# 1AC

### 1AC: Framework

#### First, In the state of nature humans are equally and infinitely free, but this manifests in infinite rights violations and violence.

Locke [John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government: Concerning the Original, Extent, and End, of Civil Government,” York University, prepared by Rod Hay for the McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought (1689). Locke FRS was an English philosopher and physician, widely regarded as one of the most influential of Enlightenment thinkers] BRACKETS FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE

TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of [their[ person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve [themselves] and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when [their] own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another. Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do. Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, [subjects] may destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE. That in the state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his [their] own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind. Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society.

#### Second, in order to prevent the rights violations of the state of nature humans enter into civil government – but that civil government cannot itself perpetuate rights violation.

Locke 2 [John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government: Concerning the Original, Extent, and End, of Civil Government,” York University, prepared by Rod Hay for the McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought (1689). Locke FRS was an English philosopher and physician, widely regarded as one of the most influential of Enlightenment thinkers] BRACKETS FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE

Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature. Sect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has entered into civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when committed within the commonwealth; and also to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need. Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature. Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey;\* where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.

#### Third, prevention of arbitrary violation of rights by the government requires a system of checks and balances within representative government.

Locke 3 [John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government: Concerning the Original, Extent, and End, of Civil Government,” York University, prepared by Rod Hay for the McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought (1689). Locke FRS was an English philosopher and physician, widely regarded as one of the most influential of Enlightenment thinkers] BRACKETS FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE

Sect. 134. THE great end of men's entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law,\* the consent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not the supreme. (\*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men, belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not made so. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10. Of this point therefore we are to note, that such men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. Ibid.) Sect. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth; yet: First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects.\* The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men's actions, must, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it. (\*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a common-weal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common good, for which societies are instituted. Unless they do this, they are not perfect. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) Sect. 136. Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges:\* for the law of nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences, which disorder men's propperties in the state of nature, men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of nature.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with contractarian representative government. Prefer additionally –

#### 1] Constructivism: There is no moral theory independent of the evaluation of agents.

Street [Sharon Street, “Objectivity & Truth: You’d Better Rethink It,” [Oxford Studies in Metaethics (11](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198784647.001.0001/acprof-9780198784647)) (2011). reet is a Professor of Philosophy and Associate Chair of the Department of Philosophy at New York University]

The problem for the normative realist arises when he is challenged to give his reasons for thinking that the causal forces landed [one moral theory] him, but not these countlessly many other[s] poor (possible) souls, on the robustly independent normative truth he posits. By hypothesis, these other agents lack no non- normative information that we have, and they are making no logical or instrumental errors. In explaining where these others have gone wrong, no doubt the realist can give non-trivially-question-begging reasons for holding this or that of his own normative premises as opposed to others. But the other[s] ideally coherent individuals are capable of [can] defending their own premises in a similar way, and their sets of values hold together in the same perfectly consistent internal fashion as our own (supposing falsely, but usefully for the sake of argument, that we are perfectly internally consistent). The realist, therefore, finds himself in a confrontation—whether actual or merely possible—of a kind that Dworkin himself describes as follows:

#### 2] Actor specificity – governmental power arises only from the power it is given.

Simmons 91 [John Simmon, “Locke and the Right to Punish,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 311-349. A. John Simmons is Commonwealth Professor of Philosophy and professor of law at the University of Virginia, where he has taught since 1976. He received his A.B. from Princeton University]

