# General Turn File

## A2 Aff

### Poverty/Employment (Util

#### 1. Turn, only a low minimum wage provides the poor with the means to step out of poverty – artificially raising the wages only makes the situation worse. Kersey 04

Paul Kersey. [Heritage Expert] “The Economic Effects of the Minimum Wage.” May 3, 2004. GC

. Over the longer term, minimum-wage or near-minimum wage work can serve[s] as a springboard to better jobs. Unskilled workers may gain new skills, or gain a record of reliability, that allows them to move on to better-paying positions. Low-wage earners frequently see their wages rise quickly: Researchers at two universities, Florida State and Miami of Ohio, found that full-time workers hired at the minimum wage received a median pay increase of 13 percent within their first year, which shows that low-wage employees are able to work through minimum wage jobs into better ones.[3] The schedule of increases currently under consideration, first to $5.90 then $6.65 an hour a year later, is not all that much greater than the pay raises that occur naturally. Simply finding full-time work, including jobs at or near the minimum wage, provides the poor with the means to escape poverty. Research by the Employment Policy Institute shows 47 percent of families living below the poverty line in 1997 managed to make it over the poverty line in 1998. The authors of that study concluded that "earnings from minimum wage work and the Earned Income Tax Credit both significantly reduced the number of working poor in the 1990s."[4] Artificially raising wages will cut[s] off this difficult but direct path to greater prosperity for many poor families, and will delay the entry of other workers, including youth, into paid work by needlessly increasing the cost of unskilled labor. Employers will not be able to [can’t] afford to hire as many unskilled workers, and will respond by cutting back services or replacing workers with machinery. Labor economists refer to the "elasticity" of demand for labor to describe the ratio of jobs gained or lost when wages change. Estimates of this "elasticity" vary, but the average estimate by labor economists is that for a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage, employment **among those affected** drops **by** 5 percent.**[5] If the minimum wage is increased from $5.15 to $6.65 per hour, demand for unskilled labor could drop by as much as 15 percent in jobs that earn the minimum wage,** result[s]ing **in the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs and making it** **more** difficult for poor families to take this **escape** route out of poverty.

This outweighs

1. Duration
2. Cites employment policy institute
3. Cause-and-effect

#### 2. Turn, increasing minimum wage widens the socioeconomic gap between the rich and poor- most comprehensive study of income distribution goes neg. Kutsch 14

Kutsch, Tom. [Digital News Producer] "CBO: Minimum Wage Hike Means Lower Employment, Higher Wages for Some | Al Jazeera America." CBO: Minimum Wage Hike Means Lower Employment, Higher Wages for Some | Al Jazeera America. Al Jazeera America, 18 Feb. 2014. Web. 25 Dec. 2014. GC

The report said **the increase to $10.10 would add $31 billion to the earnings of low-wage workers.** But it noted that **only 19 percent of that increase would go to families [below] earning less than the poverty threshold, while 29 percent would go to families earning more than triple the poverty level.** That is because many low-wage earners are not in low-wage families.

Prefer this evidence:

1. Congressional budget office tracks money
2. Nonbiased because government agency
3. Even if you’re evidence is right- it goes to the wrong people

#### 3. Turn, national studies from last year prove that raising wage lowers employment. Gitis 1

Gitis, Ben. [Policy analyst] "How Minimum Wage Increased Unemployment and Reduced Job Creation in 2013 | Research." American Action Forum. N.p., 5 Feb. 14. Web. 04 July 2014. <http://americanactionforum.org/research/how-minimum-wage-increased-unemployment-and-reduced-job-creation-in-2013>. GC

Widespread discussion of increasing the minimum wage has recently sparked action. **In 2013, laws to raise the minimum wage were approved in five states**, the District of Columbia, SeaTac (an airport zone) in Washington, and Montgomery and Prince George’s counties in Maryland. To date in 2014, Connecticut and Delaware approved laws to raise the state minimum wage and [over 30 states are considering minimum wage hikes](http://bigstory.ap.org/article/minimum-wage-bills-pushed-least-30-states). While policymakers continue to debate the merits of increasing the federal minimum wage, it is important to understand the labor market implications of such a policy. Unfortunately, these very effects are controversial. To what extent will a rise in the minimum wage hurt overall hiring and employment? Would any effects be concentrated on low-skill workers and sectors? The variety amongst state minimum wages provides a natural experiment from which to learn. Nineteen states enforced minimum wages above the federal minimum of $7.25 per hour and thirty-one had minimum wages equal to $7.25 in 2013.[1] **This paper uses recent data to analyze the impact of raising the minimum wage on employment among the 50 states**. As shown in the following charts, the analysis finds **that in 2013, a $1 increase in the minimum wage was associated with a 1.48 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate**, a 0.18 percentage point decrease in the net job growth rate, a 4.67 percentage point increase in the teenage unemployment rate, and a 4.01 percentage point decrease in the teenage net job growth rate. Consequently, **high state minimum wages increased unemployment by 747,700 workers and reduced job growth by 83,300 jobs.**

