# Stock

### Framework (3:40)

#### First, ethics are split between the deontic and the aretaic. Deontic theories classify actions as right or wrong through moral law, whereas aretaic theories attempt to develop moral agents that make the right decisions. Gryz 11.

Gryz 11 [Jarek, professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies. “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. November 2011, Issue 5.] SHS ZS

**There are two fundamental classes of** terms traditionally distinguished within **moral vocabulary**: **the deontic and the aretaic**. The terms from **the first** set **serve in the prescriptive function of** a **moral code**. This function consists in **providing answers to questions like: What am I** **(morally) required to do**? Answers to such questions usually have the grammatical form of an imperative and are called “prescriptions”, “moral norms”, “rules”, “precepts”, or “commands”. **They are expressed by means of** such terms as: ‘**right’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’**, etc. **The second class contains terms used for a moral** **evaluation of an** action (or an **actor**). Such moral evaluation is not primarily intended to direct actions, although it seems capable of performing this function as well. **Terms used for evaluations include**: ‘**good’, ‘bad’, ‘blameworthy’, ‘praiseworthy’, ‘virtuous’**, etc. The ‘right’ is the key notion of the normative part of a moral theory; **the ‘good’ is used to express moral judgments**.

#### To clarify, deontic theories guide ethics by looking at the actions of moral actors, whereas aretaic theories guide ethics by looking at the character of moral actors themselves. By developing good moral character, good actions will naturally follow.

#### Prefer the aretaic:

#### [1] Hijacks – All actions expressed in the deontic can be expressed in the aretaic, but the aretaic provides an infinitely richer vocabulary for evaluating character. Gryz 11.

[Gryz ’11 (Jarek, Prof in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2011, 14:493–501, Springer)] SHS ZS  
The way we use words ‘good/bad’ and ‘right/wrong’ seems to support the above claims. **Goodness and badness come in degrees**, hence **we have words like ‘better’ and ‘worse’**; **we lack similar terms for** **deontically evaluated actions**. The availability of degree terms in the former case seems to indicate the presence of many criteria used in evaluation; **an all-or- nothing choice, implied by** the use of **‘right’ or ‘wrong’, suggests focusing on** only **one quantum quality**.12 But fine-grainedness is not only a property of particular aretaic terms, **the entire aretaic vocabulary is infinitely richer and allows us to draw much** **finer distinctions in act-evaluations than the deontic vocabulary**. For example, **by saying** that **something is praiseworthy we imply** that **it deserves approval** or favor: we assess it higher when we say that it is admirable, since then it should be also respected and honored. The meaning of the word ‘praiseworthy’ can be quite well conveyed by saying, that it is something that ought to be done, or that it is the right (in Ross’s understanding of ‘right’) thing to do: yet **expressing the word ‘admirable’ in deontic vocabulary seems** just **impossible**. From what has been said so far one can derive an encouraging conclusion for the advocates of attractive ethics. Sheer richness and fine-grainedness of aretaic vocabulary seems to be a good reason for believing that **all that can be said in deontic terms can be equally well expressed in aretaic terms**. This is not to say, however, that we can produce a translation manual which would provide us with a general method of expressing deontic notions in terms of aretaic ones for all possible cases. In particular, it does not seem possible, as we hope to have shown, to substitute ‘good’ for ‘right’ or ‘deplorable’ for ‘wrong’. The relation between the aretaic and the deontic seems to be somewhat similar to the relation between the physical and the mental in the mind-body problem. We can claim that deontic is supervenient on the aretaic without committing ourselves to the idea of complete definitional reduction. In other words, we may allow for token identity (each particular action can have an aretaic description that perfectly matches the deontic one) and deny the possibility of type identity (that there is aretaic sentence true of all and only the actions having some deontic property). If this analogy is correct then the idea of definitional reduction of the deontic to the aretaic, and in particular, Stocker’s identification of rightness and goodness, is doomed. But we can still pursue a more modest goal. **If our task is** just **to substitute** **every** particular **deontic evaluation with an aretaic** one, **there are no** logical **reasons that would make it impossible** (it would not work, of course, in the opposite direction). From that perspective, **attractive ethical theories seem** to be much **better** off **than the imperative ones**.

#### [2] Collapses – A. Engaging in ethics concedes to the authority of attempting to become a better person, which is an aretaic quality. B. If agents were conditioned properly, they would independently take the right actions, which hijacks deontic theories. C. Infinite regress – we can always ask why to follow a deontic rule, but the answer will terminate in attempting to achieve some aretaic property.

#### [3] Prerequisite – A. Philosophy has to frame who we are as individuals before dictating how we should act; I would not tell a serial killer to follow the categorical imperative but try to reform their character first. B. The origin of philosophy had to start through an aretaic paradigm since there were no preconceived notions or rules that we needed a guide towards the good; they chose to develop the good out of their own volition. C. Absent the aretaic, there would be no reason to care about the morality of our actions without it being grounded in trying to become a better person.

#### [4] Motivation – A. The aretaic improves citizens’ moral standing. People can always opt-out of a deontic theory but by focusing on the aretaic we improve the moral character of citizens, causing them to act ethically out of their own volition. B. The aretaic allows people to understand the intrinsic nature behind their actions; they are no longer following an abstract theory but making the choice they think is correct. The deontic fails to provide a motivating factor to follow the theory and thus fails Cox 12.

#### [Cox 12 Damian Cox, philosophy prof @ Bond Univ, Judgment, Deliberation, and the Selfeffacement of Moral Theory, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2012.] SHS ZS Derek Parﬁt introduced the term ‘‘self-effacement’’ to describe the case in which proponents of a moral theory direct moral agents not to believe the theory.1 The term has since been used in a variety of ways. Glen Pettigrove uses the term to refer to moral theories that ‘‘cannot serve as a person’s motive when she acts.’’2 Joel Martinez applies the term to moral theories whose application requires agents to act from considerations other than the considerations that make an action right.3 Whereas Parﬁt frames self-effacement in terms of the beliefs of moral agents, Pettigrove frames it in terms of motives for action and Martinez in terms of reasons for action. Self-effacement can also be framed in terms of moral deliberation. On this construal, a theory is self-effacing if it entails that it is sometimes wrong to use the theory in moral deliberation. A theory is deliberatively self-effacing if and only if it implies a rejection of any direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. The phenomenon of deliberative self-effacement is pervasive and highly signiﬁcant. For example, utilitarian judgment of deliberation performed in directly utilitarian terms tends to be harsh. Working through expected utility calculations is normally a sub-optimal way of morally deliberating, even for individuals who are good at calculating. By utilitarian lights, this makes it a morally wrong way of deliberating. Utilitarians have long recognized this feature of utilitarian deliberation and the most popular response has been to reject any direct connection between moral deliberation and judgment of right action. This is the position that Bentham takes. Writing about deliberation in terms of the hedonic calculus, Bentham says: ‘‘It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment.’’4 By ‘‘moral judgment,’’ Bentham means moral deliberation, so in this passage he is denying a need to apply his theory of right action directly when deciding how to act. Bentham does not do so, but other utilitarians develop indirect forms of utilitarianism in which utilitarian judgment of rightness is carefully separated from processes of moral deliberation.5 According to indirect utilitarians, deliberation in general ought to proceed on grounds that, given the condition and circumstances of deliberators, produce the best outcomes over the long haul. Direct utilitarian calculation will only occasionally constitute such grounds. Indirect utilitarianism is a deliberatively self-effacing theory and its plausibility depends upon the plausibility of denying a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. Deliberative self-effacement crops up in unexpected places. For example, Bernard Williams argued that reasoning explicit in the works of Kant would lead a person to entertain one thought too many in cases where motives of love ought to predominate.6 Williams thought that this demonstrated the hollowness of the account that Kant advances. One way to interpret his objection to the account advanced by Kant is as a charge of self-effacement. A proper understanding of obligations of love requires that a person not act on them by explicitly consulting them. To do so would be to have one thought too many. The account advanced by Kant, therefore, is self-effacing. Followers of Kant ought to recommend against a direct deployment of an account of right action in moral deliberation along the lines of what Kant proposes. Followers of Kant have a ready response, however, and this is to embrace the possibility of self-effacement. It is at root the same as the response offered by indirect utilitarians. What makes an action right according to Kant ought to be distinguished from his view of how a person ought to deliberate about what to do. Love brings with it obligations, but these are not always obligations to deliberate about the obligations of love and act accordingly. The problem Williams uncovered is not with accounts of moral judgment along the lines of what Kant proposed, anchored as they are in respect for the rational nature of persons, but with the implicit assumption of a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. If we assume that the terms of moral deliberation must be the terms of moral judgment, we arrive at an implausible account of moral deliberation in contexts of love. The key to solving the problem Williams introduced, therefore, is to ﬁnd a coherent and plausible way of denying a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment.

