# Turkey AC

## Aff

#### The United States stores over 50 B61 nuclear bombs at Incirlik airbase in Turkey, and they aren’t going anywhere soon.

Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, where his work focuses on nuclear disarmament, deterrence, and arms control, preventing nuclear terrorism, missile defense, and the defense budget, Concern Grows About U.S. Weapons in Turkey, November 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/news/concern-grows-about-us-weapons-turkey> ///AHS PB

As a matter of policy, the U.S. Defense Department does not comment on the presence or number of nuclear weapons in Turkey or anywhere else in Europe. But President Donald Trump appeared to confirm, at least indirectly, the existence of the weapons in Turkey in comments to reporters at the Oval Office on Oct. 16. Asked about the security of the weapons at Incirlik, Trump said he was “confident” in their safety. Victoria Coates, the senior director for the Middle East on the National Securfity Council, also appeared to acknowledge the presence of the weapons in an Oct. 15 interview. Asked if the administration is planning to remove the weapons from Turkey, Coates said, “There are no plans for that at the moment that I’m aware of.”

#### Turkey is holding the B61s hostage, their very existence causes regional conflict, Turkish aquirement, nuclear terrorism, and political blackmail.

Sébastien Roblin, Journalist focused international security and military history with more than 500 published articles at The National Interest, NBC and War is Boring, Turkey fired on U.S. special forces in Syria. It's absurd that it still has U.S. nukes, Oct. 18, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/turkey-fired-u-s-special-forces-syria-it-s-absurd-ncna1068361 ///AHS PB

Recent comments by Erdogan have caused some to fear he may be motivated to seize the nukes in Incirlik. In September, Erdogan stated in a speech that Turkey should have its own nukes, making the demonstrably false claim that “there’s no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them.” While the 700-pound B61s are considered small “tactical” nuclear weapons, that needs to be put in context; the bombs in Turkey are designed so their explosive “yield” can be adjusted to between one-fifitieth and 11 times the effect of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in World War II. To be fair, one shouldn’t exaggerate the risks of a James Bond-style nuclear heist. Though the base’s extensive security measures might only delay the Turkish military if it was intent on seizing the nukes, the bombs use Permissive Action Links, meaning their fuse can only be activated using a code transmitted by the U.S. president or his designated second-in-command. Furthermore, the B61s are designed so that U.S. technicians at the base can rapidly sabotage them by overheating their thermal batteries. This means that even if the B61s were somehow seized or stolen, they would require extensive modification to convert into usable weapons, though the materials inside them could be used in a dirty bomb — designed to contaminate a large area with radiation. On the other hand, the danger doesn’t end there. The nukes could be attacked by anti-American militants —the base is only 70 miles away from Turkish-Syrian border — resulting in loss of life even if the bombs aren’t captured. Worse, the nukes could effectively be used as bargaining chips to advance Turkish interests at the expense of America’s. That’s not impossible to imagine, because Erdogan has not hesitated to use political prisoners as bargaining chips in efforts to obtain concessions in arms deals. For example, in 2017, Ankara held onto a Turkish-German national journalist, offering to release him to Germany in exchange for Berlin authorizing upgrades to Turkish Leopard 2 tanks. And the Incirlik base itself has been at the center of troubling activity. In 2016, Turkish Air Force officers at Incirlik plotted and deployed aircraft in support of the coup. The Turkish government then cut electricity to the base, impacting the security of the U.S. nuclear facilities there.

#### Nukes are bad—even a small scale explosion kills millions

ICAN, Swiss anti-nuclear weapons organization—won the 2017 Nobel Peace prize, Catastrophic harm, No Date, <https://www.icanw.org/catastrophic_harm> ///AHS PB

1 A single nuclear weapon can destroy a city and kill most of its people. Several nuclear explosions over modern cities would kill tens of millions of people. Casualties from a major nuclear war between the US and Russia would reach hundreds of millions. [Modeling the effects on cities →](https://www.icanw.org/modeling_the_effects_on_cities) [Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings →](https://www.icanw.org/hiroshima_and_nagasaki_bombings) 2 The extreme destruction caused by nuclear weapons cannot be limited to military targets or to combatants. [Blast, heat and radiation →](https://www.icanw.org/blast_heat_and_radiation) [Outlawing inhumane weapons →](https://www.icanw.org/outlawing_inhumane_weapons) 3 Nuclear weapons produce ionizing radiation, which kills or sickens those exposed, contaminates the environment, and has long-term health consequences, including cancer and genetic damage. [The legacy of nuclear testing →](https://www.icanw.org/the_legacy_of_nuclear_testing) [Nuclear weapons production →](https://www.icanw.org/nuclear_weapons_production) 4 Less than one percent of the nuclear weapons in the world could disrupt the global climate and threaten as many as two billion people with starvation in a nuclear famine. The thousands of nuclear weapons possessed by the US and Russia could bring about a nuclear winter, destroying the essential ecosystems on which all life depends. [Climate disruption and famine →](https://www.icanw.org/climate_disruption_and_famine) 5 Physicians and first responders would be unable to work in devastated, radioactively contaminated areas. Even a single nuclear detonation in a modern city would strain existing disaster relief resources to the breaking point; a nuclear war would overwhelm any relief system we could build in advance. Displaced populations from a nuclear war will produce a refugee crisis that is orders of magnitude larger than any we have ever experienced.

#### The Incirlik nukes serve no purpose besides being sitting ducks – lack of proper aircraft, regional nuclear umbrella, and no modernization mean they are useless for regional deterrence.

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But Turkey no longer has any F-16s and pilots certified to deliver nuclear weapons. Nor are any of the U.S. jets based at Incirlik modified for that job. So it’s extremely unlikely that the bombs in Incirlik would make any material difference to guaranteeing Turkish or American security. After all, as long as Turkey remains in NATO, nuclear weapons based elsewhere in Europe would still be at hand to deter against attacks on Turkey by other countries. Turkey would have gotten F-35s, except it was kicked out of the program earlier this year because of its purchase of Russian air-defense weapons that violated U.S. sanctions on Moscow and posed a security vulnerability to those same stealth jets. That in itself tells much of the story: An ally once so close it was due to receive and build parts for F-35s full of sensitive technology loses its access to the advanced jets because it is no longer deemed reliable and trustworthy. Lacking even aircraft at hand capable of dropping them, the nukes at Incirlik are therefore purely symbolic — a supposed testament to the strength of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. And for years, Washington has been more preoccupied with the symbolic implications of withdrawing the nukes rather than the security risks posed by keeping them in Turkey.

#### Thus the plan: The United States ought to eliminate its nuclear arsenals from Incirlik Air Base.

Harvey M. Sapolsky, Professor Emeritus at MIT and the former Director of the MIT Security Studies Program, Time to Pull US Nuclear Weapons Out of Turkey, MAY 17, 2019, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/05/get-us-nuclear-weapons-out-turkey/157101/> ///AHS PB

Storing nuclear weapons close to trouble is a bad idea. Giving Turkey a shared finger on the nuclear trigger is rapidly losing its charm especially as Turkey flirts with Russia and has growing grievances with the United States. Let’s end NATO’s nuclear-sharing program, beginning with the nuclear weapons at Incirlik.