And prefer this study using it uses a multi-regression analysis to control for confounding variables. Gitis 2

**Gitis, Ben. "How Minimum Wage Increased Unemployment and Reduced Job Creation in 2013 | Research." *American Action Forum*. N.p., 5 Feb. 14. Web. 04 July 2014. <http://americanactionforum.org/research/how-minimum-wage-increased-unemployment-and-reduced-job-creation-in-2013>. GC**

**This analysis contains four regressions measuring the impact of increasing the minimum wage on state unemployment rates**, net job growth rates, teenage unemployment rates, and teenage net job growth rates. Besides minimum wage, the other independent variables in each regression include a measure of education and an interaction term between education and minimum wage. […] **All data come[s] from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Annual Average tables**. Mean annual unemployment rates are derived from the Preliminary 2013 Data on Employment Status by State and Demographic Group

#### 4. Turn, raising the minimum wage causes huge unemployment and wrecks the economy which means wages don’t go to those who need it most- 70 years of research goes neg. Wilson 12

The Negative Effects of Minimum Wage Laws by Mark Wilson [Former deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor]. CATO Institute Policy Analysis, 2012. GC

Despite the use of different models to understand the effects of minimum wages, all economists agree that businesses will make changes to adapt to the higher labor costs after a minimum wage increase. Empirical research seeks to determine what changes t variables such as employment and prices firms will make, and how large those changes will be. The higher costs will be passed on to someone in the long run; the only question is who. The important thing for policymakers to remember is that a decision to increase the minimum wage is not cost-free; someone has to pay for it. The main finding of economic theory and empirical research over the past **70 years** is that minimum wage **increases** tend to reduce[s] employment. The higher the minimum wage relative to competitive-market wage levels, the greater the employment loss that occurs. While minimum wages ostensibly aim to improve the economic well-being of the working poor, the disemployment effects of a minimum wages have been found to fall disproportionately on the least skilled and on the most disadvantaged individuals, including the disabled, youth, lower-skilled workers, immigrants, and ethnic minorities.16 Based on his studies, Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman observed: “The real tragedy of minimum wage laws is that they are supported by well-meaning groups who want to reduce poverty. But the people who are hurt most by higher minimums are the most poverty stricken.”17 In a generally competitive labor market, employers bid for the most productive workers and the resulting wage distribution reflects the productivity of those workers. If the government imposes a minimum wage on the labor market, those workers whose productivity falls below the minimum wage will find few, if any, employment opportunities. The basic theory of competitive labor markets predicts that a minimum wage imposed above the market wage rate will reduce employment.18 Evidence of employment loss has been found since the earliest implementation of the minimum wage. The U.S. Department of Labor’s own assessment of the first 25-cent minimum wage in 1938 found that it resulted in job losses for 30,000 to 50,000 workers, or 7 The greatest adverse impact will generally occur in the poorer and lower-wage regions. In those regions, businesses have to take more dramatic steps to adjust to the higher costs. 10 to 13 percent of the 300,000 covered workers who previously earned below the new wage floor.19 It is important to note that the limited industries and occupations covered by the 1938 FLSA accounted for only about 20 percent of the 30 million private sector, nonfarm, nonsupervisory, production workers employed in 1938. And of the roughly 6 million workers potentially covered by the law, only about 5 percent earned an hourly rate below the new minimum.20 Following passage of the federal minimum wage in 1938, economists began to accumulate statistical evidence on the effects. Much of the research has indicated that increases in the minimum wage have adverse effects on the employment opportunities of low-skilled workers.21 And across the country, the greatest adverse impact will generally occur in the poorer and lower-wage regions. In those regions, more workers and businesses are affected by the mandated wage, and businesses have to take more dramatic steps to adjust to the higher costs. As an example, with the original 1938 imposition of the minimum wage, the lower-income U.S. territory of Puerto Rico was severely affected. An estimated 120,000 workers in Puerto Rico lost their jobs within the first year of implementation of the new 25-cent minimum wage, and the island’s unemployment rate soared to nearly 50 percent.22 Similar damaging effects were observed on American Samoa from minimum wage increases imposed between 2007 and 2009. Indeed, the effects were so pronounced on the island’s economy that President Obama signed into law a bill postponing the minimum wage increases scheduled for 2010 and 2011.23 Concern over the scheduled 2012 increase of $.50 compelled Governor Togiola Tulafono to testify before Congress: “We are watching our economy burn down. We know what to do to stop it. We need to bring the aggressive wage costs decreed by the Federal Government under control. . . . Our job market is being torched. Our businesses are being depressed. Our hope for growth has been driven away.”24 In 1977 ongoing debate about the minimum wage prompted Congress to create a Minimum Wage Study Commission to “help it resolve the many controversial issues that have surrounded the federal minimum wage and overtime requirement since their origin in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.”25 The commission published its report in May 1981, calling it “the most exhaustive inquiry ever undertaken into the issues surrounding the Act since its inception.”26 The landmark report included a wide variety of studies by a virtual ‘‘who’s who’’ of labor economists working in the United States at the time.27 A review of the economic literature amassed by the Commission by Charles Brown, Curtis Gilroy, and Andrew Kohen found that the “time-series studies typically find that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment by one to three percent.”28 This range subsequently came to be thought of as the consensus view of economists on the employment effects of the minimum wage. It is important to note that different academic studies on the minimum wage may examine different regions, industries, or types of workers. In each case, different effects may predominate. A federal minimum wage increase will impose a different impact on the fast-food restaurant industry than the defense contractor industry, and a different effect on lower-cost Alabama than higher-cost Manhattan. This is why scholarly reviews of many academic studies are important. In 2006 David Neumark and William Wascher published a comprehensive review of more than 100 minimum wage studies published since the 1990s.29 They found a wider range of estimates of the effects of the minimum wage on employment than the 1982 review by Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen. The 2006 review found that “although the wide range of estimates is striking, the oft-stated assertion that the new minimum wage research fails to support the traditional view that the minimum wage reduces the employment of low-wage workers is clearly incorrect. Indeed . . . the preponderance of the evidence points to disemployment effects.”38 Some employers will replace their lowest-skilled workers with somewhat higherskilled workers in response to increases in the minimum wage. Nearly two-thirds of the studies reviewed by Neumark and Wascher found a relatively consistent indication of negative employment effects of minimum wages, while only eight gave a relatively consistent indication of positive employment effects. Moreover, 85 percent of the most credible studies point to negative employment effects, and the studies that focused on the least-skilled groups most likely to be adversely affected by minimum wages, the evidence for disemployment effects were especially strong. In contrast, there are very few, if any, studies that provide convincing evidence of positive employment effects of minimum wages. These few studies often use a monopsony model to explain these positive effects. But as noted, most economists think such positive effects are special cases and not generally applicable because few low-wage employers are big enough to face an upward-sloping labor supply curve as the monopsony model assumes