#### [5] The deontic fails – A. It’s impossible for a moral law to account for every single situation; there will always be cases in which the rule fails B. Fails to account for differences in cultures or norms, the aretaic solves by allowing people to determine and weigh between their own virtues C. Moral laws can be interpreted in an infinite number of ways and there’s no way to hold people accountable for following them correctly D. Moral laws are socially constructed and dependent upon the places and conditions where they will be in use which means they are subjective and fail; virtues solves and is more flexible

#### [6] Consequences fail – Ethical theories have to always guide action. Even if they work 99% of the time that is not sufficient because there would be instances where agents do not know what to do. A. Induction fails – the logic of looking to the past to predict the future is all premised in the past, so it’s circular. B. Aggregation fails – there’s no way to weigh between different forms of pain and pleasure. C. Butterfly effect – no way to know when we cut off looking at consequences. D. Culpability – there are an infinite number of pretenses for actions which means assigning culpability is impossible which is necessary for a moral theory to ascribe blame for actions.

#### Next, the only ethics consistent with the aretaic is a virtue paradigm: This does not presuppose descriptive normative claims; we rather focus on developing agents to make them virtuous. Reader.

[Reader 2k (Reader, Soren. Late Professor of Philosophy, Durham University “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalism, Reasons, and Virtue.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4, Dec. 2000.)]  
**Virtue is a** free **disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions**. Virtue ethics claims that **what is to count as a good action** or what is a good outcome **is** conceptually **dependent on claims about** **the virtue of an agent**. How is this dependence supposed to work? Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself,’ **virtue ethicists** instead **explore the** concrete **dependence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from** already **virtuous agents**. They hold that **the key to moral rationality is** found **in moral education**. Ethics begins with the apprentice moral agent: the child, or the foreigner, or the damaged person in rehabilitation are all examples. These **beginner-agents learn from** the experienced, **wise moral agent by copying**, by mimicking in **their actions** the actions of the virtuous agent. This mimicking, or 'going on in the same way', does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how the world is (i.e., beliefs), nor that they acquire the ability to report on or provide justifications for what they do. **Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things**, going on to do the same, **then going on to do the same in new ways**, once they have mastered the skill.16 The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: **there is and can be nothing 'behind' the expertise of** the phronimos **which can explain or justify it** (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, to use Aristotle's examples at NE 1104b7-l 1). Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learn ing of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-fol lowers can learn from being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it.

#### Thus, the standard is promoting virtue.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Constitutiveness – moral questions are derived from the life-form of a particular entity, which justifies following our true form. This outweighs – just as I would say a knife is bad if it is blunt, humans would be bad if they do not follow their true form. Any deontic theories are simply a deviation from our form. Foot:

[Foot, Phillipa; “Natural Goodness”; Oxford University (2001)] SHS ZS

Anscombe writes, ‘[G]etting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life, and that far beyond what could be secured by…other means.’ Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called **an ‘Aristotelian necessity’**: [is] that which **is necessary because** and in so far as **good hangs on it.** We invoke the same idea when we say that **it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill**. These ‘**Aristotelian necessities’ depend on** what the **particular species of plants and animals** need, **[and] on their natural habitat**, and the ways of making out that there are in their repertoire. **These** things together **determine** **what** it is for members of **a particular species** to be as they **should be,** and to do that which they should do. And for all the enormous differences between [the] life [of] and humans and that of plants or animals, we can see **that human defects and excellences are similarly related to what human beings are and what they do.**

#### [2] Actor specificity – Virtue is impossible without impetus to act ethically: the state must provide conditions that facilitate virtue development. Ingrahm 13.

[Ingram 13 Andrew Ingram (The University of Texas School of Law, J.D.; The University of Texas at Austin, M.A. Philosophy; A.B. Brown University.) “A (Moral) Prisoner’s Dilemma: Character Ethics and Plea Bargaining” 2013 <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/files/2013/12/8.-Ingram.pdf> ] SHS ZS

Now there are some philosphers and lay people who may profess not to care about character. On the other hand, there are some who care about character a great deal. Though it is not a commonly held position today, there have been some thinkers who argued that **the purpose of the state is the development of virtue in the citizens.**23 For these theorists, the objective of the ideal state is to facilitate and cultivate the development of virtuous individuals. **This principle would extend to criminal-justice policy**. **A justice system which** deliberately **took steps** with a high chance **of rewarding dishonesty would not be** in keeping with the criteria for criminal justice in **the character-building state**. At a minimum, the state would be sending the wrong message to its citizens, declaring that it cares not for virtue and vice and will nonchalantly punish the relatively virtuous more than the comparatively vicious. Beyond this, **there is the problem that the state is encouraging vice and discouraging virtue** by incentivizing the one and penalizing the other. Strictly speaking, this is not my thesis, although it is suggested by the same phenomenon. The traditional position in virtue ethics is that **virtuous actions build virtue and vicious actions build vice**—just like other habits. **From the perspective of the** character-building **state**, **it is** obviously **unacceptable for it to be encouraging** betrayal given that such acts nourish **bad character**. Finally, **there is something** twisted and **cruel about** deliberately **putting a person to** a **choice between** her **conscience and** her **freedom**. Tracy, we imagined, was not someone who made the decision to turn state’s evidence lightly. There are, however, some people who do so easily, with utter indifference to their former partners or even malice in their hearts against them. **When the prosecutor offers to make a deal with** such **an awful character**, **his only hesitation will involve** just **how good of a deal he can bargain** to obtain. Now contrast this person with someone like Louisa who is honest or who has tender feelings and wishes not to harm another human being by increasing the amount of time that person will spend in prison. She is **caught between** the demands of her **compassion** or her honor on one hand, **and** the prospect of **years** of misery **behind bars** on the other. Moreover, Louisa must also be mindful of her duties as a mother. The thought of violating one’s principles or bringing harm to one’s former partner in crime (who could be a close friend or even a close family member as well) is tortuous for the woman of conscience. The same is true for the fear of prison; its deprivations are at least as miserable for the saint as they are for the sinner. In sum, the perverse reality is that the more honest or compassionate a person is, the more she will suffer from the dilemma the prosecutor has fashioned.

#### [3] Subject transformation – Virtue ethics are key to fighting racism by accounting for the particularities in relationships and encourages transformation of character. O’Connel.

[O’Connel, Maureen. “After White Supremacy? The Viability of Virtue Ethics for Racial Justice.” Journal of Moral Theology. Published 2014] SHS ZS

As a white Christian ethicist and protagonist in the scenes above, I wonder whether virtue ethics as it is understood and practiced in Catholic moral theology serves as a viable moral method for examin- ing and responding to these racial events. There are many reasons to think that would be the case. To begin, **virtue ethics** generally **aims for moral** **development in personal or intrapersonal spheres**,2 which are also **the spaces where racism** in our post-civil rights era **has re- treated and remains firmly entrenched** as evidenced in the first sce- nario. **Virtue ethics is** also **attentive to the material** **or concrete par- ticularities of agents** and contexts, **and** therefore **invites** **attuned per- ception to** the more **subtle dimensions of human moral action** such as intention and emotive reasoning, as well as the fitting or appropriate response in light of the underlying relationships of a given situation.3 **This would make it helpful in combating racism in its more covert** contemporary **forms** such as internalized **dispositions of superiority** (operative in the first scenario), **situations where stereotypes are like- ly to occlude actual facts** (the second scenario), o**r situations where one’s place in the racial hierarchy is likely to determine how one re- lates to others** (the third scenario). Finally, **virtue ethics encourages ongoing and future-oriented transformation** through a process of striving toward a vision of what one hopes to become, whether as an individual or as a community, operative in the second and third sce- narios.4 Americans were recently reminded of the indispensability of virtue ethics for racial justice as we marked the 50th Anniversary of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, recalling a prophet- ic imperative to judge people on their character rather than the color of their skin and recommitting ourselves to making dreams of racial equality a reality.

