# 1nc

## k

### 1nc – war – notes

#### War is ontologically constitutive, an immanent condition of life as such. Only by ignoring this fact and renouncing sovereign, mystical experiences, does a militaristic vision of total warfare become possible.

* War = ontological fact of life/inner experience – wars are these experiences (ecstasy/terror) playing out
* When we have so much production/growth that it has to become unproductive (destructive) – that’s war – it’s the necessary response to expansion/econimc grow]
* War is k2 life
* we live in excess – that can be used for growth of system, or, when system cannot grow, it must be lost w/o profit – that war
* **War = everywhere – cells are dying as you think – thought is war on unknowability**
* Violence is constitutive of thought
* Different forms of war, both are fundamental for grasping political
  + Means war is necessary condition for talking about politics
  + War as mystical/inner experience
    - Inner experience = Definitionally an impossible concept to define
      * Irrational
      * Prior to subject/object distinction
      * Subjects ability to posit itself as an object of knowledge makes us want to place subjectitivy elsewhere – **read the book *Inner Experience* –** by the end: self = dynamism prior to all thought – motor of thought not destination – definitionally alludes the thinking subject/notion of subjectivity or objectivity – quasi-mystical
        + All subjects are god
      * Not rational
      * Cant be defined
      * Prior to all rational thinking/etc – process not destination – doesn’t have to do with the particular things we think
    - war as inner experience means all of thought is attempt to capture inadequacy of thinking to describe/get at slef – bataille wants to get to inner thought – says he wants to bring us to the limits of thought
      * keeps getting definitions but says they’re overly intellectual
      * wants materialism to be something that evades all thinking – wants to show that there are aspects of reality that cant be showed intellectually
    - distinct from conventional war
    - transcendental (but this is not the right word)
  + Conventional war
    - emperical
  + Use war in fun way in speeches – switching between ideas
  + More in alt card
  + Underlying experience in both mystical warfare and fundamental warfare – bottom out in same stuff – root cause claim – mystical = prior tothis
  + War = unproductive movement of expenditure
    - Atheological summa – set of bataille books –
    - Then – middle period – responds to Marxism – unproductive expendire is this – marxists focus too much on productivity – instead, what really underlies economic production is excess/expenditure/waste – cap cant make everything into an object of consumption – waste – **this is not accidental but essential feature of econ/life** – rambles about how sun = pure expenditure – we’re surviving off of the waste of sun – notion of restrictive economy – only productivity – wants to replace with general economy (if society is in purely restricted econ, it has to has an outlet for waste, if we restrict too much, that outlet is conventional warfare – states need outlet for extra energy)
      * Reason why ww2 had to happen was industrial revolution, not political motivations – had to squander waste in some ways – need to squander waste causes the hostilities – root cause claim – says that this is happening again rn
      * War is rationalization of yoinks
      * Warfare preceded economics
      * All the people in state are building excess – live is constituted by excess –
      * Drives pulling in all directions – more important that we move between most extreme drives – conflict between super happiness and super sadness -more important than just becoming – conflict of those drives is inherent to life – life is at war w itself
    - War = necessary response to and for life – war inev claim and war k2 other shit claim – BUT form that war takes is not a priori
    - One way it can be expressed is docile and one is conventional – this line is important for more post fiat version of the K
    - Ordinarily receives more energy than necessary for maintaining life – excess energy is used for growth of system – if it cant grow no more it must be lost w/o profit – one of most useful lines in a debate setting – must be spent in a good OR bad way – can result in modern conventional wars of total destruction if we don’t burn it off through unproductive expenditure – Bataille spark arg – extinction inev, crunch coming now, etc
      * If system can no longer grow – its like a sponge, full of water, when something reaches limits, you have to just get rid of excess – that will always go into useless expenditure or catastrophically
      * We’re in a moment of excess growth w no where to go
      * Ppl flee from mystical warfare – violence is inevitable – only takes on conventional form bc you have fled from mystical – only bc u are not accepting pain/violence through thinking too hard do you think its okay to enact violence on the other
      * War brought about in its own way
      * Gives ppl more autonomy/power
      * Privilege of ruling class/sovereign moment
      * Thinking = Qualititatively different from conventional warfare
      * No link to bataille = murderous fascist
      * Contrasted w/ util/etc bc those are drive to productivity
      * War is everywhere, not acknowledging that its warfar – they define warfare in only conventional sense – thinking of it in those terms – saying link of omission is fleeing idea that it **defines life in general** – attempt to restrict warfare is the surest guarantee of war
      * This stuff – its about DnG – beginning of the card explains that both Bataille and DnG have something in common here – thesis of article is that they are similar
        + Hilarious alt claim – if all war is appropriations of essense of war – if alt diverts attention for these, then alt diverts attentions/energy from war – alt re appropriates energy so there isn’t energy for war – bataille spark arg – consumes all energy for modern warfare
  + Bullet pointing here is lowkey nonsense but this is a thesis claim – attempts to cause/restrict warfare – at: thought is itself warfare/etc – yoink

Wilson 05Julie, “Unproductive expenditure and the spatial ground of the earth: Bataille on the other side of Deleuze and Guattari” - EE - Sep 26, 2005 <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpbataille6.htm>

Both Bataille and Deleuze & Guattari’s ontological projects are fueled by attempts to understand the most radical of human movements through a conceptualization of war and its different forms. These different forms of war are absolutely fundamental for grasping the political claims of each project, not to mention the stakes that surround the category of unproductive expenditure. In the thought of Bataille two different forms of war emerge: war as mystical or inner experience, and war in the more conventional sense as death and destruction on the battlefield. Much of Bataille’s wartime writings can be read as attempts to see an equivalence between actual war and mystical experience. In his book Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred, Alexander Irwin references Bataille’s own words in “The Practice of Joy before Death:” “’I want to show that an equivalence exists between war, ritual sacrifice, and the mystical life.’ All these forms of behavior reflect ‘the same play of ‘ecstasies’ and ‘terrors’ in which man joins in the games of heaven’”(136). Bataille thus sees a fundamental similarity between the violence of the battlefield and mysticism in the ecstasy and terror that characterize both experiences; his insistence on the equivalence stems from both his energetic framework-- better known as general economy-- and the latter’s commitment to thinking through the category of unproductive expenditure, or the moment when production (and/or growth) has reached its terrestrial limits and must turn unproductive, or rather, destructive of energetic resources. For Bataille, the emergence of war in both instances is intimately bound up in the category of unproductive expenditure; in fact, war is the moment and movement of unproductive expenditure, or profitless expenditure. In the energeticist ontology of Bataille, unproductive expenditure—consumptions and dissipations—are linked to the realm of the necessary; thus, so is war. In “The Practice of Joy before Death,” Bataille writes: “’I MYSELF AM WAR.’ I imagine human movement and excitation, whose possibilities are limitless: this movement and excitation can only be appeased by war” (Visions of Excess, 239). War, for Bataille, is the necessary and universal response to expansive and growth-seeking being; in this sense, war as profitless expenditure is fundamental to maintaining the balance of forces on Earth. War (and thus unproductive expenditure) engender destructions of forces and energies, but what Bataille desperately wants us to understand is that although war in-itself is immanent to and necessary for life, the form it will take is not an a priori. In Volume One of The Accursed Share, Bataille clarifies the central claims of his ontological project: The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of the system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically (21). We can ignore or forget the fact that the ground we live on is little other than a field of multiple destructions. Our ignorance only has this incontestable effect: It causes us to undergo what we could bring about in our own way, if we understood (23). Here we see clearly the two faces of war or unproductive expenditure: the catastrophic war that destroys life through violence turned against peoples/ war experienced as undergone; and the glorious inner experience of the mystic/ war brought about in one’s own way. In the case of actual war, unproductive expenditure is the privilege of the ruling classes; in inner experience, unproductive expenditure is a sovereign moment or movement of desiring subjects.Deleuze & Guattari’s work follows a similar structure evidenced in the concept of the war machine. In the nomadology plateau of A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze & Guattari differentiate between the war machine that takes war for its object and the war machine that draws a creative line of flight. They write:The war machine is not uniformly defined, we have tried to define the two poles of the war machine: at one pole, it takes war for its object and forms a line of destruction prolongable to the limits of the universe. But in all of the shapes it assumes here—limited war, total war, worldwide organization—war represents not at all the supposed essence of the war machine but only, whatever the machine’s power, either the set of conditions under which the States appropriate the machine…or the dominant order of which the States themselves are now only parts. The other pole seemed to be the essence: it is when the war machine…has as its object not war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of smooth space and the movement of a people in that space…(422).

#### The modern nation-state is the institutionalization of war through the rational utility of modern society, perfecting violence in a form of life-denying fascism. All attempts to flee or purify conflict through the elimination of the nuclear factor result in ever-increasing cycles of violence. By voting affirmative and choosing to live in excess, you resign yourself to a fate worse than death – perpetual boredom.

War k2 states establishing their power

Potlatch of state resources – useless splurge of resources for no reason

War = opposite of utility

Two states

* Monocephalic – Utilitarian – perfect liberal order – civilized – reason/enlightenment
* Acephalic – Nonproductive expenditure – anarchic/chaotic
* This dichotomy is a nice fwk for evaluating the world

Eventually – monocephalic state weeds out all difference/becomes FASCIST

Acephalic chaos starts over again – life goes chaotic but FREE yoink

Time moves between stasis and ek-stasis

War = process of breaking out from this

We think west is anti-fascist but roots are in fascism – drive for hyper-order/stasis

James and will

* State can either pursue warfare in terms of energy, or, alternatively in a more totalizing sense
* Two principles of utility
  + Utilitiarian
  + A-telic/ek-stasis/nonproductive
  + Criticism of util – if you only view useful things as means to an end, you can constantly ask the why question – why is that useful – eventually, chain of reasons will have to bottom out and you’ll have to say something intrinsically valuable. but this intrinsic shit is inherently not utilitarian/useful – has no use by definition – using something as a means to an end prevents intrinsic value – logic of utility depends on something that’s useless
    - Wants to make everything as intrinsically valuable/useless
    - Describe everything as intrinsically valuable to make util collapse – escape from conflict of utility
    - Everything is endless hope of why question
      * Hope for total knowledge through total instrumental rationality – hope for total mastery over way things work but nihilistic project that nothing has hope – only thing that has value is hope for meaning – mastery impact
* Next section
  + State is nothing but servitude that purifies violence
  + Contrasts head of state – reason w/ headless, mad mystical state – both have violence – but the acephalic state **acknowledges** its violence, it confronts it – as a consequence it’s violence isn’t hierearchicaly ordered – also of a lower degree – doesn’t spill up to military violence, but instead ppl getting drunk/etc – purification of violence is worse bc its like mass bombing – jerk at drunken violence orgy more than nukes – but obv latter, purified violence is worse
  + Bataille calls ultimate ideal state of control fascism – end goal of state is totalizing control – it’s the perfection of the nation state – that’s what they think debate should be like (i.e. state engagement good) AND fwk is this stifling that deals with creativity through excluding us
    - But that doesn’t work – never banishes ekstasis of life – always reactionary/attempt to suffocate – terminally non unique – life reemerges

Impact stuff

* Aspiring to deification – liberalism good args are just state sanctioned violence carried out at a larger level as opposed to anarchic community with lower level violence – sublimated form of same violent impulses – nuclear bomb is same form as peace mission/Hollywood movies – different forms of same channeling of murderousness
* Ppls imprisonment within this shit 0 should provide release from servitude but ppl must escape – enthusiasm must find release through this – upshot – we have desire to release excessive energy, if we engage in modern nation state, we repress fun as much as possible – let it out at macropolitical level in conventional warfare – go to war with other countries but are not satisfied – experience it as distant/technocratic – escalation claim – bc we aren’t satisfied personally by war of nation state, we encourage **ever more grotesque forms of violence** – psychological addiction to worse violence –
* Only thing that fulfills us is making more taboos and then stepping over them – end of card = escalation claim

Hamblet 5. Wendy, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy, Adelphi University “The Manic Ecstasy of War.” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 17:39–45