Outweighs

1. Literature Review
2. Specificity
3. Time Frame
4. They’re going to say from Cato Institute but empirics don’t lie
5. Expert analysis confirms. Gillikin

Gillikin, Jason. "Problems With Minimum Wage." Small Business. Hearst Newspapers, n.d. Web. 26 June 2014.

Some experts suggest that minimum wages harm the very minority populations they were designed to support. James Liebler of the Future of Freedom Foundation says that "low-productivity workers tend to belong to the [be] minority groups that the law was designed to aid. Their lower ability to produce stems from differences in education, culture, motivational background, breakdown of the family unit, etc. Comparatively, the productivity of young whites is higher than that of the average minority youth." In Liebler[’s]&#039;s analysis, white youth out-produce minority youth, and as such, employers are more likely to hire the white youth when they are denied the option to pay a bit less for a slightly less productive minority employee.

#### 5. Turn, increased wages reduces non-monetary benefits, which outweigh the wage increase. McKenzie 14

Richard McKenzie [Econ professor at Merage School of Business, UC Irvine]. “Why are there so few job losses from minimum-wage hikes?” April 9, 2014. National Center for Policy Analysis. JY.

**Employers compete with one another to reduce their labor costs**, and that competition is expressed in a variety of ways in labor markets — certainly **in** money **wages**, **but also** in terms of fringe **benefits, work demands and all other forms of nonmoney compensation**. Workers also compete for the available unskilled jobs. The competition among employers and workers will not disappear with a wage increase but will merely be redirected into the components of compensation packages not covered by the wage mandate. Wage floors, therefore, restrain competitive pressures in only one of the many ways in which businesses compete. **With a minimum-wage increase**, employers will move to cut labor costs in other areas. As such, **employers are likely to reduce fringe benefits and**/or **increase work demands**. Indeed, past experience has confirmed the nonmonetary impact of a minimum-wage hike on workers, not only in reduced fringe benefits but in increased work demands and decreased job training. For example: **When the minimum wage was increased in 1967**, economist Masanori Hashimoto found that **workers gained 32 cents in money income but lost 41 cents per hour in training — a net loss of 9 cents** an hour in full-income compensation. Similarly, Linda **Leighton and** Jacob **Mincer in one study, and** Belton **Fleisher in another, concluded that increases in the minimum wage reduce on-the-job training and, as a result, dampen long-run growth in the** real **incomes of covered workers**. Additionally, North Carolina State University economist Walter Wessels determined that a wage increase caused New York retailers to increase work demands. In most stores, fewer workers were given fewer hours to do the same work as before. More recently, Mindy Marks found that the $0.90 per hour increase in the federal minimum-wage rate in 1990 reduced the probability of workers receiving employer-provided health insurance from 66.2 percent to 63.1 percent, and increased the likelihood that covered workers would be reduced to part-time work by 26 percent. Wessels also found that **for every 10 percent increase in the minimum wage, workers lose 2 percent of nonmonetary compensation per hour**. Extrapolating from Wessels’ estimates, an increase in the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to only $9.00 an hour would make covered workers worse off by 35 cents an hour. And **if the minimum wage were raised to $10.10 an hour, for example**, the estimated 16.5 million **workers** earning between $7.25 and $10.10 **could lose nonmonetary compensation more valuable than the** $31 billion in **additional wages they are expected to receive.**