### Offense (1:20)

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle. Affirm:

#### [1] Ethical community – Compulsory voting aids in the generation of an ethical community, which is a necessary virtue for living together in society. Chapman 19

[Chapman, Emilee Booth. Stanford University. “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting.” American Journal of Political Science] SHS ZS

Proponents of compulsory voting typically justify compelling people to vote by appealing to two benefits from near-universal electoral turnout: First, higher turnout will produce a political system that is more equally responsive to all citizens; second, higher turnout will increase the perceived legitimacy of the political system (Engelen 2007, 24–25; L. Hill in Brennan and Hill 2014; Lijphart 1996, 1997). Critics of compulsory voting, on the other hand, object that these arguments place too much emphasis on the act of voting while neglecting the diversity of partici- pation that characterizes healthy democracies. Annabelle Lever (2010, 908) argues, “Voting is, at best, only one form of democratic political participation and, from some per- spectives, not an especially important or attractive one.” Other critics likewise claim that compulsory voting arbi- trarily singles out one kind of participation as essential to democracy (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 31). High voter turnout, opponents contend, is not necessarily important for democracy. Moreover, compelling higher turnout is not harmless. Critics argue that compulsory voting could compromise the quality of democratic par- ticipation and that it needlessly interferes with individual liberty. Opponents of compulsory voting rightly observe that voting is only one aspect of democracy, but they wrongly conclude that approximately universal voting is not valuable to contemporary democracy. **Voting is not interchangeable with other forms of political influence**. **Elections play a** distinctive and **important role within a broader framework of democracy**, a role characterized by mass participation, in fact, by an ambition toward univer- sal participation. Established democracies devote tremendous re- sources to making voting accessible. India’s 2014 Lok Sabha election, for example, required nearly a million polling places to ensure that all eligible voters, even those in the most remote parts of the country, would have a meaningful opportunity to vote (Vyawahare 2014). Public discourse and the widespread belief in a duty to vote suggest a further publicly shared belief that it is important not only for citizens to have ample opportunity to vote, but also that citizens actually take advantage of that opportunity (see, e.g., Blais 2000, 95). This public attitude toward voting is distinct from atti- tudes toward other forms of participation; in the popular imagination, voting is singled out as the object of a duty. Of course, critics of compulsory voting who doubt the value of high voter turnout are also likely to be critical of this prominence of voting in public discourse and in the popular imagination. Voting is not the only way citizens participate in decision making in today’s democracies. Citizens might also contribute to public deliberation, pe- tition their representatives, donate money to a campaign, or even stand for office themselves. Popular voting alone need not (and surely cannot) bear all of the normative weight of democracy, and fostering a more equally re- sponsive government certainly requires attention to the significant inequities in these other domains of participa- tion (Lever 2010). Seen in this light, the special emphasis on electoral participation may seem arbitrary and thus an insufficient basis for compelling citizens to vote. The special emphasis on **voting** in popular political culture is not arbitrary or misguided, though. Rather, it **is grounded in the distinctive and valuable role** that periodic **moments of** approximately **universal participation** **play in contemporary democratic practices**. When characterized by approximately universal turnout, **elections interrupt the ordinary, delegated business of government with ex- traordinary spectacles of democracy that command the attention of the general public** and manifest the equal po- litical authority of all citizens. Though they cannot fully instantiate democracy on their own, **these moments** effec- nas. tively **contribute to** contemporary **democratic practices in a number of ways** irst, the ambition toward **universal participation** in periodic elections **helps** to **guard against political disen- gagement** and alienation by defining concrete expecta- tions for participation. Skeptics of the value of high voter turnout often argue that active participation is not essen- tial to democracy because individuals can passively exer- cise political authority by deferring to their fellow citizens or to political elites. But political inaction can only be in- terpreted as passive participation if citizens believe it is appropriate and possible for them to intervene when the are dissatisfied with the direction of their public life. In modern societies, though, many people do not see them- selves as political agents in their own right, able to exert influence over their political circumstances (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 168). A pluralist model of democracy might simply call for citizens to take advantage of opportunities to participate whenever and however they wish, but many citizens will never participate because they never feel competent to do so, or because it simply never occurs to them. The ambi- tion toward **universal participation** in elections **mitigates** this problem of **habitual disengagement by establishing an expectation that citizens will perform their** **politica agency** on specific and predictable occasions. Knowing that they will be called upon to actively participate on a recurring basis provides citizens with a reason to develop an enduring political identity Moreover, by directing cit- izens attention to particular political questions that they will be expected to answer, elections make the often frus- trating and potentially discouraging task of figuring out what to pay attention to easier for normal citizens. This benefit is magnified by the relative information saturation that occurs around elections. Critics of compulsory voting might argue that, rather than trying to enforce universal electoral participation, we can more effectively combat political disengagement and alienation by promoting participation in other are- nas. But, even if nonelectoral participation can be more effective than voting at increasing political engagement and efficacy in individual cases, approximating universal participation in other forms of activism or participation would require much more radical reforms of political cul- ture and institutions. Efforts to increase voter turnout, on the other hand, build on an extensive infrastructure of electoral administration and the existing, widespread norm that there is a duty to vote. Moreover, periodic moments of approximately **universal participation** would likely still play a valuable role in a political system already characterized by widespread citizen engagement, for several reasons. First, these moments **facilitate collective action**. **Individuals can** influence public life more effectively when they are able to **combine their efforts with other like-minded citizens**. Insofar as elections represent occasions in which all citizens can count on each other to participate, **they can help to overcome** some of the **coordination problems** that make it difficult for large, diverse, unorganized, or underresourced groups to effectively utilize other channels of influence. Second, when citizens internalize an expectation of **universal participation** in elections, electoral campaigns also **create a relatively attentive audience to whom po- litical leaders and activists can address political claims**,8 facilitating the introduction of new issues and the contes- tation of existing political divisions. Finally, periodic moments of approximately **universal participation** **make the political involvement** and formal political equality of all citizens **manifest**. This spectacle **reinforces parties’ and elected officials’ incentives to take the interests and concerns of all citizens into account**. Elections are not the only way for citizens to hold politi- cal leaders to account, but elections are still distinctively valuable mechanisms of democratic control when they predictably involve the entire citizenry in the sanctioning process. When characterized by nearly universal partic- ipation, **elections provide an unambiguous reminder to public officials that they are accountable** to all citizens, not just the most vocal and active. Because elections make manifest the responsiveness of the political system to the equal agency of all citizens in at least a few concrete instances, the optics of periodic moments of approximately universal participation can also contribute to the empirical legitimacy of a demo- cratic regime. Those who find themselves on the losing side of a political decision may have a harder time main- taining the belief that they speak for a silent majority when citizens routinely reveal how they align themselves on significant dimensions of political conflict (see also Przeworski 1999). The optics of approximately **universal participation** also imbue elections with powerful expressive effects that can **reinforce citizens’ commitment to democracy**. In Just Elections, Dennis Thompson (2002) observes that elec- tions have two kinds of expressive effects: First, “**they enable citizens to express attitudes about the political process**”; second, they “express the polity’s attitude to- ward its citizens” (22). When they credibly call for the participation of all citizens, elections convey the commu- nity’s belief in the value of all citizens’ contributions. And y voting, citizens participate in this public expression: “**When citizens go to the polls** on the same day, visibly and publicly participating in the same way in a common experience of civic engagement, **they demonstrate** their **willingness to contribute on equal terms** to the democratic process” (Thompson 2002, 34). By regularly participat- ing in elections, citizens habitually enact their roles as participants in the political community as well as their commitment to decision-making procedures that instan- tiate the equal political authority of all citizens.

#### Ethical communities are key to acting virtuously – means my offense procedurally outweighs. Markulla.

[“Ethics and Virtue.” Markkula Center. Published 1988] SHS ZS

At **the heart of** the **virtue** approach to **ethics** **is the** idea of "**community**". **A person's character traits are not developed in isolation, but within** and by the **communities to which he or she belongs**, including family, church, school, and other private and public associations. As people grow and mature, their **personalities are deeply affected by the values that their communities prize**, by the personality traits that their communities encourage, and by the role models that their communities put forth for imitation through traditional stories, fiction, movies, television, and so on. **The virtue approach urges us to** **pay attention to** the contours of **our communities and the habits of character they encourage and instill**. The **moral life,** then, **is not simply a matter of following moral rules** and of learning to apply them to specific situations. The **moral life is also a matter of** trying to **determine the kind of people we should be and of attending to the development of character within our communities** and ourselves.

#### [2] Moral Practices – Compulsory voting ensures citizens reflect upon the candidates for whom they are voting, which causes them to evaluate the beneficial virtues within others. This reflection is key – by considering what virtues are optimal for others, they have a better framework and understanding of moral character which they can apply to themselves.

