# AC Valley R6 v Khan Lab EC

### AC – FW

#### Ethics is an inquiry into moral truth, but truth is constrained by pragmatist inquiry since the only way to conceptualize a belief is through what makes a practical difference.

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So moral thought is not of one uniform kind and starting our moral philosophy from the idea that we aim at truth will not force us to think that. We will not be forced to think of moral inquiry as the active testing of hypotheses. Rather, we will think of moral inquiry as part of the enterprise of giving reasons. And reason here does not have to be a cold thing – a thing which stands apart from cultural meanings, from passion, and from emotion. The core of the pragmatist conception of truth is that a true belief would be the best belief, were we to inquire as far as we could on the matter. We shall see that ‘best’ here amounts to ‘best fits with all experience and argument’, not the kind of ‘best’ that other pragmatists, James and Rorty, for instance, have flirted with – consoling, best for our lives, or most comfortable. A true belief, rather, is a belief that could not be improved upon, a belief that would forever meet the challenges of reasons, argument, and evidence. Pragmatists sometimes put this idea in the following unhelpful way: a true belief is one which would be agreed upon at the hypothetical end of inquiry. But a better characterisation is that a true belief is one that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on the matter. A true belief is such that, no matter how much further we were to investigate and debate, that belief would not be overturned by recalcitrant experience and argument. Like the unhelpful formulation, this one captures what is important in pragmatism – the idea that a true belief is one which could not be improved upon. But the new formulation is much better.3 First, it does not run up against the possibility that inquiry might end prematurely, with, say, the destruction of life on earth. On the unhelpful formulation, it looks as if the beliefs which would be held then must be true, which is a crazy thing for a philosopher to suggest. Second, the new formulation does not require the pragmatist to attempt the doomed task of saying just what is meant by the hypothetical end of inquiry, cognitively ideal conditions, or perfect evidence, whatever these might be. Any attempt at articulating such notions will have to face the objection that it is a mere glorification of what we presently take to be good.4 And, finally, the new formulation does not mislead one into thinking that the pragmatist is a contractarian or a certain kind of deliberative democrat – someone who thinks that what is important is agreement, rather than being the best a belief could be. When the new formulation is unpacked, we shall see that there is a version of pragmatism on which truth is not as fickle as Rorty supposes. A belief is not true for one culture and false for another; and a belief is not true at one time and false at another. Beliefs do not, as William James suggested, ‘become’ true and then ‘become’ false, as the evidence for or against them comes to light.5 But truth, on the best version of pragmatism, is also not quite as objective as the correspondence theorist supposes. It is not, for instance, a property that holds regardless of the possibilities for human inquiry. Since philosophy is concerned with understanding our place in the world and with understanding the status of our beliefs, this seems to me an unobjectionable feature of pragmatism. But, of course, to properly argue for this picture of philosophy would be a large undertaking in itself. Some of the points in its favour will come out below, but the reader will have to turn to Misak (1991) and (1995) for more sustained arguments. I shall argue that when this view of truth and knowledge is brought to moral philosophy, we can see moral judgements as being candidates for truth. Truth here is as the pragmatist sees it – a property of the beliefs which would be the best beliefs for us to have. This does not, I shall argue, make such truth and knowledge second-rate. For we shall not follow Habermas in thinking that there is something higher or better with which to contrast it. If you like, the task before us is to say how objectivity and subjectivity can both be characteristic of our judgements. We are pulled to think that there is truth and objectivity, even if what is objectively true – belief – is a product of our deliberation and investigation. Thus, on the meta-ethical view of pragmatism, the semantic issue of whether ethical discourse is truth-apt becomes an epistemological issue about whether we can have knowledge in ethics. The question to be answered is whether our ethical beliefs have the same sorts of legitimate aspirations as our beliefs in science, mathematics, and discourse about ordinary, middle-sized objects. This, of course, is an old and venerable problem, a problem which seems not to go away, despite our best philosophical efforts. We have seen it hound the views of the philosophers canvassed in the last chapter. How can we resolve the tension between the facts of, on the one hand, pluralism and disagreement and, on the other, the ideal of consensus and the aim of getting the right answers to our questions? What I offer here is a position which is as much of an attempt to expose the deep and pressing difficulties as an attempt to solve them. Philosophy, practice, and correspondence The central thought of pragmatism is that our philosophical theories must be connected to experience and practice. A belief, hypothesis, or theory which pretends to be above experience, which thinks so well of itself that it pretends to be immune from recalcitrant experience, is spurious. I have tried elsewhere to elucidate both the semantic and the epistemological arguments in this thought’s favour6, and here I will briefly rehearse some of the reasons why we might think that a belief must be linked to experience. For this requirement will shape our theory of truth, objectivity, and morality. One point is about the demands of inquiry. Hypotheses, Peirce argued, ought not to block the path of inquiry. A hypothesis that had no consequences, that was severed from experience, that provided nothing on to which to latch, would be useless for inquiry. It would be, as Wittgenstein put it, a cog upon which nothing turned. Investigation into such hypotheses is bound to be barren and to direct attention away from worthwhile pursuits. Another is a point about belief, a point made nicely by David Wiggins. A belief aims at truth7 – if I believe p, I believe it to be true. But if this is right, then the belief that p must be sensitive to something – something must be able to speak for or against it. If beliefs need not be sensitive to something, then we could not interpret beliefs by asking: How do things have to be for this state of mind to succeed in its aim or be correct? What does this state of mind have, qua the belief it is, to be differentially sensitive to?8 If there was nothing a belief had to be sensitive to, then we could not individuate it; we could not tell it from another. A belief has a distinguishable content only if we can ‘envisage finding the right sort of licence to project upon subjects’ (Wiggins 1991b: 151). I can interpret or come to understand a sentence which is initially unintelligible to me only by coming to see what it is responsive to. Again, the requirement which presses itself upon the theorist is that a belief must be linked to something which we can experience.

#### And, rule-based ethics fail—applying a rule to a new situation is infinitely regressive. Instead, we must intelligently revise principles through experimentation—test principles by putting them into practice, revising our conception of the problem along the way, finding solutions.

Lekan 2003 (Todd [prof of phil @ Muskingum University], “Making Morality PRAGMATIST RECONSTRUCTION IN ETHICAL THEORY”, Vanderbilt University Press, 2003) BE

