# AC – Let Girls Learn

## Framing

#### Ethical decisionmaking begins with specifying an evaluative space, which defines what information counts in favour of valuing an object, and of valuing one object over another. Some ethical theories, like util or deontology, define their evaluative space in terms of just one kind of information—such as utility, or the nature of an action. Narrow evaluative spaces exclude relevant information: a life is not valuable *simply* because it can experience pleasure or because it has the freedom to choose.

#### Instead of a narrow evaluative space, we should use a capabilities approach that sees value in terms of capabilities to function.

Sen 1 [Sen, Amartya (Trinity College, Cambridge). “Capabilities and Well-Being.” In Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993. Print. pp. 30–53 // XR]

The identification of the objects of value specifies what may be called an evaluative space. In standard utilitarian analysis, for example, the evaluative space consists of the individual utilities (defined in the usual terms of pleasures, happiness, or desire fulfilment). Indeed, a complete evaluative approach entails a class of ‘informational constraints’ in the form of ruling out directly evaluative use of various types of information, to wit, those that do not belong to the evaluative space. 7 The capability approach is concerned primarily with the identification of value-objects, and sees the evaluative space in terms of functionings and capabilities to function. This is, of course, itself a deeply evaluative exercise, but answering question (1), on the identification of the objects of value, does not, on its own, yield a particular answer to question (2), regarding their relative values. The latter calls for a further evaluative exercise. Various substantive ways of evaluating functionings and capabilities can all belong to the general capability approach. The selection of the evaluative space has a good deal of cutting power on its own, both because of what it includes as potentially valuable and because of what it excludes. For example, because of the nature of the evaluative space, the capability approach differs from utilitarian evaluation (more generally ‘welfarist’ evaluation 8 ) in mak[es]ing room for a variety of human acts and states as important in themselves (not just because they may produce utility, nor just to the extent that they yield utility). 9 It also makes room for valuing various freedoms–in the form of capabilities. On the other side, the approach does not attach direct–as opposed to derivative–importance to the means of living or means of freedom (e.g. real income, wealth, opulence, primary goods, or resources), as some other approaches do. These variables are not part of the evaluative space, though they can indirectly influence the evaluation through their effects on variables included in that space.

### Prefer this approach:

#### 1. It accounts for a wider view of values, so it avoids the risk of excluding relevant moral data. This outweighs since narrow evaluative spaces presume we know beforehand which data matter, but that’s impossible since moral data is highly context-dependent. Our judgements about which data matter might not come from representative moral cases.

#### 2. Solves metaethical disagreement. Narrow evaluative spaces assume stances on objectivity vs. subjectivity, motivationalism, etc. – the capabilities approach doesn’t.

Sen 2 [Sen, Amartya (Trinity College, Cambridge). “Capabilities and Well-Being.” In Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993. Print. pp. 30–53 // XR]