#### Neg risk scenarios are flawed:

#### [1] US nuclear reallocation does not affect our relationship with Turkey and enhances global credibility.

Jim Baird, Research Associate with the Defense Strategy and Planning program at the Stimson Center, Pull the Nukes from Turkey — and Then Think Bigger, OCTOBER 29, 2019, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/10/pull-nukes-turkey-and-then-think-bigger/160936/> ///AHS PB

Some critics argued then, as they do now, that withdrawing nuclear weapons from Turkey would damage already-weak U.S.-Turkish relations. The fact of the matter is that the United States has a long history of assessing the geopolitical realities on the ground and re-positioning its nuclear forces accordingly. In 1991, the United States removed weapons from South Korea. In 2008, the final American nukes left Britain. Their removal was a response to changing strategic realities after the Cold War. Relations with South Korea and the U.K remained strong as ever. Of course, Turkey’s recent behavior has already strained relations with the West; President Erdogan has indicated his desire to acquire nuclear weapons. If the removal of U.S. nuclear forces from Turkey sends a message about the state of U.S.-Turkish relations, it would serve as a well-deserved rebuke. Removing nuclear weapons from Turkey is a smart next step, but the Trump administration should think bigger. The United States could save billions of dollars by removing its nuclear weapons from Europe and halting efforts to build new ones, according to a Stimson Center analysis. Those savings could help modernize conventional forces in the region and upgrade multi-domain capabilities and counter-terrorism efforts to better defend against modern threats. President Trump recently expressed confidence in the security of America’s nuclear weapons in Turkey, even as the Air Force recently denied sending reinforcements. But having weapons of little utility in an increasingly volatile region does U.S. security interests no favors. Nor does giving Turkey leverage over U.S. forces and assets that they could potentially take hostage in the event of a real crisis. Removing these artifacts of the Cold War from Turkey is the only sure-fire way to ensure their security. There is no good reason that U.S. nuclear weapons should continue to remain based in a tinderbox near the Syrian border. The Trump administration has a chance to make a move that reduces risk in the region and strengthens the credibility of U.S. diplomacy. With the fast-moving events in Turkey and Syria, there’s not a moment to waste.

#### [2] Turkey has no domestic nuclear capability—if they want bombs they need to steal.

Paul Iddon, freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan. He writes about Middle East developments, history and politics, Turkey’s nuclear future, Oct 21 2019, <https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-nuclear-power/turkeys-nuclear-future> ///AHS PB

On two occasions in September, Erdoğan said it was unacceptable that Turkey could not have nuclear weapons. “Some countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But [they tell us] we can’t have them. This, I cannot accept,” he [said](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-nuclear-erdogan/erdogan-says-its-unacceptable-that-turkey-cant-have-nuclear-weapons-idUSKCN1VP2QN). “There is no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them,” he went on to falsely claim. Later at the UN General Assembly, the Turkish president insisted that the possession of such technology “should either be forbidden for all, or permissible for everyone.” Erdoğan did not specify whether or not Turkey had any plans to acquire such weapons, which is unlikely. Turkey is not presently pursuing a nuclear weapons programme and also lacks the basic infrastructure to build one even if it decides to do so. The only nuclear-related technology being developed in Turkey today is the Akkuyu nuclear power plant on its Mediterranean coast. Russia won the contract to build the facility in 2010 and construction work began in April 2018. Erdoğan hopes the $20 billion project will be completed by the 2023 centennial. But [it will likely take longer](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-turkey-nuclear/turkeys-planned-20-billion-russian-built-nuclear-plant-facing-delay-idUSKCN1GL1W2) since Rosatom, the Russian manufacturer, has had trouble finding Turkish partners to take a 49 percent stake in the project. Also, the plant is being built in an area prone to earthquakes. This, along with reportedly [recurring cracks](https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/06/turkey-russia-fears-over-safety-of-nuclear-plant-flare-up.html) in the concrete foundation of the site, has led to concerns and questions about its safety. Even if Akkuyu is completed soon and Turkey procures all the technical knowhow to build reactors of its own, neither of which is likely, it still would not have the means to make nuclear weapons. “Developing nuclear power is one thing,” Dr. Ali Bakeer, a political analyst and consultant, told Ahval. “Developing nuclear weapons is quite another.” He said that while “Moscow is helping Ankara in the Akkuyu project it has no interest in a nuclear-capable Turkey and certainly will not help a NATO member to develop nuclear weapons or the means to do so.”

## Aff V2 Updated

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#### Cut card about Stealing

#### Get good impact card

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#### Independently the B-61s are useless to US deterrence strategy.

Alex Lockie, Former news editor and a military and foreign-policy blogger at Business Insider, The US is going to spend $8 billion on completely useless bombs, Aug 16, 2016, <https://www.businessinsider.com/b61-nuclear-gravity-bomb-is-useless-2016-8> ///AHS PB

First off, the US is not allowed to land the nuclear capable planes these bombs require at Incirlik. Second, even Turkey doesn't operate planes that can carry these nukes. Third, the nukes are of an old and irrelevant design, and they should provide no comfort to anyone as a deterrent. General James Cartwright, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote the following of the B61s in a 2012 report: “Their military utility is practically nil. They do not have assigned missions as part of any war plan and remain deployed today only for political reasons within the NATO alliance. The obligation to assure US allies in Europe ... would fall to US strategic nuclear and conventional forces, which are amply capable of fulfilling it.” In an interview with Business Insider, Heeley echoed these sentiments. The B61s are short-range and low-yield, not the type of bomb we would use in an actual conflict. "The likely hood right is that we're going to use the big bombs, and not the little bombs," Heeley said. In the event that the US would move to use the B61s at Incirlik, a NATO ally would have to remove the bombs from Turkey, bring them to another base, and then the US could equip them onto a bomber. Such a feet of logistics would be hard to conceal from any worthy adversary. Furthermore, the US is currently [updating every leg of the nuclear triad](http://www.businessinsider.com/us-needs-450-billion-nuclear-modernization-2016-8) — the ability to launch nuclear weapons from the air, land, and sea. This effort is expected to cost anywhere from $450 billion to $1 trillion, but the B61s don't need to be a part of that picture. As they are gravity bombs, these nukes are dropped by bombers from the sky, which would require a bomber to fly over its target. In this age of advanced air defenses, gravity bombs have simply outlived their use. The Pentagon is [currently developing](http://www.businessinsider.com/air-force-stealthy-nuclear-armed-cruise-missiles-2016-8) a long-range standoff cruise missile to eliminate the need to risk bombers and crews over contested air spaces.

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# 1AR

## Case

### Extension

## Policy Theory

### PICS

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not read plan inclusive counterplans. : 1] They steal the entire aff which moots 6 minutes of AC speech time 2] PICS allow the neg to auto win by finding tiny, trivially true issues that would easily be outweighed by the advantage 3] PICS kill substantive education since they incentivize the neg to go for nitpicky objections every round instead of respond to the aff.