Outweighs

1. Multi-Study Approach> Meta-Study
2. Circa 68
3. Long Term

#### 6. Turn, even if minimum wages don’t decrease employment, it causes employers to hire more skilled workers and raise prices, both of which hurt the poor. Romer 13

Christina Romer [Econ prof at UC Berkeley, former chair of Council of Economic Advisors for the Obama Administration]. “The Business of the Minimum Wage.” New York Times. March 2, 2013. JY

Some evidence suggests that employment doesn’t fall much because the higher minimum wage [lowers labor turnover](http://escholarship.org/uc/item/76p927ks), which raises productivity and labor demand. But it’s possible that productivity also rises because the higher minimum attracts more efficient workers to the labor pool. If these new workers are typically more affluent — perhaps middle-income spouses or retirees — and end up taking some jobs held by poorer workers, a higher minimum could harm[ing] the truly disadvantaged. Another reason that employment may not fall is that businesses pass along some of the cost of a higher minimum wage to consumers [through higher prices](http://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/njmin-aer.pdf). Often, the customers paying those prices — including some of the diners at McDonald’s and the shoppers at Walmart — have very low family incomes. Thus this price effect may harm the very people whom a minimum wage is supposed to help.

Implications

1. Coopts your internal warrant
2. 2 analytical warrants= strength of link
3. Empirics plus analytics means that this evidence is a tiebreaker on the weighing debate.

7. Turn, increased wages incentives misclassification by companies as a loophole to get out of paying, Woodfield 14

**Woodfield, Nicholas. "Employers Skirt Wage Requirements [Commentary]." *Baltimoresun.com*. Baltimore Sun, 07 July 2014. Web. 07 July 2014. GC**

Without extra safeguards, **wage hikes will mainly give employers a huge new incentive to break the law by "misclassifying" more workers in order to stay competitive. Misclassification [it] is** already rampant among employers. It's illegal, and it cheats both employees and taxpayers, but it's also **easy to imple ment and tough — too tough — for workers to fight.** What is misclassification, exactly? Well, most federal and local wage laws apply only to "employees" — and rules such as overtime pay apply only to "non-exempt employees." To avoid extra costs, about **30 percent of employers play** brazen (and unlawful) **games with** these legal definitions. **Want to hire people without paying them the minimum wage** — or unemployment insurance, or worker's compensation, or Medicare tax, or many other expenses? Just **don't call your new hires "employees,"** even if that's what they are. **Call them "independent contractors,"** and see if anyone notices. **Want to avoid paying your employees time-and-a-half after 40 hours of work?** Just **call them "exempt,"** even if they're not: They probably won't object. **Facing a tight economy, more companies have been shortchanging their workers** — and depriving them of legal rights, and evading taxes — via such wrongdoing. Federal lawsuits for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act have risen for six straight years now, to more than 8,100 in the year ended March 31. **Most employers never face any consequences for their law-breaking**, however: They have their cake and eat it, too. Misclassification is a norm in industries such as construction; university researchers found last year that **more than 40 percent of Texas construction workers, for instance, are misclassified as independent contractors** — or paid entirely under the table. In such an environment, **even honest employers feel they must break the law simply to compete. Imagine what'll happen to Seattle's construction industry when the cost of honesty jumps by 60 percent — the amount that city plans to raise its minimum wage, to $15 per hour.**

Outweighs

1. Recency
2. Verifiability

### A2 Deont

### Re-Conceptualization

Under equal freedom- Universalizability comes first

A. The formula of universal law outweighs the formulation of humanity. Palikkathayil

Pallikkathayil, Japa. Consent and the Formula of Humanity (n.d.): n. pag. Northwestern University. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. PH

Korsgaard’s proposed solution involves what she calls a ‘double-level’ theory. On this view, the Formula of Universal Law [Universalizability] sets a minimum standard for the [of] permissibility of our actions that must never be violated – we must never act on a maxim that cannot be universalized. The [FOH] Formula of Humanity gives us more robust standards for our actions. When, however, the point of the Formula of Humanity is not effectively realizable, the prohibition against treating others in ways that eliminate the possibility of [possible] consent gives way. In these non-ideal situations, we must work toward[s] a situation in which the point of the Formula can be effectively realiz[tion]ed even [if it] though that may involve[s] doing something that [violating] the Formula itself forbids. In other words, the Formula represents a goal that guides us rather than a norm that constrains us.

1. Logical consistency- If I deem an action is good for me then, I must be able to deem that action good for everyone else in similar situated circumstances otherwise the maxim that I will can’t be categorical binding since they’re concerned with contingent factors and empirical states which can only general material and conditional obligations. It’s also contradictory to act in a non-universalizable manner a morally relevant distinction between agents that non-existent.