Eli Sagan’s At the Dawn of Tyranny posits the advent of civilization as coincidental with the dawn of tyranny and oppression. War, one of the oldest human institutions, has proven invaluable to states in establishing their power over subgroups within the system, as well as in acquiring territories from neighboring peoples to permit their expansion in space and power. Because of war’s great functionality to the state, there remains little mystery to the long-term success of war as a state institution over the formative millennia of civilization. The continuing popularity of war among modern states ostensibly dedicated to democracy, freedom, and the dignity of human beings, remains baffling to violence scholars. Karl von Clausewitz’s On War, considered by many scholars to be the canonical treatment of the war philosophy, attributes to war a logic all its own: war composes a compulsion, a dynamic that aims at excessive overflow, absolute expenditure of the energies of the state. War seeks absolutization as it feeds and fires the population’s martial enthusiasm; if unchecked by political goals, war will fulfill itself in the maximum exertion of self-expenditure—self-annihilation. War composes a potlatch of state resources, a useless splurge of the nation’s human and economic wealth for no better reason than wanton celebration of state power. The language of absolute expenditure resonates with the philosophy of Georges Bataille. His philosophy explains two principles of expenditure— the principle of classical utility defined by utilitarian goals serving current power relations, and that of nonproductive expenditure—that is, orgiastic outflow or ek-stasis that escapes mundane servitude to reason and utility. Political implications of the two economies are exposed in Bataille’s “Propositions on Fascism.” There, the two dialectical opposites represent extreme possibilities for the state structures. The first model aspires to perfect order, like the timeless realm of the gods, a frozen homogeneous perfection that is monocephalic (single-headed). Like the god, the monocephalic state becomes self-identified as a sacred entity—changeless, eternal, and perfect, its laws and customs fixed and imperative. At the other end of the structural spectrum resides the second form of state—the acephalic state—disordered, anarchic, and volatile. This state is seen by ordered states as a terrifying, heterogeneous primitive lifeform where uncivilized tribes practice mystical thinking, incommensurable truths, and mad affective experience. Unreasonable. Useless. Mad. People within the acephalic social structure enjoy abundant ritual lives that offer escape from the mundane in orgiastic festivals involving drunkenness, dancing, blood rites, wanton tortures, self-mutilation, and even murder in the name of dark monster gods. The monocephalic state, on the other hand, has overcome all death. The civilized state boasts an enlightened stable form that promotes reason, life, and progress, whereas the primitive society is referred to chaos, madness, and death. Bataille’s dichotomy provides a valuable framework for analyzing global realities, even in the modern world. Because Bataille insists the models represent dual extreme possibilities in the cyclical evolution of all states, then all states seek timeless stability, secured against time with absolute truth claims, infallible social codes, and enduring legislation. States are duly secured by the legalized violence of police and military that appropriate the illegal violence of the people and ultimately suppress all transformation. Intricate unyielding systems of rules and regulations—passports, licenses, identity cards, forms completed in triplicate, travel restrictions, immigration regulations, police interrogations, surveillance of social and financial transactions among subgroups, security checkpoints, departments of homeland security—weed out the deviant lifeforms until ultimately all countervoices have been silenced, all rebellion quite obliterated, all evolutionary movement logically contradictory. But, at this evolutionary apex, a problem arises in paradise. As the monocephalic state increasingly closes itself off, it stifles social existence, smothers creative energies, chokes the passion from its citizen-devotees, suffocates their spiritual urges, and reduces all sacrifices to mundane utility. When the perfect eternality of the structure is complete and the nation duly deified, all labors have become co-opted in utter servitude. Bataille names this culminating stage of development, the peaceful, stable end sought by all states, in its most excessive extrapolation—fascism. Ultimately, however, life and time must break free and move forward into futures. This most solid state holds firm for a short while only; then there begins a condensation of forces. Life rises up and explodes the suffocating stasis, disintegrating the solid, erect whole. Existence and liberty flow forth in rage, blood, tears, and passion. The death of God is complete. For Bataille, these endless cycles describe the movement of history: the erection of unitary gods of knowledge and power that ultimately ossify into totalities, and then explode in hysterical, raging catastrophes, releasing the explosive liberty of life from mundane servitude. The acephalic chaos will eventually recompose, slowly heaving up an ugly divine head once again. Life turns back on its chaotic freedom and develops what Bataille calls an aversion to the initial decomposition. The chaotic structure moves from the ek-stasis bliss of wanton pleasures and pains toward the stasis of the deity once again. Time, states, and human individuals, for Bataille, move between the two contradictory forms: stasis and ek-stasis. Time demands both forms in the world—the eternal return of an imperative object, and the explosive, creative, destructive rage of the liberty of life. Bataille’s analysis of state evolution offers resolution to the mystery of the frequency of wars in the modern civilized era: It suggests that war composes a “potlatch”—a manic ecstasy of useless self-expenditure that permits a breakout from mundane servitude.We may not readily recognize, in our states, the extreme forms that Bataille describes—fascist stasis or chaotic ecstasy. We believe that, although chaos is unquestionably undesirable, fascism is promoted only by madmen—Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin. We may be convinced that fascist urges fade with global democracy where all people will, eventually, know the order and security of the first world. Modern Western states, we may object, compose a golden mean between Bataille’s two economies, aspiring neither to fascism nor to a manic primitivism, but to the reasonable metron of golden rules. But the roots of the Western world are well planted in the fascist drive for hyper-order and changeless eternality. Hesiod and the PreSocratics, as much as Jewish and Christian myth, cite a common arche of the universe in the good works of a god that renders order (cosmos) out of chaos (kaos). For the ancients, one head (cephalus) is far superior to many; simplicity is beauty, whereas the many compose hoi poloi, an embarrassment of riches. The foundational logic that posits monocephalic order as ontologically and morally superior to acephalic multivocity remains an unquestioned assumption embedded in the Western lifeworld. A single well-ordered edifice, stretching high into the sky—erect, rigid, unyielding—is preferable, in the Western mind, to the broadest playing field studded with incongruous heroics. Bataille’s meditations on the dark underside of reason’s projects and triumphs, on such prohibited subjects as monstrous tortures, illicit sexual excesses, and the colorful anuses of apes, provide a theater of cruelty and death that is designed to challenge the polite threshold of civilized culture, to shock and interrupt the philosophical tradition it invades, and to subvert the pretenses of refined sophistication thought definitive of civilized society. Bataille shows that people are torn by conflicting drives, by lofty ideals, and by the dark concealed forces they suppress and deny.Lorenz states that Bataille’s treatment of the dark, concealed urges in human nature offer resolution to the paradox of the simultaneous lofty goals of modern states and the frequency of brutal aggressions by those very states naming themselves the most civilized. Perhaps the popularity and frequency of war even in the civilized modern era represents the release of suppressed subterranean drives within industrialized, rationalist, rigidly hierarchically ordered populations enslaved to reason and utility.The violence that floods the globe in modernity, that claims to be serving reasonable projects of global freedom and democracy, may represent new forms expressing old desires, the projects of monocephalic statehood aspiring to deification. Bataille recognizes chthonic forces as instrumental in the modern world: “The economic history of modern times is dominated by the epic but disappointing effort of fierce men to plunder the riches of the Earth [and turn its fire and metal into weapons] ... . [M]an [lives] an existence at the mercy of the merchandise he produces, the largest part of which is devoted to death.” The fierce men of modernity—gods, kings, and their modern sequels (presidents, popes, corporate rulers)—extend their control to the ends of the planet. Fierce men disembowel the Earth and turn on their own kind the products of molten metal torn from her bowels to ensure the permanence of their nations. War, states Bataille, “represents the desperate obstinacy of man opposing the exuberant power of time and finding security in an immobile and almost somnolent erection.” Bataille believes that primitive urges are still at work in the projects of modernity. Human beings, as much as superstructures of power, must satisfy their dark urges for the good of their communities. They must release their death drives if they are to gather together in heartfelt communities. Human beings crave mystical, passionate, frenzied escape from the rigorous projects of their ordered systems. If Bataille is correct, people must ultimately break free from the mundane enterprises of their everyday lives. Their inner demons will beckon them from their ordered worlds to revel in orgiastic festival. Surely Bataille’s claim—that life’s erotic drives will out and fulfill themselves in deathly destructiveness and wanton joy—should trouble us greatly, given the leveling effects of modern industrial society, its will to mediocrity, utility, and conformity. But is Bataille correct in his attribution of a measureless and rending character to modern war? Is modern warfare the aimless catastrophe that Bataille claims it to be? If so, then modern wars can be explained, according to Bataille, as ecstatic release from the fascist orientation of modern ordered states and from people’s imprisonment within the merchandise they produce. Modern war, with its Shock and Awe techno-theatrics, should provide a wondrous release from mundane servitude. 42 WENDY C. HAMBLET War could be said to satisfy collective fantasies of manic omnipotence and the drive for self-sacrifice for sacred values. Perhaps the wars of modernity occur with such rabid frequency because people must satisfy their suppressed lust for a sexualized release from the cold reality of state projects, the utilitarian reasons of state. This resonates with Clausewitz’s claim that people’s martial enthusiasm must find release in politically restrained wars or fulfill itself in the maximum exertion of self-expenditure, that is, self-annihilation. For Clausewitz, modernity represents that unfettered stage when war has escaped all political bounds and reasonable restraint. Although ostensibly a world driven by the lofty goals, modernity—for Clausewitz—composes an era of absolute war. The democratic revolution may have embraced other goals—citizen welfare and the grandeur of their rulers—but democracy, for Clausewitz, composes merely one of a number of crucial forces (the scientific revolution that provides the technology, the industrial revolution that provides mass production of weaponry, and the imperialism that draws the entire globe into the war system) that have been successfully harnessed to the powerprojects of the mightiest nations. The goods of the modern West, including the good of democracy, exist to extend Western hegemony globally in the marketplace of military power. But Bataille claims that war is useless expenditure—a release of the primal urges of a community toward excessive overflow. He states: “Military existence is based on a brutal negation of any profound meaning of death and, if it uses cadavers, it is only to make the living march in a straighter line.” But, if war is to be posited as an ecstatic release, it must compose orgiastic overflow, an entirely useless and pointless expenditure of the nation’s finest goods. Excessive expenditure is defeated the moment the violent explosion of forces serves mundane projects of servitude and utility. When war serves the purposes of the state, it loses its manic and ecstatic character and ceases to fulfill the people’s deepest needs for release from servitude and instrumentality. But Bataille is mistaken; the apparent uselessness of modern warfare is a deception, an illusion. War is one of the oldest traditions of our species. It has become a timeworn vehicle precisely because it serves a great many functions in states. Clausewitz names the institution of war a form of communication between nations. Franco Fornari states: “War is a multifunctional institution. ... It is extremely difficult to find a substitute that would perform all of its functions.” One of the most crucial functions that war provides in service of the state is the crystallization of its monopoly on violence. War is a crucial aspect of the centralizing, evolutionary process that culminates, ultimately, in fascist stability. The establishment of a massive and robust military is THE MANIC ECSTASY OF WAR 43 utterly necessary to the deification of the structure and the raising of a sturdy cephalus, because, along with the creation of strong policing and military forces, war serves to alienate the private violence of the citizens and place their collective aggressive energies into the hands of the cephalus. War serves the collective illusion of eternality. War serves other crucial functions in the state: it confirms the values, virtues, and meanings of one’s own cultural group. Sacred symbols—flags, national anthems, tales of past heroes, fallen ancestors—are put to work in luring the best of the nation—its strong and courageous youths—to the extreme patriotism required to maintain order in fascist regimes. The seduction of the nation’s best to its wars includes their provision of an international stage to display the collective prowess of the nation, a point of pride for all citizens, even the most oppressed of the society, and it allows for the individual display of the soldiers’ manly character—the valor, the selflessness, the loyalty. The wars of modern super-states continue in the tradition of imperialist projects of old. Posited as serving the most selfless values—the advancement of freedom, democracy, and the spread of civilization—today’s wars clearly bring too massive a booty to be named selfless expenditures. In fact, for the past fifty years, wars have increasingly become shameless lootings of helpless peoples—the projects of economists and accountants and big businessmen purified by political propaganda and backed by an arsenal of modern techno-weaponry. War serves the needs of the cephalus; it serves the personal narcissism of the leaders, and the collective narcissism of the combatants and civilians. Above all, modern wars serve economic goals; their booty is prodigious. They may cost the sacred love-object (the nation) massive capital, human and monetary, but the generals, the political leaders, and their corporate cronies profit handsomely from the hostilities. War also serves the fantasy that the sacred love-object (the nation) is the savior and benefactor of the globe; war serves the paranoid collective delusion that the cephalus is infallible and indestructible, unlimited as the god in its strength and in its moral substance. Killing the enemies, propagandized as evil, the collective illusion is fed that evil is overthrown: thus the sanctity of the loveobject is preserved. Sacred values are recomposed; the cephalus stands taller, more erect, more firm than ever in the wake of a good war. But for all the benefits served by the institution of war, modern wars are deeply tragic; they do waste millions of innocent lives; they tear apart societies and disburse homeless families across the globe. One in nine of the earth’s seven billion now lives a miserable, wandering, hopeless existence on parched lands where even the earth mother is barren. 44 WENDY C. HAMBLET Ultimately the greatest tragedy of modern war lies in its stark utility to the few at the extreme expenditure of its many. The utility of war defeats the purposes of war by frustrating the deepest needs of the society—the people’s need to build heartfelt communities, a need that can only be served by expressing the collective aggressive energies of the society beyond utility. Bataille states that: “Since [war] is essentially constituted by armed force, it can give to those who submit to its force of attraction nothing that satisfies the great human hungers, because it subordinates everything to a particular utility ... it must force its half-seduced lovers to enter the inhuman and totally alienated world of barracks, military prisons, and military administrations.” In fact, it may well be the non-release of ecstatic urges that explains a state’s return, year after year and decade after decade, to that old institution. It may be that the deepest paradox of modern war is that, in its usefulness to the cephalus and in its service to the fascist drives of the state, war proves utterly useless in dispensing its most fundamental function; it ceases to discharge the most vicious and cruel needs of the people, their deepest primitive motivations, whose collective release makes possible the formation of a heartfelt community. Bataille counts this failure as the most tragic of the multiple tragedies of modern war. The sacred values of community—life, freedom, festival, and the joy of communal fraternity—are rendered meaningful only in juxtaposition to their opposites. Bataille states: “The emotional element that gives an obsessive value to communal life is death.” But, ultimately, insists Bataille, the sacrifice will be celebrated beyond the reasonable purposes of the cephalus. If Bataille is correct, then we can be certain that, for those states whose wars are utterly utilitarian, self-annihilation is imminent.

#### Rather than thinking of violence as something external to, or apart from, the thinking-subject, we must recognize violence as an irreducible condition of subjectivity. Only in this way can we come to terms with the traumatic conditions of subjectification and thereby transvalue violence into an overcoming of distinctions between subjects and objects, the self and others.

First bit

* Already putting together in the earlier parts of the speeches
  + Immanence is continuous/imporsanal, qualifies intimacy as profound subjectivity
    - Immanence – inner experience that precedes all distinctions between subject and object, universal
    - Intimacy = relationship to immanence
    - Immanence = continuous impersonal flow of energy that connects us, organic energy that connects us, continuous, not interrupted by transcendence of restrictions
    - Intimacy = our way of thinking about relating to that continutity – a grounding of a type of subjectivity in terms of the dynamism of life/excess of energy
    - Establishing a different relationship to war like instincts that are life itself
  + I v other Is – in this understand, there are just experiences/interalltions – when we act under the umbrella of instrumental meaning, we lose connection with other things that would come with other things – doesn’t pause to think about itself – I can relate to outside world as a set of different tools – say, mayan was the one who had aggression, now we have peace- that’s what understands the world in terms of objects – understands me mayan and other in terms of different spheres – imminenet munity of the world – such an experience – is unlimited expenditure
  + Have problem of having too much energy – annihilation of subject through this in monstrous well of rage by plunging ourselves in – that’s expenditure – that’s a radification of a new type of subjectivity
    - That itself is a form of expenditure – this speaking energy etc

The rest

* Knowledge moves past dynamism of thought – transcend our inner experience/intimate connection to world – could also frame in reverse direction
* Blue stuff: laughter is an example – not really thinking about much – not analyzing joke just sort of doing it – especially when a large group do it – laughter doesn’t do anything
  + Really hard laughter
* Treat immanent life as ontological – violence as discrete action/materialism does not engage as ontological claim – could be link as well
* Could give us access to sovereign experiences of immanence
* Laughter is violence
* Affirmitive ways of thinking i.e. scenario planning rely on subject/object distinction – place violence on outside world – you are defined by violence only through utility of work – mutual exclusivity arg – separation of beings from each other – dissolution of discrete objects into chaotic flux
* Arrogance of humanity/that we are better than other species come from transcendence idea
* Lion =/= king of animals – only higher tide – every animal is in world like water in water – metaphysical unity – everything boils down to same stuff – no real difference between one wave and rest of the ocean
  + Continuous heterogeneity – opposes with
  + Continuous heterogeneity
    - Allows us to talk about difference within water – still able to be different bc his wave is different but not better
  + discontinuous homogeneity
    - all trying to do same operation but our transcendent operations separate us from each other – each trying to master world – produce same form of utilitarian calculation but separate ourselves from each other
* further down:
* geneology of transcendence of subject – backstory of how we get to reflective consciousness
  + imitation of desire of the other – fundamental experience of symbolic order is trauma
  + to be a subject, one must sacrifice one’s self in the face of power – origins of society are just purified modes of violence – entering into symbolic realsm is done by being disciplined
  + cant just submit/revolt –
  + occupied by speech not just doing it
  + ur constituted by the world – **fiat k** – above the law
* bottom section
  + might be getting lost about whats doing the dissolution of subject/object distinction, BUT, if the s/o distinction is lost, must change concept of violence – if alt can change that distinction, that makes violence impossible – to be violent to something means you have to otherize yourself
  + only way you can relate to other ununderstandable stuff in ur body that controls is through celebration – having fun is not a subject/object relation but a celebration of being possessed
  + already established that violence/war is ontological, so, what violence is most ethical – hamblet does a rlly good job explaining that state is not a good way to deploy that, but the best way to deploy that violence is violence against the self
    - not self harm but violence against **concept of self** – violence against idea that there is a distinct self – group conscious or something lik ethat
      * or, minimization of self – analyse structures that lead you to be you

Direk 4

Zeynep, Professor of Philosophy, KOC University, “Bataille on Immanent and Transcendent Violence” Bulletin de la Societe Amencaine de Philosophy de Langue Franfais vol 14 no 2 fall 2004.