The pragmatist model of deliberative events questions this division between application and justification. The division is yet another example of the fixed-end view of justificatory structure, applied now to moral judgment. We have general principles that are justified in some special way. These are held fixed antecedently to deliberation. The task of moral judgment is to discern the particulars of the situation so as to determine whether or not a principle applies. The pragmatist response to this model is that at best it represents settled cases where routinized procedures are deployed with relative ease. However, the model does not adequately account for the learning that goes on when the situation itself is indeterminate—when established norms fail us. I want to turn now to a closer look at Onora O’Neill’s efforts to de- velop a neo-Kantian model of moral judgment, which, I argue, makes an untenable separation between justification and application.¶ Recent work in Kantian ethics has shown that it is possible to develop a more nuanced view of moral judgment than that usually attributed to Kant’s approach. Kantian ethics is frequently attacked for being overly rigid in its account of absolute rules that block the more nuanced responses needed in the thick of ambiguous and vexing moral problems. Kant’s own application of his categorical imperative supports the objection. One need only consider his absolute prohibition against lying, even if doing so will save a life. Nevertheless, with careful attention to everything Kant has to say, neo-Kantians can make a good case for the suggestion that the categorical imperative does not in- volve, strictly speaking, the application of a principle to concrete situations. Some neo-Kantians claim that there is a place for non- rule-governed judgment at the level of the formulation of the maxims that are tested by the categorical imperative procedure. The idea in rough is that prior to testing maxims of action we must judge the morally salient facts of the case in order to con- struct the maxim. Such judgment is not itself a matter of applying moral principles or even of using Kant’s categorical testing procedure. Principles are indeterminate. They alone cannot tell us what to do. At some point in deliberation we must judge that this case must be subsumed under some principle P.¶ The argument for the necessity of non-rule-governed judg- ment is simple. When I am faced with the need to decide whether the principle that says “if any act is one of lying, then that act ought not be done” applies to some action that I am consider- ing, I cannot make this decision by reference to a principle on pain of infinite regress. That is, I must first recognize the action as falling under the appropriate description “lying,” and only then can I determine that it violates some more general moral principle, thus yielding the particular moral judgment that this ac- tion ought not be done.3 The point here is that the judgment or perception of this case as being one of lying—as falling under that general moral principle—is not itself an application of a moral rule. Assume, for a moment, that it is. Then my recognition that an action A is an instance of some general principle P must be decided by reference to some principle P’ that indicates that ac- tions of this type fall under P. But then, how do I know that P’ applies to this case? On the basis of our initial assumption, this can only be determined by reference to some other principle P’’ that indicates that P’ applies to those cases in which P applies to A and so on ad infinitum. The point is that we cannot rely on moral rules to escape “judgment.” The very claim that we should rely on these rules (as opposed to any of the other myriad rules that might apply to this case) shows that judgment has been made. O’Neill illustrates this idea of non-rule-determined judgment by way of Kant’s notion of “reflective judgment.” She says, “The situation of agents is in the first place one that requires reflective judgment: Only when an account or description of a particular case has been given—only when a process of reflection has pro- duced an appraisal of the case—can principles be applied and a solution sought.”4 O’Neill draws on some remarks from Kant’s Critique of Judgment to show that Kant’s moral theory is not un- duly rigid. That is, we need not read Kant as believing that his categorical imperative provides us with some sort of algorithmic decision procedure for determining moral obligation. Rather, Kant recognizes that moral principles are of themselves indeter- minate with respect to their application in a specific situation. People need to develop a kind of perceptive skill in noticing the¶ relevant features of situations.¶ Notice that O’Neill claims that first a person must “appraise”¶ or “reflectively judge” a situation, and then principles can be ap- plied so as to arrive at a solution of what one morally should do. Another way of putting this point is that “without minor pre- mises reasoning cannot be practical,”5 meaning that we must ex- ercise judgment about the particular situation (minor premise) in order to determine whether some general moral principle (ma- jor premise) is applicable in guiding action in some situation. This judgment cannot itself be an application of a rule, for the rea- sons just given in the regress argument.¶ For O’Neill, there are two basic phases of practical delibera- tion: (1) that of appraising or reflectively judging a situation and (2) that of applying principles to the situation described or judged in order to come to some decision about the rightness or wrong- ness of an action. One of O’Neill’s aims is to argue against Wittgensteinian writers who believe that moral reflection should be centered on examining “what we want to say” about various hy- pothetical examples (usually drawn from literature). She—I think rightly—points out that the Wittgensteinians, by focusing on ex- amples whose moral significance has more or less already been¶ assumed, fail to account for the fact that oftentimes our difficul- ties lie precisely in determining what sort of case it is that we are dealing with. Is this case one in which the relevant description is that of a person (doctor) killing another (a patient), or is it one in which someone is serving a client’s requests in an appropriate way? Is the case one in which a person is lying to a friend or one in which she is helping to build a friend’s confidence? In short there are myriad ways one might describe a case, and sometimes there are controversial and conflicting accounts of what sort of classification is appropriate. A good example of such deep con- flict can be found in the debate over abortion. Some describe the case as “the murder of a baby”; others describe it as “a woman’s decision to abort unwanted fetal tissue.”¶ As has been mentioned, O’Neill points to Kant’s Third Cri- tique in order to develop an account of judgment that will do justice to it. Although Kant believes that reflective judgment is not determined by rules, we can adopt what O’Neill calls “strat- egies of judgment” and what Kant calls some “maxims of reflec- tive judgment” to help guide deliberators in their construal or description of the situation. These are “regulative principles.” Kant suggests three: seeking consistency in our judgments, en- larging our thought/attempting to take the standpoint of others, and thinking for oneself.6¶ I have no quarrel with these Kantian regulative principles. Instead I want to examine the claim that ethical deliberators first construe a case and then bring principles to bear in order to ren- der some decision or particular moral judgment. One way of in- terpreting this claim is that in any piece of ethical deliberation we need first to determine the facts of the case before applying norms or moral principles. One might be tempted to make this claim partly on the grounds that the semantic content of any moral principle has a descriptive part. A moral principle like “if any action is one of lying, then that action is forbidden” includes within it a descriptive meaning governed by general semantic rules that enable us to refer descriptively to those actions that are lies.¶ The problem with this last move is that we are not here deal-¶ ing with the semantics of moral terms but with the psychological processes by which deliberators come to see that a bit of moral discourse applies in a certain way. Appeal to “meaning rules” is of no help here for much the same reason that the application conditions of a rule cannot themselves be applied by rules.¶ Furthermore, the description of a case already involves the mobilization of moral or normative considerations. That is to say, it is already a moral achievement (as opposed to simply a cogni- tive achievement) for a person to recognize the moral salience of the features of a case. O’Neill herself admits that the power of judgment that deliberators develop in order to construe cases is a power of moral judgment. That is to say, we are talking about a moral construal (or description) of a case here. But since this construal is guided by moral norms, we need to ask in what sense it is correct to view deliberation as involving two distinct steps: (1) construing the case and (2) applying a moral principle. What would be left for practical reason to do after the case has been construed? After all, if our construal of a case already presup- poses that we classify the case as having morally salient features of a certain sort, then haven’t we already applied a certain set of moral principles P1 . . . Pn? Or if we haven’t literally brought them out explicitly as applicable to this case, aren’t they at least presupposed in our construal?¶ The question is, What is left to test after a case has been con- strued by judgment? That is, once we have formulated a descrip- tion of the case as “a patient is suffering and requests that life support be ceased,” which includes such moral considerations as the “rightness of preventing unnecessary suffering” and the “right- ness of respecting the autonomy of people by honoring their wishes,” one wonders whether there is any further step that in- volves the application of principles. Perhaps what an O’Neillian Kantian would say is that once we have made out the case by making clear these moral principles, we go on to test these sa- lient moral features of the case by the categorical imperative test- ing procedure. This suggests that what is actually tested by the categorical imperative are general maxim types (e.g., maxims that include the consideration of unnecessary suffering, the making¶ of a promise, and so on). But if this is the case, it would seem that the categorical imperative procedure would be used to test not the specific maxims of a case but rather the general features of specific maxims. Furthermore, such testing would presumably already be done prior to any deliberation. That is, we would al- ready know what the general moral considerations are that could be willed universally. The only task for deliberation would be to see what considerations are relevant to just this maxim made out in just this case and this would not be decided by the categorical imperative.7¶ We have just seen how this interpretation suggests that the categorical imperative really does no work in testing a particular maxim after the maxim has been made out. But it might be thought (as O’Neill briefly suggests) that the moral principles that could pass the categorical imperative test are employed to help construe the case. We have already granted the primacy of judg- ment as an activity that, although perhaps guided by principles of both a more regulative sort (such as thinking from a broad- minded perspective) and a more substantive sort (such as tell the truth or do not cause unnecessary suffering), can only subsume particular cases under these general principles via an act of judg- ment. But granting this already moves our account of ethical judg- ment beyond the model that says we must first construe a case and then apply pre-established indeterminate moral principles.¶ The view that we must reject is that moral judgment involves a mental act that first identifies nonmoral properties and then adds moral predicates to these properties. We should reject the idea that any moral judgment is composed of two separated fac- tors, the nonmoral property that a person might believe to be present in a certain situation and the value predicate that is hitched to the factual property identified in the descriptive predi- cate.8¶ In my view this “peeling” of the evaluative from the cogni- tive is distorting. Recognizing a situation as consisting of some set of important facts relevant to a moral judgment requires at least a tacit evaluation that these facts are relevant. Describing the situation as one in which pain occurs is already a description¶ offered by an agent concerned with noticing such features. And this concern reflects a moral ability—an ability to take certain features as salient and worth noticing in the first place. One might regard the pain of another without moral concern. One could simply note that the person is in pain, perhaps giving an account of the physical state that instantiates the pain state. But the fact that we can so regard the pain of another is no objection to the point that I am making here. After all, a criticism of such disre- gard implies that we notice a failure to take a fact as relevant that ought to be relevant. I do not want to suggest that we are always right about the ways in which we regard the situation. Nor do I deny that through discussion and critical accounting we might be able to improve our responses to and judgments about relevant features of situations. This is just to admit that fallibility.¶ The fact that our descriptions are guided by evaluative con- siderations is illuminated by our account of norms as resident in activities and practices. Learning norms involves learning the proper identification and description of a practice or activity. Identifying the kind of situation we are in implies already identi- fying what sorts of response are appropriate or proper. Conversely, identifying what sort of responses are appropriate or proper involves identifying what kind of situation we are in. As Thomas Green puts it in reference to Will’s view that norms are “resident in practices,”¶ This fittingness of conduct to setting is often negotiated simply by recognizing what activity it is in which we are engaged. Recognizing the difference between norms of school and home is largely iden- tical with learning what it means to say that this (the place where one is) just is the school, the family, or the church. It is pretty much identical with such things as being able to say that we are now not simply tossing the ball, but playing baseball, that we are not now simply stacking stone, but laying a dry-wall.9

