## A2 Brentwood Rawls AC

### Theory

### Reflective Equillibrium Bad

1. Interpretation: Debaters may not read reflective equilibrium as a constraint that all ethical theories must meet.
2. Violation: The #4 reason to prefer the standard says, “All theories must undergo reflective equilibrium.
3. Standards:

Resolvability- their interpretation forces intervention since the judge has to assess which theory has a stronger link to reflective equilibrium, which is functionally impossible since competing theories can both reach optimal coherence with different intuitions. This exacerbated by the fact that RE doesn’t provide criteria for what reaching coherence is. Even if indicts disprove it’s consistency, it’s impossible to determine which beliefs reflective equilibrium gives most credence since it states or justifies the initial beliefs which forces interpretive intervention- supercharged by the fact some debaters use it to exclude theories while others use it as a evaluative paradigm. Additionally, they make it impossible for the judge to sign a coherent ballot since they would have to determine the respective probability of our frameworks and the quantitative magnitude of the impact under both our frameworks factoring the indicts made in round- this is an independent reason to drop them for initiating RE. Resolvability comes first under fairness since it necessary to the judge to evaluate.

Philosophical education- the practice encourages basterdization since RE is just a epistemological theory not a paradigmatic approach- that would require justifying epistemic modesty or ethical convergence meaning I should be able to win the framework debate without linking into RE. This also kills framework debate between meta-ethics since we only try to link into RE instead of providing different epistemological views. Also, just undermine the philosophical debate by not justifying RE but just asserting that must use. Philosophical education is the internal link to education since LD is the unique outlet for it.

### Must Spec Rawlsian Principle

1. Interpretation: If they aff defends a standard of “consistency with principle arrived behind the veil of ignorance” they must specify the lexical priority by which we evaluate the principles.
2. Violation: They didn’t
3. Standards:

#### Strat Skew- Their interpretation makes the aff a moving target since they can expand on rawlsian principle in the 1AR to mute the 1NC- this is supercharged by the fact that principles are incompatible with each other since they generate different obligations and prohibtions. UEA

"Three Strikes against 'the Difference Principle'" University of East Anglia, n.d. Web. 31 July 2014. PH

My own view is that, if we took Rawls’s own ‘theory’ seriously, just on its own terms, it would not yield very substantial inequalities. We would, if we applied a ‘substantive’ interpretation of the equality of liberty principle, adjudge it in fact to rule[s] out all but fairly marginal instances of economic inequality, all but fairly minor instantiations of the difference principle. It would prohibit, for example, many of the taken-for-granted features of contemporary Western societies: such as accumulation of wealth due to a primarily debt-based money system, inheritance of wealth, private ownership of land (as opposed to private stewardship of land subject to a land tax), private-commercial ownership of the media, and private and commercial-corporate funding of political parties, to mention just a few. All these, I suggest, lead inevitably to political inequality, to a society/system whereby one person’s liberty (e.g. Rupert Murdoch’s) is many others’ virtually-complete powerlessness (e.g. your’s or mine).2 The first argument I would bring to bear then against the difference principle is that it will, unless the resultant inequalities are very small, inevitably deform, diminish or simply destroy equality of liberty. Unless the principle of equality is liberty is interpreted in an unacceptably formalistic way, Rawls’s theory should -- on its own terms -- undermine nearly all applications of the difference principle. Or, at the very least, it will constrain what can be done with the products of inequality -- with money -- so tightly that the acquisition of money will be virtually pointless, because there will be nothing of any moment that that money can buy (so: not health, not power, not audience, not the ability to dictate what others labour on, etc.

Even if I pick 1 principle and weigh- they can still restart in the 1AR and win the time tradeoff. Strategy is key to fairness and education since it creates effective roads to the ballot.

Resolvability- they make it impossible for determine what links and doesn’t link since Rawls has 3 principles which means they can’t weigh between the principle

### Kritik

### Anthro

#### The aff’s focus on human traits provides the basis for an anthropocentrism, which justifies human oppression and environmental degradation. They say “ethics must be grounded in mutually agreeable principles to be consistent with the will of the people” – vote neg to endorse a new animal-centric scholarship that is more productive in resisting hierarchies than traditional approaches. Best 09

Best 9, UT El Paso philosophy professor, 2009 (Steven, “The Rise of Critical Animal Studies: Putting Theory into Action and Animal Liberation into Higher Education “, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VII, Issue 1, 2009, http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal\_Articles\_download/issue\_9/JCAS%20VII%20Issue%201%20MAY%20ISSUE%20The%20Rise%20of%20Critical%20Animal%20Studies%20pgs%209-52.pdf,)

Postmodern critiques have been hugely influential in many theoretical strains of animal studies, but theorists could not employ the insights of postmodernism without overcoming their limitations. This is crucial for two reasons. First, deconstructionists and social constructionists are typically speciesists and dogmatic humanists (even those who deconstruct “humanism”!) who rarely challenge the human/animal dichotomy and analyze how it is used to advance false views of all animal, human and nonhuman. Second, they fail to see that the human/animal opposition underpins oppositions between reason/emotions, thought/body, men/women, white/black, and Western/non-Western. Yet as noted by theorists (e.g., Keith Thomas, Jim Mason, and Charles Patterson) 9 with broader optics and more inclusive theories than humanism, speciesism and animal domestication provided the conceptual template and social practice whereby humans begin to clearly distinguish between “human rationality” and “animal irrationality.” 10 Animals – defined as “brute beasts” lacking “rationality” – thereby provided the moral basement into which one could eject women, people of color, and other humans deemed to be subhuman or deficient in (Western male) “humanity.” Whereas nearly all histories, even so-called “radical” narratives, have been written from the human standpoint, a growing number of theorists have broken free of the speciesist straightjacket to examine history and society from the standpoint of (nonhuman) animals. This approach, as I define it, considers the interaction between human and nonhuman animals – past, present, and future -- and the need for profound changes in the way humans define themselves and relate to other sentient species and to the natural world as a whole. What I call the “animal standpoint” examines the origins and development of societies through the dynamic, symbiotic interrelationship between human and nonhuman animals. It therefore interprets history not from an evolutionary position that reifies human agency as the autonomous actions of a Promethean species, but rather from a co-evolutionary perspective that sees nonhuman animals as inseparably embedded in human history and as dynamic agents in their own right. 11 The animal standpoint seeks to illuminate the origins and development of dominator cultures, to preserve the wisdom and heritage of egalitarian values and social relations, and to discern what moral and social progress means in a far deeper sense than what is discernible through humanist historiography, anthropology, social theory, and philosophy. However “critical,” “subversive,” “groundbreaking,” or “radical” their probing of historical and social dynamics, very few theorists have managed to see beyond the humanist bias in order to adopt a proper analytical and moral relation to other animals; they have failed, in other words, to grasp the importance of nonhuman animals in human life, the profound ways in which the domination of humans over other animals creates conflict and disequilibrium in human relations to one another and to the Earth as a whole. Thus, the animal standpoint seeks generally to illuminate human biological and social evolution in important new ways, such as reveal the origins, dynamics, and development of dominator cultures, social hierarchies, economic and political inequalities, and asymmetrical systems of power that are violent and destructive to everything they touch. Providing perspectives and insights unattainable through other historical approaches, the animal standpoint analyzes how the domination of humans over nonhuman animals is intimately linked to the domination of humans over one another, as it also brings to light the environmental impact of large-scale animal slaughter and exploitation. A key thesis of animal standpoint theory is that nonhuman animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall, and that in fundamental ways, the oppression of human over human is rooted in the oppression of human over nonhuman animal. Animal standpoint theory thus leads us ineluctably to understanding the commonalities of oppression, and hence to alliance politics and the systemic revolutionary viewpoint of total liberation. 12 It demonstrates – would that dogmatic Left, eco-humanists, and so-called “environmentalists” take note! -- the profound importance of veganism and the animal rights/liberation movement for human liberation, peace and justice, and ecological healing and balance.