#### [3] Democracy – Voting is constitutive citizens in democracies, which means it is part of the form of a proper citizen. Since the government has an obligation to foster virtues, voting should be compulsory. Tweedale:

[Tweedale, Stephen. Voting and Virtue Ethics, Popcorn Machine, March 31, 2013, <https://stephentweedale.wordpress.com/2019/03/31/voting-and-virtue-ethics/> 7/31/20] SHS ZS

In this context, a virtue is an “excellent trait of character”; examples of such traits include benevolence, compassion, kindness, generosity, courage, honesty, tolerance, conscientiousness, frugality, reasonableness, and moderation. A person’s possession of the virtues is a necessary condition for a complex, distinctively human kind of flourishing we have strong reason to value (sometimes referred to as eudaimonia, a technical term from ancient Greek that I won’t be using in the rest of this post). From a virtue ethical perspective, right action can be defined as the action that would be performed under the circumstances by a person who has the virtues. Applied to the ethics of voting, this means that **one ought to vote because virtuous person would vote**, and one ought to vote in a certain way because a virtuous person would vote that way. Why is it virtuous to vote? One reason is that **democratic politics is** partly **constitutive of human flourishing**. **Political institutions have a** **pervasive effect on the conditions in which we live our lives**, including our social and physical environment and the rights and opportunities we enjoy. **Undemocratic forms of government** (even if they miraculously turn out to be perfectly benevolent) **alienate us from these institutions**; **democracy is necessary** for us **to have real control over the conditions in which we live our lives**. Given our capacities for freedom, self-determination, and cooperation, **control over these conditions is** plausibly **part of** what **human flourishing** entails. And because control over these conditions entails democracy, **democracy is plausibly part of** what **human flourishing** entails. **For democracy to exist, people must vote**; **the shared activity of voting is** partly **constitutive of democracy**. If the shared activity of voting is partly constitutive of democracy, and democracy is partly constitutive of human flourishing, then the shared activity of voting is partly constitutive of human flourishing. It follows, I think, that **a person who possesses the virtues**—the traits necessary a for human flourishing—**would** thereby **have a disposition to vote** even though they know that their own vote will not determine the outcome of an election. A second reason why one ought to vote is related to the fact that democracy is not only partly constitutive of but also an important contributor to human flourishing. Democratic government is, on the whole, good government. **Democracies do a better job** of delivering important goods (from health care to the administration of justice) **than non-democracies**. And again, democracy requires people to vote. People who do so incur some (minor) cost for no real benefit to themselves. Generally speaking, **voters** [but]**seem to be motivated to make this small sacrifice** by what the economist Jean Drèze calls\* “public-spiritedness”—itself perhaps a kind of virtue.

### Underview (0:55)

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory – It’s key to check neg abuse, no 1AR theory means neg can be infinitely abusive because nothing can stop them, which outweighs because it means aff can’t win. Drop the debater on 1AR theory because the aff can’t split the 2ar between both theory and substance. No neg RVIs since the neg can dump on the shell for 6 minutes and make the 2AR impossible. Competing interpretations because reasonability collapses – you have to win offense to your justification which concedes the validity of the theory. 1AR Theory before neg theory – a) the neg can win their shell in the long 2nr but it’s impossible for the aff to beat the shell back in the 2ar b) key to check back against abusive neg strategies.

#### [2] Fairness is a voter a) all argumentation presupposes fairness – i.e. that the judge won’t hack for either side b) judges cannot evaluate the round properly if it is skewed

#### [3] Presumption affirms a) We assume the validity of statements unless given a reason to deny them – i.e. we will assume a person is telling the truth unless given a reason to doubt them. b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral like drinking water

#### [4] Permissibility affirms a) Conditional logic: If a system of morals must be applicable to every agent in order to label actions as morally permissible, it results in the conditional statement, “If a system of morals exists ****then voting ought to be compulsory.****” Skep denies the antecedent, and in conditional logic[[1]](#footnote-1), statements with false antecedents always have true consequents, thus resolution is permissible, which means skep affirms. B) Law of Excluded Middle: Moral systems that don’t or can’t assign permissibility or impermissibility to actions are incomplete guides to action. If permissibility is true, then there cannot be prohibitions. Without prohibitions, there’s no reason to negate, so affirm.

# Kritik

### Framework (3:40)

#### First, ethics are split between the deontic and the aretaic. Deontic theories classify actions as right or wrong through moral law, whereas aretaic theories attempt to develop moral agents that make the right decisions. Gryz 11.

Gryz 11 [Jarek, professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies. “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. November 2011, Issue 5.] SHS ZS

**There are two fundamental classes of** terms traditionally distinguished within **moral vocabulary**: **the deontic and the aretaic**. The terms from **the first** set **serve in the prescriptive function of** a **moral code**. This function consists in **providing answers to questions like: What am I** **(morally) required to do**? Answers to such questions usually have the grammatical form of an imperative and are called “prescriptions”, “moral norms”, “rules”, “precepts”, or “commands”. **They are expressed by means of** such terms as: ‘**right’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’**, etc. **The second class contains terms used for a moral** **evaluation of an** action (or an **actor**). Such moral evaluation is not primarily intended to direct actions, although it seems capable of performing this function as well. **Terms used for evaluations include**: ‘**good’, ‘bad’, ‘blameworthy’, ‘praiseworthy’, ‘virtuous’**, etc. The ‘right’ is the key notion of the normative part of a moral theory; **the ‘good’ is used to express moral judgments**.

#### To clarify, deontic theories guide ethics by looking at the actions of moral actors, whereas aretaic theories guide ethics by looking at the character of moral actors themselves. By developing good moral character, good actions will naturally follow.

#### Prefer the aretaic:

#### [1] Hijacks – All actions expressed in the deontic can be expressed in the aretaic, but the aretaic provides an infinitely richer vocabulary for evaluating character. Gryz 11.

[Gryz ’11 (Jarek, Prof in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, “On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2011, 14:493–501, Springer)] SHS ZS  
The way we use words ‘good/bad’ and ‘right/wrong’ seems to support the above claims. **Goodness and badness come in degrees**, hence **we have words like ‘better’ and ‘worse’**; **we lack similar terms for** **deontically evaluated actions**. The availability of degree terms in the former case seems to indicate the presence of many criteria used in evaluation; **an all-or- nothing choice, implied by** the use of **‘right’ or ‘wrong’, suggests focusing on** only **one quantum quality**.12 But fine-grainedness is not only a property of particular aretaic terms, **the entire aretaic vocabulary is infinitely richer and allows us to draw much** **finer distinctions in act-evaluations than the deontic vocabulary**. For example, **by saying** that **something is praiseworthy we imply** that **it deserves approval** or favor: we assess it higher when we say that it is admirable, since then it should be also respected and honored. The meaning of the word ‘praiseworthy’ can be quite well conveyed by saying, that it is something that ought to be done, or that it is the right (in Ross’s understanding of ‘right’) thing to do: yet **expressing the word ‘admirable’ in deontic vocabulary seems** just **impossible**. From what has been said so far one can derive an encouraging conclusion for the advocates of attractive ethics. Sheer richness and fine-grainedness of aretaic vocabulary seems to be a good reason for believing that **all that can be said in deontic terms can be equally well expressed in aretaic terms**. This is not to say, however, that we can produce a translation manual which would provide us with a general method of expressing deontic notions in terms of aretaic ones for all possible cases. In particular, it does not seem possible, as we hope to have shown, to substitute ‘good’ for ‘right’ or ‘deplorable’ for ‘wrong’. The relation between the aretaic and the deontic seems to be somewhat similar to the relation between the physical and the mental in the mind-body problem. We can claim that deontic is supervenient on the aretaic without committing ourselves to the idea of complete definitional reduction. In other words, we may allow for token identity (each particular action can have an aretaic description that perfectly matches the deontic one) and deny the possibility of type identity (that there is aretaic sentence true of all and only the actions having some deontic property). If this analogy is correct then the idea of definitional reduction of the deontic to the aretaic, and in particular, Stocker’s identification of rightness and goodness, is doomed. But we can still pursue a more modest goal. **If our task is** just **to substitute** **every** particular **deontic evaluation with an aretaic** one, **there are no** logical **reasons that would make it impossible** (it would not work, of course, in the opposite direction). From that perspective, **attractive ethical theories seem** to be much **better** off **than the imperative ones**.

#### [2] Collapses – A. Engaging in ethics concedes to the authority of attempting to become a better person, which is an aretaic quality. B. If agents were conditioned properly, they would independently take the right actions, which hijacks deontic theories. C. Infinite regress – we can always ask why to follow a deontic rule, but the answer will terminate in attempting to achieve some aretaic property.

#### [3] Prerequisite – A. Philosophy has to frame who we are as individuals before dictating how we should act; I would not tell a serial killer to follow the categorical imperative but try to reform their character first. B. The origin of philosophy had to start through an aretaic paradigm since there were no preconceived notions or rules that we needed a guide towards the good; they chose to develop the good out of their own volition. C. Absent the aretaic, there would be no reason to care about the morality of our actions without it being grounded in trying to become a better person.

#### [4] Motivation – A. The aretaic improves citizens’ moral standing. People can always opt-out of a deontic theory but by focusing on the aretaic we improve the moral character of citizens, causing them to act ethically out of their own volition. B. The aretaic allows people to understand the intrinsic nature behind their actions; they are no longer following an abstract theory but making the choice they think is correct. The deontic fails to provide a motivating factor to follow the theory and thus fails Cox 12.