#### This requires a democracy—two warrants:

#### [1] Democracy facilitates social inquiry into common problems by requiring public argument among equal citizens.

Rogers 2002 (Melvin L. [Scott Waugh Chair in the Division of the Social Sciences and Associate Professor of Political Science and African American Studies at UCLA]. “Liberalism, Narrative, and Identity: A Pragmatic Defense of Racial Solidarity.” Theory and Event, vol. 6, issue 2, 2002, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/45177.) NP 3/12/17.

To begin, deliberative democracy acts both as a device for achieving political justification and a problem-solving mechanism. It aims at justification because it demands, as Joshua Cohen argues, that the legitimacy of the "terms and conditions of association proceed through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens."[70] But it is simultaneously a problem-solving activity to the extent that deliberation in public forums is context specific; it grows out of problems or tensions that develop in the course of collective organization that demand citizens to reason dialogically as to possible solutions.[71] The product of deliberation is registered directly or through legislative representatives, and this in turn connects deliberation to actual legislative institutions that can produce change. It places emphasis on equality, the freedom of individuals from coercion, and publicity. Although this last feature has been the source of disagreement, for our purposes it means that reasons offered in the public sphere regarding proposals must be accessible by the audience to which it is addressed.[72] So political institutions in the U.S. that foster structures that support free and public deliberation can be understood, on one level, as more or less legitimate to that extent. I say "on one level" since deliberative democrats wish to say something substantive about the legitimacy of deliberation that accrue to the outcome rather than the procedure itself. So the system is never legitimate so long as the procedure is fair, but must also be assessed by its ability to extend more substantive goods such as equality of opportunity. ￼￼￼45. This should immediately draw us to our previous discussion relating to reciprocal accountability. But it is important to see that it works on two different fronts. The first of these is the relationship between individuals and political representatives. The second is the relationship among citizens. Let us take up the first of these. 46. 47. Deliberative democrats require as part of their justificatory matrix that "others" see the validity of the principles that underwrite political and economic institutions and the policies that follow. This is vital to the understanding of the public sphere that deliberative democrats endorse. The public sphere is an arena in which individuals understand themselves as members of a political community to the extent that they can register their opinions in response to potential laws and policies and those already in existence to influence their shape. So if fairness and equality are to be secured for historically excluded groups, public policies must, by dint of their claims to legitimacy, gain the assent of those who they claim to serve or those most likely to be affected. So, for example, deliberation about what sanctions should be put in place to effectively deal with racial profiling in legal enforcement units cannot legitimately get off the ground if those most impacted by profiling are excluded from the conversation. Yet, we all know that topics can be excluded from the agenda, and specific problems such as racial profiling can be blocked from being thematized. However, reciprocal accountability views policy responses to discrimination and the historical results of racism, or the absence of such policies by political officials as actions for which they can be held to give an account. If "others" can see the rationality of policies, they can also dispute policy agenda setting by pointing to important features of social reality (i.e. blacks being indiscriminately pulled over on interstate highways) that are necessary to do justice to justice. To see the validity of political principles and policies is to understand them to be candidates for praise and endorsement or blame and rejection. And so this institutionalizes a mechanism of opposition, the nature of which not only contributes to the strength of legitimacy, but is also its life's blood. This begins to shift our emphasis from the institutions that support deliberation, to the content of deliberation that is coextensive with what legitimizes its outcome. If social identities, actions, and institutional developments are constituted through narrative, then deliberation must also be narratively mediated in the public sphere to understand the recurring presence of race and racial solidarity. In other words, one cannot adequately describe the process of deliberation and its origination without presupposing the elements of narrativity. Deliberation's origination in the pressures of collective organization underscores the centrality of setting; its attempt to follow changes in the environment as information for a possible reorientation in action denotes its temporal dimension; and its goal to achieve intersubjective understanding becomes possible because of acknowledged reciprocal accountability. Thus, deliberation turns out to be an instantiation of narrativity. Given this, political legitimacy itself is narratively formed through an on-going dialogue regarding political principles and the institutionalization of policies among those who share a common political horizon. Let me first try to say something about what this does for conversations about race.

#### [2] Only democracy avoids rigid procedures through self-revision—this is the only way to resolve value pluralism.

Peter 2-2008 (Fabienne [Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick]. “Pure Epistemic Proceduralism.” Episteme, vol. 5, issue. 1, Feb 2008, pp. 44-55, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/pure-epistemic-proceduralism/1FCACEB6E4428C3FFD7BB1DC4C4328B7>.) //iLake AS

Proceduralists present different arguments against instrumentalism and for why it matters that people can participate in democratic decision-making under some conditions of political fairness. Here is why I think that we ought to reject instrumentalism. First, I take it as a premise that the interests and perspectives of the members of the democratic constituency inevitably diverge and that they have different views – with good reasons – about which social state is best. This premise is what Rawls has called “the fact of reasonable pluralism” (1993, 63ff.), and it entails an irreducible pluralism of reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good. Instrumentalists probably do not want to deny this fact. Instead, they will try to brush it aside, hoping that reasonable pluralism will not be very deep on important matters and that there is sufficient congruence in people’s conceptions of the good to identify some ideal outcome. But aside from the question of how deep this pluralism is, there is the issue of what it means to respect it. I want to claim that respect of reasonable value pluralism implies that people’s possibility to participate in the evaluation of alternative social states is constitutive of democratic legitimacy. Here instrumentalists will not follow. Sen’s distinction between well-being and agency is helpful to defend this view (Sen 1985). Sen argues that even if the purpose is to evaluate the goodness of outcomes, it is not sufficient to take into account individuals’ well-being – however interpreted. For people should not simply be seen as patients, who do or do not have well-being, but as agents interested in the autonomous formulation and pursuit of their goals. Their well-being may be one of these goals, but how they conceive of well-being is again a result of their agency, and they may pursue goals other than their well-being. To respect value pluralism is thus to respect individual agency. But to respect individual agency is to ensure that individuals have the possibility to participate in the evaluation of alternative social arrangements. If individuals are not just seen as passive carriers of wellbeing, but as causal forces in the forming of individual and collective goals, there is need for inclusive procedures which allow individuals with differing conceptions of the good to participate in the collective evaluation and choice of their social arrangements. We thus have an argument for why respect of reasonable value pluralism entails a demand for inclusive, fair procedures which enable individual agents to act together, or, in other words, for why respect of value pluralism entails that democratic procedures form an irreducible component of legitimacy. It follows from this first argument for a proceduralist conception of legitimacy that the democratic decision-making process itself is at least one of the sources which confers normativity on its outcomes.5 The instrumentalist view, which relies on a procedure-independent ideal outcome to get off the ground, is deficient in this regard. It fails to acknowledge how respect of reasonable value pluralism implies that the collective evaluation and choice of social arrangements in pluralist constituencies necessarily involves democratic procedures. As a result, it wrongly denies how democratic procedures are constitutive of legitimacy.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with pragmatic constraints of democratic inquiry. The FW is procedural, not substantive—democracy is not just another impact to weigh against, rather it’s a decision procedure that tells us what questions to ask and how we determine answers to those questions.

#### Prefer:

#### [1] Action theory: Individual identity is constituted by experience and interaction with the external world. Moral considerations arise in response to specific conditions—only this provides a coherent notion of free action.

