# Agamben AC

#### In 1735 Carl Linnaeus published Systema Naturae, which divided all-natural organisms into closed categories of species formation. This attempt at universal knowledge saw beings which previously coexisted along side one another, forced into categories like genus, phyla, and kingdom to achieve a top down ordering of the world. At the center of this project was the homo sapien, which had succeeded in becoming the center of the natural universe by defining everything in opposition to it.

#### Today, western society exists through the anthropological machine, which creates the concept of the human through defining it in opposition to everything it is not in the nonhuman. This project not only marks the natural world as fundamentally separate from the western man, but also requires that “others” like the slave and the savage are given animal characteristics, in order to create a proper way of being human, placing them in a state of ontological indistinction. The sovereign can never solve for this violence since it exists in a state of exception.

[Matthew Calarco](https://philpapers.org/s/Matthew%20Calarco), Assistant professor of philosophy at California State University Fullerton, Jamming the anthropological machine , Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. Stanford University Press. pp. 163--79 (2007) ///AHS PB

Agamben makes a distinction between two key variations on uit anthropological machine: the modern and pre-modern. The modern anthropological machine is post-Darwinian. It seeks to understand, following the principles of natural science, the emergence of the fully constituted human being from out of the order of the human animal (the latter, of course, is in many ways indistinguishable from certain non-human animals, especially so-called "higher primates”). In order to mark this transition, it is necessary to determine and isolate the animal aspects of the human animal and exclude them from humanity proper. Agamben describes this process as involving an "animalization” of certain modes of human life, an attempt to separate out-within human beings themselves—what precisely is animal on the one hand and human on the other. This variation on the anthropological machine gives rise to the search by nineteenth-century paleontologists for the "missing link” that provides the biological transition from speechless ape to speaking human. But it also opens the way for the totalitarian and democratic experiments on and around human nature that function by excluding animal life from human life within human beings. Agamben suggests that "it is enough to move our field of research ahead a few decades, and instead of this innocuous paleontological find we will have the Jew, that is, the nonman produced within the man, or the neomort and the overcomatose per son, that is, the animal separated within the human body itself" (0, 37). The pre-modern form of the anthropological machine, which runs from Aristotle up through Linnaeus, functions in a similar but inverted form. Rather than animalizing certain aspects of the human, animal life is itself humanized. Human beings who take an essentially animal form are used to mark the constitutive outside of humanity proper: the infant savage, the wolf-man, the werewolf, the slave or barbarian, and so on. Here, the beings situated at the limits of humanity suffer similar consequences to those "animalized" beings caught within the working of the modern anthropological machine. As Agamben suggests, the structure or machine that delimits the contours of the human is perfectly ironic and empty. It does not function by uncovering a uniquely human trait that demarcates a clean ontological break between human and non-human animals-for, as Agamben himself acknowledges, no such trait or group of traits is to be found. This much we know from current debates in evolutionary biology and animal ethics. And here it is not so much a matter of subscribing to a watered-down, quasiDarwinian continuism that would blur any and all distinctions one might wish to make between and among human and non-human animals, but rather recognizing that deciding what constitutes the human" and "the animal" is not simply a scientific or ontological matter. The locus and stakes of the human-animal distinction are also deeply political and ethical. For not only does the distinction create the opening for the exploitation of nonhuman animals and others considered not fully human (this is the point that is forcefully made by animal ethicists), but it also creates the conditions for contemporary biopolitics, in which more and more of the so-called "biological" and "animal" aspects of human life are brought under the purview of the State and the juridical order. As Agamben has argued in Homo Sacer and elsewhere, biopolitics, whether it manifests itself in totalitarian or democratic form, contains within it the virtual possibility of concentration camps and OLICI VIVIHIL and nihilistic means of producing and controlling bare life. It comes as no surprise, then, that Agamben does not seek to articulate a more precise, more empirical, or less dogmatic determination of the human-animal distinction; rather, he insists that the distinction must be abolished altogether, and along with it the anthropological machine that produces the distinction. Recalling the political consequences that have followed from the modern and pre-modern separation of "human" and "animal" within human existence, Agamben characterizes the task for thought in the following terms: "it is not so much a matter of asking which of the two machines i.e., the modern or pre-modern anthropological machine) ... is better or more effective—or, rather, less lethal and bloody-as it is of understanding how they work so that we might, eventually, be able to stop them" (0, 38). Now, the critic of Agamben's argument is likely to see a slippery-slope fallacy here. Why is it a necessary or even virtual possibility that every time a human-animal distinction is made that there will be negative ("lethal and bloody") political consequences for certain human beings? Isn't the promise of democratic humanism and Enlightenment modernism (the very traditions Agamben would have us leave behind their foundational commitment to reform, their perfectibility and inclusiveness? Isn't it precisely humanism that guards against the worst excesses of totalitarianism and human rights abuses? The reader who takes up a careful study of Agamben's work from this angle, seeking answers to such questions, will be well positioned to grasp its novelty. The overarching thesis of Agamben's work since the 1990s is that there is in fact an "inner solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism, not at an empirical level, but at a historical and philosophical level (HS, 10). Despite the enormous differences between these two political systems, they are nevertheless united in their investment in the politics of the anthropological machine, and in seeking to separate bare life from properly political life. Even if democratic regimes maintain safeguards designed to prevent many of the totalitarian excesses perpetrated against bare life (and Agamben's references to Karen Quinlan and others make it clear that democracies are actually far from successful in such matters), they continue unwittingly to create the conditions of possibility for such consequences. This hidden implication of democracy comes to the fore especially in those instances where the rule of law is suspended, for example, in the declarations of sovereign exception to the law or in the refugee crisis that accompanies the decline of nation-States. Such states of exception are, Agamben argues (following Benjamin), becoming more and more the rule in contemporary political life and the examples one might adduce in support of this thesis are indeed becoming increasingly and troublingly commonplace. Con siderations of this kind are what lead Agamben to the conclusion that the genuine political task facing us today is not the reform, radicalization, or expansion of humanism and democracy, but the creation of an altogether different form of political life.

#### And this will to classify requires the maintenance of a proper linguistic order. The absence of a definitive difference between human and animal, has lead language to operate as a violent border, where the proper man is created

Giorgio Agamben, Italian philosopher, The Open: Man and Animal, published 2002 ///AHS PB