#### [Cox 12 Damian Cox, philosophy prof @ Bond Univ, Judgment, Deliberation, and the Selfeffacement of Moral Theory, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2012.] SHS ZS Derek Parﬁt introduced the term ‘‘self-effacement’’ to describe the case in which proponents of a moral theory direct moral agents not to believe the theory.1 The term has since been used in a variety of ways. Glen Pettigrove uses the term to refer to moral theories that ‘‘cannot serve as a person’s motive when she acts.’’2 Joel Martinez applies the term to moral theories whose application requires agents to act from considerations other than the considerations that make an action right.3 Whereas Parﬁt frames self-effacement in terms of the beliefs of moral agents, Pettigrove frames it in terms of motives for action and Martinez in terms of reasons for action. Self-effacement can also be framed in terms of moral deliberation. On this construal, a theory is self-effacing if it entails that it is sometimes wrong to use the theory in moral deliberation. A theory is deliberatively self-effacing if and only if it implies a rejection of any direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. The phenomenon of deliberative self-effacement is pervasive and highly signiﬁcant. For example, utilitarian judgment of deliberation performed in directly utilitarian terms tends to be harsh. Working through expected utility calculations is normally a sub-optimal way of morally deliberating, even for individuals who are good at calculating. By utilitarian lights, this makes it a morally wrong way of deliberating. Utilitarians have long recognized this feature of utilitarian deliberation and the most popular response has been to reject any direct connection between moral deliberation and judgment of right action. This is the position that Bentham takes. Writing about deliberation in terms of the hedonic calculus, Bentham says: ‘‘It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment.’’4 By ‘‘moral judgment,’’ Bentham means moral deliberation, so in this passage he is denying a need to apply his theory of right action directly when deciding how to act. Bentham does not do so, but other utilitarians develop indirect forms of utilitarianism in which utilitarian judgment of rightness is carefully separated from processes of moral deliberation.5 According to indirect utilitarians, deliberation in general ought to proceed on grounds that, given the condition and circumstances of deliberators, produce the best outcomes over the long haul. Direct utilitarian calculation will only occasionally constitute such grounds. Indirect utilitarianism is a deliberatively self-effacing theory and its plausibility depends upon the plausibility of denying a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. Deliberative self-effacement crops up in unexpected places. For example, Bernard Williams argued that reasoning explicit in the works of Kant would lead a person to entertain one thought too many in cases where motives of love ought to predominate.6 Williams thought that this demonstrated the hollowness of the account that Kant advances. One way to interpret his objection to the account advanced by Kant is as a charge of self-effacement. A proper understanding of obligations of love requires that a person not act on them by explicitly consulting them. To do so would be to have one thought too many. The account advanced by Kant, therefore, is self-effacing. Followers of Kant ought to recommend against a direct deployment of an account of right action in moral deliberation along the lines of what Kant proposes. Followers of Kant have a ready response, however, and this is to embrace the possibility of self-effacement. It is at root the same as the response offered by indirect utilitarians. What makes an action right according to Kant ought to be distinguished from his view of how a person ought to deliberate about what to do. Love brings with it obligations, but these are not always obligations to deliberate about the obligations of love and act accordingly. The problem Williams uncovered is not with accounts of moral judgment along the lines of what Kant proposed, anchored as they are in respect for the rational nature of persons, but with the implicit assumption of a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. If we assume that the terms of moral deliberation must be the terms of moral judgment, we arrive at an implausible account of moral deliberation in contexts of love. The key to solving the problem Williams introduced, therefore, is to ﬁnd a coherent and plausible way of denying a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment.

#### [5] The deontic fails – A. It’s impossible for a moral law to account for every single situation; there will always be cases in which the rule fails B. Fails to account for differences in cultures or norms, the aretaic solves by allowing people to determine and weigh between their own virtues C. Moral laws can be interpreted in an infinite number of ways and there’s no way to hold people accountable for following them correctly D. Moral laws are socially constructed and dependent upon the places and conditions where they will be in use which means they are subjective and fail; virtues solves and is more flexible

#### [6] Consequences fail – Ethical theories have to always guide action. Even if they work 99% of the time that is not sufficient because there would be instances where agents do not know what to do. A. Induction fails – the logic of looking to the past to predict the future is all premised in the past, so it’s circular. B. Aggregation fails – there’s no way to weigh between different forms of pain and pleasure. C. Butterfly effect – no way to know when we cut off looking at consequences. D. Culpability – there are an infinite number of pretenses for actions which means assigning culpability is impossible which is necessary for a moral theory to ascribe blame for actions.

#### Next, the only ethics consistent with the aretaic is a virtue paradigm: This does not presuppose descriptive normative claims; we rather focus on developing agents to make them virtuous. Reader.

[Reader 2k (Reader, Soren. Late Professor of Philosophy, Durham University “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalism, Reasons, and Virtue.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 3, No. 4, Dec. 2000.)]  
**Virtue is a** free **disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions**. Virtue ethics claims that **what is to count as a good action** or what is a good outcome **is** conceptually **dependent on claims about** **the virtue of an agent**. How is this dependence supposed to work? Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself,’ **virtue ethicists** instead **explore the** concrete **dependence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from** already **virtuous agents**. They hold that **the key to moral rationality is** found **in moral education**. Ethics begins with the apprentice moral agent: the child, or the foreigner, or the damaged person in rehabilitation are all examples. These **beginner-agents learn from** the experienced, **wise moral agent by copying**, by mimicking in **their actions** the actions of the virtuous agent. This mimicking, or 'going on in the same way', does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how the world is (i.e., beliefs), nor that they acquire the ability to report on or provide justifications for what they do. **Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things**, going on to do the same, **then going on to do the same in new ways**, once they have mastered the skill.16 The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: **there is and can be nothing 'behind' the expertise of** the phronimos **which can explain or justify it** (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, to use Aristotle's examples at NE 1104b7-l 1). Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learn ing of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-fol lowers can learn from being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it.

#### Thus, the standard is promoting virtue.

#### Prefer additionally

#### [1] Constitutiveness – moral questions are derived from the life-form of a particular entity, which justifies following our true form. This outweighs – just as I would say a knife is bad if it is blunt, humans would be bad if they do not follow their true form. Any deontic theories are simply a deviation from our form. Foot:

[Foot, Phillipa; “Natural Goodness”; Oxford University (2001)] SHS ZS

Anscombe writes, ‘[G]etting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life, and that far beyond what could be secured by…other means.’ Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called **an ‘Aristotelian necessity’**: [is] that which **is necessary because** and in so far as **good hangs on it.** We invoke the same idea when we say that **it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill**. These ‘**Aristotelian necessities’ depend on** what the **particular species of plants and animals** need, **[and] on their natural habitat**, and the ways of making out that there are in their repertoire. **These** things together **determine** **what** it is for members of **a particular species** to be as they **should be,** and to do that which they should do. And for all the enormous differences between [the] life [of] and humans and that of plants or animals, we can see **that human defects and excellences are similarly related to what human beings are and what they do.**

#### [2] Actor specificity – Virtue is impossible without impetus to act ethically: the state must provide conditions that facilitate virtue development. Ingrahm 13.

[Ingram 13 Andrew Ingram (The University of Texas School of Law, J.D.; The University of Texas at Austin, M.A. Philosophy; A.B. Brown University.) “A (Moral) Prisoner’s Dilemma: Character Ethics and Plea Bargaining” 2013 <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/files/2013/12/8.-Ingram.pdf> ] SHS ZS

Now there are some philosphers and lay people who may profess not to care about character. On the other hand, there are some who care about character a great deal. Though it is not a commonly held position today, there have been some thinkers who argued that **the purpose of the state is the development of virtue in the citizens.**23 For these theorists, the objective of the ideal state is to facilitate and cultivate the development of virtuous individuals. **This principle would extend to criminal-justice policy**. **A justice system which** deliberately **took steps** with a high chance **of rewarding dishonesty would not be** in keeping with the criteria for criminal justice in **the character-building state**. At a minimum, the state would be sending the wrong message to its citizens, declaring that it cares not for virtue and vice and will nonchalantly punish the relatively virtuous more than the comparatively vicious. Beyond this, **there is the problem that the state is encouraging vice and discouraging virtue** by incentivizing the one and penalizing the other. Strictly speaking, this is not my thesis, although it is suggested by the same phenomenon. The traditional position in virtue ethics is that **virtuous actions build virtue and vicious actions build vice**—just like other habits. **From the perspective of the** character-building **state**, **it is** obviously **unacceptable for it to be encouraging** betrayal given that such acts nourish **bad character**. Finally, **there is something** twisted and **cruel about** deliberately **putting a person to** a **choice between** her **conscience and** her **freedom**. Tracy, we imagined, was not someone who made the decision to turn state’s evidence lightly. There are, however, some people who do so easily, with utter indifference to their former partners or even malice in their hearts against them. **When the prosecutor offers to make a deal with** such **an awful character**, **his only hesitation will involve** just **how good of a deal he can bargain** to obtain. Now contrast this person with someone like Louisa who is honest or who has tender feelings and wishes not to harm another human being by increasing the amount of time that person will spend in prison. She is **caught between** the demands of her **compassion** or her honor on one hand, **and** the prospect of **years** of misery **behind bars** on the other. Moreover, Louisa must also be mindful of her duties as a mother. The thought of violating one’s principles or bringing harm to one’s former partner in crime (who could be a close friend or even a close family member as well) is tortuous for the woman of conscience. The same is true for the fear of prison; its deprivations are at least as miserable for the saint as they are for the sinner. In sum, the perverse reality is that the more honest or compassionate a person is, the more she will suffer from the dilemma the prosecutor has fashioned.