Here’s how to weigh. For Kant, Perfect duties come before imperfect duties, because perfect duties can never be violated whereas imperfect duties constantly entail trade-offs. Mahon:

http://home.wlu.edu/~mahonj/Ethics/Ethics-\_Lecture5.htm

he "Contradiction in Conception Test" establishes perfect duties. The "Contradiction in Will Test" establishes imperfect duties. (i) Contradiction in Conception Test Take the maxim: "In order to get money, I will tell a lie" Now perform the following thought-experiment: consider a world in which everyone acts on that maxim. Call it the "World of the Universalized Maxim". You are also included in "everyone", so imagine that in this world you are also acting on this maxim. What would be the case in this world? Well, in that world, everyone would lie to get money. But, apparently, in that world, a lie would never get you money. A lie would be useless. No-one would believe what anyone said when they were trying to get money. So, in that world, YOU would not get money by telling a lie. There is a contradiction in CONCEIVING of a law of lying to get money -- it would never work! What does this test show? It shows that lying cannot work by being practiced by everyone. Lies can only work by being practiced by some people and not others. The person who tells a lie [A liar] is relyi[es]ng on its not being the case that people lie to get what they want. He or she is relying on its being the case that people tell the truth to get what they want. He or she is making an exception of himself or herself, in principle, to the rule of truthfulness. Such a failure – [So universalized] there is a contradiction in CONCEIVING of [the] a law of lying ever working -- entails that acting on that maxim is impermissible, or forbidden. However, Kant holds that ANY maxim involving lying, since it will never get you what you want, will fail the test. Hence, all lying is impermissible, or wrong. In the case of an action that is forbidden, or wrong, it follows that the opposite action is required, or right. In this case, one is required not to lie (or to be truthful in one's assertions). Furthermore, since the contradiction is in the very conceiving, it follows that there is a perfect duty not to lie (or, a perfect duty to be truthful in one's assertions). (ii) Contradiction in Willing Test Take the maxim: "In order to be happy, I will not help anyone else" Again, perform the thought-experiment: [Yet] consider a world [where] in which everyone [isn’t altruistic] (including you) acts on that maxim. What would be the case in this world? Well, in that world, no-one would help anyone. I would not help anyone, and no one would help me. Kant thinks that it is indeed possible to CONCEIVE of law of non-beneficence (or pure self-reliance). However, he claims, [But] no rational being would ever will [that] to live in such a world "inasmuch as cases might often arise in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others and in which he would deprive himself, by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the aid he wants for himself." In such a world, that is, I have willed that no-one help ME when I am in need of help. But no rational being would ever will this, since she will have various ends to pursue, and she will indeed will whatever means are necessary to the pursuit of those ends, and sometimes this will involve the help of others. How could it be rational, granted that I have various ends to pursue, to will that other people never help you in under circumstances whatsoever? You would never will it! What does this test show? It shows that non-beneficence would never be willed by anyone. The person who wills non-beneficence is relying on its being the case that others help him. He really wants others to help him, and him not to help others. So, once again, he is making an exception of himself, in principle, to the rule of helping others. Such a failure -- there is a contradiction in WILLING a law of non-beneficence -- entails that acting on that maxim is impermissible, or forbidden. However, Kant holds that ANY maxim involving non-beneficence, since it will never get you what you want, will fail the test. Hence, non-beneficence, or principled refusal to help others, is impermissible, or wrong. In the case of an action that is forbidden, or wrong, it follows that the opposite action is required, or right. In this case, one is required not to not be beneficent (or to be beneficent insofar as one can). Since the contradiction is a contradiction in willing [entails] only, however, it follows that there is only an imperfect duty to be beneficent insofar as one can. What this means is that, first of all, one can never, in being beneficent, [which can’t] violate any perfect duty (e.g. one cannot help others by lying). Secondly, since it is [as] an imperfect duty, one is not required to be beneficent all the time [like with]. Perfect duties include: Do not lie, Do not steal, Do not murder. Imperfect Duties include: Help others [vs] when you can, Develop your natural talents, Develop your moral perfection.

2 Implications:

1st You negate under the universalizability constraint.

#### First, the principle of living wage is impossible since its justification can be changed by different degrees arbitrarily. Phillips

Phillips, Brian. [Author of Individual Rights and Government Wrongs] "The Fallacy of "Living Wage"" Capitalism Magazine. Capitalism Magazine, 06 Mar. 2013. Web. 27 Dec. 2014. PH

If the advocates of the “living wage” are truly convinced that arbitrary government dictates have no detrimental consequences on jobs, why don’t they advocate a “prosperity wage”? Instead of legislating a wage that allows families to “get by,” why don’t they legislate a wage that allows families to prosper? In other words, instead of a “living wage” of $10 an hour (or whatever the figure may be), why don’t legislators force businesses to pay $100 an hour? One would think that the answer is obvious, but apparently it isn’t. Few, if any, businesses could afford to pay $100 an hour. They would not create new jobs, and they would likely cut most of the jobs that they currently have. The results would be catastrophic. The difference between a “living wage” and a “prosperity wage” is only one of degree. The principle is the same. A “prosperity wage” would be devastating to jobs. So is a “living wage,” a minimum wage, or any other government mandated wage. The only difference is the number of jobs and lives destroyed.