In the archaic world of paganism, immanence acquires a sacred and divine character as soon as the profane world of work and action begins to separate itself from the intimacy of all beings. In describing that moment, Bataille qualifies immanence explictly as "continuous," "impersonal" and "without distinction," and qualifies intimacy as "profound subjectivity" (TR 301/33). In The Accursed Share, he interprets that ground in terms of the dynamic and fluid life energy that is always in excess. Life is always already excessive because every living organism receives more energy from the cosmos than the amount sufficient for its self-preservation. In contrast to the limited problems of classical economy, "in the general problem there always reappears the essence of the biomass, which must constantly destroy (consume) a surplus of energy."2 Immanence can never be articulated in terms of the opposition between subject and object, which characterizes experience in the profane world of work, action and project. 30 BATAILLE ON VIOLENCE However, it is the place of a deep subjectivity, a confused, non-reflective consciousness of the self that is not limited by the I or other I's (fR 300/31). I believe that Bataille is a radical thinker of subjectivity, and his attempt to go beyond the classical notion of the subject can be related to Merleau-Ponty's thinking of subjectivity as incarnated in The Phenomenology of Perception. 3What Merleau Ponty calls "the ante-predicative life of consciousness" or "the silence of primary consciousness" is the natural perceptive involvement of incarnated existence with the world. 4 In that involvement, the relation with the other is not based on absolute separation, but on the fact that bodily operative intentions read, understand, constantly connect, and affectively communicate with each other. Merleau-Ponty writes that operative intentionality "produces the natural and ante-predicative unity of the world and of our life"; it furnishes "the text which our knowledge tries to translate into precise language."s For both Merleau-Ponty and Bataille, subjectivity as the immanent unity of the world and life can never become the object of knowledge, although it can be "experienced." Such an experience, which implies the loss of a subject as clear consciousness of objects is, in Bataille's economical terms, nothing but an unlimited expenditure of energy. Bataille thinks that the subject, as an individual and separate being, belongs to transcendence, for it has always already transcended the natural environment and is in a position to know objects from the outside. Knowledge is a possibility of transcendence, going outside of oneself to an impenetrable other. Moreover, that transcendence is related to violence not only because representation is violent but also because the subject in the world of work is subordinated and servile. The violence to which animals are exposed in nature is very different than the violence to which we are exposed, and which reproduces us in the world of work as knowing, acting, speaking subjects. In the technological era, man lives under the domination of anonymous powers and experiences. He is subject to both oppression and the empty promises of transcendence. According to Bataille, the deep truth of subjectivity is never revealed by transcendence. Although he believes that the expenditure of the forces of the body-for example, erotic experience and laughter-may open a way for the realm of immanence in which we re-establish our continuity with all living and non-living beings, this feeling of continuity is for him nothing n10re than abrief touching of the untouchable. The fact that he talks about "the lost intimacy" in our being even in the context of his historical discourse on the displacement of the borders between the sacred and the profane in successive historical worlds may give rise to the impression that Bataille is giving expression to a desire to go back to our archaie, immediate animal existence by transgressing our subjectivist and objectivist modern cultures. That way of reading Bataille can make his thought look like some sort of metaphysical nostalgia. However, this interpretation becomes suspect if we emphasize that the loss here is not the absence of something that was previously present, but the absence of something that is still present in our lived experience-even though it is erased, forgotten, and constantly ignored by the ways in which we schematize our experience. Our lost intimacy with other living beings-from which immanent violence is never missing-is animal as well as divine, life as much as death. Perhaps we need to treat "immanent violence" as an ontological concept that may call for interpretation on the basis of an ontology of life. Obviously, this constitutes the ontological foundation of Bataille's further distinction between interior and exterior violence, in terms of which he reads destruction in societies. The distinction between immanent and transcendent violence I find in Bataille has an explanatory value as an analytical tool. At the final analysis, it will be especially useful in understanding why Bataille refrains from condemning violence in purely ethical or political terms. How does Bataille draw the species barrier between non-human animals and human animals? He believes, with Nietzsche, that the world of things, inclividuals, work, utility and action transcends immanent life. In a sense, only when we were not yet "human" were we completely immanent to nature. In Theory of Religion, he conceives oE non-human animality in terms oE "immanence" and "immecliacy" (TR 291/17). The emphasis on "immecliacy" marks a liEe limited to the realm oE the sensible. A non-human animal is deprived of universal concepts and ideas that serve as schemes for constructing a world out of life. Immanence is determined by an inability to overcome the environment in which a living being spends its life. Transcendence is the overcoming oE the sensible toward the cancept that Erames nature, whereas immanence is being imprisoned in the environing sensible element. We should note that this use oE the couple "transcendence-immanence" singles out man among other species as a builder oE the world, failing to emphasize that as humans we inhabit the earth along with other species. The definition oE man as a "thinking animaI" immecliately gives way to a discourse articulating what thinking may mean as a specific diEEerence, and usually not to what we may share with other animal species. But Eor Bataille, what is leEt unthought in this definition is precisely our being inside animality as weIl as outside it. As an animal species on earth, we have ventured outside the immanent continuity oE being by a movement oE transcendence. Because our intelligence originates in an interruption of immanence, it is bound to remain ignorant of its source. Intellegence can never return to immanence without losing itself in it, and in the realm of transcendence it Eails ta attain consciousness of the fact that the kernel of Ollr being still belangs to immanence. Nevertheless, Bataille does not merely affirm that we can swim upstream, against intelligence, using intelligence against itself to create an opportunity to find an exit to a conscious experience of the internal relation of all living beings. Only the violence which I exert, or to which I am exposed, can tear apart the constructed structures of the world of subjects and objects in which life is suffocated, and can give us access to sovereign experiences of immanence. Selfconsciousness in Bataille's sense, which is not-knowing, is only possible through such experiences. Intelligence is bound to remain foreign to the life that gave rise to it: it can only enframe, intervene and know nature from the outside; it will always fail to communicate with life from within. However, mental life consists not only of rational thinking. The immanent flow of our incarnated consciousness, which is essentially an internal relation of communication with others in unceasing differentiation, is not constituted or controlled by a knowing subject. By "incarnated existence," we here need to understand impersonal existence, the way in which life communicates with itself. We gain access to that immanence and experience it only through the interruption of the world of utility and work, and the dissolution of the individuality that makes possible the overcoming of the separation of beings from each other. In our contact with the elements, in nutrition, in the satisfaction of our needs, in desire and erotic experience, we take part in the rhythm of communication of life with itself, even though cultural forces persuade us to control that contact with animal existence within us to tame it and forget it. "Immanence" for Bataille does not mean immanence to an object or a subject but to a total Being or "One." An animal's lack of access to transcendence does not imply that it is a being closed in its inner world, for it does not have an inner world in which to enclose itself. Animal is immanent to the environment in which it lives and does not have the capacity to transcend it. But how is this milieu, this "One", described? Bataille depicts it by invoking the type of certainty that manifests itself "when an animal eats another one" (TR 291/1 7). When an animal eats another one, the meaning of the situation in which the former finds itself is clearly similar to that of the latter. The similarity between the meanings of those two situations cannot be found in the sensations that the animals have, for one is being torn to pieces by the other. Nevertheless, both animals are immanent to one and the same medium, which does not make the one who is active in eating "transcendent" with respect to the other who is eaten. In some kinds of animals, during the period of copulation males fight for females and those males who prove to be stronger chase away the others. There is a difference between the victorious animal and the defeated one. However the victory, if it is not by chance, proves nothing else than a quantitative difference of strength (TR 292/18). The establishment of such a difference does not make the victorious male transcend the others. The acts of killing, winning, and copulating give rise to a feeling of "transcendence" only in the human world, due to the "objectification" of the other as passive. In opposition to the immanent violence in nature, violence is seen as a mark of transcendence in the human world. It bears in itself the promise of elevating man to God, enabling him to incorporate an image of Him. Revealed religions bal~ homicide and human sacrifice. In the Muslim religion, to take away someone's life, given to him/her by God, is to transgress the limits of the realm in which human beings can legitimately use their power. To kill someone is to usurp God's authority over life and death and thus to set one's self as an equal to God. This is why only wars fought in the name of God can legitimate the killing of human beings. The idea that, in killing, the murderer substitutes himself for God, bears in itself the implicit tendency to trunk that violence can deify a human being. Physically abusive husbands, parents, torturers and rapists take themselves to be transcending their victims. This sense of transcendence is accompanied by a pleasure stemming from their perception of physical superiority as constituting an ontological, epistemological, and even a moral difference. In Theory of Religion, Bataille writes, "The lion is not the king of the animals. In the movement of waters, he is only a higher tide that can reverse the weaker ones. That an animal eats another does not change a fundamental situation: every animal is in the world like water in water' (fR 292/18-19).6 By contrast, man is not in the world like water in water. Even a superficial glimpse of "social status" in the human world will show that factors such as "education," "gender," "ethnicity," "race," and "class" intersect to constitute quite incomparable situations. The power of transcendence in the world of work, utility and action rests on situational differences, and the subject who assumes a status that such crisscrossing of differences may assign to it pays for this by losing his/her own sovereign selE7 To the genealogy of the transcendence of the subject belong the experiences of fear, submission, guilt, self-contempt, self-hatred, imitation of the desire of the other, and the illusion of self-sufficiency, self-coincidence and independence. Being before the law and entering it, the fundamental experience of the symbolic order is a trauma. In the world of work, in order to become a subject, one needs to sacrifice one's self in the face of power, repress one's immediate desires, reconcile oneself with the authority, accept being rewarded and punished by it and delay free self-expression until one has nothing left to express. Bataille seeks ways of transgressing the limits of a life of submission to the world of power relations, but he is skeptical about the "warrior of freedom" as well. Both the submissive self and the revolutionary self become subjects by being exposed to transcendent violence, and they are produced by their opposite reactions to it. Oppressive systems of power do change by sacrificing or marginalizing those who fight for freedom, yet their challenge and resistance open the path of communication for those who keep silent out of fear of persecution as surrogate victims. Freedom fighters become surrogate victims. However, it is also true that, even when they cannot make a difference that directly changes the oppressive systems, they open the way for the discourse that paves the way for transformation. The fighter for freedom may be saving the dignity of the environment, but helshe cannot attain his/her self consciousness in so far as helshe is committed to action and work for the common utility. An interior outlet to immanence is neither possible for those who wait for their turn to be in charge of power nor for the marginalized revolutionary. In short, struggle for power, no matter what the consequences are, takes one away from the direction of the immanence in which Bataille sees "the sovereign good" and the ultimate possibility of our existence. Neither submission to law and authority nor revolt may lead to immanence. Occupying a position of power within a system licenses the subject to use violence. The feeling of transcendence experienced as the possessor of that power is in fact illusory, for the truth is that one is temporarily possessed by that power. Because one is only the surrogate subject, the transient host of power, the truth of the appearance of subjective potency is nothing but impotence. Immanent violence targets this illusory sense of transcendence. For example, Fight Club, one of the cult movies of recent years, lends itself to being read in terms of the question of the unleashing of immanent violence against the nluch greater violence errlbedded in a society organized by advanced capitalist relations of production. 8 The anti-heros of this movie exert immanent violence to destroy the ways in which life is possessed by the desire to possess. They find relief in a play of violence among friends which makes winning and losing insignificant and yet their immanent violence risks being lost in revolutionary terrorism. Fight Club seems to begin in Bataillean fashion as a "project against the project" and ends up as a struggle to prevent the other's death to which it leads. This struggle is not the result of a conflict between the return to immanence and morality or religion. It is a struggle between transcendent and immanent violence. The argument that a living being's life can be sacrificed for higher ends is a mark of transcendent violence, for there are no such ends in immanence. Of course, this is not to say that immanence has no risk or no danger. A plane of immanence on which no concern for transcendence can have a hold manifests itself with an unthinkable power to emancipate. A globalizing world promises no history that would make mankind even more transcendent. Technology tolerates only the accumulation of information which supplies no critical resources. Given this present state of affairs, violence seems to have already lost the promise of transcendence. However, one may ask about the victims of immanent violence too. For example, what about the pornographic snuff movies which cause the deaths of thousands of women in the world? Would that be a phenomenon of immanent violence? Let us turn to Theory of Religion before we speculate about how Bataille might answer that question. The violence that makes transcendence possible presupposes an act of objectification. Unlike human consciousness which distinguishes itself from its objects, an eagle that attacks a lamb does not distinguish it from itself. An object is by definition that which is thrown in front of an onlooker, and thus something I can set up over against myself. Unlike the hammer I use or the other whose hand I hold, an object can never be an extension of my living body. The eagle does not perceive the lamb as an object. Animals do not have an "outside world" that consists of objects. Given that objects are temporal syntheses, and presupposing with Bataille that the dimension of future that marks intelligence is not open to animals, an animal cannot see its prey as an object. According to Bataille, the eating of one animal by another is consumption, an extermination that has no duration and occurs in an actual time in which nothing is objectified. 9 Neither can we say that an animal that eats another one is using it. The eagle is immersed in the nutritive "element" in the act of emptying the intestines of the other that it lays open. In contrast to the relation with an object, the immanent relation with the other does not involve a separation, a distinction between me and the other. According to Bataille such an internal relation with the other has no duration, that is, it is always in the present. This is not to say that it is closed to the future. However, the future here is not the time of projects but a time that can never be anticipated. When Bataille writes that "intimacy is violence," we should perhaps understand this in terms of the fragilities of inter-corporeality as much as the exposure by the present to a future that is to come, without any possibility of anticipation. Bataille emphasizes that duration belongs to the world of objects. Objects are spatial and temporal syntheses. It is important to ren1ember that Merleau-Ponty explains the illusion of transcendence by taking his departure precisely from that synthetic nature of perception. As is well-known, for Merleau-Ponty an object that appears in its thickness is spatial as well as temporal, and is never given to my perception from all the points of view at once. 10 That the gaze is always bound to a certain perspective implies that the object will always absolutely be partially closed. Our classic and ordinary fiction of an "object" owes its being to the attribution of the primacy of vision over all the other senses, and to the presupposition that there can be an all-encompassing gaze. In Merleau-Ponty's terms, this illusion rests on our forgetting the role played by the spatiality of the living body in vision. We may say that our tendency, in our imagination, to separate the gaze from the living body to which it belongs is one of the conditions of transcendence that can make even the world itself an object. "It is the ex-stase of perception which causes all perception to be perception of something."ll When we conceive the world as a big object, we forget that we inhabit the earth with our fellow creatures. Now, immanent violence is an attempt to overcome the separation between the I and the other that gave rise to subjects and objects. If, in the age of technology, one can talk about violence on a plane of immanence which does not bring about or reproduce transcendence by becoming internal to the subject, history, God, and so on, then such violence may attest to the experience of the living body through pain, or through an experience of remembering that heals. The violence that results in transcendence objectifies-the female body killed by snuff is set on the screen as the ultimate object in which life is destroyed. On the other hand, in the lived experience of immanent violence, the desire is to destroy the object that is the human body, the human body as an object. Bataille knows well that our civilization treats the female body as an object of a male gaze; however, erotic experience as a sovereign experience cannot have anything to do with objectification, except to overcome it. In so far as the erotic is a touching of lost intimacy, it is the dissolution of both object and subject

### 1nc – war – 1

#### War is ontologically constitutive, an immanent condition of life as such. Only by ignoring this fact and renouncing sovereign, mystical experiences, does a militaristic vision of total warfare become possible.

Wilson 05Julie, “Unproductive expenditure and the spatial ground of the earth: Bataille on the other side of Deleuze and Guattari” - EE - Sep 26, 2005 <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpbataille6.htm>

Both Bataille and Deleuze & Guattari’s ontological projects are fueled by attempts to understand the most radical of human movements through a conceptualization of war and its different forms. These different forms of war are absolutely fundamental for grasping the political claims of each project, not to mention the stakes that surround the category of unproductive expenditure. In the thought of Bataille two different forms of war emerge: war as mystical or inner experience, and war in the more conventional sense as death and destruction on the battlefield. Much of Bataille’s wartime writings can be read as attempts to see an equivalence between actual war and mystical experience. In his book Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred, Alexander Irwin references Bataille’s own words in “The Practice of Joy before Death:” “’I want to show that an equivalence exists between war, ritual sacrifice, and the mystical life.’ All these forms of behavior reflect ‘the same play of ‘ecstasies’ and ‘terrors’ in which man joins in the games of heaven’”(136). Bataille thus sees a fundamental similarity between the violence of the battlefield and mysticism in the ecstasy and terror that characterize both experiences; his insistence on the equivalence stems from both his energetic framework-- better known as general economy-- and the latter’s commitment to thinking through the category of unproductive expenditure, or the moment when production (and/or growth) has reached its terrestrial limits and must turn unproductive, or rather, destructive of energetic resources. For Bataille, the emergence of war in both instances is intimately bound up in the category of unproductive expenditure; in fact, war is the moment and movement of unproductive expenditure, or profitless expenditure. In the energeticist ontology of Bataille, unproductive expenditure—consumptions and dissipations—are linked to the realm of the necessary; thus, so is war. In “The Practice of Joy before Death,” Bataille writes: “’I MYSELF AM WAR.’ I imagine human movement and excitation, whose possibilities are limitless: this movement and excitation can only be appeased by war” (Visions of Excess, 239). War, for Bataille, is the necessary and universal response to expansive and growth-seeking being; in this sense, war as profitless expenditure is fundamental to maintaining the balance of forces on Earth. War (and thus unproductive expenditure) engender destructions of forces and energies, but what Bataille desperately wants us to understand is that although war in-itself is immanent to and necessary for life, the form it will take is not an a priori. In Volume One of The Accursed Share, Bataille clarifies the central claims of his ontological project: The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of the system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically (21). We can ignore or forget the fact that the ground we live on is little other than a field of multiple destructions. Our ignorance only has this incontestable effect: It causes us to undergo what we could bring about in our own way, if we understood (23). Here we see clearly the two faces of war or unproductive expenditure: the catastrophic war that destroys life through violence turned against peoples/ war experienced as undergone; and the glorious inner experience of the mystic/ war brought about in one’s own way. In the case of actual war, unproductive expenditure is the privilege of the ruling classes; in inner experience, unproductive expenditure is a sovereign moment or movement of desiring subjects.Deleuze & Guattari’s work follows a similar structure evidenced in the concept of the war machine. In the nomadology plateau of A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze & Guattari differentiate between the war machine that takes war for its object and the war machine that draws a creative line of flight. They write:The war machine is not uniformly defined, we have tried to define the two poles of the war machine: at one pole, it takes war for its object and forms a line of destruction prolongable to the limits of the universe. But in all of the shapes it assumes here—limited war, total war, worldwide organization—war represents not at all the supposed essence of the war machine but only, whatever the machine’s power, either the set of conditions under which the States appropriate the machine…or the dominant order of which the States themselves are now only parts. The other pole seemed to be the essence: it is when the war machine…has as its object not war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of smooth space and the movement of a people in that space…(422).

#### The modern nation-state is the institutionalization of war through the rational utility of modern society, perfecting violence in a form of life-denying fascism. All attempts to flee or purify conflict through the elimination of the nuclear factor result in ever-increasing cycles of violence. By voting affirmative and choosing to live in excess, you resign yourself to a fate worse than death – perpetual boredom.

Hamblet 5. Wendy, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy, Adelphi University “The Manic Ecstasy of War.” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 17:39–45

