## Shell

### 1NC -- Econ

#### The plan triggers runaway inflation, distorts the labor market, and doesn’t solve the underlying root cause.

Tankersley 18 (Jim Tankersley. “Democrats’ Next Big Thing: Government Guaranteed Jobs” 5-22-2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/us/politics/democrats-guaranteed-jobs.html>) DLuo

WASHINGTON — Prominent Democrats — stung by their eroding support from working-class voters but buoyed by the deficit-be-damned approach of ruling Republicans — are embracing a big idea from a bygone era: guaranteed employment. The “job guarantee” plans, many of them pressed by Democratic White House hopefuls, vary in scope and cost, but they all center on government-sponsored employment that pays well above the $7.25-an-hour federal minimum wage — a New Deal for a new age, absent the bread lines and unemployment rates of the Great Depression. The most aggressive plans seek to all but eradicate unemployment and to set a new wage floor for all working Americans, pressuring private employers to raise wages if they want to compete for workers. How such guarantees would be paid for is still largely unresolved. And criticism of the idea has emerged not only from conservatives who detect a whiff of socialism but also from liberals who say guaranteed employment is the wrong way to attack the central issue facing workers in this low-unemployment economy: stagnant wages. But Democratic leaders hope the push will help their party bridge the growing political divide between white and minority workers, and silence the naysayers who accuse the party of being devoid of new, big ideas. The employment plans, along with single-payer “Medicare for all” health care, free college, legalized marijuana and ever less restrictive immigration rules, are parts of a broader trend toward a more liberal Democratic Party in the Trump era. “It’s going to create a more competitive labor market where people are going to start getting living wages, not just minimum wage,” said Senator Cory Booker, Democrat of New Jersey, who [unveiled a job-guarantee plan](https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=778) in April. “Giving people the dignity of work, of being able to stand on their own two feet, there’s such a strengthening element of that.” Many conservative economists, and some liberals, fret over the plans’ often large costs, which some Democrats would cover by repealing pieces of President Trump’s signature tax cuts. The plans could force private companies to compete with the government for workers, distort an already tight job market and push some firms out of business, they warn. Most of all, they question the need for any government jobs program when unemployment has dipped below 4 percent. “I don’t know if the Democrats have noticed, but jobs are doing very well,” said Larry Kudlow, the director of Mr. Trump’s National Economic Council. He said the administration would oppose such plans. Federal job guarantees are [a throwback idea](https://www.vox.com/2018/4/27/17278052/case-for-jobs-guarantee-sanders-booker-gillibrand). President Franklin D. Roosevelt essentially called for them in his [“Second Bill of Rights”](http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/address_text.html) speech in 1944, which held that Americans had “the right to a useful and remunerative job” and “the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation.” The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. [endorsed the idea](http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2013/08/honoring-dr-kings-call-for-a-job-guarantee-program.html) in the 1960s. A handful of liberal researchers have [revived and promoted](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/federal-job-guarantee-universal-basic-income-investment-jobs-unemployment/) such a plan in recent years, including Mark Paul, William A. Darity Jr. of Duke University and Darrick Hamilton of the New School. Last year, the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank stacked with veterans of the Obama administration, released a [job guarantee proposal](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/05/16/432499/toward-marshall-plan-america/) that would employ an estimated 4.4 million Americans. Last Tuesday, the group [released a follow-up plan](https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release/2018/05/15/450544/release-cap-releases-major-plan-investing-communities-establishing-job-guarantee-hard-hit-regions/) that detailed how it would guarantee jobs to Americans who live in particularly distressed communities, urban and rural. Mr. Booker’s plan would create pilot programs to provide jobs to Americans in as many as 15 areas where the unemployment rate remains dismal. [Its co-sponsors](https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2746/cosponsors) include three Democratic senators also seen as possible presidential candidates: Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, Kamala Harris of California and Kirsten Gillibrand of New York. Senator Chris Van Hollen of Maryland, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee chairman, would fund “transitional” jobs lasting up to one year for workers who have been unemployed for six months or more. [Representative Ro Khanna of California](https://khanna.house.gov/sites/khanna.house.gov/files/RK%20Jobs%20for%20All%20DRAFT%20051018%209PM.pdf) would provide federally subsidized employment, in the public or private sector, for anyone who wants to work, for a maximum period of two and a half years. Sign up to receive an email when we publish a new story about the 2020 election. Sign Up The most ambitious proposal, an outline from Senator Bernie Sanders, independent of Vermont and another possible White House hopeful, would promise a government job in areas such as construction, child care and park maintenance to anyone who wants one, paying a “living wage” and offering benefits on par with what current federal employees earn. [Trump in North Carolina: ‘All you hear is Covid, Covid, Covid, Covid, Covid, Covid.’](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/21/us/trump-biden-election?name=styln-elections-2020&region=inline&label=undefined&module=undefined&block=storyline_latest_updates_recirc&action=click&pgtype=Article&impression_id=170c0dd1-14ee-11eb-af36-83c05d3fcb44&variant=1_Show&index=2#trump-in-north-carolina-all-you-hear-is-covid-covid-covid-covid-covid-covid) [Obama mocks Trump’s Chinese bank account: ‘They would’ve called me Beijing Barry.’](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/21/us/trump-biden-election?name=styln-elections-2020&region=inline&label=undefined&module=undefined&block=storyline_latest_updates_recirc&action=click&pgtype=Article&impression_id=170c0dd2-14ee-11eb-af36-83c05d3fcb44&variant=1_Show&index=2#obama-philadelphia-speech) [Giuliani denies he did anything wrong in the new ‘Borat’ movie.](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/21/us/trump-biden-election?name=styln-elections-2020&region=inline&label=undefined&module=undefined&block=storyline_latest_updates_recirc&action=click&pgtype=Article&impression_id=170c0dd3-14ee-11eb-af36-83c05d3fcb44&variant=1_Show&index=2#giuliani-borat) Is this helpful? Behind the stampede is Democrats’ desire for tangible programs to offer to working-class voters, which they could contrast to Mr. Trump’s racially divisive immigration appeals to white workers. “We are living in a world where Trump and Trumpism is trying to drive wedges between people,” said Neera Tanden, a former adviser to President Barack Obama and to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign, who is the president of the Center for American Progress. “It’s important to the country and the progressive movement that we have ideas that matter in the lives of working people who are black, brown and white.” To win control of Congress this fall and defeat Mr. Trump in 2020, she added, “We have to have some answers for how to get good jobs with a decent living for people who didn’t go to college.” Senator Bernie Sanders, independent of Vermont, in April in Mississippi. His proposal would promise a government job in areas such as construction, child care and park maintenance to anyone who wants one, paying a “living wage” and offering benefits on par with what current federal employees earn. Given the current state of the job market, the operative word there is “good.” It has been a long time since jobs have been this easy to find in the United States. Unemployment fell to nearly a half-century [low of 3.9 percent in April](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). At the same time, [wage growth has only sluggishly advanced](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/01/business/economy/wages-salaries-job-market.html). Real median household income is [up only slightly](https://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/2018/05/02/real-median-household-income-reintroduction-march-at-61-227) from where it was in 2000. Critics from the left say a job guarantee will not adequately address that broad wage issue. “It’s kind of a very large hammer in search of a nail,” said Anne Kim, the director of domestic and social policy at the Progressive Policy Institute, a liberal research group in Washington. “And it’s the wrong nail. We really should be searching for solutions to the wage stagnation problem.” Advocates of the more targeted jobs plans say they are needed to help workers who are still stuck on the bad side of the improving national employment numbers. “It’s a strong argument in many parts of the country that, for folks who are out there committed to finding a job, we should create this transitional program to help them get on their feet,” Mr. Van Hollen said. “You have a lot of Republicans right now who say they want to help people who are out of work by taking away their health care or other benefits, but are doing nothing to help them find a job.” Conservatives say the most sweeping job guarantee plans could [ignite runaway inflation](https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/democrats-jobs-guarantee-bernie-sanders-is-mainstream-now/) and impose a large degree of central planning on private industry. From the left, Ms. Kim said she worries the effort would create “a permanent class of underclass jobs” that some workers would not be able to move up from. And then there is the cost. Mr. Sanders’s office said his plan is not yet complete and thus cannot be assessed, for costs or for the benefits it would bring to the economy. Others estimate their plans would cost hundreds of billions of dollars over a decade, but could be funded all or in part by rolling back some parts of the tax law that Mr. Trump signed in December, estimated to cost $1.5 trillion over 10 years. Democrats’ casual attitude toward cost is in part a reaction to the Republican tax bill, which was passed without much concern for rising government red ink. It also reflects a growing belief among many liberals that a clear lesson from Mr. Trump’s victory is that Democrats need to go bold — and spend big. “The Republicans for the last 30 years have been running on supply-side economics,” Mr. Khanna said. “You cut taxes, that’s going to grow the economy, that’s going to pay for deficits. Democrats need to change the script.”

#### Full employment ends economic growth and leads to infinite contractions – turns case

Brandman 20 (Brandman University, Online accredited university. 2-19-2020. “Understanding the effects of low unemployment rates: What business leaders should know” <https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/low-unemployment-rates>) DLuo

When the unemployment rate reaches a record low — as it recently did in the U.S. — most people would assume that’s a positive sign. It means the economy is continually strengthening and workers are seeing ample opportunities to land sustainable and fulfilling jobs, right? The true effects of low unemployment aren’t quite so simple. In fact, there’s often so much happening beneath the surface that it can be confusing for most people to follow along. At least those of us who aren’t economic experts. So, what does a record low unemployment rate really mean for American workers and business owners? While you may be accustomed to hearing about the positive impact on our economy, you’re probably less familiar with the potential downsides. Read on to learn about three negative impacts of low unemployment that are worth keeping in mind. 3 Negative side effects of low unemployment In September 2019, unemployment rates in the U.S. hit a [50-year low](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/07/that-50-year-low-in-unemployment-isnt-helping-worker-paychecks.html). The country has generated millions of new jobs since the Great Recession, when unemployment reached its height at [10 percent](https://www.investopedia.com/insights/downside-low-unemployment/). While this might typically be viewed as a success worth celebrating, some experts believe it’s possible for an unemployment rate to get too low. They typically cite three reasons. 1. Low unemployment makes recruitment and retention more difficult This first negative impact that can result from low unemployment is a bit more obvious than the others: When jobs are plentiful and more employees are finding stable work, the pool of candidates applying for open positions shrinks. At the same time, organizations may see an increase in employee turnover when workers have ample opportunities at their fingertips. Simply put, employees can afford to be choosey when it comes to finding new positions that might better suit their wants and needs. When there are [more job openings](https://www.bls.gov/web/jolts/jlt_labstatgraphs.pdf) than there are unemployed Americans, recruiters and hiring managers have an incredibly hard job. Some companies have even begun to [pay candidates to attend an interview](https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbersin/2018/07/03/the-ugly-side-to-todays-low-unemployment-rate/#5676ab6c3e99) for a position they may not even secure. That pressure is felt at every level of an organization. In fact, the [2018 Conference Board CEO Study](https://www.conference-board.org/c-suite-challenge2018/) reveals that “failure to attract and retain top talent” is the number one issue on CEOs’ minds today. Some call what we’re seeing in today’s job market a “war for talent” as organizations compete when it comes to benefits offerings and other perks that might attract candidates. They’re going far beyond increasing salary offerings. To combat the hard-hitting impact low unemployment has on hiring and retention, employers might consider [a number of different tactics](https://www.4cornerresources.com/blog/recruiting-low-unemployment), including: Highlighting a thriving and robust [company culture](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/how-a-caring-leader-can-create-a-culture-of-support) Prioritizing [work-life balance](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/within-reach-finding-the-balance-between-work-and-life-infographic) for employees Investing in [employee education benefits](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/employee-education-benefits) Prioritizing [professional development](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/professional-development-benefits) [Promoting from within](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/promoting-from-within) 2. Low unemployment often results in lost productivity Economists have determined that when unemployment reaches unprecedented lows, the labor market can reach a point where each additional job added doesn’t generate enough productivity to cover its cost. Every subsequent job will contribute to a scenario where what an economy actually produces diverges from what it has the potential to produce — known by many as the “[output gap](https://www.investopedia.com/insights/downside-low-unemployment/).” The output gap rises and falls alongside the economy. In simple terms, a negative output gap means the economy’s resources are being underutilized. Conversely, a positive output gap means the market is over-utilizing resources, and the overall economy becomes inefficient. Productivity can also take a hit if employers aren’t offering competitive wages in the midst of the tight labor market. This inevitably results in hiring teams filling vacancies with less-qualified candidates. So, while there may be more jobs than there are people today, there aren’t enough workers with the requisite skills and experience to fill them. According to a recent [Workday study](http://unitedwayswva.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Building-Tomorrows-Talent-Collaboration-Can-Close-Emerging-Skills-Gap.pdf), just 35 percent of employers feel their entry-level employees are ready to perform the duties expected of them. Recruiters may be creating jobs and hiring candidates, but the resulting skill gap means that organizations are getting less and less done per hour each day. This can also result in overwhelmed and stressed employees. Often, the top performers in a particular company become overtasked in an attempt to fill the gap. The average full-time employee already works [more than 8 hours](https://www.bls.gov/charts/american-time-use/emp-by-ftpt-job-edu-h.htm) per day — consider how that could increase for those picking up the slack. 3. Low unemployment could mean another recession is coming The last time we saw unemployment rates as low as they are today was in 1969, when President Richard Nixon was still in office. While unemployment fell to 3.5 percent in December 1969, it shot back up to 6.1 percent a year later. The conditions back then, many note, closely mirror what we’re seeing now. After a historically long economic expansion, the American economy fell into a recession — although a mild one. [According to CNBC](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/08/the-last-time-unemployment-was-this-low-something-bad-happened.html), investing experts today are conflicted over what the current state of our economy means. Is it just getting started with such positive marks? Is it on its way to another mild slowdown? Or will it eventually lead to a much more severe downturn? While time will ultimately tell, the hesitation to predict what’s coming is enough to give many business owners pause. In many ways, we’re still making up for the damage [caused by the Great Recession](https://prospect.org/economy/low-unemployment-bad-news-good-news/) that stretched from the early 2000s to the early 2010s — and the decades of wage stagnation that preceded it. Many employers have become [more risk-averse](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/07/that-50-year-low-in-unemployment-isnt-helping-worker-paychecks.html), not yet willing to meet today’s tight labor market with the necessary higher pay. In fact, September 2019 marked the first time in years that worker earnings decreased. This can contribute to many of the aforementioned difficulties related to hiring and retention in today’s overtasked workforce. The effects of low unemployment: Where do we go from here? Perhaps you’re interested in identifying some ways to potentially remedy the negative effects a historically low unemployment rate can have on your business. It’s worth considering the numerous ways your organization can differentiate itself from the pack. You may want to keep a few things in mind:

# Impact Modules

## Disease

### 1nc – ! – disease

#### Economic decline hampers health programs and increase disease spread

Frank 18 – Robert A.University of Ottawa. [“Conflict and Disease: A Complex Relationship”, March 2018, [Lex AZ], 10.18192/riss-ijhs.v7i1.1895]

Impact of Economic Instability Financial crises hinder quality of life, **while** promoting **redistribut**ion of **funds away from areas** that are most **beneficial to citizens**. A common feature of economic crises is a rapid increase in unemployment, which **often results in** instability and mass protest (International Labour Organization, 2013). The uncertainty associated with financial loss is also a significant stressor that **can negatively impact** mental and physical health. **Throughout the economic crisis** in Greece, mental illness and suicide rates have increased significantly, while **HIV rates** have also **increased** due to intravenous drug utilization (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). Furthermore, many individuals are thrust into poverty and subsequently face the barriers associated with low socioeconomic status. Despite the **significant impact of** **economic collapse on** societal health, the **quality of healthcare** is often paradoxically sacrificed due to reallocation of limited funds, as **highlighted by** the funding cuts **to** mental **health** and drug abuse prevention **programs** in Greece during its economic struggles (Simou & Koutsogeorgou, 2014). A **society in economic crisis**, therefore, **faces a conflicting scenario with** increased demand for, but **reduced** supply of, health services.

#### Extinction—defense is wrong

Millett 17 Piers Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population). In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

### ---2nr – at: burnout

#### No burnout- their science assumes the wrong models and avoids recurring hosts.

MacPhee et al. 13 (Ross D. E., Ph.D. in Physical Anthropology from University of Alberta, Former chairman of the Department of Mammalogy at the American Museum of Natural History, Professor at Richard Gilder Graduate School, Alex D. Greenwood, Head of the Department of Wildlife Diseases at the Leibniz Institute for Zoo and Wildlife Research, Professor of wildlife diseases in the Department of Veterinary Medicine of the Freie Universität Berlin, “ Infectious Disease, Endangerment, and Extinction,” Hindawi Publishing Corporation, <http://www.hindawi.com/journals/ijeb/2013/571939/>)

Infectious disease, especially virulent infectious disease, is commonly regarded as a cause of fluctuation or decline in biological populations. However, it is not generally considered as a primary factor in causing the actual endangerment or extinction of species. We review here the known historical examples in which disease has, or has been assumed to have had, a major deleterious impact on animal species, including extinction, and highlight some recent cases in which disease is the chief suspect in causing the outright endangerment of particular species. We conclude that the role of disease in historical extinctions at the population or species level may have been underestimated. Recent methodological breakthroughs may lead to a better understanding of the past and present roles of infectious disease in influencing population fitness and other parameters. 1. Background Although lethal epi- or panzootics are obvious risk factors that can lead to population fluctuation or decline in particular circumstances, infectious diseases are seldom considered as potential drivers of extirpation or extinction—that is, of the complete loss of all populations or subunits comprising a given biological species. For example, in conservation biology, infectious disease is usually regarded as having only a marginal or contributory influence on extinction, except perhaps in unusual circumstances (e.g., [1–4]). In their examination of 223 instances of critically endangered species listed by the IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) as allegedly threatened by infectious disease, Smith et al. [4] found that in the overwhelming majority of cases there was no conclusive evidence to support infectious disease as a contributing threat. Although this record should improve with increasing awareness of the effects of infectious diseases on wildlife, as this paper illustrates progress has so far been slow. Both of the authors of this paper are primarily concerned with mammals, which is the group that will receive the bulk of attention here. However, at the pragmatic, data-gathering level, the issues concerned with properly accounting for and evaluating the effects of infectious diseases on natural populations differ little from one phylogenetic grouping to another. First, narrowing down extinction events or even catastrophic population declines to single causes is almost always problematic. In most real cases, extinction is multicausational, even if one cause can be identified as being predominantly responsible [5]. Habitat fragmentation and climate change are currently regarded as the leading prime movers behind most instances of extreme endangerment, to which other stressors such as pollution, invasive competitors, and so forth, might be of greater or lesser importance in particular circumstances. Disease, however, is rarely mentioned as a possible contributing factor in such contexts (but see [6]). Another difficulty is lack of knowledge about pathogen diversity and susceptibility in wildlife. In the absence of sufficient means of detection and characterization, it is difficult to assess or to give quantitative expression to the degree to which pathogens might influence population decline or extinction. Thus it has been estimated that only a small fraction of bacterial diversity has been identified at even the most basic systematic level. This problem is exacerbated in the case of viruses, which often evolve rapidly and defy, in any case, classical methodologies for identifying “species” [7]. For example, bat viruses have only recently begun to be described systematically, even though many chiropterans are known vectors of numerous zoonotic diseases and corporately represent the second largest grouping (by species richness) of mammals after rodents [8, 9]. A similar lack of knowledge affects our understanding of parasites and fungi that affect wildlife. The foregoing difficulties are compounded when one considers that, unless a species is studied extensively during and up to the actual extinction event affecting it, all extinction studies are retrospective. Retrospective investigation of losses in which disease is possibly implicated is often severely hindered by limitations in the number and quality of samples available for study, as well as the inability to satisfy Koch’s postulates—especially if both host and pathogen became extinct simultaneously [10]. Performing isolation, reisolation, and reinfection experiments to directly establish that a particular pathogen was indeed the causative agent behind a given infection is either very difficult or impossible to do retrospectively. Isolation and recreation of the 1918 H1N1 influenza A virus [11], for example, were performed by sequencing from extractions derived from individuals thought to have died of the disease in WWI, not by directly isolating the infectious virus from tissues (as would be required to formally comply with Koch’s postulates). Although most studies will have to be correlative rather than dispositive, one can nevertheless test hypotheses concerning plausible causal agents and examine samples for presence/absence of specific pathogens [12]. Forensically, decay, degradation, and chemical changes in DNA post mortem produce severe methodological challenges to retrieving and accurately determining sequences [13]. In addition, in any retrospective investigation involving “ancient DNA,” pathogen nucleic acids will be less abundant than those of the host, and this dilution effect will make sequence retrieval even more complex [10]. For example, relatively abundant mitochondrial DNA is generally easier to retrieve from fossils or historical samples than lower copy per cell nuclear DNA. Pathogen nucleic acids are generally even lower copy than host DNA sequences in a given extraction. These and other factors reviewed here may help to explain the paucity of conclusive studies of disease-mediated extinction, except in the very few instances in which sampling and methodological roadblocks could be overcome. Nonetheless, in favorable circumstances it should be possible to genetically analyze ancient pathogens with sufficient accuracy to make the endeavor worthwhile, especially because next-generation sequencing methods are beginning to make such endeavors ever more feasible [14–18]. Why should the possible role of infectious disease in endangerment and extinction be regarded as a critical issue in modern conservation? Whether or not disease was ever a major cause of extinction in the fossil record [19], in our times it plays an acknowledged but perhaps underestimated role. Pathogen-driven population declines have been identified in a wide array of invertebrate and vertebrate taxa (cf. [20]), suggesting that the phenomenon is probably universal. Yet without the kinds of monitoring methods now available, some and perhaps most of these declines would have gone undetected, or attributed to other causes. Further, the processes forcing such declines are as diverse as the pathogens themselves and are far from being clearly understood. The apparent increase in zoonotic diseases during the last few decades [21] may be objectively real or merely due to better monitoring, but it seems highly likely that loss or reduction of pristine habitats and the overall impact of invasive species should promote the introduction of opportunistic pathogens into wildlife with increasing frequency. Thus, understanding the dynamics of disease-mediated species declines may be critical to conservation missions concerned with a wide variety of species and habitats. Recent advances in molecular biology and microbiology have permitted the detection and identification of hosts of novel microorganisms, many of which are pathogenic, and the technology needed to assess threat levels is becoming increasingly available. 2. Disease as an Agent of Extinction: Some Considerations Although the fossil record clearly establishes that the fate of all species is to eventually die out, it is obvious from the same record that the rate of disappearance of individual species varies significantly [22]. As already noted, inferences about how (as opposed to when) an individual species disappeared must be developed inductively and retrospectively. An important guideline is that apparent causes of extinction that are diachronic (repeatedly affect species across time) are inherently more plausible than ones that are claimed to have occurred only once, or apply to only one taxon. Although this means that explanations about individual extinctions are not strictly testable, they can nevertheless be evaluated in terms of likelihood, which is the approach currently taken by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and several other conservation organizations interested in compiling extinction statistics [23, 24]. It is an accepted tenet in conservation biology that any severe, continuing threat to a species might eventually contribute to its extinction [25]. From this perspective, it is also accepted that diseases presenting with very high levels of mortality—as in the case of a highly transmissible infection that is newly emergent in a population—can cause outright endangerment. But are there conditions under which a disease, probably in combination with other threats, might so imperil a species to cause its complete disappearance? MacPhee and Marx [19] considered this issue from the standpoint of model pathogenic features that a disease-provoking organism might exhibit in forcing the extinction of a given species. These features include: (1) a reservoir species presenting a stable carrier state for the pathogen, (2) a high potential for causing infections in susceptible species, affecting critical age groups, (3) a capacity for hyperlethality, defined here as mortality rates in the range of 50–75%. Only under the most extreme conditions is it conceivable that a species would suffer extinction in a single epizootic event. Much more likely would be repeated outbreaks over a period of years gradually reducing the fitness level of the species, with final disappearance potentially caused by stochastic events (such as causally unassociated climate change). One way in which this condition might be achieved would be through a stable carrier (i.e., a species other than the target, living in similar circumstances in the same environment, and in which the infection is inapparent or at least sublethal). A well-studied example is the transfer of simian acquired immunodeficiency virus from one species of macaque to another [26]. Although this instance occurred under captive conditions, repeated outbreaks of distemper in lions and African wild dogs have long been thought to be due to transfer from domestic dogs (although the mechanism is debated; see [27]). Obviously, for a disease to have a very severe impact, it would be necessary for the pathogen to occur in highly lethal, aggressive strains that strongly impact the target species before attenuated strains arise and become common. High potential for causing infections in a susceptible species is usually associated with the ability to successfully enter the organism through a major portal, such as the respiratory tract, where it can be lodged and transmitted easily (e.g., via aerosol). To achieve hyperlethality and produce serious mortality, all age groups within a species would probably have to be susceptible, not just the very young or very old (or the immunocompromised), with death the usual outcome. In large-bodied mammals, a fundamental consideration is that any process that deleteriously affects young individuals will have a pronounced effect on survivorship because of the lengthy intervals in birth spacing [19]. Lethality in the range of 50–75% is obviously extremely high and thus extremely unusual, although historically seen in Ebola infections in humans and in experimental transmission studies from pigs to macaques [28]. High percentages may have also been achieved in rinderpest outbreaks among East African bovids in the early 20th century [29], although quantitative data on this are largely lacking. An important issue here, however, is whether pathogens causing this level of lethality could maintain themselves in nature long enough to seriously imperil a species. Speculatively, a possible outcome with hyperlethal infections producing a rapid, fatal outcome is that affected populations would be reduced to small numbers of widely dispersed and/or relatively or completely immune individuals. Under these circumstances, the epizootic would necessarily abate as it ran out of new hosts, leading to the conclusion that exceptionally lethal diseases cannot be indefinitely maintained in a population or species under normal circumstances. However, if reservoirs exist from which the pathogen could repeatedly emerge, in principle epizootics might resurge year after year until population sizes were reduced below viable levels (~50–500 individuals). At this point stochastic effects might intervene and lead to complete loss of the species. Among possible examples of this “perfect storm” of circumstances and consequences is the loss of Christmas Island rats, detailed elsewhere in this paper. Among birds, the severe impact of avian malaria on Hawaiian honeycreepers is also pertinent and discussed later in this paper. Although a number of honeycreeper species survive at high elevations, above the limit at which introduced Culex mosquitos can survive, there are multiple adventitious threats, such as deforestation and competition from invasive species, which add to their endangerment picture [30].

## Diversionary War

### 1nc – ! – div war

\*I do not recommend reading this as the only impact, but its good as a quick second module.

#### Independently, collapse causes diversionary lashout – extinction

Foster 16 Dennis M. Distinguished Professor Head of the Department of International Studies and Political Science, “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?”, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d755c6d748c6>

These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals. As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.” A possible implication for military action I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.