#### Educational settings key to challenge the dualism. Goob 11

Goob 11 (Ecological Thoughtprint Magazine, http://ecologicalthoughtprint.org/2011/12/04/dualism-doesnt-make-sense/)

Have you ever asked someone, “Where is Nature?  Where is the environment?”  How do you think they would respond?  How would you respond? One icy afternoon, from the heated confines of a classroom, I asked this same question.  Student after student repeated a similar motion.  “There,” they said, immediately pointing across the room to the half-frosted window.  “Out there.” Through the third-storey window we could see frozen oak leaves fallen from near-barren branches, sailing through the air until they softly landed in rolling hills of rust, amber and gold.  Further out, the inlet waters lapped at decaying logs washed up on the rocks.  Glimmers of winter sunlight peeked out from the edge of heavy grey clouds. I turned back to the students.  “Okay, what about in here?” I asked, waving my hands around the room.  “Is this Nature too?” They exchanged puzzled looks.  A few shook their heads in firm disagreement, glancing at the tightly sealed glass window. I continued.  ”Think about your body.  Your breathing.  Air is flowing in and out.  Where is the air coming from?  Where is it going?  If we open the window, what then?  Is ’Nature’ coming in?  What if we were to go outside to a tree and pick an apple and eat it?  You would say the apple is part of Nature, right?  What about as it enters your mouth, as you bite, as you chew, swallow, digest, and absorb?  The apple is in you — did the Nature-part of the apple disappear?  Or is it still there?  Is Nature in you?  Is Nature now a part of you?” Taking a step back, I looked at the entire class.  “Conversely, are you a part of Nature?” Blurring the boundary What I hoped is that students would begin to question a deep-seeded modern way of thinking known as dualism.  From a dualistic worldview, there is a clear division between the human world and natural world.  A concrete building is regarded as soundly in the human domain while a mountain is relegated to the realm of Nature — no matter that they are both composed from common aggregates of rock and minerals.  A pencil is of humans while a tree is of Nature — no matter that they share an “ancestry” of materials.  In this way of thinking, humans are seen as largely autonomous from the rest of the natural world; the environment is simply that — environs – one’s surroundings, that which lays around at a distance but not within.

#### The stories we tell about the environment come first. Dormenus 2k

Doremus 2k (Holly Doremus is Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and co-faculty director of the California Center for Environmental Law and Policy "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection:Toward a New Discourse" 1-1-2000scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=wlulr)

The stories we tell to explain and justify our view of the relationship of humanity with nature are important determinants of the policies we adopt and the attitudes we develop. To date we have relied on three primary discourses to explain why and how the law should protect nature. These discourses are all valid. Nature is an important material resource for human use, a unique esthetic resource for human enjoyment, and most people agree that we have some kind of ethical obligation to protect nature. While the discourses themselves are both valid and inevitable, the forms in which they have been brought to the political debate limit our ability to respond to, and even our ability to fully perceive, the problem of nature protection. The ecological horror story encourages us to view nature solely as a bundle of resources for human consumption or convenience, to rely on cost-benefit accounting in making decisions about what parts of nature we should protect, and to ignore the loss of nature short of catastrophic ecological collapse. The wilderness story teaches us that nature is defined by our absence, and encourages us to establish a limited number of highly protected reserves. The story of Noah's ark allows us to believe we are racing a short-term crisis, resolvable through straightforward temporary measures. None of these stories addresses the crux of the modern nature problem, which is where people fit into nature. In order to address the boundary conflicts, distributional issues, and conflicts between discourses that currently plague our efforts to protect nature, we must find ways to address those issues in our political conversation. We already have a substantial number of building blocks that could contribute to a new discourse about people and nature. Constructing such a discourse should be a high priority in the new millennium for those who hope nature will survive into the next one.

### Poverty Metric

#### The aff’s notion of poverty facilitates exclusion and simplifies the concept of “being in poverty”. Saith

Ashwani Saith, Academic Staff Unit. International Institute of Social Studies, “Poverty Lines Versus the Poor: Methods Versus Meaning”, Economic and Political Weekly

A more serious concern is whether the notion of poverty as conceptualized in the poverty line discourse is intrinsically meaningful when assessing the extent, nature and forms of deprivation experienced in society. Is it overly reductionist in what Amartya Sen has [is] called commodity space, and thereby exclusionary of a wide range of deficits which are held to be significant by those that experience them on a regular basis? This concern is intensified by the recent drive to narrow the focus of poverty discourse and policy on the category of the “chronically” poor, a sub-category of the poor that are held to experience poverty, in the sense of the poverty line approach, over several years continuously.

#### This form of exclusion is insidious rendering poor households invisible from social-political dynamics. Saith 2

Ashwani Saith, Academic Staff Unit. International Institute of Social Studies, “Poverty Lines Versus the Poor: Methods Versus Meaning”, Economic and Political Weekly

The poverty line approach treats each household independently and scales it on the basis of its average per capita expenditure level. In this approach, all relational dimensions go missing. The fact that poor households suffer from high levels of spatial and identity-based social exclusion and marginalization is omitted. There is no reference to the issues of inequality and to power relations in the community within which the poor live. The approach is one-dimensional and is blind on socio-political dynamic that underlies the persistence and the reproduction of poverty. Thus, the weakness and continuous erosion of the claims of the poor with regard to community or social resources, or in the domain of access to government services is [are] rendered invisible. Conversely, differences in the access of households to lineage, or social networks would also play a signiﬁcant role in their poverty status, especially their fallback positions and their residual exposure to vulnerability.