The idea of this sprachloser Urmensch—as Haeckel also defines him—entailed, however, some aporias of which he does not seem to have been aware. In reality, the passage from animal to man, despite the emphasis placed on comparative anatomy and paleon- tological findings, was produced by subtracting an element that had nothing to do with either one, and that instead was presup- posed as the identifying characteristic of the human: language. In identifying himself with language, the speaking man places his own muteness outside of himself, as already and not yet human. It fell to a linguist, Heymann Steinthal—who was also one of the last representatives of the Wissenschaft des Judentums, which had sought to apply the methods of modern science to the study of Judaism—to lay bare the aporias implicit in Haeckel’s theory of the Homo alalus and, more generally, those of what we can call the modern anthropological machine. In his studies on the origin of language, Steinthal had himself advanced, many years before Haeckel, the idea of a prelinguistic stage of humanity. He had tried to imagine a phase of man’s perceptual life in which language has not yet appeared, and he had compared this with the percep- tual life of the animal; he then tried to show how language could spring from the perceptual life of man and not from that of the animal. But this is precisely where an aporia appeared which he would only fully realize some years later. We have [he writes] compared this purely hypothetical stage of the human soul with that of the animal, and have in the first discerned, in general and in all respects, an excess of forces. We then had the human soul apply this excess to the formation of language. We have thereby been able to show why language originated from the human soul and its perceptions, and not from that of the animal. . . . But in our description of animal and human souls we have had to leave aside language, the possibility of which we were precisely supposed to prove. It first should have been shown whence stems the force by means of which the soul forms language; this force which has the abil- ity to create language obviously cannot stem from language. For this reason we have invented a stage of man that precedes language. But of course, this is only a fiction; for language is so necessary and natu- ral for the human being, that without it man can neither truly exist nor be thought of as existing. Either man has language, or he simply is not. On the other hand—and this justifies the fiction—language nevertheless cannot be regarded as already inherent in the human soul; rather, it is by this time a production of man, even if not yet a fully conscious one. It is a stage of the soul’s development and requires a deduction from the preceding stages. With it, true and proper human activity begins; it is the bridge that leads from the ani-mal kingdom to the human kingdom. . . . But why the human soul alone builds this bridge, why man alone and not the animal pro- gresses through language from animality to humanity: this is what we wanted to explain through a comparison of the animal with the ani- mal-man. This comparison shows us that man, as we must imagine him, that is, without language, is indeed an animal-man [Tier- Mensch] and not a human animal [Menschentier], and is always already a species of man and not a species of animal.4 What distinguishes man from animal is language, but this is not a natural given already inherent in the psychophysical structure of man; it is, rather, a historical production which, as such, can be properly assigned neither to man nor to animal. If this element is taken away, the difference between man and animal vanishes, unless we imagine a nonspeaking man—Homo alalus, precisely— who would function as a bridge that passes from the animal to the human. But all evidence suggests that this is only a shadow cast by language, a presupposition of speaking man, by which we always obtain only an animalization of man (an animal-man, like Haeckel’s ape-man) or a humanization of the animal (a man-ape). The animal-man and the man-animal are the two sides of a single fracture, which cannot be mended from either side.

Sciecne tries to take top down approach of the world, universal knowledge and stuff creates a goal of classifying the world and getting complete understand. When we apply this to living beings we cut stuff into species. When applied to humanity we try to classify where exactlyhe human occurs Evolution language ect. This defines the human in opposition to animal and creates violence to those who don’t fully live up to the definition of the human. Instead we should remistify science, which means we stop trying to determine the exact classificatory system and instead view the world as excedding our understanding. This also implies being with animals, where we exist along side them expiercning the world from different way.

#### The political only gains its coherence through the endless reproduction of the anthropological machine. Politics is based upon the exclusion of those who exist in the human-animal distinction, and cannot separate itself from.

Sue Ruddick, Associate Professor at the university of Toronto, Situating the Anthropocene: planetary urbanization and the anthropological machine, Urban Geography, 36:8, 1113-1130, 2015, DOI: 10.1080/02723638.2015.1071993 ///AHS PB Brackets in original card

The grounding of the citizen subject, the basic characteristics of urban subjectivity, long before its capitalist variant emerged, was founded on a fundamental exclusion that has persisted, even accelerated, in the modern era. The emergence of the city-state and the very foundation of the polis rested on who is included as human, as citizen: “the [Western modern concept of] the human-animal divide is not only political but sets up the very possibility of the polis. Who is included in human society and who is not is a consequence of the politics of ‘humanity’ which engenders the polis itself” (Oliver, 2007, p. 1). Put differently, it is this vision of bare life accorded to a certain part of humanity and most of the nonhuman world (privileged pets excepted) that becomes the basis of differentiation exploitation on which the concept of the civilized world, the capitalist urban is grounded, an exclusion not produced as a remainder or by-product but in the very grounds of its emergence. For Oliver, this concept of the polis is inscribed through the work of the anthropological machine, at once an extension and a transformation of Agamben’s framework. Agamben himself, building on Homo Sacer (1998) in The Open: Man and Animal (2004), sketches the coordinates of a larger landscape of inclusions and exclusions. The anthropological machine is a kind of conceptual apparatus for distinguishing the human from the nonhuman more broadly, not only within the human but also between the human and the animal. In Western societies, it is the anthropological machine that generates a concept of humanity, of what it means to be human: “The production of man through the opposition man/animal, human/inhuman” (Agamben, 2004, p. 37). The question he poses here is slightly different than that entertained in Homo Sacer (1998) or in State of Exception (2005). It is not: how is exclusion performed?— the inclusive exclusion that holds certain beings within, yet suspended from, the benefits of law and of citizenship. It is rather: how does Western humanity imagine itself to be civilized, to be civil in light of these exclusions? Or, in our terms, what becomes the basis for a new urban subjectivity, the parody and plenitude of everyday life to which Lefebvre alludes? The emphasis here, again, is not so much on who is excluded and how but on the way in which the Western concept of the human and humanity paradoxically secures its sense of itself through (and not in spite of) this very act of exclusion. “In our culture man has always been the result of a simultaneous division and articulation of the animal and the human, in which one of the two terms of the operation was also what was at stake in it . . . the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested” (Agamben, 2004, p. 92). In modernity, Agamben writes, the anthropological machine functions by producing a caesura between human and nonhuman within the human itself “by animalizing the human, by isolating the non-human within the human . . . the non-man produced within the man” (Agamben, 2004, p. 37). The separation between humans and animals is clear and the “zone of indistinction” in law is contained entirely within the human (i.e., we are all humans, but some are more like animals than others). Agamben, however, has a more restrictive reading of the spatial manifestation of this discourse, not the polis (with its suggestions of urbanity) but the concentration camp, which for Agamben assumes the function of paradigm. The connection between this model of the biopolitical as a supplement to capitalist development is clear, although not developed in any depth: “the development and triumph of capitalism . . . would not have been possible without the disciplinary control achieved by a new bio-power, which, through a series of appropriate technologies, so to speak created the ‘docile bodies’ it needed” (Agamben, 1998, p. 10). The anthropological machine, then, becomes the supplement that enables the selfinscription of capitalism as civilizing, in spite of and, in fact, alongside its extraordinary legacy of destruction. In a sense, the anthropological machine enables the fusion of two paradoxical operations: democracy suspended in order to safeguard democracy and life rendered killable in order to sustain life. It is this concept of the polis as a kind of pregiven urban citizen-subjectivity, an urbanism engendered through the anthropological machine, that I want to explore in greater depth, for it carries within it, I would argue, the basis of naturalizing a doubled exclusion (within the human and between the human and the animal) that becomes a significant driver in the development and sustenance of capitalist urbanization. The key point here is that the concept of civility is grounded on this exclusion. Exclusion within the human and between the human and the nonhuman is not a mere effect, an unfortunate by-product or collateral damage of urban civility, but rather its founding act. The Western concept of humanity, the polis, requires this division and capitalist urbanization both profits from this division and plays a central role in its naturalization through spatial and discursive orderings. The anthropological machine writes the unspoken script of capitalist urbanism, the set of rules known to everyone but rarely vocalized, that cloak its violent commands in the language of an everyday civility, the idea that urban civility, Western civilization, can and must be bought and paid for with the coin of environmental and human destruction, its effects placed out of sight by distance or out of mind by discourse

#### Advocacy card

Jarius Victor Grove, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXTINCTION From the Anthropocene to the Eurocene, 12/04/2017, ///AH SPB