### Condo

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not read conditional [Alternatives/Counterplans]: 1] Condo scews aff strategy since I only have 4 minutes to respond to 3] Its irreciprocal since I can’t kick the aff but you can garner offense off multiple advocacies.

### Links Of Omission

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not read links of omission. 1] unpredictable 2] irresolvable 3] uneducational

## CP’s

### A2 Disable CP

#### [1] Disabling doesn’t solve Turkey can repair

Joseph V. Micallef, best-selling military history and world affairs author, and keynote speaker, Is It Time to Withdraw US Nuclear Weapons from Incirlik?, 14 Nov 2019, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/14/it-time-withdraw-us-nuclear-weapons-incirlik.html> ///AHS PB

Disabling the bomb renders it useless. Bombs that have been disabled have to be returned to Pantax for repair. It is not inconceivable, however, that should the Turkish government obtain the disabled bombs, it could, with external aid, be able to repair the devices and make them usable again.

#### [2] It’s a question of access to nuclear materials. Crossapply Roblin which says even if conventional use fails, Turkey and Terrorists can use the uranium to make a dirty bomb

#### [3] Even if the Nukes aren’t usable their presence causes conflict and hostage taking which still leads to death.

### A2 NFU CP

#### [1] Non unique: The US already has NFU, but that wont stop Turkey or Terrorists from stealing our weapons.

#### [2] The aff solves better, no reason why Turkey should have NFU if we can stop it from having nukes in the first place

#### [3] NFU fails: A] Just claiming miscalc allows states to launch and call it a second strike B] States don’t trust each other and will still launch anyway, then can just ignore the law.

#### [4] Perm do both – no mutual exclusivity and net benefit is the advantage—things like hostage taking and regional instability are still bad with NFU.

### A2 Transfer CP w T-Elim

#### [1] Turkey as to consent to direct removal, but they want to steal

Miles A. Pomper, Senior Fellow in the Washington DC office of Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Why the US has nuclear bombs in Turkey, and why it's so tricky to remove them, Oct 24, 2019, <https://www.businessinsider.com/us-nuclear-bombs-in-turkey-tricky-to-remove-2019-10> ///AHS PB

Taking the weapons out of Turkey carries some physical risks. The bombs aren't terribly heavy — [roughly 700 pounds](https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/19263/get-to-know-americas-long-serving-b61-family-of-nuclear-bombs) each — but moving nuclear material requires significant security. In addition, the Turkish government would have to help — or at least not stand in the way — of [landing transport planes or sending cargo convoys by land or sea](https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/30417/u-s-reviewing-options-for-pulling-nuclear-bombs-out-of-turkey-heres-how-they-might-do-it).

#### [2] Can permanently destroy Nukes

#### [3] No use for the Nukes—not updated

#### [5]

#### [] Perm do the counterplan: If I win a counterinterp to T, transferring is consistent with elimination.

### A2 Transfer CP wo T-Elim

#### Perm do the counterplan: I advocate eliminating them from Incirlik Air Base, which means that we don’t destroy the bombs, just remove them, so any transfer is consistent with my advocacy.

### A2 Asteroids CP

#### [1] Perm do both: The counterplan is entirely uncompetitive with the aff.

#### [A] The Nukes are Incirlik are manual bombs which mean they cant be attached to missiles and don’t work with most planes. These aren’t the bombs we will use.

#### [B] We only get rid of a small part of America’s nuclear arsenal which means, every other US Nuke and every other country can still shoot down the asteroid.

#### [2] Non unique-- Nuking Asteroids has been illegal since the cold war due to testing treaties[[1]](#footnote-1).

#### [3] Zero Risk

Everitt 8[James “If an asteroid hit the earth?” published 12/20/2008; http://push.pickensplan.com/video/2187034:Video:1691581]

A computer video circulating the internet has rekindled fears that an asteroid will hit Earth and send mankind the way of the brontosaurus. Based on NASA projections, there is indeed a chance that such an asteroid will impact Earth in the next year. **It is 1 in 2,518,072** This number is derived from NASA calculations of the likelihood of a strike by any one of the six substantial Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) whose current course could intersect our planet's in 2009. The most likely of the bunch, an NEO named 2008 AO112, alone has a 1 in 4,000,000 chance of impacting Earth. In other words, there's a 99.999975% chance the thing will miss us. By comparison, in the new year, based on recent National Safety Council data, chances are less that you will be killed by an asteroid than by the following: Motor vehicle accident: 1 in 6,539 Exposure to noxious substances: 1 in 12,554 Assault by firearm: 1 in 24,005 Accidental drowning: 1 in 82,777 Exposure to smoke, fire or flames: 1 in 92,745 Exposure to forces of nature (lightning, flood, storms, etc.): 1 in 136,075 **Falling out of bed** or off other furniture: 1 in 329,819 Choking on food: 1 in 343,179 Air and space transport accidents: 1 in 502,554 Exposure to electric current, radiation, temperature, and pressure: 1 in 705,969 Being bitten, stung or crushed by another person or animal: 1 in 1,841,659 Chances You'll Be Killed by an Asteroid in 2009! Conclusion: It would be statistically unwise to sell your home (your chances of selling it aside) and use the proceeds for a pre-asteroid splurge in the tropics. Alternatively, if you are considering fleeing Earth, you are more likely to die by spacecraft accident than by asteroid. And if you do so anyway, given the chance of being bitten, stung or crushed by another person or animal, your chances are even worse if you bring company.

#### [4] Nukes fail and asteroids reconstruct

Andrew Masterson, Science reporter citing physics Profs from John Hopkins, Think we can nuke away an incoming asteroid? Think again, 2019, <https://cosmosmagazine.com/space/think-we-can-nuke-away-an-incoming-asteroid-think-again> ///AHS PB

The research, [published](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.icarus.2018.12.032) in the journal Icarus, shows that an asteroid damaged in a collision – by another asteroid, for instance, or a nuclear missile fired at it in the blind hope that doing so will prevent it from smacking into the planet with catastrophic consequences – will substantially reconstruct itself because of the strong gravitational pull of its still-intact core.

## DA’s

### A2 Kills Euro-Umbrella

####  [1] Their impacts are empirically disproven and misunderstand that allies still want a nuclear umbrella.

Hans M. Kristensen, the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists where he provides the public with analysis and background information about the status of nuclear forces and the role of nuclear weapons., Urgent: Move US Nuclear Weapons Out Of Turkey, Oct.16, 2019, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/ ///AHS PB

Another argument against withdrawal will be that moving them out of Turkey will cause the other members of the so-called nuclear sharing arrangement (Belgium, Germany, Holland, Italy) to question why they should continue to store U.S. nuclear weapons. Withdrawal from Turkey could, so the argument goes, trigger a domino effect of withdrawal from other countries as well. But the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear bombs from Greece in 2001 and from England five years later did not cause the other countries to demand withdrawal as well or the collapse of NATO. If they truly believe deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons is important for NATO security, then they will stay. If the mission falls with withdrawal from Turkey, then they obviously don’t think it’s important and the weapons should be withdrawn from all the countries anyway. The U.S. extended deterrence posture in Europe can adequately be maintained with advanced conventional forces backed up by strategic forced in the background.