#### The division created by poverty lines is the first step toward justification for the inequalities of our current society -- I control the internal link to their impact- the kritik stops the initial link in the causal chain that causes inequality while they only beat around the bushes. Dividing the poor into their own group allows us to blame them for their circumstances and ignore our responsibility. This division forces us to keep people impoverished in order to exclude them. Ross 91

ROSS 1991 [(Thomas, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; “The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness.” Georgetown Law Journal, 79 Geo. L.J. 1499) JB.]

The first rhetorical step, the creation of the abstraction the "poor," is an easily overlooked yet powerful part of the rhetoric of poverty. We are so used to speaking of the poor as a distinct class that we overlook[ing] the rhetorical significance of speaking this way. By focusing on the single variable of economic wealth and then drawing a line on the wealth continuum, we create a class of people who are them, not us. Creating this abstraction is, in one sense, merely a way of speaking. We do this because to speak of the world in sensible ways we must resort to categories and abstractions. There are meaningful differences between the circumstances of people below the poverty line and the circumstances of middle class people, and to ignore these real differences can lead to injustice. n2 Thus, to speak of the "poor" is a sensible way to [\*1500] talk. In the rhetorical context, however, it is also much more. The creation of the category of the "poor", also makes possible the assertion of their moral weakness. To assert their moral weakness, "they" must exist as a conceptually distinct group. There is a long history of speaking of the poor as morally weak, or even degenerate. n3 Thus, when we hear legal rhetoric about the poor, we often hear an underlying message of deviance: we are normal, they are deviant. Our feelings about their deviance range [\*1501] from empathy to violent hatred. Still, even in the most benevolent view, they are not normal. Their deviance is a product of a single aspect of their lives, their relative wealth position. All other aspects of their lives are either distorted by the label of deviance or ignored. By creating this class of people, we are able at once to distinguish us from them and to appropriate normalcy to our lives and circumstances.

#### Thus, we must reject the affirmative’s representations of poverty as an act of resistance. Before creating effective policy is even possible, we must debunk the misconceptions that surround poverty. Schram 95

Sanford F. Schram, associate professor of political sciences at Macalester College, 1995 [Words of welfare: The poverty of social science and the social science of poverty, JB]

**The politics of renaming highlights the relationships of discourse to struc­ture and ideology to power.**87 The limits of euphemisms suggest that **these renamings often reinforce a broader, institutionalized, and structural con­text that is supported through the daily actions of aligned groupings exer­cising power to effect outcomes consistent with their interests. Yet the power plays reinforcing prevailing structures also operate to encourage selected interpretations of a wide variety of acts of signification. These structures help create a "social logic" that constrains interpretation of even the most imaginative of renamings. Whereas the structural conditions that constrain policy discourse are themselves discursively constituted, they in turn produce material constraints that limit notions of what is feasible and practi­cal under the existing arrangements.** Therefore, displacing the self-sufficiency of the "breadwinner" will not on its own make "dependents" more worthy. Even if "bread" itself is shown in good part, if not the whole loaf, to be symbolic, that will not by itself lead people to eat some other symbol. Gain­ing leverage for political change involves appreciating not just how mater­ial structures can be denaturalized. **Political change comes with also appre­ciating how material practices serve to constrain seriously the extent to which discursive moves 'will have any tractability in public settings. Only when the power plays supporting such structural conditions are resisted can alternative discursive moves gain political salience." Action to improve the lives of poor people involves instituting changes in institutional prac­tices so that people will be motivated to think more inclusively or be willing to entertain the idea that it is rational for them as well-meaning, if not self-interested, individuals to promote the well-being of marginal groups.** The existing institutional infrastructure currently works against such thinking.

**Vote for the debater who best discursively challenges current poverty Representations. The way we speak about poverty determines the policies we construct and the way they are implemented. Good reps and discourse are a pre-requisite to effective policy. Russell-Morris 09**

Russell-Morris, George Mason University, 2009 (Brianne, The Logic of Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the Reauthorization of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996)

**Discourse and policy go hand in hand, and so both must change in order for inequalities and thus poverty to be truly addressed. A change in poverty discourse must precede a change in antipoverty policy. New social welfare policy should be based in a discourse that promotes an understanding that inequality and poverty are entangled. The welfare state must change fundamentally in order to address and to dismantle the sources of structural inequalities, such as neoliberal capitalism and patriarchal gender relations, rather than the individual outcomes of those inequalities.** Both Schram (1995) and O’Connor (2001) call for a need to view discourse and structure as connected. In other words, **we must focus on how policy and the language that is used to discuss and create that policy reinforce each other, and only then can we begin to move beyond such a limited discourse**. O’Connor argues that **poverty researchers must work independently of the State so that they “generate a genuinely independent and critical body of knowledge that aims to set rather than follow the agenda for policy debate”** (2001:293). **If poverty knowledge is understood as part of larger cultural dynamics and their resulting economic, political, and social inequalities, poverty as a social problem is “de-pauperized” and will be taken seriously as a problem with structural, not behavioral, roots. Institutions, and not only the individual-level consequences of those institutions, would come under scrutiny and would be targeted for change** (O’Connor 2001).

### Feminist Essentialism

#### They say that “LW reduces discrimination against women”, what women, why is African Americans and women isolated as the only to groups that experience on exclusion in the workplace? Focusing on a universal narrative of women’s oppression binds feminism to a sexual identity and re-inscribes patriarchy – co-opting the impacts of the AC. The Mohanty 84

Mohanty 84, women's studies department chair at Syracuse University (Chandra Under Western Eyes:Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses, p. 344)

What is problematical, then, about this kind of use of "women" as a group, as a stable category of analysis, is that it assumes an ahistorical, universal unity between women based on a generalized notion of their subordination. Instead of analytically demonstrating the production of women as socio-economic political groups within particular local contexts, this move limits the definition of the female subject to gender identity, completely bypassing social class and ethnic identities. What characterizes women as a group is their gender (sociologically not necessarily biologically defined) over and above everything else, indicating a monolithic notion of sexual difference. Because women are thus constituted as a coherent group, sexual difference becomes coterminus with female subordination, and power is automatically defined in binary terms: people who have it (read: men), and people who do not (read: women). Men exploit, women are exploited. As suggested above, such simplistic formulations are both reductive and ineffectual in designing strategies to combat oppressions. All they do is reinforce binary divisions between men and women.