#### Second, living wage is arbitrary since it doesn’t allow employers to set wages they deem sufficient. Phillips

Phillips, Brian. [Author of Individual Rights and Government Wrongs] "The Fallacy of "Living Wage"" Capitalism Magazine. Capitalism Magazine, 06 Mar. 2013. Web. 27 Dec. 2014. PH

If someone wants to offer a job with a pay of $2 an hour, [t]he[y] should be free to do so. If he cannot attract enough workers at that wage, he will need to offer more or go out of business. If a worker is willing to work for $2 an hour, why should anyone prevent [them] him from doing so? If the business owner judges that a job is only worth $2 an hour, he should be free to act on his own judgment. If a worker judges that a job paying $2 an hour is his best opportunity, he should be free to act on his own judgment. Government intervention in the employer/employee relationship prohibits each from acting as he thinks best for his own life. Like all advocates of government intervention, the advocates of a “living wage” believe that they know what is best for other individuals. They are willing to use government coercion to dictate how others may live their lives. Ironically, and sadly, while advocating a “living wage” they simultaneously seek to prohibit others from actually living.

#### Third, companies are incentives to misclassify that would undermine the very maxim of increasing wages. Woodfield

**Woodfield, Nicholas. "Employers Skirt Wage Requirements [Commentary]." *Baltimoresun.com*. Baltimore Sun, 07 July 2014. Web. 07 July 2014. GC**

Without extra safeguards, **wage hikes will mainly give employers a huge new incentive to break the law by "misclassifying" more workers in order to stay competitive. Misclassification [it] is** already rampant among employers. It's illegal, and it cheats both employees and taxpayers, but it's also **easy to implement and tough — too tough — for workers to fight.** What is misclassification, exactly? Well, most federal and local wage laws apply only to "employees" — and rules such as overtime pay apply only to "non-exempt employees." To avoid extra costs, about **30 percent of employers [do this] play** brazen (and unlawful) **games with** these **legal definitions.** **Want to hire people without paying them the minimum wage** — or unemployment insurance, or worker's compensation, or Medicare tax, or many other expenses? Just **don't call your new hires "employees,"** even if that's what they are. **Call them "independent contractors,"** and see if anyone notices. **Want to avoid paying your employees time-and-a-half after 40 hours of work?** Just **call them "exempt,"** even if they're not: They probably won't object. **Facing a tight economy, more companies have been shortchanging their workers** — and depriving them of legal rights, and evading taxes — via such wrongdoing. Federal lawsuits for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act have risen for six straight years now, to more than 8,100 in the year ended March 31. **Most employers never face any consequences for their law-breaking**, however: They have their cake and eat it, too. Misclassification is a norm in industries such as construction; university researchers found last year that **more than 40 percent of Texas construction workers, for instance, are misclassified as independent contractors** — or paid entirely under the table. In such an environment, **even honest employers feel they must break the law simply to compete. Imagine what'll happen to Seattle's construction industry when the cost of honesty jumps by 60 percent — the amount that city plans to raise its minimum wage, to $15 per hour.**

Willing a law into place that would be undermined is non-universalizable since it would destroy the concept and authority of laws in the first place.

#### Fourth, minimum wage increase violates a perfect duty since companies use it as a tool of deceit to crush weaker competitors. Leef 13

Leef, George. [Contributor at Forbes] "Minimum Wage Alchemy." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 11 Nov. 2013. Web. 19 Jan. 2015. PH

Ah, but perhaps the business people who want a higher minimum wage don’t advocate it out of kindness and generosity, but instead because they see it as a means of gaining an advantage over competitors. Economist David Henderson argues persuasively that some business owners, whose employees are already above the apparently altruistic higher minimum, would gain from having it imposed because it would wreak havoc with existing lower-wage competitors or because it would deter lower-wage competitors from entering the market. Many existing businesses like to use government regulation to help them fend off the prospect of lower-cost competition, just as many well-paid workers like to use it to shield them against other workers who would try to compete by accepting lower wages. That is the dirty secret behind laws like the Davis-Bacon Act and other “prevailing wage” statutes. Mandating high wages looks “compassionate” but it’s actually just a price-fixing scheme meant to prevent lower wage competitors, as I argued in this article in Cato Journal. Businesses often play rent-seeking games, pushing laws that superficially appear to be public-spirited when they are actually just ways of increasing profits through political machinations.

This violates a perfect duty since if we universalized deceitful intentions there’d be no concept of truth.

#### Fifth, living wage can never be a perfect duty.

1. It’s just benevolent coercion- it creates state regulations to help the poor but they’re not independent since they’re subject to the welfare of the state just like a slave is still subject to a benevolent master.
2. Beneficence is an imperfect duty since we wouldn’t conceive of a world where the state didn’t institute policies to aid those in need but if universalized, it doesn’t undermine our ability to conceptualize a world where people are in poverty.

