### Topshelf

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### 1NC – Tajikistan Terror DA

#### Tajikistan on the brink of becoming a new hotspot for grassroots terror now – all precautions necessary

**Steward 8/7** Scott Stewart (VP of Tactical Analysis, Stratfor), 8-7-2018, "Why an Attack by Grassroots Jihadists in Tajikistan Matters," Stratfor, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/why-attack-grassroots-jihadists-tajikistan-matters> OHS-AT

Many Tajiks, as well as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), have joined the Khorasan Province, the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State. Meanwhile, the power of the Taliban in Afghanistan is growing. These developments raise concerns about the possibility that militants could take root in Tajikistan, developing into a threat to the government. So, was the July 29 attack a sign of a growing movement? The answer lies in looking closely at the assault itself.

Examining the Attack

The tactics in the assault seem to be consistent with those typically used by grassroot jihadists. Evidence that it was a grassroots effort can also be seen in the wording for the Islamic State's claim for the attack, which said the men were soldiers who had responded to its call. This language is typically used for jihadists inspired by the Islamic State or directed by its members through online forums. The language it uses for operatives from franchise groups or for members sent out to conduct attacks, such as the cell responsible for the Paris and Brussels attacks, is different.

In addition, the assault itself had not been planned or executed well. It's hard to imagine a more vulnerable target than a group of bicyclists on a rural stretch of highway. Yet, the attack succeeded in killing only four of them. Furthermore, it was carried out before an array of witnesses, including one who recorded it on a cellphone video.

The method of attack, a vehicular assault followed by an armed attack, corresponds exactly to tactics that the Islamic State has encouraged its grassroots supporters to employ. Similar assaults have taken place in London and in Barcelona. The choice to carry out this type of attack in the United Kingdom or Spain, where it is somewhat difficult to get firearms, makes logical sense. But weapons are much easier to obtain in Tajikistan, especially for any professional operative with connections to either the Islamic State or the Taliban.

Finally, the assault doesn't reflect the capabilities of trained operatives. Many of the Taliban's older operational leaders have been at war since 1979, and the younger ones have known warfare all their lives. They have survived 17 years of combat with U.S. and NATO troops, probably the best trained and equipped forces on the planet. That combat experience has honed the Taliban's military capabilities, including a sophisticated ability to carry out armed assaults and ambushes. They have also become quite adept at terrorist attacks, including assassinations. The Taliban and Islamic State militants in the region are capable killers and would be able to plan a much more effective attack against a group of foreign cyclists, choosing a moment of greater vulnerability, such as when they were asleep in their tents, to strike.

Keeping a Lid on Tajikistan

Within Tajikistan, jihadist activity has remained weak for several reasons. First, the Taliban remain focused on Afghanistan and do not have a larger regional agenda. Second, the Tajik government has created a pervasive security apparatus that aggressively pursues any perceived opposition, including religious extremism. Thousands of Russian troops stationed at the 201st military base back up those domestic security forces. Third, Tajikistan's long secular communist tradition also means that jihadism does not hold the same widespread appeal that it does in Afghanistan. These factors make Tajikistan a hostile operating environment for jihadists, especially those operating in formal hierarchical groups. In many ways, this has created an operational environment similar to those seen in Europe or North America — where grassroots terrorists working alone or in small cells are better able to avoid the government's attention than professional cadres linked to groups.

In some ways, Tajikistan resembles Libya under Moammar Gadhafi. The strongman was able to suppress dissent, including that by jihadists, and to keep regional and tribal fractures in check through the use of force. Once Gadhafi's control slipped, the country spiraled into civil war. Like Libya, Tajikistan is quite brittle. Government oppression, combined with a young and impoverished population, could eventually result in an increase in jihadist adherents inside the country. And if Tajikistan were to fracture, it could open up another space for extremists to operate in Central Asia.

#### US military assistance is critical in the fight against terror – unique training and equipment that Russia can’t provide AND turns drug trafficking

- green = optional, depends on adv

**Bahrom 15** Nadin Bahrom, 4-23-2015, "Help from United States bolsters Tajikistan's fight against terrorism," <http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/04/10/feature-01> OHS-AT \*\*brackets in original text\*\*

Military co-operation with the US is key for Tajikistan, said Saifullo Safarov, first deputy director of the Strategic Research Centre under the President of Tajikistan.

"The US is helping Tajikistan in its fight against international terrorism, especially in Afghanistan," Safarov told Caravanserai. "Threats that come out of Afghanistan are also threats to the US. That's why we need to co-ordinate against the Afghan [threat]."

"We are unable to ensure our security without US co-operation," he dded.

The US is committed to help Tajikistan because both are members of the C5+1, a consortium of the US and the five Central Asian states that addresses challenges like terrorism, Dushanbe-based security analyst Abdumannon Azizov told Cararavanserai.

"Tajikistan has designated the fight against terrorism ... as a priority," said Azizov, noting that radicalisation of migrant workers and the build-up of Central Asian insurgents in Afghanistan near the Tajik border "are influencing the situation".

US trainers can bring Tajik military units up to US standards, he said.

Equipment is another avenue of potential US aid, he said.

"All of our military equipment is Soviet made," he said. "Given the situation in northern Afghan provinces, it would be beneficial if the US could ... provide military and technical support for border guards," he said.

Benefits of cooperation

Placed in a dangerous neighbourhood, Tajikistan needs all the help it can get, say observers.

Tajikistan co-operates with all countries to fight terrorism, Abdulkhalim Gafforov, an MP affiliated with the Socialist Party, told Caravanserai.

"We should take advantage of all opportunities [to co-operate]," he said. "Such co-operation is in the interests of security and national stability."