#### Additionally, these essentialist stereotypes about what it means to be a woman or a man reproduce violence around the globe. Peterson 2k

Peterson 2000 [(Spike, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona) SAIS REVIEW, "Rereading Public and Private: The Dichotomy that is Not One." Vol. 20, Iss. 2; pg. 11] AT

Gender-sensitive accounts go beyond this by bringing everyday practices, reproductive processes, and the politics of subjectivity into relation with states, security, and political economy questions. For example, conventional neglect of the family impoverishes our understanding not only of how reproductive labor keeps our worlds "working," but also of how individual and collective identities, cultural practices, divisions of labor, group ideologies, and socio-cultural meaning systems are (re)produced and resisted. In various ways, some more direct than others, these are crucial factors in sustaining (and contesting) the state and its legitimacy. Consider that the family/household is the primary site of reproductive labor that makes all societal reproduction possible, of subject formation and cultural learning that naturalizes ideologies and encourages group identifications (religious, racial/ethnic, national), and of gender-socialization that encourages boys to be independent, competitive, in control, and "hard," and girls to be relationship-oriented, non-aggressive, nurturing, and "soft." 19 Moreover, neglect of the private (as familial and personal) has prevented IR theorists from taking desire and emotional investments seriously. Modernist dichotomies fuel this bias by casting reason as antithetical to--rather than inseparable from--emotion. Our fear of "contaminating" objective reason and research by acknowledging the role of emotion and commitment has impoverished our study of and knowledge about major social dynamics. As a consequence, in regard to security studies, we are tragically ill-informed in the face of often violent social forces such as nationalism, neo-fascism, and fundamentalism, in part because scholars avoid dealing with the power of emotional engagement and its effects on political identification and allegiance. Regarding political economy, we deny the effects of subjective identities in structuring labor markets, job performance, and national productivity. And we are only beginning to grasp the interaction of desires and identities with consumption patterns and hence the global political economy. Even less familiar, but increasingly salient: we are ill-prepared to analyze the dependence of financial markets on psychological phenomena (risk-assessment, "trust" in the stock market), and what we must acknowledge are "non-rational" features of the international financial system. Regarding security issues--a focal point of IR inquiry--feminists argue that gendered identities are key to manifestations of violence. Empirical evidence indicates that, worldwide, most acts of direct violence are committed by men. Yet not all men are violent, and societies vary dramatically in exhibiting violence, which suggests that biologistic explanations are, at best, naïve. Whatever else is entailed in accounting for systematic violence, it is absolutely remarkable--one might even suggest irrational--that so little attention has been devoted to assessing the role of masculinity in this male-dominated arena. Feminists insist that our investigations of violence--from war atrocities to schoolyard killings and domestic battering--take seriously how masculinity is constructed, internalized, enacted, reinforced, and glorified. In IR, such recognition requires that we seriously consider the question: Is militarism without masculinism possible?

#### Vote negative to reject the aff’s totalizing framework – this is key to women’s emancipation. Spegele 02

Spegele 2 [(Roger, Monash University, Victoria, Australia, phD from Cambridge) “Emancipatory International Relations: Good News, Bad News or No News at All?” International Relations 2002 Sage Journals] AT

By contrast, Feminist Postmodern Theory focuses on an epistemology which reveals the futility of any attempt to define an essential female nature or to replace masculinist epistemology with feminist epistemology. It denies that any totalizing framework, including Marx’s, will result in emancipation. For Feminist Postmodern Theory, we (men included) must reject all subject/object dichotomies including the dichotomy, redolent in FST, which says that men and women are fundamentally different and women are superior. Feminist Postmodern Theory aims to emancipate women not by seeking a unitary absolute or transcendent truth but by subverting, displacing, disrupting and transgressing all dichotomies, normalizings, unities and totalities. According to Christine Sylvester, one of its most incisive proponents in international relations, postmodern feminism ‘looks for differences in voices and standpoints and marks the connections that may exist across the differences. It looks for new forms and mobilities of subjectivity that can replace single-subject categories . . .’17 In her more recent work, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era, Sylvester becomes more explicit in her commitment to a postmodern feminism which ‘exposes the smokescreens, and the histories of the screens and the smoke, in brilliant, eyeopeningways’.18 The path to emancipation lies neither in assimilation nor in the overthrow of male dominance and its replacement by female (or feminist)dominance. Emancipation comes about through looking at ‘other identity allegiances within ourselves and our context of knowledge with an empathetic critical gaze’.19 It comes from ‘listening to and engaging canon-excluding and canon-including subjectivities’.20 Rejecting postmodern feminist doctrine, Sylvester deploys and develops the concept of homesteading to articulate what women require in the face of their homeless condition. According to Sylvester, homesteading leads to emancipation ‘through a radically empathetic conversational politics that helps us to learn the strengths and limitations of our inherited identity categories and to decide our identities, theories, politics, and daily concerns rather than continue to derive them out of hand because they come from established authority sources’.21 In Sylvester’s view, homesteading is always a ‘politics of disturbance that unsettles and ploughs up inherited turfs without planting the same old seeds in the field . . .’22 It emancipates, we are told, through ‘an unraveling-reworking process’ such as the one that took place at Greenham Common. Emancipation is a matter, on this view, ‘of shaking up foundations and always maintaining ambiguity and a Janus-faced politics of disturbance’.23

### Debate Safety K

#### The logical structure of the rawlsian position has been used to justify atrocities, which has been experienced by members of the debate community. Willey

Willey, Mark. "Objections to the Theory of Justice." John Rawls Refuted. Mark Willey, 2005. Web. 3 Aug. 2014. PH

Rawls never considered that the coercive government needed to impose his[society]socialism is exactly like those mass murdering socialist tyrannies of the 20th century, in other words, that this is too much power to hand over to a central government and erases human rights. Whether it was National Socialism (12 million innocents murdered), Soviet Socialism (35 million innocents murdered), Sino-Socialism (at least 70 million innocents murdered), or Khmer Rouge socialism (2 million innocents murdered or 25 percent of the total population), man [history] has proved that socialism must be avoided at all costs because the dangers are unacceptable. North Korea is the perfect Rawlsian state. Even if everyone agreed to rules that established a crushing bureaucracy that could be and therefore likely would be co-opted by a moral monster like Hitler or Stalin, history tells us those rules must be rejected out of hand. The very rigidity of Rawls' system is dangerous. Note that the rules resulting from Rawls' process are set in stone while normally governing rules are modified and corrected by experience. This is a caution since a bad rule under Rawls would be incalculably and permanently damaging. Rawls' apologists might argue that he was only talking theory, however his Original Position is used to justify real world socialism. So practical defects are fatal to this project.