2nd Collapses to consequentialism

#### Only consequentialism can meet the universalizabilty constraint. Universalizing anything else results in a conflict in normative reasons. Pettit:

[Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University]. The Cost of Non-Consequentialism. February 5, 1999. <http://www.philo.umontreal.ca/documents/cahiers/Pettit\_Non-Consequentialism.pdf>

Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalised, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context or whatever. So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non-particular or universal kind. Thus, if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C — these may bear on the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like — then we assumethat something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C-type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalisability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific: so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalisability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. **Suppose** that I accept**consequentialis[m]**t doctrine and believe of an agent that in their particular circumstances, C, he or she ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. If that option really **is right** by my consequentialist lights, **then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O**the **right** option **for me** in those circumstances, **so they will make it** the **right** option**for any other agent** in such circumstances. Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalisability. I can happily universalise my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalisability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I will only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he or she do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble. Universalisability would not force me to think that everyone ought to swim to the help of a child in such a situation; undoubtedly they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that anyone ought to swim to the help of the child; it only requires a person-by-person prescription, not a collective one.So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalisability. But how is the universalisability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? According to **[Suppose a] non-consequentialist theory, [where] the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern, P;** this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring their special obligations, or whatever. Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say of an agent — again, let us suppose, myself — that I ought to choose O in these circumstances, C, or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me — in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern, P — so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. The problem Suppose that I do say, in the straightforward way, **that** pattern P**requires, not just that I do O in C, but also**, for any agent whatsoever,**that [any] agent should do O in C as well.** Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C. This response is going to lead me, as a non-consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that something is right gives one a normative reason to prefer it; the judgment of rightness must provide such a reason if it is to have an action-guiding role. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, then I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, then I commit myself — again, because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness — to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that [any] agent do O. The problem with these reasons and these commitments, **however,** is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible**that**, perversely, **the best way** for me **to ensure** or increase the chance **that** for **any**arbitrary **agent**, X, that agent **does O in C**-type circumstances**, is to choose non-O myself in** those **C**ircumstances. The best way to satisfy the preference as to what the arbitrarily chosen agent should do may be to go against the preference as to what one should do oneself. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself; the best way to get people to help their own children may be not to press for the advantage of one’s own; the best way to minimise murder may to commit a murder; and so on. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern, P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself. The best way to increase the chance that for any arbitrary agent, X, that agent instantiates P may be not to instantiate P oneself. How can I avoid the conclusion that in such a perverse situation I ought to promote the overall instantiation of my cherished pattern, even at the cost of not instantiating it myself? How, in other words, am I to keep faith with the non-consequentialist commitment to the rightness of instantiating P, even where this means that the overall realisation of the pattern falls short of what it might have been? It is hardly going to be plausible for me to say that normative reasons bearing on preferences over my own choices trump normative reasons bearing on preferences over how other people behave. Both sorts of reasons are supported in the common language of what is the right choice or of what ought to be done. And it would surely run against the spirit of universalisability — the spirit in which I deny that my own particular identity is important to the prescription defended — to say that a reasoned preference as to what I do myself should not be responsive to a similarly reasoned preference as to what people in general do — what arbitrary agent, X, does — in the sorts of circumstances in question. The upshot is that **if as a non-consequentialist** theorist**I** straightforwardly **universalise** the prescription that in a certain situation I should instantiate **a** favoured**pattern, P, then** the prescription to which I thereby commit myself — that in that situation any X ought to instantiate pattern, P — may force me to revise my original self-prescription. **I have equal reason to prefer both that I instantiate P and that any agent instantiate P** — this reason is expressed by the use of the word ‘right’ or ‘ought’ in each case — **and** the spirit of **universalizability blocks me from treating myself as** in any way **special**. **Thus,** if the preferences are inconsistent in a certain situation — if the choice is between my instantiating P alone, for example, or my acting so that many others instantiate P instead — then **I will have reason not to instantiate P myself.** As a would-be non-consequentialist thinker, my initial claim must have been that the point is to instantiate P in my own life, not promote it generally. But I countenance the general claims of the P-pattern **when I universalize** in the straightforward way: **I prescribe general conformity to that pattern, not just conformity in my own case. Thus** it now seems that what I must think is that this general conformity is to be promoted, even if that means not myself instantiating the pattern in my own behaviour or psychology or relationships. It seems that what **I must embrace**, in effect, is a**consequentialism** in which conformity to pattern P is the ultimate value to be promoted.