#### [3] Subject transformation – Virtue ethics are key to fighting racism by accounting for the particularities in relationships and encourages transformation of character. O’Connel.

[O’Connel, Maureen. “After White Supremacy? The Viability of Virtue Ethics for Racial Justice.” Journal of Moral Theology. Published 2014] SHS ZS

As a white Christian ethicist and protagonist in the scenes above, I wonder whether virtue ethics as it is understood and practiced in Catholic moral theology serves as a viable moral method for examin- ing and responding to these racial events. There are many reasons to think that would be the case. To begin, **virtue ethics** generally **aims for moral** **development in personal or intrapersonal spheres**,2 which are also **the spaces where racism** in our post-civil rights era **has re- treated and remains firmly entrenched** as evidenced in the first sce- nario. **Virtue ethics is** also **attentive to the material** **or concrete par- ticularities of agents** and contexts, **and** therefore **invites** **attuned per- ception to** the more **subtle dimensions of human moral action** such as intention and emotive reasoning, as well as the fitting or appropriate response in light of the underlying relationships of a given situation.3 **This would make it helpful in combating racism in its more covert** contemporary **forms** such as internalized **dispositions of superiority** (operative in the first scenario), **situations where stereotypes are like- ly to occlude actual facts** (the second scenario), o**r situations where one’s place in the racial hierarchy is likely to determine how one re- lates to others** (the third scenario). Finally, **virtue ethics encourages ongoing and future-oriented transformation** through a process of striving toward a vision of what one hopes to become, whether as an individual or as a community, operative in the second and third sce- narios.4 Americans were recently reminded of the indispensability of virtue ethics for racial justice as we marked the 50th Anniversary of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, recalling a prophet- ic imperative to judge people on their character rather than the color of their skin and recommitting ourselves to making dreams of racial equality a reality.

#### [4] Hidden Supremacy – Only virtue ethics can account for degrees of white supremacy – other theories cannot resolve microaggressions and unintentional forms of racism that occur pre-consciously. O’Connel.

[O’Connel, Maureen. “After White Supremacy? The Viability of Virtue Ethics for Racial Justice.” Journal of Moral Theology. Published 2014] SHS ZS

In addition to a way of thinking and knowing, **white supremacy can** also **be understood as a habituated set of dispositions** and prac- tices, **performed with varying levels of intentionality** (discussed in further detail in the next section) **and calcified over lifetimes and generations**, which inform and reinforce whites’ individual and col- lective stances toward themselves and others. MacMallin explains **whiteness in terms of “the practices, habits, and assumptions that impede human flourishing** and democracy and that **stem from the concept of whiteness as a superior and pure group** within the human family.”26 **Whiteness**, he contends, is a predisposition that **runs deep- er than our intentional will and organizes both thought and behavior consciously and pre-consciously**. In terms of the dispositional dimension of the habitus of white- ness, **scholars identify fear and hatred of racial others**, and the confu- sion of navigating the contradictions and cognitive dissonance of whiteness, evidenced by the fact that **most stereotypes of people of color are** deeply **rooted in affective dimensions of the self**. Everyday practices of white supremacy are too many to enumerate here but generally include a general antipathy to difference, a sense of enti- tlement to social advantages, denial of the reality of racism or shock when confronted with overt expressions of racism, or guilt about ra- cial injustice. Applebaum identifies **a common denominator in the “belief in one’s authority and in one’s own experience as truth**” along with “**an unwillingness to be challenged** that is protected by perceived white moral goodness or white benevolence.”27 The habit- uation of **whiteness** is not limited to individuals but also **depends on the social context of many racial events**, where the reception of these habits by other members of the dominant group only further en- trenches them in the self-understanding and worldviews of individual members and the group as a whole. Yancy identifies several such habits of whiteness: **clutching purs- es, crossing streets or locking car doors as men of color approach**, and policing one’s thoughts for political correctness or one’s neigh- borhood for residential correctness. Psychologist Derald Wing Su describes these habits in terms of “**microaggressions**” or regular in- sults, assaults or invalidations unknowingly communicated verbally, **nonverbally or symbolically by good intentioned whites that convey messages of our own superiority** or normativity and another’s inferiority or difference.28 These might include inabilities to properly pro- nounce or remember names of persons of color, inquiring as to their country of origin or qualifications for a job or degree, or invalidating their experience by simply not asking about it.Obviously, the **habitual characteristics of white supremacy corre- late to features of virtue ethics**, which we will turn to in the next sec- tion. For now, I call attention to Yancy’s observation that “**the ways in which whites have *become* the *white* selves we are**”29 underscores the point that **whiteness is an unfolding social construct in which whites participate**, and **this construct shapes our way of being**, not simply our way of seeing or of thinking, in ways that we are not able to recognize. **It also shapes our physicality**. Karyn McKinney notes that for many Euro-Americans, “becoming white,” an assimilation process that spans generations and is easier for those without distinc- tive ethnic markers such as skin color, comes at the cost of cultural distinctiveness so essential for identity and character formation.30 Moreover, neurologists are discovering the impact of the dispositions and practices of whiteness on the biochemistry of the human brain.31

### Offense (1:20)

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle.

#### [1] Ethical community – Compulsory voting aids in the generation of an ethical community, which is a necessary virtue for living together in society. Chapman 19

[Chapman, Emilee Booth. Stanford University. “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting.” American Journal of Political Science] SHS ZS