Eli Sagan’s At the Dawn of Tyranny posits the advent of civilization as coincidental with the dawn of tyranny and oppression. War, one of the oldest human institutions, has proven invaluable to states in establishing their power over subgroups within the system, as well as in acquiring territories from neighboring peoples to permit their expansion in space and power. Because of war’s great functionality to the state, there remains little mystery to the long-term success of war as a state institution over the formative millennia of civilization. The continuing popularity of war among modern states ostensibly dedicated to democracy, freedom, and the dignity of human beings, remains baffling to violence scholars. Karl von Clausewitz’s On War, considered by many scholars to be the canonical treatment of the war philosophy, attributes to war a logic all its own: war composes a compulsion, a dynamic that aims at excessive overflow, absolute expenditure of the energies of the state. War seeks absolutization as it feeds and fires the population’s martial enthusiasm; if unchecked by political goals, war will fulfill itself in the maximum exertion of self-expenditure—self-annihilation. War composes a potlatch of state resources, a useless splurge of the nation’s human and economic wealth for no better reason than wanton celebration of state power. The language of absolute expenditure resonates with the philosophy of Georges Bataille. His philosophy explains two principles of expenditure— the principle of classical utility defined by utilitarian goals serving current power relations, and that of nonproductive expenditure—that is, orgiastic outflow or ek-stasis that escapes mundane servitude to reason and utility. Political implications of the two economies are exposed in Bataille’s “Propositions on Fascism.” There, the two dialectical opposites represent extreme possibilities for the state structures. The first model aspires to perfect order, like the timeless realm of the gods, a frozen homogeneous perfection that is monocephalic (single-headed). Like the god, the monocephalic state becomes self-identified as a sacred entity—changeless, eternal, and perfect, its laws and customs fixed and imperative. At the other end of the structural spectrum resides the second form of state—the acephalic state—disordered, anarchic, and volatile. This state is seen by ordered states as a terrifying, heterogeneous primitive lifeform where uncivilized tribes practice mystical thinking, incommensurable truths, and mad affective experience. Unreasonable. Useless. Mad. People within the acephalic social structure enjoy abundant ritual lives that offer escape from the mundane in orgiastic festivals involving drunkenness, dancing, blood rites, wanton tortures, self-mutilation, and even murder in the name of dark monster gods. The monocephalic state, on the other hand, has overcome all death. The civilized state boasts an enlightened stable form that promotes reason, life, and progress, whereas the primitive society is referred to chaos, madness, and death. Bataille’s dichotomy provides a valuable framework for analyzing global realities, even in the modern world. Because Bataille insists the models represent dual extreme possibilities in the cyclical evolution of all states, then all states seek timeless stability, secured against time with absolute truth claims, infallible social codes, and enduring legislation. States are duly secured by the legalized violence of police and military that appropriate the illegal violence of the people and ultimately suppress all transformation. Intricate unyielding systems of rules and regulations—passports, licenses, identity cards, forms completed in triplicate, travel restrictions, immigration regulations, police interrogations, surveillance of social and financial transactions among subgroups, security checkpoints, departments of homeland security—weed out the deviant lifeforms until ultimately all countervoices have been silenced, all rebellion quite obliterated, all evolutionary movement logically contradictory. But, at this evolutionary apex, a problem arises in paradise. As the monocephalic state increasingly closes itself off, it stifles social existence, smothers creative energies, chokes the passion from its citizen-devotees, suffocates their spiritual urges, and reduces all sacrifices to mundane utility. When the perfect eternality of the structure is complete and the nation duly deified, all labors have become co-opted in utter servitude. Bataille names this culminating stage of development, the peaceful, stable end sought by all states, in its most excessive extrapolation—fascism. Ultimately, however, life and time must break free and move forward into futures. This most solid state holds firm for a short while only; then there begins a condensation of forces. Life rises up and explodes the suffocating stasis, disintegrating the solid, erect whole. Existence and liberty flow forth in rage, blood, tears, and passion. The death of God is complete. For Bataille, these endless cycles describe the movement of history: the erection of unitary gods of knowledge and power that ultimately ossify into totalities, and then explode in hysterical, raging catastrophes, releasing the explosive liberty of life from mundane servitude. The acephalic chaos will eventually recompose, slowly heaving up an ugly divine head once again. Life turns back on its chaotic freedom and develops what Bataille calls an aversion to the initial decomposition. The chaotic structure moves from the ek-stasis bliss of wanton pleasures and pains toward the stasis of the deity once again. Time, states, and human individuals, for Bataille, move between the two contradictory forms: stasis and ek-stasis. Time demands both forms in the world—the eternal return of an imperative object, and the explosive, creative, destructive rage of the liberty of life. Bataille’s analysis of state evolution offers resolution to the mystery of the frequency of wars in the modern civilized era: It suggests that war composes a “potlatch”—a manic ecstasy of useless self-expenditure that permits a breakout from mundane servitude.We may not readily recognize, in our states, the extreme forms that Bataille describes—fascist stasis or chaotic ecstasy. We believe that, although chaos is unquestionably undesirable, fascism is promoted only by madmen—Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin. We may be convinced that fascist urges fade with global democracy where all people will, eventually, know the order and security of the first world. Modern Western states, we may object, compose a golden mean between Bataille’s two economies, aspiring neither to fascism nor to a manic primitivism, but to the reasonable metron of golden rules. But the roots of the Western world are well planted in the fascist drive for hyper-order and changeless eternality. Hesiod and the PreSocratics, as much as Jewish and Christian myth, cite a common arche of the universe in the good works of a god that renders order (cosmos) out of chaos (kaos). For the ancients, one head (cephalus) is far superior to many; simplicity is beauty, whereas the many compose hoi poloi, an embarrassment of riches. The foundational logic that posits monocephalic order as ontologically and morally superior to acephalic multivocity remains an unquestioned assumption embedded in the Western lifeworld. A single well-ordered edifice, stretching high into the sky—erect, rigid, unyielding—is preferable, in the Western mind, to the broadest playing field studded with incongruous heroics. Bataille’s meditations on the dark underside of reason’s projects and triumphs, on such prohibited subjects as monstrous tortures, illicit sexual excesses, and the colorful anuses of apes, provide a theater of cruelty and death that is designed to challenge the polite threshold of civilized culture, to shock and interrupt the philosophical tradition it invades, and to subvert the pretenses of refined sophistication thought definitive of civilized society. Bataille shows that people are torn by conflicting drives, by lofty ideals, and by the dark concealed forces they suppress and deny.Lorenz states that Bataille’s treatment of the dark, concealed urges in human nature offer resolution to the paradox of the simultaneous lofty goals of modern states and the frequency of brutal aggressions by those very states naming themselves the most civilized. Perhaps the popularity and frequency of war even in the civilized modern era represents the release of suppressed subterranean drives within industrialized, rationalist, rigidly hierarchically ordered populations enslaved to reason and utility.The violence that floods the globe in modernity, that claims to be serving reasonable projects of global freedom and democracy, may represent new forms expressing old desires, the projects of monocephalic statehood aspiring to deification. Bataille recognizes chthonic forces as instrumental in the modern world: “The economic history of modern times is dominated by the epic but disappointing effort of fierce men to plunder the riches of the Earth [and turn its fire and metal into weapons] ... . [M]an [lives] an existence at the mercy of the merchandise he produces, the largest part of which is devoted to death.” The fierce men of modernity—gods, kings, and their modern sequels (presidents, popes, corporate rulers)—extend their control to the ends of the planet. Fierce men disembowel the Earth and turn on their own kind the products of molten metal torn from her bowels to ensure the permanence of their nations. War, states Bataille, “represents the desperate obstinacy of man opposing the exuberant power of time and finding security in an immobile and almost somnolent erection.” Bataille believes that primitive urges are still at work in the projects of modernity. Human beings, as much as superstructures of power, must satisfy their dark urges for the good of their communities. They must release their death drives if they are to gather together in heartfelt communities. Human beings crave mystical, passionate, frenzied escape from the rigorous projects of their ordered systems. If Bataille is correct, people must ultimately break free from the mundane enterprises of their everyday lives. Their inner demons will beckon them from their ordered worlds to revel in orgiastic festival. Surely Bataille’s claim—that life’s erotic drives will out and fulfill themselves in deathly destructiveness and wanton joy—should trouble us greatly, given the leveling effects of modern industrial society, its will to mediocrity, utility, and conformity. But is Bataille correct in his attribution of a measureless and rending character to modern war? Is modern warfare the aimless catastrophe that Bataille claims it to be? If so, then modern wars can be explained, according to Bataille, as ecstatic release from the fascist orientation of modern ordered states and from people’s imprisonment within the merchandise they produce. Modern war, with its Shock and Awe techno-theatrics, should provide a wondrous release from mundane servitude. 42 WENDY C. HAMBLET War could be said to satisfy collective fantasies of manic omnipotence and the drive for self-sacrifice for sacred values. Perhaps the wars of modernity occur with such rabid frequency because people must satisfy their suppressed lust for a sexualized release from the cold reality of state projects, the utilitarian reasons of state. This resonates with Clausewitz’s claim that people’s martial enthusiasm must find release in politically restrained wars or fulfill itself in the maximum exertion of self-expenditure, that is, self-annihilation. For Clausewitz, modernity represents that unfettered stage when war has escaped all political bounds and reasonable restraint. Although ostensibly a world driven by the lofty goals, modernity—for Clausewitz—composes an era of absolute war. The democratic revolution may have embraced other goals—citizen welfare and the grandeur of their rulers—but democracy, for Clausewitz, composes merely one of a number of crucial forces (the scientific revolution that provides the technology, the industrial revolution that provides mass production of weaponry, and the imperialism that draws the entire globe into the war system) that have been successfully harnessed to the powerprojects of the mightiest nations. The goods of the modern West, including the good of democracy, exist to extend Western hegemony globally in the marketplace of military power. But Bataille claims that war is useless expenditure—a release of the primal urges of a community toward excessive overflow. He states: “Military existence is based on a brutal negation of any profound meaning of death and, if it uses cadavers, it is only to make the living march in a straighter line.” But, if war is to be posited as an ecstatic release, it must compose orgiastic overflow, an entirely useless and pointless expenditure of the nation’s finest goods. Excessive expenditure is defeated the moment the violent explosion of forces serves mundane projects of servitude and utility. When war serves the purposes of the state, it loses its manic and ecstatic character and ceases to fulfill the people’s deepest needs for release from servitude and instrumentality. But Bataille is mistaken; the apparent uselessness of modern warfare is a deception, an illusion. War is one of the oldest traditions of our species. It has become a timeworn vehicle precisely because it serves a great many functions in states. Clausewitz names the institution of war a form of communication between nations. Franco Fornari states: “War is a multifunctional institution. ... It is extremely difficult to find a substitute that would perform all of its functions.” One of the most crucial functions that war provides in service of the state is the crystallization of its monopoly on violence. War is a crucial aspect of the centralizing, evolutionary process that culminates, ultimately, in fascist stability. The establishment of a massive and robust military is THE MANIC ECSTASY OF WAR 43 utterly necessary to the deification of the structure and the raising of a sturdy cephalus, because, along with the creation of strong policing and military forces, war serves to alienate the private violence of the citizens and place their collective aggressive energies into the hands of the cephalus. War serves the collective illusion of eternality. War serves other crucial functions in the state: it confirms the values, virtues, and meanings of one’s own cultural group. Sacred symbols—flags, national anthems, tales of past heroes, fallen ancestors—are put to work in luring the best of the nation—its strong and courageous youths—to the extreme patriotism required to maintain order in fascist regimes. The seduction of the nation’s best to its wars includes their provision of an international stage to display the collective prowess of the nation, a point of pride for all citizens, even the most oppressed of the society, and it allows for the individual display of the soldiers’ manly character—the valor, the selflessness, the loyalty. The wars of modern super-states continue in the tradition of imperialist projects of old. Posited as serving the most selfless values—the advancement of freedom, democracy, and the spread of civilization—today’s wars clearly bring too massive a booty to be named selfless expenditures. In fact, for the past fifty years, wars have increasingly become shameless lootings of helpless peoples—the projects of economists and accountants and big businessmen purified by political propaganda and backed by an arsenal of modern techno-weaponry. War serves the needs of the cephalus; it serves the personal narcissism of the leaders, and the collective narcissism of the combatants and civilians. Above all, modern wars serve economic goals; their booty is prodigious. They may cost the sacred love-object (the nation) massive capital, human and monetary, but the generals, the political leaders, and their corporate cronies profit handsomely from the hostilities. War also serves the fantasy that the sacred love-object (the nation) is the savior and benefactor of the globe; war serves the paranoid collective delusion that the cephalus is infallible and indestructible, unlimited as the god in its strength and in its moral substance. Killing the enemies, propagandized as evil, the collective illusion is fed that evil is overthrown: thus the sanctity of the loveobject is preserved. Sacred values are recomposed; the cephalus stands taller, more erect, more firm than ever in the wake of a good war. But for all the benefits served by the institution of war, modern wars are deeply tragic; they do waste millions of innocent lives; they tear apart societies and disburse homeless families across the globe. One in nine of the earth’s seven billion now lives a miserable, wandering, hopeless existence on parched lands where even the earth mother is barren. 44 WENDY C. HAMBLET Ultimately the greatest tragedy of modern war lies in its stark utility to the few at the extreme expenditure of its many. The utility of war defeats the purposes of war by frustrating the deepest needs of the society—the people’s need to build heartfelt communities, a need that can only be served by expressing the collective aggressive energies of the society beyond utility. Bataille states that: “Since [war] is essentially constituted by armed force, it can give to those who submit to its force of attraction nothing that satisfies the great human hungers, because it subordinates everything to a particular utility ... it must force its half-seduced lovers to enter the inhuman and totally alienated world of barracks, military prisons, and military administrations.” In fact, it may well be the non-release of ecstatic urges that explains a state’s return, year after year and decade after decade, to that old institution. It may be that the deepest paradox of modern war is that, in its usefulness to the cephalus and in its service to the fascist drives of the state, war proves utterly useless in dispensing its most fundamental function; it ceases to discharge the most vicious and cruel needs of the people, their deepest primitive motivations, whose collective release makes possible the formation of a heartfelt community. Bataille counts this failure as the most tragic of the multiple tragedies of modern war. The sacred values of community—life, freedom, festival, and the joy of communal fraternity—are rendered meaningful only in juxtaposition to their opposites. Bataille states: “The emotional element that gives an obsessive value to communal life is death.” But, ultimately, insists Bataille, the sacrifice will be celebrated beyond the reasonable purposes of the cephalus. If Bataille is correct, then we can be certain that, for those states whose wars are utterly utilitarian, self-annihilation is imminent.

#### Rather than thinking of violence as something external to, or apart from, the thinking-subject, we must recognize violence as an irreducible condition of subjectivity. Only in this way can we come to terms with the traumatic conditions of subjectification and thereby transvalue violence into an overcoming of distinctions between subjects and objects, the self and others.

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Zeynep, Professor of Philosophy, KOC University, “Bataille on Immanent and Transcendent Violence” Bulletin de la Societe Amencaine de Philosophy de Langue Franfais vol 14 no 2 fall 2004.

In the archaic world of paganism, immanence acquires a sacred and divine character as soon as the profane world of work and action begins to separate itself from the intimacy of all beings. In describing that moment, Bataille qualifies immanence explictly as "continuous," "impersonal" and "without distinction," and qualifies intimacy as "profound subjectivity" (TR 301/33). In The Accursed Share, he interprets that ground in terms of the dynamic and fluid life energy that is always in excess. Life is always already excessive because every living organism receives more energy from the cosmos than the amount sufficient for its self-preservation. In contrast to the limited problems of classical economy, "in the general problem there always reappears the essence of the biomass, which must constantly destroy (consume) a surplus of energy."2 Immanence can never be articulated in terms of the opposition between subject and object, which characterizes experience in the profane world of work, action and project. 30 BATAILLE ON VIOLENCE However, it is the place of a deep subjectivity, a confused, non-reflective consciousness of the self that is not limited by the I or other I's (fR 300/31). I believe that Bataille is a radical thinker of subjectivity, and his attempt to go beyond the classical notion of the subject can be related to Merleau-Ponty's thinking of subjectivity as incarnated in The Phenomenology of Perception. 3What Merleau Ponty calls "the ante-predicative life of consciousness" or "the silence of primary consciousness" is the natural perceptive involvement of incarnated existence with the world. 4 In that involvement, the relation with the other is not based on absolute separation, but on the fact that bodily operative intentions read, understand, constantly connect, and affectively communicate with each other. Merleau-Ponty writes that operative intentionality "produces the natural and ante-predicative unity of the world and of our life"; it furnishes "the text which our knowledge tries to translate into precise language."s For both Merleau-Ponty and Bataille, subjectivity as the immanent unity of the world and life can never become the object of knowledge, although it can be "experienced." Such an experience, which implies the loss of a subject as clear consciousness of objects is, in Bataille's economical terms, nothing but an unlimited expenditure of energy. Bataille thinks that the subject, as an individual and separate being, belongs to transcendence, for it has always already transcended the natural environment and is in a position to know objects from the outside. Knowledge is a possibility of transcendence, going outside of oneself to an impenetrable other. Moreover, that transcendence is related to violence not only because representation is violent but also because the subject in the world of work is subordinated and servile. The violence to which animals are exposed in nature is very different than the violence to which we are exposed, and which reproduces us in the world of work as knowing, acting, speaking subjects. In the technological era, man lives under the domination of anonymous powers and experiences. He is subject to both oppression and the empty promises of transcendence. According to Bataille, the deep truth of subjectivity is never revealed by transcendence. Although he believes that the expenditure of the forces of the body-for example, erotic experience and laughter-may open a way for the realm of immanence in which we re-establish our continuity with all living and non-living beings, this feeling of continuity is for him nothing n10re than abrief touching of the untouchable. The fact that he talks about "the lost intimacy" in our being even in the context of his historical discourse on the displacement of the borders between the sacred and the profane in successive historical worlds may give rise to the impression that Bataille is giving expression to a desire to go back to our archaie, immediate animal existence by transgressing our subjectivist and objectivist modern cultures. That way of reading Bataille can make his thought look like some sort of metaphysical nostalgia. However, this interpretation becomes suspect if we emphasize that the loss here is not the absence of something that was previously present, but the absence of something that is still present in our lived experience-even though it is erased, forgotten, and constantly ignored by the ways in which we schematize our experience. Our lost intimacy with other living beings-from which immanent violence is never missing-is animal as well as divine, life as much as death. Perhaps we need to treat "immanent violence" as an ontological concept that may call for interpretation on the basis of an ontology of life. Obviously, this constitutes the ontological foundation of Bataille's further distinction between interior and exterior violence, in terms of which he reads destruction in societies. The distinction between immanent and transcendent violence I find in Bataille has an explanatory value as an analytical tool. At the final analysis, it will be especially useful in understanding why Bataille refrains from condemning violence in purely ethical or political terms. How does Bataille draw the species barrier between non-human animals and human animals? He believes, with Nietzsche, that the world of things, inclividuals, work, utility and action transcends immanent life. In a sense, only when we were not yet "human" were we completely immanent to nature. In Theory of Religion, he conceives oE non-human animality in terms oE "immanence" and "immecliacy" (TR 291/17). The emphasis on "immecliacy" marks a liEe limited to the realm oE the sensible. A non-human animal is deprived of universal concepts and ideas that serve as schemes for constructing a world out of life. Immanence is determined by an inability to overcome the environment in which a living being spends its life. Transcendence is the overcoming oE the sensible toward the cancept that Erames nature, whereas immanence is being imprisoned in the environing sensible element. We should note that this use oE the couple "transcendence-immanence" singles out man among other species as a builder oE the world, failing to emphasize that as humans we inhabit the earth along with other species. The definition oE man as a "thinking animaI" immecliately gives way to a discourse articulating what thinking may mean as a specific diEEerence, and usually not to what we may share with other animal species. But Eor Bataille, what is leEt unthought in this definition is precisely our being inside animality as weIl as outside it. As an animal species on earth, we have ventured outside the immanent continuity oE being by a movement oE transcendence. Because our intelligence originates in an interruption of immanence, it is bound to remain ignorant of its source. Intellegence can never return to immanence without losing itself in it, and in the realm of transcendence it Eails ta attain consciousness of the fact that the kernel of Ollr being still belangs to immanence. Nevertheless, Bataille does not merely affirm that we can swim upstream, against intelligence, using intelligence against itself to create an opportunity to find an exit to a conscious experience of the internal relation of all living beings. Only the violence which I exert, or to which I am exposed, can tear apart the constructed structures of the world of subjects and objects in which life is suffocated, and can give us access to sovereign experiences of immanence. Selfconsciousness in Bataille's sense, which is not-knowing, is only possible through such experiences. Intelligence is bound to remain foreign to the life that gave rise to it: it can only enframe, intervene and know nature from the outside; it will always fail to communicate with life from within. However, mental life consists not only of rational thinking. The immanent flow of our incarnated consciousness, which is essentially an internal relation of communication with others in unceasing differentiation, is not constituted or controlled by a knowing subject. By "incarnated existence," we here need to understand impersonal existence, the way in which life communicates with itself. We gain access to that immanence and experience it only through the interruption of the world of utility and work, and the dissolution of the individuality that makes possible the overcoming of the separation of beings from each other. In our contact with the elements, in nutrition, in the satisfaction of our needs, in desire and erotic experience, we take part in the rhythm of communication of life with itself, even though cultural forces persuade us to control that contact with animal existence within us to tame it and forget it. "Immanence" for Bataille does not mean immanence to an object or a subject but to a total Being or "One." An animal's lack of access to transcendence does not imply that it is a being closed in its inner world, for it does not have an inner world in which to enclose itself. Animal is immanent to the environment in which it lives and does not have the capacity to transcend it. But how is this milieu, this "One", described? Bataille depicts it by invoking the type of certainty that manifests itself "when an animal eats another one" (TR 291/1 7). When an animal eats another one, the meaning of the situation in which the former finds itself is clearly similar to that of the latter. The similarity between the meanings of those two situations cannot be found in the sensations that the animals have, for one is being torn to pieces by the other. Nevertheless, both animals are immanent to one and the same medium, which does not make the one who is active in eating "transcendent" with respect to the other who is eaten. In some kinds of animals, during the period of copulation males fight for females and those males who prove to be stronger chase away the others. There is a difference between the victorious animal and the defeated one. However the victory, if it is not by chance, proves nothing else than a quantitative difference of strength (TR 292/18). The establishment of such a difference does not make the victorious male transcend the others. The acts of killing, winning, and copulating give rise to a feeling of "transcendence" only in the human world, due to the "objectification" of the other as passive. In opposition to the immanent violence in nature, violence is seen as a mark of transcendence in the human world. It bears in itself the promise of elevating man to God, enabling him to incorporate an image of Him. Revealed religions bal~ homicide and human sacrifice. In the Muslim religion, to take away someone's life, given to him/her by God, is to transgress the limits of the realm in which human beings can legitimately use their power. To kill someone is to usurp God's authority over life and death and thus to set one's self as an equal to God. This is why only wars fought in the name of God can legitimate the killing of human beings. The idea that, in killing, the murderer substitutes himself for God, bears in itself the implicit tendency to trunk that violence can deify a human being. Physically abusive husbands, parents, torturers and rapists take themselves to be transcending their victims. This sense of transcendence is accompanied by a pleasure stemming from their perception of physical superiority as constituting an ontological, epistemological, and even a moral difference. In Theory of Religion, Bataille writes, "The lion is not the king of the animals. In the movement of waters, he is only a higher tide that can reverse the weaker ones. That an animal eats another does not change a fundamental situation: every animal is in the world like water in water' (fR 292/18-19).6 By contrast, man is not in the world like water in water. Even a superficial glimpse of "social status" in the human world will show that factors such as "education," "gender," "ethnicity," "race," and "class" intersect to constitute quite incomparable situations. The power of transcendence in the world of work, utility and action rests on situational differences, and the subject who assumes a status that such crisscrossing of differences may assign to it pays for this by losing his/her own sovereign selE7 To the genealogy of the transcendence of the subject belong the experiences of fear, submission, guilt, self-contempt, self-hatred, imitation of the desire of the other, and the illusion of self-sufficiency, self-coincidence and independence. Being before the law and entering it, the fundamental experience of the symbolic order is a trauma. In the world of work, in order to become a subject, one needs to sacrifice one's self in the face of power, repress one's immediate desires, reconcile oneself with the authority, accept being rewarded and punished by it and delay free self-expression until one has nothing left to express. Bataille seeks ways of transgressing the limits of a life of submission to the world of power relations, but he is skeptical about the "warrior of freedom" as well. Both the submissive self and the revolutionary self become subjects by being exposed to transcendent violence, and they are produced by their opposite reactions to it. Oppressive systems of power do change by sacrificing or marginalizing those who fight for freedom, yet their challenge and resistance open the path of communication for those who keep silent out of fear of persecution as surrogate victims. Freedom fighters become surrogate victims. However, it is also true that, even when they cannot make a difference that directly changes the oppressive systems, they open the way for the discourse that paves the way for transformation. The fighter for freedom may be saving the dignity of the environment, but helshe cannot attain his/her self consciousness in so far as helshe is committed to action and work for the common utility. An interior outlet to immanence is neither possible for those who wait for their turn to be in charge of power nor for the marginalized revolutionary. In short, struggle for power, no matter what the consequences are, takes one away from the direction of the immanence in which Bataille sees "the sovereign good" and the ultimate possibility of our existence. Neither submission to law and authority nor revolt may lead to immanence. Occupying a position of power within a system licenses the subject to use violence. The feeling of transcendence experienced as the possessor of that power is in fact illusory, for the truth is that one is temporarily possessed by that power. Because one is only the surrogate subject, the transient host of power, the truth of the appearance of subjective potency is nothing but impotence. Immanent violence targets this illusory sense of transcendence. For example, Fight Club, one of the cult movies of recent years, lends itself to being read in terms of the question of the unleashing of immanent violence against the nluch greater violence errlbedded in a society organized by advanced capitalist relations of production. 8 The anti-heros of this movie exert immanent violence to destroy the ways in which life is possessed by the desire to possess. They find relief in a play of violence among friends which makes winning and losing insignificant and yet their immanent violence risks being lost in revolutionary terrorism. Fight Club seems to begin in Bataillean fashion as a "project against the project" and ends up as a struggle to prevent the other's death to which it leads. This struggle is not the result of a conflict between the return to immanence and morality or religion. It is a struggle between transcendent and immanent violence. The argument that a living being's life can be sacrificed for higher ends is a mark of transcendent violence, for there are no such ends in immanence. Of course, this is not to say that immanence has no risk or no danger. A plane of immanence on which no concern for transcendence can have a hold manifests itself with an unthinkable power to emancipate. A globalizing world promises no history that would make mankind even more transcendent. Technology tolerates only the accumulation of information which supplies no critical resources. Given this present state of affairs, violence seems to have already lost the promise of transcendence. However, one may ask about the victims of immanent violence too. For example, what about the pornographic snuff movies which cause the deaths of thousands of women in the world? Would that be a phenomenon of immanent violence? Let us turn to Theory of Religion before we speculate about how Bataille might answer that question. The violence that makes transcendence possible presupposes an act of objectification. Unlike human consciousness which distinguishes itself from its objects, an eagle that attacks a lamb does not distinguish it from itself. An object is by definition that which is thrown in front of an onlooker, and thus something I can set up over against myself. Unlike the hammer I use or the other whose hand I hold, an object can never be an extension of my living body. The eagle does not perceive the lamb as an object. Animals do not have an "outside world" that consists of objects. Given that objects are temporal syntheses, and presupposing with Bataille that the dimension of future that marks intelligence is not open to animals, an animal cannot see its prey as an object. According to Bataille, the eating of one animal by another is consumption, an extermination that has no duration and occurs in an actual time in which nothing is objectified. 9 Neither can we say that an animal that eats another one is using it. The eagle is immersed in the nutritive "element" in the act of emptying the intestines of the other that it lays open. In contrast to the relation with an object, the immanent relation with the other does not involve a separation, a distinction between me and the other. According to Bataille such an internal relation with the other has no duration, that is, it is always in the present. This is not to say that it is closed to the future. However, the future here is not the time of projects but a time that can never be anticipated. When Bataille writes that "intimacy is violence," we should perhaps understand this in terms of the fragilities of inter-corporeality as much as the exposure by the present to a future that is to come, without any possibility of anticipation. Bataille emphasizes that duration belongs to the world of objects. Objects are spatial and temporal syntheses. It is important to ren1ember that Merleau-Ponty explains the illusion of transcendence by taking his departure precisely from that synthetic nature of perception. As is well-known, for Merleau-Ponty an object that appears in its thickness is spatial as well as temporal, and is never given to my perception from all the points of view at once. 10 That the gaze is always bound to a certain perspective implies that the object will always absolutely be partially closed. Our classic and ordinary fiction of an "object" owes its being to the attribution of the primacy of vision over all the other senses, and to the presupposition that there can be an all-encompassing gaze. In Merleau-Ponty's terms, this illusion rests on our forgetting the role played by the spatiality of the living body in vision. We may say that our tendency, in our imagination, to separate the gaze from the living body to which it belongs is one of the conditions of transcendence that can make even the world itself an object. "It is the ex-stase of perception which causes all perception to be perception of something."ll When we conceive the world as a big object, we forget that we inhabit the earth with our fellow creatures. Now, immanent violence is an attempt to overcome the separation between the I and the other that gave rise to subjects and objects. If, in the age of technology, one can talk about violence on a plane of immanence which does not bring about or reproduce transcendence by becoming internal to the subject, history, God, and so on, then such violence may attest to the experience of the living body through pain, or through an experience of remembering that heals. The violence that results in transcendence objectifies-the female body killed by snuff is set on the screen as the ultimate object in which life is destroyed. On the other hand, in the lived experience of immanent violence, the desire is to destroy the object that is the human body, the human body as an object. Bataille knows well that our civilization treats the female body as an object of a male gaze; however, erotic experience as a sovereign experience cannot have anything to do with objectification, except to overcome it. In so far as the erotic is a touching of lost intimacy, it is the dissolution of both object and subject