And, rawlsian theory re-creates the historic oppression experienced by certain groups, including the oppressed in the debate community by abstracting from the material conditions to the hypothetical ideals, which ignores the circumstances that cause the conditions to come in to existence about in the first place- this a vicious cycle that allows rawls to say we don’t care about groups that aren’t the “least well-off”.

**The judge has an obligation as an ethical decision-maker to exclude position that make debate an unsafe space for all members involved, this means they must reject the AC framework since it justifies views atrocities that impedes certain members of the community from engaging in effective discussion- this is debate safety. Teehan 14**

TEEHAN: Honestly, I don't think that 99% of what has been said in this thread so far actually matters. It doesn't matter whether you think that these types of assumptions should be questioned. It doesn't matter what accepting this intuition could potentially do or not do. It doesn't matter if you see fit to make, incredibly trivializing and misplaced I might add, links between this and the Holocaust. All of the arguments that talk about how debate is a unique space for questioning assumptions make an assumption of safety. They say that this is a space where one is safe to question assumptions and try new perspectives. That is not true for everyone. When we allow arguments that question the wrongness of racism, sexism, homophobia, rape, lynching, etc., we make debate unsafe for certain people. The idea that debate is a safe space to question all assumptions is the definition of privilege, it begins with an idea of a debater that can question every assumption. People who face the actual effects of the aforementioned things cannot question those assumptions, and making debate a space built around the idea that they can is hostile. So, you really have a choice. Either 1) say that you do not want these people to debate so that you can let people question the wrongness of everything I listed before, 2) say that you care more about letting debaters question those things than making debate safe for everyone, or 3) make it so that saying things that make debate unsafe has actual repercussions. On "debate is not the real world". Only for people who can separate their existence in "the real world" from their existence in debate. That means privileged, white, heterosexual males like myself. I don't understand how you can make this sweeping claim when some people are clearly harmed by these arguments. At the end of the day, you have to figure out whether you care about debate being safe for everyone involved. I don't think anyone has contested that these arguments make debate

### FW

#### Rule Consequentialism best meets the constraint of RE- it coheres with our fundamental intuitions. Hooker

Brad Hooker, “Rule Consequentialism”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). URL – <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/consequentialism-rule>/>.

We have seen that rule-consequentialism evaluates rules on the basis of the expected value of their acceptance by the overwhelming majority. What rules will such an approach endorse? It will endorse[s] rules prohibiting physically attacking innocent[s] people or their property, taking the property of others, breaking one's promises, and lying. It will also endorse rules requiring one to pay special attention to the needs of one's family and friends, but more generally to be willing to help others with their (morally permissible) projects. Why? The crude answer is that a society where such rules are widely accepted would be likely to have more good in it than one lacking such rules. The fact that these rules are endorsed by rule-consequentialism [This] makes [these] rule[s]-consequentialism attractive. For, intuitively, these rules seem right. However, other moral theories endorse these rules as well. Most obviously, a familiar kind of moral pluralism contends that these intuitively attractive rules constitute the most basic level of morality, i.e., that there is no deeper moral principle underlying and unifying these rules. Call this view Rossian pluralism (in honor of its champion W. D. Ross (1930; 1939)). Rule-consequentialism may agree with Rossian pluralism in endorsing rules against physically attacking the innocent, stealing, promise breaking, and rules requiring various kinds of loyalty and more generally doing good for others. But rule-consequentialism goes beyond Rossian pluralism by specifying an underlying unifying principle that provides impartial justification for such rules. Other moral theories try to do this too. Such theories include some forms of Kantianism (Audi 2001; 2004), some forms of contractualism (Scanlon 1998), and some forms of virtue ethics (Hursthouse 1999; 2002; Foot 2000). In any case, the first way of arguing for [but] rule-consequentialism is to argue that it specifies an underlying principle that provides impartial justification for intuitively plausible moral rules, and that no rival theory does this as well (Urmson 1953; Brandt 1967; Hospers 1972; Hooker 2000). This first way of arguing for rule-consequentialism might be seen as drawing on the idea that a theory is better justified to us to the extent that it increases coherence within our beliefs (Rawls 1951; 1971, pp. 19–21, 46–51; DePaul 1987; Ebertz 1993; Sayre-McCord 1986; 1996). [See the entry on [coherentist theories of epistemic justification](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/).] But the approach might also be seen as moderately foundationalist in that it begins with a set of beliefs (in various moral rules) to which it assigns independent credibility though not infallibility (Audi 1996; 2004; Crisp 2000). [See the entry on [foundationalist theories of epistemic justification](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/).] Admittedly, coherence with our moral beliefs does not make a moral theory true, since our moral beliefs might of course be mistaken. Nevertheless, if a moral theory fails significantly to cohere with our moral beliefs, this undermines the theory's ability to be justified to us.

The standard is consistency with rule consequentialism; the optmific rule is reducing existential risk.

1. Actor-specificity is a meta-framing issue. Governments ONLY have access to knowledge towards the general aggregate not specific individuals, which means they must use consequentialism to determine policy action also means the veil falses since policy-makers don’t know if it would be a mutually agreeable principle. And, collective action results in trade-off, which means that side constraints paralyze state action. There can’t be a distinction between acts and omissions since policy-makers consider permissions and prohibition when regulating the public domain. Also, mean my ethic is most germane.
2. Moral progress is reason we should default to preventing extinction to ensure that we can resolve morality in the future- they concede that it is a relevant interest. Indicts to the framework mandates it since we need as many perspectives as possible to resolve and act in accordance with the coherent ethical view.
3. Existential risk is most consistent with impartiality since it doesn’t create distinctions between agents but rather tries to preserve as many people as possible.

Under RE, extinction is the biggest impact since most ethical theories would make concessions to it since it precludes the possibility of acting in accordance with their ethical principle- Extinction also harms the least well-off which makes it a direct harm under your framework.

#### Rawls’s theory is a form of distributive justice, but these ultimately collapse to an aggregative conception of well-being, AKA util.