Proponents of compulsory voting typically justify compelling people to vote by appealing to two benefits from near-universal electoral turnout: First, higher turnout will produce a political system that is more equally responsive to all citizens; second, higher turnout will increase the perceived legitimacy of the political system (Engelen 2007, 24–25; L. Hill in Brennan and Hill 2014; Lijphart 1996, 1997). Critics of compulsory voting, on the other hand, object that these arguments place too much emphasis on the act of voting while neglecting the diversity of partici- pation that characterizes healthy democracies. Annabelle Lever (2010, 908) argues, “Voting is, at best, only one form of democratic political participation and, from some per- spectives, not an especially important or attractive one.” Other critics likewise claim that compulsory voting arbi- trarily singles out one kind of participation as essential to democracy (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 31). High voter turnout, opponents contend, is not necessarily important for democracy. Moreover, compelling higher turnout is not harmless. Critics argue that compulsory voting could compromise the quality of democratic par- ticipation and that it needlessly interferes with individual liberty. Opponents of compulsory voting rightly observe that voting is only one aspect of democracy, but they wrongly conclude that approximately universal voting is not valuable to contemporary democracy. **Voting is not interchangeable with other forms of political influence**. **Elections play a** distinctive and **important role within a broader framework of democracy**, a role characterized by mass participation, in fact, by an ambition toward univer- sal participation. Established democracies devote tremendous re- sources to making voting accessible. India’s 2014 Lok Sabha election, for example, required nearly a million polling places to ensure that all eligible voters, even those in the most remote parts of the country, would have a meaningful opportunity to vote (Vyawahare 2014). Public discourse and the widespread belief in a duty to vote suggest a further publicly shared belief that it is important not only for citizens to have ample opportunity to vote, but also that citizens actually take advantage of that opportunity (see, e.g., Blais 2000, 95). This public attitude toward voting is distinct from atti- tudes toward other forms of participation; in the popular imagination, voting is singled out as the object of a duty. Of course, critics of compulsory voting who doubt the value of high voter turnout are also likely to be critical of this prominence of voting in public discourse and in the popular imagination. Voting is not the only way citizens participate in decision making in today’s democracies. Citizens might also contribute to public deliberation, pe- tition their representatives, donate money to a campaign, or even stand for office themselves. Popular voting alone need not (and surely cannot) bear all of the normative weight of democracy, and fostering a more equally re- sponsive government certainly requires attention to the significant inequities in these other domains of participa- tion (Lever 2010). Seen in this light, the special emphasis on electoral participation may seem arbitrary and thus an insufficient basis for compelling citizens to vote. The special emphasis on **voting** in popular political culture is not arbitrary or misguided, though. Rather, it **is grounded in the distinctive and valuable role** that periodic **moments of** approximately **universal participation** **play in contemporary democratic practices**. When characterized by approximately universal turnout, **elections interrupt the ordinary, delegated business of government with ex- traordinary spectacles of democracy that command the attention of the general public** and manifest the equal po- litical authority of all citizens. Though they cannot fully instantiate democracy on their own, **these moments** effec- nas. tively **contribute to** contemporary **democratic practices in a number of ways** irst, the ambition toward **universal participation** in periodic elections **helps** to **guard against political disen- gagement** and alienation by defining concrete expecta- tions for participation. Skeptics of the value of high voter turnout often argue that active participation is not essen- tial to democracy because individuals can passively exer- cise political authority by deferring to their fellow citizens or to political elites. But political inaction can only be in- terpreted as passive participation if citizens believe it is appropriate and possible for them to intervene when the are dissatisfied with the direction of their public life. In modern societies, though, many people do not see them- selves as political agents in their own right, able to exert influence over their political circumstances (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 168). A pluralist model of democracy might simply call for citizens to take advantage of opportunities to participate whenever and however they wish, but many citizens will never participate because they never feel competent to do so, or because it simply never occurs to them. The ambi- tion toward **universal participation** in elections **mitigates** this problem of **habitual disengagement by establishing an expectation that citizens will perform their** **politica agency** on specific and predictable occasions. Knowing that they will be called upon to actively participate on a recurring basis provides citizens with a reason to develop an enduring political identity Moreover, by directing cit- izens attention to particular political questions that they will be expected to answer, elections make the often frus- trating and potentially discouraging task of figuring out what to pay attention to easier for normal citizens. This benefit is magnified by the relative information saturation that occurs around elections. Critics of compulsory voting might argue that, rather than trying to enforce universal electoral participation, we can more effectively combat political disengagement and alienation by promoting participation in other are- nas. But, even if nonelectoral participation can be more effective than voting at increasing political engagement and efficacy in individual cases, approximating universal participation in other forms of activism or participation would require much more radical reforms of political cul- ture and institutions. Efforts to increase voter turnout, on the other hand, build on an extensive infrastructure of electoral administration and the existing, widespread norm that there is a duty to vote. Moreover, periodic moments of approximately **universal participation** would likely still play a valuable role in a political system already characterized by widespread citizen engagement, for several reasons. First, these moments **facilitate collective action**. **Individuals can** influence public life more effectively when they are able to **combine their efforts with other like-minded citizens**. Insofar as elections represent occasions in which all citizens can count on each other to participate, **they can help to overcome** some of the **coordination problems** that make it difficult for large, diverse, unorganized, or underresourced groups to effectively utilize other channels of influence. Second, when citizens internalize an expectation of **universal participation** in elections, electoral campaigns also **create a relatively attentive audience to whom po- litical leaders and activists can address political claims**,8 facilitating the introduction of new issues and the contes- tation of existing political divisions. Finally, periodic moments of approximately **universal participation** **make the political involvement** and formal political equality of all citizens **manifest**. This spectacle **reinforces parties’ and elected officials’ incentives to take the interests and concerns of all citizens into account**. Elections are not the only way for citizens to hold politi- cal leaders to account, but elections are still distinctively valuable mechanisms of democratic control when they predictably involve the entire citizenry in the sanctioning process. When characterized by nearly universal partic- ipation, **elections provide an unambiguous reminder to public officials that they are accountable** to all citizens, not just the most vocal and active. Because elections make manifest the responsiveness of the political system to the equal agency of all citizens in at least a few concrete instances, the optics of periodic moments of approximately universal participation can also contribute to the empirical legitimacy of a demo- cratic regime. Those who find themselves on the losing side of a political decision may have a harder time main- taining the belief that they speak for a silent majority when citizens routinely reveal how they align themselves on significant dimensions of political conflict (see also Przeworski 1999). The optics of approximately **universal participation** also imbue elections with powerful expressive effects that can **reinforce citizens’ commitment to democracy**. In Just Elections, Dennis Thompson (2002) observes that elec- tions have two kinds of expressive effects: First, “**they enable citizens to express attitudes about the political process**”; second, they “express the polity’s attitude to- ward its citizens” (22). When they credibly call for the participation of all citizens, elections convey the commu- nity’s belief in the value of all citizens’ contributions. And y voting, citizens participate in this public expression: “**When citizens go to the polls** on the same day, visibly and publicly participating in the same way in a common experience of civic engagement, **they demonstrate** their **willingness to contribute on equal terms** to the democratic process” (Thompson 2002, 34). By regularly participat- ing in elections, citizens habitually enact their roles as participants in the political community as well as their commitment to decision-making procedures that instan- tiate the equal political authority of all citizens.

#### Ethical communities are key to acting virtuously – means my offense procedurally outweighs. Markulla.

[“Ethics and Virtue.” Markkula Center. Published 1988] SHS ZS

At **the heart of** the **virtue** approach to **ethics** **is the** idea of "**community**". **A person's character traits are not developed in isolation, but within** and by the **communities to which he or she belongs**, including family, church, school, and other private and public associations. As people grow and mature, their **personalities are deeply affected by the values that their communities prize**, by the personality traits that their communities encourage, and by the role models that their communities put forth for imitation through traditional stories, fiction, movies, television, and so on. **The virtue approach urges us to** **pay attention to** the contours of **our communities and the habits of character they encourage and instill**. The **moral life,** then, **is not simply a matter of following moral rules** and of learning to apply them to specific situations. The **moral life is also a matter of** trying to **determine the kind of people we should be and of attending to the development of character within our communities** and ourselves.

#### [2] Moral Practices – Compulsory voting ensures citizens reflect upon the candidates for whom they are voting, which causes them to evaluate the beneficial virtues within others. This reflection is key – by considering what virtues are optimal for others, they have a better framework and understanding of moral character which they can apply to themselves.

#### [3] Democracy – Voting is constitutive citizens in democracies, which means it is part of the form of a proper citizen. Since the government has an obligation to foster virtues, voting should be compulsory. Tweedale:

[Tweedale, Stephen. Voting and Virtue Ethics, Popcorn Machine, March 31, 2013, <https://stephentweedale.wordpress.com/2019/03/31/voting-and-virtue-ethics/> 7/31/20] SHS ZS

In this context, a virtue is an “excellent trait of character”; examples of such traits include benevolence, compassion, kindness, generosity, courage, honesty, tolerance, conscientiousness, frugality, reasonableness, and moderation. A person’s possession of the virtues is a necessary condition for a complex, distinctively human kind of flourishing we have strong reason to value (sometimes referred to as eudaimonia, a technical term from ancient Greek that I won’t be using in the rest of this post). From a virtue ethical perspective, right action can be defined as the action that would be performed under the circumstances by a person who has the virtues. Applied to the ethics of voting, this means that **one ought to vote because virtuous person would vote**, and one ought to vote in a certain way because a virtuous person would vote that way. Why is it virtuous to vote? One reason is that **democratic politics is** partly **constitutive of human flourishing**. **Political institutions have a** **pervasive effect on the conditions in which we live our lives**, including our social and physical environment and the rights and opportunities we enjoy. **Undemocratic forms of government** (even if they miraculously turn out to be perfectly benevolent) **alienate us from these institutions**; **democracy is necessary** for us **to have real control over the conditions in which we live our lives**. Given our capacities for freedom, self-determination, and cooperation, **control over these conditions is** plausibly **part of** what **human flourishing** entails. And because control over these conditions entails democracy, **democracy is plausibly part of** what **human flourishing** entails. **For democracy to exist, people must vote**; **the shared activity of voting is** partly **constitutive of democracy**. If the shared activity of voting is partly constitutive of democracy, and democracy is partly constitutive of human flourishing, then the shared activity of voting is partly constitutive of human flourishing. It follows, I think, that **a person who possesses the virtues**—the traits necessary a for human flourishing—**would** thereby **have a disposition to vote** even though they know that their own vote will not determine the outcome of an election. A second reason why one ought to vote is related to the fact that democracy is not only partly constitutive of but also an important contributor to human flourishing. Democratic government is, on the whole, good government. **Democracies do a better job** of delivering important goods (from health care to the administration of justice) **than non-democracies**. And again, democracy requires people to vote. People who do so incur some (minor) cost for no real benefit to themselves. Generally speaking, **voters** [but]**seem to be motivated to make this small sacrifice** by what the economist Jean Drèze calls\* “public-spiritedness”—itself perhaps a kind of virtue.

### Underview (0:55)

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory – It’s key to check neg abuse, no 1AR theory means neg can be infinitely abusive because nothing can stop them, which outweighs because it means aff can’t win. Drop the debater on 1AR theory because the aff can’t split the 2ar between both theory and substance. No neg RVIs since the neg can dump on the shell for 6 minutes and make the 2AR impossible. Competing interpretations because reasonability collapses – you have to win offense to your justification which concedes the validity of the theory. 1AR Theory before neg theory – a) the neg can win their shell in the long 2nr but it’s impossible for the aff to beat the shell back in the 2ar b) key to check back against abusive neg strategies.