#### [2] Allies know Turkey is unstable and it is isn’t a universal precedent, empirically proven by the fact NATO bilaterally kicked Turkey out of the fighter program.

#### [3] Your impact should have already triggered: A] We removed 40 Nukes in 2005 and other countries didn’t call for reductions[[2]](#footnote-2) B] The nukes at Incirlik aren’t modernized so Turkey isn’t part of the active deterrent force.

#### [4] Crossapply Baird who says that standing up to bad behavior enhances the overall credibility of our umbrella since it shows the US means business. Solves the DA since we reassure allies of our intentions.

### A2 Turkey-Nato Collapse DA

#### [1] Turkey wont leave Nato over Incirlik—multiple factors

Xinhua, official state-run press agency of the People's Republic of China, article is quoting US defense Mark Esper secretary, Haldun Solmazturk a US think tank specialist on Turkey, and Yaşar Yakış former Turkish ambassador to the UN, Spotlight: Kicking U.S. out of military bases would lead to Ankara-NATO crisis: analysts, 2019-12-22, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/22/c_138650306.htm> ///AHS PB

A day after Erdogan made threatening remarks, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper suggested that Turkey's commitment to NATO would be questioned if Ankara is serious about closing the two facilities at NATO's disposal. The Incirlik base in southern Turkey, whose proximity to Russia and Iran and its capacity to host heavy bombers and heavy transport aircraft are major assets for Washington, is also being used by NATO countries. The Kurecik radar base in the province of Malatya is widely argued to have been built as an early warning system to protect Israel against Iran's potential ballistic missile threat. Closing the Kurecik radar and expelling the U.S. personnel there would mean kicking NATO personnel out of Turkey, noted Solmazturk, who chairs the Incek debates at the Ankara-based 21st Century Turkey Institute. The defense spending bill adopted by the U.S. Congress also sanctions a joint Turkish-Russian gas pipeline project in the Black Sea. Erdogan's remarks indicate that Turkey is ready to close the two military bases if no settlement is reached, Haldun Yalcinkaya, an international relations analyst at the TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara, told Xinhua. Expressing strong dissatisfaction with the U.S. targeting the pipeline project as well, the Turkish president said Friday that the U.S. attitude amounts to a blatant breach of Turkey's rights. Ankara will launch its own sanctions against the U.S. in retaliation, he added, once again underlining that Ankara would not back away from the S-400 deal with Moscow. All the analysts think Trump could delay sanctions on Turkey for some time to unavoidably implement later those of the sanctions that would hurt Ankara less at best, as the president cannot totally ignore a law. Erdogan and Trump have a good personal relationship and the U.S. president has said several times that Ankara was obliged to buy the Russian air defense system as the former U.S. administration did not agree to sell the U.S. Patriot system to Ankara. "But even the relatively minor sanctions would seriously damage the ailing Turkish economy," Solmazturk stated. Trump would want to capitalize on his sympathetic attitude to benefit the U.S. when bargaining with Ankara, remarked Yalcinkaya. The U.S. Senate is expected to pass in January another harsher set of sanctions on Turkey, which the House of Representatives adopted in late October. This set of sanctions aims to punish Turkey for its military operation in October against the U.S.-backed Kurdish militia in Syria as well as for its purchase of the S-400s. Despite strong opposition and threat of sanctions by Washington, Ankara started to receive the first batch of the S-400 system in summer. According to official statements, the system is supposed to have been deployed by now, but will only be in fully operation by April next year. The U.S. says the F-35 fighter jets and the S-400 system cannot be active on the same territory, signaling it may settle for a solution in which the S-400 system is not activated. The U.S. is particularly concerned about Turkey's rapprochement with Russia. In recent years, numerous reports have appeared in the Western media that Turkey's axis is shifting away from the West, something repeatedly denied by Turkish officials. Even if the tension with the U.S. is not resolved, Turkey would not wish to leave NATO, said Solmazturk. "The Turkish government is close to Washington rather than Moscow as far as its political targets are concerned," he argued, noting Turkey and Russia are supporting rival camps in the Libyan civil war. "Turkey enjoys the world's strongest defense umbrella by being a NATO member and should duly assess the value of this blessing," Yakis said, adding the U.S. and NATO nations should also pay heed to Turkey's rightful complaints.

#### [2] Baird means we revamp Nato Cred

#### [3] NATO Doesn’t collapse—Trumps erratic behavior confirms resilience

#### Relations stuff

#### Nukes not Key no effect

### A2 Turkey Relations

#### [1] Extend Baird which says that A] The US has pulled Nukes out of multiple allies without relations harms and B] The aff would enhance our credibility which makes Erdogan less likely to move towards Russia.

#### [2] Empirically denied, we halved our nukes at Incirlik in 2005[[3]](#footnote-3) and they didn’t spiral out of control.

#### [3] No reason for Turkey to lash out—they are still protected under the US nuclear umbrella.

#### [4] Aff Outweighs: Turkey stealing a nuclear bomb is much worse than them just getting mad at us.

#### [5] Your in a doublebind either A] Turkey is rational, so they wont get mad if we take out nukes or B] Turkey is irrational so we should take Nukes out sooner than later

### A2 Turkey Prolifs

#### [1] Extend the Iddon evidence from the advantage that Turkey A] Doesn’t have the technical capacity to build nukes B] Doesn’t have operational nuclear material and C] Wont be aided by NATO or Russia. Means the only way they can get a nuke is by stealing.

#### [2] Numerous political factors prevent internal Turkey Proliferation

Paul Iddon, freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan. He writes about Middle East developments, history and politics, Turkey’s nuclear future, Oct 21 2019 [2], <https://ahvalnews.com/turkey-nuclear-power/turkeys-nuclear-future> ///AHS PB

While Erdoğan said Turkey was being denied the right to develop nuclear weapons he chose to ignore the fact that Ankara has signed both the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This essentially means that Turkey has already pledged to the rest of the world that it will not seek the development of a nuclear arsenal. “If Turkey is planning to acquire nuclear weapons, it will be hard to do so without being noticed,” Bakeer said. “More importantly, lacking the rational motives, it will find it almost impossible to sell its case.” “However, the moment Iran and/or Saudi Arabia possess nuclear weapons then Ankara’s calculations might completely change.” Stein also believes that if Turkey did pursue such a capability it would certainly face sanctions. But he does not believe this outcome is at all likely. “Ankara has shown no willingness to even pay for a reactor, let alone absorb the cost of a clandestine weapons programme,” he said. “If Ankara wanted the bomb, and I’m sceptical, Turkey would need to basically build-up nuclear infrastructure from scratch.”

#### [3] Turkey stealing nukes outweighs on probability A] Getting nukes would require NATO fallout in either world so Erdogan will choose the most direct path B] A full state nuclear program has infinite possible roadblocks like US hacking, sabotage, and UN intervention while stealing a nuke is a single action.

