply to their lands.147 The BLM representatives at one point left the room while Indian tribes testified on the impacts of the rule on their energy development.148 But the issues raised by the tribes in absence of BLM representatives were important; for example, the chairman of the Three Affiliated Tribes, Tex Hall, argued that the BLM has jurisdiction to regulate activities on public lands, but not on Indian lands, which are not public lands.149 He argued that “[l]ack of consultation equals lack of respect. [The tribes] are sovereign nations; the actions of these federal agencies are illegal and disrespectful.”150 If tribes are hindered from energy development and blocked from the consultation process, selfdetermination and self-governance are frustrated, completely undermining congressional intent and preventing federal statutes such as TERAs from being at all effective.

### 2NR---Overview

#### The counterplan does three things.

#### First, it returns sovereignty over environmental and resource concerns on reservations to Indigenous tribes – which means tribes get complete control over environmental regulation and resource usage on their reservations. That power currently exists with the federal government but the CP gives tribes complete discretion over what kinds of projects are built or norms are established that concern the environment or resources on their reservations.

#### Second, provide fossil fuel production subsidies to tribes for resource extraction on reservations. The government puts money on the table and says that should *tribes* want to extract on their reservations and produce or sell fossil fuels, they can use it for that purpose. We’ll be very clear – the CP does not give Exxon money to produce fossil fuels on indigenous reservations – it goes *to the tribes*.

#### Third, it removes all other fossil fuel production subsidies.

#### Here’s the net benefit –

#### The CP gives tribes a golden opportunity for economic development that helps them escape cycles of poverty that have devastated indigenous communities for decades.

#### Extend Regan – reservations are the poorest communities in the United States – almost half live in poverty, unemployment is 4x the national average – poverty makes life on tribal reservations living hell – they lack basic services of living like electricity, plumbing, or housing, have low education, high degrees of crime and infant mortality – all of those are incredibly structurally violent.

#### The AFF solves – it gives tribes the opportunity to are convert their oil stores from reserves to live capital -- they can extract and sell oil in the US which is highly profitable and will uplift domestic industry in indigenous communities – it creates many jobs on processing and refining plants, and brings in mass profit streams to tribes that translate into higher wages, more infrastructure and domestic services, more demand for products which in turn incentivizes more supply and economic growth, etc. Subsidies are key -- it allows production to be profitable – that was [x] from the aff – and kickstarts domestic industry.

#### Lastly on the overview, the counterplan solves the aff –

#### it only allows for tribal production on reservations which is a small slice of national production every year – and is nowhere close to the scale of production, influence, and publicity that corporations like Exxon do – the CP solves those.

#### Use sufficiency framing – if the counterplan solves 99% of the case you should vote neg because a massive risk of the disad outweighs an unquantifiable solvency deficit and they don’t have a clear and credible brink that identifies how much of the aff you have to access to solve their impacts.

#### Now, even if they win a residual solvency deficit, our impact independently outweighs the aff:

#### 1] Cyclicality –

#### 2] Natives first –

#### 3] Turns case –

### 2NR---AT Warming Linear

#### 1] Our poverty impact literally brings tons of disenfranchised native communities from the brink of survivability to flourishing – that outweighs a *tiny* risk of warming which is completely insignificant in the broader context of the world’s emissions

#### 2] \*\* Flag this argument They’ve dropped the second piece of Ludvig evidence which ends this portion of the debate – if this debate is about a tradeoff between impacts of economic development and environmental damage – you should *leave that decision to the tribes* – Ludvig says that tribes are *best positioned* to make that decision because they have the best understanding of their economic needs, the environmental makeup and potential risk of damage – each situation is different – every reservation is stricken by different degrees of poverty, sickness, infant mortality, etc. AND each reservation has oil or coal at different depths, different degrees of purity that affect their emissions, etc. The point here is that each situation is specific and thus it is incoherent to have a one-size-fits-all situation that says that in every instance, the margin of warming outweighs the margin of poverty – that decision should be left *up to the tribes* who *know the situation best* and thus are more likely to make the right decision – essentially, our impact is self weighing.

#### Remember that the aff does not force tribes to produce fossil fuels OR use the subsidies – it just puts the money on the table – if they think the environmental factors outweigh, they’ll say no.

#### Now, Ludvig also says that tribes are *uniquely concerned about the environment* because their cultural values dictate respect for the environment – that just means that if a tribe does decide to pollute, you can be sure it’s out of sheer necessity.

#### 3] Risk analysis – I’ll win substantial case defense on the warming stuff but there’s no 1AR response to our impact ev which is where you should break the tie if its close

### 2NR---AT Tribes can sell renewable energy

#### Doesn’t solve the CP – couple of reasons.

#### 1] Fossil fuels > everything else – there’s a shit ton of it undeveloped – the point is that the Cp turns energy wealth into physical money

#### 2] No subsidies for renewables

#### 3] Don’t have the infrastructure

#### 4] No DA

### 2NR---AT Solvency Deficit

#### Use sufficiency framing

#### 1] The counterplan only PICs out of tribal reservations – tiny, not Exxon, not public

#### 2] The AFF doesn’t solve all [x] either – tons of examples of mitigatory defense – [*x – insert most relevant a] and b]* ], c] there’s still the 80% of fossil fuel production that doesn’t occur in the US, and d] the aff does not bring fossil fuels down to 0 immediately – it only shunts the production of fossil fuels whose extraction costs are so high that they would otherwise be unprofitable without subsidies – there’s still a lot of oil that is easy to extract and would be profitable even without subsidies. If aff solvency can overwhelm this mitigation, there’s no way it can’t overcome a couple of reservations – they lack a *clear, credible brink* for solvency and the existence of mitigatory defense means you should presume the little bit the PIC adds doesn’t hose its solvency either.

### 1NC---Bubbles CP

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should fully fund a program to cover at least 4.8% of the surface of the Earth’s oceans in a monolayer of 0.1 μm diameter latex particles, either hollow, or of core-shell morphology, bearing a conventional stabilization system that is inactivated in salt water.

#### Solves warming and there’s no solvency deficits.

Morgan 11 John Morgan., (John runs R&D programmes at a Sydney startup company. He has a PhD in physical chemistry, and research experience in chemical engineering in the US and at CSIRO. He is a regular commenter on BNC.) "Low intensity geoengineering – microbubbles and microspheres" Brave New Climate, 10-8-2011, https://bravenewclimate.com/2011/10/08/low-intensity-geoengineering-microbubbles-and-microspheres/, DOA:11-8-2017 // WWBW \*bracketed for symbols\*