Peirce (Charles S. Peirce [philosopher], “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”, Popular Science Monthly 12, January 1878) BE

The principles set forth in the first part of this essay lead, at once, to a method of reaching a clearness of thought of higher grade than the "distinctness" of the logicians. It was there noticed that the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained; so that the production of belief is the sole function of thought. All these words, however, are too strong for my purpose. It is as if I had described the phenomena as they appear under a mental microscope. Doubt and Belief, as the words are commonly employed, relate to religious or other grave discussions. But here I use them to designate the starting of any question, no matter how small or how great, and the resolution of it. If, for instance, in a horse-car, I pull out my purse and find a five-cent nickel and five coppers, I decide, while my hand is going to the purse, in which way I will pay my fare. To call such a question Doubt, and my decision Belief, is certainly to use words very disproportionate to the occasion. To speak of such a doubt as causing an irritation which needs to be appeased, suggests a temper which is uncomfortable to the verge of insanity. Yet, looking at the matter minutely, it must be admitted that, if there is the least hesitation as to whether I shall pay the five coppers or the nickel (as there will be sure to be, unless I act from some previously contracted habit in the matter), though irritation is too strong a word, yet I am excited to such small mental activity as may be necessary to deciding how I shall act. Most frequently doubts arise from some indecision, however momentary, in our action. Sometimes it is not so. I have, for example, to wait in a railway-station, and to pass the time I read the advertisements on the walls. I compare the advantages of different trains and different routes which I never expect to take, merely fancying myself to be in a state of hesitancy, because I am¶ bored with having nothing to trouble me. Feigned hesitancy, whether feigned for mere amusement or with a lofty purpose, plays a great part in the production of scientific inquiry. However the doubt may originate, it stimulates the mind to an activity which may be slight or energetic, calm or turbulent. Images pass rapidly through consciousness, one incessantly melting into another, until at last, when all is over -- it may be in a fraction of a second, in an hour, or after long years -- we find ourselves decided as to how we should act under such circumstances as those which occasioned our hesitation. In other words, we have attained belief.¶ In this process we observe two sorts of elements of consciousness, the distinction between which may best be made clear by means of an illustration. In a piece of music there are the separate notes, and there is the air. A single tone may be prolonged for an hour or a day, and it exists as perfectly in each second of that time as in the whole taken together; so that, as long as it is sounding, it might be present to a sense from which everything in the past was as completely absent as the future itself. But it is different with the air, the performance of which occupies a certain time, during the portions of which only portions of it are played. It consists in an orderliness in the succession of sounds which strike the ear at different times; and to perceive it there must be some continuity of consciousness which makes the events of a lapse of time present to us. We certainly only perceive the air by hearing the separate notes; yet we cannot be said to directly hear it, for we hear only what is present at the instant, and an orderliness of succession cannot exist in an instant. These two sorts of objects, what we are immediately conscious of and what we are mediately conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so long as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having beginning, middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the succession of sensations which flow through the mind. They cannot be immediately present to us, but must cover some portion of the past or future. Thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations.¶ We may add that just as a piece of music may be written in parts, each part having its own air, so various systems of relationship of succession subsist together between the same sensations. These different systems are distinguished by having different motives, ideas, or functions. Thought is only one such system, for its sole motive, idea, and function is to produce belief, and whatever does not concern that purpose belongs to some other system of relations. The action of thinking may incidentally have other results; it may serve to amuse us, for example, and among dilettanti it is not rare to find those who have so perverted thought to the purposes of pleasure that it seems to vex them to think that the questions upon which they delight to exercise it may ever get finally¶ settled; and a positive discovery which takes a favorite subject out of the arena of literary debate is met with ill-concealed dislike. This disposition is the very debauchery of thought. But the soul and meaning of thought, abstracted from the other elements which accompany it, though it may be voluntarily thwarted, can never be made to direct itself toward anything but the production of belief. Thought in action has for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest; and whatever does not refer to belief is no part of the thought itself.¶ And what, then, is belief? It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. We have seen that it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit. As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought. That is why I have permitted myself to call it thought at rest, although thought is essentially an action. The final upshot of thinking is the exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part; but belief is only a stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will influence future thinking.¶ The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes. Imaginary distinctions are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of expression; -- the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however. To believe that any objects are arranged among themselves as in Fig. 1, and to believe that they are arranged in Fig. 2, are one and the same belief; yet it is conceivable that a man should assert one proposition and deny the other. Such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs really different, and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly to beware, especially when we are upon metaphysical ground. One singular deception of this sort, which often occurs, is to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking. Instead of perceiving that the obscurity is purely subjective, we fancy that we contemplate a quality of the object which is essentially mysterious; and if our conception be afterward presented to us in a clear form we do not recognize it as the same, owing to the absence of the feeling of unintelligibility. So long as this deception lasts, it¶ ￼￼¶ obviously puts an impassable barrier in the way of perspicuous thinking; so that it equally interests the opponents of rational thought to perpetuate it, and its adherents to guard against it.¶ Another such deception is to mistake a mere difference in the grammatical construction of two words for a distinction between the ideas they express. In this pedantic age, when the general mob of writers attend so much more to words than to things, this error is common enough. When I just said that thought is an action, and that it consists in a relation, although a person performs an action but not a relation, which can only be the result of an action, yet there was no inconsistency in what I said, but only a grammatical vagueness.¶ From all these sophisms we shall be perfectly safe so long as we reflect that the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action; and that whatever there is connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an accretion to it, but no part of it. If there be a unity among our sensations which has no reference to how we shall act on a given occasion, as when we listen to a piece of music, why we do not call that thinking. To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves. Now, the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable they may be. What the habit is depends on when and how it causes us to act. As for the when, every stimulus to action is derived from perception; as for the how, every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result. Thus, we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.

#### [2] Epistemic reliability: pragmatism is a claim about epistemic good, which means it controls the internal link to how we know about other frameworks and takes into account their claims, so advantages of other frameworks are non-unique.

#### [3] Bindingness: to question against deliberation is deliberation and concedes it’s valuable. That outweighs—if a framework isn’t binding no one will follow it and it cannot guide action.

### AC – Whole Res

#### I affirm: in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory. I’ll spec for links to DAs in CX if you want.

#### Compulsory voting has historically proven useful over other reforms for increasing voter turnout, reducing inequalities, and fostering democracy.

Chapman 11-15-2018 (Emilee Booth [Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, PhD from Princeton University]. “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting.” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 63, issue 1, 15 Nov. 2018, pp. 101-112, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12393>.) //iLake AS