#### [4] Crossapply Baird who says that standing up to Turkey shows America is serious about bad behavior and deterrence which renews the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. This A] causes them to fix their behavior and B] Solves Erdogan’s concerns about a weak US nuclear umbrella.

#### [5] No warrant why taking nukes of Incirlik directly leads to a conventional program. Their evidence is an unrelated quote by Erdogan with spin to relate it to the base.

### A2 Bioweapons

#### [1] The plan doesn’t cause American bioweapons since its only a small part of our overall arsenal.

#### [2] Extend the second Roblin evidence this takes out the DA since A] The Incirlik Nukes are not used for deterrence so there is no impact and B] Turkey is still part of our nuclear umbrella so they have no reason to develop bioweapons.

#### [3] Turkey doesn’t develop.

NTI, Nuclear Threat Initiative, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization founded in 2001 by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and philanthropist Ted Turner in the United States, Overview, April, 2015, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/turkey/> ///AHS PB

Biological Turkey does not possess [biological weapons](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/biological-weapon-bw/), nor is it known to have ever undertaken a biological weapons program. [29] Ankara is a party to the [Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/biological-and-toxin-weapons-convention/), having signed and [ratified](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/ratification/) it in 1974, and is a member of the [Australia Group](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/australia-group-ag/) to control trade in CBW relevant items. Chemical As a member in good standing of the [Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC)](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/chemical-weapons-convention/), Turkey does not currently possess [chemical weapons](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/chemical-weapon-cw/), and is not known to have ever possessed a chemical weapons program. [30] Ankara signed the CWC in 1993, ratifying it in 1997, and is also a member of the Australia Group, an [export control](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/export-control/) mechanism to control trade in CBW relevant items.

#### [4] We outweigh on timeframe, any bioweapon develop would be preceded and ended by a nuclear holocaust.

#### [5] Switching from Nukes to Bioweapons doesn’t work

**Gormley 15** – “Bioweapons not an alternative to nuclear weapons” Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is an associate professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. She is the author of *Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise and Organization for Weapons Development* [https://thebulletin.org/roundtable\_entry/bioweapons-not-an-alternative-to-nuclear-weapons/] // ahs emi

Historically, because of their unpredictability and the uncertainty of their outcomes, biological weapons were never fully integrated in US military doctrine. In the Soviet Union, **the military also viewed bioweapons as unreliable, due to the difficulty of controlling their dispersion and the possible risks of infecting Soviet troops.** Attempts by Soviet scientists to develop new biological agents, unknown in nature, which the enemy could not protect against, lasted about 20 years and did not go beyond the exploratory and research and development phases. Furthermore**, both the United States and Soviet Union struggled to design effective missile systems for the delivery of these weapons.** The US program did not produce a dedicated bioweapons cruise missile, and the Soviets could not solve technical difficulties associated with the development of a ballistic missile warhead that could effectively protect fragile bioagents against the stress of re-entry. These challenges underscore my final point: **Bioweapons are technically complex and can be very expensive. Their complexity derives from their reliance on living microorganisms that are highly sensitive to their environmental and handling conditions. Their behavior throughout the development process is unpredictable,** which—as past state and terrorist programs show—causes many failures and delays in program advancement. Furthermore, the stages of a bioweapons lifecycle—research, development, production, scale-up, weaponization, and testing—are highly interdependent, and the successful passage from one stage to the next requires organizational and managerial conditions that promote coordination, cooperation, and information exchange among the various teams of experts involved. Such conditions are particularly difficult to achieve. As a result, **most past state and non-state bioweapons programs have been unsuccessful at reaching their goals. The Soviet Union, which had the longest-running and largest program, spent an estimated $35 billion** over the last 20 years of the program’s life **but was unable to develop the new agents that it aimed to produce.** The US program cost about $700 million over 27 years without producing a weapon that satisfied military requirements. Iraq spent over $80 million during the last five years of its program but was only able to produce ineffective weapons that would have destroyed most of the agents they contained upon impact. Finally, South Africa and the Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo spent about $30 million and $10 million respectively, but failed at all stages in a futile quest for bioweapons. Thus, bioweapons are hardly affordable, and their technical feasibility is constrained by a host of factors, of which I have mentioned only a few.

#### [6] Diseases don’t cause extinction

Ian York, Quora, 6/4/14 (head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch of the Influenza Division at the CDC, PhD in Molecular Virology and Immunology from McMaster University, M.Sc. in Veterinary Microbiology and Immunology from the University of Guelph, former Assistant Prof of Microbiology & Molecular Genetics at Michigan State, [“Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?”, <http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species>] bcr 8-20-2016 RECUT AHS PB

But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to **burn** themselves out that way.¶ Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive.¶ We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. ¶ We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.

### A2 Turkey in Danger

#### 1] Extend Roblin which explicitly says the US nuclear umbrella in Europe deters attacks on Trueky.

#### 2] No Turkey nukes are needed—US arsenals solves the link

Matthew Fuhrmann, Proffessor of Political Science at Texas A&M, and Todd S. Sechser, Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, Can the U.S. protect its nuclear weapons in Turkey?, Oct. 18, 2019 at 4:51 a.m. CDT, ///AHS PB

A recent study we conducted shows that the critical factor for preventing aggression against U.S. allies is a formal alliance relationship with the United States — not the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons. Indeed, our research found that global deployments of nuclear weapons made very little difference for deterrence even during the Cold War. This makes sense, because the United States doesn’t need to forward-deploy its forces to place allies under its nuclear umbrella. American missiles and submarines give it the capability to hit any target in the world. What matters is the United States’ commitment to defend its partners with nuclear weapons if necessary — not where these nuclear forces are physically located.

#### 3]

### A2 Terror

### A2 Detterance

## K’s

### A2 Orientalism

### A2 Afropess

### A2 Set Col

### A2 Baudrillard—General

#### Top Level Overview:

#### [1] Case Outweighs: A] Even if the alt is true, we are only able to enact it if we are alive, so my advantage is a lexical pre req B] Extinction prevents all future generations, this means that any 1% risk hyperreality is false or we can rediscover meaning justifies keeping humans around.

#### [2] No Impact to the Kritik, insofar as you concede Util as a normative ethic, there is no reason why being complicit in the system causes more pain than not getting rid of Nukes

#### [3] Baudrillard is an empirical claim without an empirical warrant. The fact that they can give you 5 cherrypicked examples where the system coopted things, doesn’t prove that all meaning is impossible

#### [4] Meaning possible

#### [5] Meaning possible

#### [6] Debate is good: A] B] C] You only learned and advocate for Baudrillard in debate, which proves this space has scholarly value.