Is there another way to look at this? The Achilles heel of the hydrosol approach is the short bubble lifetime. But are there other ways to brighten water? Are there any other micron sized light scattering particles cheaply available in prodigious quantities, which float in water and don’t dissolve? It turns out the answer is yes. Synthetic latex is produced on a huge scale – [1010 kg in 2005](http://books.google.com.au/books?id=3CdgNiBrHfIC&pg=PA43&lpg=PA43&dq=cost+of+bulk+synthetic+latex&source=bl&ots=X5hv6DcDeR&sig=48ZERM5d3UWtW2yZ4NDtjhiKriU&hl=en&ei=5iGITuPBHayUiQeAwe2jDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDoQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false). A latex is a dispersion of polymer microspheres in water (Figure 5). The particle size is typically around 0.1 – 0.5[micro-meter] μm. The polymer content is high – about 50% by weight. And its cheap – [a bit over a dollar per kilo wet](http://books.google.com.au/books?id=3CdgNiBrHfIC&pg=PA43&lpg=PA43&dq=cost+of+bulk+synthetic+latex&source=bl&ots=X5hv6DcDeR&sig=48ZERM5d3UWtW2yZ4NDtjhiKriU&hl=en&ei=5iGITuPBHayUiQeAwe2jDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDoQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false). It looks like a bright white opaque liquid, like wood glue, which is a polyvinylacetate latex. Its a bulk commodity used in adhesives, paper coatings, paint and many other applications. The common polymers are acrylates, polystyrene and its copolymers, PVA, and others. These polymers themselves are inert and non toxic. Whether they present any physical risk to the biota needs to be determined but given the small particle size and low concentration in a milieu already loaded with natural micro- and nanoparticles it seems low risk. The main safety concern in my opinion would be any residual monomers, which are toxic. But these can be eliminated, certainly to the point where these materials can be safely unleashed on the public as paints and glues. The chief virtues of latex particles over bubbles is they don’t dissolve, they don’t coalesce, they are durable, and they can be made much smaller. They have a density of just over 1 g cm-3 so they sink, but at 0.2 micron the sedimentation velocity is too slow to matter. This presents a different problem – the chief loss mechanism now is not dissolution but loss by convection to deeper waters. Is there some way to keep these particles afloat? I think there is. Most of these **latex polymers**, polystyrene, for example, **are** hydrophobic – they’re **water repellent**. To keep the particles in suspension requires added surfactants, or putting electrically charged groups on the surface. But when diluted with salt water, both these stabilization mechanisms fail. Without stabilization **a polystyrene sphere will attach to the water surface. Breaking waves will drive them under, but rising bubbles will scavenge them back to the surface again. This mechanism is well known and extensively studied in the mineral separation process of flotation**, where particles of mineral ores are recovered from slurries by attachment to rising bubbles. **The natural bubble population from breaking waves could keep even submicron particles concentrated at and near the ocean surface (Figure 6).** The use of **latex technology opens other doors for engineering particle properties.** For instance, rather than producing a particle composed of a single polymer, **its possible to construct** a particle with two different polymers in a core-shell morphology, or even **hollow particles. Such particles can have much higher scattering power than simple spheres, and are also made in bulk at commodity prices**. Indeed, they are used as opacifiers in paint. We could paint the oceans white. Figure 6. Latex particles adsorbed on the surface of an oil droplet. Similar behaviour would be observed at the air-water interface. Painting by numbers Lets run the numbers on this and ask, what would it take to reverse current warming? First we need to know how much light these particles scatter back to space. I used [Mie theory](http://omlc.ogi.edu/calc/mie_calc.html) to analyse scattering of 500 nm wavelength light (roughly the solar peak) from 0.1[micro-meter] μm diameter polystyrene spheres, as if the sun were overhead**. The back scattering from these very small particles is intense** – 42% of overhead light returns to space. And this is just direct scattering. Some of the light that scatters forward will scatter off a second particle, and a third. **Multiple scattering will see more than 42% of light returned to space.** Since these particles attach to the surface, lets consider, for the moment, a monolayer on the water surface. This requires 1014particles per square metre, with a volume of 5.2×10-8 m3 per m2 (or 5 parts per billion of the top 10 m, for comparison with Seitz’ figures). Polystyrene has a density of 1050 kg m-3, so that’s a mass of 55 mg m-2. Over 3.16×1014 m2 of ocean that’s 1.7×1010 kg polymer. What would this do to the earth’s energy balance? Average insolation (accounting for cloud cover [Jin et al. 2002, cited by Seitz]) is 239 Wm-2. The monolayer cross sectional area fraction is pi/4. So the energy returned by direct overhead scattering is about 78 W. That’s huge compared to the current CO2 forcing of about 2.25 Wm-2. Modelling reported by Seitz indicates an increase of ocean albedo of 0.05 translates to an increase of planetary albedo by 0.031 [Seitz 2010; Figure 5]. So I’ll assume planetary albedo increase is 60% of the ocean albedo increase, which means we need ocean backscattering of 3.75 Wm-2. **We would only need 4.8% of a monolayer to offset current CO2 forcing** (ignoring the contribution from multiple scattering). 4.8% of a whole ocean monolayer is 8.3×108 kg of dry polymer, or about 1.7×109 kg wet latex. At say $1.20 per kg, **this would cost $2.0 billion and account for 17% of 2005 global production capacity. This is**, surprisingly, **well within reach. $2.0b to reverse global warming is cheap.** Restricting dispersal to the mid latitudes where the greatest effect is achieved, using core-shell latex technology, and **properly accounting for multiple scattering would see this cost drop even further.** Annual growth in latex production grew organically by [4.5% per annum](http://books.google.com.au/books?id=3CdgNiBrHfIC&pg=PA43&lpg=PA43&dq=cost+of+bulk+synthetic+latex&source=bl&ots=X5hv6DcDeR&sig=48ZERM5d3UWtW2yZ4NDtjhiKriU&hl=en&ei=5iGITuPBHayUiQeAwe2jDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDoQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false) between 2000-2005. Ramping production by 17% would be completely feasible. The ongoing cost depends on the residence time of the particles at the ocean surface. Equatorial currents [run at about 1 ms-1](http://oceanmotion.org/html/resources/oscar.htm), which would imply a traversal time of about 1 year for the Pacific ocean. Mid latitude the currents are much slower. The latex particles themselves will degrade in the environment, and there will be losses by association and entrainment in a complex marine environment. Figure 8. Major ocean surface currents. But let’s provisionally estimate a cost of $2b per year. This is significantly cheaper than, say, stratospheric sulfur aerosol injection which is estimated at $25-50b per year, let alone space sunshades. And it doesn’t require exotic engineering, enabling R&D, or orbital launches – it uses existing materials at a rate well inside existing production capacity. Conclusion So consider this final elaboration of Russell Seitz’ bright idea: **0.1[micro-meter] μm diameter latex particles**, possibly hollow, or of core-shell morphology, **bearing a conventional stabilization system that is inactivated in salt water ensuring that the particles are retained at and near the surface, are produced in bulk using about 17% of existing production capacity and using commercial recipes, and are sprayed onto the sea from tanks aboard ships** or crop dusting aircraft, oil rigs, **and other structures, in the mid latitudes.** For a cost in the order of a mere $2b per year we could offset current global warming, subject to the many disclaimers and qualifications discussed above, and many others not mentioned. More limited, local applications, such as the direct cooling of coral reefs as envisaged by Seitz for the microbubble concept, are also possible.

He continues

Geoengineering is crazy. The sheer scale of the aspiration speaks of hubris. Terraforming the planet by pulling down billions of tonnes of carbon dioxide, or pushing millions of tonnes of plastic up into orbit is absurd. The material intensities and costs are ridiculous. And yet, with no deep cuts in emissions in evidence, with atmospheric CO2 at [390 parts per million](http://co2now.org/) and climbing at a rate of about 2 ppm a year, our “safe” working level of 350 ppm is rapidly disappearing in the rear view mirror even as we’re pushing the pedal harder to the floor. We do a lot of crazy things. But what if there was a geoengineering approach that used no materials, almost no energy, works at sea level, with cheap technology we could start deploying at scale today? That’s exactly what Russell Seitz at Harvard is proposing. In this post I want to look at his idea of increasing the reflectivity of the oceans with tiny microbubbles, It’s a fascinating, low impact concept, though not without some challenges. So I’ll also propose a different means to the same end that addresses these issues, and of course has some of its own. Then we can talk about how crazy it all is. Bright Water In a remarkable [paper](http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4737323/Seitz_BrightWater.pdf?sequence=1) published just over a year ago – which I highly recommend reading – **Seitz proposed injecting microbubbles** of air **into seawater**, effectively **creating an “inverse cloud”. Sunlight is scattered back into space from these bubbles.** This concept has no material inputs, bubble sparging equipment is cheap and low power, and could be installed on ships already travelling the worlds waterways. We don’t need to [launch giant lenses into space](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_sunshade) or build [giant balloon tethered pipelines to the stratosphere](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stratospheric_sulfur_aerosols_(geoengineering)). We have a much more down to earth delivery system already in place, in the form of more than 10 000 ships at sea, 1300 working oil rigs and many thousands of retired platforms (3500 in the Gulf of Mexico alone) not to mention islands and suitable coastlines. It’s the little bubbles of nothing that make it really something The appeal of this technique comes from the fact that you only need very small bubbles to scatter light**.** Leveraging the cube law relationship for volume gives you a lot of scattering power if you can make really small bubbles. The air from a single 1 cm bubble, could fill a trillion 1[micro-meter] μm bubbles. Seawater naturally contains up to 1 ppm by volume of air as larger bubbles – in the 10-100[micro-meter] μm range. Their reflectance can be measured, but is so small as to be irrelevant to the Earth’s energy balance. But **if** this quantity of **air were broken down to 1[micro-meter] μm bubbles**, there would be a million more of them, and Seitz estimates **the backscattered light would amount to several watts per square metre.** That’s some serious power. Light scattering from small spherical particles is calculated using [Mie theory](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mie_theory), a fairly horrendous piece of mathematical machinery. Seitz reports Mie theory scattering results 1[micro-meter] μm radius bubbles at various concentrations. At 0.2 ppm of air in water as 1[micro-meter] μm radius bubbles, the albedo (reflectivity) increase is 1%, equal to the current CO2 forcing (Figure 2). This is an astonishing result: **global warming is fully offset by 0.2 parts per million of 1[micro-meter] μm bubbles!** Using the IPCC mid-range climate sensitivity of 0.7 K per Wm-2 the global average temperature would decrease by about 1 degree, more than the 0.74 K warming seen in the 20th century. The NCAR CAM3.1 climate model was used to look at the effect of 1 ppm of 1[micro-meter] μm bubbles in a 780 ppm CO2 scenario – double our current CO2 level. Under this extravagant CO22 burden the model nevertheless indicated a cooling of 2.7 K [Seitz 2010; Figure 5]. So microbubbles really could be a powerful engineered response to climate change, if we can deploy them.