The Aristotelian critique points towards a more general issue, namely, that of the ‘incompleteness’ of the capability approach –both in generating substantive judgements and in providing a comprehensive theory of valuation. Quite different specific theories of value may be consistent with the capability approach, and share the common feature of selecting value-objects from functionings and capabilities. Further, the capability approach can be used with different methods of determining relative weights and different mechanisms for actual evaluation. The approach, if seen as a theory of algorithmic evaluation, would be clearly incomplete. 47 It may well be asked: why pause at outlining a general approach, with various bits to be filled in, rather than ‘completing the task’? The motivation underlying the pause relates to the recognition that an agreement on the usability of the capability approach–an agreement on the nature of the ‘space’ of value-objects–need not presuppose an agreement on how the valuational exercise may be completed. It is possible to disagree both on the exact grounds underlying the determination of relative weights, and on the actual relative weights chosen, 48 even when there is reasoned agreement on the general nature of the value-objects (in this case, personal functionings and capabilities). If reasoned agreement is seen as an important foundational quality central to political and social ethics, 49 then the case for the pause is not so hard to understand. The fact that the capability approach is consistent and combinable with several different substantive theories need not be a source of embarrassment. Interestingly enough, despite this incompleteness, the capability approach does have considerable ‘cutting power’. In fact, the more challenging part of the claim in favour of the capability approach lies in what it denies. It differs from the standard utility-based approaches in not insisting that we must value only happiness (and sees, instead, the state of being happy as one among several objects of value), or only desire fulfilment (and takes, instead, desire as useful but imperfect evidence –frequently distorted–of what the person herself values). 50 It differs also from other–non-utilitarian–approaches in not placing among value-objects primary goods as such (accepting these Rawlsian-focus variables only derivatively and instrumentally and only to the extent that these goods promote capabilities), or resources as such (valuing this Dworkinian perspective only in terms of the impact of resources on functionings and capabilities), and so forth. 51 A general acceptance of the intrinsic relevance and centrality of the various functionings and capabilities that make up our lives does have substantial cutting power, but it need not be based on a prior agreement on the relative values of the different functionings or capabilities, or on a specific procedure for deciding on those relative values. Indeed, it can be argued that it may be a mistake to move on relentlessly until one gets to exactly one mechanism for determining relative weights, or — to turn to a different aspect of the ‘incompleteness’ — until one arrives at exactly one interpretation of the metaphysics of value. There are substantive differences between different ethical theories at different levels, from the meta-ethical (involving such issues as objectivity) to the motivational, and it is not obvious that for substantive political and social philosophy it is sensible to insist that all these general issues be resolved before an agreement is reached on the choice of an evaluative space. Just as the utilization of actual weights in practical exercises may be based on the acceptance of a certain range of variability of weights (as I have tried to discuss in the context of the use of the capability approach 52), even the general rationale for using such an approach may be consistent with some ranges of answers to foundational questions.

#### This outweighs a) the resolution is a political question about obligations between societies and res context constrains our theories, e.g. this resolution is inappropriate for medical ethics and b) political philosophy guarantees a starting point based on our actual convictions.

#### 3. It’s most consistent with how moral language works—we regularly weigh multiple disparate sources of value.

Sen 3 [Sen, Amartya (Trinity College, Cambridge). “Capabilities and Well-Being.” In Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1993. Print. pp. 30–53 // XR]

Clearly, there is at least no informational loss in seeing well-being evaluation in terms of capabilities, rather than directly in terms of the achieved, or chosen, or maximal functioning n-tuple. While this indicates that the informational base of capability is at least as adequate as that of achieved functionings, the claim in favour of the capability perspective is, in fact, stronger. The advantages of the extension arise from two rather different types of consideration[s]. First, we may be interested not merely in examining ‘well-being achievement’, but also ‘well-being freedom’. A person's actual freedom to live well and be well is of some interest in social as well as personal evaluation. 23 Even if we were to take the view, which will be disputed presently, that well-being achievement depends only on the achieved functionings, the ‘well-being freedom’ of a person will represent the freedom to enjoy the various possible well-beings associated with the different functioning n-tuples in the capability set. 24 Second, freedom may have intrinsic importance for the person's well-being achievement. Acting freely and being able to choose may be directly conducive to well-being, not just because more freedom may make better alternatives available. This view is contrary to the one typically assumed in standard consumer theory, in which the contribution of a set of feasible choices is judged exclusively by the value of the best element available. 25 Even the removal of all the elements of a feasible set (e.g. of a ‘budget set’) other than the chosen best element is seen, in that theory, as no real loss, since the freedom to choose does not, in this view, matter in itself. In contrast, if choosing is seen as a part of living (and ‘doing x’ is distinguished from ‘choosing to do x and doing it’), then even ‘well-being achievement’ need not be independent of the freedom reflected in the capability set. 26 In that case, both ‘well-being achievement’ and ‘well-being freedom’ will have to be assessed in terms of capability sets. Both must then involve ‘set evaluation’ in a non-elementary way (i.e. without limiting the usable informational content of capability sets through elementary evaluation). There are many formal problems involved in the evaluation of freedom and the relationship between freedom and achievement. 27 It is, in fact, possible to characterize functionings in a ‘refined’ way to take note of the ‘counterfactual’ opportunities, so that the characteristic of relating well-being achievement to functioning n-tuples could be retained without losing the substantive connection of well-being achievement to the freedom of choice enjoyed by the person. Corresponding to the functioning x, a ‘refined’ functioning (x/S) takes the form of ‘having functioning x through choosing it from the set S’. 28 Sometimes even our ordinary language presents functionings in a refined way. For example, fasting is not just starving, but starving through rejecting the option of eating. The distinction is obviously important in many social contexts: we may, for example, try to eliminate involuntary hunger, but not wish to forbid fasting. The importance of seeing functionings in a refined way relates to the relevance of choice in our lives. The role of the choice involved in a capability set has been discussed above in the context of well-being only, but similar arguments apply to the assessment of agency achievement and the standard of living. 2

#### Also proves the aff subsumes the NC—you can re-describe any ethical theory in terms of capabilities to experience happiness, to have choice, etc.