The US has provided more than $260 million (1.7 billion TJS) in security assistance in 25 years of full relations, Dushanbe-based regional security analyst Abdulmalik Kodirov told Caravanserai.

Tajikistan used those funds to build border check-points, transport and electrical systems and training grounds, as well as to conduct military training inside and outside the country, he said.

"Most of the money the US sends goes to preventing threats from Afghanistan," said Kodirov. "We also run programmes to fight drug trafficking. Tajikistan can't fight these threats alone."

He urged more Tajiks in the security sector to learn English.

"That will increase the number of Tajik experts who undergo counter-terrorism training in the US," he said.

Tajikistan chooses to have an open-door policy, which makes international co-operation necessary for its security, said Shokirjon Khakimov, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party.

"There's no doubt that military co-operation, joint training sessions and joint projects will help us fight trans-national terrorism," he told Caravanserai. "We'll also be able to contribute to fighting international terrorism."

Strengthening relations

The recent training consisted of previously agreed-upon scenarios, a Tajik security official who requested anonymity told Caravanserai.

"Tajik soldiers worked with their American colleagues to develop counter-terrorism tactics," said the source. "They learned how to fight in close quarters with terrorists."

Co-operation with the US has been growing, remarked the source.

One sign of that tightening bond was the exchange of telegrammes between the countries' presidents in February to mark the 25th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, he added.

US President Donald Trump wrote of the countries' "common goals of regional security and stability" in his message, while Tajik President Emomali Rahmon cited his "optimism" about the course of future relations.

The exchange of telegrammes attests to shared interest in "security in Central Asia and in Afghanistan", the security sector source told Caravanserai.

The US is committed to ensuring regional stability and fighting terrorism, US embassy spokesman Jeff Ridenour told Caravanserai.

"We believe that expanding the Tajik armed forces' capabilities is an important step in achieving our goal of fighting terrorism," he said.

The two sides participated in scenarios that tested their crisis response, he said, adding that they had a primary goal of developing co-ordination against trans-national terrorism.

"Military-to-military engagements are intended to expand levels of co-operation, enhance mutual capabilities, and promote long-term regional stability and joint-operation," said the US embassy in a March statement before the exercises took place.

#### Lone wolf WMD attacks cause extinction.

Ackerman and Pinson 14 – Gray A., Director of the Special Projects Division at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); Lauren E., Senior Research/Project Manager at START and PhD student at Yale University, 2014 (“An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* (Vol. 26, Issue 1) Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Tandfonline)

The first question to answer is whence the concerns about the nexus between CBRN weapons and isolated actors come and whether these are overblown. The general threat of mass violence posed by lone wolves and small autonomous cells has been detailed in accompanying issue contributions, but the potential use of CBRN weapons by such perpetrators presents some singular features that either amplify or supplement the attributes of the more general case and so are deserving of particular attention. Chief among these is the impact of rapid technological development. Recent and emerging advances in a variety of areas, from synthetic biology 3 to nanoscale engineering, 4 have opened doors not only to new medicines and materials, but also to new possibilities for malefactors to inflict harm on others. What is most relevant in the context of lone actors and small autonomous cells is not so much the pace of new invention, but rather the commercialization and consumerization of CBRN weapons-relevant technologies. This process often entails an increase in the availability and safety of the technology, with a concurrent diminution in the cost, volume, and technical knowledge required to operate it. Thus, for example, whereas fifty years ago producing large quantities of certain chemical weapons might have been a dangerous and inefficient affair requiring a large plant, expensive equipment, and several chemical engineers, with the advent of chemical microreactors,5 the same processes might be accomplished far more cheaply and safely on a desktop assemblage, purchased commercially and monitored by a single chemistry graduate student.

The rapid global spread and increased user-friendliness of many technologies thus represents a potentially radical shift from the relatively small scale of harm a single individual or small autonomous group could historically cause. 6 From the limited reach and killing power of the sword, spear, and bow, to the introduction of dynamite and eventually the use of our own infrastructures against us (as on September 11), the number of people that an individual who was unsupported by a broader political entity could kill with a single action has increased from single digits to thousands. Indeed, it has even been asserted that ‘‘over time. . . as the leverage provided by technology increases, this threshold will finally reach its culmination—with the ability of one man to declare war on the world and win.’’7 Nowhere is this trend more perceptible in the current age than in the area of unconventional weapons.

These new technologies do not simply empower users on a purely technical level. Globalization and the expansion of information networks provide new opportunities for disaffected individuals in the farthest corners of the globe to become familiar with core weapon concepts and to purchase equipment—online technical courses and eBay are undoubtedly a boon to would-be purveyors of violence. Furthermore, even the most solipsistic misanthropes, people who would never be able to function socially as part of an operational terrorist group, can find radicalizing influences or legitimation for their beliefs in the maelstrom of virtual identities on the Internet.

All of this can spawn, it is feared, a more deleterious breed of lone actors, what have been referred to in some quarters as ‘‘super-empowered individuals.’’8 Conceptually, super-empowered individuals are atomistic game-changers, i.e., they constitute a single (and often singular) individual who can shock the entire system (whether national, regional, or global) by relying only on their own resources. Their core characteristics are that they have superior intelligence, the capacity to use complex communications or technology systems, and act as an individual or a ‘‘lone-wolf.’’9 The end result, according to the pessimists, is that if one of these individuals chooses to attack the system, ‘‘the unprecedented nature of his attack ensures that no counter-measures are in place to prevent it. And when he strikes, his attack will not only kill massive amounts of people, but also profoundly change the financial, political, and social systems that govern modern life.’’10 It almost goes without saying that the same concerns attach to small autonomous cells, whose members’ capabilities and resources can be combined without appreciably increasing the operational footprint presented to intelligence and law enforcement agencies seeking to detect such behavior.