### 2NR---Overview

#### The counterplan solves the case –

1] Reverses warming –

2] Stable and capitalizes on the nature of the ocean to like,,, idk

Use sufficiency framing – if the counterplan solves 99% of the case you should vote neg because a massive risk of the disad outweighs an unquantifiable solvency deficit and they haven’t identified how much of the aff you have to access to solve their impacts.

### 2NR---AT Bubbles Pop

#### Latex solves.

Morgan 11 – (10/8/11, John, PhD in physical chemistry, runs R&D programmes at a Sydney startup company, research experience in chemical engineering in the US and at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Australia's national science agency, “Low intensity geoengineering – microbubbles and microspheres,” <http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/10/08/low-intensity-geoengineering-microbubbles-and-microspheres/>)

**The chief virtues of latex particles over bubbles is they don’t dissolve, they don’t coalesce, they are durable, and they can be made much smaller.** They have a density of just over 1 g cm-3 so they sink, but at 0.2 micron the sedimentation velocity is too slow to matter. **This presents a different problem – the chief loss mechanism now is not dissolution but loss by convection to deeper waters. Is there some way to keep these particles afloat? I think there is. Most of these latex polymers, polystyrene, for example, are hydrophobic – they’re water repellent. To keep the particles in suspension requires added surfactants, or putting electrically charged groups on the surface.** But **when diluted with salt water, both these stabilization mechanisms fail. Without stabilization a polystyrene sphere will attach to the water surface. Breaking waves will drive them under, but rising bubbles will scavenge them back to the surface again.** **This mechanism is well known and extensively studied in the mineral separation process of flotation, where particles of mineral ores are recovered from slurries by attachment to rising bubbles. The natural bubble population from breaking waves could keep even submicron particles concentrated at and near the ocean surface** (Figure 6). **The use of latex technology opens other doors for engineering particle properties**. For instance, **rather than producing a particle composed of a single polymer, its possible to construct a particle with two different polymers in a core-shell morphology, or even hollow particles. Such particles can have much higher scattering power than simple spheres, and are also made in bulk at commodity prices**. Indeed, they are used as opacifiers in paint. **We could paint the oceans white.**

### 2NR---AT Studies Wrong

#### Our proposal is scientifically rigorous –state of the art modeling proves.

**Kinitsch 10** “Could Tiny Bubbles Cool the Planet?”, 3-26-10, Science Magazine<http://news.sciencemag.org/physics/2010/03/could-tiny-bubbles-cool-planet>, RSR

Computer simulations show that tiny bubbles could have a profound cooling effect. Using a model that simulates how light, water, and air interact, Seitz found that microbubbles could double the reflectivity of water at a concentration of only one part per million by volume. When Seitz plugged that data into a climate model, he found that the microbubble strategy could cool the planet by up to 3°C. He has submitted a paper on the concept he calls “Bright Water" to the journal Climatic Change.

#### Models and computer simulations prove solvency.

Kintisch 10 (Eli; 3/26/2010; covers policy news for Science with an emphasis on climate and energy research; “Could Tiny Bubbles Cool the Planet?” http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2010/03/could-tiny-bubbles-cool-planet; Date Accessed: 12/6/2016; DS)

**Natural bubbles** already brighten turbulent seas and provide a luster known as “undershine” below the ocean’s surface. But these bubbles only lightly brighten the planet, contributing less than one-tenth of 1% of Earth’s reflectivity, or albedo. What Seitz imagines is pumping even smaller bubbles, about one-five-hundredth of a millimeter in diameter, into the sea. Such "microbubbles" are essentially "mirrors made of air," says Seitz, and they might be created off boats by using devices that mix water **supercharged with compressed air** into swirling jets of water. “I’m emulating a natural ocean phenomenon and amplifying it just by changing the physics—the ingredients remain the same." Computer simulations show that tiny bubbles could have a **profound cooling effect**. Using a model that simulates how light, water, and air interact, Seitz found that microbubbles could double the reflectivity of water at a concentration of only one part per million by volume. When Seitz plugged that data into a climate model, he found that the microbubble strategy could cool the planet by up to **3°C**. He has submitted a paper on the concept he calls “Bright Water" to the journal Climatic Change. In addition to helping curb global warming, the microbubble strategy could also **help conserve water** by reducing evaporation in rivers and lakes, says Seitz. That’s a problem that leads to the loss of billions of tons of freshwater each year in California alone. Seitz says adding bubbles to a 1-square-kilometer patch of ocean is **feasible**, but scaling it up may be technically difficult. Energy is not the limiting factor, he says, estimating that the energy output of 1000 windmills might be sufficient to add bubbles to an **entire ocean**. The larger challenge to large-scale deployment, he says, would be ensuring that the bubbles last as long as possible. In nature, a bubble’s lifetime depends on the level of dissolved organic matter and nanoparticles, without which small bubbles rapidly shrink and disappear. If the water is too clean, the bubbles might not last long enough to be effectively spread over large areas, Seitz says. One way to test the viability of the idea might be to **study the impact** of bubbles created in the wakes of ships, says oceanographer Peter Brewer of the Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute in Moss Landing, California. "It's something nobody's talked about," he says of Seitz’s technique

### 1NC---EOR CP

#### Counterplan text, Resolved: the United States federal government ought to:

#### Significantly increase 45Q subsidies for Enhanced Oil Recovery

#### Mandate EOR operations in anthropogenic CO2 deposits

#### Establish a low carbon fuel standard to ensure reciprocity of burying and usage

#### Gradually nationalize companies

#### Significantly expand saline aquifers and exploration

#### Keep all other existing fossil fuel subsidies

**Roberts ’19** (Roberts, David. “Could Squeezing More Oil out of the Ground Help Fight Climate Change?” Vox, 2 Oct. 2019, [www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/10/2/20838646/climate-change-carbon-capture-enhanced-oil-recovery-eor](http://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/10/2/20838646/climate-change-carbon-capture-enhanced-oil-recovery-eor).) \*\*Note: article goes over pros and cons of EOR, but our advocacy is consistent with the author’s beliefs. //ZL

Thinking bigger about EOR and CCS If climate change is an emergency, policymakers ought to treat it that way. It cannot be enough to slowly induce oil and gas companies to shift to more carbon-friendly practices, taking care not to unduly startle them. They must be jolted. At the very least, 45Q should be strengthened, the monitoring and verification standards protected, and the subsidy for geologic storage increased. But here are a few policy ideas, listed in order of increasing ambition, that might get the decarbonization job done faster. Rather than simply subsidizing the EOR operations that choose to switch to captured CO2, all EOR operations could be required to do so. And they could be required to maximize (and verify) permanent geologic sequestration. Those requirements could be accompanied, in the beginning, by a subsidy, to avoid any alarming jumps in oil or gasoline prices, but over time, subsidies could fade out and they could simply become regulatory requirements. The social license of EOR operations should be contingent on their burying captured carbon, and they should shoulder those costs. A national low-carbon fuel standard (LCFS), like the one in California, could be put in place and steadily ratcheted down, requiring all oil and gas companies, not just those doing EOR, to offset more and more of the carbon content of their products, until eventually they were burying (or funding the burial of) an amount of carbon equal to the amount their fuels produced. (The LCFS would also apply to imported oil.) This would also amount to a fundamental change in the social license of oil and gas operations. You want to dig up oil and gas; you have to pay to bury carbon. Oil and gas companies could be nationalized and set, by policy, on a path that would steadily phase out production of hydrocarbons and steadily scale up carbon sequestration. Eventually, they would become large, publicly owned sequestration companies. There’s simply no reason to have private, profit-making entities standing as middlemen between the public and the solution to an existential crisis, slowing things down and skimming off the rewards.