The special emphasis on voting in popular political culture is not arbitrary or misguided, though. Rather, it is grounded in the distinctive and valuable role that periodic moments of approximately universal participation play in contemporary democratic practices. When characterized by approximately universal turnout, elections interrupt the ordinary, delegated business of government with extraordinary spectacles of democracy that command the attention of the general public and manifest the equal political authority of all citizens. Though they cannot fully instantiate democracy on their own, these moments effectively contribute to contemporary democratic practices in a number of ways. First, the ambition toward universal participation in periodic elections helps to guard against political disengagement and alienation by defining concrete expectations for participation. Skeptics of the value of high voter turnout often argue that active participation is not essential to democracy because individuals can passively exercise political authority by deferring to their fellow citizens or to political elites. But political inaction can only be interpreted as passive participation if citizens believe it is appropriate and possible for them to intervene when they are dissatisfied with the direction of their public life. In modern societies, though, many people do not see themselves as political agents in their own right, able to exert influence over their political circumstances (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 168). A pluralist model of democracy might simply call for citizens to take advantage of opportunities to participate whenever and however they wish, but many citizens will never participate because they never feel competent to do so, or because it simply never occurs to them. The ambition toward universal participation in elections mitigates this problem of habitual disengagement by establishing an expectation that citizens will perform their political agency on specific and predictable occasions.4 Knowing that they will be called upon to actively participate on a recurring basis provides citizens with a reason to develop an enduring political identity.5 Moreover, by directing citizens’ attention to particular political questions that they will be expected to answer, elections make the often frustrating and potentially discouraging task of figuring out what to pay attention to easier for ordinary citizens.6 This benefit is magnified by the relative information saturation that occurs around elections. Critics of compulsory voting might argue that, rather than trying to enforce universal electoral participation, we can more effectively combat political disengagement and alienation by promoting participation in other arenas.7 But, even if nonelectoral participation can be more effective than voting at increasing political engagement and efficacy in individual cases, approximating universal participation in other forms of activism or participation would require much more radical reforms of political culture and institutions. Efforts to increase voter turnout, on the other hand, build on an extensive infrastructure of electoral administration and the existing, widespread norm that there is a duty to vote. Moreover, periodic moments of approximately universal participation would likely still play a valuable role in a political system already characterized by widespread citizen engagement, for several reasons. First, these moments facilitate collective action. Individuals can influence public life more effectively when they are able to combine their efforts with other like-minded citizens. Insofar as elections represent occasions in which all citizens can count on each other to participate, they can help to overcome some of the coordination problems that make it difficult for large, diverse, unorganized, or underresourced groups to effectively utilize other channels of influence. Second, when citizens internalize an expectation of universal participation in elections, electoral campaigns also create a relatively attentive audience to whom political leaders and activists can address political claims,8 facilitating the introduction of new issues and the contestation of existing political divisions. Finally, periodic moments of approximately universal participation make the political involvement and formal political equality of all citizens manifest. This spectacle reinforces parties’ and elected officials’ incentives to take the interests and concerns of all citizens into account. Elections are not the only way for citizens to hold political leaders to account, but elections are still distinctively valuable mechanisms of democratic control when they predictably involve the entire citizenry in the sanctioning process. When characterized by nearly universal participation, elections provide an unambiguous reminder to public officials that they are accountable to all citizens, not just the most vocal and active. Because elections make manifest the responsiveness of the political system to the equal agency of all citizens in at least a few concrete instances, the optics of periodic moments of approximately universal participation can also contribute to the empirical legitimacy of a democratic regime. Those who find themselves on the losing side of a political decision may have a harder time maintaining the belief that they speak for a silent majority when citizens routinely reveal how they align themselves on significant dimensions of political conflict (see also Przeworski 1999). The optics of approximately universal participation also imbue elections with powerful expressive effects that can reinforce citizens’ commitment to democracy. In Just Elections, Dennis Thompson (2002) observes that elections have two kinds of expressive effects: First, “they enable citizens to express attitudes about the political process”; second, they “express the polity’s attitude toward its citizens” (22). When they credibly call for the participation of all citizens, elections convey the community’s belief in the value of all citizens’ contributions. And by voting, citizens participate in this public expression: “When citizens go to the polls on the same day, visibly and publicly participating in the same way in a common experience of civic engagement, they demonstrate their willingness to contribute on equal terms to the democratic process” (Thompson 2002, 34). By regularly participating in elections, citizens habitually enact their roles as participants in the political community as well as their commitment to decision-making procedures that instantiate the equal political authority of all citizens.9 The democratic value of increased voter turnout thus derives from the contributions of elections—as periodic moments of (approximately) universal participation—to an equally responsive government and other democratic values. But the extent to which elections satisfactorily perform this important function depends on voting rates. Consistently low turnout rates diminish many of the distinctive democratic virtues of elections. This is especially true when a substantial number of citizens in contemporary democracies never vote and when these habitual nonvoters tend to be concentrated in poor and otherwise disadvantaged groups. Many citizens do not vote in part because they do not perceive the political system as responsive to them. Public officials in turn reinforce this perception; officials have an incentive to prioritize the concerns of likely voters over those of habitual nonvoters (Griffin and Newman 2005; K. Q. Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Martin 2003). Periodic moments of universal participation ideally prevent this kind of informal disenfranchisement, but communities with voluntary voting rely on social norms to enforce the expectation that everyone votes. In marginalized groups within large societies, such norms may not be available. Many scholars have pointed to compulsory voting as an important step in counteracting this cycle of disengagement in marginalized communities (Birch 2009, 53–54; L. Hill 2010, 919–21; Lijphart 1997). Numerous studies have shown that compulsory voting effectively and often dramatically increases turnout rates—by 15 percentage points or more (e.g., Birch 2009, 79–97; Hirczy 1994)10—and electoral participation is distributed more evenly across society (Fowler 2013, 72; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998, 421–22). By promoting reliable compliance with the expectation of universal electoral participation, effectively enforced compulsory voting remedies the collective action problem that plagues vulnerable communities with chronically low turnout rates. Members of politically alienated groups have more reason to regard their vote as an instrument of political influence if they know that others like them will also vote. The claims that increasing voter turnout through compulsory voting will improve government responsiveness to and representation of the poor and marginalized are especially plausible in light of the functions of moments of approximately universal participation, and there is at least some evidence to support these arguments for mandatory voting. Some studies, for example, have found that compulsory voting is associated with lower levels of income inequality and corruption—outcomes that benefit the poor who are less likely to vote in voluntary systems (Birch 2009, 130–31; Chong and Olivera 2008). Compulsory voting is not the only instrument for increasing voter turnout, but, even when penalties for not voting are relatively low and excuses are permissive, compulsory voting tends to be more effective than most other measures, especially those that are comparably feasible. Relatively uncontroversial reforms focused on making voting more convenient and accessible at best increase turnout by only a few percentage points, and they do not typically draw many new voters from underrepresented groups (James 2010, 373–74). In fact, sometimes these “convenience voting” reforms can result in decreased turnout (Berinsky 2005). More dramatic convenience reforms—like Sunday voting and automatic voter registration—tend to produce more significant increases in turnout, but they still fall short of compulsory voting’s effectiveness (James 2010, 378–82). The only measure that appears comparably effective—switching from majoritarian to proportional representation— requires radical systemic change, and it may not be effective or desirable in all political or institutional contexts.11 And, of course, compulsory voting can be regarded as a complement, not simply an alternative, to other turnout-boosting reforms. Compulsory voting is not a unique or universal solution to the problem of low voter turnout, but its combination of effectiveness and flexibility relative to other measures for increasing turnout make it a particularly valuable tool in the toolkit for democratic reform. The case for compulsory voting rests not only on its effectiveness, though, but also on its compatibility with the virtues of moments of universal participation. Compulsory voting can magnify elections’ effect on democratic norms by adding the expressive power of law to the norm of universal voting. Compulsory voting clearly sends the message that all citizens—not just the college educated or wealthy—are expected to contribute to electoral decision making. This expressive effect, reinforced by the experience of actually participating in the vote, encourages citizens to see themselves as political agents. Because of its expressive effect, compulsory voting is also valuable as an object of political support. When citizens support mandatory voting laws, they clearly express a public belief in and commitment to the value of all citizens’ participation in democracy (Engelen 2007, 29). Because compulsory voting strengthens the public commitment to democratic norms while also increasing the government’s adherence to those norms, proponents have argued that mandatory voting also increases at least the descriptive legitimacy of a political system, and anecdotal evidence supports this claim (see, e.g., Lijphart 1997, 10). Compulsory voting has also been associated with a higher reported satisfaction with democracy (Birch 2009, 114).

#### Increased voter turnout generates more epistemically sound modes of social inquiry—three warrants.

Maskivker 6-2016 (Julia [Associate Professor of Political Science at Rollins College, PhD in Political Science from Columbia University]. “An Epistemic Justification for Voting.” Critical Review, vol. 28, issue 2, June 2016, <https://scholarship.rollins.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1255&context=as_facpub>.) //iLake AS