Extinction comes first under the standard

1. Uncertainty means we should default to preventing extinction to ensure the future has the possibility of more value. Indicts to the framework mandates it since we need as many perspectives as possible to resolve and act in accordance with the coherent ethical view. Framework contestation concedes the desire to escape uncertainty.
2. Risk analysis means preventing existential risk comes first. Bostrom 05

Bostrom, Nick. [Professor of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of Future of Humanity Institute Director of Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, Professor of University of Oxford] "Transcript of "A Philosophical Quest for Our Biggest Problems"" TED. TED Conferences, July 2005. Web. 27 Dec. 2014. PH

Now, if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percentage point -- not very much -- so that's equivalent to 60 million lives saved, if we just count the currently living people, the current generation. Now one percent of six billion people is equivalent to 60 million. So that's a large number. If we were to take into account future generations that will never come into existence if we blow ourselves up, then the figure becomes astronomical. If we could eventually colonize a chunk of the universe -- the Virgo supercluster -- maybe it will take us 100 million years to get there, but if we go extinct we never will. Then, even a one percentage point reduction in the extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number -- 10 to the power of 32. So if you take into account future generations as much as our own, every other moral imperative of philanthropic cost just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on would be to reduce existential risk because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just overwhelm any other benefit you could hope to achieve. And even if you just look at the current people, and ignore the potential that would be lost if we went extinct, it should still have a high priority. Now, let me spend the rest of my time on the third big problem, because it's more subtle and perhaps difficult to grasp. Think about some time in your life -- some people might never have experienced it -- but some people, there are just those moments that you have experienced where life was fantastic.

This means if there were a 1% chance of consequentialism being true, existential risk would be bad for the purpose of decision-making.

[Insert DA]

### A2 I-Law

#### 1. Turn, minimum wage also meets International Law. Eva 14

**Liu, Eva, and Jackie Wu. *Minimum Wage Systems*. Hong Kong: Research and Library Services Division, Legislative Council Secretariat, 1999. 2014. Web. 2014. GC**

Alongside **the notions of the** **minimum wage** and the living wage, there **is also the concept of fair wages.** According to one study, 12 **dimensions of the concept of fair wages have been identified, in particular: wages must be paid regularly and in full to the workers; they must comply with the minimum wage regulations** and at least correspond to the living wage; they should not require excessive working hours; they must lead to a balanced wage structure, free of discrimination, and take into account different levels of education, skills and professional experience, and reward individual and collective performan viewpoint, **the minimum wage and living wage can be seen as components of the broader concept of fair wages, which shows the close relationship between Conventions Nos 131 and 95, and other ILO instruments on working conditions**.

Prefer the ILO:

1. It’s the standard for international labor across all nations, which means that it has precedent over other nations in terms of labor and organization, as well as in dealings of all labor precedents.
2. It’s the enforceable mechanism for international labor organizations, also responsible for how employers have standards for treating their workers, so prefer these because it sets the standards for how employers set standards.
3. This nonuniques all of her offense thus you look to the NC

2. Turn, only 2 countries violate, the US doesn’t. She says in CX that the US does, this shows that all her offense is false. Fisk

**Fisk, Milton. "Human Rights and Living Wages." *Milton Fisk*. Indiana University, 2007. Web. 15 July 2014. GC**

For example, in a 2004 report on five countries, **the C**ommitteeon **E**conomic**, S**ocial, and **C**ultural **R**ights **notes its concern that Azerbaijan and Chile have minimum wages that are insufficient to ensure a decent living for workers and their families**. This committee monitors implementation of the 1974 covenant that, among many other things, sets a standard for minimum wages in countries ratifying it.

Currently the US does not have laws requiring living wages, and the CESCR has not called them out on it, this shows that absent living wage laws, we still abide by international law

My Offense outweighs

#### A. HRC and ICCPR are not legally binding. ACLU 14

**"FAQ: The Covenant on Civil & Political Rights (ICCPR)." *American Civil Liberties Union*. ACLU, Apr. 2014. Web. 15 July 2014. GC**

At the end of its March session, **the Human Rights Committee issued a list of observations and recommendations regarding U.S. compliance with the ICCPR**, **[which is]** available here. The Concluding Observations on the U.S. report advise progress to be made and evaluated at the next review. Among its recommendations, the Committee often identifies areas of concern and asks for additional information from the U.S., to be supplied within one year, on measures taken to address them. While the recommendations are **not legally binding**, they place an important moral obligation on the U.S. government, which has committed itself to complying with the treaty. The recommendations are also used to assess progress toward implementing the ICCPR and to identify areas for improvement.

#### B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not binding. OHCHR 14

**"Declaration on Human Rights Defenders." *Declaration on Human Rights Defenders*. OHCHR, 2014. Web. 15 July 2014. GC**

Elaboration of **the Declaration on human rights** defenders began in 1984 and ended with the adoption of the text by the General Assembly in 1998, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A collective effort by a number of human rights non-governmental organizations and some State delegations helped to ensure that the final result was a strong, very useful and pragmatic text. Perhaps most importantly, the Declaration is addressed not just to States and to human rights defenders, but to everyone. **It tells us that we all have a role to fulfil as human rights defenders and emphasizes that there is a global human rights movement that involves us all**. The Declaration’s full name is the “Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” – with this longer title is frequently abbreviated to “The Declaration on human rights defenders”. **The Declaration is not, in itself, a legally binding instrument.**

Their international treaties not being legally binding is terminal defense on the aff since “requiring living wage” is a legal mandate so even if the aff may be a good thing in terms of I-Law that doesn’t generate on obligation to do it. This means you presume neg because I’m the only one to with a risk of unique offense- also squo is the default.