#### It goes carbon negative and bridges gap to renewables – subsidies + mandates are key

**Nunez-Lopez et al. ’19** (Núñez-López, Vanessa, Gil-Egui, Ramón, and Hosseini, Seyyed A. Environmental and Operational Performance of CO2-EOR as a CCUS Technology: A Cranfield Example with Dynamic LCA Considerations. United States: N. p., 2019. Web. doi:10.3390/en12030448. Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States). Gulf Coast Carbon Center. Bureau of Economic Geology. Jackson School of Geosciences) //ZL

A dynamic assessment of reservoir performance coupled with energy consumption is necessary to understand the range and evolution of the carbon balance of CCUS systems. Our results show that all four CO2 injection scenarios started operating with a negative carbon footprint and at some point transitioned into operating with a positive carbon footprint. The negative carbon footprint period could be engineered to last longer through operational changes and, more significantly, with stacked saline carbon storage. Results from our numerical reservoir simulation study confirm the premise that the optimized displacement of reservoir fluids with CO2 provides an opportunity for simultaneously enhancing oil production and associated carbon storage. In our reservoir simulations, the ultimate oil recovery in the CGI and WAG scenarios was largest, and so was the carbon storage at the end of 25 years of CO2 injection. Results from CO2 utilization ratio and oil production analyses showed that the hybrid scenario, which combined a WAG flooding strategy with a water curtain injection, was the most EOR-efficient. In this scenario, oil was recovered faster, producing earlier revenues and potentially the best project value. However, it did not perform well environmentally. The best initial environmental performance was achieved by the CGI scenario, even though WAG remained net carbon negative for as long as CGI and produced 80% of the oil produced by CGI with only 58% of the injected CO2. Based on our analysis, WAG appears to have better potential for EOR/storage co-optimization, providing the best compromise between environmental and operational performance. Environmental performance can be significantly improved in a stacked storage scenario. Our stacked storage assessment provides a better understanding of how EOR and saline carbon storage can be Energies 2019, 12, 448 14 of 15 co-managed as a CCUS project matures. Our analysis shows how WAG and CGI can be net carbon negative in a gate-to-grave system, throughout the entire CO2-EOR operation, regardless of the selected gas separation technology, and in spite of the assumption that only excess recycled CO2 was injected into the saline aquifer. In cases where the CO2-EOR operator sees value in storing more CO2 through a carbon credit program (e.g., the 45Q carbon credit program in the USA) and decides to inject more CO2 than the offtake from the EOR recycling facility, all CO2 injection strategies could potentially be net carbon negative. Our study demonstrates the variability of the net carbon balance of CCUS systems. Net carbon balance not only varies among different EOR settings, but it also varies depending on the strategy selected to develop reservoirs with the same geologic setting. In addition, net carbon balance also varies significantly through time, as projects mature. This variability is mostly due to the efficiency of the EOR process, which controls oil recovery and associated carbon storage. Most studies on carbon lifecycle analysis of CO2-EOR use a range for EOR efficiency, commonly stated in barrels of oil produced per ton of CO2 purchased. Such simplifications provide a narrow view of carbon lifecycle variability of CO2-EOR. Our results also provide an understanding of the interplay between environmental performance and economic oil production. This understanding can assist in the co-optimization of CO2-EOR and geologic carbon storage

#### Subsidies key – aquifers empirically solve carbon emissions

**Roberts ’19** (Roberts, David. “Could Squeezing More Oil out of the Ground Help Fight Climate Change?” Vox, 2 Oct. 2019, [www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/10/2/20838646/climate-change-carbon-capture-enhanced-oil-recovery-eor](http://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/10/2/20838646/climate-change-carbon-capture-enhanced-oil-recovery-eor).) \*\*Note: article goes over pros and cons of EOR, but our advocacy is consistent with the author’s beliefs. //ZL

Most of the CO2 used in EOR stays underground When CO2 is injected underground for EOR, most of it, around 90 to 95 percent, stays there, trapped in the geologic formation where the oil was once trapped. If the CO2 comes from the right source and enough is buried, it could amount to substantial carbon sequestration. But those are important caveats. First, less than 15 percent of the CO2 used in today’s US EOR operations (as of 2010) is pulled from “anthropogenic” sources like natural gas processing and hydrocarbon conversions. Over 85 percent comes from “terrestrial” sources, a few big natural CO2 reservoirs under the Earth’s surface. It was already sequestered; it has to be dug up. The best EOR can hope to do is re-bury it, a decidedly carbon-intensive practice over the full lifecycle. (No appreciable amount of EOR CO2 yet comes from direct air capture, though there’s a [big DAC demonstration plant running](https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/6/14/17445622/direct-air-capture-air-to-fuels-carbon-dioxide-engineering) in the Permian.) EOR is an attractive on-ramp for CCS First, the big problem with CCS is that, in the absence of a fairly stiff price on carbon, there’s no incentive to do it, which means it’s hard to get private capital to invest in it. EOR is the only form of large-scale, permanent carbon sequestration that currently makes a profit. Under the right policy regime, the profit-making motive could be harnessed in service of burying carbon. In the process, EOR could help scale up CCS and drive costs down. Second, while most of the saline aquifers (porous, brine-filled rocks deep underground) that are being discussed for large-scale CCS have not yet been explored in any detail, the reservoirs from which EOR draws are much better understood. There are more historical records, they have been subject to more testing and monitoring, and their ability to securely store their contents over long periods of time has been demonstrated by the fact that they trapped hydrocarbons for millions of years. They are promising locations with which to get started on CCS in the near term. Third, oil companies have the equipment, experience, and capital to manage a huge industry like CCS. They know exactly the price point at which burying CO2 would become more profitable than digging up oil and will switch from the one to the other when that price point is reached. They already have much of the infrastructure in place. It’s just up to policymakers to help make capture CO2 cheap. Ultimately, the ability to effectively use EOR to reduce carbon depends on a standardized method of measuring the full lifecycle emissions of the EOR process. Such a standard is now sorely lacking. There are basic disagreements over how and what to measure. There’s no way to fairly credit EOR’s carbon reductions until they can be quantified.

### 2NR---Overview

#### Vote negative to sustain sources of energy while reversing carbon emissions. The counterplan solves the case

1] Nunez-Lopez proves multiple scientific models say EOR with low carbon fuel standards goes carbon negative – that’s better than the case which is just mitigation and is key to reverse impacts. And, Roberts says saline aquifers scale up status quo CCS – oil companies are key – only they have the equipment, experience, and capital to maintain CCS projects at this scale.

2] Companies are held accountable – gradual nationalization and regulation means increased subsidies are supplanted with better fed oversight – keeps them from abusing power.

Use sufficiency framing – if the counterplan solves 99% of the case you should vote neg because a massive risk of the disad outweighs an unquantifiable solvency deficit and they haven’t identified how much of the aff you have to access to solve their impacts.

#### No perm --

1] Functionally and textually competitive

2] They bankrupt companies – means EOR operations are impossible

3] No net benefit – counterplan alone is sufficient to go carbon negative and resolve their impacts

### 1NC---LIHEAP CP

#### CP Text: the United States should

* **Implement LIHEAP reforms outlined by GAO 10,**
* **Increase funding for LIHEAP,**
* **And eliminate all other subsidies for fossil fuels.**

GAO 10 [United States Government Accountability Office, “LOW-INCOME HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM Greater Fraud Prevention Controls Are Needed”, June 2010, <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10621.pdf>] northview sd

To establish an effective fraud prevention system for the LIHEAP program in the seven states, the Secretary of HHS should evaluate our findings and consider issuing guidance to the states addressing the following six recommendations: • Require applicants and household members to provide Social Security numbers for themselves and all members of the household in order to receive energy assistance benefits. • Evaluate the feasibility (including consideration of any costs and operational and system modifications) of validating applicant and household member identity information with SSA. • Develop prepayment edit checks to prevent individuals from receiving duplicate benefits. • Evaluate the feasibility of using SSA’s or states’ vital record death data to prevent individuals using deceased identities from receiving benefits. • Evaluate the feasibility of preventing incarcerated individuals from improperly receiving benefits, for example, by verifying Social Security numbers with state’s prisoner information. • Evaluate the feasibility of using third-party sources (e.g., State Directory of New Hires) at a minimum on a random or risk basis, to provide assurance that individuals do not exceed maximum income thresholds.