The epistemic properties of voting are predicated on three distinct accounts of the epistemic attributes of judgment aggregation through majority rule. These three accounts rely on the law of large numbers. They are “The Condorcet Jury Theorem”, “the Miracle of Aggregation, ” and a model based on cognitive diversity called the “Crowds Beats the Average Law” (Landemore 2011). The Jury Theorem in the abstract demonstrates that among large numbers of people voting on some yes-or-no question, majoritarian results are almost certain to track the “truth” provided three conditions hold: 1) voters are better than random (better than a coin flip) at choosing the best proposition; 2) they vote with statistical independence of each other (what one voter chooses does not depend on what the other chooses), and 3) they vote sincerely, not strategically. (Cohen 1989: 11-13). 5 The mathematics of the theorem show that the higher the number of voters, the closer the level of certainty about which option is the “correct one.” Despite some scholars’ suspicion that the theorem does not have any practical use because the conditions above do not hold in real-life societies, the literature on epistemic democracy has spawn a large number of studies showing how the three assumptions can be relaxed without invalidating the theorem’s application to real democratic settings. For example, Goodin and Estlund (2004) show that the theorem applies to elections including a plurality of alternatives and to voters with predicting abilities lower than 0.5 percent.6 Landemore (2011) claims that considering scenarios where two options are at stake is empirically plausible in real democracies due to other mechanisms than can reduce a plurality of alternatives to a sequence of binary choices. Furthermore, the “enlightenment” condition stipulating the need for better-than-random competence is not implausible, and critics have offered a rebuttal of many of the pessimistic conclusions in the literature (Goodin and Estlund 2004). For example, if it is not unreasonable to think that low voter competence may be partly a function of less-than-optimal institutional performance (i.e., bad education, low political accountability, party polarization that alienates citizens), then, one could think that voter competence can be improved via various policies and measures of a non-coercive nature, including better funding for education, more stringent public norms of civility, and reform of local participation mechanisms, among others. Voter incompetence does not have to be seen as unchangeable. Additionally, the jury theorem has been generalized to the case of correlated votes so long as the interdependence between votes is sufficiently low (Lahda 1992; Bottom et., al 2002). This finding permits us to relax the independence condition and reject the voter atomism that has been traditionally attributed to the theorem. Communication among voters in a plural society is not necessarily detrimental to the theorem’s application, as the original formulation of the theorem seems to suggest. Indeed, it can be a good thing if it increases the judgment accuracy of the average voter (Estlund 1989, 1994). Finally, some degree of strategic voting has been found to be compatible with the precepts of the theorem (Dekel and Piccione, 2000). The second account through which the epistemic properties of voting are thought to come to life is the “miracle of aggregation” (Landemore 2011: 156-60). This mechanism is also dependent on the law of large numbers. It explains why the average guess of large groups of people tends to be uncannily accurate. In its most democratic version, “the distribution of errors around each individual’s blurry judgment is such that individual errors cancel each other out in the aggregate; thus the collective aggregate is fairly accurate.” (Ibid: 158). In simple words, errors tend to cancel each other out in big enough groups. The third account for explaining collective intelligence is based on the level of cognitive diversity within a group, understanding cognitive diversity as plurality of modes of thinking and interpretations of the world. This account tells us that the group predicts better than particular individuals, and the amount by which it does increases as the group becomes more cognitively diverse. (Page 2007: 197; Landemore 2011: 160). Differently put, one very smart person or a group of like-minded smart persons may predict worse than a group of less smart persons who have fewer cognitive similarities in common (similarities about how they see the world and how they may approach problems, consequently). This account surely highlights the value of intellectual originality as something not strictly identical with intellectual performance and it suggests that the former may be more useful than the latter. The foregoing accounts of democracy’s epistemic virtues are all based on the law of large numbers and are therefore liable to the problem of systematic biases in the voting population. This means that if the majority of voters are all biased in one same direction (i.e., they are all racially prejudiced or they are all ideologically blind to a particular position) cognitive diversity will be low, errors will not cancel each other out, and majority rule will amplify the mistakes all voters hold instead of eliminating them. However, this theoretical possibility is only truly menacing in practice if individual predictive accuracy does not reach the better-than-random-competence threshold and if group diversity is so low as to make that variable trivial. Optimistically assuming minimally good voters (or the possibility of encouraging their emergence) and a liberal enough society fostering a diversity of views and positions, the worst case “bias scenario” is not necessarily a certainty. Or we shouldn’t assume it to be all the time.