From this ecological perspective, geopolitics has culminated in a planetary epoch in which a particular anthropos is capable of making a ‘cene.’ 1 However, I think the Anthropocene as a philosophical and political crisis has been too quick to forget the geopolitical arrangements of power and violence that have brought us to this point. Not all of ‘us’ have played an equal part in the making of either the anthropos or the Anthropocene. In part, the often narrow focus on climate change and the fever pitch of the contemporary crisis erases the Euro-American role in building and maintaining the current world order. The argument often advanced by great powers and environmentalists alike amounts to ‘now that everything is broken it is everyone’s problem so pointing fingers just gets in the way of a solution.’ Even critical and posthumanist approaches often lose sight of the role of hegemony and power. This is, in part, because of the effort of those lines of thought to decenter the human as the sole locus of thinking, and action is a necessary but insufficient maneuver. This chapter attempts to relax the focus on a narrow human world while holding onto the very specific human, and often national, assemblages that broke this planet. I do not think I am alone in wanting to open up to the global magnitude of what confronts the planet. And yet in this chapter I want to do so without losing sight of the real differences in politics, geography, history, meaning, and cosmology that modulate how each one of us will confront the end of this epoch. In so doing, I hope to emphasize a refrain that the end of the world is never the end of everything. An apocalypse is always more and less than an extinction; and whatever makes a life out of the mess we are currently in will depend in some ways on how we come to understand the contemporary condition. Ideas matter even if they cannot save us. Stories, explanations, and philosophical adventures are the best of what the human estate has to offer. No matter how desperate things get, someone will still ask why this is happening, and we will share in that question the possibility of thinking together. As William Connolly often says, ‘we are distinctive but not unique’, and that distinctiveness is connected to a sense of wonder – even when it is a dark wonder. As we explore the dark fascination with the futures of our species, the catastrophic inadequacy of our dominate form of life becomes more and more apparent. The dominant forms of planetary life display an obsession with warfare and order – part technological hubris, part ecological sabotage – and have ripped their way through every continent on the planet, making a geological mark we could best call the Eurocene. The making of this epoch, the Eurocene, has been created by no single class or nation, much less by a clearly defined agenda. An aggregating and heterogeneous collection of people, things, perspectives, hatreds, malignancies, and creeping global expansions has unleashed our contemporary condition. We live in a moment imperiled by an immature giganticism. All of us experience this moment differently, but a rare few can escape even for a moment the degree to which a weight impinges upon us all. We live in an apocalyptic era unequally created by a minority bent on the accumulation of wealth and a self-interested regenerating political order. However, the ‘we’ that will bear the burden of this 500-year project of rationalized exploitation is much vaster and includes bumble bees, humpback whales, poison arrow frogs, Hawaiians, wolves, Micronesians, African-Americans, the inhabitants of Flint Michigan, Syrians, Mayans, Queers, Christians, Muslims, Atheists, Transhumanists, Hipsters, Shamans, Entrepreneurs, homeless veterans, war orphans, albatrosses, elephants … Unfortunately there is no high ground from which the entire moving arrangement can be seen. Every perspective obscures and reveals some larger or smaller part of the story of how ‘we’ broke the world. The scale; when? where? magnitude? how long? The connection between each unfolding catastrophe or history of venal will-to-power and presumed superiority shares a connection but not an identifiable cause or choke point that can be isolated and targeted from the heights of rational abstraction. My perspective, my point of view, is from the United States of America, maybe the second to last empire. The U.S. is where I find myself, and it is also where I belong, despite my best efforts to gain distance from such a horrifically destructive and arrogant form of life. To be American is not merely to be a citizen of the U.S.A. It is, rather, to be part of a precarious mixture of European industrial and demographic expansion, a home-grown sense of Christian providence, Liberal institutional development, and a ruthless martial art of extermination and settlement that has continued unabated since its founding. It is in this context that I will try to explore what I think is the character of contemporary geopolitics. For me, in the dying light of the American empire, we face a last great planetary struggle for homogenization. The character of global extinction: the Anthropocene as geopolitical fact I would sum up my fear about the future in one word: boring. And that’s my one fear: that everything has happened; nothing exciting or new or interesting is ever going to happen again … the future is just going to be a vast, conforming suburb of the soul. (J.G. Ballard in Vale and Juno 1984: n.p.) In a world that encourages uniformity, that judges values by their utility, perhaps these animals like so many of their kind, also, are doomed to disappear in favor of some more commercially useful species. Yet, I cannot avoid a bitter sense of loss that, we, born to a world that still held these creatures, are being robbed of a priceless inheritance, a life that welcomes diversity not sameness, that treasures astonishment and wonder instead of boredom. (Jacques Cousteau)2 Every day we are told things are worse than we thought. Sea level rise is happening faster than we thought; species are disappearing faster than we thought; the possibilities for reversal are slimmer and slimmer. And the proposals for human survival gaining traction – geoengineering, the centrally managed super-cities of Stewart Brand’s Eco-Modernist manifesto, space colonization, becoming digital beings – resemble the wonders of thriving planetary life less and less (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2016).3 On April 20, 2016 The Washington Post headline read ‘And then we wept.’ 4 The news was in and it wasn’t good. The Great Barrier Reef, the Amazon rainforest of the world’s oceans, was 93 percent bleached. The coral foundation of its vast ecosystem was dead or dying (Mooney 2016). A year to the day before this announcement we were told that the northern white rhino was extinct.5 The last white rhino, a male named Sudan, is now kept under guard from poachers 24 hours a day, but no army or protection is sufficient for survival as there is no mate remaining. The young men carrying machine guns are Sudan’s only company as he waits to perish, a task thoroughly accelerated by human desires for horn. Each event – a global reef system in Australia, the loss of a singular species in central Kenya, a slow shift in ocean levels – exists in an interregnum between the brutal facts of existence through which all things must pass and the crisis of our contemporary moment that the cycle of passing and renewal has been interrupted by the metabolic rift of modern human animals. Which trajectory we are facing is unclear. Is the sixth great extinction upon us? The difficulty in classifying extinctions is differentiating a normal rise, decline, and extinction of species against which to compare and periodize ‘events’ of catastrophic and lethal acceleration. Even the five great extinctions took place over unfathomable periods of time.6 In all of the great extinctions, ‘events’ are hundreds of thousands of years long. Furthermore, the incomplete nature of the fossil record makes population sampling very difficult. One has to figure out ways to reliably distinguish between whether the absence of evidence is indeed evidence or merely the absence of evidence. After extensive review of excavations worldwide over at least 150 years of research, one can estimate what is called the ‘background’ extinction rate. This is the expected rate of species loss over a given period of time. This rate is not definitive. At best, it is a kind of working rule of thumb. That being said, the academic debates over whether or not the current rate of extinction exceeds any version of the background rate is like two kids on the Empire State Building bickering over whether it is the fall that kills you or the certain impact at the bottom (Rockstrom et al. 2009). Even conservative estimates put the loss of species across the plant and animal kingdom at thousands of times the background rate from earlier human and pre-human eras. To put it another way, even if the most conservative estimates are right, we are in real trouble. Thanks to habitat loss and the chytrid fungus, the amphibian extinction rate is 45,000 times higher than the background rate. Amphibians survived four of the five great extinction events in Earth’s history, yet one generation of human travel has spiked amphibian extinction rates above what was caused by multiple asteroid impacts, super volcanoes, cataclysmic climate oscillations, and a collision with a comet (Kolbert 2014). In an irony only humans will appreciate, the current apocalypse is marked by a noticeable lack of raining frogs. Amphibians are not alone in the race to extinction. As recounted by Elizabeth Kolbert (2014), one-third of all reef-building corals, one-third of all freshwater mollusks, one-third of sharks and rays, one-fourth of all mammals, one-fifth of all reptiles, and one-sixth of all bird species are disappearing. What makes this particular era of disappearances unique is not just the rate of extinction but also the distribution. The entire ocean is facing unprecedented instability (Roach 2006).7 Furthermore, extinctions are occurring globally, even in those areas spared heavy industrialization and development. While climate change is unlikely to help, the current amphibian apocalypse is driven almost entirely by the human-induced movement of people and things around the planet.8 The chytrid fungus now affecting the majority of the planet is responsible for mass die-offs of amphibians, depriving them of oxygen and causing heart attacks. While climate change should certainly be central to global political agendas, the already occurring sixth great extinction calls into question more than just the dependence on fossil fuels. Climate change is one manifestation of our global ecological crisis. From the perspective of those forms of life being wiped off the planet, the entire rhythm and circulation of just-in-time globalization enforced by great power navies – one of the most defining characteristics of the Eurocene – is threatening. In so far as an environmental agenda has gained political currency since the mid-1990s, no political party or significant constituency takes seriously the proposition that global travel should come to an end. Freedom of movement is almost unquestionably championed by liberal societies; those that do challenge it are often reactionaries and xenophobes, not environmentalists. Since the first slow and then accelerating egress from Africa, humans have spread to every continent on the planet. That movement once resembled something like the linearity of osmosis but has reached, for some in the elite, terminal velocity. There are now humans that live in constant motion on permanent-residence cruise ships to avoid taxes, and there is a global class of anxious airport-hopping business elite that resides in no place in particular.9 The latter are so allergic to friction slowing their circulation that even in this age of security and checkpoints they have been granted special routes and forms of identification to avoid the coagulation of administration now managing planetary circuits (Salter and Mutlu 2012). This is just one example of how liberal practices come up against McKenzie Wark’s reworking of what Marx calls metabolic rift. For Wark, following Marx, the advent of labor which freed humans from the animal world also put humans out of synch with natural process. The result is that humans to be human require too much food, water, and energy for natural cycles to fulfill (Wark, 2015: 4). There is no version of the contemporary order that can be egalitarian and sustainable. Disposable consumer-based economies cannot scale for any length of time. So in some sense Wark and Marx are right. The cycles of the Earth and much of its inhabitants are out of synch with humans and their love of labour. For Wark, in particular, this leaves little else to do but accept that any viable human project will have to embrace geoengineering and even space colonization alongside other efforts to build a ‘post-scarcity society.’ However such concepts should be made more precise in identifying the particular forms of life that are at odds with or exceed multi-species ecological feedback. If humanity is to find itself in another dark age, rather than a unified global project for environmental management there are many possible ways of living that could be sustained within the dynamic equilibrium of earth systems. But the point stands. If we remain within the currently restricted vision of the future of global culture – an America for everyone – -the adaptive character of even large Earth systems, such as the hydrologic cycle,10 will collapse or enter periods of extreme turbulence. To put this another way, the ought of the cosmopolitanism ‘good’ and the ecological are not consonant. However you feel about transnational capitalism, it is indisputable that the uninterrupted movement of things and people around the planet comes at an extraordinarily high cost to human animals and non-human animals alike. This is at times difficult to discern as the human population steadily increases and the world seems suffuse with living things. Therefore the problem of the current crisis is not reducible solely to some aggregate of living biomass. What is being lost is the diversity of life that inspires wonder. Apocalypses are not primarily about extinction – they are irreversible transformations. The often misguided debates over climate change capture this problem quite acutely. In fact, despite how difficult it is to admit that the deniers of anthropogenic climate change may be half right, they are correct that fluctuations are a normal part of the Earth’s history.11 However, what sustains the conservative bent of this claim is the sense of providence that the full argument entails. Those who champion adaptation and ‘natural’ fluctuation trade on the presumption that the Earth adapts and fluctuates for us. Fluctuations will occur and creatures will adapt, but in the past that has meant everything from a world of only single-celled anaerobic bacteria to vast seas of virtually nothing but trilobites. Climate denialism is, ironically, no less anthropocentric than many of its scientifically validated opponents. The peril of similarity: or, the great homogenization In addition to extinction level events, the Earth has also experienced a number of monoculture events – that is epochs of great homogenization. Whether by reptiles, plants, or humans, domination by one species has resulted in collapses and explosions in creature diversity. It is not without precedent that one form of life could predominate and even spawn a new earthly order, as in the Cambrian explosion 540 million years ago, considered by most geologists as the most innovative period of evolution. The great transformation of the planet by photosynthesis provides another salient example. However, the terraforming accomplished by plants is not likely to be repeated by humans unless an incipient form of life that thrives in a carbon-rich, hot, radioactive, dioxin-saturated environment comes to take over the planet. And even then it is not just the warmer temperature or toxic nature of the Anthropocene that is dangerous to life. Periods of rapid warming and novel additions to the atmosphere have often caused violent feedback such as rapid cooling or, in some cases, ocean stagnation from the loss of ocean currents and upwelling. In such cases the cascading die-offs of creatures great and small can themselves tweak and shift vast planetary cycles in new directions of amplifying and intensifying destructiveness or creativity, depending on the inheritors of the new dynamic equilibrium (Benton 2008). The problem is also that humans are not innovating or undergoing speciation to fill the gaps left by other forms-of-life, as dinosaurs once did. Diversity is collapsing within the human species as well. Most languages and most ways of life outside the narrow scope of Euro-America are disappearing at an accelerating rate. According to linguist David Harrison (2007) and a number of other linguists working at UNESCO, of the 6,912 languages currently spoken worldwide, fewer than half of them will survive the 21st century. Language extinction is not the loss of words. According to Harrison, each language contains a different cognitive map of the human brain. This claim cannot be overstated. In an example from Harrison’s research amongst the Urarina people of Peru, some languages, although very few, place the object of the sentence at the beginning. The action and subject are grammatically organized by the object. According to Harrison (2007: 19): Urarina places the direct object first, the verb second, and the subject last … Were it not for Urarina and a few other Amazonian languages, scientists might not even suspect it were possible. They would be free to hypothesize – falsely – that O-V-S word order was cognitively impossible, that the human brain could not process it. Each new grammar pattern we find sheds light on how the human brain creates language. The loss of even one language may forever close the door to a full understanding of human cognitive capacity. Given the bloody philosophical war that has been waged over the relationship between humans and the objects in the external world they encounter for the entire history of recorded thought, linguistic worlds such as the Urarina’s represent possibilities that decades of critique may not be grammatically equipped to produce. Given how bound up our current political and ecological disasters are with the problem of objectification, or why we treat objects so badly, this might be important. In order to consider Harrison’s provocation fully, we have to give up on the idea that there is some kind of formal isomorphism in the basement of all languages. There is no meta-language. Instead, Harrison says, ‘languages are selforganizing systems that evolve complex nested structures and rules for how to put the parts of words or sentences together’ (2007: 249). Rather than think of language as the way that humans master the world, Harrison says, it is language ‘that has colonized our brains’ (2007: 225). After a life spent trying to record and hold on to as many of the disappearing languages around the world as possible, Harrison argues that every language is a singular ‘accretion of many centuries of human thinking about time, seasons, sea creatures, reindeer, flowers, mathematics, landscapes, myths, music, infinity, cyclicity, the unknown, and the everyday’ (2007: viii). Furthermore, the loss of languages is not an issue of ‘multiculturalism.’ The loss is not just one of a way of life, like being a hipster, an activist, or an academic: it is the extinction of a form-of-life. With each language that dies we lose a glimpse of the cosmos never to be repeated. As Agamben (2000) has said of the form-of-life, it is a set of practices and conditions of being that is inseparable from being biologically alive. Few cases capture the inextricable relationship between life and living like those groups that have survived 500 years of colonial expansion intact in the forests of Brazil.12 As they have successfully postponed the virulence of the European world of disease, exposure to ‘us’ (global culture) will mean certain death. With no inherited immunity, these groups will return to the soil with their cosmic perspective. The primary cause of the displacement of uncontacted peoples in Brazil is logging and drug violence, both part of globalization. I should be clear about what I mean by ‘perspective.’ A perspective is not a ‘point of view’ in the postmodern trivial sense, as if there is no truth and only an ‘opinion of the truth.’ This kind of consumerist ‘common-sense’ postmodernism is a dead end. By perspective, I mean what anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro calls radical perspectivism, whereby the selves of a host of different entities – jaguars, rocks, uncontacted peoples, plants – all experience and theorize the world in heterogeneous alliances not reducible to each other, much less as something like ideology or belief. According to Castro, what we find in comparative cosmologies are the possibilities of human–nature relations that are no less real or material than Western scientific observations, but that organize the world around feritas (‘wildness’) rather than humanitas (‘culture, humanity’) (Viveiros de Castro 1992: 29). Given how self-destructive and inevitable Euro-American anthropocentrism often feels in contemporary modern life, forms-of-life organized otherwise are more than just curiosities. Instead, other cosmologies and the languages that dwell in them offer the possibility of radical mutation. In the case of French thinker Tristan Garcia, this mutation is an adventure in philosophy and metaphysics that refuses to accept subject/object and human/non-human binaries as inevitable problems of cognition. Instead, Garcia traces what some have called a flat ontology or a way of being where each human is in an egalitarian, give-and-take relationship with things, animals, and other humans for creating meaning about the world. The superiority and sovereignty of self-consciousness for making meaning in the world is ditched to explore something else entirely (Garcia 2014: 221–223). Garcia’s work draws on a minor Continental tradition of philosophy, but it is difficult to imagine the inspired escape from ‘the metaphysics of access’ in favor of the dignity of things without the cosmologies of Amerindians or without Castro’s role as a kind of inter-cosmology diplomat.13 Consequently, as the linguistic and cosmological differences of the world flatten and merge, it is not just ‘background’ loss or functional survival of the fittest that is taking place. Humans as the sole inheritors of the hominid legacy are experiencing catastrophic loss, a kind of internal hollowing out. The ecological crisis reaches deep into our material and mental constitutions. The destruction of perspectives – whether it is those of poison dart frogs, sawfish, Navajo speakers, mpingo trees, bluefin tuna, isolated people of the Brazilian rainforest whose names belong to them alone, or artists and philosophers forced to abandon their creativity in favor of brain-dulling precarious labor – leaves this world less interesting and less complex than it was before. With each loss of these forms-of-life we lose not just a diversity of opinions about the universe, but distinctive practices of tilling the earth, water management, creativity, revolutionary thinking, aquaculture, human–animal ecologies as well as political and ethical practices (Goldberg-Hiller and Silva 2011). More than mere ‘points of view,’ forms-of-life carry with them means for inhabiting the Earth that in some cases far exceed the mono-technological thinking of contemporary global development. Homogenization entails a restriction of our socio-technical horizons. To be clear, these vital practices