#### LIHEAP results in massive benefits for millions of low income households – heating and cooling saves lives but more funding is key

NCLC 17 “The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP): A Safety Net that Saves Lives.” National Consumer Law Center. Cites something from 2017 so it’s from then or later. <https://www.nclc.org/issues/energy-utilities-a-communications/liheap-safety-net-saves-lives.html> TG

The federal [Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)](https://liheapch.acf.hhs.gov/) provides life-saving assistance for low-income households with young children, frail elderly, and individuals with disabilities, by helping to pay electricity, gas, and oil bills. Payments are generally made to the utility or fuel vendor directly to help ensure that utility service is not terminated and that fuel tanks don’t run dry. States and localities that deliver the assistance have leveraged substantial, additional funding from private sector programs and funds to help more families. Without LIHEAP, households experience disconnection of utility service, leading to lack of heat in the winter or cooling in the summer. This creates dangerous situations, especially for elders and young children. Households sometimes resort to unsafe heating methods resulting in serious property damage and even loss of life. Many more families experience homelessness simply because their houses are not livable. Unaffordable energy bills lead to dire choices. Research has documented that families with young children put less food on the table when they don’t get LIHEAP. The lack of adequate nutrition results in underweight babies and school-age children who aren’t able to get to school, or under-preform. A Cost-Effective, Life-Saving Program In recent years, LIHEAP has helped an estimated 7 million families annually by paying a portion of their heating or cooling bills. And yet the program is chronically underfunded: [currently only 20 percent of eligible households receive assistance.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/17/program-that-keeps-families-from-freezing-is-only-lower-impact-if-you-ignore-all-the-families-who-didnt-freeze/?utm_term=.5ecbda6cd4d3) Every year, LIHEAP provides grants to each state and territory. These governmental grantees have broad discretion in how they structure their energy assistance program. States have flexibility in setting the income-eligibility criteria and benefit amounts to target assistance so that the most vulnerable receive the most help. LIHEAP is a targeted energy assistance program that has enjoyed strong bipartisan support over its 35 years of existence. The federal government has imposed much stricter reporting requirements on the state LIHEAP programs. In response, states have demonstrated that LIHEAP is an effective program for reducing “energy burdens” – a key program measure showing the percent of out-of-pocket household income needed to pay energy bills. As LIHEAP help is provided to a vulnerable household, it makes energy bills more affordable. This means that households can avoid having the heating oil or propane tank run dry in the middle of a frigid winter or a shut-off of electricity in the middle of a sweltering summer. LIHEAP therefore frees up limited household income that can be spent on food, rent, or prescription medicine. [National studies](http://neada.org/communications-events/surveys/neada-releases-2009-national-energy-assistance-survey/) have documented the dire choices low-income households face when energy bills are unaffordable. Because adequate heating and cooling are tied to the habitability of the home, low-income families will go to great lengths to pay their energy bills. Low-income households faced with unaffordable energy bills cut back on life-sustaining necessities, including food, medicine and medical care. Low-income households experience very low food security during heating and cooling seasons when energy bills are high. [A pediatric study in Boston](http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/118/5/e1293?download=true) documented an increase in the number of extremely low weight children, age 6 to 24 months, in the three months following the coldest months, when compared to the rest of the year. Clearly, families are going without food during the winter to pay their heating bills, and their children fail to thrive and grow. A [Colorado study](http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/researchandoutreach/Buechner%20Institute%20for%20Governance/Centers/CEPA/Publications/Documents/HomelessExecutive%20Summary-FINAL-2-27-07.pdf) found that the second leading cause of homelessness for families with children is the inability to pay for home energy. When people are unable to afford paying their home energy bills, dangerous and even fatal results occur. In the winter, families resort to using unsafe heating sources, such as space heaters, ovens and burners, all of which are fire hazards. Space heaters pose 3 to 4 times more risk for fire and 18 to 25 times more risk for death than central heating. In the summer, the inability to keep the home cool can be lethal. Older adults, young children, and persons with chronic medical conditions are particularly susceptible to heat-related illness and are at a high risk of heat-related death. Air conditioning is the number one protective factor against heat-related illness and death, especially in the South and Southwest. LIHEAP assistance helps these vulnerable people keep their homes at safe temperatures during the winter and summer. Simply put, LIHEAP saves lives.

#### The counterplan competes.

US Treasury 14 [This is the US Progress Report on Fossil Fuel Subsidies to the 2014 G20.] “United States – Progress Report on Fossil Fuel Subsidies.” US Treasury. 2014. <https://www.treasury.gov/open/Documents/USA%20FFSR%20progress%20report%20to%20G20%202014%20Final.pdf> TG

B. Consumption Fossil Fuel Subsidies There is one consumption subsidy that is funded by the Federal government in the United States. It is targeted at low-income households, and benefits are typically dispersed as a lump sum credit on a household’s utility bill. Because the program is a targeted transfer that helps low-income households obtain essential energy services and does not encourage wasteful consumption, this program is not proposed for phase-out. Further information about the program can be obtained at: www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/liheap and http://liheap.ncat.org/ Consumption Subsidy: Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) Description: A discretionary block grant awarded to States, territories, and tribes and tribal organizations to provide home heating and cooling energy assistance to low-income households. Grantees may use a portion of their LIHEAP funds for low-cost residential weatherization services and for program administration. Federal guidelines limit eligibility to households with incomes up to 150% of poverty or 60% of State median income. The program typically reaches a small share (less than 20%) of eligible households. In FY 2008, the average LIHEAP heating benefit (heating and winter crisis benefits combined) was $363, representing 43% of average home heating expenditures for LIHEAP households. Analysis: Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) A discretionary block grant awarded to States, territories, and tribes and tribal organizations to provide home heating and cooling1 energy assistance to low-income households. Grantees may use a portion of their LIHEAP funds for low-cost residential weatherization services and for program administration. Federal guidelines limit eligibility to households with incomes up to 150% of poverty or 60% of State median income2 . The program typically reaches a small share (less than 20%) of eligible households. In FY 2008, the average LIHEAP heating benefit (heating and winter crisis benefits combined) was $363, representing 43% of average home heating expenditures for LIHEAP households.3 LIHEAP assistance is targeted to vulnerable households (those with elderly, disabled or young children) and to the poorest (those with the highest energy burdens relative to their income). These households are targeted as they may face serious health and safety risks if they do not have adequate heating and cooling in their homes. In FY 2008, 32% of LIHEAP households had an elderly member, 32% included a disabled member, and 21% had a child under 5 years old.3 The average energy burden among LIHEAP recipient households was 17%, compared to 14% among all low-income households.4 Expiration: Authorization expired at the end of FY 2007. Congress continues to provide annual appropriations. Annual Revenue Cost (million $): $3,400 for FY 2014

### 2NR---O/V

#### The PIC solves and outweighs the case – the Low Income Home-Energy Assistance Program subsidizes energy bills of and makes it possible for poor families to buy fossil fuels to heat their homes. The subsidy is a tiny part of the budget which means it definitely solves 100% of case

Use sufficiency framing – if the counterplan solves 99% of the case you should vote neg because a massive risk of the disad outweighs an unquantifiable solvency deficit and they haven’t identified how much of the aff you have to access to solve their impacts.

### 2NR---AT Low Impact

#### Best studies prove eliminating the LIHEAP leaves millions of the most vulnerable in the cold.

Ingraham 17 (Ingraham, Christopher. “Analysis | Program That Keeps Families from Freezing Is Only ‘Lower-Impact’ If You Ignore All the Families Who Didn't Freeze.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 17 Mar. 2017, [www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/17/program-that-keeps-families-from-freezing-is-only-lower-impact-if-you-ignore-all-the-families-who-didnt-freeze/.)//LK](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/17/program-that-keeps-families-from-freezing-is-only-lower-impact-if-you-ignore-all-the-families-who-didnt-freeze/.)//LK) [Accessed 10/24/19]