## Nuclear War

### 1nc – ! –

#### Decline causes nuclear war – loose nukes, counterbalancing, and regional instability

Mann 14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>)

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

## Slow Growth

### 1nc – ! – slow growth

#### Slow growth alone is sufficient to cause great power war – extinction

Edelman & Brands 17 Eric Hal Hal Brands is senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Eric Edelman is counselor at CSBA and the Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence at SAIS., 6-21-2017, "America and the Geopolitics of Upheaval," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/america-and-geopolitics-upheaval

"The essence of a revolution is that it appears to contemporaries as a series of more or less unrelated upheavals,” Henry Kissinger wrote in 1969. “But the crises which form the headlines of the day are symptoms of deep-seated structural problems.” Kissinger wrote this passage as the postwar international system was coming under unprecedented strain, with profound shifts in the global distribution of power driving incessant disruptions in U.S. foreign policy. His admonition applies just as well today, at the onset of a new era of upheaval. During Donald Trump’s presidency and after, U.S. foreign policy is likely to be wracked by crises. The instability and violence along a resurgent Russia’s periphery, the growing frictions with an increasingly assertive China, the provocations of a rapidly nuclearizing North Korea and the profound chaos at work throughout the Middle East: these and other challenges have recently tested U.S. officials and are likely to do so for the foreseeable future. The world now seems less stable and more dangerous than at any time since the Cold War; the number and severity of global crises are increasing. Yet crises do not occur in a vacuum; they are symptomatic of deeper changes in the international order. Accordingly, America’s responses will be ill-informed and astrategic unless Washington first forms a deeper conception of the current moment. The geopolitical changes underway are often framed in terms of “polarity”—the debate on whether America’s “unipolar moment” is over and a multipolar world has emerged. But this debate is misleading. On the one hand, discussions of polarity frequently exaggerate American decline, obscuring the fact that even though Washington’s international superiority has diminished, its global lead over any single challenger remains quite impressive. On the other hand, the polarity debate actually obscures both the degree and breadth of the ongoing changes in the international system, and of the challenges facing American officials. The fundamental fact of international politics today is that the post–Cold War era has ended. The defining features of that period were uncontested U.S. and Western primacy, marked declines in ideological struggle and great-power conflict, and remarkable global cooperation in addressing key international-security challenges. Now, however, the world has returned to a more normal—which is to say, more dangerous and unsettled—state. The core characteristics of the emerging era are the gradual erosion of U.S. and Western primacy, revived great-power competition across all three key regions of Eurasia, renewed global ideological struggle, and empowerment of the agents of international strife and disorder. What makes the present period so tumultuous is that these forces often compound one another’s destabilizing effects; moreover, their collective impact is magnified by a growing uncertainty about whether America and other traditional defenders of the international system will continue playing that role in the future. American primacy is not dead, in other words, and true multipolarity is still a long ways off. But U.S. primacy is far more contested than at any time in a quarter-century, and the friendly contours of the post–Cold War system have given way to a darker and more challenging environment. The best way to understand the present era is to compare it to the previous one. The post–Cold War era was defined by four phenomena that made it historically favorable to American interests. The first was uncontested U.S. primacy. America emerged from the Cold War with clear economic dominance, possessing nearly 25 percent of global GDP in 1994. It controlled nearly 40 percent of world defense outlays, along with utterly unrivaled advantages in global power-projection capabilities. Crucially, these capabilities not only gave Washington an enormous lead over any geopolitical competitor; they also provided the ability—as Saddam Hussein discovered in 1991—to marshal decisive military might in virtually all the key strategic regions around the world. In the nineteenth century, the British ship of the line symbolized London’s global primacy; in the late twentieth century, the American carrier strike group symbolized an even more imposing preeminence. Nor was American dominance purely unilateral, because it was powerfully accentuated by the strengths of the broader Western coalition. In 1994, America’s treaty allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific accounted for 47 percent of global GDP and 35 percent of global military spending, giving Washington and its closest friends upward of 70 percent of global economic power and military spending. Throughout the post–Cold War era, allied involvement thus lent added force to U.S. diplomacy on key issues of international order; from the Gulf War to the war in Afghanistan, allied contributions reinforced America’s ability to project military power overseas. This was no balance of power; it was one of the most pronounced imbalances the world had ever seen. U.S. dominance was also evident in a second phenomenon—the decline of international ideological competition. Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis has been much derided, but it captured three indisputable facts about the post–Cold War era: that democracy and markets were spreading more widely than ever before; that there was no credible global competitor to the liberal-capitalist model; and that even former U.S. enemies, such as Russia, and authoritarian states, such as China, were making unprecedented efforts to integrate into the liberal order either economically, politically or both. To be clear, Western concepts of human rights and political democracy were far from fully accepted in these countries, and Russian and Chinese leaders—among others—sooner or later came to see liberal proselytism as a grave threat. But the intense ideological struggles of the twentieth century were clearly over, and the liberal model seemed incontestably ascendant. These first two phenomena related to a third—the remarkable great-power comity of the post–Cold War era. The end of the Cold War did not, as was widely expected, see a fragmenting of America’s alliances, or a resurgence of Japanese and German revisionism. Rather, the major Western powers remained tied to America, largely because Washington continued to provide crucial global public goods such as security and leadership of an open global economy. Moreover, the sheer geopolitical dominance of the Western coalition meant that it was dangerous if not impossible for countries like Russia and China to mount serious great-power challenges of their own. Admittedly, there remained sometimes-serious disagreements between the United States and these countries, over issues from NATO enlargement to Taiwan, and those disagreements would grow more pronounced with time. But the danger of great-power war was nonetheless historically low during the 1990s, and great-power rivalries were more muted than at any time since the Concert of Europe. All of these characteristics fed into a final post–Cold War phenomenon: remarkable multilateral cooperation in addressing the relatively mild international disorder of the day. With great-power conflict dormant, U.S. foreign policy and the international community focused largely on combating lesser geopolitical “spoilers,” from ethnic cleansing to mass-casualty terrorism to the actions of aggressive regional powers such as Iraq or North Korea. These efforts, in turn, were greatly aided by the relatively tranquil state of international politics. The absence of great-power conflict made it far easier to organize broad coalitions to confront malevolent actors, whether Saddam Hussein in 1990–91 or Al Qaeda after 9/11. In the same vein, great-power peace allowed America and its allies to devote increasing attention to other forms of post–Cold War disorder. The fact that NATO could focus on “out of area” interventions for roughly two decades after the Soviet collapse, for instance, was directly related to the paucity of more traditional geopolitical threats. It would be a mistake, of course, to exaggerate how benign or pliable the post–Cold War environment really was. The “global disorder” of the period hardly seemed mild for the victims of catastrophic terrorism or ethnic cleansing; U.S. primacy was not omnipotence, as Washington’s travails in places from Mogadishu to Srebrenica to Helmand amply demonstrated. But by any meaningful historical comparison, the structure of international politics was uniquely conducive to the promotion of U.S. interests and ideals—a fact that is now the source of some nostalgia as the global system changes in five significant ways. The first key structural shift underway is the erosion of U.S. and Western primacy. It is incorrect to see this change as a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, for true multipolarity will not arrive anytime soon. The United States still possesses substantial economic advantages over its closest competitor, China, namely an $18 trillion GDP that (as of 2015) was more than $7 trillion larger than China’s, and a per-capita GDP roughly four times that of China. U.S. defense spending also remains around three times that of China, and Washington maintains enormous advantages in the power-projection capabilities—aircraft carriers, advanced tactical aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines and others—that allow it to command the global commons and exert disproportionate influence around the world. What has happened over the past fifteen years, however, is that the extent of U.S. and Western primacy has diminished. The U.S. shares of global wealth and military spending have declined from 25 percent and 42 percent, respectively, in 2004, to around 22 and 34 percent in 2015. The drop-off among America’s allies has been more severe. U.S. allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific commanded 47 percent of global GDP and 35 percent of global military spending in 1994; those shares had fallen to 39 and 25 percent, respectively, by 2015. Moreover, many of America’s most powerful allies—particularly in Europe—have undergone severe military decline. The British Royal Navy once ruled the waves, but now struggles to rule even the waters around the home islands; the German army faces equipment shortfalls so severe that its troops have had to exercise with broomsticks in place of machine guns. Western overmatch remains impressive by historical standards, but the global playing field is slanted much less dramatically than before. Meanwhile, the relative positions of America’s principal competitors have improved significantly. Russian economic power remains unimpressive, but an aggressive military modernization program has roughly doubled defense spending over a decade while also developing the capabilities needed to compete with the West—airborne assault units, special-operations forces, ballistic and other missile systems, and anti-access/area-denial capabilities, among others. China, meanwhile, has expanded its share of global wealth more than threefold, from 3.3 to 11.8 percent, between 1994 and 2015, and its share of world military spending more than fivefold, from 2.2 to 12.2 percent. As in Russia’s case, China’s military buildup has featured the tools—ballistic and cruise missiles, diesel-electric and nuclear submarines, advanced air defenses, and fourth-generation fighters—needed to offset longstanding U.S. advantages in the Asia-Pacific, as well as capabilities, such as aircraft carriers, needed to project Chinese power even further afield. The uncontested U.S. primacy of the 1990s has become the highly contested primacy of today. This is no academic distinction; the pernicious effects of this shift are already being seen. The decline of allied military power has made it harder for those allies to defend themselves against growing security threats, and to make more than token military contributions to addressing global challenges such as the rise of the Islamic State. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously warned in 2011 that NATO faced a “dim if not dismal future” if European capabilities continued to erode; American frustration has only become more pronounced since then. More fundamentally still, the changing power balance means that U.S. rivals and adversaries now have greater ability to shift the international order to suit their own preferences, a factor driving a second key shift in global politics today. If great-power comity was the post–Cold War norm, great-power competition is the standard today. Authoritarian rivals that were never fully reconciled to the post–Cold War order, and accepted it only to the degree compelled by U.S. and Western primacy, are now using their greater relative power to push back against that order in key geopolitical regions from East Asia to the Middle East to eastern Europe. Because Washington’s principal adversaries can concentrate their resources regionally, rather than having to distribute them globally, the power shifts that have occurred in recent years are having outsized effects at the regional level. And because the regional orders now being challenged have been the foundation of the broader post–Cold War system, these countries are effectively subverting the system “from the bottom up.” Consider Chinese behavior in East Asia. Chinese leaders always saw America’s post–Cold War dominance as a transitory condition to be suffered for a time, not something to be welcomed forever. And so as China’s geopolitical potential has soared, Beijing has taken bolder steps to erect a Sino-centric regional order. It has asserted expansive maritime claims and used techniques such as island building to shift facts on the ground without risking a premature military clash with America. It has challenged longstanding norms such as freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and steadily increased efforts to coerce its neighbors. It has probed and worked to weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships, by simultaneously wooing and intimidating America’s regional friends. Finally, Beijing has conducted a major military buildup focused precisely on capabilities that will give it dominance over its neighbors and prevent the United States from intervening in their defense. These efforts are now having an accumulating effect. Chinese coercion has dramatically altered perceptions of momentum and power in the region, while the Chinese buildup has made the outcome of a Sino-American war over Taiwan or other regional hotspots far more doubtful. Chinese economic diplomacy has drawn many countries in the region closer into Beijing’s economic orbit. “America has lost” the struggle for regional supremacy, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines announced in 2016—an exaggeration, surely, but a marker of how contested the region has become. Great-power competition is even more unvarnished in Europe, where a militarily resurgent Russia is reasserting lost influence and undoing key aspects of the post–Cold War settlement. Moscow has waged wars of conquest against Georgia and Ukraine; it has worked to undermine NATO and the European Union through efforts ranging from paramilitary subversion, to military intimidation, to financial support for anti-EU and anti-NATO politicians and other intervention in Western political processes. In doing all of this, Russia has fundamentally contested the notion of a post–Cold War Europe whole, free and at peace; it has challenged—with some success—the institutions that have long maintained security and prosperity in the region. And as with China, these actions have been underwritten by a military buildup that has restored Russian overmatch along NATO’s exposed eastern flank and enhanced Moscow’s ability to project power as far afield as the Middle East. Russia has become an ambitious great power again: it is asserting its prerogatives in ways that only seem anomalous in contrast to the remarkable cooperation of the post–Cold War era. Finally, geopolitical revisionism is alive and well in the Middle East. Iran is not in the same power-political class as Russia or China, but it is a regional power seeking to assert regional mastery. It is doing so via the use of proxies and its own forces in conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, via the weaponization of sectarianism in countries across the region, and via investments in asymmetric capabilities such as ballistic missiles and special-operations forces. This agenda has led Tehran into conflict with U.S. security partners such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; it has contributed significantly to the instability that plagues the region. Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, of course. But taken collectively, they represent a geopolitical sea change from the post–Cold War era. The revival of great-power competition entails sharper international tensions than have been known for decades, and the return of Cold War phenomena such as arms races and security dilemmas. It entails intensifying conflicts over the global rules of the road, on issues from freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force. It entails starker struggles over states that reside at the intersection of rival great powers’ spheres of influence, such as the Philippines, Ukraine and Iraq. Finally, it raises the prospect that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war—a phenomenon that seemed to have followed the Soviet Union onto the ash heap of history with the end of the Cold War. The world has not yet returned to the titanic geopolitical struggles of the twentieth century, but it is returning to the historical norm of great-power strife—with all the dangers that entails.