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#### War is ontologically constitutive, an immanent condition of life as such. Only by ignoring this fact and renouncing sovereign, mystical experiences, does a militaristic vision of total warfare become possible.

Wilson 05Julie, “Unproductive expenditure and the spatial ground of the earth: Bataille on the other side of Deleuze and Guattari” - EE - Sep 26, 2005 <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpbataille6.htm>

Both Bataille and Deleuze & Guattari’s ontological projects are fueled by attempts to understand the most radical of human movements through a conceptualization of war and its different forms. These different forms of war are absolutely fundamental for grasping the political claims of each project, not to mention the stakes that surround the category of unproductive expenditure. In the thought of Bataille two different forms of war emerge: war as mystical or inner experience, and war in the more conventional sense as death and destruction on the battlefield. Much of Bataille’s wartime writings can be read as attempts to see an equivalence between actual war and mystical experience. In his book Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred, Alexander Irwin references Bataille’s own words in “The Practice of Joy before Death:” “’I want to show that an equivalence exists between war, ritual sacrifice, and the mystical life.’ All these forms of behavior reflect ‘the same play of ‘ecstasies’ and ‘terrors’ in which man joins in the games of heaven’”(136). Bataille thus sees a fundamental similarity between the violence of the battlefield and mysticism in the ecstasy and terror that characterize both experiences; his insistence on the equivalence stems from both his energetic framework-- better known as general economy-- and the latter’s commitment to thinking through the category of unproductive expenditure, or the moment when production (and/or growth) has reached its terrestrial limits and must turn unproductive, or rather, destructive of energetic resources. For Bataille, the emergence of war in both instances is intimately bound up in the category of unproductive expenditure; in fact, war is the moment and movement of unproductive expenditure, or profitless expenditure. In the energeticist ontology of Bataille, unproductive expenditure—consumptions and dissipations—are linked to the realm of the necessary; thus, so is war. In “The Practice of Joy before Death,” Bataille writes: “’I MYSELF AM WAR.’ I imagine human movement and excitation, whose possibilities are limitless: this movement and excitation can only be appeased by war” (Visions of Excess, 239). War, for Bataille, is the necessary and universal response to expansive and growth-seeking being; in this sense, war as profitless expenditure is fundamental to maintaining the balance of forces on Earth. War (and thus unproductive expenditure) engender destructions of forces and energies, but what Bataille desperately wants us to understand is that although war in-itself is immanent to and necessary for life, the form it will take is not an a priori. In Volume One of The Accursed Share, Bataille clarifies the central claims of his ontological project: The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of the system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically (21). We can ignore or forget the fact that the ground we live on is little other than a field of multiple destructions. Our ignorance only has this incontestable effect: It causes us to undergo what we could bring about in our own way, if we understood (23). Here we see clearly the two faces of war or unproductive expenditure: the catastrophic war that destroys life through violence turned against peoples/ war experienced as undergone; and the glorious inner experience of the mystic/ war brought about in one’s own way. In the case of actual war, unproductive expenditure is the privilege of the ruling classes; in inner experience, unproductive expenditure is a sovereign moment or movement of desiring subjects.Deleuze & Guattari’s work follows a similar structure evidenced in the concept of the war machine. In the nomadology plateau of A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze & Guattari differentiate between the war machine that takes war for its object and the war machine that draws a creative line of flight. They write:The war machine is not uniformly defined, we have tried to define the two poles of the war machine: at one pole, it takes war for its object and forms a line of destruction prolongable to the limits of the universe. But in all of the shapes it assumes here—limited war, total war, worldwide organization—war represents not at all the supposed essence of the war machine but only, whatever the machine’s power, either the set of conditions under which the States appropriate the machine…or the dominant order of which the States themselves are now only parts. The other pole seemed to be the essence: it is when the war machine…has as its object not war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of smooth space and the movement of a people in that space…(422).

#### Their purification of war lends itself not to a perfect world devoid of violence but rather a collective moment of catharsis wherein all human error is forgotten

Hamblet 7[Wendy, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy, Adelphi University “Guilty of innocence or nobody remembers the Armenians.” Armenians, Journal of Genocide Research, 7:1, 129-144, DOI: 10.1080/14623520500045229]

The corruptions of war and peace, the public and wholesale crimes that make war, the greed and lies of the peace And victor’s vengeance: how at a distance They soften into romance—blue mountains and blossomed marshes in the long landscape of history—Caligula Becomes an amusing clown, and Genghis A mere genius, a great author of tragedies. Our own time’s chiefs of massacre—Stalin died yesterday— Watch how soon blood will bleach, and gross horror Become words in a book. (from Robertson Jeffers, “Skunks”) Nobody remembers the Armenians In the “second talk on Poland” in Obersaltzberg, August 22, 1939, speaking to Reichmarshal Hermann Goering and the other commanding generals, Hitler advised brutality and mercilessness in their assault on Poland, for the sake of “a quick victory” that would begin his “new distribution of the world” (New York Times, November 24, 1945, Vol LCV, No 32, p 081). Successful state-building is for great men. Mercy and compassion are for weaklings, he argued. The world only remembers the strong and history records the most brutal tyrants as “successful state-builders.” History purifies, asserted Hitler, and it purifies universally. He illustrated this by asking the arresting question: “Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?” Louis Lochner reported on the speech. Lochner tells: “Goering jumped on the table. Blood-thirsty thanks and bloody promises. He danced around like a savage. The few doubtful ones remained silent.” Lochner, a top rate reporter, more than two decades chief of the Berlin Bureau of the Associated Press, demonstrates how the purifying sleight of hand functions so effectively to isolate the evil monstrous at a safe distance from the “human” site of responsibility. In this report, Lochner succumbs to the very “logic of purification” that guides Hitler’s view Journal of Genocide Research (2005), 7(1), March, 129–144 ISSN 1462-3528 print; ISSN 1469-9494 online=05=010129-15 # 2005 Research Network in Genocide Studies DOI: 10.1080=14623520500045229 Downloaded by [University of Michigan] at 01:02 29 October 2015 of history and counsels “mercilessness and brutality” to the generals of the Third Reich. Hitler recognizes what is missed by the objective reporter coolly recording the facts that will become history. When Hitler notes that none of us remembers the Armenians, he underscores an almost universal “human” feature: none of us remembers the victims of past spectacular human crimes any more than we give but passing notice to the ongoing holocausts that, daily, snuff out lives around the globe. We are all highly accomplished at forgetting the worst human crimes, and, most significantly, of forgetting our own complicity in the greatest—because daily—violences. So easily we forget our personal failings, our culture’s depraved roots, our species’ primal violences. So conveniently we distance ourselves from responsibility and from remorse. Hitler, the madman, the “monster,” knew human beings better than we know ourselves. Hitler was right about all of us! We are all innocent in our culpability. The worst crimes fall into oblivion for very comprehensible reasons. In an important article, “Penser les Massacres,” Belgian political scientist Jacques Semelin discusses three problems that turn even researchers away from consideration of the worst human violences (Semelin, 2001, p 1). The first is psychological in nature: avoiding a research topic that triggers horror and repulsion is understandable. The second is moral: faced with acts of pure savagery, how is it possible to prove “scientific neutrality”? The compassion felt for the victims leads spontaneously to the condemnation of their torturers. The third obstacle is more specifically of an intellectual nature: the phenomenon of massacre defies understanding. It appears to have no “sense,” nor to “serve” any purpose. We tend to write it off as man’s “folly.” It is easy to understand the why of our forgetting. In this paper, I shall propose an explanation of how we accomplish that expiatory feat. I shall seek to define the “logic of purification” that Hitler claimed guides the crafting of history and sanitizes our collective consciences, by exposing a purification mechanism that has been “ritualized” into our very ways of being, into the parameters of the lifeworld, and perhaps even into our flesh, by obsessive repetition in the early millennia of human time. Arguing from the theories of prominent anthropologists, I shall propose the development and persistence of a certain conceptual and linguistic mechanisms that removes past horrors from their discomfiting proximity and especially from the scope of personal and cultural responsibility by displacing evil onto alien others in proximity to our “sacred” home space. My claim is that human beings, in the dawn of human time, developed a concealing and sorting mechanism that permitted the easy forgetting of their own murderous ways of being-together—ways that, as Konrad Lorenz, Rene´ Girard, Walter Burkert, Paul Radin and other anthropologists have shown, are fundamentally murderous. We witness the persistence of this purifying mechanism in the very ways in which we make moral judgments, in the way we, still today, isolate and illuminate as “evil” the unsettling forces at work around us. Even as we nod our assent to Lochner’s assessment of Goering as a “savage,” even as we configure Hitler as a monster and his death camps as appalling anomalies, WENDY C. HAMBLETT 130 Downloaded by [University of Michigan] at 01:02 29 October 2015 we ourselves re-enact a kind of “successful state-building.” We reconstruct the crime scene of human moral failure by a ritualized logical maneuver, a “counter-cultural rejection,” that reinterprets human deeds as “monstrous” and “inhuman,” thereby successfully distancing ourselves from the potential for such deeds. This paper traces this reconstructive maneuver to its primal formulations, looking back to the time our earliest ancestors crawled down from their arboreal paradises and stood upright on the savannah. By a consideration of the primal violences from which we, as human beings (and our systems and institutions), have sprung, I will attempt to expose the origins of the modes of moral thinking that underpin the sanctity of our home spaces, while yet disposing us toward certain violent modes of being-in-the-world. Then I shall mark out traces of a post-holocaust philosophical insight that threatens to collapse the ritualized logic and its concomitant distancing maneuver, first by following Primo Levi into the death camps of Buna and Auschwitz, and finally, by embarking on a disturbing hypothetical journey into the netherworld of human “nature” exposed by Georges Bataille in his disturbing account of human being as the “enraged torturer.” From purification rituals Walter Burkert, anthropologist and classical philologist at the University of Zurich, takes up the project of understanding human violence by wedding historical and philological research to biological anthropology. In a most impressive corpus (Homo Necans, Structure and History in Greek Mythology, Greek Tragedy and Sacrificial Ritual, The Creation of the Sacred, Ancient Mystery Cults, Greek Religion), Burkert traces the origin of human “civilizing” processes into the distant past of human existence. Burkert originally assigned to the classical tradition profound importance for Western intellectual and cultural beginnings. But, in the course of his research, his investigations led him to a remarkable discovery. The classical tradition was itself permeated with symbols persisting from much earlier epochs of human time. Burkert came to see that, even in the highest period of classical culture, patterns of thought and activity, “ritualized” in pre-Greek cultures and perhaps even prehistoric in origin, continued to exercise an unshakeable hold over the fifth century Greeks, even though cultural and religious “meanings” of these rituals had long fallen from the conscious memory of the practitioners. The bloody sacrifice ritual is one such pervasive anomaly that continued to accompany festivals, seats of oracles, cult gatherings, mystery ceremonies, athletic games, Greek theater, state ceremonies and funeral services long after that ritual had any meaningful resonances with the events or with the beliefs of the participants of those events. Burkert’s inquiry into the uncanny endurance of such rituals eventually led him to another astounding insight: rituals function in such a manner that they do not require either conscious belief or even understanding in order to remain functionally operative and ideologically persistent. That is to say, even where their story (logos) has been lost or seemingly disconnected from the cultural context, their ideology (the eidoi of their logos—the form and symbols of their story) remains enduringly persistent and functional. To discover what the archaic logoi might be communicating to those later generations, Burkert looks back to the rituals performed pervasively in the early millennia of the Western tradition. Anthropologists like Konrad Lorenz had carved out this intellectual territory. Lorenz, writing in the 1960s, had shocked the anthropological world with the disturbing revelation that murderousness is the human being’s primal state. In his Nobel prize winning On Aggression, Lorenz had unfolded the tale of human beginnings as the “grotesque perversion” of a natural selective process. In a particularly disturbing passage, Lorenz states: There is evidence that the first inventors of pebble tools, the African Australopithecines, promptly used their new weapon to kill not only game but fellow members of their species as well. Peking Man, the Prometheus who learned to preserve fire, used it to roast his brothers: beside the first traces of the regular use of fire lie the mutilated and roasted bones of sinanthropos pekinensis himself. (Lorenz, 1966, p 239) Perhaps Lorenz’s most troubling discovery was that the first men were murderous, not because they lacked the “civilizing effects” of cultural development, but precisely because of their cultural proficiencies. Humans, beginning with the mastery of fire, evolved quickly from beings tyrannized by economic insecurity into beings who controlled and created their environment. From that point onward, explains Lorenz, the natural selective tendencies that, in animals and earlier humans, served important evolutionary purposes (maintaining an even spatial distribution of groups within the species and favoring species continuance by selecting the hardier to excel both territorially and sexually), began to go astray. Aggressive tendencies, when uninfluenced by environmental exigencies, can run amuck in directions that are maladaptive to the environment. This is what happened to humans, Lorenz explains. Their aggressive behaviors became “exaggerated to the point of the grotesque and the inexpedient”(Lorenz, 1966, p 42). At a very early stage in human development, intra-specific aggression was already replacing species defense with species offence in the form of brutal wars waged against neighboring tribes, and even between brothers, fathers and sons within the social group. Selective processes, gone astray, expressed themselves in elaborate rituals of aggressive prowess aimed at human others. Lorenz is convinced that we are fundamentally prone toward intra-specific aggression. In fact, it is only through further perversions of our “grotesque and inexpedient” perversions that we learn to love and nurture at all. Rituals of love and friendship emerged for human communities as reformulations of displays of redirected aggression and ceremonies of appeasement. Aggression is thousands of years older, more time-honored in our ritual heritage, more deeply embedded in our being, than love or friendship or nurturance. According to Lorenz, violent urges are fundamental to the way of being of humankind. He states: “intra-specific aggression can certainly exist without its counterpart, love, but conversely there is no love without aggression” (Lorenz, 1966, p 214). Lorenz’s insights informed the anthropological community that the rich palette of ritual WENDY C. HAMBLETT 132 Downloaded by [University of Michigan] at 01:02 29 October 2015 practices evidenced in early hominoids were fundamentally of a single kind— murderous rituals aimed at other human beings. Walter Burkert takes up the task of tracing the murderous rituals into early human communities centered about life’s most significant functions—hunting, warfare, and mating. Though he resists the full endorsement of the thesis that founds sociobiology (the co-evolution of genes and culture), Burkert does posit in the distant past of human existence the advent of a “common mental world” whose symbolic content and tenor of seriousness he believes to have been transmitted through the ages and into modernity through an uninterrupted chain of tradition. That chain of tradition is the ritual history of human culture, with its systems, its institutions, its social and economic practices, and, above all, the conceptual and linguistic systems (the symbols and the logic connecting those symbols) that configure these ways of being-in-the-world. We only need look around us to see those “perverted elaborations” of which Lorenz speaks still at work in the world today: in the swaggering machismo of males in many patriarchal societies across the globe; in the overblown bravado of Western cinema and television heroes; in the “warrior virtues” displayed on the hockey rinks and football fields, in the rhetoric of gun lobbyist groups; in the way young boys thrash each other in the schoolyards and young men brawl in barrooms; in the rhetoric of Western news media that name “terrorist” all opponents of Western values and actions and Western terrorisms as legitimate battles fought “for freedom and democracy.” Successful “state-building” has always been accomplished in the ways of Genghis and Hitler. But since this fact makes for bad conscience we reconfigure our enemies as demons, our home spaces as sacred and pure and our violent histories (the rape of the Americas, the slave trade, civil wars, current social and political oppression) as occasions for celebration (Columbus Day, Independence Day). How is this reinterpretive maneuver accomplished, then? Burkert contends that the creative confusion began in the early days of the Paleolithic hunt. In the hunt, the intense collective energies of anxiety and terror that had to be focused upon large carnivores by human beings armed only with fire-hardened weapons heightened the significance of the event far beyond the mere gathering of food. A full range of survival strategies had to be summoned in order for the hunt to prove successful. This meant that patterns of behavior within the group (those regulating feeding habits, pairing, sexuality, reproduction, care of weaker members, territory, leadership, allegiances and other methodologies of cooperation) had to be realigned and concretized. Behavior codes (“rituals” in ethological parlance) resulted to sublimate and rechannel the old intra-specific aggressions to accomplish the cooperative solidarity that would ensure the success of the hunt. The first rituals probably circumscribed pre-hunt ceremonies that called forth the power of the ancestors, charmed the prey into the territory and contracted its “consent” to the immanent killing. Eventually, explains Burkert, the ritual field would have expanded to embrace all aspects of the hunt—the murder and the post-murder festivities. This led, eventually, to the articulation of every manner of social code—prohibitions and prescriptions GUILTY OF INNOCENCE OR NOBODY REMEMBERS THE ARMENIANS 133 Downloaded by [University of Michigan] at 01:02 29 October 2015 delineating appropriate behaviors in all context of social interaction. Socioeconomic and political relations—cultural institutions and systems—developed from the patterns of interaction that culminated in the distribution of meats during the festival closure of the hunt. Primarily, ritual ceremonies developed to bring to expression and then reinterpret the guilt and anxieties of the hunting people. They eased the “hesitation” before the emotionally explosive event, absorbed the “shock” at the spilling of the blood of a creature of such symbolically-charged potency, and voiced the “apologies” after the fact and the disclaimers of responsibility that freed them from the guilt of the act. Rituals performed the crucial function of establishing the fiction that the victim consents to, cooperates with, and participates in his [their] own murder. Thus the horror of the kill could be successfully inverted into festivity in the celebration of the living death and the beneficence of the self-sacrificial victim/prey monster/god who blesses the community with harmony and full stomachs. Thus the animal, while remaining animal, became anthropomorphized and divinized. It assumed contrasting images that were dialectically opposed yet intertwined: male/female, wild predator/friend of man, evil/beneficent, lifegiving/death-giving, demon/god. In time the polar symbols of these rituals developed into a full cosmos-embracing hierarchy that comprised the “common mental world” shared by the group. Burkert explains how this “common mental world” functions. All tradition consists of condensed, systematized information that keep conceptual systems finite. Ritual traditions communicate strategies of negation and mechanisms of class/ gender inclusion and exclusion. That is, they convey a “logic of domination” that reasserts the status quo of socioeconomic and political realities by supplying constitutive patterns and analogies that structure thought and action (Bloch, 1992, p 7). Through these strategies, a “reduction of complexity” is achieved that sorts the confusing chaos of sense data into a simplified system of meanings to orient human beings who, otherwise, would feel helpless, engulfed and overwhelmed by the infinite complexity of their environment. One essential way this reduction of complexity is achieved, explains Burkert, is through the positing of “dual containers,” the legacy of the polarized logic of the hunt. Phenomena are, by virtue of these “containers,” sorted into meaningful events: good–bad, sacred–profane, pure–impure, friend–enemy, god–demon, beneficent–demonic. From these dualities, hierarchies are constructed and links of causality forged so that reality can be reduced to simple and general concepts. A radically simplified, polarized worldview can be most useful as an orienting system. Add to this an ultimate signifier (god, king, president, pope, chief, father) and even the conflicting equations of life can be easily resolved, as matters to be left to a higher wisdom. Through such ritualized orderings, then, a culture’s collective representations are constructed and communicated to the young of each successive generation. Rituals comprise, for Burkert, “the very epitome of cultural learning” (Burkert, 1996, pp 28–29). It is not merely that the violent rituals practiced throughout human history were self-reinforcing by the power of resonance (though it is that WENDY C. HAMBLETT 134 Downloaded by [University of Michigan] at 01:02 29 October 2015 too), it was how they were made to resonate in the bodies of the participants. Ritual learning, historically, took harsh, intimidating forms. Learning is most indelible where memories are painful, humiliating, or anxiety-ridden, behaviorists assure us. Ancient ritual practices centered about animal and human sacrifices, painful purgatorial purifications and excruciating physical mutilations. Terror and pain leave indelible scars. Thus Burkert concludes that the horrifying, agonizing rituals etched into the flesh of each subsequent generation a radically over-simpli- fied polarized worldview and a logic of domination that reasserted as “legitimate” the historical order, precisely by carving out clear boundaries between sacred community and demonic alien forces. Thus was a culture marked self-identical across the flux of time and re-legitimized by connection with the changeless eternality of the ancestors and the gods.