Among the many federal programs slated for elimination in Donald Trump's budget is the Low Income Home Energy Assistance program (LIHEAP), a Health and Human Services Department initiative that provides close to 6 million low-income households with help for their heating and cooling bills. "Compared to other income support programs that serve similar populations," the budget states by way of rationale, "LIHEAP is a lower-impact program and is unable to demonstrate strong performance outcomes." The White House Office of Management and Budget did not respond to repeated requests to specify which other income support programs it's being compared to, or which impact and performance measures it's being evaluated on. So we're left to puzzle through this on our own. And the claim is something of a puzzle. A 2014 paper in the journal Contemporary Economic Policy by economists at Virginia Tech and the USDA noted that while the program has been under "significant scrutiny" from Congress in recent years, "no one has explicitly put forth" the argument that "the program does not work." AD On the contrary, a number of federal and private academic reports on the program's efficacy have had generally positive things to say about the program's efficacy. For instance, the whole purpose of LIHEAP is to provide energy assistance to the most vulnerable households, reducing overall energy insecurity. On those terms, it appears to be working: LIHEAP's most recent report to Congress, for fiscal year 2014, shows that the program helped 5.7 million households with their heating bills, 673,000 with cooling, and another 1.7 million or so households with "crisis" situations where the program intervened when power to the house was about to be shut down. There's some overlap between these categories, but it's not clear how much since all states don't track them separately. But we can say that the program kept millions of families warm, hundreds of thousands cool, and helped 1.7 million avoid termination of their utilities. That's a pretty big footprint. AD What do we know about households that receive LIHEAP? The most recent federally-funded survey of recipients was conducted in 2011. At that time, more than 90 percent of LIHEAP households include either children, disabled people or senior citizens -- individuals at particular risk for temperature-related health issues. One-fifth of LIHEAP households are home to military veterans. Recipient families are low income, and tend to skimp on spending elsewhere to keep the lights on. "Nearly one third reported that they went without food, over 40 percent sacrificed medical care, and one quarter had someone in the home become sick because the home was too cold." LIHEAP is also associated with better health among poor children (Frank et. al., 2006). Young children living in LIHEAP households were less likely to be undernourished, as well as less likely to require emergency hospitalization, than young kids in economically similar non-LIHEAP households. AD Does LIHEAP actually reduce energy insecurity overall? Yes (Murray and Mills, 2014). This analysis of 2005 federal survey data found, not surprisingly, "participation in LIHEAP significantly increases energy security in low-income households." The authors also ran some economic simulations and found that "eliminating LIHEAP decreases the number of energy-secure households by 17%, significantly changing the size and composition of the energy secure population within the United States." In other words, getting rid of LIHEAP as Trump proposes will have a big impact on low-income families in the U.S.

### 2NR---AT It Got Eliminated

#### No – they’re enrolling new members already

Brown 10/11 (Brown, Jake. “SUMMER LIHEAP NEWS WRAP-UP, PT. 2.” LIHEAP.org, LIHEAP.org, 11 Oct. 2019, [www.liheap.org/news/2019/10/11/summer-liheap-news-wrap-up-pt-2.)//LK](http://www.liheap.org/news/2019/10/11/summer-liheap-news-wrap-up-pt-2.)//LK) [Accessed 10/24/19]

The Midwest’s summer cooling season extended beyond the planned-for deadline, buttressing right up – and in some cases – into the start of fall enrollment for LIHEAP’s winter heating season. An all-hands-on-deck effort across the country, Memphis television channel Fox 13 teamed up with Shelby County officials to give $8 million in extra aid as part of their “Keep the Lights On” campaign. With a one-time payment of between $150 and $650 in utility assistance per household available, Fox 13’s on-site reporter, Merle Purvis, took to the airwaves to raise awareness for those in need: “I’m so glad that you guys are her joining us. The phone lines are already ringing, the second Darryl gave the number, the phone lines started ringing. This is very important business here. We’re trying to help the County give away $8 million to help families keep the lights on. You can see there, they’re already busy. In fact, those lines started ringing at 11 o’clock this morning before we even gave the telephone number out, all of the cues were full by 1 o’clock in the afternoon. For the next 90 minutes, we’re going to have these Community Service Agency experts on the lines, qualified and certified to take personal information to see if you qualify to get help paying your power bill. You could get a grant of up to $675 if you qualify. We’ll also have leaders from the county here talking about who qualifies, and will make sure you have every piece of information you need.” 1 Up in Iowa, a powerful letter to the editor was delivered by Trisha S. Wilkins, Executive Director of the Northeast Iowa Community Action Corporation, emphasizing just how desperate the weather was making the families her organization works tirelessly to help keep the power on year round, specifically “1,658 unduplicated individuals (in)…the 12-month period that ended August 31, 2019…experiencing a temporary setback or face a continuous challenge to meet their basic needs, including 554 households participated in the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)…in Northeast Iowa counties of Allamakee, Bremer, Chickasaw, Clayton, Fayette, Howard and Winneshiek.” 2 Meanwhile, down in neighboring Illinois, the Kendall-Grundy Community Action Services, as part of their LIHEAP disbursal protocol, are keeping an eye on both the short and long term, explaining that “the mission for these energy assistance programs are to assist low income households in meeting their immediate home energy needs by paying a portion of winter energy bills to prevent service interruptions, while providing education on home energy conservation and other opportunities to achieve and maintain energy security and financial self stability.” 3 Out Western, the Navajo-Hopi Observer reported that in an effort to help the maximum number of tribal residents through the punishing summer heat out on the oft-rural reservations they call home, the “Native American Disability Law Center to will be assisting low-income Native American Elders (65 years and older) and Native Americans with disabilities (21 years and older) to connect to benefits programs like… the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). This service is offered free of charge thanks to a grant from the National Council on Aging (NCOA). The Native American Disability Law Center was selected by the NCOA to operate a Benefits Enrollment Center (BEC) for San Juan and McKinley Counties, because we have a unique connection to people with disabilities as well as great community partners.” 4

### 2NR---AT PDCP

#### The PIC is textually competitive – international consensus agrees it’s a subsidy

Rapier 12 (Rapier, Robert. “The Surprising Reason That Oil Subsidies Persist: Even Liberals Love Them.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 12 Aug. 2012, [www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2012/04/25/the-surprising-reason-that-oil-subsidies-persist-even-liberals-love-them/#3bad36132792.)//LK](http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2012/04/25/the-surprising-reason-that-oil-subsidies-persist-even-liberals-love-them/#3bad36132792.)//LK) [Accessed 10/24/19]

But look at the breakdown. The single largest expenditure is just over $1 billion for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is designed to protect the U.S. from oil shortages. The second largest category is just under $1 billion in tax exemptions for farm fuel. The justification for that tax exemption is that fuel taxes pay for roads, and the farm equipment that benefits from the tax exemption is technically not supposed to be using the roads. The third largest category? $570 million for the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program. (This program is classified as a petroleum subsidy because it artificially reduces the price of fuel, which helps oil companies sell more of it). Those three programs account for $2.5 billion a year in "oil subsidies." Oil Subsidies that Liberals Love So why do we still have fossil fuel subsidies? Because almost nobody -- not even Bill McKibben -- wants to get rid of all of the programs that are classified as fossil fuel subsidies. I suspect McKibben would not advocate eliminating the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program. Two of the most outspoken Democratic opponents of oil subsidies have strongly defended this particular program -- even though it is classified by the OECD as the 3rd largest petroleum subsidy. When Republicans tried to cut funding for the program, Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., called the proposal an "extreme idea" that would "set the country backwards." Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass, states on his website that he is a "longtime Congressional champion of providing assistance to low-income families to heat and cool their homes."

### 1NC---RFSP CP

#### CP Text: [Aff actor] should maintain fossil fuel subsidies and eliminate the renewable fuel standard program.

#### Solves case – RFSP produces more CO2 than fossil fuels.

Potts 16 Brian Potts, 10-22-2016, Brian H. Potts is a partner in the Environment, Energy, and Resources Practice Group at the international law firm Perkins Coie LLP. He has published articles on energy and environmental issues in law journals published by Yale, Harvard, N.Y.U., and Berkeley., "Debunking the Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Myth", No Publication, https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2016/10/23/debunking\_the\_fossil-fuel\_subsidy\_myth\_110091.html, Accessed on 10-26-2019 // JPark \*bracketed for ableist language\*