### ---2nr ­– at: resilience

#### Economic crisis guarantees global conflict—resilience is wrong, the liberal order’s weak and current leaderships won’t be cooperative

Pesek 18, William former columnist for Barron’s and Bloomberg, quoting former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and Eurasia Group President Ian Bremmer, 1/12/18, “Why a 2018 crisis would be particularly devastating,” http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/iLkHAL2cCCxfOqYvRzFAsL/Why-a-2018-crisis-would-be-particularly-devastating.html

Twenty years ago, Lawrence Summers came up with a particularly graphic analogy for market crises: airplane crashes. Jets, the former US treasury secretary explained, make travel faster, more efficient and safer, although the odd accident is far more stunning and deadly than one that befalls other forms of transport. “In the same way,” Summers said, “modern global financial markets carry with them enormous potential for benefit, even if some of the accidents are that much more spectacular.” This comparison leaps to mind as Summers sounds the alarm about 2018. Summers’s core policy belief is this: even when the periphery of the global economy (emerging markets) plunges, the centre (developed ones) is solid enough to hold capitalism together. Increasingly, Summers believes that centre might crack in the event of new turmoil—even within the 12 months ahead. Stock markets, as Summers points out in recent speeches and op-eds, are going gangbusters. That’s despite the US being in the hands of a leader threatening trade wars, redistributing wealth to the top 1%, taunting nuclear states via Twitter, spouting untruths, attacking the media, flouting international laws, trampling on democratic values and cozying up to autocrats Washington used to abhor. China, Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Summers argues, are “more authoritarian, more nationalist and more truculent on the world stage than they were a year ago.” North Korea is growing more belligerent, more erratic and more nuclear year after year. Europe, meanwhile, remains traumatized by Britain’s exit from the European Union (EU) and faces myriad populist and far-right insurgencies. All this begs the question: why, oh why, are equity markets surging as if investors haven’t a care? Why are bond yields so impossibly low from Washington to Tokyo as leaders borrow with abandon? Perhaps Bitcoin’s bewildering bull run is more a symptom of the extent to which markets have lost all sense of reality than an anomaly. Trouble is, the global economy’s surface looks infinitely better than the foundations beneath it. “Yes, markets are soaring and the economy isn’t bad, but citizens are divided,” says Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group. “Governments aren’t doing much governing. And the global order is unraveling.” What happens if there is some kind of reckoning? Say if Wall Street hit a 2008-like wall, China’s debt meltdown arrived or Washington started a trade war. A major terrorist attack, conflict on the Korean peninsula, confrontation in the South China Sea or troubles in Iran or Pakistan could slam markets. At the same moment, “the scale of the world’s political challenges is daunting”, Bremmer says. “Liberal democracies have less legitimacy than at any time since World War II, and most of their structural problems don’t appear fixable. Today’s strongest leaders show little interest in civil society or common values.” Looking at the past two decades, if his team “had to pick one year for a big unexpected crisis—the geopolitical equivalent of the 2008 financial meltdown—it feels like 2018,” Bremmer says. Summers worries geopolitics and economics will collide. “Financial markets are widely cited, including by US President Donald Trump, as providing comfort in the current moment,” he says. “But a relapse into financial crisis would likely have catastrophic political consequences, sweeping into power even more toxic populist nationalists.” My objective here isn’t to give readers sleepless nights, but to call out the gaping disconnect between jubilant markets and the chaos that may lie ahead. Asia learned a great deal from its 1997-98 meltdown. Banks were strengthened, currencies became more flexible, central banks amassed ample currency reserves and governments increased transparency. After that 2013 “taper tantrum,” India, for example, worked to stabilize the rupee, tame inflation and address bad loans in the banking system. The West learned far less from the 2008 Lehman Brothers crash, throwing money at the problem, but demurring on painful reforms. Banks are re-leveraging as we speak. Market meltdowns tend to happen sooner and faster than punters expect. In 2008, the US responded by cutting short-term rates 500 basis points (one basis point is 0.01 percentage point), while peers in Europe and Japan followed suit. Such a response isn’t available in 2018 . Nor is aggressive fiscal loosening. The Trump White House already engineered a $1.5 trillion tax cut the economy didn’t need. That, Summers says, means the next recession will be “protracted and deep, with severe global consequences.” In 2009, after Wall Street cracked, then-US President Barack Obama cobbled together a global response with Group of 20 nations. Trump has gone the other way, alienating most of the allies Obama worked with to restore global calm. “I shudder to think what a serious recession will mean for politics and policy,” Summers says. “It is hard to imagine avoiding a resurgence of protectionism, populism, and scapegoating. In such a scenario, as with another financial crisis, the centre will not hold.” It’s hard to imagine, too, the severity of the next airplane-like crash in global markets.

# Link Modules

## Decline Generics

### 1nc -- decline

#### Full employment ends economic growth and leads to infinite contractions – turns case

Brandman 20 (Brandman University, Online accredited university. 2-19-2020. “Understanding the effects of low unemployment rates: What business leaders should know” <https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/low-unemployment-rates>) DLuo

When the unemployment rate reaches a record low — as it recently did in the U.S. — most people would assume that’s a positive sign. It means the economy is continually strengthening and workers are seeing ample opportunities to land sustainable and fulfilling jobs, right? The true effects of low unemployment aren’t quite so simple. In fact, there’s often so much happening beneath the surface that it can be confusing for most people to follow along. At least those of us who aren’t economic experts. So, what does a record low unemployment rate really mean for American workers and business owners? While you may be accustomed to hearing about the positive impact on our economy, you’re probably less familiar with the potential downsides. Read on to learn about three negative impacts of low unemployment that are worth keeping in mind. 3 Negative side effects of low unemployment In September 2019, unemployment rates in the U.S. hit a [50-year low](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/07/that-50-year-low-in-unemployment-isnt-helping-worker-paychecks.html). The country has generated millions of new jobs since the Great Recession, when unemployment reached its height at [10 percent](https://www.investopedia.com/insights/downside-low-unemployment/). While this might typically be viewed as a success worth celebrating, some experts believe it’s possible for an unemployment rate to get too low. They typically cite three reasons. 1. Low unemployment makes recruitment and retention more difficult This first negative impact that can result from low unemployment is a bit more obvious than the others: When jobs are plentiful and more employees are finding stable work, the pool of candidates applying for open positions shrinks. At the same time, organizations may see an increase in employee turnover when workers have ample opportunities at their fingertips. Simply put, employees can afford to be choosey when it comes to finding new positions that might better suit their wants and needs. When there are [more job openings](https://www.bls.gov/web/jolts/jlt_labstatgraphs.pdf) than there are unemployed Americans, recruiters and hiring managers have an incredibly hard job. Some companies have even begun to [pay candidates to attend an interview](https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbersin/2018/07/03/the-ugly-side-to-todays-low-unemployment-rate/#5676ab6c3e99) for a position they may not even secure. That pressure is felt at every level of an organization. In fact, the [2018 Conference Board CEO Study](https://www.conference-board.org/c-suite-challenge2018/) reveals that “failure to attract and retain top talent” is the number one issue on CEOs’ minds today. Some call what we’re seeing in today’s job market a “war for talent” as organizations compete when it comes to benefits offerings and other perks that might attract candidates. They’re going far beyond increasing salary offerings. To combat the hard-hitting impact low unemployment has on hiring and retention, employers might consider [a number of different tactics](https://www.4cornerresources.com/blog/recruiting-low-unemployment), including: Highlighting a thriving and robust [company culture](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/how-a-caring-leader-can-create-a-culture-of-support) Prioritizing [work-life balance](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/within-reach-finding-the-balance-between-work-and-life-infographic) for employees Investing in [employee education benefits](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/employee-education-benefits) Prioritizing [professional development](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/professional-development-benefits) [Promoting from within](https://www.brandman.edu/news-and-events/blog/promoting-from-within) 2. Low unemployment often results in lost productivity Economists have determined that when unemployment reaches unprecedented lows, the labor market can reach a point where each additional job added doesn’t generate enough productivity to cover its cost. Every subsequent job will contribute to a scenario where what an economy actually produces diverges from what it has the potential to produce — known by many as the “[output gap](https://www.investopedia.com/insights/downside-low-unemployment/).” The output gap rises and falls alongside the economy. In simple terms, a negative output gap means the economy’s resources are being underutilized. Conversely, a positive output gap means the market is over-utilizing resources, and the overall economy becomes inefficient. Productivity can also take a hit if employers aren’t offering competitive wages in the midst of the tight labor market. This inevitably results in hiring teams filling vacancies with less-qualified candidates. So, while there may be more jobs than there are people today, there aren’t enough workers with the requisite skills and experience to fill them. According to a recent [Workday study](http://unitedwayswva.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Building-Tomorrows-Talent-Collaboration-Can-Close-Emerging-Skills-Gap.pdf), just 35 percent of employers feel their entry-level employees are ready to perform the duties expected of them. Recruiters may be creating jobs and hiring candidates, but the resulting skill gap means that organizations are getting less and less done per hour each day. This can also result in overwhelmed and stressed employees. Often, the top performers in a particular company become overtasked in an attempt to fill the gap. The average full-time employee already works [more than 8 hours](https://www.bls.gov/charts/american-time-use/emp-by-ftpt-job-edu-h.htm) per day — consider how that could increase for those picking up the slack. 3. Low unemployment could mean another recession is coming The last time we saw unemployment rates as low as they are today was in 1969, when President Richard Nixon was still in office. While unemployment fell to 3.5 percent in December 1969, it shot back up to 6.1 percent a year later. The conditions back then, many note, closely mirror what we’re seeing now. After a historically long economic expansion, the American economy fell into a recession — although a mild one. [According to CNBC](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/08/the-last-time-unemployment-was-this-low-something-bad-happened.html), investing experts today are conflicted over what the current state of our economy means. Is it just getting started with such positive marks? Is it on its way to another mild slowdown? Or will it eventually lead to a much more severe downturn? While time will ultimately tell, the hesitation to predict what’s coming is enough to give many business owners pause. In many ways, we’re still making up for the damage [caused by the Great Recession](https://prospect.org/economy/low-unemployment-bad-news-good-news/) that stretched from the early 2000s to the early 2010s — and the decades of wage stagnation that preceded it. Many employers have become [more risk-averse](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/07/that-50-year-low-in-unemployment-isnt-helping-worker-paychecks.html), not yet willing to meet today’s tight labor market with the necessary higher pay. In fact, September 2019 marked the first time in years that worker earnings decreased. This can contribute to many of the aforementioned difficulties related to hiring and retention in today’s overtasked workforce. The effects of low unemployment: Where do we go from here? Perhaps you’re interested in identifying some ways to potentially remedy the negative effects a historically low unemployment rate can have on your business. It’s worth considering the numerous ways your organization can differentiate itself from the pack. You may want to keep a few things in mind:

### ---2nr – xt: generic

#### The plan triggers runaway inflation, distorts the labour market, and doesn’t solve the underlying root cause.

Tankersley 18 (Jim Tankersley. “Democrats’ Next Big Thing: Government Guaranteed Jobs” 5-22-2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/us/politics/democrats-guaranteed-jobs.html>) DLuo