#### The alternative to compulsory voting is right-wing populism—that weakens democracy by suppressing pluralism.

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To understand why it is worthwhile to prevent the rise of right-wing populist parties, and how compulsory voting can fulfil this goal, a closer look at the nature, meaning and goals of populism is in order. Most scholars define populism as an ideology, often a thin-centred one (Mudde 2007; Müller 2016). Others refer to it as a rhetorical strategy, a discourse or a movement (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2018), and yet others as a political style (Canovan 1999; Arditi 2007; Moffitt and Tormey 2014). For the purposes of this paper, populism will be conceptualised as a strategy of collective action that has distinct ideological and rhetorical characteristics (Urbinati 2019). I come back to this definition in the next section where I discuss the mobilisation-conception of populism. On the second question – the meaning of populism – most say that it relies on a dichotomy between a virtuous people and a corrupt elite (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013), one that foregrounds a homogenous people whose general will should be the basis of government. Because of this claim to homogeneity, for some scholars, populists are by definition anti-pluralist and oppose liberal-democratic values (Urbinati 2019; Müller 2016). Regardless, most authors agree that two different, almost contradictory, types of populism exist, some indeed authoritarian, nationalist and exclusive – such as right-wing populism (Mudde 2007), but some progressive and inclusive – such as left-wing populism (Mouffe 2018). This distinction between exclusive and inclusive populism is key in understanding the different practices associated with populism. Thus, the third question – populism’s strategic goals – invites two separate interpretations. For many observers, populism aims to establish the hegemony of popular will and eliminate its opponents. In that sense, populists tend to undermine liberal procedures, such as institutional checks and balances, the rule of law and party government (Müller 2016), often by handing over power to individuals who pose as defenders of ‘the people’. These are simply a new elite (think of Trump), who claim a symbolic identification with ‘the common man’ (i.e. low- and middle-class people) and the exclusive moral legitimacy to speak in the name of the people, without necessarily subjecting themselves to established structures of accountability (Urbinati 2019). Seen from this perspective, populism constitutes a threat for liberal democracy. However, for others, the goal of populism is to mobilise grievances and inspire excluded social groups. In a context of increasing socioeconomic inequalities and uncertainties about the future, the many are disappointed by political elites, and distanced from economic, cultural and urban elites. In this context, a radical type of politics seems justified. Populists then emerge to challenge established power structures and influence decision-making in favour of policies that are (or at least appear to be) in the interest of the people. They ‘give voice to groups that do not feel represented by the political establishment’ and bring forward issues that are ‘normally seen by most elites as disgusting and vulgar’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, 209). In other words, populism productively brings to the fore painful but real problems of the existing political and social order, articulates the will of a neglected part of the population, and produces antagonism and political dissensus, which is vital for democracies to progress. In this scenario, populism functions as a corrective to democracy (Kaltwasser 2012). In light of this double-sided understanding of populism, as potentially both a threat and a corrective to democracy, it is hard to decide how to deal with populism in a way that is not itself one-sided. Chances are that responses will either overlook the illiberal side of populism or undermine its inclusivist side. Those who see populism as a type of proto-authoritarianism are ready to support restrictions and even sanctions dictated by the logic of ‘militant democracy’ that prescribes preventive strikes against democracy’s internal enemies. Others who recognise the contribution of populism to democratic politics tend to stress what they perceive as its justified causes – elitism, inequalities, neoliberal dominance – and join forces with populists to eradicate these causes. Contrary to this dichotomous approach to populism, that is either excessively dismissive or too permissive, I would like to propose possibilities for constitutional engineering that avoid the traps just mentioned. This line of approach does not presuppose that populism is only bad or only good; it takes for granted that both of these qualities coexist. What is needed, then, is a measure, which, on one hand, rejects the exclusivist, anti-pluralist and anti-egalitarian danger of populism, especially right-wing populism, and on the other promotes its positive goal, which is the democratic inclusion of neglected sectors of society. Compulsory voting is, I argue, such a measure. On one hand, it addresses three central sources of populist discontent: demobilisation of excluded groups, unequal representation and socioeconomic inequalities. On the other hand, it bolsters the inclusivist, pluralist and egalitarian elements of a democratic system. In what follows, I present in more detail how exactly a legal obligation to vote reconciles these two goals. Voter mobilisation The problem: populist voter mobilisation Populism is a successful mode for mobilising voters. In sociology, mobilisation is commonly defined as ‘the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life’ (Tilly 1978, 69). This requires a formation of groups and associations (or parties, for that matter) that explore and pursue collective goals. Indeed, populist parties bring about popular mobilization, ‘the mobilization of the poor, the excluded, or others not previously mobilized, into coordinated – and often confrontational – political activity in public space’ (Jansen 2011, 83). 2 Studies consistently find that working-class voters are the most likely supporters of right-wing populist parties (Betz and Meret 2013; Ford and Goodwin 2014). Disaffected by economic macro-changes and centre-left parties’ programme shifts, workers seem to have abandoned their former party loyalties and driven up abstention numbers during the 1990s and 2000s (Rydgren 2005). These developments created a political opportunity for populist parties. As one recent study puts it: ‘in a systemic crisis, which depresses the motivation to vote for traditional parties of both left and right, the disappointment generates an abstention-based entry space for a populist platform’ (Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli 2017, 4). As a result, populists mobilised disaffected populations that were likely to abstain, specifically young, white, male members of the working class. Yet, while popular mobilisation of demobilised groups is a broad, non-ideological and politically neutral act, populist mobilisation is very particular. Unlike popular mobilisation, populist mobilisation is always accompanied by populist rhetoric, i.e. actions and expressions that reinforce the populist principle. The populist principle, as defined earlier, invokes the dichotomy of a virtuous and homogenous people versus a corrupt and powerful elite. The aim of populist rhetoric is then to forge a solidary collective group – the ‘people’ – by means of referring to it rhetorically. In other words, the mobilisational force of populism relies on activating, through a particular type of rhetoric, cognitive, affective and symbolic resources that persuade ordinarily marginalised social groups to come forward and engage in contentious political action. Populist parties use this type of rhetoric to bring voters to the polls. This has both a positive and negative side. What is positive is that it indeed mobilises alienated and disadvantaged groups and engages them in electoral politics that are crucial for agenda-setting and policy reform. What is negative is that it does so through rhetoric that promotes on one hand an anti-pluralist conception of ‘the people’, which is depicted as an indivisible unit, and on the other a one-sided notion of popular sovereignty that excludes elites and other ‘enemies of the people’ from the exercise of this sovereignty. Radical right-populist rhetoric has the additional effect of racialising the working class, i.e. portraying it as white and homogenous, ignoring its non-white members, as well as the disenfranchised immigrant population that shares the same working-class insecurity (Mondon 2017). The challenge then is to preserve populism’s mobilisational inclusiveness and discard its deleterious rhetorical and normative premises. The solution: universal voter mobilisation Does compulsory voting represent a non-populist alternative to inclusive mobilisation? In what follows, I argue that compulsory voting impedes right-wing populist mobilisation and prompts a more inclusive form of voter participation. The most crucial advantage with regard to voter mobilisation is that compulsory voting brings out the vote of all members of the electorate. This includes (1) the disaffected parts of the population that populists appeal to, but also (2) the disaffected parts not captured by populist mobilisation, as well as (3) habitual voters. Indeed, the universal mobilisation produced by compulsory voting has two crucial addon effects in comparison to populist mobilisation: that of mobilising the most disaffected voters, and of inclusively and evenly mobilising the entire electorate. In the first case, a distinction must be made between the disaffected voters mobilised by right-wing populist parties, and the most disaffected voters not mobilised by them. In practice, disaffected voters include blue-collar workers and lower-level employees, especially young, less educated, white males (Norris 2005; Betz and Meret 2013); right-wing populism is often lauded as ‘democratic’ or ‘inclusivist’ because it brings these disaffected voters back into the voting game. Yet, the working-class and under-class constituency does not solely consist of male white voters. It also includes the most disaffected voters, namely female, non-white and immigrant voters – to the extent that the latter are enfranchised (Mondon 2017). These voters are particularly vulnerable to intersectional layers of disempowerment that add to working-class resentment. We already know that the worse off a person is – in terms of socioeconomic and educational attainment – the more likely she is to abstain (Birch 2009; Hill 2014). Thus, female, non-white and (enfranchised) immigrant voters from low-income groups would be particularly disinclined to vote. Women and immigrants are indeed in general less inclined to support right-wing populist parties (Spierings and Zaslove 2015; Pietsch 2017). Thus, mobilising these voters may counter-balance the over-mobilisation of other disaffected parts of the population. Yet, the most crucial difference between populist and mandatory mobilisation is that, while the former is inclusive of some excluded parts of the voting population, the latter is inclusive of all parts of the voting population. This distinction matters both empirically and normatively. Empirically, the higher the abstention rates of the overall registered voter population, the more inflated the percentage of elected parties (including right-wing populist parties) will be. This creates a mismatch between party support and actual voter shares in the population or within particular social groups. Mondon underlines how the propensity of working-class voters to abstain in both France and the UK has created the wrong impression that the majority of working-class voters support right-wing populist parties, when in reality only the majority of those working-class voters who make the journey to the polling station have supported such parties (Mondon 2017); this is less than half of the overall working-class voter population. 3 In a system where all registered voters would be required to cast a ballot, such artificial increase in right-wing populist parties’ voting percentages that does not correspond to an increase in absolute numbers of voters that support them would disappear. This does not only matter in terms of misguided perceptions about the popularity of right-wing populist parties; it also has direct institutional consequences as voting percentages translate to parliamentary seats and, as such, into real political decision-making power. In addition, the difference between mobilising a demobilised subset of the electorate and mobilising all members of the electorate highlights a crucial normative quality. True, populist mobilisation supports the inclusion of formerly excluded parts of the voting population (at least some of them); but while doing so it advocates and promotes the exclusion of other parts of the population, the so-called ‘elite’ and – in the case of right-wing populist parties – ethnic and religious minorities. Put differently, populist mobilisation is from a rhetorical and normative viewpoint by definition exclusivist; it defines the people, i.e. the legitimate source of popular sovereignty, in terms that do not include the entire population. By contrast, mandatory mobilisation is by definition, empirically and normatively, inclusivist and universal.

#### **Compulsory voting deems individual experiences valuable and allows for mutual exchange within the deliberative process.**

Hill 13[Lisa Hill- “Deliberative Democracy and Compulsory Voting” ELECTION LAW JOURNAL Volume 12, Number 4, researchgate.net/publication/312057361\_Deliberative\_Democracy\_and\_Compulsory\_Voting 2013] UT AI

Therefore, some deliberative democrats have come to terms with existing practices of democracy, conceding that ‘‘[v]oting and representation are practically necessary’’ (Bohman, 1998: 412, 416). After all, a decision eventually has to be made: first we deliberate, then we vote.4 One advantage of voting is that it ‘‘settles the issue’’ and results in a decision and a binding obligation that enables us to get on with doing the things that need to be done for the benefit of all (Mackie, 2008: 6). If it is true that deliberative democracy is not so much an ‘‘alternative to representative democracy’’ as ‘‘an expansion of representative democracy’’ (Chambers, 2003: 308)5 then it is worthwhile to reflect on means by which elections can be rendered more legitimate and authentic in the eyes of both aggregative and deliberative democrats. The idea here is to explore what kinds of elections, ideally, should follow the deliberation stage. While there may be a number of possible answers to this question, I consider here the compatibility of compulsory voting with deliberative ideals. Procedural/participatory democrats share with deliberative democrats a desire for authenticity and legitimacy. Although they define these ideals differently, something they have in common is a desire for decision making that is free from distortions of unequal political power, reflecting a ‘‘form of manifest equality among citizens’’ (Cohen, 2009: 19; Dahl, 1979: 124–5). They both also value democratic practices that ‘‘embody the essential democratic principles of responsiveness to public wishes’’ (Parkinson, 2003: 180). As Robert Dahl, speaking for the proceduralists, would put it, ‘‘the people must have the final say’’; they ‘‘must be sovereign’’ (1979: 98–108). I argue here that compulsory voting is better able than voluntary voting to deliver legitimacy and authenticity,6 due to its capacity to deliver high and socially even turnout.7 Not only are such elections more inclusive and less subject to distortions of unequal political power, they are also better able to reflect the objective interests of voters

. Although the latter does not equate to the disinterested pursuit of the ‘‘common good’’ as per the preference of deliberative democrats,8 one can safely say that such an outcome is superior to a situation where only certain sections of the population have their interests served. They can at least, be present at what Dahl (1979) refers to as the ‘‘decisive stage’’ so as to participate in self-government, protect their own interests and be part of the mutual enterprise of democracy.