#### Thus the standard is promoting capabilities. It does not claim that consequences are the *only* evaluand, just that they are important. Further, the capabilities approach includes freedom, gender equality, and education in its evaluative space. These values are mutually realizable in global development, and impose obligations on well-equipped actors to realize them.

### Impact calc:

#### 1. Situated evaluation is necessary for moral responsibility. Your evaluation of a killing differs if you are the murderer as opposed to merely observing the death. Moral decisionmaking occurs in particular situations, and the information a situation presents may change our evaluation of an action.

Sen 2k [Sen, Amartya (Trinity College, Cambridge). “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason.” *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 97, No. 9 (Sep., 2000), pp. 477-502. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2678488> Accessed: 12/07/2010 12:50 // XR]

From which perspective should the evaluation be done? The demand of situated evaluation requires that a person not ignore the particular position from which she is making the choice. Consider, for example, the parent of a child for whom she is choosing a particular baby food. The requirement of situated evaluation does not, in any way, vindicate smugness about one's contingent level of ignorance, and does not deny the need for the person to find out, if reasonably possible, more about what others know or see (for example, that the baby food with which the parent is familiar might have been shown to be harmful). Nor does it deny the relevance of broader sympathies (for example, a parent may well ask whether it is right that her child should have the benefit of some baby food to which other children do not have access). What is denied is the possibility of ignoring the person's own responsibilities in her particular situation, in this case that of being a parent of this child. Even if the decision is to respond to some considerations coming from outside her situation (such as not using a baby food of which the neighbors are suspicious, or not giving one's child a baby food that the neighbors cannot afford to give to their children), that decision would have to be worked out from-and in this sense be compatible with-the responsibility she has toward her child for whom she is choosing a baby food (the "other" considerations and their impor- tance would have to be evaluated by the parent situated in her own position). She has to take responsibility for not only her choices of substantive actions (going beyond evaluation), but also for her evaluations on which the choices are to be based. She has to do the evaluation, taking note-as Arjuna does-of her own position in the events and of her responsibility for things that may happen as a result of what she does. This valuational issue raises a question of great importance regard- ing the relationship between the person who is doing the evaluation (as well as the choosing) and the particular circumstances in which she is situated. Arjuna is bothered not merely by the fact that many will die if the war were to take place, but also by the fact that he will himself be killing lots of people and by the further fact that many of the people to be killed are persons for whom he himself has affection. These are the things that contribute to the bad nature of the events that would occur due to the war, seen particularly from the position of Arjuna himself. This realization is part and parcel of his taking responsibility for his choices and their consequences. Another observer who is uninvolved in these events need not attach any special importance to the fact that Arjuna (not he, but Arjuna) will be killing people, and that among the dead will be people for whom Arjuna (not he, but Arjuna) feels closeness and affection. Arjuna cannot reasonably take a similarly detached view of the consequences of his choice, since he is directly involved in making this choice. The evaluations can, thus, be reasonably situated in the life of the person doing the evaluation and making the choices. This contrasts quite sharply with the utilitarian formula that the evaluation must be, in every way, independent of the evaluator and, in particular, must take the very specific form of maximizing the sum total of utilities. Such has been the hold of utilitarianism within the general discipline of consequential evaluation that rather than taking the utilitarian claim of evaluator-independence as a very special case (at best admis- sible and certainly not mandatory), consequentialism is often defined as having to depend inescapably on evaluator-independent valua- tions. I should also comment on the fact that the discipline of position- related evaluator-relativity, the fuller implications of which I have tried to explore elsewhere,1" must be distinguished from a claim that anyone is free to evaluate consequences as he likes. Far from being free to evaluate consequences as he likes, Arjuna has the responsibil- ity-indeed cannot escape the responsibility-to take note of the spe- cial badness of the events as he must evaluate them, because he himself would have to do some of the killing, and victims would often be quite innocent persons for whom Arjuna has affection. It is not so much a license to evaluate the outcomes as one likes, but a requirement that one must take note of the contingent connections and circum- stances that characterize Arjuna's situation in this choice problem. Responsibility-and this is the important point here- demands situated valuation by the agents.