WASHINGTON — Prominent Democrats — stung by their eroding support from working-class voters but buoyed by the deficit-be-damned approach of ruling Republicans — are embracing a big idea from a bygone era: guaranteed employment. The “job guarantee” plans, many of them pressed by Democratic White House hopefuls, vary in scope and cost, but they all center on government-sponsored employment that pays well above the $7.25-an-hour federal minimum wage — a New Deal for a new age, absent the bread lines and unemployment rates of the Great Depression. The most aggressive plans seek to all but eradicate unemployment and to set a new wage floor for all working Americans, pressuring private employers to raise wages if they want to compete for workers. How such guarantees would be paid for is still largely unresolved. And criticism of the idea has emerged not only from conservatives who detect a whiff of socialism but also from liberals who say guaranteed employment is the wrong way to attack the central issue facing workers in this low-unemployment economy: stagnant wages. But Democratic leaders hope the push will help their party bridge the growing political divide between white and minority workers, and silence the naysayers who accuse the party of being devoid of new, big ideas. The employment plans, along with single-payer “Medicare for all” health care, free college, legalized marijuana and ever less restrictive immigration rules, are parts of a broader trend toward a more liberal Democratic Party in the Trump era. “It’s going to create a more competitive labor market where people are going to start getting living wages, not just minimum wage,” said Senator Cory Booker, Democrat of New Jersey, who [unveiled a job-guarantee plan](https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=778) in April. “Giving people the dignity of work, of being able to stand on their own two feet, there’s such a strengthening element of that.” Many conservative economists, and some liberals, fret over the plans’ often large costs, which some Democrats would cover by repealing pieces of President Trump’s signature tax cuts. The plans could force private companies to compete with the government for workers, distort an already tight job market and push some firms out of business, they warn. Most of all, they question the need for any government jobs program when unemployment has dipped below 4 percent. “I don’t know if the Democrats have noticed, but jobs are doing very well,” said Larry Kudlow, the director of Mr. Trump’s National Economic Council. He said the administration would oppose such plans. Federal job guarantees are [a throwback idea](https://www.vox.com/2018/4/27/17278052/case-for-jobs-guarantee-sanders-booker-gillibrand). President Franklin D. Roosevelt essentially called for them in his [“Second Bill of Rights”](http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/address_text.html) speech in 1944, which held that Americans had “the right to a useful and remunerative job” and “the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation.” The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. [endorsed the idea](http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2013/08/honoring-dr-kings-call-for-a-job-guarantee-program.html) in the 1960s. A handful of liberal researchers have [revived and promoted](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/federal-job-guarantee-universal-basic-income-investment-jobs-unemployment/) such a plan in recent years, including Mark Paul, William A. Darity Jr. of Duke University and Darrick Hamilton of the New School. Last year, the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank stacked with veterans of the Obama administration, released a [job guarantee proposal](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/05/16/432499/toward-marshall-plan-america/) that would employ an estimated 4.4 million Americans. Last Tuesday, the group [released a follow-up plan](https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release/2018/05/15/450544/release-cap-releases-major-plan-investing-communities-establishing-job-guarantee-hard-hit-regions/) that detailed how it would guarantee jobs to Americans who live in particularly distressed communities, urban and rural. Mr. Booker’s plan would create pilot programs to provide jobs to Americans in as many as 15 areas where the unemployment rate remains dismal. [Its co-sponsors](https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2746/cosponsors) include three Democratic senators also seen as possible presidential candidates: Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, Kamala Harris of California and Kirsten Gillibrand of New York. Senator Chris Van Hollen of Maryland, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee chairman, would fund “transitional” jobs lasting up to one year for workers who have been unemployed for six months or more. [Representative Ro Khanna of California](https://khanna.house.gov/sites/khanna.house.gov/files/RK%20Jobs%20for%20All%20DRAFT%20051018%209PM.pdf) would provide federally subsidized employment, in the public or private sector, for anyone who wants to work, for a maximum period of two and a half years. Sign up to receive an email when we publish a new story about the 2020 election. Sign Up The most ambitious proposal, an outline from Senator Bernie Sanders, independent of Vermont and another possible White House hopeful, would promise a government job in areas such as construction, child care and park maintenance to anyone who wants one, paying a “living wage” and offering benefits on par with what current federal employees earn. [Trump in North Carolina: ‘All you hear is Covid, Covid, Covid, Covid, Covid, Covid.’](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/21/us/trump-biden-election?name=styln-elections-2020&region=inline&label=undefined&module=undefined&block=storyline_latest_updates_recirc&action=click&pgtype=Article&impression_id=170c0dd1-14ee-11eb-af36-83c05d3fcb44&variant=1_Show&index=2#trump-in-north-carolina-all-you-hear-is-covid-covid-covid-covid-covid-covid) [Obama mocks Trump’s Chinese bank account: ‘They would’ve called me Beijing Barry.’](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/21/us/trump-biden-election?name=styln-elections-2020&region=inline&label=undefined&module=undefined&block=storyline_latest_updates_recirc&action=click&pgtype=Article&impression_id=170c0dd2-14ee-11eb-af36-83c05d3fcb44&variant=1_Show&index=2#obama-philadelphia-speech) [Giuliani denies he did anything wrong in the new ‘Borat’ movie.](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/10/21/us/trump-biden-election?name=styln-elections-2020&region=inline&label=undefined&module=undefined&block=storyline_latest_updates_recirc&action=click&pgtype=Article&impression_id=170c0dd3-14ee-11eb-af36-83c05d3fcb44&variant=1_Show&index=2#giuliani-borat) Is this helpful? Behind the stampede is Democrats’ desire for tangible programs to offer to working-class voters, which they could contrast to Mr. Trump’s racially divisive immigration appeals to white workers. “We are living in a world where Trump and Trumpism is trying to drive wedges between people,” said Neera Tanden, a former adviser to President Barack Obama and to Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign, who is the president of the Center for American Progress. “It’s important to the country and the progressive movement that we have ideas that matter in the lives of working people who are black, brown and white.” To win control of Congress this fall and defeat Mr. Trump in 2020, she added, “We have to have some answers for how to get good jobs with a decent living for people who didn’t go to college.” Senator Bernie Sanders, independent of Vermont, in April in Mississippi. His proposal would promise a government job in areas such as construction, child care and park maintenance to anyone who wants one, paying a “living wage” and offering benefits on par with what current federal employees earn. Given the current state of the job market, the operative word there is “good.” It has been a long time since jobs have been this easy to find in the United States. Unemployment fell to nearly a half-century [low of 3.9 percent in April](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). At the same time, [wage growth has only sluggishly advanced](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/01/business/economy/wages-salaries-job-market.html). Real median household income is [up only slightly](https://www.advisorperspectives.com/dshort/updates/2018/05/02/real-median-household-income-reintroduction-march-at-61-227) from where it was in 2000. Critics from the left say a job guarantee will not adequately address that broad wage issue. “It’s kind of a very large hammer in search of a nail,” said Anne Kim, the director of domestic and social policy at the Progressive Policy Institute, a liberal research group in Washington. “And it’s the wrong nail. We really should be searching for solutions to the wage stagnation problem.” Advocates of the more targeted jobs plans say they are needed to help workers who are still stuck on the bad side of the improving national employment numbers. “It’s a strong argument in many parts of the country that, for folks who are out there committed to finding a job, we should create this transitional program to help them get on their feet,” Mr. Van Hollen said. “You have a lot of Republicans right now who say they want to help people who are out of work by taking away their health care or other benefits, but are doing nothing to help them find a job.” Conservatives say the most sweeping job guarantee plans could [ignite runaway inflation](https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/democrats-jobs-guarantee-bernie-sanders-is-mainstream-now/) and impose a large degree of central planning on private industry. From the left, Ms. Kim said she worries the effort would create “a permanent class of underclass jobs” that some workers would not be able to move up from. And then there is the cost. Mr. Sanders’s office said his plan is not yet complete and thus cannot be assessed, for costs or for the benefits it would bring to the economy. Others estimate their plans would cost hundreds of billions of dollars over a decade, but could be funded all or in part by rolling back some parts of the tax law that Mr. Trump signed in December, estimated to cost $1.5 trillion over 10 years. Democrats’ casual attitude toward cost is in part a reaction to the Republican tax bill, which was passed without much concern for rising government red ink. It also reflects a growing belief among many liberals that a clear lesson from Mr. Trump’s victory is that Democrats need to go bold — and spend big. “The Republicans for the last 30 years have been running on supply-side economics,” Mr. Khanna said. “You cut taxes, that’s going to grow the economy, that’s going to pay for deficits. Democrats need to change the script.”

### 2nr – xt: employment a/o

#### It leads to hiring gaps that freeze growth.

Censky 12 (Annalyn Censky, 5-15-2012. “What 0% unemployment looks like” <https://money.cnn.com/2012/05/15/news/economy/zero-unemployment/index.htm>) DLuo

NEW YORK (CNNMoney) -- What if every person who wanted a job had one? The entire United States may never be able to reach a 0% unemployment rate. But on a smaller scale, it's not entirely unheard of. Simply put, 0% unemployment can occur when everyone who is looking for a job has one. It can happen in niche markets when there are more openings than there are workers to fill them. Such was the case with Monaco. According to the CIA, the country had a 0% unemployment rate in 2005. The tiny nation -- which is smaller than a square mile -- has to import workers from neighboring France in order to fill the demand for service jobs at the local upscale casinos and hotels. In the U.S., college grads who studied astrophysics, geophysics, pharmacology and actuarial science had zero unemployment in 2010, according to the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce. [4 degrees with 0% unemployment](https://money.cnn.com/galleries/2012/news/economy/1205/gallery.high-demand-jobs?iid=EL) In these small and [highly-skilled fields](https://money.cnn.com/galleries/2012/news/economy/1205/gallery.high-demand-jobs?iid=EL), many recent grads have job offers before they graduate. That was the case for Bette Wiebke, who just graduated with a bachelor's in actuarial science from Drake University. She's had a job lined up with Travelers Insurance since September. "The fact that most of us can get jobs coming straight out of college, definitely says something good about the occupation," Weibke said. While obviously not all students find jobs right away, those who don't often choose to go on to grad school, and aren't counted as unemployed during their studies. About 97% of Drake University actuarial grads either have a job or internship, or are enrolled in grad school within six months of graduating. "It's hard to imagine there would be zero percent unemployment in any field, but for certain segments, there is much higher demand for workers than there is supply," said Kerry Boehner, founder of KOB Solutions, a Pittsburgh-based recruiting firm. The balance of jobs and workers can quickly change as more people enter markets with little-to-no unemployment. That's why Boehner cautions young people not to choose a career track in an advanced specialty simply because it's currently in demand. "If you're going to school for 11 years, what's hot now may not be hot in 11 years," she said. What should the unemployment rate be? The U.S. job market currently has [8.1% unemployment](https://money.cnn.com/2012/05/04/news/economy/jobs-report-unemployment/index.htm?iid=EL). While almost everyone agrees that's too high, zero unemployment wouldn't be a good thing either. An economy with no unemployment is like a stagnant real estate market, said University of Oregon professor Mark Thoma. "Suppose every apartment in the country is full, and I wanted to move from New York to Los Angeles," he said. "I would have to find someone in L.A. who wants to move to New York, and we would have to do a trade. It's much more efficient to have some vacancies." [Job market dropouts](https://money.cnn.com/galleries/2012/news/economy/1205/gallery.job-market-dropouts/?iid=EL) Some churn in the labor market is a sign of a healthy economy, said Chris Pissarides, a Nobel Prize winning economist at the London School of Economics. He estimates that even in the best of times, regular turnover in the job market leads to an unemployment rate around 5%. Add on structural changes that can put people out of work -- for example construction workers after the housing bust -- and full employment is probably somewhere around an unemployment rate of 6%. "In an economy that is really growing fast, there's always a need to reallocate workers either across the country, skill categories or industries. People may need to change jobs," Pissarides said. "Therefore we have to accept there will always be some unemployment and it's good for the economy."

## Deficit

### 1nc -- deficit

#### The aff forces permanent MMT – that’s unsustainable given China’s rise, and creates permanent inflationary cycles.

Meeham 10-21 (William F. Meehan III. 10-21-2020. Senior Partner Emeritus @ McKinsey, Lecturer @ Stanford GSB. “Can The Federal Reserve Print Money Forever? Or, How Continuing To Print Money To Support Deficit Spending May End Badly, With China’s Help” <https://www.forbes.com/sites/williammeehan/2020/10/21/can-the-federal-reserve-print-money-forever-or-how-continuing-to-print-money-to-support-deficit-spending-may-end-badly-with-chinas-help/#1222555f58d4>) DLuo

From the New York Times on October 16: “The federal budget deficit soared to a record $3.1 trillion in the 2020 fiscal year…The federal government spent $6.55 trillion in 2020, while tax receipts and other revenue trailed at $3.42 trillion. Much of the spending came from the $2.2 trillion economic relief package that Congress passed in March…The deficit — the gap between what the U.S. spends and what it earns through tax receipts and other revenue — was $2 trillion more than what the White House’s budget forecast in February. It was also three times as large as the 2019 deficit of $984 billion. Here's a quiz question: do you really understand how the U.S. Government can spend so much more than it receives? If so, no need to read further. For those of us willing to admit that we don’t really understand how the U.S. Government can continue to fund its deficit spending…for the first time U.S. debt is now about equal to GDP (Gross Domestic Product), like the sound barrier we once thought if we hit it we might explode…this column will try to explain. Our trusted guide is not an academic economist, who tend to be….academic. Ian Shepherd, a fellow classmate from Stanford Graduate School of Business (1978) is an Australian, although a knowledgeable and caring United States “outsider.” Ian is principally an inventor of new systems in financial markets, an activity that resulted in him appearing before the United States Supreme Court in its ground-breaking 2014 “patent eligibility” case, Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International. Ian has a deep understanding of financial markets; he worked in international banking, was a partner at McKinsey & Company and has been an advisor to the Australian Treasury and the Australian Office of Financial Management. Ian has a particular professional interest in monetary policy design. “There were specific villains in the 2008 Financial Crisis; take your pick: Lehman Bros, AIG, Countrywide, Goldman Sachs, and so on. In mid-March 2020, there was a run on liquidity in financial markets worldwide. Yes, most companies in America then had a dependency on debt. But, to market outsiders, the financial markets functioned as well as they do usually. Still, the March liquidity run involved no (obvious) specific villains. “The extraordinary demand for market liquidity in the United States in mid-March principally manifested itself as non-Government sales of U.S. Treasury securities (treasuries). It quickly became clear to the Federal Reserve (the Fed) that its Primary Dealer banks (large global banks) lacked the balance sheet capacity to buy (and then sell to others) these securities quickly; the Fed needed to immediately become the principal buyer of treasuries. Had the Fed not done this, the price of treasuries would have fallen, possibly precipitously, and their yield or interest rate would have risen just as dramatically; this would have then put upward pressure on the Government’s borrowing costs…and then, likely inflation and higher interest rates for everybody. “The Fed soon began purchasing treasuries at a scale never seen before; it became a buyer of all treasuries its banks wished to sell. These sales saw the Fed rapidly increase its balance sheet assets and, correspondingly, increase the “excess reserve” liabilities of its banks. Looked at from the perspective of the Fed’s banks individually, these “excess reserves” simultaneously became their new assets, replacing their sold treasuries. “Soon after this, the Fed began purchasing any and all other assets that its banks wished to sell, at prices that held before the mid-March liquidity crisis, allowing banks to escape taking losses. Meanwhile, the Fed, because it is, well, the Fed, didn’t need to account for the assets it purchased as losses. “In short, the Fed’s “excess reserves” became new and high-quality assets of the banks. The popular term for what the Fed is doing is “printing money,” and at a rate rarely seen before; in fact, most of this printing is by the banks. “This process repeats itself; every time this happens the banks are able to purchase the unwanted assets of other market participants, using their money creation powers to do so, backed by their ‘excess reserves” with the Fed. In turn, the Fed purchases these assets in return for providing further increased “excess reserves” to its banks. “The effect of the Fed’s actions has been to keep interest rates lower than they would have been, benefiting all borrowers, including the Government, in the process. “A feature of the Fed’s asset purchases by “printing money” is that Wall Street firms and their large corporate clients have been the primary beneficiaries of its actions. The Fed has contributed to programs to directly support Main Street too, although nowhere near as much, or as effectively, as its Wall Street programs. The net effect of this strategy has been to increase societal inequity within the United States; it has also exposed the average U.S. citizen to future inflation risks. “With the Covid-19 pandemic appearing likely to persist for longer than we had hoped and the economy showing few signs of improving, the Fed’s actions will likely continue. With interest rates now close to zero, there is really nothing else the Fed can do. The Fed’s balance sheet will continue to grow, possibly to tens of trillions of dollars. Financial asset prices could be expected to continue increasing too, particularly in the equities market, if it continues to be stable, supported by technology companies, led by FAANG (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Alphabet/Google). “But we are on a collision course with another force, as we see further increasing Main Street insolvencies, unemployment and the weakening of the finances of ordinary households and businesses. If the Fed were to ease up “printing money,” we might see significant deflation, like Japan in the 1990s. Worst still, we might see rapidly increasing inflation. This would produce the secular stagflation former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has spoken of—remember President Jimmy Carter?” Why can the U.S. confidently “print money”, but other countries cannot (necessarily) do the same? “The short answer is because the U.S. dollar is the global reserve currency. In other words, most countries and companies from other countries usually need to transact business in U.S. dollars, making them exposed to the value of their currency relative to U.S. dollars. The United States and the Fed in particular, doesn’t face this “currency risk. “Some contend that the United States is at risk to other countries, particularly China, not buying treasuries, or even aggressively selling the treasuries they already hold. At least in the short-medium term, the Fed could directly purchase all of the treasuries the Government issues. Under worse case scenarios, the banking industry would contract. “Nevertheless, the United States should be in a position to fund itself for a very long time. All other things being equal, the U.S. dollar status as the global reserve currency could be expected to progressively decline. But the United States global position need not decline relative to most other countries. If, in particular, China were not a variable in this equation all this might be a reasonable bet for the United States to take; however, China is a variable in the equation.” How could China’s emerging new monetary policy threaten the sustainability of the United States’ current approach? “The notion of central bank digital currency (CBDC)-based new monetary policy rests on the radical idea of every individual and business in a country having a bank account with its central bank (the equivalent of the Fed) rather than with a commercial bank. Interest on balances in these accounts could be at positive, zero or negative rates. By way of such an account, entities would be able to electronically transact with others, typically using their phones, Paypal, WeChat Pay, credit or debit cards – effectively, a government-underwritten type of bitcoin, on steroids. The government could credit payments, including money its central bank simply “prints”, and debit payments, like for taxes. “Monetary policy based on such an account system would allow a government to by-pass having to issue bonds to raise debt in order to spend the bond’s proceeds as they do now. Any government would simply “print money” and use it to buy the goods and services it needs or make payments to individuals or businesses. In such a world, all the actions we described the U.S. Fed doing above become outdated. “A distinctive aspect of CBDC-based new monetary policy is that the money it “prints” is no longer “fungible,” meaning one US dollar or Euro isn’t necessarily equivalent to another. Rather, every unit of CBDC-type money that is issued by a country can have specific rules electronically attached to it. These rules can include: how quickly the money must be spent; on what goods and services it can be spent; which individuals or businesses it can be spent with. “CBDC-based monetary policy would be completely different to current monetary policy, in which the U.S. dollar’s status as “reserve currency” allows the Fed to do all the things we described above. A risk any government faces from simply “printing money” is, of course, inflation. However, this could be mitigated by a government, reducing the CBDC units available or limiting their use. Similarly, faced with the risk of deflation, a government could increase the CBDC units it makes available or limit the period of time within which these units must be spent. “If a CBDC-based monetary policy was implemented by China, Japan and/or the Eurozone, it could reduce their exposure to the U.S. dollar and weaken its unique role as the global reserve currency. And, the U.S., as the dominant even monopoly player may be slow to react to the “attacker’s advantage”. Ironically, the U.S. might also be constrained by hundreds of existing U.S. patents, many of which owned by inventors/assignees that are not U.S. entities.”