#### The modern nation-state is defined as the rational perfection violence in a form of life-denying fascism of utility. Any attempt to flee or purify conflict through the elimination of the nuclear factor results in ever-increasing cycles of violence—by voting affirmative and choosing life in excess, you resign yourself to a fate worse than death – perpetual boredom.

Hamblet 5. Wendy, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy, Adelphi University “The Manic Ecstasy of War.” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 17:39–45

Eli Sagan’s At the Dawn of Tyranny posits the advent of civilization as coincidental with the dawn of tyranny and oppression. War, one of the oldest human institutions, has proven invaluable to states in establishing their power over subgroups within the system, as well as in acquiring territories from neighboring peoples to permit their expansion in space and power. Because of war’s great functionality to the state, there remains little mystery to the long-term success of war as a state institution over the formative millennia of civilization. The continuing popularity of war among modern states ostensibly dedicated to democracy, freedom, and the dignity of human beings, remains baffling to violence scholars. Karl von Clausewitz’s On War, considered by many scholars to be the canonical treatment of the war philosophy, attributes to war a logic all its own: war composes a compulsion, a dynamic that aims at excessive overflow, absolute expenditure of the energies of the state. War seeks absolutization as it feeds and fires the population’s martial enthusiasm; if unchecked by political goals, war will fulfill itself in the maximum exertion of self-expenditure—self-annihilation. War composes a potlatch of state resources, a useless splurge of the nation’s human and economic wealth for no better reason than wanton celebration of state power. The language of absolute expenditure resonates with the philosophy of Georges Bataille. His philosophy explains two principles of expenditure— the principle of classical utility defined by utilitarian goals serving current power relations, and that of nonproductive expenditure—that is, orgiastic outflow or ek-stasis that escapes mundane servitude to reason and utility. Political implications of the two economies are exposed in Bataille’s “Propositions on Fascism.” There, the two dialectical opposites represent extreme possibilities for the state structures. The first model aspires to perfect order, like the timeless realm of the gods, a frozen homogeneous perfection that is monocephalic (single-headed). Like the god, the monocephalic state becomes self-identified as a sacred entity—changeless, eternal, and perfect, its laws and customs fixed and imperative. At the other end of the structural spectrum resides the second form of state—the acephalic state—disordered, anarchic, and volatile. This state is seen by ordered states as a terrifying, heterogeneous primitive lifeform where uncivilized tribes practice mystical thinking, incommensurable truths, and mad affective experience. Unreasonable. Useless. Mad. People within the acephalic social structure enjoy abundant ritual lives that offer escape from the mundane in orgiastic festivals involving drunkenness, dancing, blood rites, wanton tortures, self-mutilation, and even murder in the name of dark monster gods. The monocephalic state, on the other hand, has overcome all death. The civilized state boasts an enlightened stable form that promotes reason, life, and progress, whereas the primitive society is referred to chaos, madness, and death. Bataille’s dichotomy provides a valuable framework for analyzing global realities, even in the modern world. Because Bataille insists the models represent dual extreme possibilities in the cyclical evolution of all states, then all states seek timeless stability, secured against time with absolute truth claims, infallible social codes, and enduring legislation. States are duly secured by the legalized violence of police and military that appropriate the illegal violence of the people and ultimately suppress all transformation. Intricate unyielding systems of rules and regulations—passports, licenses, identity cards, forms completed in triplicate, travel restrictions, immigration regulations, police interrogations, surveillance of social and financial transactions among subgroups, security checkpoints, departments of homeland security—weed out the deviant lifeforms until ultimately all countervoices have been silenced, all rebellion quite obliterated, all evolutionary movement logically contradictory. But, at this evolutionary apex, a problem arises in paradise. As the monocephalic state increasingly closes itself off, it stifles social existence, smothers creative energies, chokes the passion from its citizen-devotees, suffocates their spiritual urges, and reduces all sacrifices to mundane utility. When the perfect eternality of the structure is complete and the nation duly deified, all labors have become co-opted in utter servitude. Bataille names this culminating stage of development, the peaceful, stable end sought by all states, in its most excessive extrapolation—fascism. Ultimately, however, life and time must break free and move forward into futures. This most solid state holds firm for a short while only; then there begins a condensation of forces. Life rises up and explodes the suffocating stasis, disintegrating the solid, erect whole. Existence and liberty flow forth in rage, blood, tears, and passion. The death of God is complete. For Bataille, these endless cycles describe the movement of history: the erection of unitary gods of knowledge and power that ultimately ossify into totalities, and then explode in hysterical, raging catastrophes, releasing the explosive liberty of life from mundane servitude. The acephalic chaos will eventually recompose, slowly heaving up an ugly divine head once again. Life turns back on its chaotic freedom and develops what Bataille calls an aversion to the initial decomposition. The chaotic structure moves from the ek-stasis bliss of wanton pleasures and pains toward the stasis of the deity once again. Time, states, and human individuals, for Bataille, move between the two contradictory forms: stasis and ek-stasis. Time demands both forms in the world—the eternal return of an imperative object, and the explosive, creative, destructive rage of the liberty of life. Bataille’s analysis of state evolution offers resolution to the mystery of the frequency of wars in the modern civilized era: It suggests that war composes a “potlatch”—a manic ecstasy of useless self-expenditure that permits a breakout from mundane servitude.We may not readily recognize, in our states, the extreme forms that Bataille describes—fascist stasis or chaotic ecstasy. We believe that, although chaos is unquestionably undesirable, fascism is promoted only by madmen—Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin. We may be convinced that fascist urges fade with global democracy where all people will, eventually, know the order and security of the first world. Modern Western states, we may object, compose a golden mean between Bataille’s two economies, aspiring neither to fascism nor to a manic primitivism, but to the reasonable metron of golden rules. But the roots of the Western world are well planted in the fascist drive for hyper-order and changeless eternality. Hesiod and the PreSocratics, as much as Jewish and Christian myth, cite a common arche of the universe in the good works of a god that renders order (cosmos) out of chaos (kaos). For the ancients, one head (cephalus) is far superior to many; simplicity is beauty, whereas the many compose hoi poloi, an embarrassment of riches. The foundational logic that posits monocephalic order as ontologically and morally superior to acephalic multivocity remains an unquestioned assumption embedded in the Western lifeworld. A single well-ordered edifice, stretching high into the sky—erect, rigid, unyielding—is preferable, in the Western mind, to the broadest playing field studded with incongruous heroics. Bataille’s meditations on the dark underside of reason’s projects and triumphs, on such prohibited subjects as monstrous tortures, illicit sexual excesses, and the colorful anuses of apes, provide a theater of cruelty and death that is designed to challenge the polite threshold of civilized culture, to shock and interrupt the philosophical tradition it invades, and to subvert the pretenses of refined sophistication thought definitive of civilized society. Bataille shows that people are torn by conflicting drives, by lofty ideals, and by the dark concealed forces they suppress and deny.Lorenz states that Bataille’s treatment of the dark, concealed urges in human nature offer resolution to the paradox of the simultaneous lofty goals of modern states and the frequency of brutal aggressions by those very states naming themselves the most civilized. Perhaps the popularity and frequency of war even in the civilized modern era represents the release of suppressed subterranean drives within industrialized, rationalist, rigidly hierarchically ordered populations enslaved to reason and utility.The violence that floods the globe in modernity, that claims to be serving reasonable projects of global freedom and democracy, may represent new forms expressing old desires, the projects of monocephalic statehood aspiring to deification. Bataille recognizes chthonic forces as instrumental in the modern world: “The economic history of modern times is dominated by the epic but disappointing effort of fierce men to plunder the riches of the Earth [and turn its fire and metal into weapons] ... . [M]an [lives] an existence at the mercy of the merchandise he produces, the largest part of which is devoted to death.” The fierce men of modernity—gods, kings, and their modern sequels (presidents, popes, corporate rulers)—extend their control to the ends of the planet. Fierce men disembowel the Earth and turn on their own kind the products of molten metal torn from her bowels to ensure the permanence of their nations. War, states Bataille, “represents the desperate obstinacy of man opposing the exuberant power of time and finding security in an immobile and almost somnolent erection.” Bataille believes that primitive urges are still at work in the projects of modernity. Human beings, as much as superstructures of power, must satisfy their dark urges for the good of their communities. They must release their death drives if they are to gather together in heartfelt communities. Human beings crave mystical, passionate, frenzied escape from the rigorous projects of their ordered systems. If Bataille is correct, people must ultimately break free from the mundane enterprises of their everyday lives. Their inner demons will beckon them from their ordered worlds to revel in orgiastic festival. Surely Bataille’s claim—that life’s erotic drives will out and fulfill themselves in deathly destructiveness and wanton joy—should trouble us greatly, given the leveling effects of modern industrial society, its will to mediocrity, utility, and conformity. But is Bataille correct in his attribution of a measureless and rending character to modern war? Is modern warfare the aimless catastrophe that Bataille claims it to be? If so, then modern wars can be explained, according to Bataille, as ecstatic release from the fascist orientation of modern ordered states and from people’s imprisonment within the merchandise they produce. Modern war, with its Shock and Awe techno-theatrics, should provide a wondrous release from mundane servitude. 42 WENDY C. HAMBLET War could be said to satisfy collective fantasies of manic omnipotence and the drive for self-sacrifice for sacred values. Perhaps the wars of modernity occur with such rabid frequency because people must satisfy their suppressed lust for a sexualized release from the cold reality of state projects, the utilitarian reasons of state. This resonates with Clausewitz’s claim that people’s martial enthusiasm must find release in politically restrained wars or fulfill itself in the maximum exertion of self-expenditure, that is, self-annihilation. For Clausewitz, modernity represents that unfettered stage when war has escaped all political bounds and reasonable restraint. Although ostensibly a world driven by the lofty goals, modernity—for Clausewitz—composes an era of absolute war. The democratic revolution may have embraced other goals—citizen welfare and the grandeur of their rulers—but democracy, for Clausewitz, composes merely one of a number of crucial forces (the scientific revolution that provides the technology, the industrial revolution that provides mass production of weaponry, and the imperialism that draws the entire globe into the war system) that have been successfully harnessed to the powerprojects of the mightiest nations. The goods of the modern West, including the good of democracy, exist to extend Western hegemony globally in the marketplace of military power. But Bataille claims that war is useless expenditure—a release of the primal urges of a community toward excessive overflow. He states: “Military existence is based on a brutal negation of any profound meaning of death and, if it uses cadavers, it is only to make the living march in a straighter line.” But, if war is to be posited as an ecstatic release, it must compose orgiastic overflow, an entirely useless and pointless expenditure of the nation’s finest goods. Excessive expenditure is defeated the moment the violent explosion of forces serves mundane projects of servitude and utility. When war serves the purposes of the state, it loses its manic and ecstatic character and ceases to fulfill the people’s deepest needs for release from servitude and instrumentality. But Bataille is mistaken; the apparent uselessness of modern warfare is a deception, an illusion. War is one of the oldest traditions of our species. It has become a timeworn vehicle precisely because it serves a great many functions in states. Clausewitz names the institution of war a form of communication between nations. Franco Fornari states: “War is a multifunctional institution. ... It is extremely difficult to find a substitute that would perform all of its functions.” One of the most crucial functions that war provides in service of the state is the crystallization of its monopoly on violence. War is a crucial aspect of the centralizing, evolutionary process that culminates, ultimately, in fascist stability. The establishment of a massive and robust military is THE MANIC ECSTASY OF WAR 43 utterly necessary to the deification of the structure and the raising of a sturdy cephalus, because, along with the creation of strong policing and military forces, war serves to alienate the private violence of the citizens and place their collective aggressive energies into the hands of the cephalus. War serves the collective illusion of eternality. War serves other crucial functions in the state: it confirms the values, virtues, and meanings of one’s own cultural group. Sacred symbols—flags, national anthems, tales of past heroes, fallen ancestors—are put to work in luring the best of the nation—its strong and courageous youths—to the extreme patriotism required to maintain order in fascist regimes. The seduction of the nation’s best to its wars includes their provision of an international stage to display the collective prowess of the nation, a point of pride for all citizens, even the most oppressed of the society, and it allows for the individual display of the soldiers’ manly character—the valor, the selflessness, the loyalty. The wars of modern super-states continue in the tradition of imperialist projects of old. Posited as serving the most selfless values—the advancement of freedom, democracy, and the spread of civilization—today’s wars clearly bring too massive a booty to be named selfless expenditures. In fact, for the past fifty years, wars have increasingly become shameless lootings of helpless peoples—the projects of economists and accountants and big businessmen purified by political propaganda and backed by an arsenal of modern techno-weaponry. War serves the needs of the cephalus; it serves the personal narcissism of the leaders, and the collective narcissism of the combatants and civilians. Above all, modern wars serve economic goals; their booty is prodigious. They may cost the sacred love-object (the nation) massive capital, human and monetary, but the generals, the political leaders, and their corporate cronies profit handsomely from the hostilities. War also serves the fantasy that the sacred love-object (the nation) is the savior and benefactor of the globe; war serves the paranoid collective delusion that the cephalus is infallible and indestructible, unlimited as the god in its strength and in its moral substance. Killing the enemies, propagandized as evil, the collective illusion is fed that evil is overthrown: thus the sanctity of the loveobject is preserved. Sacred values are recomposed; the cephalus stands taller, more erect, more firm than ever in the wake of a good war. But for all the benefits served by the institution of war, modern wars are deeply tragic; they do waste millions of innocent lives; they tear apart societies and disburse homeless families across the globe. One in nine of the earth’s seven billion now lives a miserable, wandering, hopeless existence on parched lands where even the earth mother is barren. 44 WENDY C. HAMBLET Ultimately the greatest tragedy of modern war lies in its stark utility to the few at the extreme expenditure of its many. The utility of war defeats the purposes of war by frustrating the deepest needs of the society—the people’s need to build heartfelt communities, a need that can only be served by expressing the collective aggressive energies of the society beyond utility. Bataille states that: “Since [war] is essentially constituted by armed force, it can give to those who submit to its force of attraction nothing that satisfies the great human hungers, because it subordinates everything to a particular utility ... it must force its half-seduced lovers to enter the inhuman and totally alienated world of barracks, military prisons, and military administrations.” In fact, it may well be the non-release of ecstatic urges that explains a state’s return, year after year and decade after decade, to that old institution. It may be that the deepest paradox of modern war is that, in its usefulness to the cephalus and in its service to the fascist drives of the state, war proves utterly useless in dispensing its most fundamental function; it ceases to discharge the most vicious and cruel needs of the people, their deepest primitive motivations, whose collective release makes possible the formation of a heartfelt community. Bataille counts this failure as the most tragic of the multiple tragedies of modern war. The sacred values of community—life, freedom, festival, and the joy of communal fraternity—are rendered meaningful only in juxtaposition to their opposites. Bataille states: “The emotional element that gives an obsessive value to communal life is death.” But, ultimately, insists Bataille, the sacrifice will be celebrated beyond the reasonable purposes of the cephalus. If Bataille is correct, then we can be certain that, for those states whose wars are utterly utilitarian, self-annihilation is imminent.