David Cummiskey [“Gewirth: Critical Essays on Action, Rationality, and Community”. Chapter 11. Gewirth’s Kantian Consequentialism. <http://www.bates.edu/Prebuilt/gewirth1.pdf>] AJ

As I understand the issue, an aggregative conception of the common good would permit greater objective need-satisfaction for the many to "outweigh" the lesser need-satisfaction of the few. *For example, it may require the basic needs of some to be sacrificed so that the basic needs of others can be satisfied.* So, we need an additional argument, which Gewirth has not provided, showing that more equal distributions of goods, which limit the degree to which agents can have their objective needs satisfied, are to be preferred to more unequal distributions that allow more agents to have their objective needs satisfied. Since, by hypoth- esis, more agency-needs will be satisfied under the "aggregative" sense, the aggregative sense is more likely to satisfy the needs of any given generic agent. So, the probability of benefit from the aggregative interpretation is greater than the probability of benefit from the "distributive," i.e., more egalitarian interpre- tation of the "common good." It thus follows from the aggregative interpretation that "the good in question is equally common to, equally had by, all the members of the group" (HR 156), as is required under the distributive interpretation. As I will argue in a moment, this benefit is similar to the benefit to the rich and poor alike of positive rights. It is also similar to the benefits of a fair system of coer- cive laws and sanctions.These considerations suggest a more Gewirthean argument for the less egalitarian aggregative interpretation. [So] If each prospective agent is indeed more likely to have the necessary goods of freedom and well-being under an aggregative conception of the common good, then the PGC would require such a distribution. For consider: [Since] Gewirth's famous argument for the Principle of Generic Consistency claims to show that every purposive, prospective agent is dialectically committed to claim (4) "I must have freedom and well-being" (CR 17).6 But if a generic agent acts on the distributive understanding of the common good, then it is less likely that they will [to] have freedom and well-being. So, the agent would be accepting the proposition "I may not (that is, it is permissible that I not) have freedom and well-being," which contradicts [itself.] (4). So each agent must recognize that the universal, equal rights to freedom and well-being correlate with a duty to promote a maximum aggregative common good. I have argued that the aggregative interpretation seems to satisfy the principle defining the "distributive" interpretation; namely, that "the good in question is equally common to, equally had by, all the members of the group" (HR 156). It seems to me that this principle is ambiguous. It should mean that the system of rights must provide a likely benefit to every affected person. Gewirth, however, takes the principle to be the more substantive claim that the goods the rights secure must satisfy an unspecified principle of egalitarian distributive justice. I I have tried to show that Gewirth's substantive egalitarian reading cannot simply be assumed. Since this issue receives scant attention in Gewirth's otherwise extensive and detailed arguments, I welcome any clarification of this most central part of his normative theory. I would like to emphasize, however, that [Since] Gewirth's Kantian hierarchy of necessary goods (RM 54-63, HR 159, CR 13-14), and his "criterion of the degree of needfulness of action" which resolves rights conflicts (CR 45-46), together entail[s] [that] a corresponding hierarchy in the conception of the common good. As a result, we are required (roughly) to maximize "basic well-being" first, and addi- tive and nonsubtractive goods, second; where the first is lexically prior, in Rawls's sense, to the second (RM 340-41, CR 46). As a result, Gewirthean consequentialism does not permit, even in principle, the sacrifice of the life and liberty of some merely to increase the wealth or luxury of others. This type of important "distribution-sensitivity" is indeed "internal" to the PGC. It follows, however, from the Kantian hierarchy in the theory of the good, and not from an egalitarian "distributive" conception of what constitutes the "common good." So, Gewirth does indeed develop a more Kantian conception of the good. This difference clearly does provide the basis for several important contrasts between the PGC and classical utilitarianism. The PGC, however, is [still]nonetheless a consequentialist normative principle.

Baker and Emery found that, although most respondents knew that close to half of all mar- riages end in divorce, when asked to predict the likelihood that their mar- riage would end in divorce, the modal response was zero."

### CP

#### [The aff actor] will implement a guaranteed basic income, where all adults receive payments equal in value to the poverty line.

#### The aff can’t perm the CP if they don’t have an advocacy text in the 1AC. This encourages shiftiness since can define the advocacy to take kill my access to CPs- uniquely since most affirmatives rely on the poverty internal link. Also, prevents them from resetting me in the 2NR. This is key to fairness since I need access to 1NC arguments to close the door in the 2NR.

#### A basic income would end poverty- this means I coopt all your income inequality internal links since I rectify discrimination and bargaining power. Vinik 13

Danny Vinik. “Everyone's Talking About This Simple Solution To Ending Poverty By Just Giving People Free Money.” Business Insider. November 12, 2013. JY

What are the benefits of a basic income? The clear one is that no American would live below the poverty line. **The U.S. has been waging the War on Poverty for a generation now and still nearly 50 million Americans are below the line. This would end that war with a decisive victory**. There are knock on effects as well. **Americans would have greater leverage to demand higher wages and better working conditions** from their employer thanks to the increased income security. **Families could allow one parent to take time off to raise their kids.** Eliminating the numerous different government welfare programs would also lead to efficiency gains as adults would simply receive their check in the mail and not have to waste time filling out paperwork at numerous different offices.

#### This is empirically verified by experiments in Canada. Lowrey 13

Annie Lowrey (econ reporter for NYT). “Switzerland’s Proposal to Pay People for being Alive.” New York Times. November 12, 2013. JY.

The left is more concerned with the power of a minimum or basic income as an anti-poverty and pro-mobility tool. There happens to be some hard evidence to bolster the policy’s case. **In the mid-1970s, the** tiny **Canadian town of Dauphin** ( the “garden capital of Manitoba” ) **acted as guinea pig for** a grand experiment in social policy called **“Mincome.”** For a short period of time, **all the residents of the town received a guaranteed minimum income**. About 1,000 poor families got monthly checks to supplement their earnings. Evelyn Forget, **a health economist at the University of Manitoba, has done some of the best research on the results**. Some of her findings were obvious: **Poverty disappeared.** But others were more surprising: **High-school completion rates went up; hospitalization rates went down**. “If you have a social program like this, community values themselves start to change,” Forget said.

This is terminal defense on the aff; there is no more poverty if we do the cp so any risk of a disadvantage to the aff means you negate.

#### The basic income is more flexible than a living wage- wages are only one form of compensation and exemptions are prone to abuse. Yglesias 13

Matthew Yglesias (executive editor at Vox). “EITC Isn't The Alternative to a Minimum Wage, This Is.” Slate. February 17, 2013. JY.