### ---2nr – xt: farhi/triffin (theory)

#### Increased bond issuance aggregate monetary instability – it triggers a Triffin dilemma that guarantees long-run collapse.

\*\*growth in other countries will have to surpass US – solow convergence, diminishing TFP, better dev departments, etc. – triggers the impact – else other countries must slow growth, triggers other warrants – and recovery helps offshore growth anyway

\*\*indict of dollar hegemony – serves as a way to counterplan in dedev

Farhi 19 (Richmond Fed interviewing Emmanuel Farhi in an interview, PhD @ MIT, Prof @ Harvard, Literally the most famous macro theorist of his generation. “Interview: Emmanual Farhi” <https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/econ_focus/2019/q2-3/interview.pdf>) DLuo

EF: You said earlier this year that the dollar is going to face competition for status as the world’s reserve currency — that is, the world monetary system will no longer be dollar-centric. Why do you think so? Farhi: If you look at the world today, it’s very much still dollar-centric even though, formally, in the organization of the international monetary system, there is a priori no special role for the dollar. So it’s a de facto dollar-centric world, not a de jure dollar-centric world. This dominance manifests itself in several aspects. The U.S. is really sort of the world banker. As such, it enjoys an exorbitant privilege and it also bears exorbitant duties. Directly or indirectly, it’s the pre-eminent supplier of safe and liquid assets to the rest of the world. It’s the issuer of the dominant currency of trade invoicing. And it’s also the strongest force in global monetary policy as well as the main lender of last resort. If you think about it, these attributes reinforce each other. The dollar’s dominance in trade invoicing makes it more attractive to borrow in dollars, which in turn makes it more desirable to price in dollars. And the U.S. role as a lender of last resort makes it safer to borrow in dollars. That, in turn, increases the responsibility of the U.S. in times of crisis. All these factors consolidate the special position of the U.S. But I don’t think that it’s a very sustainable situation. More and more, this hegemonic or central position is becoming too much for the U.S. to bear. The global safe asset shortage is a manifestation of this limitation. In my view, there’s a growing and seemingly insatiable global demand for safe assets. And there is a limited ability to supply them. In fact, the U.S. is the main supplier of safe assets to the rest of the world. As the size of the U.S. economy keeps shrinking as a share of the world economy, so does its ability to keep up with the growing global demand for safe assets. The result is a growing global safe asset shortage. It is responsible for the very low levels of interest rates that we see throughout the globe. And it is a structural destabilizing force for the world economy. It creates macroeconomic instability by pushing the world economy toward the zero lower bound. For example, if we were to experience a recession in the U.S., it’s pretty clear that we would hit the zero lower bound. Monetary policy would then have a limited ability to deal with the recession. It also creates financial instability. The fact that interest rates are so low means that it’s very cheap to borrow. It encourages leverage and reach for yield. In my view, the global safe asset shortage echoes the dollar shortage of the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, the U.S. was the pre-eminent supplier of reserve assets. The global demand for reserve assets was growing because the rest of the world was growing. And that created a tension, which was diagnosed by Robert Triffin in the early ’60s: Either the U.S. would not satisfy this growing global demand for reserve assets, and this lack of liquidity would create global recessionary forces, or the U.S. would accommodate this growing global demand for reserve assets, but then it would have to stretch its capacity and expose itself to the possibility of a confidence crisis and of a run on the dollar. In fact, that is precisely what happened. Eventually, exactly like Triffin had predicted, there was a run on the dollar. It brought down the Bretton Woods system: The dollar was floated and that was the end of the dollar exchange standard. Today, there is a new Triffin dilemma: Either the U.S. does not accommodate the growing global demand for safe assets, and this worsens the global safe asset shortage and its destabilizing consequences, or the U.S. accommodates the growing global demand for safe assets, but then it has to stretch itself fiscally and financially and thereby expose itself to the possibility of a confidence crisis. More generally, the relative importance of the U.S. is going to keep shrinking. Other global powers are going to assert themselves. There is going to be rebalancing. It’s happening today in foreign affairs and it’s a safe bet that it’s also going to happen in economic and financial affairs. Basically, I think that the role of the hegemon is becoming too heavy for the U.S. to bear. And it’s only a matter of time before powers like China and the eurozone start challenging the global status of the dollar as the world’s pre-eminent reserve and invoicing currency. It hasn’t happened yet. But you have to take the long view here and think about the next decades, not the next five years. I think that it will happen. These countries need to develop the ambition, the institutions, and the reputation necessary to play a global monetary role. It takes time.

### ---2nr – at: permanent expansion

#### Expansion is unsustainable – action now only aggregates probabilistic collapse.

Buchanan 10-22 ([Pat Buchanan](https://thebrunswicknews.com/users/profile/pbuchanan). 10-22-2020. “Can America afford to still do it all?” <https://thebrunswicknews.com/opinion/editorial_columns/can-america-afford-to-still-do-it-all/article_c562ffe8-257e-5f41-bf31-72ae61a4792c.html>) DLuo

In fiscal year 2020, which ended on Sept. 30, the U.S. government set some impressive new records. The deficit came in at $3.1 trillion, twice the previous record of $1.4 trillion in 2009, which was set during the Great Recession, and three times the 2019 deficit of about $1 trillion. Federal spending hit $6.5 trillion, one-third of U.S. gross domestic product, a share unrivaled except for the later years of World War II when federal spending exceeded 40% of GDP. The U.S. national debt, $14 trillion when Donald Trump took office, now stands at $21 trillion, roughly the same size as U.S. GDP. In fiscal year 2021, the deficit could be of the same magnitude as 2020. Why so? First, the economy is not fully recovered from the 2020 depression. Unemployment is still near 8%. Nancy Pelosi has already proposed $2.2 trillion in new spending to battle the effects of the coronavirus pandemic in the first month of this fiscal year. And COVID-19 cases are spiking again. With the national debt already equal to the GDP, and growing faster now, a question arises: Where does this end? How many more multitrillion- dollar deficits can we sustain before the quality of U.S. debt is called into question by Japan, China and the other nations that traditionally buy and hold U.S. debt? How long before the value of the U.S. dollar is questioned? How long before our creditors start demanding higher interest rates to compensate for the rising risks they are taking in buying the bonds of so profligate a nation? According to Stein’s Law, named after Herb Stein, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers who enunciated it, if something cannot go on forever, it will stop. Or was Herb Stein wrong, and we can borrow and spend forever? Consider the built-in engines of spending that were causing trillion-dollar deficits even before the coronavirus hit? With the huge baby boomer generation, born between 1946 and 1964, only half retired and still reaching 65 and 66 in the millions every year, the claims on Social Security and Medicare, the two largest programs in the U.S. budget, are certain to grow. So, too, are the claims on Medicaid, health care for the poor, the next largest item in the budget. With unemployment at 8%, other social programs that date to the Great Society days of over half a century ago — welfare, housing, education, nutrition — and consume a large share of our budget, are unlikely to shrink. Interest on the debt, as the U.S. national debt rises and becomes riskier, is also likely to be headed one way — straight up. Which brings us to that other major budget item: national defense. The Trump era has already produced a significant increase in defense spending, while defense commitments have seen no reduction. We are obligated to defend some 30 NATO allies from the Atlantic to the Baltic and Black seas. In the Middle and Near East, we have troops stationed in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Afghanistan and Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. With the new strategic “pivot to Asia,” U.S. troops and ships have moved into the Indo-Pacific region to contain China in what is being called Cold War II. Then there are the U.S. treaty commitments to defend Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand dating to the ‘50s Allies are our strength, we are told. They are also our dependents. This morning came press reports that ISIS, whose caliphate in Syria and Iraq we annihilated, is turning up in Africa. A new front may be opening up in the global war on terror. The question here is a simple one: Can we continue to do it all? Our resources are not inexhaustible. Already, U.S. GDP is receding as a share of global GDP, and the defense budget is receding as a share of U.S. GDP. We are being obligated to do more and more, at home and abroad, while our share of the world’s wealth is less and less. Can we continue to maintain strategic parity and contain the ambitions of the other great powers, Russia and China? Can we continue to defend South Korea and Japan from Kim Jong Un and his nuclear arsenal, confront and choke the Ayatollah’s regime in Iran and, at the same time, reconstruct George H. W. Bush’s “new world order”? While doing all this, can we overcome the worst pandemic since the Spanish flu of 100 years ago, and deal with a national divide and racial crisis as bad as any since the 1960s, if not the Civil War? We’re going to find out.

## Fed Rates

### 1nc – fed rates module

#### The aff fundamentally shifts federal reserve monetary policy – injects higher uncertainty into markets, decreases validity of market instruments, wrecks the potency of the dual mandate, and makes catastrophic mistakes more likely.

FOMC 20 (Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, they’re really good at math. 8/27/2020. “Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.” <https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf>) DLuo

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is firmly committed to fulfilling its statutory mandate from the Congress of promoting maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public as clearly as possible. Such clarity facilitates well-informed decisionmaking by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty, increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society. Employment, inflation, and long-term interest rates fluctuate over time in response to economic and financial disturbances. Monetary policy plays an important role in stabilizing the economy in response to these disturbances. The Committee’s primary means of adjusting the stance of monetary policy is through changes in the target range for the federal funds rate. The Committee judges that the level of the federal funds rate consistent with maximum employment and price stability over the longer run has declined relative to its historical average. Therefore, the federal funds rate is likely to be constrained by its effective lower bound more frequently than in the past. Owing in part to the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound, the Committee judges that downward risks to employment and inflation have increased. The Committee is prepared to use its full range of tools to achieve its maximum employment and price stability goals. The maximum level of employment is a broadbased and inclusive goal that is not directly measurable and changes over time owing largely to nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. Consequently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee’s policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the shortfalls of employment from its maximum level, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision. The Committee considers a wide range of indicators in making these assessments. The inflation rate over the longer run is primarily determined by monetary policy, and hence the Committee has the ability to specify a longer-run goal for inflation. The Committee reaffirms its judgment that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate. The Committee judges that longer-term inflation expectations that are well anchored at 2 percent foster price stability and moderate long-term interest rates and enhance the Committee’s ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. In order to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at this level, the Committee seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time, and therefore judges that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time. Monetary policy actions tend to influence economic activity, employment, and prices with a lag. In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks over time to mitigate shortfalls of employment from the Committee’s assessment of its maximum level and deviations of inflation from its longer-run goal. Moreover, sustainably achieving maximum employment and price stability depends on a stable financial system. Therefore, the Committee’s policy decisions reflect its longer-run goals, its medium-term outlook, and its assessments of the balance of risks, including risks to the financial system that could impede the attainment of the Committee’s goals. The Committee’s employment and inflation objectives are generally complementary. However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives are not complementary, it takes into account the employment shortfalls and inflation deviations and the potentially different time horizons over which employment and inflation are projected to return to levels judged consistent with its mandate. The Committee intends to review these principles and to make adjustments as appropriate at its annual organizational meeting each January, and to undertake roughly every 5 years a thorough public review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices.