#### 2. Both processes and immediate effects play a role in moral evaluation.

Sen 2k [Sen, Amartya (Trinity College, Cambridge). “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason.” *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 97, No. 9 (Sep., 2000), pp. 477-502. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2678488> Accessed: 12/07/2010 12:50 // XR]

A state of affairs is informationally rich. There is no particular reason to insist on an impoverished account of a state of affairs in evaluating it. Also, the reach of consequential reasoning can incorporate processes of choice, and not merely the narrowly defined ultimate outcomes. In the context of decision theory and rational choice, I have argued for the importance of paying particular attention to "comprehensive outcomes" (including actions undertaken, processes involved, and the like along with the final outcomes), in- stead of confining attention to only the "culmination outcome" (what happens at the very end).21 The distinction can be very central to certain problems in economics, politics, sociology, and in the general theory of rational decisions and games. As it happens, the distinction is also crucial in assessing the reach of consequential reasoning. If, for example, a presidential candidate were to argue that what is really important is not just to win the forthcoming election, but "to win the election fairly," then the outcome recommended is a comprehensive outcome, which includes a process consideration (not just the culmination outcome of winning the election- no matter how).22 The appraisal of comprehensive outcomes can be an integral part of the assessment of states of affairs, and thus a crucial building block in consequential evaluation

#### 3. Total aggregation is impossible and undesirable: a) each person’s brains are inaccessible – reports of pleasure, pain, preferences, etc., are all flawed data b) what makes some values, like freedom, valuable is that they are not features of a society but instead deeply individual c) ten headaches are not one migraine – there’s no person capable of experiencing aggregative harms.

## Offense

#### Sociocultural obstacles prevent girls and womens’ education in developing countries—the capability to attend school is limited.

Jill Filipovic 17, 5-15-2017, "How do you get girls to school in the least educated country on Earth?," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/may/15/niger-girls-education-challenge-un

Men and boys, too, face low rates of education and literacy in Niger, but women and girls remain worse off. Economically and culturally, boys tend to be afforded more opportunities, and when a family decides it can only send some of its children to school, it’s the girls who stay home. That, advocates say, feeds into a series of other social ills. Chief among them is early marriage, which brings with it poverty and high rates of infant and maternal mortality. Marriage, says Maggie Janes-Lucas, Mercy Corps’ senior programme officer for west and central Africa, “can be physically, emotionally detrimental to her and to her longer-term health. We believe that giving these girls the opportunity to integrate [into] formal schooling and to continue their schooling will reduce these risks.” Low rates of education also help keep Niger poor. One World Bank study found that a year of secondary schooling can mean as much as a 25% increase in a woman’s earnings later in life, which in turn helps fuel her country’s economy. According to some estimates, a single percentage point increase in girls’ education translates into a GDP boost of .3%. And an educated mother is more likely to send her own daughters to school, fueling increased educational attainment and economic development over generations. Getting more girls into school, then, is a linchpin to increase wealth, stability, equality and development. Niger has a long way to go on the UN’s sustainable development goals for both education and gender equality and investment in education remains outpaced by need. The complex set of intertwined political, cultural and economic forces keeping the country impoverished and volatile means the simple task of getting girls to stay in school is bigger than it looks – and a challenge even the most dedicated educators and advocates have yet to figure out how to meet. Niger’s startlingly low rates of literacy and education are both caused by and feed back into a cycle of poverty, early marriage and large family size. For the Soumana children, and children across Niger, the barriers to formal education are high. In a rural country, schools are often far from the village, and students walk several kilometres each way in the punishing heat. Many schools don’t have functional latrines, and so when girls start their periods, they stay home. Teachers are often on strike because they aren’t paid well or go months without being paid at all; this year, education advocates say, public school teachers have been on strike nearly half of all teaching days, leaving their students well behind in their studies. Under the Nigerien system, students have to pass an exam to enter secondary school, and when they aren’t going to school consistently, many of them fail and drop out. Even when students attend school, Niger’s low literacy rates and booming numbers of young people – almost half of Niger’s population is under the age of 15 – means there simply aren’t enough literate, trained teachers to go around. Much of the educated population leaves. As a result, especially in the country’s more rural reaches, much of the in-classroom instruction is only just about better than nothing. “The huge problem is that with that rapid population growth no matter how many schools we build or how much support we give the ministry of education, it’s never enough,” says Patrick Rose, who works as a crisis communications specialist for Unicef in west and central Africa. “It’s a moving target. You can set a target and deliver X amount of schools for X amount of population, but the reality is it’s growing faster than anyone is able to cope with.” Conflict, too, keeps girls out of school. The kidnapping of the Chibok girls from their school in northern Nigeria made headlines around the world, but it’s [is] only one in a long list of assaults Boko Haram has leveled on schools, snatching girls and killing teachers – including in Niger. In the Diffa region of the country, hundreds of thousands of people are displaced by war. Parents fearful for their children’s lives don’t want to send them into danger; teachers fearful for their own often stay home or flee.