When we ask what makes it just for a particular person or group, rather than another, to punish some person, the answer that seems most natural concerns neither utility nor desert. It is not that our governments deserve to punish us, or that their doing so maximizes happiness; it is rather that they have authority or the right to do so. Locke put the point thus: "To justify bringing such evil [i.e., punishment] on any man two things are requisite. First, that he who does it has commission and power to do so. Secondly, that it be directly useful for the procuring of some greater good.... Usefulness, when present, being but one of those conditions, cannot give the other, which is a commission to punish.", The natural answer to our question makes central reference to authorization and rights, and it has been the natural rights tradition in political philosophy that has emphasized this point most forcefully. According to that tradition, one person (A) may justly punish another (B) only if either (i) A has a natural right to punish the crimes (wrongs) of B, or (2) B has alienated to A or created for A by forfeiture a right to punish B for B's crimes (wrongs). This position cannot, I think, adequately be characterized as either purely utilitarian or purely retributivist.2 It will not be my purpose here to evaluate the entire natural rights position on punishment, or to explore its relations to other views (e.g., whether it is consistent with or even reducible to retributivist or deterrence views).3 I wish to concentrate on only one aspect of natural rights theory's claims about punishment, a position shared by classical natural rights theorists (such as Grotius and Locke) and contemporary ones (such as Nozick and Rothbard). All persons in a state of nature, these authors claim, have a moral right to punish moral wrongdoers. This "natural executive right," of course, plays a central role in Locke's account of how a government can come to have the right to punish its citizens (as it must in any Lockean account of these matters), and Locke's defense of the executive right is the best known of the classical defenses. I will, accordingly, focus much of my attention on Locke's arguments and possible extensions or developments of them. But any theory of punishment must either accommodate or reject this right, so my discussion of Locke's views should prove of more than purely historical interest. The motivation for defending the natural executive right seems reasonably clear. Locke and other philosophers in the natural rights tradition have normally wanted to claim that all political authority (or "power") is artificial, and so must be explained in terms of more basic, natural forms of authority. Governments have rights to limit our liberty, for instance, only insofar as they have been granted those rights by us; we, however, possess these rights naturally (or, rather, are "born to" a basic set of moral rights). Governmental rights, then, are simply composed of the natural rights of those who become citizens, transferred to government by some voluntary undertaking (e.g., contract, consent, or the granting of a trust). This transfer of rights may go unobserved by some (as when consent is "tacit" only), but it must take place if government is to have any de jure power. However beneficial and fair the practices and policies a government enforces, it has no right or authority to enforce them against an uncommitted "independent."4 The same story can be told about a government's right to punish criminals. This right, like all governmental rights, must be composed of the redistributed natural rights of citizens, rights that the citizens must therefore have been capable of possessing in a nonpolitical state of nature. It is hard to deny that governments do, at least sometimes, have (or are capable of having) the de jure authority or right to punish criminals. But if they do, the argument continues, persons in a state of nature must also, at least sometimes, have the right to punish wrongdoers. From what other source could a government have obtained its right?

### Contention

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle ethical maxim. CX checks/T and theory because bidirectionality means I’ll always violate something. Now affirm –

#### 1] Sovereign legitimacy – In order to maintain equality and freedom amongst individuals in the community, and to prevent arbitrary violation of that, a system of government must be based in representation which means authoritarianism is illegitimate.

Locke 4 [John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government: Concerning the Original, Extent, and End, of Civil Government,” York University, prepared by Rod Hay for the McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought (1689). Locke FRS was an English philosopher and physician, widely regarded as one of the most influential of Enlightenment thinkers] BRACKETS FOR GENDERED LANGUAGE

Sect. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their's, that no body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being, or in one man, as in absolute powers, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man's property is not at all secure, tho' there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.

#### 2] Suppressing revolt – citizens have the right to overthrow an illegitimate sovereign – US military aid prevents the people from exercising that right – US relationships with authoritarian partners involves suppressing dissent.

Owen & Poznansky 14 [John M. Owen IV & Michael Poznansky, “When does America drop dictators?,” European Journal of International Relations 2014, Vol. 20(4) 1072–1099. Owen is Ambassador Henry J. and Mrs. Marion R. Taylor Professor of Politics, and a Faculty Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture,  Assistant Professor of International Affairs and Intelligence Studies in the [Graduate School of Public and International Affairs](https://www.gspia.pitt.edu/) and a faculty affiliate with the [Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies](http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/)]

Even when the first condition is satisfied, and dissident elites in the client state are America-acceptant, inertia can prevent a US President from dropping a dictator and pressing for free elections. Bilateral relations between Washington and an authoritarian regime become institutionalized over time. Such path-dependent institutions may only be disrupted following an exogenous shock (Pierson, 2000). Thus, our second condition is a sharp increase in the domestic threat to the authoritarian regime. Such a potential turning point may come in the form of a spike in civil unrest, an outright rebellion, an upcoming election, or a recent fraudulent one. These types of events all confront the dictator with a choice of whether to increase repression or negotiate with domestic opponents. At the same time, they confront the US administration with a dilemma: stick with the old repulsive partner, or drop him in favor of actors calling for freedom. During crises of this sort, the US government will monitor intensely regime opponents to gauge how America-acceptant or -resistant they are. Our two conditions are what J.L. Mackie calls INUS conditions: insufficient but necessary conditions that, when occurring together, are unnecessary but sufficient to bring about the outcome (Mackie, 1965; Mahoney, 2010). We do not claim that Washington can never drop a dictator unless our two INUS conditions occur jointly, but we do claim that when they do so occur, Washington will drop the dictator. In sum, an exogenous crisis in the client state presents a US President with a choice of his own. He can either press the ruler to move toward democracy, or can approve of repression. His decision will turn in part on whether opposition elites are sufficiently America-acceptant to commit to excluding America-resisters from government. US diplomats and intelligence agents continuously monitor dissident political movements in client states. During a regime crisis, their monitoring is especially crucial, and US diplomats will seek negotiations with dissidents to determine their preferences and try to come to an acceptable bargain. When dissident elites’ preferences are America-resistant, it will be relatively difficult for those elites and Washington to arrive at a bargain. When dissident elites’ preferences