### ---2nr – uq: rates low now

#### Low rates are here to stay.

Smialek 5-22 (Jeanna Smialek, 5-22-20. “Rock-Bottom Interest Rates May Be Here to Stay” <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/22/business/economy/fed-interest-rates-coronavirus.html>) DLuo Rock-Bottom Interest Rates May Be Here to Stay) DLuo

Once the labor market begins to recover, the Federal Reserve’s experience in the pre-pandemic, record-long economic expansion is likely to influence when its raises rates. Federal Reserve officials were running a huge experiment with America’s job market before coronavirus lockdowns gripped the American economy, one that could inform how officials think about unemployment — and the path for interest rates — in the pandemic’s aftermath. The Fed came into 2020 planning to allow unemployment to sit at 50-year lows without trying to cool off the labor market by raising rates. Wages and inflation are usually expected to shoot higher when the job market is tight, but that relationship had [remained muted](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/business/economy/economy-inflation-fed.html) even a decade after the 2008 financial crisis. America will never know how many people might have gotten jobs had the trial run its course. The labor market was enjoying a slowly increasing employment-to-population [ratio](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), stronger [wages](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AHETPI), and record-low minority unemployment rates when the pandemic abruptly closed businesses and kicked tens of millions out of their jobs. But central bankers have learned a lesson over the past decade that could inform how they respond when economies reopen, the recovery picks up steam and unemployment falls. Instead of trying to offset very-low unemployment with higher interest rates, as they did between 2015 and 2018, they may simply remain patient when the job market begins to heal, humbled by the realization that the old inflationary rules seem to no longer apply. That could leave interest rates, which have been set at near-zero since officials abruptly slashed them at a [series of emergency meetings](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/business/economy/federal-reserve-coronavirus.html) in March, at rock-bottom for years as the labor market mends. “We’ve learned something very fundamental about our ability to associate levels of unemployment with inflation, or indeed, other imbalances,” Jerome H. Powell, the Fed chair, [said](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NStvQ7uIAOU) in a Peterson Institute for International Economics interview last week. “That is a lesson we’ll be carrying forward.”

### ---2nr – at: self-check/adjustment

#### Low rates mean more monetary policy is impossibleand future policy in infinite time becomes less effective – the plan aggregates that.

Bernanke 17 (Ben S. Bernanke, has at LEAST one-half of a brain cell. April 12, 2017. “How big a problem is the zero lower bound on interest rates?” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/04/12/how-big-a-problem-is-the-zero-lower-bound-on-interest-rates/)DLuo

If inflation is too low or unemployment too high, the Fed normally responds by pushing down short-term interest rates to boost spending. However, the scope for rate cuts is limited by the fact that interest rates cannot fall (much) below zero, as people always have the option of holding cash, which pays zero interest, rather than negative-yielding assets. [[1]](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/04/12/how-big-a-problem-is-the-zero-lower-bound-on-interest-rates/#f1) When short-term interest rates reach zero, further monetary easing becomes difficult and may require unconventional monetary policy, such as large-scale asset purchases (quantitative easing). Before 2008, most economists viewed this zero lower bound (ZLB) on short-term interest rates as unlikely to be relevant very often and thus not a serious constraint on monetary policy. (Japan had been dealing with the ZLB for several decades but was seen as a special case.) However, in 2008 the Fed responded to the worsening economic crisis by cutting its policy rate nearly to zero, where it remained until late 2015. Although the Fed was able to further ease monetary policy after 2008 through unconventional methods, the ZLB constraint greatly complicated the Fed’s task. How big a problem is the ZLB likely to be in the future? [A paper at the recent Brookings Papers on Economic Activity conference, by Federal Reserve Board economists Michael Kiley and John Roberts](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/5_kileyroberts.pdf)—of which I was a formal discussant—attempted to answer this question by simulating econometric models of the U.S. economy, including the model that serves as the basis for most Fed forecasting and policy analysis. Kiley and Roberts (KR) concluded that, under some assumptions about the economic environment and the conduct of monetary policy, short-term interest rates could be at or very close to zero (that is, the ZLB could be binding) as much as 30-40 percent of the time—a much higher proportion than found in most earlier studies. If correct, their result reinforces the need for fresh thinking about how to maintain the effectiveness of monetary policy in the future, [a point recently emphasized by San Francisco Fed president John Williams](http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2016/august/monetary-policy-and-low-r-star-natural-rate-of-interest/) and others (and with which, I should emphasize, I very much agree). In this post I discuss the KR result but also point out a puzzle. If in the future the ZLB will often prevent the Fed from providing sufficient stimulus, then, on average, inflation should be expected to fall short of the Fed’s 2 percent target—a point shown clearly by KR’s simulations. The puzzle is that neither market participants nor professional forecasters appear to expect such an inflation shortfall. Why not? There are various possibilities, but it could be that markets and forecasters simply have confidence that the Fed will develop policy approaches to overcome the ZLB problem. It will be up to the Fed to prove worthy of that confidence. THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF ZLB EPISODES As I’ve noted, KR’s research suggests that periods during which the short-term interest rate is at or close to zero may be frequent in the future. They also find that these episodes would typically last several years on average and (because monetary policy is hobbled during such periods) result in poor economic performance. Two key assumptions underlie these conclusions. First is the presumption that the current, historically low level of interest rates will persist, even when the economy is once again operating at normal levels and monetary policy has returned to a more-neutral setting. [As another paper at the Brookings conference examined in some detail](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/4_delnegroetal.pdf), real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates have been declining for decades, for reasons including slower economic growth; an excess of global savings relative to attractive investment opportunities; an increased demand for safe, liquid assets; and other factors largely out of the control of monetary policy. If the normal real interest rate is currently about 1 percent—a reasonable guess—and if inflation is expected on average to be close to the Fed’s target of 2 percent, then the nominal interest rate will be around 3 percent when the economy is at full employment with price stability. Naturally, if interest rates are typically about 3 percent, then the Fed has much less room to cut than when rates are 6 percent or more, as they were during much of the 1990s, for example. Indeed, the KR simulations show that the expected frequency of ZLB episodes rises quite sharply when normal interest rates fall from 5 or 6 percent to 3 percent. [What do changes in the Fed’s longer-run goals and monetary strategy statement mean?](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/09/02/what-do-changes-in-the-feds-longer-run-goals-and-monetary-strategy-statement-mean/) [The Fed’s review of its monetary policy strategy—and what Brookings’ scholars have to say about it](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/08/12/the-feds-review-of-its-monetary-policy-strategy-and-what-brookings-scholars-have-to-say-about-it/) [What is yield curve control?](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/05/what-is-yield-curve-control/) The second factor determining the frequency and severity of ZLB episodes in the KR simulations is the Fed’s choice of monetary policies. This important point is worth repeating: The frequency and severity of ZLB episodes is not given, but depends on how the Fed manages monetary policy. In particular, KR’s baseline results assume that the Fed follows one of two simple policy rules: one estimated from the Fed’s past behavior, and the second determined by a standard Taylor rule, which relates the Fed’s short-term interest rate target to the deviation of inflation from the Fed’s 2 percent target and on how far the economy is from full employment. Using the Fed’s principal forecasting model, KR find that in the future the U.S. economy will be at the ZLB 32 percent of the time under the estimated monetary policy rule, and 38 percent of the time under the Taylor-rule policy. Because of the frequent encounters with the ZLB, the simulated economic outcomes are not very good: Under either policy rule, on average inflation is about 1.2 percent (well below the Fed’s 2 percent target) and output is more than 1 percent below its potential. WHAT DO MARKETS AND PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS THINK? Are these results plausible? A specific prediction of the KR analysis, that in the future frequent contact with the ZLB will keep inflation well below the Fed’s 2 percent target, can be compared to the expectations of market participants and of professional forecasters. These comparisons do not generally support KR’s worst-case scenarios. For example, measures of inflation expectations based on comparing returns to inflation-adjusted and ordinary Treasury securities, suggest that market participants see inflation remaining close to the Fed’s 2 percent target in the long run.[[2]](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/04/12/how-big-a-problem-is-the-zero-lower-bound-on-interest-rates/#f2) The prices of derivatives that depend on long-run inflation outcomes also imply that market expectations of inflation are close to 2 percent. To illustrate the latter point, Figure 1 shows inflation expectations as derived from zero-coupon inflation swaps. ([See here](http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/04/how-liquid-is-the-inflation-swap-market.html) for an explanation of these instruments and a discussion of their properties.) Figure 1 suggests that market participants expect inflation to average about 2-1/4 percent over long horizons, up to thirty years. These expectations relate to inflation as measured by the consumer price index, which tends to be a bit higher than inflation measured by the index for personal consumption expenditures, the inflation rate targeted by the Fed. So Figure 1 seems quite consistent with a market expectation of 2 percent for the Fed’s targeted inflation rate over very long horizons.

### ---2nr – at: no dual mandate

#### The mandate is legislatively enshrined and targeted through interest rates

Johnston 5-31 ([MATTHEW JOHNSTON](https://www.investopedia.com/contributors/53788/), May 31, 2020 “Breaking Down the Federal Reserve's Dual Mandate” <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/100715/breaking-down-federal-reserves-dual-mandate.asp>) DLuo

The current mandate of the U.S. Federal Reserve was shaped by events of the 1970s, which was marked by simultaneous high inflation and unemployment, a condition known as [stagflation](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stagflation.asp). The Federal Reserve Act of 1977 modified the original act establishing the Federal Reserve in 1913 and clarified the roles of the [Board of Governors](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/board-of-governors.asp) and [Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fomc.asp)1﻿ Congress explicitly stated the Fed's goals should be "maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates."2 ﻿ It is these goals that have come to be known as the Fed's "[dual mandate](http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/speeches/our-dual-mandate)."3﻿ The first thing to notice about the dual mandate is that it is actually three goals: 1) maximum employment; 2) stable prices and 3) moderate long-term interest rates. We shall begin by looking at maximum employment before turning to the other two goals, which can effectively be treated as a single mandate. KEY TAKEAWAYS The Federal Reserve has two mandates: maintaining maximum employment and maintaining stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates.3﻿ Maximum employment doesn't mean 100% employment, which is not possible, but rather the level of employment that is likely in normal economic conditions when there is neither a boom or a recession. Stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates can be seen as essentially one mandate, since long-term interest rates are set with an eye to managing pricing pressure and inflation. Maximum Employment When thinking about the first mandate there are two very important points to make: 1) maximum employment does not mean 100 percent employment or zero percent unemployment, and 2) there is not one single level of employment, carved in stone and valid for all eternity, known as the "maximum level of employment." Economists recognize there will always be some level of unemployment. This is because there will always be people quitting or starting new jobs, businesses failing and new ones starting, or specific sectors contracting and others expanding. Because it takes time to find a new job, there will always be a certain level of unemployment, and thus the level the Fed is tasked with achieving is not zero percent unemployment. The desired unemployment level is one that would prevail in normal [economic conditions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economic-conditions.asp), i.e. in the absence of a [boom](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/boom.asp) or recession. This rate has come to be known as the [natural rate of unemployment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/naturalunemployment.asp). This natural rate is determined by structural factors that affect the flexibility or mobility of the [labor market](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-market.asp). For example, if workers have greater mobility within their country to work in another region, this would help to reduce the natural rate of unemployment. Regulations that restrict labor mobility will tend to raise the natural rate. It is not always obvious whether the economy is in normal economic times or even what the natural rate of unemployment is if it were. The Fed must rely on [assessments](https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12848.htm) from its members despite the uncertainty, and these are always subject to revision. As of May 2020, the estimate of the longer-term natural or normal rate of unemployment ranged anywhere is about 4.5 percent.4﻿ (For more, see: [The Unemployment Rate: Get Real](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/10/unemployment-rate-get-real.asp).) Stable Prices and Moderate Long-Term Interest Rates In order for people and businesses to make plans for the future, they need to be reasonably confident that prices will remain relatively constant over time. As a result, price instability in the form of either [deflation](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deflation.asp) or rapid inflation can have drastic consequences on economic stability. We noted above that stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates could effectively be interpreted as comprising a single mandate. This is because long-term [nominal](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nominal.asp) interest rates are set with inflation expectations in mind. For any given [nominal interest rate](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nominalinterestrate.asp), rapidly rising prices will diminish the [real interest rate](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/realinterestrate.asp) that [lenders](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lender.asp) receive and [debtors](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/debtor.asp) must pay. Thus, in an unstable monetary environment with rapidly rising prices, lenders will want to charge much higher interest rates to mitigate the inflation-rate risk. (For more, see: [Understanding Interest Rates: Nominal, Real, And Effective](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/082113/understanding-interest-rates-nominal-real-and-effective.asp).) On August 27, 2020 the Federal Reserve announced that it will no longer raise interest rates due to unemployment falling below a certain level if inflation remains low. It also changed its inflation target to an average, meaning that it will allow inflation to rise somewhat above its 2% target to make up for periods when it was below 2%. Having just combined the goals of stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates into a single mandate, it may be surprising to realize that since January 2012, the FOMC has targeted an inflation rate of two percent to achieve its dual mandate.7﻿ This sounds more like a single mandate, which is why one can view the Fed as being consistent with the single mandate of price stability sought by the [European Central Bank (ECB)](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/europeancentralbank.asp).8﻿ The Fed's reasoning is that this inflation target, by ensuring price stability, creates a stable economic environment able to foster the goal of maximum employment.7﻿ When prices are stable, people and businesses can make longer-term economic decisions necessary for stable [economic growth](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economicgrowth.asp). This leads to improved employment opportunities. Stable prices and long-term interest rates are Federal Reserve goals that directly influence each other, making them essentially one mandate. The Bottom Line Whether it is a triple, dual or single mandate, the primary aim of the Federal Reserve is to create a stable monetary environment. To achieve this, the Fed has deemed that targeting inflation (by keeping it at a low and stable rate of two percent) is the best way to achieve such stability.7﻿ So all the fuss about changing interest rates is really all about keeping prices stable in order to foster economic growth and promote maximum employment.