#### [7] Perf con the fact that you respond ot the aff means you find meaning in it, proves radical seducation

#### [8] Baudrillard is a sexist who advocates for SACRIFICING WOMEN – don’t let them get away with reading repugnant scholarship

Brodribb 92, Somer Brodribb 1992 teaches feminist theory/politics and women’s social and political thought at the University of Victoria, British Columbia. She studied in the Feminist focus of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, NOTHING MAT(T)ERS: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism, First published by Spinifex Press)

Jean Baudrillard blames the failure of the “revolution” on women and change, women’s change. He sees puritanical “hysterics” everywhere whom he accuses of exaggeration about sexual abuse (1986, p. 42). The radical nostalgia which pervades his postmodern scribbling is for Rousseau’s (1979) Sophie and Lasch’s haven in a heartless world. For Baudrillard, a rapist is a violent fetus who longs for ancient prohibitions not sexual liberation (1986, p. 47). Baudrillard’s pessimism is actually his hope for a defeat of feminist initiated change and a return to man and god in contract, the eternal sacrifice of woman. His ramblings in his cups of cool whisky (1986, p. 7) are given the status of thought. He considers himself outré and daring to criticize feminists but, as anyone who has taken a feminist position knows, misogynous attack is banal and regular. Sorry, Baudrillard: it is outré to support and to be a feminist. But is this in vino veritas, when Baudrillard proposes a Dionysian sacrifice of woman to the image of beauty, purity, eternity? In Amérique, he writes: “One should always bring something to sacrifice in the desert and offer it as a victim. A woman. If something has to disappear there, something equal in beauty to the desert, why not a woman? (1986, p. 66). When queried about this “gratuitously provocative statement” Baudrillard replied, “Sacrificing a woman in the desert is a logical operation because in the desert one loses one’s identity. It’s a sublime act and part of the drama of the desert. Making a woman the object of the sacrifice is perhaps the greatest compliment I could give her” (Moore: 1989, p. 54). A compliment postmodernism will make over and over, like opera.18 Commenting on a sacrificial scene in D.H.Lawrence’s The Woman Who Rode Away, Millett writes: This is a formula for sexual cannibalism: substitute the knife for the penis and penetration, the cave for a womb, and for a bed, a place of execution—and you provide a murder whereby one acquires one’s victim’s power. Lawrence’s demented fantasy has arranged for the male to penetrate the female with the instrument of death so as to steal her mana... The act here at the centre of the Lawrentian sexual religion is coitus as killing, its central vignette a picture of human sacrifice performed upon the woman to the greater glory and potency of the male (1971, p. 292).

#### Reps are a voter since exclusion causes material violence and exclusion which prevents people from making arguments in the first place.

#### On the alternative: A] The Alt Fails: IF there is nothing that disngithiushes it from cap then why haven’t things happened B] Perm do the aff: Meaning is incoherent, and the neg is winning, vote aff because its incoherent B] No impact not destroying the debate space, just getting ballot and doing something other rounds. C] Perm do the K without the ballot, fully unproducosve since u don’t win but breaks you attachment

#### Neg proves that we can know the borders

#### Turner 93

#### Meaning is possible and participation in politics is inevitable---the alt naturalizes oppression by conflating existing conditions with meaning per se---the neg can’t withdraw from, or collapse the system

Andy Robinson 4, Zizek hater, Baudrillard, Zizek and Laclau on "common sense" - a critique, http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/baudrillard-zizek-and-laclau-on-common.html

Baudrillard thinks his account of the masses is confirmed by disinterest in politics and "public" debates (12-13), and that this is a resistance to political manipulation (SSM 39). He is wrong. This disinterest is relative: at the time of The Consumer Society, Baudrillard still recognised that this disinterest can be shattered by sudden uprisings. Further, it is quite possible to explain such disinterest without falling back on the crude kind of theories of mystification Baudrillard cites as the only alternative to his view (SSM 12-13). Brinton, and Albert and Hahnel, for instance, have analysed disinterest as an insulation built into authoritarian character-structures which enables people to cope with capitalism. Baudrillard's earlier work similarly involves a model of how the consumer society produces disinterest. Furthermore, political manipulation is, as Gramsci and others show, closely intertwined with the supposedly "meaningless", "apolitical" discourses of everyday life. It is simply not possible to withdraw from politics; one always participates in practices which influence social outcomes and others' actions, so that the illusion of withdrawal from politics is actually a naturalisation of a particular kind of political system. Baudrillard's explicitly stated view that everyday practice is beyond representation and the politics (SSM 39) is therefore wholly mistaken and leads him to effectively endorse the naturalisation of politics (even though he tries to avoid ENDORSING something he sees as meaningless and therefore not endorsable - 40-1. Actually he does endorse indirectly via loaded language). He also misses the dimension of political INTRUSION into everyday life - for instance, the aggressive police presence which blights so many inner-city communities, and the linked phenomenon of a politicised fear of "crime". At this point, in contradiction to Vaneigem, Reich and Foucault as well as his earlier work, Baudrillard also wants to deny a liberatory potential to resistance in everyday life (SSM 40-1).¶ Baudrillard sometimes substitutes his own views for evidence, as when he discusses what "we" the audience experience (GW 39). ¶ Baudrillard's claim that the masses are "dumb", silent and conduct any and all beliefs (SSM 28) and "the reversion of any social" (SSM 49) is problematised by the persistence of subcultures and countercultures, while his claim that any remark could be attributed to the masses (SSM 29) hardly proves that it lacks its own demands or beliefs. He is leaping far too quickly from the confused and contradictory nature of mass beliefs to the idea that the masses lack - or even reject - meaning per se. He wants to portray the masses as disinterested in meaning, instinctual and "above and beyond all meaning" (SSM 11), lacking even conformist beliefs (87-8) and without a language of their own (22). This is contradicted by extensive evidence on the construction of meaning in everyday life, from Hoggart on working class culture to Becker, Lemert, Goffman and others on deviance. Even in the sphere of media effects, the evidence from research on audiences, such as Ang on Dallas viewers and Morley on the Nationwide audience, suggests an active construction of meaning by members of the masses, negotiating with or even opposing dominant codes of meaning. This may well show a decline of that kind of meaning promoted by the status quo - but it hardly shows a rejection of meaning per se. When the masses act stupid, it may well be due to what radical education theorists term "reactive stupidity" - an adaptive response to avoid being falsified and "beaten" by acting stupid. Baudrillard again wrongly conflates the dominant system with meaning as such. Indeed, Baudrillard seems to have changed his mind AGAIN by the time of the Gulf War essays, when he refers to the MEDIA, not the masses, as in control (GW 75), and to stupidity as a result of "mental deterrence" (GW 67-8), which produces a "suffocating atmosphere of deception and stupidity" (GW 68) and a control through the violence of consensus (GW 84).

### A2 Charity Cannabalism

#### [1] Turn the alternative is worse—not discussing material violence just A] Endlessly allows it to keep on happening and B] Makes it impossible to determine who the perpetuators are.

#### [2] No warrant to why charity cannibalism exists or is bad, its Baudrillard making an assertion that western media operates in a certain way which is empirically denied by material improvement due to charities, political pressure, and online campaigns.

#### [3] No reason as to why my aff is charity cannibalism, since I talk about hypothetical nuclear war and geopolitics, not the third world suffering Baudrillard is referring too. Don’t allow them to give new 2nr links since that’s a form of sandbagging which kills stable clash.