In the energy industry, there are lots of subsidies. But none are more attacked by environmental groups and the press than the government's handouts to the fossil-fuel industry. These attacks, however, are overblown and misinformed. The federal government subsidizes the fossil-fuel industry to the tune of about $3 to $5 billion dollars per year (the exact amount depends on whose numbers you believe). This might sound like a lot. But the subsidies the federal government is simultaneously forcing the fossil-fuel industry to pay to its competitors, mainly biofuel producers, hugely [outweigh] the aid that the industry receives. According to the apolitical U.S. Energy Information Agency, the federal government spends about $3.5 billion per year subsidizing the coal, petroleum and natural gas industries. By contrast, the Feds dole out about $15 billion every year in subsidies to the renewable energy industry (mainly to support new wind and solar projects) and $20 billion per year for agricultural subsidies and insurance. Don't believe the EIA's subsidy calculations for the fossil-fuel industry? Last year, in an effort to eliminate all direct fossil-fuel subsidies, President Obama asked his U.S. Treasury Department to figure out how much the industry gets in subsidies from fossil-fuel specific tax code provisions. The answer, according to the Treasury: $4.7 billion. Regardless of which number you believe, these fossil-fuel subsidies pale in comparison to the $15 to $20 billion the fossil-fuel industry has to shell out to its competitors and the agricultural sector every year because of the Environmental Protection Agency's renewable fuel standards program. Each year the EPA requires gasoline and diesel refiners to blend a certain amount of renewable fuel (mainly corn ethanol and soybean-based biodiesel) into our fuel supply before sending it to gas pumps. When this program was originally adopted back in 2005, the percentage of renewable fuel required to be blended into gasoline and diesel fuel was fairly low. But under the Clean Air Act, the percentage has ramped up every year (this year it will be about 10%), and the percentage is slated to continue to go up until at least 2022. By forcing the petroleum industry to blend so much renewable fuel every year, the EPA's program is impacting a huge transfer of wealth from petroleum companies to renewable fuel producers and the corn and soybean farmers providing those producers with the inputs necessary to make their renewable fuel. In other words, on the whole, the fossil-fuel industry in this country isn't being subsidized; it's being forced to subsidize others. From an environmental perspective, you might think this is a good thing. It's not. Since 2005, the science behind the climate and other environmental benefits from using biofuels has mostly eroded. As John DeCicco, a professor at the University of Michigan with a Ph.D. from Princeton, told Congress earlier this year: "from its inception, the (renewable fuel standard) has increased rather than decreased the amount of CO2 entering the atmosphere compared to petroleum fuels such as gasoline." The reason, at least in part, is that the huge transfer of wealth caused by the renewable fuel standard has caused farmers to clear cut forests and prairie (which are better carbon sinks), and replace them with corn and soybean crops. Still, the debate about repealing fossil-fuel subsidies seems to get much more attention than ending the EPA's costly renewable fuel program. In August, Gilbert Metcalf, an economics professor at Tufts University, released a study looking at what would happen if the U.S. stopped giving tax breaks to companies for producing oil and gas. He found that removing such fossil-fuel subsidies would have a very modest impact on global oil prices (a less than one percent increase), but would dampen domestic oil and gas production by 4 to 5 percent and would increase domestic natural gas prices by 7 to 10 percent. Such significant domestic impacts could be avoided, however, if we scrapped the much more expensive renewable fuel standard program in addition to (or even in lieu of) repealing the nation's fossil-fuel subsidies. Doing so would improve the environment, while simultaneously boosting domestic oil and gas production and eliminating a huge, unnecessary drag on our economy.

#### Avoids politics – Republicans support the counterplan.

Geyser 7-5 Thomas Geyer, 7-5-2019, "EPA's renewable fuel standard proposal draws ire from Iowa's farmers, politicians", Quad-City Times, https://qctimes.com/news/local/epa-s-renewable-fuel-standard-proposal-draws-ire-from-iowa/article\_10c4eb38-e36f-55a7-b93b-37e8916289a2.html, Accessed on 10-26-2019 // JPark

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency on Friday issued a proposed rule under the Renewable Fuel Standard that would increase the amount of biofuels blended into refiner’s fuel, saying the volume obligations for 2020 are on track to meet the statutory deadline. But the proposal, which triggers the public comment process, drew the ire of corn and soybean associations, Iowa’s Gov. Kim Reynolds as well as the state’s advocates in Washington, D.C., such as U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, and U.S. Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, after the agency failed to reallocate waived amounts under the hardship program for smaller refiners. The EPA sets biofuel blending standards under the Renewable Fuels Standard, but it also gives waivers to small refineries that can prove that compliance with the blending standards would harm them financially. The EPA's announcement opens the public comment about the proposal. Under the proposal, the conventional renewable fuel volumes, primarily met by corn ethanol, would be maintained at the implied 15-billion gallon target set by Congress. Also proposed is an advanced biofuel volume requirement for 2020 of 5.04 billion gallons, which is 0.12 billion gallons higher than the advanced biofuel volume requirement for 2019. The EPA also is proposing to maintain the biomass-based diesel volume for 2021 at 2.43 billion gallons. Monte Shaw, executive director of the Iowa Renewable Fuels Association, pointed out that while the 2021 proposed level for biomass-based diesel was “flatlined” at 2.43 billion, the U.S. consumed 2.6 billion gallons of biomass-based diesel in 2018. “The RFS is designed to be a market driving mechanism,” Shaw said in a news release Friday. “Setting the biodiesel blend level two years hence below what the industry already achieved last year cuts at the core of how the RFS was intended to be implemented. Congress established a separate biodiesel category for a reason, and EPA needs to begin respecting that.” Shaw also said that while 15 billion gallons target set for conventional renewable fuel volumes that would be met by ethanol is in line with the statute, the draft proposal does not address the demand destruction caused by unjustified small refinery exemptions. Reynolds released a statement Friday in which she said, “I am incredibly disappointed to see that the EPA has failed to reallocate the millions of lost gallons due to their brazen and unprecedented use of small refinery exemption waivers. “A robust RFS is essential to a healthy ag economy in Iowa and across the country. I urge EPA Secretary (Andrew) Wheeler to reverse course and uphold President Trump’s commitment to rural America by strengthening the RFS and putting an end to the abusive practice of granting waivers to profitable oil refineries,” Reynolds added. U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley said in a news release that, “President Trump made commitments to farmers in Iowa and throughout Rural America. Those commitments include upholding the letter and spirit of the RFS (Renewable Fuel Standard). While he has stood by them, farmers and biofuels producers have told me that they see the president’s advisors at EPA breaking his promises by undercutting the RFS and bowing to pressure from Big Oil and its Washington allies.” “It’s unacceptable that EPA would set biofuel volumes below demand at a time when farmers, biofuels producers and agribusiness owners are forced to shed jobs and close plants,” Grassley said. “I urge President Trump to compel EPA to reverse course and keep his word to the forgotten Americans who have faithfully stood with him.”

### 2NR---Overview

#### Counterplan solves the case

1] The Fuel Standard Program is a larger carbon emitter than fossil fuels – a] deforestation – collapses carbon sinks and wrecks biodiversity b] doesn’t increase renewable production – it’s integrating biofuels into petroleum products

2] Don’t believe the media hype – biofuels are definitely worse than fossil fuels – the risk of a net benefit def outweighs.

Use sufficiency framing – if the counterplan solves 99% of the case you should vote neg because a massive risk of the disad outweighs an unquantifiable solvency deficit and they haven’t identified how much of the aff you have to access to solve their impacts.

#### Biofuels suck

Garson 5-30 Katja Garson, 5-30-2019, Communications lead at the Climate, Land, Ambition and Rights Alliance, "Dangerous delusions: biomass is not a renewable energy source", Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation, https://www.leonardodicaprio.org/dangerous-delusions-biomass-is-not-a-renewable-energy-source/, Accessed on 11-2-2019 // JPark