#### Rather than thinking of violence as something external to, or apart from, the thinking-subject, the alternative recognizes violence as an irreducible condition of subjectivity and overcomes distinctions between subjects and objects, the self and others.

Direk 4

Zeynep, Professor of Philosophy, KOC University, “Bataille on Immanent and Transcendent Violence” Bulletin de la Societe Amencaine de Philosophy de Langue Franfais vol 14 no 2 fall 2004.

In the archaic world of paganism, immanence acquires a sacred and divine character as soon as the profane world of work and action begins to separate itself from the intimacy of all beings. In describing that moment, Bataille qualifies immanence explictly as "continuous," "impersonal" and "without distinction," and qualifies intimacy as "profound subjectivity" (TR 301/33). In The Accursed Share, he interprets that ground in terms of the dynamic and fluid life energy that is always in excess. Life is always already excessive because every living organism receives more energy from the cosmos than the amount sufficient for its self-preservation. In contrast to the limited problems of classical economy, "in the general problem there always reappears the essence of the biomass, which must constantly destroy (consume) a surplus of energy."2 Immanence can never be articulated in terms of the opposition between subject and object, which characterizes experience in the profane world of work, action and project. 30 BATAILLE ON VIOLENCE However, it is the place of a deep subjectivity, a confused, non-reflective consciousness of the self that is not limited by the I or other I's (fR 300/31). I believe that Bataille is a radical thinker of subjectivity, and his attempt to go beyond the classical notion of the subject can be related to Merleau-Ponty's thinking of subjectivity as incarnated in The Phenomenology of Perception. 3What Merleau Ponty calls "the ante-predicative life of consciousness" or "the silence of primary consciousness" is the natural perceptive involvement of incarnated existence with the world. 4 In that involvement, the relation with the other is not based on absolute separation, but on the fact that bodily operative intentions read, understand, constantly connect, and affectively communicate with each other. Merleau-Ponty writes that operative intentionality "produces the natural and ante-predicative unity of the world and of our life"; it furnishes "the text which our knowledge tries to translate into precise language."s For both Merleau-Ponty and Bataille, subjectivity as the immanent unity of the world and life can never become the object of knowledge, although it can be "experienced." Such an experience, which implies the loss of a subject as clear consciousness of objects is, in Bataille's economical terms, nothing but an unlimited expenditure of energy. Bataille thinks that the subject, as an individual and separate being, belongs to transcendence, for it has always already transcended the natural environment and is in a position to know objects from the outside. Knowledge is a possibility of transcendence, going outside of oneself to an impenetrable other. Moreover, that transcendence is related to violence not only because representation is violent but also because the subject in the world of work is subordinated and servile. The violence to which animals are exposed in nature is very different than the violence to which we are exposed, and which reproduces us in the world of work as knowing, acting, speaking subjects. In the technological era, man lives under the domination of anonymous powers and experiences. He is subject to both oppression and the empty promises of transcendence. According to Bataille, the deep truth of subjectivity is never revealed by transcendence. Although he believes that the expenditure of the forces of the body-for example, erotic experience and laughter-may open a way for the realm of immanence in which we re-establish our continuity with all living and non-living beings, this feeling of continuity is for him nothing n10re than abrief touching of the untouchable. The fact that he talks about "the lost intimacy" in our being even in the context of his historical discourse on the displacement of the borders between the sacred and the profane in successive historical worlds may give rise to the impression that Bataille is giving expression to a desire to go back to our archaie, immediate animal existence by transgressing our subjectivist and objectivist modern cultures. That way of reading Bataille can make his thought look like some sort of metaphysical nostalgia. However, this interpretation becomes suspect if we emphasize that the loss here is not the absence of something that was previously present, but the absence of something that is still present in our lived experience-even though it is erased, forgotten, and constantly ignored by the ways in which we schematize our experience. Our lost intimacy with other living beings-from which immanent violence is never missing-is animal as well as divine, life as much as death. Perhaps we need to treat "immanent violence" as an ontological concept that may call for interpretation on the basis of an ontology of life. Obviously, this constitutes the ontological foundation of Bataille's further distinction between interior and exterior violence, in terms of which he reads destruction in societies. The distinction between immanent and transcendent violence I find in Bataille has an explanatory value as an analytical tool. At the final analysis, it will be especially useful in understanding why Bataille refrains from condemning violence in purely ethical or political terms. How does Bataille draw the species barrier between non-human animals and human animals? He believes, with Nietzsche, that the world of things, inclividuals, work, utility and action transcends immanent life. In a sense, only when we were not yet "human" were we completely immanent to nature. In Theory of Religion, he conceives oE non-human animality in terms oE "immanence" and "immecliacy" (TR 291/17). The emphasis on "immecliacy" marks a liEe limited to the realm oE the sensible. A non-human animal is deprived of universal concepts and ideas that serve as schemes for constructing a world out of life. Immanence is determined by an inability to overcome the environment in which a living being spends its life. Transcendence is the overcoming oE the sensible toward the cancept that Erames nature, whereas immanence is being imprisoned in the environing sensible element. We should note that this use oE the couple "transcendence-immanence" singles out man among other species as a builder oE the world, failing to emphasize that as humans we inhabit the earth along with other species. The definition oE man as a "thinking animaI" immecliately gives way to a discourse articulating what thinking may mean as a specific diEEerence, and usually not to what we may share with other animal species. But Eor Bataille, what is leEt unthought in this definition is precisely our being inside animality as weIl as outside it. As an animal species on earth, we have ventured outside the immanent continuity oE being by a movement oE transcendence. Because our intelligence originates in an interruption of immanence, it is bound to remain ignorant of its source. Intellegence can never return to immanence without losing itself in it, and in the realm of transcendence it Eails ta attain consciousness of the fact that the kernel of Ollr being still belangs to immanence. Nevertheless, Bataille does not merely affirm that we can swim upstream, against intelligence, using intelligence against itself to create an opportunity to find an exit to a conscious experience of the internal relation of all living beings. Only the violence which I exert, or to which I am exposed, can tear apart the constructed structures of the world of subjects and objects in which life is suffocated, and can give us access to sovereign experiences of immanence. Selfconsciousness in Bataille's sense, which is not-knowing, is only possible through such experiences. Intelligence is bound to remain foreign to the life that gave rise to it: it can only enframe, intervene and know nature from the outside; it will always fail to communicate with life from within. However, mental life consists not only of rational thinking. The immanent flow of our incarnated consciousness, which is essentially an internal relation of communication with others in unceasing differentiation, is not constituted or controlled by a knowing subject. By "incarnated existence," we here need to understand impersonal existence, the way in which life communicates with itself. We gain access to that immanence and experience it only through the interruption of the world of utility and work, and the dissolution of the individuality that makes possible the overcoming of the separation of beings from each other. In our contact with the elements, in nutrition, in the satisfaction of our needs, in desire and erotic experience, we take part in the rhythm of communication of life with itself, even though cultural forces persuade us to control that contact with animal existence within us to tame it and forget it. "Immanence" for Bataille does not mean immanence to an object or a subject but to a total Being or "One." An animal's lack of access to transcendence does not imply that it is a being closed in its inner world, for it does not have an inner world in which to enclose itself. Animal is immanent to the environment in which it lives and does not have the capacity to transcend it. But how is this milieu, this "One", described? Bataille depicts it by invoking the type of certainty that manifests itself "when an animal eats another one" (TR 291/1 7). When an animal eats another one, the meaning of the situation in which the former finds itself is clearly similar to that of the latter. The similarity between the meanings of those two situations cannot be found in the sensations that the animals have, for one is being torn to pieces by the other. Nevertheless, both animals are immanent to one and the same medium, which does not make the one who is active in eating "transcendent" with respect to the other who is eaten. In some kinds of animals, during the period of copulation males fight for females and those males who prove to be stronger chase away the others. There is a difference between the victorious animal and the defeated one. However the victory, if it is not by chance, proves nothing else than a quantitative difference of strength (TR 292/18). The establishment of such a difference does not make the victorious male transcend the others. The acts of killing, winning, and copulating give rise to a feeling of "transcendence" only in the human world, due to the "objectification" of the other as passive. In opposition to the immanent violence in nature, violence is seen as a mark of transcendence in the human world. It bears in itself the promise of elevating man to God, enabling him to incorporate an image of Him. Revealed religions bal~ homicide and human sacrifice. In the Muslim religion, to take away someone's life, given to him/her by God, is to transgress the limits of the realm in which human beings can legitimately use their power. To kill someone is to usurp God's authority over life and death and thus to set one's self as an equal to God. This is why only wars fought in the name of God can legitimate the killing of human beings. The idea that, in killing, the murderer substitutes himself for God, bears in itself the implicit tendency to trunk that violence can deify a human being. Physically abusive husbands, parents, torturers and rapists take themselves to be transcending their victims. This sense of transcendence is accompanied by a pleasure stemming from their perception of physical superiority as constituting an ontological, epistemological, and even a moral difference. In Theory of Religion, Bataille writes, "The lion is not the king of the animals. In the movement of waters, he is only a higher tide that can reverse the weaker ones. That an animal eats another does not change a fundamental situation: every animal is in the world like water in water' (fR 292/18-19).6 By contrast, man is not in the world like water in water. Even a superficial glimpse of "social status" in the human world will show that factors such as "education," "gender," "ethnicity," "race," and "class" intersect to constitute quite incomparable situations. The power of transcendence in the world of work, utility and action rests on situational differences, and the subject who assumes a status that such crisscrossing of differences may assign to it pays for this by losing his/her own sovereign selE7 To the genealogy of the transcendence of the subject belong the experiences of fear, submission, guilt, self-contempt, self-hatred, imitation of the desire of the other, and the illusion of self-sufficiency, self-coincidence and independence. Being before the law and entering it, the fundamental experience of the symbolic order is a trauma. In the world of work, in order to become a subject, one needs to sacrifice one's self in the face of power, repress one's immediate desires, reconcile oneself with the authority, accept being rewarded and punished by it and delay free self-expression until one has nothing left to express. Bataille seeks ways of transgressing the limits of a life of submission to the world of power relations, but he is skeptical about the "warrior of freedom" as well. Both the submissive self and the revolutionary self become subjects by being exposed to transcendent violence, and they are produced by their opposite reactions to it. Oppressive systems of power do change by sacrificing or marginalizing those who fight for freedom, yet their challenge and resistance open the path of communication for those who keep silent out of fear of persecution as surrogate victims. Freedom fighters become surrogate victims. However, it is also true that, even when they cannot make a difference that directly changes the oppressive systems, they open the way for the discourse that paves the way for transformation. The fighter for freedom may be saving the dignity of the environment, but helshe cannot attain his/her self consciousness in so far as helshe is committed to action and work for the common utility. An interior outlet to immanence is neither possible for those who wait for their turn to be in charge of power nor for the marginalized revolutionary. In short, struggle for power, no matter what the consequences are, takes one away from the direction of the immanence in which Bataille sees "the sovereign good" and the ultimate possibility of our existence. Neither submission to law and authority nor revolt may lead to immanence. Occupying a position of power within a system licenses the subject to use violence. The feeling of transcendence experienced as the possessor of that power is in fact illusory, for the truth is that one is temporarily possessed by that power. Because one is only the surrogate subject, the transient host of power, the truth of the appearance of subjective potency is nothing but impotence. Immanent violence targets this illusory sense of transcendence. For example, Fight Club, one of the cult movies of recent years, lends itself to being read in terms of the question of the unleashing of immanent violence against the nluch greater violence errlbedded in a society organized by advanced capitalist relations of production. 8 The anti-heros of this movie exert immanent violence to destroy the ways in which life is possessed by the desire to possess. They find relief in a play of violence among friends which makes winning and losing insignificant and yet their immanent violence risks being lost in revolutionary terrorism. Fight Club seems to begin in Bataillean fashion as a "project against the project" and ends up as a struggle to prevent the other's death to which it leads. This struggle is not the result of a conflict between the return to immanence and morality or religion. It is a struggle between transcendent and immanent violence. The argument that a living being's life can be sacrificed for higher ends is a mark of transcendent violence, for there are no such ends in immanence. Of course, this is not to say that immanence has no risk or no danger. A plane of immanence on which no concern for transcendence can have a hold manifests itself with an unthinkable power to emancipate. A globalizing world promises no history that would make mankind even more transcendent. Technology tolerates only the accumulation of information which supplies no critical resources. Given this present state of affairs, violence seems to have already lost the promise of transcendence. However, one may ask about the victims of immanent violence too. For example, what about the pornographic snuff movies which cause the deaths of thousands of women in the world? Would that be a phenomenon of immanent violence? Let us turn to Theory of Religion before we speculate about how Bataille might answer that question. The violence that makes transcendence possible presupposes an act of objectification. Unlike human consciousness which distinguishes itself from its objects, an eagle that attacks a lamb does not distinguish it from itself. An object is by definition that which is thrown in front of an onlooker, and thus something I can set up over against myself. Unlike the hammer I use or the other whose hand I hold, an object can never be an extension of my living body. The eagle does not perceive the lamb as an object. Animals do not have an "outside world" that consists of objects. Given that objects are temporal syntheses, and presupposing with Bataille that the dimension of future that marks intelligence is not open to animals, an animal cannot see its prey as an object. According to Bataille, the eating of one animal by another is consumption, an extermination that has no duration and occurs in an actual time in which nothing is objectified. 9 Neither can we say that an animal that eats another one is using it. The eagle is immersed in the nutritive "element" in the act of emptying the intestines of the other that it lays open. In contrast to the relation with an object, the immanent relation with the other does not involve a separation, a distinction between me and the other. According to Bataille such an internal relation with the other has no duration, that is, it is always in the present. This is not to say that it is closed to the future. However, the future here is not the time of projects but a time that can never be anticipated. When Bataille writes that "intimacy is violence," we should perhaps understand this in terms of the fragilities of inter-corporeality as much as the exposure by the present to a future that is to come, without any possibility of anticipation. Bataille emphasizes that duration belongs to the world of objects. Objects are spatial and temporal syntheses. It is important to ren1ember that Merleau-Ponty explains the illusion of transcendence by taking his departure precisely from that synthetic nature of perception. As is well-known, for Merleau-Ponty an object that appears in its thickness is spatial as well as temporal, and is never given to my perception from all the points of view at once. 10 That the gaze is always bound to a certain perspective implies that the object will always absolutely be partially closed. Our classic and ordinary fiction of an "object" owes its being to the attribution of the primacy of vision over all the other senses, and to the presupposition that there can be an all-encompassing gaze. In Merleau-Ponty's terms, this illusion rests on our forgetting the role played by the spatiality of the living body in vision. We may say that our tendency, in our imagination, to separate the gaze from the living body to which it belongs is one of the conditions of transcendence that can make even the world itself an object. "It is the ex-stase of perception which causes all perception to be perception of something."ll When we conceive the world as a big object, we forget that we inhabit the earth with our fellow creatures. Now, immanent violence is an attempt to overcome the separation between the I and the other that gave rise to subjects and objects. If, in the age of technology, one can talk about violence on a plane of immanence which does not bring about or reproduce transcendence by becoming internal to the subject, history, God, and so on, then such violence may attest to the experience of the living body through pain, or through an experience of remembering that heals. The violence that results in transcendence objectifies-the female body killed by snuff is set on the screen as the ultimate object in which life is destroyed. On the other hand, in the lived experience of immanent violence, the desire is to destroy the object that is the human body, the human body as an object. Bataille knows well that our civilization treats the female body as an object of a male gaze; however, erotic experience as a sovereign experience cannot have anything to do with objectification, except to overcome it. In so far as the erotic is a touching of lost intimacy, it is the dissolution of both object and subject