## T

### T-Plural

### T-Nebel Long

#### Overview: Reject the shell since they didn’t specify whether semantics or pragmatics offense comes first, which allows the 2nr to pick the issue the 1ar undercovers for 6 minutes and always win on a collapse.

#### Counterinterpretation: The affirmative may defend a subset of the resolution if the aff is disclosed and has a solvency advocate.

#### I meet the counter interp since I do both these things, this solves 100% of pragmatics offense since you had a predictable basis for prep.

#### Standards:

#### [1] Not having a plan allows the negative to PIC out of an infinite variety of trivial issues, for example every country the aff doesn’t talk about, single missiles, or asteroids. PICS are worse than plans: A] you still have a 1NC to read generics while I have no ability to weigh the aff and B] I have 4 minutes to prep the pic while you had at least 30 to prep the plan

#### [2] Not having a plan kills stable clash since its impossible to weigh between unrelated issues that don’t exist in the topic lit, such as whether Noko Nukes having Nukes is better than the US getting rid of them. Topic lit controls the internal link to predictability since its where prep actually occurs. This independently kills fairness since it affs we delink from ever argument and education since our debate has no real-world applicability.

#### [3] Plans force us to go deep and research all nuances of a single issue. Depth outweighs breadth: learning a little bit about everything doesn’t matter if we cant apply it

#### A2 Semantics:

#### Pragmatics come before semantics: 1] Without fairness and education debate would be irresolvable and nonexistent, so come first under competing interps 2] Semantics presuppose that an order to be topical an advocacy must entail the resolution, which begs the question of pragmatic justifications.

#### Additionally semantics are racist 1] It identifies one correct way of speaking, and says everyone who doesn’t confirm should lose, which excludes alternative forms of English and 2] Semantics would require minorities debate blatantly racist topics like the 2020 UIL “gentrification is just”. That’s a voting issue, you push people out of the debate community, and all arguments presuppose an accessible ability to engage

#### A2 Jurisdiction is 1] empirically denied since judges vote on non topical affs all the time, and 2] begs the question of the model of debate the judge should endorse

#### A2 Stasis point: 1] Subsets solve since its still part of topical prep and 2] Debate norms are more predictable than random semantic interps.

#### A2 Pics don’t negate: 1] People will still read them anyway in a world without plans and 2] You can’t just arbitrarily fiat away the abuse the counterinterp would cause since that is not what the shell entails and prevents setting norms.

#### A2 Pragmatics Offense

#### A2 Limits: 1] Limits flows aff since there are more one card PICS then plans 2] There is no brightline for how many affs is too many 3] Opensource solves since you steal case negs and 4] its non unique since you still have to respond to the advantage

#### A2 Ground: 1] I lose a reciprical amount of ground, I can read an ISreal or US aff now 2]There is tons of neg ground against this aff like the NATO, Turkey Prolif, and Removal Das 3] Generic arguments like NFU and Pess solve.

#### A2 TVA: 1] Doesn’t solve PICS and 2] Begs the question of what the better norm is

#### A2 Reject potential abuse of PICS: 1] This breaks theory since know what a good topic is through what it allows and 2] Rejecting potential abuse auto affirms since they responded to the plan in this round.

#### Use reasonability with a bright line of link and impact turn ground within the topic literature: 1] Competing interps allows the neg to read mutually exclusive T shells every round which 2] I speak in the dark and I had to pick an interp so good should be good enough.

### T-Eliminate

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eliminate>

to put an end to or get rid of

# Cutting Cards

#### No battlefield utility

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/14/it-time-withdraw-us-nuclear-weapons-incirlik.html

The approximately 700- to 1,200-pound bombs, depending on the variant, were designed to be delivered by a wide range of U.S. and NATO military aircraft, provided they had been modified to carry the weapons. That includes both interceptors, fighter bombers and strategic bombers. The latest version of the B61, the Mod 12 upgrade, will be deployable on the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning. The bombs at Incirlik have not yet been upgraded. Currently, there are no planes, either Turkish or American, stationed in Turkey that can carry these bombs.

The weapons were classed as tactical or theater weapons and were originally intended to be used against concentrations of Soviet infantry and armor in the event of a Soviet invasion of Turkey.

The nuclear weapons were removed from the four other Turkish bases following the end of the Cold War. The nuclear bombs at Incirlik, however, remain.

The U.S. has approximately 150 to 180 B61 weapons at six NATO bases: Klein's Borger in Belgium, Büchel in Germany, Aviano and Ghedi-Torre in Italy, Volkel in the Netherlands and Incirlik.

Notwithstanding the improvements envisioned by the Mod 12 upgrade, including the improved accuracy and standoff capabilities, it's hard to see under what battlefield conditions such weapons would or could be used.

#### Disabling fails

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/14/it-time-withdraw-us-nuclear-weapons-incirlik.html

Disabling the bomb renders it useless. Bombs that have been disabled have to be returned to Pantax for repair. It is not inconceivable, however, that should the Turkish government obtain the disabled bombs, it could, with external aid, be able to repair the devices and make them usable again.

#### Inherency plus solvency advocate

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/10/pull-nukes-turkey-and-then-think-bigger/160936/

At present, as many as fifty U.S. nuclear weapons sit under guard in an airbase in Turkey, just a 150-mile drive from the Syrian border. Meanwhile, tensions between Washington and Ankara continue to mount. Turkish forces recently attacked U.S. allies and troop positions in Syria, bracketing U.S. forces with artillery fire, apparently in an effort to pressure them to withdraw. This latest offense follows a steady rapprochement between Turkey and Russia, which threatens to do lasting harm to Ankara’s relationship with the rest of NATO. The rapid deterioration of Turkey’s relationship with the West raises serious questions about the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey. As the administration reviews this policy in the coming days, the smart solution is to remove these Cold War relics from Turkey once and for all.

#### A2 kills relations

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/10/pull-nukes-turkey-and-then-think-bigger/160936/

Some critics argued then, as they do now, that withdrawing nuclear weapons from Turkey would damage already-weak U.S.-Turkish relations. The fact of the matter is that the United States has a long history of assessing the geopolitical realities on the ground and re-positioning its nuclear forces accordingly. In 1991, the United States removed weapons from South Korea. In 2008, the final American nukes left Britain. Their removal was a response to changing strategic realities after the Cold War.

Relations with South Korea and the U.K remained strong as ever.

#### Detteriwti9n non unique

https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/

Withdrawing the weapons does not, of course, mean the United States is abandoning Turkey. That relationship is already in serious trouble and keeping the weapons at Incirlik based on the idea that it will somehow counterweight Turkey’s further drift away from NATO is probably an illusion. That boat seems to have sailed; the relationship is likely to deteriorate whether or not there are nuclear weapons at Incirlik. That is the reality the Air Force must relate to now.

#### A2 storage wars

https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/

Another argument against withdrawal will be that moving them out of Turkey will cause the other members of the so-called nuclear sharing arrangement (Belgium, Germany, Holland, Italy) to question why they should continue to store U.S. nuclear weapons. Withdrawal from Turkey could, so the argument goes, trigger a domino effect of withdrawal from other countries as well.