### AC – UV

#### [1] Presumption and permissibility affirm: [a] otherwise it would freeze action because we would have to justify infinitely small things like drinking water [b] it’s harder to affirm because of the 7-4-6-3 time skew and disclosure means they can react to the 1AC, so if there’s no offense I did the better debating

#### [2] Aff gets RVI on T and theory if I win a counter-interp. A) Reciprocity: I don’t have the ability to read T against you but you always have the option of reading both T and theory, giving you a 2-to-1 structural advantage that only the RVI rectifies. If you read only T or only theory you still had both options available, so in the 1AR I should have two options as well. B) Aff speaks first so I’m always forced to choose some interp of the topic and of what’s fair meaning there’s always the potential I violate. RVI is the only check against the use of frivolous T and theory. C) Having to prove that the AC is topical or fair skews my ability to cover substance given the time-crunched 1AR so I need to be able to win on these issues.

#### [3] Aff gets access to 1AR theory since otherwise it becomes impossible to check back for infinite NC abuse which outweighs on magnitude. 1AR theory needs to be drop the debater—I don’t have time to split between substance and theory so it’s the only way to rectify abuse. No neg RVIs because they don’t need it—they can split the NR, which would equalize NR-2AR time skew. Competing interps on aff theory—shields the 2ar from a 2nr counterinterp dump since it holds them to a higher standard of what they have to do to win theory. And, neg abuse outweighs aff abuse since they can react whereas I’m forced to adapt. No new 2nr framing issues on theory—be paradigmatically opposed to new in the 2 arguments and they had their chance in the NC.

#### It takes democratic engagement to solve extinction—sequencing means you affirm.

#### Small 06 (Jonathan, former Americorps VISTA for the Human Services Coalition, “Moving Forward,” The Journal for Civic Commitment, Spring, http://www.mc.maricopa.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.jsp)

What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require collective action, unity, and enlightened self-interest. Confronting global warming, depleted natural resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability will require[s] cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and most of all solidarity – ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life through the tiny lens of our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven. Our very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society. With humankind’s next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our conception of education. We’ll need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, let’s not get bogged down on subtleties. Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community issues. There is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that today’s youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and today’s youth. But one thing is for sure; today’s youth no longer see government and politics as an effective or valuable tool for affecting positive change in the world. Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, “There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don’t know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.” Maybe the youth’s rejection of American politics isn’t a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience. Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government and commerce, have the potential for positive change. Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.

#### Particularism is good—root cause claims and focus on overarching structures ignore application to material injustice.

Gregory Fernando Pappas 16 [Texas A&M University] “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016, BE

The pragmatists’ approach should be distinguished from nonideal theories whose starting point seems to be the injustices of society at large that have a history and persist through time, where the task of political philosophy is to detect and diagnose the presence of these historical injustices in particular situations of injustice. For example, critical theory today has inherited an approach to social philosophy characteristic of the European tradition that goes back to Rousseau, Marx, Weber, Freud, Marcuse, and others. Accord- ing to Roberto Frega, this tradition takes society to be “intrinsically sick” with a malaise that requires adopting a critical historical stance in order to understand how the systematic sickness affects present social situations. In other words, this approach assumes that¶ a philosophical critique of specific social situations can be accomplished only under the assumption of a broader and full blown critique of soci- ety in its entirety: as a critique of capitalism, of modernity, of western civilization, of rationality itself. The idea of social pathology becomes intelligible only against the background of a philosophy of history or of an anthropology of decline, according to which the distortions of actual social life are but the inevitable consequence of longstanding historical processes. (“Between Pragmatism and Critical Theory” 63)¶ However, this particular approach to injustice is not limited to critical theory. It is present in those Latin American and African American political philosophies that have used and transformed the critical intellectual tools of ¶ critical theory to deal with the problems of injustice in the Americas. For instance, Charles W. Mills claims that the starting point and alternative to the abstractions of ideal theory that masked injustices is to diagnose and rectify a history of an illness—the legacy of white supremacy in our actual society.11 The critical task of revealing this illness is achieved by adopting a historical perspective where the injustices of today are part of a larger historical narrative about the development of modern societies that goes back to how Europeans have progressively dehumanized or subordinated others. Similary, radical feminists as well as Third World scholars, as reaction to the hege- monic Eurocentric paradigms that disguise injustices under the assumption of a universal or objective point of view, have stressed how our knowledge is always situated. This may seem congenial with pragmatism except the locus of the knower and of injustices is often described as power structures located in “global hierarchies” and a “world-system” and not situations.12¶ Pragmatism only questions that we live in History or a “World-System” (as a totality or abstract context) but not that we are in history (lowercase): in a present situation continuous with others where the past weighs heavily in our memories, bodies, habits, structures, and communities. It also does not deny the importance of power structures and seeing the connections be- tween injustices through time, but there is a difference between (a) inquiring into present situations of injustice in order to detect, diagnose, and cure an injustice (a social pathology) across history, and (b) inquiring into the his- tory of a systematic injustice in order to facilitate inquiry into the present unique, context-bound injustice. To capture the legacy of the past on present injustices, we must study history but also seek present evidence of the weight of the past on the present injustice.¶ If injustice is an illness, then the pragmatists’ approach takes as its main focus diagnosing and treating the particular present illness, that is, the particular situation-bound injustice and not a global “social pathology” or some single transhistorical source of injustice. The diagnosis of a particular injustice is not always dependent on adopting a broader critical standpoint of society in its entirety, but even when it is, we must be careful to not forget that such standpoints are useful only for understanding the present evil. The concepts and categories “white supremacy” and “colonialism” can be great tools that can be of planetary significance. One could even argue that they pick out much larger areas of people’s lives and injustices than the categories of class and gender, but in spite of their reach and explanatory theoretical value, they are nothing more than tools to make reference to and ameliorate particular injustices experienced (suffered) in the midst of a particular and unique re- lationship in a situation. No doubt many, but not all, problems of injustice are a consequence of being a member of a group in history, but even in these cases, we cannot a priori assume that injustices are homogeneously equal for all members of that group. Why is this important? The possible pluralism and therefore complexity of a problem of injustice does not always stop at the level of being a member of a historical group or even a member of many groups, as insisted on by intersectional analysis. There may be unique cir- cumstances to particular countries, towns, neighborhoods, institutions, and ultimately situations that we must be open to in a context-sensitive inquiry. If an empirical inquiry is committed to capturing and ameliorating all of the harms in situations of injustice in their raw pretheoretical complexity, then this requires that we try to begin with and return to the concrete, particular, and unique experiences of injustice.¶ Pragmatism agrees with Sally Haslanger’s concern about Charles Mills’s view. She writes: “The goal is not just a theory that is historical (v. ahistori- cal), but is sensitive to historical particularity, i.e., that resists grand causal narratives purporting to give an account of how domination has come about and is perpetuated everywhere and at all times” (1). For “the forces that cause and sustain domination vary tremendously context by context, and there isn’t necessarily a single causal explanation; a theoretical framework that is useful as a basis for political intervention must be highly sensitive to the details of the particular social context” (1).13¶ Although each situation is unique, there are commonalities among the cases that permit inquiry about common causes. We can “formulate tentative general principles from investigation of similar individual cases, and then . . . check the generalizations by applying them to still further cases” (Dewey, Lectures in China 53). But Dewey insists that the focus should be on the indi- vidual case, and was critical of how so many sociopolitical theories are prone to starting and remaining at the level of “sweeping generalizations.” He states that they “fail to focus on the concrete problems which arise in experience, allowing such problems to be buried under their sweeping generalizations” (Lectures in China 53).¶ The lesson pragmatism provides for nonideal theory today is that it must be careful to not reify any injustice as some single historical force for which particular injustice problems are its manifestation or evidence for its exis- tence. Pragmatism welcomes the wisdom and resources of nonideal theories that are historically grounded on actual injustices, but it issues a warning about how they should be understood and implemented. It is, for example, sympathetic to the critical resources found in critical race theory, but with an important qualification. It understands Derrick Bell’s valuable criticism as context-specific to patterns in the practice of American law. Through his inquiry into particular cases and civil rights policies at a particular time and place, Bell learned and proposed certain general principles such as the one of “interest convergence,” that is, “whites will promote racial advantages for blacks only when they also promote white self-interest.”14 But, for pragma- tism, these principles are nothing more than historically grounded tools to use in present problematic situations that call for our analysis, such as deliberation in establishing public policies or making sense of some concrete injustice. The principles are falsifiable and open to revision as we face situation-specific injustices. In testing their adequacy, we need to consider their function in making us see aspects of injustices we would not otherwise appreciate.15