### 2nr – war thesis

Our thesis – war is ontologically constitutive – the inner experience of mystical and sacrificial war is fundamentally the same as conventional war on the battlefield – humans necessarily consume more energy than they output – the unproductive use of the excess energy is the moment of war – that moment of expenditure is necessary to existence – that’s Wilson – if we constantly try purify it through regulations like the elimination of nuclear weapons, we either suffocate all forms of human pleasure OR that unproductive expenditure reemerges in more insidious forms of violence – that’s hamblet 5 – [their concession of this is/if we win this it’s] an auto-neg presumption ballot even if they win framework because it means that even if indopak tensions are resolved that same violence will reemerge in different ways through bioweapons, chemical weapons or conventional weapons at the same or greater scale which takes out solvency

Our theory of war is proven by anthropology – this warrant from our Hamblet 7 card goes conceded – the first inventors of pebble tools used them to kill fellow humans – the Peking Man cooked his peers – the order they demand through the passage of the plan doesn’t resolve violence, it creates it – Hamblet says that cultural proficiencies create the need for radical violence to escape from the incessant order of the world, they don’t reduce conflict

### 2nr – link – war

the link is the 1ac’s conception war – by understanding war as something external from the subject i.e. viewing indo-pak war as something that can be manipulated separately from ourselves, they render violence more insidious – that’s hamblet 5 and direk – elimination of the nuclear factor of wars is nothing but a sanitization of war that does nothing but resolve our insecurities abour our own violent tendencies

[by situating war as something inhumane/etc] they attempt to distance themselves from all forms of violence in a forming of cleansing that allows us to forget humans are not perfect – this is evident in phenomena like the erasure of indigenous people, the japan removing any information about their invasion of china in world war 2 from history books, and the claim that the civil war was about states’ rights – by attempting to distinguish conflict from human nature, they justify any form of violence that can be concealed by history – that’s hamblet 7 – there are a few impacts

First is deification – they pave the road for endless wars in the name of geopolitical prosperity and violent lash-outs against all deemed incoherent – this outweighs the aff and turns case – that was the work we did at the top of the 2nr– war becomes more advanced and more insidious – first it’s war against [1ac enemy], then war against the environment, then war against finitude – if and when indopak tensions still exist post aff, we’ll just need a more extreme measure like bioweapons or external nukes or worse – this turns their escalation arguments and means only the alt solves the case – that’s hamblet 5

Second is value deferral – by purifying all forms of violence to create a perfect world sans indopak war and nuclear weapons to create a perfect world of stasis, they banish all forms of chaos or ek-stasis, which hamblet indicates are a precondition for experiencing value – otherwise nihilism is cemented as we can no longer experience any sort of world outside the order we create through their logic of utility – that’s hamblet 5 this will be largely explained on the framework page

Third is externalization of violence - it is only through the distancing of ourselves from any object that we can enact violence – extend direk – it is the subject/object distinction they engender when they posit indopak tensions, nuclear escalation and in general the plan as external from this round that enables purified wars and violence against the other – this creates lash-outs against difference and is the root cause of environmental destruction, persecution and tensions between india and pakistan – it is only through the subject/object distinction that we can establish differences that justify violence against the other

### 2nr – framework

Our interpretation is that you should evaluate the round based upon competing affect

All of debate operates on the level of affect – speaking activities can only function through affective persuasion. Foregoing this analysis means erasing the very existence of debate itself. Your ballot is not a referendum on the fiated plan but rather its affective impact derived from its presentation

This solves their theory arguments – it’s predictable and fair

We can lose framework and still win this debate – just evaluate the K as an impact turn

There’s a monocephalic enlightenment disad to their interpretation that functions as independent offense versus the aff – if we win this but lose the link you still vote neg – extend hamblet – the project of imagining a perfectly ordered world through fiat lends itself to a weeding out of all forms of difference ––we lash out against all that doesn’t conform to our model in an attempt to establish an ideal world – that drive or hyper-order and stasis recreates fascism and violence against the other – and – it independently causes a retreat away from all forms of irrationality – we fear that which we cannot squeeze into our perfect post-plan world – as we run away from all that we can’t predict, our lives become devoid of all value and we succumb to perpetual boredom – that independently outweighs case – if life is devoid of value then extinction isn’t net negative

This internal link turns all of their offense because we can never leave debate and use our [portable skills/etc] because debate is the only place that exists in this fantasy world of complete tabula-rasa style rationality that is now the sole arbiter of value.

Their interpretation reifies the ritualistic patterns of the hunt – by imposing static rules onto debate, they convey a logic of domination that tries to produce a certain type of debater, makes debate a training ground – the repetition of fiated discussions forces debaters to approach the world in a certain way that prevents all alt solvency and means links are disads to their framework – they creates a sense of helplessness and hopelessness with the real world and then promise to us that the rules will always be there to protect us from the complexity of existence

### 2nr – alt

The alternative is a recognition of the inability to differentiate between the self and the external – what direk calls immanent violence – we advocate for an elimination of the subject object distinction that allows for a new conception of violence – rather than eliminating war through the purification of the liberal world order, the alternative is a war against the very concept of the self – we reject the notion that there is an I that is distinguished from anything outside of the self – that independently means we reject any attempt to perceive or know the world external from ourselves – that solves the aff – to enact violence against the other requires you perceive the other as different from yourself – and it solves war – countries won’t need to go to war because excess energy will have been expulsed in the unproductive expenditure of violence against the self – if we win our war is ontological thesis then we solve their escalation internal links– this is not a form of physical self-harm but rather metaphysical violence against the concept of the self

[insert nasty k tricks]

### 2nr – at: perm

What the perm is really asking you is “if gutted all the claims the 1ac made, then could we win?” – if you look at the claims the 1ac made, they clearly have a conception of value that is incommensurate with the alt – they obviously think of [xyz country] as external from themselves – they obviously conceive of war and of death as a static event – that means that there’s either no net benefit to the perm because they’ve severed out of the entire 1ac or the perm can’t solve because it doesn’t actually abadon the subject/object distinction

There’s an independent mastery disad to the perm – the affirmatives attempt to perceive and create values to describe the world engender a logic of instrumental rationality where we desire to know all – there are three impacts – first, this desire for knowledge necessarily posits the world as external from the subject which means the perm can’t solve the links – second, their project of rendering the world calculable prevents all value as all forms of pleasure and positive experiences are passed off as numbers and statistics – third, this sisyphean task of complete rationality in the world creates ressentiment and cruel optimism as we never gain complete understanding of the world – any attempt to impose a value system or understand facets of the world engender this disad – only the alternative alone can solve it

### 2nr – at: util

They say util – but they’ve conceded an answer to util in the hamblet 5 card – if you only view useful things as a means to an end, you constantly ask the why question – why is that useful, etc, etc – eventually, the chain of reasons bottoms out and you’ll say something is intrinsically valuable – but – intrinsic value is inherently not utilitarian – it has no use by definition – which means the logic of utility depends on something that’s useless – this engenders an independent mastery impact – they hope for a complete answer to the endless why question – this attempt to achieve total knowledge through instrumental rationality over value terminates in a nihilistic project wherein all value is lost – our solution of nonproductive expenditure resolves this – by describing everything as intrinsically valuable, we collapse the means/end logic that justifies violence against those who are seen as useless which is more offense against util and escape from the endless conflict of utility that prevents all value

### ---at: extinction outweighs

a. Evaluating extinction as a prior question in every instance is infinitely regressive which makes violence inevitable and precludes value

b. If we win our value deferral impact then extinction isn’t a net negative

### 2nr – at: rules

Lol we may mockingly take part in repressive structures, but only to scramble the codes and resist those structures again. This is not responsive to the thesis of the aff.

Following speech times does not always equal productivity -- we could probably give a better speech in 6 minutes than you could in 10 minutes -- it just so happened that our arguments came out to roughly that time

## at: cards

### -- at: friedrich

Non-responsive -- Friedrich is a criticism of Bataille’s book “The Grand Narrative” -- aka, not us. This card also makes the comparison to say that enjoying acts of luxury and unproductivity is the same thing as being Jim Jones -- super messed up

### -- at: boldt-irons

These cards are awful -- they advocate for a seemingly “peaceful” world that requires anyone in poverty to give up any hope of having some sort of enjoyment within their life -- the *most privileged argument ever*

### -- at: biles

Non-responsive -- these cards just talk about how Sartre preferred exploring theories of existentialism in his work rather than drawing from Bataille’s model

### -- at: itzkowitz

This card is absurdly hypertagged -- the card says and I quote “Bataille confirms community is what we are after” -- the aff does not desire extinction, but chooses to revel in the uncertainty of existence instead

### -- at: gates

Non-responsive -- all these cards criticize the act of burning money for the dead as being a “waste” -- this notion of unproductivity automatically being a waste is exactly what the 1ac criticizes, but we don’t literally burn money -- we are too broke to do that

### -- at: wollins

Wollins is wrong -- this was answered mainly in the overview but i’ll answer it here too -- even if the aff has a 1% risk of war, conflict will always be inevitable in the world of productivity -- means that it becomes a question of deciding between one glorious war or one hundred catastrophic wars

### -- at: yang

Here is a quote from their card: “If Bataille had addressed our consumer society today, he would have said that this sort of consumption is still in the sense of productivity and productive accumulation”. Moving on. We’ll answer this on the neolib flow too.

### -- at: plontisky

You didn’t read the rest of this card -- it goes on to say that “all of Bataille’s theories are saved by the labyrinth of Bataille’s inscription” -- plontisky says the opposite of what you

### -- at: minkoff/pavlovski

We are not talking about literally stabbing you in the chest you fucktard goodbye

### -- at: goux

All the Goux cards are non-contextual to the aff -- all the cards we read are from this decade contextualizing Bataille’s theories of transgression to the modern-day economy -- you’re the ones reading cards from 1990…

Any arguments about a K of utility are misreadings -- they misunderstand what utility is and nowhere in the 1ac do we define utility as something that is strictly necessary

### -- at: tverberg

Did you ever take a science class -- the 1st rule of thermodynamics says that energy cannot be destroyed, only transformed -- also, death is completely inevitable and ca never be stopped

### -- at: sørenson

Wrong wrong wrong -- empirical examples prove that theories of luxurious expenditure do not allow for capitalist destruction -- the Wenzhou people of China have lived hundreds of years engaging in these methods without being exploited by capitalist ideologies

### -- at: trainer

You misunderstand the aff -- we aren’t saying to go buy an SUV and burn acres of forest -- reveling in luxury can be as simple as eating some really good food or having really good sex -- it doesn’t always necessitate resource waste -- the first Featherstone card in the 1ac also impact turns this -- only an engagement of luxurious expenditure can prevent capitalism from destroying *literally everything*

### -- at: noys

This card flows aff -- it says trying to restrict Bataillian theories with strict rules and regulations is bad -- turns their framework arguments and proves that there will be no topical version of the aff -- trying to limit off bataillian theories with homogenous rules kills all ability to think freely, which means any topical version of the aff will turn all their framework arguments too

## also in 1nc

### spark – bioweapons

#### The aff causes a shift to bioweapons development

Zilinskas 2K

Former Clinical Microbiologist. Dir. – Chem/Bio Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Raymond, Biological warfare: modern offense and defense, 1-2

It is an odd characteristic of biological weapons that military generals tend to view them with distaste, but civilian bioscientists often have lobbied for their development and deployment. There are, of course, understandable reasons for this oddity; generals find that these weapons do not fit neatly into tactical or strategic military doctrines of attack or defense, whereas researchers have observed that transforming microbes into weapons presents interesting scientific challenges whose solution governments have been willing to pay well for. Another oddity is that whenever biological weapons have been employed in battle, they have proven militarily ineffectual, yet bellicose national leaders persevere in seeking to acquire them. There is also a facile explanation for this anomaly, namely, that although pathogens are all too willing to invade prospective hosts, human ingenuity so far has failed to devise reliable methods for effectively conveying a large number of pathogens to the population targeted for annihilation by disease. This repeated failure has not deterred leaders; again and again they become allured by the potential destructive power of biological weapons. Perhaps trusting science too much, they direct government scientists to develop them, believing that this time a usable weapon of mass destruction will be achieved. Their belief so far has been thwarted, but is it possible that within the foreseeable future the potential of **b**iological **w**eapons will be realized and that the effect of a biological bomb, missile, or aerosolized cloud can be as readily predetermined as that of a bomb or missile carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead? There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our **perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change.** The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, **leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms** as the most accessible form of **w**eapon of **m**ass **d**estruction.

#### That’s worse than the aff – only the alt solves

Singer 1

(Clifford E., professor of nuclear engineering and director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana – Champaign, “Will mankind survive the millennium?” Bulletin of the program in Arms Control Disarmament, and International Security, 13:1, Swords and Ploughshares, http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/312/WillMankindSurvivetheMillennium.pdf)

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a so called nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above [hu]mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years. There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose **a more serious threat to human survival**. The first and most immediate **is biological warfare** combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.

### conventional weapons

#### Conventional wars happen faster and are more deadly than the case

Payne 16

President of the National Institute for Public Policy, the head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State [Keith B. Payne, Once Again: Why a ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy Is a Very Bad Idea, July 6 16, <https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/07/no-first-use-nuclear/>]

It would reduce the potential cost of using conventional, chemical, and biological attacks for would-be aggressors. The Obama administration reportedly is seriously considering adopting a “no first use” (NFU) nuclear-weapons policy. A prospective NFU policy would be a U.S. commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons — as opposed to existing policy, which retains some ambiguity regarding when and if the U.S. would use nuclear weapons. An NFU policy would eliminate that ambiguity for U.S. adversaries. It sounds warm and progressive and has long been a policy proposal of disarmament activists. NFU has, however, been rejected by all previous Democratic and Republican administrations for very sound reasons, most recently by the Obama administration in 2010. The most important of these reasons is that retaining a degree of U.S. nuclear **ambiguity helps to deter war**, while adopting an NFU policy would undercut that deterrence. How so? Under the existing policy of ambiguity, potential aggressors such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran must contemplate the reality that if they attack us or our allies, they risk possible U.S. **nuc**lear **retal**iation. **There is no doubt** whatsoever that this risk of possible U.S. nuclear retaliation has deterred war and the escalation of conflicts. In fact, the percentage of the world population lost to war has fallen dramatically since U.S. nuclear deterrence was established after World War II. That is a historic accomplishment. The fatal flaw of the warm and progressive-sounding NFU proposal is that it tells would-be aggressors that they do not have to fear U.S. nuclear retaliation as long as they attack us or our allies with advanced **conventional, chemical, and/or biological weapons**. They would risk U.S. nuclear retaliation only if they attack with nuclear weapons. **Numerous historical case studies demonstrate without a doubt** that some aggressors **look for such** openings **to undertake military moves** they deem critical. They do not need to see a risk-free path to pursue aggression, only a path that allows them some vision of success, however improbable that vision may seem to others. The U.S. **nuc**lear **deterrent** helps to **shut down the possibility** that would-be aggressors will contemplate such paths. A U.S. NFU policy would be particularly dangerous at a time when Russia and China may be armed with chemical and **biological weapons** and are pursuing **expansionist policies** in Europe and Asia, respectively. Russia is by far the strongest military power in Europe. It has moved repeatedly against neighboring states since 2008, forcibly changing established borders in Europe for the first time since World War II and issuing explicit nuclear first-use threats in the process. Only several months ago, Russia reportedly **rehearsed the invasion** of Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark in a military exercise involving 33,000 troops. In Asia, China is the strongest military power and is expanding its reach against U.S. allies, with tactics that include building and **militarizing islands** in the South China Sea. At a time when key U.S. allies face unprecedented threats from powerful neighbors, the U.S. should not reduce the calculation of risks that Russia and China must confront in their respective expansionist drives by adopting an NFU policy. Indeed, **this is a breathtaking understatement** in a world in which aggressors still exist, as do advanced conventional, chemical, and possibly biological weapons, and in which another world war **using “only” such modern non-nuclear weapons** could cause **death levels far beyond** the 80 to 100 million lost in **World Wars I and II**.

#### Nukes create an incentive for cooperation – that isn’t the case for conventional weapons – turns case and every other impact

Bradley 16

[joined the National Institute for Public Policy as an analyst in 2007. She currently provides on-site support at United States Strategic Command in the Plans and Policy Directorate as part of the Deterrence Analysis Plans Support group, Increasing Uncertainty, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1001632.pdf]

Relations with other nuclear powers have been fairly cooperative and benign since the end of the Cold War. Crises that arose were managed, and peaceful solutions have been negotiated, contributing to the mistaken belief that nuclear weapons are no longer relevant. However, could it be that those weapons encourage leaders to be benign and cooperative?48 In 1946 J. Robert Oppenheimer reflected that “it did not take atomic weapons to make man want peace. But the atomic bomb was the turn of the screw. It has made the prospect of war unendurable.”49 That is, far from being unusable, nuclear weapons are used every day to encourage compromise in international relations because failure to compromise may lead to the unthinkable.

In drafting the NPR, the US government failed to consider the perceptions of our adversaries or to tailor strategy to the unique threat that each poses. As we have pointed out, deterrence is a psychological function in the mind of the adversary. Failure to acknowledge and account for how our enemies view their security environment, their relationship with the United States, their unique history and culture, or the value they place on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs has made our deterrence relationships potentially less stable. Increasing our emphasis on conventional weapons that adversaries view as more usable and a threat to their nuclear arsenals has caused them to feel insecure. To counter this trend, they have modernized and increased the size of their arsenals and rely more on nuclear weapons to meet their security needs.

Nuclear deterrence has always been a risky proposition, and the fact that it has not failed in the past 70 years may have as much to do with our deterrence strategy as plain luck. But as risky as relying on nuclear deterrence is, it is still the “least bad” option and has not lost its relevance. Therefore, it is important that we strive to understand our adversaries as we develop and implement our nuclear-deterrent strategies so that we do not undermine its effectiveness. Nuclear deterrence may be much more fragile than any of us realize. It is imperative that we do not take the “nuclear taboo” for granted by assuming that our adversaries place the same value on the relevance of nuclear weapons that we do.