#### Gender equality in education is positively required by the standard: it is essential to the *realization* of multiple intertwined capabilities as well as to *discussion* about the goods of society more broadly.

Unterhalter 03 [Unterhalter, Elaine. (Professor of Education and International Development, University College London). “Education, capabilities and social justice.” Background paper prepared for the

Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2003/4: *Gender and Education for All: The Leap to Equality*. [http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001469/146971e.pdf //](http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001469/146971e.pdf%20//) XR]

The capability approach in education requires us to think about the gendered constraints on functionings and freedoms in educational organisations, like schools or adult literacy classes. It also draws attention to how sometimes, despite relatively high levels of education for girls and women, the legal system, the forms of political participation and economic ownership, or employment and leisure practices limit agency and ‘substantive’ freedom of girls and women, thus entailing capability deprivation. In some societies a good proportion of women do complete twelve years of schooling, but then encounter prohibitions on inheritance and property ownership, discrimination in relation to employment and assumptions about the food they will eat and how leisure time will be used. These arrangements are sometimes normalised, confirmed, or barely challenged by the form and content of what is learned at school. The capability approach in education alerts us to the importance of an expanded notion of freedom and agency and the extent to which these are inappropriately limited by forms of social arrangement. Indicators like ‘years of full-time schooling’ are related to, but by no means capture, these values. Gender inequality in social arrangements might constrain women from participating in family decision-making, might prevent them contributing to community, work-place or national discussions of important issues, one consequence of which might be that their interests are neglected when decisions on a course of action are taken. Education as an intrinsic good for women and men It is widely held in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in documentation associated with the EFA movement, with the Millennium Development Targets and in the Constitutions of many countries that education is an intrinsic good for women and men. But sometimes these statements appear merely rhetorical. Education is good partly because it helps secure other ‘goods’, for example securing a job, contributing to increased income, protecting one’s own health or the health of a child, participating in decision-making fora. But education is also a ‘good’ for women and men, because education is good in itself. All other things being equal an educated person, who can access a range of different ways of thinking about issues and participate fully in the life of a society has a more fulfilling life, than an uneducated person, who is barred from this, even though the educated person may not benefit financially. This analysis does not rest on any particular assumptions about what the content or form of education is, as in many different societies there are different ways of thinking about the nature of education. The capabilities approach helps us understand the nature of the intrinsic good of education, because it helps us distinguish those aspects of education that are linked to schooling and intertwined with achieved functionings, for example skills to undertake a certain kind of work or command a certain income or stand for local government, and those aspects of education that are part of a wider concern with substantive freedoms, possibly valuing considering a range of different viewpoints from newspapers, books, television and radio, valuing being able to participate in discussions of what should be taught and learned, valuing being regarded as an educated person. The capability approach gives much greater value to the second meaning of education than earlier approaches that tended to measure the value of education, only for example in how it contributed to increased GDP per capita.