But I still think **minimum wage regulations are far from optimal**. The real policy mix you're looking for is a blend of wage subsidies (to encourage work) and something like a Guaranteed Basic Income program that just hands out cash to people regardless of what they do. A GBIhelps people by giving them money, obviously. It also serves as a kind of de facto minimum wage, since if people can earn money doing nothing, in practice you're going to need to offer them higher pay to get them to work. But it's **[GBI is] much more flexible than a minimum wage. In a GBI world, an employer has to make work** somehow **appealing enough to get employees** even though everyone's guaranteed a basic minimum whether they work or not. But **that "appealing" factor could be high wages**, could be **valuable skills and training**, could just be **a pleasant work atmosphere, or** could be **some combination** of the three. Current **minimum wage policies** sort of **try to achieve these goals by having exemptions for** educationally rewarding **internships or vocational programs. But these exemptions manage to be simultaneously too prone to abuse and too inflexible to capture the full range of possible scenarios that arise in human life**. Obviously, real-world politicans and activists operate within constraints, but when I'm dictator that's what we're going to do.No minimum wage rule, no sloppy enforcement, and no weird loopholes. But everyone gets a check every month,and employers need to offer a proposition that's more attractive than leisure even though pure leisure won't necessarily lead to immiseration. I'd also add in a progressive payroll tax that's somewhat negative at low levels to prevent the disemployment effects from getting out of hand.

This solves the Unions and Discrimination advantages since in a system of basic income employers have to fight for employees rather than able to push them ultra-low wages.

### Crime DA

#### A. Uniqueness: Crime in the U.S. is at its lowest in decades- other uniqueness claims are based in false public perception. Wood 12

Wood, Daniel B. [Staff Writer] "US Crime Rate at Lowest Point in Decades. Why America Is Safer Now." The Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor, 9 Jan. 2012. Web. 25 Dec. 2014. PH

The last time the crime rate for serious crime – murder, rape, robbery, assault – fell to these levels, gasoline cost 29 cents a gallon and the average income for a working American was $5,807. That was 1963. In the past 20 years, for instance, the murder rate in the United States has dropped by almost half, from 9.8 per 100,000 people in 1991 to 5.0 in 2009. Meanwhile, robberies were down 10 percent in 2010 from the year before and 8 percent in 2009. The declines are not just a blip, say criminologists. Rather, they are the result of a host of changes that have fundamentally reversed the high-crime trends of the 1980s. And these changes have taken hold to such a degree that the drop in crime continued despite the recent recession. Because the pattern "transcends cities and US regions, we can safely say crime is down," says James Alan Fox, a criminologist at Northeastern University in Boston. "We are indeed a safer nation than 20 years ago." He and others give four main reasons for the decline: Increased incarceration, including longer sentences, that keeps more criminals off the streets. Improved law enforcement strategies, including advances in computer analysis and innovative technology. The waning of the crack cocaine epidemic that soared from 1984 to 1990, which made cocaine cheaply available in cities across the US. The graying of America characterized by the fastest-growing segment of the US population – baby boomers – passing the age of 50. The data point to a persistent perception gap among Americans. Despite strong evidence of crime dropping over recent decades, the public sees the reverse. "Recent Gallup polls have found that citizens overwhelmingly feel crime is going up even though it is not," says Professor Fox. "This is because of the growth of crime shows and the way that TV spotlights the emotional. One case of a random, horrific shooting shown repeatedly on TV has more visceral effect than all the statistics printed in a newspaper."

#### B. Link: Increasing Wages is linked to a rise in crime especially among youth. Beauchamp and Chan 13

Beauchamp, Andrew [Assistant Professor of Economics at Boston College], and Stacey Chan [PhD Candidate at Boston College]. "The Minimum Wage and Crime." The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy BE J. Econ. Anal. Policy (2013). PH

Did raising the minimum wage increase crime in the United States over the past 15 years? The evidence we present suggests the answer is yes. Further, our results indicate that this increase[s] in crime occurs across the board, with increases in theft, drug sale, and violent crime. Among the employed these increases appear occur due to a decrease in labor income from reduced work. Effects are particularly large for low-skilled workers with prior criminal connections. Our results highlight the importance of providing employment opportunities [for] youth given the evidence for a relationship between licit and illicit work. They also point to the dangers both to the individual and to society from policies that restrict the already limited employment options of this group. Our results indicate that crime will increase by 1.9 percentage points among 14-30 year-olds as the minimum wage increases, with effects being even larger among teenagers. With an average overall crime rate at 12.1%, this is a substantial increase. The social costs to raising the minimum wage may not appear in net employment or unemployment changes, but nonetheless appear non-trivial.

Outweighs:

1. Specificity- Low-Skilled youth are the first to go unemployed when wages increase, which pushes them into a life of crime, so even if negative evidence indicates higher wages move adults away from the crime scene that’s because living wage doesn’t impact them in the same way.
2. They use an extremely large sample size increase the probability of causality instead of correlation.
3. Examines data from 13-year span, which accounts for fluctuation in the CJS and wage laws.
4. Data is self-reported which means it’s truly representative of crime rates because victims are being asked so they have no incentive to withhold info while not every crime is reported
5. My evidence doesn’t assess data records, which eliminates complication from policy chances.

-There going to say not say that the DA doesn’t link since the aff only speaks to living wage ordinances while my link evidence is about raising minimum wage but a) the warrant still applies since my evidence indicates that the REASON low-skill youth resort to crime when pushed out of the job and b) the distinction they’re trying to draw supercharges my evidence since living wage would entail a larger income raise which means more jobs would be lost.

#### C. Internal Link: Crime kills soft power. Falk 12

Falk, Richard. [United Nations Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights] "When Soft Power Is Hard." ALJAZEERA. ALJAZEERA, 28 July 2012. Web. 11 Jan. 2015.

This unabashed avowal of imperial goals is the main thesis of the article, perhaps most graphically expressed in the following words: "The United States can increase the effectiveness of its military forces and make the world safe[with] for soft power, America's inherent comparative advantage." As the glove fits the hand, **soft power** complements hard power within the wider enterprise of transforming the world in the United States' image, or at least in the ideal version of the United States' sense of self. The authors acknowledge (rather parenthetically) that their strategy **may not work if the US continues** much longer **to be seen unfavourably abroad as a national abode of** drugs, **crime, [and] violence**, fiscal irresponsibility, family breakdown, and political gridlock. **They make a** rather meaningless **plea to restore "a** **healthy democracy" at home as a prelude to** the heavy lifting of **democratising the world, but they** do not pretend medical knowledge, and **offer no prescriptions for restoring the health of the American body politic.** And now, 16 years after their article appeared, it would appear that the adage, "disease unknown, cure unknown", applies.