Using trees and crops is being touted by the biomass industry as a way to curb carbon emissions, but it turns out bioenergy and biofuels are as bad as fossil fuels for the climate, the environment and local communities. On our rapidly changing Earth, everything is connected. The need to abandon unsustainable resource extraction grows more urgent with each day that passes. That’s why we need to talk about biomass. The use of biomass (plant material) to create bioenergy (for heat or power) and biofuels (for transportation) is responsible for rising levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) and environmental destruction – starting well before the burning takes place. This May, for the first time in recorded history, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere hit 415 ppm (parts per million). Yet in 800,000 years of climate history, CO2 levels never exceeded 300 ppm. Now, a dramatic increase in the exploitation of natural resources is shaping a legacy of climate breakdown, with vulnerable communities and ecosystems struggling to survive. Amidst growing recognition of this crisis and the push to divest from fossil fuels, the bioenergy and biofuel industries seem to promise a way forward. Generating bioenergy by burning wood pellets and creating biofuel from crops such as soy, palm and rapeseed sounds like a sustainable alternative. Yet in reality, biomass energy does more harm than good to our climate, ecosystems and communities. Wood processing facility. Courtesy of WOLF Forest Protection Movement, Slovakia The root word ‘bio’ stems from ‘bíos’, which means ‘life’ in Greek. Bioenergy and biofuels are derived from organic matter which, like all living things, contains carbon. When burned, that carbon is released into the atmosphere in the form of carbon dioxide. Though industry marketing relies on ‘bio’ to suggest ecological responsibility, the carbon-rich nature of wood means that burning wood for energy emits between 30-50% more carbon on a per-unit-of-energy basis than burning coal. And biofuel made from palm oil is three times more polluting than fossil diesel when land-use changes are taken into account. Despite claims of sustainability, the bioenergy industry is clearcutting its way through biodiverse forests -- natural carbon sinks that would otherwise be working to pull carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The U.S. is one of the largest suppliers of the staggering 22 million tonnes of wood pellets consumed in the EU each year. Communities in Virginia, Mississippi and North Carolina are already battling to protect forests and to stop the construction of new production plants in socially deprived areas. Projected wood pellet flows in 2027: Environmental Paper Network 2018 Companies also blanket cleared land with tree plantations. These monocultures cannot sequester as much carbon as older forests and they deplete soils of nutrients. They are also more susceptible to fires, and do not support the biodiversity found in natural forests. Industry reports may claim that forest cover is increasing, however they include these ‘fake forests’ within their calculations. The bioenergy industry is predicted to expand by 250% over the next ten years, having already doubled in the last decade. This would spell disaster for ecosystems upon which both humans and animals depend, and it flies against the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. Palm plantations, often used to produce biodiesel, cause similarly devastating deforestation in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Thankfully, in March 2019 the European Commission decided that diesel derived from palm oil is not a sustainable source of energy, and levels of palm oil in diesel will be reduced to zero by 2030. Nevertheless, some palm oil will still be classed as a green fuel, and other parts of the world are yet to make similar policy changes. Photo by Pablo García Saldaña Biofuels can also be produced from crops like corn (ethanol) and soy (diesel). Biofuel crops have been gobbling up land previously dedicated to grow food crops, causing new land to be cleared. This indirect land-use change causes further loss of carbon sinks and biodiversity, rising food prices, water and soil pollution caused by the wider use of agrochemicals, adding even more associated emissions. This trend has also resulted in the violation of the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities who depend on the land for small-scale agriculture and forest resources. Cases of land-grabbing, human rights abuses, and resulting loss of traditional practices are rife, as outlined in a 2018 letter from indigenous representatives in Indonesia. Local people left with few other options may start working on plantations, facing poor working conditions and exploitation. Further still, governments may even help limit industry transparency, as is the case in Indonesia. When it comes to the health impacts of burning wood pellets, research shows that although wood may emit less mercury and sulfur than coal, it emits more harmful particulates and more nitrogen oxides. Communities living near bioenergy plants suffer similarly to those living near a coal plant: with lung problems, asthma, and heart issues. Closeup of wood pellets It seems unbelievable that bioenergy and biofuels are being presented as part of the climate solution. The EU’s Renewable Energy Directive misleadingly suggests that bioenergy is carbon neutral (based on the simplistic reasoning that trees re-grow), and the EU long term climate strategy relies on increases in bioenergy of up to 80 percent, while the Fuel Directive promotes the use of biofuels until 2020. It may be difficult for many people to accept that burning biomass is just as bad, if not worse, than burning fossil fuels, but this fact is finally sparking national and international movements against the biomass and biofuel industries. According to the IPCC Special Report on global warming of 1.5 degrees, we have only 11 years in which to change how we consume and live. The bioenergy and unsustainable biofuel industries operate using the same extractive ideology that got us here in the first place -- an ideology which puts resource exploitation and short-term gains ahead of indigenous rights, local communities and ecosystems. This is no change.

### 1NC---Saudi CP

#### CP Text: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should remove fossil fuel subsidies and the United States federal government should maintain them.

Meyer 18 Robinson Meyer, 2-8-2018, ROBINSON MEYER is a staff writer at The Atlantic, where he covers climate change and technology., "The World Spends $400 Billion Propping Up Oil Companies. Is That Bad?", Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/02/maybe-cutting-fossil-fuel-subsidies-wouldnt-do-much-good/552668/, Accessed on 10-13-2019 // JPark

In the thrilling world of multinational industrial policy, it’s about as high-stakes a fight as you can get. Every year, the world’s governments spend hundreds of billions of dollars making it cheaper to extract and burn fossil fuels. Almost as regularly, their representatives get together and beg everyone else to stop doing that. Then they go home and keep doing it themselves. The pattern has worn on for more than two decades. Way back in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol—the first international treaty aimed at fixing global warning—called for governments to stop subsidizing all “greenhouse-gas-emitting sectors.” That didn’t happen, so, in 2009, the leaders of the G20 nations resolved anew to “phase out ... inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies.” Three years later, President Obama declared that “a century of subsidies to the oil companies is long enough.” In 2016, when G20 leaders met in China, they again “reaffirmed” the need to end subsidies. Somehow, all those affirmations didn’t get the job done. Governments are still subsidizing oil extraction today, to the tune of about $400 billion per year. And climate advocates continue issuing unheeded proposals to cut those subsidies as a way of reducing greenhouse-gas pollution. But maybe all the rigamarole isn’t worth it. A new study, published this week in the journal Nature, argues that withdrawing subsidies wouldn’t have as large an effect as anticipated. In both the world’s richest and poorest countries, canceling fossil-fuel subsidies would neither significantly reduce carbon-dioxide pollution nor increase the amount of investment in renewable energy between now and 2030. Only in countries in a sort of middle tier—moderately wealthy places that export vast amounts of oil and gas, like Russia, Venezuela, or Saudi Arabia—would cutting subsidies lead to major declines in emissions. And even on a global scale, slashing fossil-fuel subsidies would do less to help the climate than would universal adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change, the study argues. That accord—which would only hold global warming to about 3 degrees Celsius, failing to hold off environmental devastation or dangerous sea-level rise—would nonetheless avert between four and eight gigatons of carbon-dioxide pollution every year. Killing subsidies would only prevent 0.5 to two gigatons of pollution annually. “We’re not advocating keeping subsidies. We’re just advocating a more regionally differentiated discussion of them,” said Jessica Jewell, an author of the paper and a political-economy researcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria. “A lot [of attention] has been focused on subsidy removal in [developed] OECD countries, whereas when you look at our results, the discussion politically should be on focusing on subsidy removal in oil- and gas-exporting regions,” she told me. This finding is, she admits, diplomatically challenging. Countries in North America and Western Europe—except for the United States—have historically pushed for a more aggressive global climate policy. But it’s in the countries most resistant to reducing emissions—Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and others near them—that slashing subsidies would have the biggest effect. The new paper provides a useful global context for arguments happening in many world capitals. Most governments spend most of their subsidy money on the consumption side—that is, they help poor and middle-class people buy fossil fuels. Cutting that support can be ethically and environmentally tricky. In India, for example, cutting the subsidies sometimes led to increases in greenhouse-gas emissions—because the country’s poorest citizens, unable to afford kerosene, started burning even dirtier fuels like firewood or charcoal. The situation isn’t any simpler in rich countries. Take the debate over subsidies in the United States. In America, it’s not clear how much the public pays to cushion oil, gas, and coal companies. The Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank, estimated in 2016 that the federal government spends about $4 billion every year on tax breaks for fossil fuels. But Oil Change International, a progressive environmental group, looked at a broader set of federal and state policies last year and put the cost to taxpayers at $20.5 billion. (And even this number leaves out some subsidies, like the federal program that helps families pay their heating bills.) No matter how you estimate them, would cutting these subsidies do any good? There, again, it also depends on whom you ask—and what assumptions they make. Gilbert Metcalf, the economist who arrived at the $4-billion figure, found that ditching the federal tax subsidies would only raise global oil prices by about 1 percent—the equivalent of at most two additional cents per every gallon of gasoline at the pump. As such, he concluded the subsidies were a waste of money, because they didn’t make gas or electricity much cheaper for Americans. Their effect on global oil prices was just too small. But by the same token, he didn’t think canceling them would reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, either. A paper published last year in Nature Energy arrived at a totally different conclusion. Though it mostly agreed with Metcalf about the domestic effects of oil subsidies, it looked at how their consequences accumulated over time. (Metcalf focused on their annual effects.) Suddenly, the subsidies seemed to have a gargantuan climate footprint: By 2050, the United States will have underwritten the drilling of an extra 17 billion barrels of oil, enough to emit over 6 billion tons of carbon dioxide. Both papers, in other words, thought America should trash its subsidies—they just had different reasons why. They also had different ideas about how the world would respond to the change. The Nature Energy paper believes that killing U.S. subsidies would decrease emissions worldwide. Metcalf argues that other countries will just fill the hole that America left in the market. Looking at the world as a whole in her new paper, Jewell takes the same view as Metcalf. If the United States or Europe were to kill their subsidies, she argues, then an oil- or gas-exporting country would just increase their production. “When you think about it, it makes sense because we’re operating on a globally liberalized market,” she told me. Therefore, she proposes that climate advocates target killing subsidies in oil-exporting nations. “These countries are already facing budgetary pressures because oil prices are low,” she said. “In a place like Saudi Arabia, there’s an opportunity now. For them to decrease subsidies is kind of a win-win.”