#### Thus the plan: The United States will pledge to protect and continue the Let Girls Learn Program.

Tara Abrahams 16, 6-30-2016, "Why the Trump Administration Needs to Let Girls Learn," Glamour, <https://www.glamour.com/story/why-the-trump-administration-needs-to-let-girls-learn/> //ilake MW

Just two years after its unveiling, the former First Lady Michelle Obama’s signature girls’ education initiative is under threat. The Let Girls Learn program—launched by Mrs. Obama and President Barack Obama at the White House in 2015—recruits government agencies, corporations, and nonprofit organizations to invest in adolescent girls’ education around the globe—from creating safe schools with proper sanitation facilities to training female teachers. But under the Trump presidency, "Let girls learn" will no longer be the rallying cry for those committed to helping girls get to school and stay there. According to an internal Peace Corps memo, while certain aspects of the program may continue, employees have been instructed to stop using the Let Girls Learn brand and were informed that Let Girls Learn would no longer exist as a “standalone program.” This isn’t a surprising move coming from President Trump. Given his [Trump’s] relationship with the truth and even basic facts, education is likely high on the list of things he wants to disappear. What is surprising and disheartening is First Daughter Ivanka Trump’s silence on the end of Let Girls Learn, given her professed role as an “advocate for the education & empowerment of women & girls”. Amid confusion about whether the program will continue and in what form, girls’ education champions are outraged that the administration could even consider ending Let Girls Learn. And rightly so. In case we’ve forgotten, educating girls is the single best investment we can make in our future. When girls go to school, they get married later. They lead healthier lives. They earn more money. They [and] become leaders of their communities and their countries. They become leaders of the next generation. Educated girls become empowered women who go to medical school, start businesses that employ hundreds of people, volunteer in their local communities, and run for elected office. If we want to solve problems like climate change, income inequality, and political instability around the world, we need these women. We need girls to go to school. According to researcher Judith Bruce, a leading gender expert at The Population Council, “Failure to invest in girls is planned poverty.” The issue of girls’ education is personal for Glamour. In 2014, we started The Girl Project to mobilize our audience to get involved and support girls around the world who want to go to school. The response has been inspiring, with readers around the world taking action on behalf of vulnerable girls everywhere. Having partnered with Mrs. Obama on two dynamic global events on girls’ education,\* Glamour can vouch for the Let Girls Learn platform as one of the best ways to elevate the issue to the highest levels of power and policy making. Xanthe Ackerman, a leading girls’ education advocate and cofounder of the Fuller Project for International Reporting, agrees: “If Let Girls Learn is shut down, let’s hope it is replaced with a program that shows U.S. leadership on this critical issue, especially in conflict-affected countries where girls are more than twice as likely to be out of school.” The White House now says that despite the internal memo, the Let Girls Learn program will not change. Spokeswoman Kelly Love said on Tuesday morning, “We are committed to empowering women and girls around the world and are continuing to examine the best ways to do so.” But even if this commitment is sincere, undermining Let Girls Learn means cutting a growing movement off at the knees, even though girls’ education represents one of our best hopes for bipartisan collaboration. To date, financial pledges to Let Girls Learn have surpassed $1 billion, which supports programs in more than 50 countries, from empowerment workshops in Japan to the building of girls’ schools in Jordan. These programs are poised to make a real difference for girls everywhere. What is the best way to empower women and girls? It’s [is] simple. Let girls learn.

#### Let Girls Learn runs programs, specialized schools, and facilities that help girls and women remain in or go back to school—the program is a mechanism that converts money to material improvements.

Michelle Obama 16, First Lady and co-creator of the Let Girls Learn program. Michelle Obama’s speech about LetGirlsLearn. CNN. <http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/01/opinions/africa-trip-michelle-obama/index.htm> //ilake MW

We also know that educating girls doesn't just transform their life prospects -- it transforms the prospects of their families, communities, and nations as well. Studies show that girls who are educated earn higher salaries -- 10 to 20 percent more for each additional year of secondary school -- and sending more girls to school and into the workforce can boost an entire country's GDP. Educated girls also marry later, have lower rates of infant and maternal mortality, and are more likely to immunize their children and less likely to contract malaria and HIV.That's why, last year, President Obama and I launched Let Girls Learn, an initiative to help adolescent girls worldwide attend school. And this week, we were proud to announce major new efforts by the U.S. government to promote girls' education in Africa. In Liberia we'll be running girls' empowerment programs, working to end gender violence in schools, and supporting new, second-chance schools for girls who were forced to drop out because of pregnancy or rape. In Morocco we'll be working closely with the Moroccan government to help transform high schools across the country, and we'll be supporting new school dormitories to allow girls from rural areas to attend school far from home. Large scale efforts like these are critically important, and will affect the lives of countless girls, but they're simply not enough. Governments alone cannot solve this problem -- not when we're talking about a number like 62 million.