are not restricted to the human estate, but also include the North American beaver’s river management practices and their ability to combat soil erosion,14 the duties of megafauna and apex predators to keep grazing creatures on the move and thus prevent overconsumption in prairie ecologies (Manning 2009), and on and on. The expanse of possible human–non-human alliances lost in the singularity of our current apocalypse is unknowable in an unusual way. Each lost alliance or form of life means a future that can no longer come about. The geopolitical advance of homogenization is killing futures as it strangles the present. Transformation, transcendence, or more of the same: the geopolitics of geoengineering? Rather than inspire responses adequate to the crisis at hand, Euro-American humans are in large part fighting to continue exactly as we are. For many scientists and modernists, the critical question is how to maintain extraordinarily high levels of economic growth and consumption because they see these practices as necessary conditions for human advancement and innovation. Inheritors of the cybernetics movement of the 1950s, called ‘systems thinkers,’ see management and governance of the entire Earth system as the next logical step. For many systems thinkers and Ecomodernists, what it is to be human is to alter our environment. Therefore, each step forward means taking greater control of the world around us. The most emblematic of these thinkers was Buckminster Fuller, whose 1968 cult classic Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth advocated that the whole planet be seen as a ship that humans must learn to steer just as they learned to navigate the oceans or grow crops. The next generation of systems theorists came of age at the beginning of the computer revolution in the 1970s when the capability for truly planetary systems management seemed to be on the horizon. Stewart Brand was one of the leaders of that movement, and founded a journal called Whole Earth Review which sought to be a forum for planet-wide guided evolution. It is not surprising that, given the interest in engineering and global development, news of the limits of growth would be met with calls for transcending those limits rather than trying to live within them. For Brand and other more explicitly industrial geo-engineers like David Keith, who has become an outspoken advocate for industrial intervention in earth systems, the only solution to the Anthropocene can only be found in its cause – human engineering. To quote the title of a recent article by Keith, the hope is located in the question ‘can science succeed where politics has failed?’ 15 For Keith and Brand in particular the hope is building what Brand and his collaborators calls in their Ecomodernist Manifesto ‘A Good Anthropocene’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2016). Following proposals made by biologist E.O. Wilson and others, Brand and his team suggest setting aside half of the planet to be rewilded. To do so the management of both human and non-human populations must be greatly intensified to accomplish what Ecomodernists call decoupling. According to the team of mostly Harvard and Oxford scientists working with Brand, modernity has greatly lessened the impact of humans on natural systems. Industrial-style agriculture, nuclear energy, and most of all urbanization reduce the dependence of humans on the environment at large. Following their argument, if humans can be herded entirely into super-cities and human access to the rest of the planet can be restricted, then a renewal of the natural world can take place. Food, energy, and other natural resources will then have to be produced by synthetic means made possible by advances in materials engineering such as nanotechnology and extreme forms of recycling which would reprocess and disaggregate all human waste into base materials to be used again. According to Ecomodernists, if we can let go of the idea that non-modern civilizations ‘lived more lightly on the Earth’ then we can concentrate and accelerate the advantages of highly industrialized societies for the rest of the planet’s human population. The Manifesto asserts that ‘even developing countries [can] achieve modern living standards’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2016). The externalities of these lifestyles, such as carbon emissions which cannot be contained within cities, will have to be ameliorated through vast planet-wide interventions. Solar shielding to regulate sunlight, Albedo modification to alter the color and reflectivity of clouds, mechanical carbon capture and storage, even planet shields of old compact discs are proposed as permanent features of future human existence and governance such that humans and the rest of nature can share a planet while no longer sharing a world. The optimistic version is that these more extreme means of planetary regulation can be replaced in a few hundred years when nuclear power and maybe other alternatives can create ‘tens of terawatt’ electrical output (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2016). In a weird resonance with critiques by Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour (1993), Philippe Descola, Jane Bennett (2010), William Connolly, and others who have effectively demonstrated that there is no ‘nature’ external to humans, Ecomodernists have conceded the point, declaring the need to invent precisely the human/non-human or culture/nature binary of modernist social theory via an unprecedented scale of global governance. The political or governance side of the vision is significantly less developed than the technical components of the manifesto. In regard to politics, the manifesto merely starts as a kind of disclaimer that: ‘We value the liberal principles of democracy, tolerance, and pluralism in themselves, even as we affirm them as keys to achieving a great Anthropocene’ (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2016). So whereas the Manifesto sees a great deal of invention and change for the technical future of the species as a question of governance, history is over and global liberal democracy is its endpoint. Technical issues are not understood as politically charged; nor is this approach understood as a specific socio-technical response to the crisis of the Anthropocene designed to buttress a specific form of consumer capitalism (Keary 2016: 23–24). The existing limitations of ‘real existing liberal democracy’ are not addressed; nor are there experts on politics or governance included in the who’s who of scientists committed to the Ecomodernist project. The challenges to a ‘great Anthropocene,’ as Brand calls it in the conclusion of the Manifesto, are technical rather than political, future oriented rather than historical, and universalplanetary-species rather than particular. Again, returning to Keith, the goal of Ecomodernism is for science to fix what politics cannot. Jedediah Purdy (2015) in his book After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene attempts to fill in where the Ecomodernist have left off. Purdy similarly sees in the ‘end of nature’ the possibility for a new more equitable nature. Although he diverges from some Ecomodernists on how and to what extent rewilding and urbanization are key components in a good Anthropocene, Purdy shares the commitment that modernism and a break from nature are necessary for achieving survival and any egalitarian future. In a less technocentric vision of geoengineering and managed wild zones, Purdy proposes something like a Roosevelt revolution for resources and global democratic governance. In geoengineering and other technological forms of intervention in the means by which humans survive, Purdy sees the possibility of overcoming scarcity and competition that otherwise undermine democratic principles. Like Brand and the Ecomodernists, Purdy sees the human character of the Anthropocene as an opportunity rather than just a catastrophe. If humans are capable of destroying the planet and altering the very material conditions of life, then they must be capable via collective action for altering the planet for good; and, like the Ecomodernists, the main obstacle to doing so is a naive and nostalgic view of nature as ‘untouched’ or ‘untouchable.’ Once we accept that there is no nature as such we can better ‘spare nature’ and live more abundant lives on the planet. In some sense the scale of catastrophe is a kind of windfall as it creates a set of challenges worthy of and inciting a true democratic cosmopolitanism. Political interests in the Anthropocene are synonymous with human interests as planetary survival is at stake. While global in consequence, the crisis we confront is not singularly global in origin and periodizes in very different ways than suggested by advocates of the Anthropocene. The attempts by Ecomodernists and Purdy alike to ‘move on’ from history are significantly dangerous for the prospects and success of their future visions for global abundance. The human-induced apocalypse when viewed with an emphasis on the effects of the 1492 landing in the Americas suggests that before the so-called ‘great acceleration’ after industrialization there is a particular geographic and political rather than species-wide character to the geological era. Advocates for renaming our ‘cene’ the Anthropocene focus too narrowly on climate change and too expansively when attributing to the whole species that catastrophic transformation of the Earth’s atmosphere (Rockstrom et al. 2009). It is telling that so many of those who warn of the dangers of the Anthropocene so quickly use the same scientific evidence to make a case for the ‘great powers’ of the world to take control of the planet through geoengineering. Ecomodernist proposals both for our new geological epoch and the solution that follows closely with it fail consider the importance of the geopolitics that have brought our planet to this moment – where nature itself appears as a question for not just human but also Euro-American governance. If we are to meaningfully take on the challenges, and even enemies, of our current apocalypse we must consider carefully the origins of the apocalypse we now face. To do so is to take seriously that there has never been an anthropos for which we can now discuss the geological consequences of something like a single human species. Rather, the Euro of the Eurocene designates a vanguard among the European people that developed a distinctively mechanistic view of matter, an oppositional relationship to nature, and a successive series of economic systems bases indebted to geographical expansion. The resulting political orders then measured success by how much wealth could be generated in the exploitation of peoples and resources. The Euro assemblage of hierarchies, racial superiorities, economies, peoples, animals, diseases, and global resettlement is reflected in the geological record. What Mackenzie Wark has called the Carbon Liberation Front was not a global phenomena but a way of technopolitics originating within a narrow geographic region of the world made global by force.16 Properly named, our era is not the Anthropocene but the Eurocene. Properly accounting for the origins of our ecological crisis is vital. No political project oriented toward the many possible futures stretching out before us can consider the questions of ecology and justice on a global, much less geological, scale unless we first take on the historical generality of the Anthropocene. The continuing project of Europeanization, now led by U.S. imperial power, is central in how the planet got to this point; and understanding this is essential for how any ‘we’ worthy of the plurality of the planet can invent something less nasty and brutish than what currently counts as order. A geological history and name that foregrounds the geopolitical confrontation that stands in the way of any such future is required to take the scale of our predicament seriously