#### [2] Fairness is a voter a) all argumentation presupposes fairness – i.e. that the judge won’t hack for either side b) judges cannot evaluate the round properly if it is skewed

#### [3] Presumption affirms a) We assume the validity of statements unless given a reason to deny them – i.e. we will assume a person is telling the truth unless given a reason to doubt them. b) If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral like drinking water

#### [4] Permissibility affirms a) Conditional logic: If a system of morals must be applicable to every agent in order to label actions as morally permissible, it results in the conditional statement, “If a system of morals exists ****then voting ought to be compulsory.****” Skep denies the antecedent, and in conditional logic[[2]](#footnote-2), statements with false antecedents always have true consequents, thus resolution is permissible, which means skep affirms. B) Law of Excluded Middle: Moral systems that don’t or can’t assign permissibility or impermissibility to actions are incomplete guides to action. If permissibility is true, then there cannot be prohibitions. Without prohibitions, there’s no reason to negate, so affirm.

# Frontlines

## AT LARP

### Generic (0:13)

#### Ethics must be rooted in the character of moral agents, not the actions they take. That means any reason to prefer the aretaic takes out util which is deontic – it attempts to ascribe moral value by looking to the consequences of our actions but completely ignores the character of the subjects behind those actions. Developing moral character comes conceptually prior; with good people good actions will follow.

## Ks

### Generic (0:12)

#### The root cause of all oppression stems from character flaws; agents wrongly embrace greed, dominance, and control. Embracing virtue ethics is key to change the character behind moral agents to overcome these issues. That means any reason to prefer the aretaic takes out the K because it is deontic – it falsely believes we can mitigate violence through taking actions when in reality we have to fix the mindset behind those actions.

### Afropess (0:17)

#### The root cause of antiblack violence stems from character flaws; whiteness embraces greed over dignity, dominance over compassion. Any reason to prefer the aretaic takes out the K because it is deontic – it falsely believes we can mitigate violence through taking actions when in reality we have to fix the mindset behind those actions. Also, their ontological claims are rooted in the deontic – a disposition that our actions are regulated by our identities – but the aretaic precedes those claims and changes the identity of the subject. That justifies following a virtue ethicist paradigm.

### Setcol (0:10)

#### The root cause of settler colonial violence stems from character flaws; settlers embraced greed over dignity, arrogance over compassion. That means any reason to prefer the aretaic takes out the K because it is deontic – it falsely believes we can mitigate violence through taking actions when in reality we have to fix the mindset behind those actions. That justifies following a virtue ethicist paradigm.

### Capitalism (0:12)

#### Ethics must be rooted in the character of moral agents, not the actions they take; capitalists embrace arrogance, greed, and dominance, which are not qualities that any deontic theory could overcome; they are rooted in character. That means any reason to prefer the aretaic takes out the kritik which is deontic – it attempts to prescribe moral rules to evaluate actions but completely ignores the character of the subjects behind those actions.

## AT Phil

### Generic (0:10)

#### Ethics must be rooted in the character of moral agents, not the actions they take. That means any reason to prefer the aretaic takes out the framework which is deontic – it attempts to prescribe moral rules to evaluate actions but completely ignores the character of the subjects behind those actions. Developing moral character comes conceptually prior; with good people good actions will follow.

### Kant (0:12)

#### Ethics must be rooted in the character of moral agents, not the actions they take. That means any reason to prefer the aretaic takes out Kant which is deontic – it uses the categorical imperative to evaluate actions but completely ignores the character of the subjects behind those actions. Practical reason concedes that there is some ideal form of the subject, but that reasoners make mistakes means we need a framework rooted in character to achieve this perfect form.

### Hobbes (0:13)

#### Ethics must be rooted in the character of moral agents, not the actions they take. That means any reason to prefer the aretaic takes out Hobbes which is deontic – it says only actions that follow the state are good but completely ignores the character of the subjects behind those actions. That humans are self-serving in the state of nature concedes that ethics needs to be based upon character reform to overcome this flaw; evaluating individual actions could ever resolve this violence.

### Levinas (0:12)

#### Ethics must be rooted in the character of moral agents, not the actions they take. That means any reason to prefer the aretaic takes out Levinas which is deontic – it says only actions that do not totalize the other are good but completely ignores the character flaws like fear and superiority that cause totalization to manifest in the first place. That proves only an aretaic theory can address the root cause of totalization.

## AT Theory

### Overview (0:15)

#### The aretaic takes out theory:

#### [1] Theory is a form of regulating what actions are good or bad in the debate space – that is precisely the deontic which fails.

#### [2] Addressing abuse has to be focused around improving debaters themselves, not just the actions they take, which demands an aretaic approach, not theory.

#### [3] These arguments come first A. they indict the model of theory, so they logically come prior B. philosophy first – even theory is framed through normative concepts such as why we care about fairness or education

## Weighing

### Aretaic First (0:18)

#### The aretaic outweighs:

#### [1] Motivation – ethical agents can always opt out of deontic theories but by reforming their character we make them act ethically out of their own volition – outweighs on normativity since it ensures a guide to action.

#### [2] Character – deontic theories cannot account for unconscious or subjective problems that agents aren’t choosing to commit like microaggressions, which is the predominance of racism. The aretaic solves by reforming character.

#### [3] Constitutiveness – committing oneself to ethics presupposes they want to become a better person which concedes to the aretaic.

### Normativity First (0:18)

#### Prefer normative theories:

#### [1] Constitutiveness – normativity provides a definition of the good which can guide action in all situations which is necessary for ethics; your ROTB cannot answer questions like if we should save a drowning baby from a pool.

#### [2] Motivation – it creates solutions for oppression by explaining what it constitutes and why it is bad which is necessary for other people to follow us.

#### [3] Impact justified – otherwise your theory is circular because it never justifies why we should uphold your ROTB other than asserting the problem exists, but that begs the question of why we should resolve the problem.

# CX

### What is a virtue?

#### The utility of objects are defined by how good they are at their purpose; for example a good knife is sharp and a bad knife is blunt because a knife’s job is to cut. The same logic applies for humans – for example we are social creatures that need to work together society, which is why value kindness and compassion, we also need to survive to live, which is why we value courageousness.

### How to weigh between virtues?

#### I think it’s a very deontic notion to apply a blanket rule for weighing between virtues – that is exactly what we’re critiquing. But in any given situation, we just see whether an action would be more constitute to the true form or purpose of a human, so the analysis is really grounded in the material and can change. In any case, virtues will rarely contradict with each other.

# Other Cards

#### Virtue ethics is needed to address the emotional content of racism which are buried within social relations. O’Connel.

[O’Connel, Maureen. “After White Supremacy? The Viability of Virtue Ethics for Racial Justice.” Journal of Moral Theology. Published 2014] SHS ZS

Most critical race scholars encourage whites committed to racial justice to see continually that “**all actors in a racialized society are affected materially** (receive benefits or disadvantages) **and ideologi- cally by the racial structure**” and to **take “responsibility for** [our] u**n- willing participation in these practices and begin a new life commit- ted to** the goal of **achieving racial equality**.”62 To do so, Yancy ex- horts whites to “**become antiracist racists**.”63 This strikes me as the language of virtue and leads me to conclude that so long as we dili- gently attend to its pervasive whiteness, virtue ethics offers the opti- mal moral approach for whites to employ when it comes to racial justice. Let me suggest three reasons why I make this claim. First, of the prominent approaches to the moral life, **virtue ethics takes seriously the emotions**, whether as expressions of cognitive reasoning or motivations **for moral action**. **Given the underlying emotional content of stereotypes, prejudices, and evasive behavior**, Feagin pinpoints the emotions and dispositions associated with whiteness—**fear and guilt, innocence and ignorance, superiority and inferiority**—**as the optimal place to begin** the process of **deconstruct- ing the white** **racial frame**. Whereas a deontological approach to ra- cial justice might reinscribe a moral obligation to values such as equality or liberty or dignity eviscerated by generations of white dominance and teleological approaches potentially reinforce an inef- fective pragmatism that sidesteps the ideological grip of whiteness on white responses to racial justice, **virtue ethics might** actually **illu- minate the easily overlooked emotional dimensions of white suprem- acy** **that need to be exposed** in the work toward racial justice. These emotions include: **stubborn nostalgia** that maintains a narrow ahistor- ical lens so as to protect the **certainty of white goodness and** the **bad- ness of blackness or brownness**, **antipathy or imperviousness** at the cognitive dissonance generated by alternative narratives of history or the present reality, **defensiveness** when it comes to justifying enti- tlements or privileges, **fear of the dark-skinned other** so ingrained by a historical trope and reinforced by the contemporary media, **false innocence or paralyzing guilt** when faced with the realization that one participates in a culture of white supremacy, and **fatigue and even frustration** at having to navigate the front and backstages of white life with either hyper-sensitivity to political correctness or a willingness to sacrifice personal integrity in order to fit into the dom- inant culture. Naming and **examining these emotions provides an important place to begin the process of inculcating alternative dispo- sitions**

1. http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/conditional.html [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/conditional.html [↑](#footnote-ref-2)