Prefer this evidence since he works for the United Nations, so he’s most qualified on how the United States’ international reputation is declining

#### U.S. soft power is key to international cooperation. Nye 04

Nye, Joseph S. [Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, is Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Faculty at Harvard- Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. "Soft power and American foreign policy." Political Science Quarterly 119.2 (2004): 255-270. PH

Skeptics about soft power say not to worry. Popularity is ephemeral and should not be a guide for foreign policy in any case. ¶ The United States can act without the world's applause. We are so strong we can do as we wish. We are the world's only ¶ superpower, and that fact is bound to engender envy and resentment. Fouad Ajami has stated recently, "The United States ¶ need not worry about hearts and minds in foreign lands."IJ Columnist CaI Thomas refers to "the fiction that our enemies can ¶ be made less threatening by what America says and does."10 Moreover, the United States has been unpopular in the past, yet ¶ managed to recover. We do not need permanent allies and institutions. We can always pick up a coalition of the willing ¶ when we need to. Donald Rumsfeld is wont to say that the issues should determine the coalitions, not vice-versa. But it ¶ would be a mistake to dismiss the recent decline in our attractiveness so lightly. It is true that the United States ¶ has recovered from unpopular policies in the past, but that was against the backdrop of the Cold War, in which ¶ other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. Moreover, while America's size and association ¶ with disruptive modernity are real and unavoidable, wise policies can soften the sharp edges of that reality and ¶ reduce the resentments that they engender. That is what the United States did after World War II. We used our ¶ soft power resources and co-opted others into a set of alliances and institutions that lasted for sixty years. We ¶ won the Cold War against the Soviet Union with a strategy of containment that used our soft power as well as ¶ our hard power. It is true that the new threat of transnational terrorism increased American vulnerability, and some ¶ of our unilateralism after September 11 was driven by fear. But the United States cannot meet the new threat[s] identified in the ¶ national security strategy without the cooperation of other countries. They will cooperate, up to a point, out of ¶ mere self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the attractiveness of the United States. Take ¶ [in] Pakistan for example. President Pervez Musharraf faces a complex game of cooperating with the United States ¶ on terrorism while managing a large anti-American constituency at home. He winds up balancing concessions ¶ and retractions. If the United States were more attractive to the Pakistani populace, we would see more ¶ concessions in the mix.

Outweighs:

1. Scope- cooperation is key to getting anything done in the international sphere, since brute military force is ineffective and will run out quickly.
2. Duration- hard power military conquests are hard to maintain, but soft power agreements are more maintainable and will last longer (like the card example, which lasted for 60 years), so the impact is experienced more often.

#### And, U.S. soft power is on the decline- the brink is now since china is taking over insidiously through the movie industry. Kellen 14

Kellen, Patrick. [Writer for Economy In Crisis] "America’s Position as a World Power Is Waning | Economy In Crisis." Economy In Crisis Americas Position as a World Power Is Waning Comments. Economy In Crisis, 15 June 2014. Web. 16 Jan. 2015. PH

It is widely considered political suicide to suggest cutting the United States defense budget. Americans equate guns and tanks with power, but military power is not the only thing that determines strength in the international realm. The United States still has the world’s most powerful military, but the value of that asset is not what it once was. Our soft power — the power to convince and gain acceptance through passive means — is waning while the rest of the world moves forward. Even our influence over our own citizens is shrinking. Meanwhile, China is taking steps to grow its soft power over. With so many strategic American industries for sale to the highest bidder thanks to our failed policies, it may seem strange at first that the Chinese would target a chain of movie theaters for their largest acquisition to date. After all, the way Americans consume movies and entertainment has been diversifying and theaters are not always the most profitable industry. The draw of this purchase could be much wider reaching than immediate profits. By controlling our movie theaters and what is shown in them, the Chinese will have access to something much more valuable than our money: control of our minds and culture. Movies can have incredible cultural influence. They can tell us what’s in style, what to buy or how to speak. The contents of one movie may not change our day to day lives, but over time what we see can drastically affect how we act. This is why American parents have become so concerned with the amount of drugs, sex and violence in our movies. These things are easily spotted and can be avoided, but the kind of propaganda that may serve the interests of another country like China may be harder to spot. When we sell a major portion of our movie industry to a foreign entity we give up any control over what we and our children see when we go out for what may seem lighthearted entertainment.Chinese officials have even said they wish to build up their soft power in the rest of the world. Dalian Wanda (the group that bought AMC), may not be a government controlled company like many others who have purchased U.S. interests, but in communist China no company is too far removed from the government’s sway. The Chinese government along with Chinese companies have been pursuing a growing number of projects and acquisitions in the United States, including a “China City” in Michigan with hundreds of housing units for Chinese nationals. The more control they gain through cultural means, the greater the likelihood that we will accept this sort of economic onslaught. Control of our country is gradually slipping away, and we are barely noticing.

#### D. Impact: International cooperation prevents existential threats. Nye and Armitage 07

Joseph Nye (Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard, and previous dean of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government) and Richard Armitage (13th United States Deputy Secretary of State, the second-in-command at the State Department, serving from 2001 to 2005), “CSIS Reports – A Smarter, More Secure America”, 11/6, 2007 [http://www.csis.org/component/option,com\_csis\_pubs/task,view/id,4156/type,1/](http://www.csis.org/component/option%2Ccom_csis_pubs/task%2Cview/id%2C4156/type%2C1/)

Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion. Legitimacy is central to soft power. **If a** people or **nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead** without using threats and bribes. **Legitimacy can also reduce opposition to**—and the costs of—**using hard power when the situation demands.** Appealing to others’ values, interests, and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction…The information age has heightened political consciousness, but also made political groupings less cohesive. Small, adaptable, transnational networks have access to tools of destruction that are increasingly cheap, easy to conceal, and more readily available. Although the integration of the global economy has brought tremendous benefits, **threats such as pandemic disease and the collapse of financial markets are more distributed and more likely to arise without warning. The threat of** widespread physical harm to the planet posed by **nuclear catastrophe** has existed for half a century, though the realization of the threat **will become more likely as the number of nuclear weapons states increases.** The potential security challenges posed by **climate change raise[s]** the possibility of an entirely **new** set of **threats** for the United States **to consider**… **States** and non-state actors who improve their ability to draw in allies will gain competitive advantages in today’s environment. Those **who alienate potential friends will stand at greater risk.** China has invested in its soft power to ensure access to resources and to ensure against efforts to undermine its military modernization. **Terrorists depend on** their ability to attract **support from the crowd** at least as much as their ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.