#### Possible Monism Card [Advocacy makes redundant]

Giorgio Agamben, Italian philosopher, The Open: Man and Animal, published 2002 ///AHS PB

Uexküll’s investigations into the animal environment are con- temporary with both quantum physics and the artistic avant- gardes. And like them, they express the unreserved abandonment of every anthropocentric perspective in the life sciences and the radical dehumanization of the image of nature (and so it should come as no surprise that they strongly influenced both Heidegger, the philosopher of the twentieth century who more than any other strove to separate man from the living being, and Gilles Deleuze, who sought to think the animal in an absolutely nonanthropo-morphic way). Where classical science saw a single world that comprised within it all living species hierarchically ordered from the most elementary forms up to the higher organisms, Uexküll instead supposes an infinite variety of perceptual worlds that, though they are uncommunicating and reciprocally exclusive, are all equally perfect and linked together as if in a gigantic musical score, at the center of which lie familiar and, at the same time, remote little beings called Echinus esculentus, Amoeba terricola, Rhizostoma pulmo, Sipunculus, Anemonia sulcata, Ixodes ricinus, and so on. Thus, Uexküll calls his reconstructions of the environ- ments of the sea urchin, the amoeba, the jellyfish, the sea worm, the sea anemone, the tick (these being their common names), and the other tiny organisms of which he is particularly fond, “excur- sions in unknowable worlds,” because these creatures’ functional unity with the environment seems so apparently distant from that of man and of the so-called higher animals. Too often, he affirms, we imagine that the relations a certain animal subject has to the things in its environment take place in the same space and in the same time as those which bind us to the objects in our human world. This illusion rests on the belief in a single world in which all living beings are situated. Uexküll shows that such a unitary world does not exist, just as a space and a time that are equal for all living things do not exist. The fly, the drag- onfly, and the bee that we observe flying next to us on a sunny day do not move in the same world as the one in which we observe them, nor do they share with us—or with each other—the same time and the same space.Uexküll begins by carefully distinguishing the Umgebung, the objective space in which we see a living being moving, from the Umwelt, the environment-world that is constituted by a more or less broad series of elements that he calls “carriers of significance” (Bedeutungsträger) or of “marks” (Merkmalträger), which are the only things that interest the animal. In reality, the Umgebung is our own Umwelt, to which Uexküll does not attribute any partic- ular privilege and which, as such, can also vary according to the point of view from which we observe it. There does not exist a for- est as an objectively fixed environment: there exists a forest-for- the-park-ranger, a forest-for-the-hunter, a forest-for-the-botanist, a forest-for-the-wayfarer, a forest-for-the-nature-lover, a forest-for- the-carpenter, and finally a fable forest in which Little Red Riding Hood loses her way. Even a minimal detail—for example, the stem of a wildflower—when considered as a carrier of significance, constitutes a different element each time it is in a different envi- ronment, depending on whether, for example, it is observed in the environment of a girl picking flowers for a bouquet to pin to her corset, in that of an ant for whom it is an ideal way to reach its nourishment in the flower’s calyx, in that of the larva of a cicada who pierces its medullary canal and uses it as a pump to construct the fluid parts of its elevated cocoon, or finally in that of the cow who simply chews and swallows it as food.