But the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear bombs from Greece in 2001 and from England five years later did not cause the other countries to demand withdrawal as well or the collapse of NATO. If they truly believe deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons is important for NATO security, then they will stay. If the mission falls with withdrawal from Turkey, then they obviously don’t think it’s important and the weapons should be withdrawn from all the countries anyway. The U.S. extended deterrence posture in Europe can adequately be maintained with advanced conventional forces backed up by strategic forced in the background.

#### Good risk scenario

https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/turkey-fired-u-s-special-forces-syria-it-s-absurd-ncna1068361

Recent comments by Erdogan have caused some to fear he may be motivated to seize the nukes in Incirlik. In September, Erdogan stated in a speech that Turkey should have its own nukes, making the demonstrably false claim that “there’s no developed nation in the world that doesn’t have them.”

While the 700-pound B61s are considered small “tactical” nuclear weapons, that needs to be put in context; the bombs in Turkey are designed so their explosive “yield” can be adjusted to between one-fifitieth and 11 times the effect of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in World War II.

To be fair, one shouldn’t exaggerate the risks of a James Bond-style nuclear heist. Though the base’s extensive security measures might only delay the Turkish military if it was intent on seizing the nukes, the bombs use Permissive Action Links, meaning their fuse can only be activated using a code transmitted by the U.S. president or his designated second-in-command. Furthermore, the B61s are designed so that U.S. technicians at the base can rapidly sabotage them by overheating their thermal batteries.

This means that even if the B61s were somehow seized or stolen, they would require extensive modification to convert into usable weapons, though the materials inside them could be used in a dirty bomb — designed to contaminate a large area with radiation.

On the other hand, the danger doesn’t end there. The nukes could be attacked by anti-American militants —the base is only 70 miles away from Turkish-Syrian border — resulting in loss of life even if the bombs aren’t captured. Worse, the nukes could effectively be used as bargaining chips to advance Turkish interests at the expense of America’s.

That’s not impossible to imagine, because Erdogan has not hesitated to use political prisoners as bargaining chips in efforts to obtain concessions in arms deals. For example, in 2017, Ankara held onto a Turkish-German national journalist, offering to release him to Germany in exchange for Berlin authorizing upgrades to Turkish Leopard 2 tanks.

And the Incirlik base itself has been at the center of troubling activity. In 2016, Turkish Air Force officers at Incirlik plotted and deployed aircraft in support of the coup. The Turkish government then cut electricity to the base, impacting the security of the U.S. nuclear facilities there.

#### No impact card

FromRoblin

https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/turkey-fired-u-s-special-forces-syria-it-s-absurd-ncna1068361

Today, the U.S. still maintains between 150 and 200 B61s in Europe, which can be deployed by specially modified Tornado and F-16 Falcon jet fighters. In the future, F-35 stealth fighters will carry an upgraded, guided version of the B61 instead.

But Turkey no longer has any F-16s and pilots certified to deliver nuclear weapons. Nor are any of the U.S. jets based at Incirlik modified for that job. So it’s extremely unlikely that the bombs in Incirlik would make any material difference to guaranteeing Turkish or American security. After all, as long as Turkey remains in NATO, nuclear weapons based elsewhere in Europe would still be at hand to deter against attacks on Turkey by other countries.

Turkey would have gotten F-35s, except it was kicked out of the program earlier this year because of its purchase of Russian air-defense weapons that violated U.S. sanctions on Moscow and posed a security vulnerability to those same stealth jets. That in itself tells much of the story: An ally once so close it was due to receive and build parts for F-35s full of sensitive technology loses its access to the advanced jets because it is no longer deemed reliable and trustworthy.

Lacking even aircraft at hand capable of dropping them, the nukes at Incirlik are therefore purely symbolic — a supposed testament to the strength of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. And for years, Washington has been more preoccupied with the symbolic implications of withdrawing the nukes rather than the security risks posed by keeping them in Turkey.

#### A2 builds own nukes

https://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/deadly-diplomatic-challenge-turkey-holding-50-us-nuclear-bombs-hostage/news-story/1a89583915a67a51546a1f1f47c396e9

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan last month declared he wanted nuclear weapons: “We have Israel nearby, as almost neighbours. They scare others by possessing these. No one can touch them.”

And, given his nation’s rapidly deteriorating relationship with the West, the US stockpile could prove a tempting shortcut to becoming the region’s second nuclear power.

“They tell us we can’t have them.” he told a party meeting last month. “This, I cannot accept.”

Meanwhile, all those US nuclear devices remain locked up on Incirlik air force base — despite years of escalating Turkish internal and international turmoil.

And we’ve already seen a dress rehearsal for their seizure by Erdoğan’s followers.

#### A2 dettrrsnce

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/11/05/its-time-to-get-us-nukes-out-of-turkey/

Washington and NATO still see a need for American nuclear bombs in Europe. While any use of a nuclear weapon would have a military effect, the Alliance has come to regard these bombs as having primarily a political purpose: deterrence and, should deterrence fail and a conflict break out, to signal (by their use) that matters are about to escalate to potentially horrific levels and thus bring the conflict to an end.

The one hundred B61 bombs deployed at bases in NATO countries other than Turkey can fulfill those requirements. There is no requirement to have U.S. nuclear weapons on the territory of five NATO members in order to deter attack and provide assurance to the twenty-seven European members of the Alliance; that can readily be done with B61 bombs based in four countries.

Moreover, while the U.S., German, Dutch, Belgian and Italian air forces each have dual-capable aircraft certified to carry nuclear weapons and crews trained in nuclear delivery, questions arose some time ago as to whether that is so with the Turkish Air Force. In that case, the most likely scenario in which a Turkish-based nuclear bomb would be used would envisage a U.S. fighter flying into Incirlik, loading a B61 bomb, and then taking off to fly to and strike its target. It would seem much simpler to launch a nuclear-armed U.S. F-16 from its base at Aviano, Italy.

#### Coupe steal

https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-andreasen-nuclear-weapons-turkey-20160811-snap-story.html

After a faction within the Turkish military tried to overthrow the Turkish government last month, one of the many arrested for his alleged role in the attempted coup was a commanding officer at the Incirlik Air Base. That base — according to numerous media reports — is a major NATO installation hosting one of the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons in Europe.

What if the Turkish base commander at Incirlik had ordered his troops surrounding the perimeter of the base to turn their guns on the U.S. soldiers that reportedly guard U.S. nuclear storage bunkers there?

What if anti-American Turkish protesters, believing the U.S. was behind the coup plot and that it was harboring the coup’s leader (ominously reminiscent of how Iranians felt about America and the shah 37 years ago) decided to march on Incirlik chanting anti-American and anti-Israeli slogans (as has actually happened) and taken over the base?

Leaving aside the coup, what if Islamic State were to attack Incirlik? In March, the Pentagon reportedly ordered military families out of southern Turkey, primarily from Incirlik, due to terrorism-related security concerns.

1. <https://phys.org/news/2019-04-asteroid-nuking.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/10/nukes-out-of-turkey/> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)