#### One school can help girls access opportunities—those girls will then be able to continue the trend of empowerment and education for their children even if aid money runs out. This outweighs; it creates a positive feedback loop that expands over time.

Joe McCarthy 15, 8-7-2015, "Educating girls is the key to ending poverty," Global Citizen, https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/educating-girls-is-the-key-to-ending-poverty/

Poverty is cyclical. The best indicator of if a child will end up in poverty is if her parents live in poverty. It’s pretty simple to understand: (1) Economic classes tend to segregate (2) Meaning poor people generally live clustered together (3) Meaning that their collective political clout degrades and rarely leads to improved access to resources and opportunities. But there is one secret weapon underused, or deliberately neglected, in most communities around the world that can break this cycle: the education of girls & women. Yes, it’s that simple. If girls & women around the world were given an education (a full education!), then poverty would not be so persistent. Let me explain: Imagine you’re a young girl living in a small village that doesn’t have access to clean water and sanitation, among many other things. There’s a good chance you’ll experience continual hunger, which, if experienced frequently before the age of 2, can lead to irreversible damage. A schoolhouse is 10 miles away, but there is a small fee for each pupil. Your parents can only afford to send one of their children to learn at this school and since boys are deemed more valuable, your brother gets to walk there every day. So you never learn how to read or write or how to do advanced arithmetic. You are forced to work long hours to help support your brother’s education. Maybe you spend your days fetching water or scrounging for food. And it’s likely that you’ll end up married (1 in 3 girls in the developing world are married before 18) and having kids in your early- to mid-teens. If the children are girls, then their situation will probably resemble yours, especially since you’ve never had the chance to stabilize your economic situation. But there’s a good chance you won’t even be involved in the lives of your children, because complications during pregnancy are the leading cause of death for girls aged 15-19 globally (pause to think about how much more treacherous the road becomes for the next generation when this happens). Now imagine the alternative: You live in conditions similar to those described above, but the nearby school has no fee, or, even better, has an incentive program in place to ease the cultural resistance against sending girls to school. For instance, in Egypt girls who attend 80 percent of school days receive rations that amount to more than they would earn had they been working instead. Therefore, families who send their kids to school every day will have more to eat. Instead of working your youth away, you’re busy learning about the world and of the many opportunities available. The benefits accumulate each year. Adolescent girls that attend school are less likely to get married and have children at a young age. Child marriage would fall by 64 percent worldwide if every girl received an education! Educated women are also less likely to contract diseases such as HIV and AIDS. An extra year of secondary school for a girl can increase her lifetime earnings by 15 to 25 percent. Women who receive an education are more likely to become entrepreneurs, invest in their communities and empower other women. Suddenly, the toxic cycle of poverty is turned inside-out and becomes a cycle of prosperity. Sounds great, right? Why aren’t girls being shepherded into schools? Why aren’t book, computers, connections flooding their neighborhoods? Well: barriers. Cultural restrictions may be strong, schools expensive, sanitation facilities inadequate, violence against women prevalent and the pressure to work all-encompassing. But each of these barriers can be systematically dismantled. Educating girls is the key to ending poverty. Programs can be enacted to make it economically worthwhile for families to send their girls to school. Schools with adequate resources and sanitation facilities can be constructed. Some of the cultural barriers may be more ingrained and hard to shed, but as girls become educated they become remarkable advocates for one another. Children of educated women are more likely to attend school for longer. Global Citizens can play a role in deploying the secret weapon against poverty as well. Globally, 62 million girls do not have access to either primary or secondary school. To close this deficit, $39 billion will need to be mustered annually (which is the equivalent of 8 days of global military spending, so not that much when you think of it that way).

## Underview