#### Advocacy

Kelly Oliver, American philosopher specializing in feminism, political philosophy and ethics. She is W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. She is also a founder of the feminist philosophy journal philoSOPHIA , Stopping the Anthropological Machine: Agamben with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, published 2007, <https://as.vanderbilt.edu/philosophy/people/facultyfiles/oliver-stopping_the_anthropoloigcal_machine.pdf> ///AHS PB

Consider as an alternative to reinstating religious discourse, re-animating science itself. Agamben diagnoses one of the central problems with scientific discourse as the tendency to reduce life to bare life by evacuating it of all mystery and therefore of its meaning. Without mystery, life is more like a machine that functions than an assembly of living creatures. Without mystery, the meaning of life is reduced to nothing more than a determination of what stimulus causes which reaction. Given the realities of our dependence upon techno-science, however, we might do better to look for the mysteries in science itself rather than return to religion. In this section, I will suggest that reanimating and reinterpreting science are parts of Merleau-Ponty’s project in the Nature Lectures. Like Agamben, Merleau-Ponty injects with meaning every experiment from biology, zoology or psychology he discusses. Merleau-Ponty goes further by suggesting that science is always motivated by a mystery that exceeds it, the mystery of life. For example, in discussing the twenty-seven species of crab in the Barbave Islands and their twenty-seven different types of sexual display, Merleau-Ponty insists that we cannot reduce their behavior to the utility of reproduction because that is to ignore the richness of their expression and “the mystery of life in the way that animals show themselves to each other” (Nature 188). He also says “there is a mystery of the sensible … which entirely grounds our Einfühlung (empathy) with the world and the animals, and gives depth to Being” (312). In these passages, it is precisely the relationships between animals, and between human animals and other animals, that sparks the mystery of life. Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to suggest that there is a natural magic that attracts scientists to the study of nature: “If these facts retain so much attention from scientists, it’s because something is in question with the observer, or because the facts seem to realize a natural magic,” which is the animal’s “mysterious” relationship with its milieu (185). By magic and mystery, Merleau-Ponty is clear that he does not mean some type of vitalism or magical life force operating within organisms. Rather, he is referring to a scientific curiosity about life that always exceeds the mechanistic tendencies of the scientific method. By rediscovering that aspect of science, we can regain its mystery, and even its magic. Merleau-Ponty describes the interplay between magic or mystery and fact, extraordinary and ordinary, sensible and miracle, visible and invisible, as the heart of science. Through his creative and philosophical interpretations of science, and specifically biology, Merleau-Ponty— unlike Heidegger and Agamben—refuses merely to dismiss science and technology as dangerous. Rather, he attempts a reanimation and reinterpretation of science by continually navigating between vitalism and mechanism without giving up on the meaningfulness of science. For Merleau-Ponty, science is not simply or in principle opposed to philosophy; rather, science and philosophy can engage in a reciprocal exchange that enlivens both. If empirical science needs an infusion of philosophy, perhaps philosophy too needs an injection of empirical life. Meaning lies somewhere between abstract philosophical categories and the so-called brute facts of empirical observation. In a section of the Nature Lectures entitled “The Phenomena of Mimicry: Living Beings and Magic,” Merleau-Ponty says “To admit the existence of a sense organ is to allow for a miracle just as remarkable as allowing for a resemblance between the butterfly and its milieu” (186). He sees his discussion of mimicry and his attempts to reconcile inner agency with outer agency, and activity with passivity, as an attempt “to make the ordinary and the extra ordinary communicate,” because “on the one hand there is a frenzied freedom of life, and on the other, an economy of life” (186). By choosing one pole over the other, scientists and philosophers find themselves caught up in classical binary oppositions that make us choose between sides of life, between inner and outer, mind and body, activity and passivity, proximity and distance, identity and difference, continuity and separation, and between animal and man. Merleau-Ponty brings these two sides together with his notion of “strange kinship”: “What the meditation of our “strange kinship” with the animals (and thus with the theory of evolution) teaches pertaining to the human body. It is to be understood as our projectionintrojection, our Ineinander with Sensible Being and with other corporeities” (Nature 271). “Strange kinship” allows us to be together with other embodied beings, not because we share an origin and evolution, or a language and culture, but rather because we have bodies that relate to their environments and to other bodies. Merleau-Ponty says that “the relation of the human and animality is not a hierarchical relation, but a lateral, a surpassing (dépassement) that does not abolish kinship” (Nature 268, translation modified; see La Nature 335). He insists on the “lateral union of animality and humanity” insofar as they are necessarily given together (Nature 271). If humans and animals are laterally related as kin, then humanity neither emerges from animality nor is it forever cut off from animality. The question of the origin of man or the origin of language cannot be answered in terms of evolution but necessarily remains a mystery because, according to Merleau-Ponty, quoting de Chardin, “man came silently into the world” (Nature 267). The “strange kinship” (étrange parenté) between humans and animals that results from the lateral union of animality and humanity cannot be reduced to evolution where humanity is the telos of animality, on the one hand, or to an abyss between body and consciousness (or animal and Da-sein), on the other (La Nature 339). This kinship neither erases all differences between animals and humans, rendering them identical, nor erases any similarities between them, rendering them radically separate. Rather, “strange kinship” allows for an intimate relation based on shared embodiment without denying differences between life-styles or styles of being. Merleau-Ponty’s theory of stylistic differences maintains difference without allowing it to become the grounds for ethical or epistemological hierarchies between beings. Human beings have a style of behavior particular to them. Various animals have their own styles of behaviors. One type of being is not the ascent or descent of the other; but neither is one radically separated from the other. This strange kinship is not based on descendents nor on generation but rather on shared embodiment in a shared world, even if the style of body and of inhabiting that world are radically different. We are akin by virtue of our embodiment, yet we are strangers by virtue of the differences in our life-styles. For Merleau-Ponty what Agamben calls the hiatus between man and animal is neither filled with some ape-man or missing link, nor is it empty and void. Rather, it is the space of the fold between two sides of the natural world or, as he says, the relationship between notes and melody. What in the Nature Lectures Merleau-Ponty calls the “intertwining” of animality and humanity, becomes in The Visible and the Invisible the “intertwining” between the visible and the invisible, body and mind. What in the later work, Merleau-Ponty calls the “thickness of flesh” and permeability of skin makes "intercorporiety" possible (Visible 141). Both the thickness of the flesh and the permeability of the skin make communication with the world and other possible (135). The thickness of the flesh guarantees relations, while the skin insures that we can distinguish our experience from the other's. Yet, since the flesh and skin are not objects, but synergetic, we are never cut off from the other. The skin is a boundary, but a permeable boundary. Flesh makes communication possible because, as Merleau-Ponty says, it is “reversible.” By reversible, he means that we are both sensing and sensible, both subject and object: The body is both subject and object “because a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, and because between my body looked at and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching, there is overlapping encroachment, so that we must say that the things pass into us as well as we into the things" (123). By virtue of the flesh, which we share with other living beings and the world, we can sense and be sensed by others and by ourselves. The reversibility of the tangible opens up an "intercorporeal being" which extends further than any one individual and founds the "transitivity from one body to another" (143). This transitivity extends between humans and animals because they also have flesh that connects them and skin that keeps them separate. Both connection and separation are necessary for relationships, and both are entailed by embodiment itself. The continuity that Merleau-Ponty describes between animals and man is not that of Darwinian evolutionary science, but rather that of configurations and styles of behavior that are repeated throughout the natural world. Or perhaps more precisely, we should call them styles of style that are repeated, in that all living creatures have life-styles that resonate with their environment and their fellows.6 Both dissonance and harmony are parts of the melody of life. To emphasize one over the other, as Heidegger and Agamben do when they insist on separation over continuity, is to risk losing the richness of life that brings with it the mysteries that they also cherish. To “let beings be” in Agamben’s sense of the unsaved, the unforgiven, and that of which we are ignorant, is not the same as celebrating the mysteries of life, or the mysteries of philosophy and science for that matter. Returning philosophy to religion, as Agamben does, seems like a step backwards on the journey away from scientific demystification and technological management of life, particularly in terms of the hierarchy between man and animal that not only produces the human at the center of God’s creation but also justifies man’s inhumanity to man. Another tack might be to follow Merleau-Ponty’s revisioning of science as a creative endeavor motivated by the infinite mysteries of life and fulfilled by on-going interpretations of the between, the chiasmus and the kinship, that together signal both the gap and the intertwining between living creatures as a fold in life itself that is part of the mystery of life.

# 1AR

## Case

### Overview

Sciecne tries to take top down approach of the world, universal knowledge and stuff creates a goal of classifying the world and getting complete understand. When we apply this to living beings we cut stuff into species. When applied to humanity we try to classify where exactlyhe human occurs Evolution language ect. This defines the human in opposition to animal and creates violence to those who don’t fully live up to the definition of the human. Instead we should remistify science, which means we stop trying to determine the exact classificatory system and instead view the world as excedding our understanding. This also implies being with animals, where we exist along side them expiercning the world from different way.

### A2 Rickert

### A2 Presumption

## A2 T Framework

State cant restrict itself so res is false

Linguistics impact turn

Classification impact turn

## A2 Cap

## A2 Deleuze/Becoming Animal

## A2 Afropess

## A2 Kant

## A2 Set Col

# Other Shit

### A2 Ideal Phil

Abbott, M. (2011). The Animal for which Animality is an Issue. Angelaki, 16(4), 87–99. doi:10.1080/0969725x.2011.641347

When Heidegger claims that ‘‘within metaphysics there is nothing to being as such’’ (Nietzsche 202), then, Agamben takes him one step further to claim that within our politics there is nothing to life as such. In Heideggerian fashion, he finds something like an ontological law here: that which is presupposed and passed over by a system of thought will return to that system as its unthinkable (such that any exclusion of being/life is always already an inclusion). Agamben gives the name ‘‘bare life’’ to this object to try and mark something of the change it undergoes as part of this process: what returns is not natural or animal life but rather a metaphysical image of ‘‘a life that is separated and excluded from itself’’ (Agamben, Open 28). The Heideggerian problematic of the ‘‘forgetting of being’’ thus takes on a biopolitical character, such that what Western metaphysics tries to forget is not just the fact that beings are, but the fact of biological life itself.4 This is to say that Agamben sets up the problems of politics in terms of a Heideggerian understanding of the metaphysical tradition, finding that the Western political space is following a particular metaphysical logic when it works to forge the human through the exclusion of the animal (an exclusion that is always already an inclusion). As he puts it: ‘‘ontology, or first philosophy, is not an innocuous academic discipline, but in every sense the fundamental operation in which anthropogenesis, the becoming human of the living being, is realized’’ (Open 79).5

#### Tech Bad

Kelly Oliver, American philosopher specializing in feminism, political philosophy and ethics. She is W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee. She is also a founder of the feminist philosophy journal philoSOPHIA , Stopping the Anthropological Machine: Agamben with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, published 2007, <https://as.vanderbilt.edu/philosophy/people/facultyfiles/oliver-stopping_the_anthropoloigcal_machine.pdf> ///AHS PB

The philosophical inquiry that potentially breaks the machine is opposed to the scientific inquiry that fuels it. Agamben suggests that science collapses the distinction between man and animal in dangerous ways by reducing humanity to sheer biology. By so doing, man is reduced to an animal determined by his own disinhibiting ring; his freedom becomes merely one effect of physical causes among others revealed by biological and medical science to be predetermined after all. The mystery of the universe and of life evaporates under the searing gaze of the scientist. Agamben seems nostalgic for a philosophical gaze that invests rather than disinvests meaning into life. He claims that today philosophy has lost its relevance because it has become mere spectacle or a private affair; it has lost its relevance for public life and for history. Even philosophy is becoming more scientific in its mode of inquiry such that, rather than enhance the mystery of life through multiple interpretations, it attempts to reveal all of its secrets, which of course also signals the end of interpretation, and the end of both philosophy and science. Agamben’s criticisms of science and our techno-scientific age revolve around the disappearance of the mysteries of biological life under the gaze of ever more powerful instruments. He argues that by closing ourselves to the mysteries of animality, we become like Heidegger’s animals caught in a disinhibiting ring of cause and effect or stimulus-response determined by our physiology (Agamben 77). We are no longer open to the mysteries of life but rather toil under the impulse to disclose all of life’s secrets. Medical science and biology attempt to reveal human life to be determined by our DNA or chemical reactions in our brains and thereby render us no different from other animals. If science succeeds in turning man into an animal whose every desire can be determined by chemical processes in his brain, then “neither man nor animal—and perhaps, not even the divine—would any longer be thinkable” (22). And when human life becomes another form of animal life, then Agamben warns that we are in danger of collapsing a distinction upon which the very categories of ethics and politics are based: When the difference vanishes and the two terms collapse upon each other—as seems to be happening today—the difference between being and the nothing, licit and illicit, divine and demonic also fades away, and in its place something appears for which we seem to lack even a name. Perhaps concentration and extermination camps are also an experiment of this sort, an extreme and monstrous attempt to decide between the human and the inhuman, which has ended up dragging the very possibility of the distinction to its ruin. (22) Agamben argues that what was merely an “innocuous paleontological find,” the ape-man, becomes the Jew or others deemed subhuman (37). Given the oppositional and hierarchical nature of the man-animal dichotomy, however, in what sense is paleontology, or zoology or biology for that matter, ever innocuous? Although it may be harmless (even beneficial to man), is the subordination of animality to humanity ever innocuous to animals? In fact, doesn’t the animalization of man work to enslave or justify “extermination” only when animals are imagined as abject and disposable creatures subjected to the whims of man? The anthropological machine produces the human and the dangerous in-between space of sub or non-human homo sapiens only by producing the animal as deprived intellectually, morally, and politically. The machine must be stopped not only for the sake of man but also for the sake of animals. A possible wrench in the works could be to revalue animals and animality rather than accept and thereby perpetuate their status as denigrated. Justifying abusing or killing some ‘people’ by arguing that they are animals or like animals, is compelling only if we assume that animals deserve or even require abuse and killing. Using the argument that people are animals or like animals in order to treat them as inferiors likewise assumes that animals are inferior. A Nietzschean revaluation of the animal and animality, then, may be one strategy to address the animalization of man as a justification for slavery and genocide.

### Util/politics?

Probably a worse version of the advocacy

The philosophical inquiry that potentially breaks the machine is opposed to the scientific inquiry that fuels it. Agamben suggests that science collapses the distinction between man and animal in dangerous ways by reducing humanity to sheer biology. By so doing, man is reduced to an animal determined by his own disinhibiting ring; his freedom becomes merely one effect of physical causes among others revealed by biological and medical science to be predetermined after all. The mystery of the universe and of life evaporates under the searing gaze of the scientist. Agamben seems nostalgic for a philosophical gaze that invests rather than disinvests meaning into life. He claims that today philosophy has lost its relevance because it has become mere spectacle or a private affair; it has lost its relevance for public life and for history. Even philosophy is becoming more scientific in its mode of inquiry such that, rather than enhance the mystery of life through multiple interpretations, it attempts to reveal all of its secrets, which of course also signals the end of interpretation, and the end of both philosophy and science. Agamben’s criticisms of science and our techno-scientific age revolve around the disappearance of the mysteries of biological life under the gaze of ever more powerful instruments. He argues that by closing ourselves to the mysteries of animality, we become like Heidegger’s animals caught in a disinhibiting ring of cause and effect or stimulus-response determined by our physiology (Agamben 77). We are no longer open to the mysteries of life but rather toil under the impulse to disclose all of life’s secrets. Medical science and biology attempt to reveal human life to be determined by our DNA or chemical reactions in our brains and thereby render us no different from other animals. If science succeeds in turning man into an animal whose every desire can be determined by chemical processes in his brain, then “neither man nor animal—and perhaps, not even the divine—would any longer be thinkable” (22). And when human life becomes another form of animal life, then Agamben warns that we are in danger of collapsing a distinction upon which the very categories of ethics and politics are based: When the difference vanishes and the two terms collapse upon each other—as seems to be happening today—the difference between being and the nothing, licit and illicit, divine and demonic also fades away, and in its place something appears for which we seem to lack even a name. Perhaps concentration and extermination camps are also an experiment of this sort, an extreme and monstrous attempt to decide between the human and the inhuman, which has ended up dragging the very possibility of the distinction to its ruin. (22)