# 2NR

### 2nr – ! – ov

### 2nr – t/ – country instability

#### Economic decline spills over globally—causes escalating conflict

Pamlin and Armstrong 15 – Dennis Pamlin, Executive Project Manager, Global Challenges Foundation, Stuart Armstrong, James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 2015 (“Global Challenges: 12 Risks that Threaten Human Civilization,” Global Challenges Foundation, February 2015, http://www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/HON301/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact-full-report-1.pdf)

Often economic collapse is accompanied by social chaos, civil unrest and sometimes a breakdown of law and order. Societal collapse usually refers to the fall or disintegration of human societies, often along with their life support systems. It broadly includes both quite abrupt societal failures typified by collapses, and more extended gradual declines of superpowers. Here only the former is included. The world economic and political system is made up of many actors with many objectives and many links between them. Such intricate, interconnected systems are subject to unexpected system-wide failures due to the structure of the network311 – even if each component of the network is reliable. This gives rise to systemic risk: systemic risk occurs when parts that individually may function well become vulnerable when connected as a system to a self-reinforcing joint risk that can spread from part to part (contagion), potentially affecting the entire system and possibly spilling over to related outside systems.312 Such effects have been observed in such diverse areas as ecology,313 finance314 and critical infrastructure315 (such as power grids). They are characterised by the possibility that a small internal or external disruption could cause a highly non-linear effect,316 including a cascading failure that infects the whole system,317 as in the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The possibility of collapse becomes more acute when several independent networks depend on each other, as is increasingly the case (water supply, transport, fuel and power stations are strongly coupled, for instance).318 This dependence links social and technological systems as well.319 This trend is likely to be intensified by continuing globalisation,320 while global governance and regulatory mechanisms seem inadequate to address the issue.321 This is possibly because the tension between resilience and efficiency322 can even exacerbate the problem.323 Many triggers could start such a failure cascade, such as the infrastructure damage wrought by a coronal mass ejection,324 an ongoing cyber conflict, or a milder form of some of the risks presented in the rest of the paper. Indeed the main risk factor with global systems collapse is as something which may exacerbate some of the other risks in this paper, or as a trigger. But a simple global systems collapse still poses risks on its own. The productivity of modern societies is largely dependent on the careful matching of different types of capital325 (social, technological, natural...) with each other. If this matching is disrupted, this could trigger a “social collapse” far out of proportion to the initial disruption.326 States and institutions have collapsed in the past for seemingly minor systemic reasons.327 And institutional collapses can create knock-on effects, such as the descent of formerly prosperous states to much more impoverished and destabilising entities.328 Such processes could trigger damage on a large scale if they weaken global political and economic systems to such an extent that secondary effects (such as conflict or starvation) could cause great death and suffering.

### 2nr – t/ – soft left impact

#### Each percentage increase of national income saves tens of thousands of lives annually

Pritchett and Summers 93 (Lant and Lawrence, Lead Socio-Economist @ World Bank + Fmr vice president of development economics and chief economist of the World Bank/fmr Secretary of Treasury/current president @ Harvard, “Wealthier is Healthier,” Policy Research, Working Papers, World Development Report—World Bank, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1993/06/01/000009265\_3961004215604/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf)

Wealthier nations are healthier nations. Figure 1 displays the association between per capita income' and two measures of a country's health, **infant mortality and life expectancy**. Both improve sharply with rising income, especially at low income levels. If rising income causes improved health through increased spending on goods that directly or indirectly improve health, **raising per capita incomes will be an important component of a country's health strategy**. There are, however, two other plausible explanations for the existence of a health-wealth relationship: (1) healthier workers are more productive and hence wealthier (reverse causation) or (2) some other factor may cause both better health and higher wealth (incidental association). Using instrumental variables estimation techniques and data across countries and over time, **we find strong evidence that the relationship between income and health is not merely associative** but causal and structural. The income elasticity of infant and child mortality is between .2 and .4 and differences in income growth rates over the last three decades explain roughly 40% of the cross country differences in mortality improvements. If income were one percent higher in the developing countries, up to33,000 infant and 53,000 child deaths would be averted annually**.**

#### \*Our impact is linear—greater levels of economic wealth correlate with better human health and lower mortality rates

Cross 96 (Frank, Professor of Business Regulation, University of Texas at Austin, 53 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 851)

Money has value only because of the things that it can buy. Some of the things that money can buy advance public health. Correspondingly**, having less money may mean poorer health**. It has become commonly known that "richer is safer." Ample empirical evidence confirms that greater wealth generally means better health. [337](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n337" \t "_self) Greater wealth may promote health by enabling individuals to make protective expenditures, such as the purchase of a child safety seat, a bicycle helmet, a smoke detector, or a fire extinguisher for the home. [338](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n338" \t "_self) Others believe that lower income is a great source of psychological stress that undermines health. [339](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n339" \t "_self) Alternatively, there is evidence that richer societies tend to demonstrate more concern for health protection, [340](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n340" \t "_self) and **economic growth may encourage the development of newer and safer products**. [341](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n341" \t "_self) As recently elaborated: [\*918] A general increase in the standard of living influences societal structure. **A wealthier society leads to the development of a better and more diverse medical research establishment, to larger markets to stimulate creation of safer products, to an infrastructure of health clubs and many opportunities for exercise, and to the societal resilience to rapidly and efficiently attack new unforeseen problems threatening our collective health and safety**. [342](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n342" \t "_self) Some combination of these dynamics yield better health as overall national income rises. On average, higher GNP means a reduction in morbidity and mortality. [343](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n343" \t "_self) The evidence for the association of wealth and health is substantial. International comparisons reveal that **wealthier nations have longer life expectancies**. [344](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n344" \t "_self) Studies within the United States likewise demonstrate **that those with higher incomes have less morbidity and mortality**. [345](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n345" \t "_self) Still other  [\*919]  research shows that **death rates vary over time for a specific group of individuals, depending on their income levels**. [346](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n346" \t "_self) Thus, an increase in wealth of, say, $ 1000 would perhaps reduce one's risk of injury or disease or premature death by one in one thousand. Scholars have used this data to show that a societal loss in the range of $ 5 million to $ 10 million engenders sufficient additional risk to create a statistical probability of an additional death. [347](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1781cb0a1ecc2140adb762f7f4a2e030&docnum=33&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAB&_md5=398db34a13fd25a646cf3dbeb8e6221c&focBudTerms=precautionary%20principle%21%20or%20precautionary%20measure%21%20w/35%20conservatives&focBudSel=all" \l "n347" \t "_self)

### 2nc – t/ – warming

#### Extraction solves shortages and is comparatively better for the environment—collapse ends environmentalism and decimates the earth.

Mead 12. Walter Russell Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. *The American Interest.* Since its founding in 2005, The American Interest has been one of the leading sources for understanding American policy, politics, and culture. 7/28/18. “The Energy Revolution 4: Hot Planet?” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/07/28/the-energy-revolution-4-hot-planet/> Accessed 7/10/18 //WR-NCP \*edited for gendered language which we do not endorse

Over a series of recent posts, I’ve been looking at the energy revolution that is changing the look of the 21st centuries. Some countries are losers, but the U.S. in particular stands to make big gains at home and in its foreign policy. On the whole, this news is about as good as it gets: trillions of dollars of valuable resources are now available to power the US economy, cut our trade deficit and reduce our vulnerability to Middle East instability. Hundreds of thousands of well paid blue collar jobs are going to reduce income inequality and help rebuild a stable middle class. Many of the resources are exactly where we would want them: in hard hit Rust Belt states. World peace is also looking more possible: the great powers aren’t going to be elbowing each other as they fight to control the last few dribs and drabs of oil. Nasty dictatorships and backward-facing petro-states aren’t going to be able blackmail the world as easily. But there is one group (other than the Russians and the Gulf Arabs and the Iranians) that isn’t sharing in the general joy: the greens. For them, the spectacle of a looming world energy crisis was good news. It justified huge subsidies for solar and wind power (and thereby guaranteed huge fortunes for clever green-oriented investors). Greens outdid themselves year after year with gloom and doom forecasts about the coming oil crunch. They hoped that public dislike of the Middle East and the costs of our involvement there could be converted into public support for expensive green energy policies here at home: “energy independence” was one of the few arguments they had that resonated widely among average voters. Back in those salad days of green arrogance, there was plenty of scoffing at the ‘peak oil deniers’ and shortage skeptics who disagreed with what greens told us all was settled, Malthusian science. “Reality based” green thinkers sighed and rolled their eyes at the illusions of those benighted techno-enthusiasts who said that unconventional sources like shale oil and gas and the oil sands of Canada would one day become available. Environmentalists, you see, are science based, unlike those clueless, Gaia-defying technophiles with their infantile faith in the power of human creativity. Greens, with their awesome powers of Gaia-assisted intuition, know what the future holds. But those glory days are over now, and the smarter environmentalists are bowing to the inevitable. George Monbiot, whose cries of woe and pain in the Guardian newspaper have served as the Greek chorus at each stage of the precipitous decline of the global green movement, gave voice to green grief at the prospect of a wealthy and prosperous century to come: “We were wrong,” he wrote on July 2, ”about peak oil. There’s enough to fry us all.” Monbiot now gets the politics as well: There is enough oil in the ground to deep-fry the lot of us, and no obvious means to prevail upon governments and industry to leave it in the ground. Twenty years of efforts to prevent climate breakdown through moral persuasion have failed, with the collapse of the multilateral process at Rio de Janeiro last month. The world’s most powerful nation is again becoming an oil state, and if the political transformation of its northern neighbour [a reference to Canada] is anything to go by, the results will not be pretty. In other words, a newly oil rich United States is going to fight even harder against global green carbon policies, and the new discoveries will tilt the American political system even farther in the direction of capitalist oil companies. Capitalism is not, Monbiot is forced to admit, a fragile system that will easily be replaced. Bolstered by huge supplies of oil, it is here to stay. Industrial civilization is, as far as he can now see, unstoppable. Gaia, that treacherous ~~slut~~, has made so much oil and gas that her faithful acolytes today cannot protect her from the consequences of her own folly. Welcome to the New Green Doom: an overabundance of oil and gas is going to release so much greenhouse gas that the world is going to fry. The exploitation of the oil sands in Alberta, warn leading environmentalists, is a tipping point. William McKibben put it this way in an interview with Wired magazine in the fall of 2011: I think if we go whole-hog in the tar sands, we’re out of luck. Especially since that would doubtless mean we’re going whole-hog at all the other unconventional energy sources we can think of: Deepwater drilling, fracking every rock on the face of the Earth, and so forth. Here’s why the tar sands are important: It’s a decision point about whether, now that we’re running out of the easy stuff, we’re going to go after the hard stuff. The Saudi Arabian liquor store is running out of bottles. Do we sober up, or do we find another liquor store, full of really crappy booze, to break into? A year later, despite the success of environmentalists like McKibben at persuading the Obama administration to block a pipeline intended to ship this oil to refineries in the US, it’s clear (as it was crystal clear all along to anyone with eyes to see) that the world has every intention of making use of the “crappy liquor.” Again, for people who base their claim to world leadership on their superior understanding of the dynamics of complex systems, greens prove over and over again that they are surprisingly naive and crude in their ability to model and to shape the behavior of the political and economic systems they seek to control. If their understanding of the future of the earth’s climate is anything like as wish-driven, fact-averse and intellectually crude as their approach to international affairs, democratic politics and the energy market, the greens are in trouble indeed. And as I’ve written in the past, the contrast between green claims to understand climate and to be able to manage the largest and most complex set of policy changes ever undertaken, and the evident incompetence of greens at managing small (Solyndra) and large (Kyoto, EU cap and trade, global climate treaty) political projects today has more to do with climate skepticism than greens have yet understood. Many people aren’t rejecting science; they are rejecting green claims of policy competence. In doing so, they are entirely justified by the record. Nevertheless, the future of the environment is not nearly as dim as greens think. Despairing environmentalists like McKibben and Monbiot are as wrong about what the new era of abundance means as green energy analysts were about how much oil the planet had. The problem is the original sin of much environmental thought: Malthusianism. If greens weren’t so addicted to Malthusian horror narratives they would be able to see that the new era of abundance is going to make this a cleaner planet faster than if the new gas and oil had never been found. Let’s be honest. It has long been clear to students of history, and has more recently begun to dawn on many environmentalists, that all that happy-clappy carbon treaty stuff was a pipe dream and that nothing like that is going to happen. A humanity that hasn’t been able to ban the bomb despite the clear and present dangers that nuclear weapons pose isn’t going to ban or even seriously restrict the internal combustion engine and the generator. The political efforts of the green movement to limit greenhouse gasses have had very little effect so far, and it is highly unlikely that they will have more success in the future. The green movement has been more of a group hug than a curve bending exercise, and that is unlikely to change. If the climate curve bends, it will bend the way the population curve did: as the result of lots of small human decisions driven by short term interest calculations rather than as the result of a grand global plan. The shale boom hasn’t turned green success into green failure. It’s prevented green failure from turning into something much worse. Monbiot understands this better than McKibben; there was never any real doubt that we’d keep going to the liquor store. If we hadn’t found ways to use all this oil and gas, we wouldn’t have embraced the economics of less. True, as oil and gas prices rose, there would be more room for wind and solar power, but the real winner of an oil and gas shortage is… coal. To use McKibben’s metaphor, there is a much dirtier liquor store just down the road from the shale emporium, and it’s one we’ve been patronizing for centuries. The US and China have oodles of coal, and rather than walk to work from our cold and dark houses all winter, we’d use it. Furthermore, when and if the oil runs out, the technology exists to get liquid fuel out of coal. It isn’t cheap and it isn’t clean, but it works. The newly bright oil and gas future means that we aren’t entering a new Age of Coal. For this, every green on the planet should give thanks. The second reason why greens should give thanks for shale is that environmentalism is a luxury good. People must survive and they will survive by any means necessary. But they would much rather thrive than merely survive, and if they can arrange matters better, they will. A poor society near the edge of survival will dump the industrial waste in the river without a second thought. It will burn coal and choke in the resulting smog if it has nothing else to burn. Politics in an age of survival is ugly and practical. It has to be. The best leader is the one who can cut out all the fluff and the folderol and keep you alive through the winter. During the Battle of Leningrad, people burned priceless antiques to stay alive for just one more night. An age of energy shortages and high prices translates into an age of radical food and economic insecurity for billions of people. Those billions of hungry, frightened, angry people won’t fold their hands and meditate on the ineffable wonders of Gaia and her mystic web of life as they pass peacefully away. Nor will they vote George Monbiot and Bill McKibben into power. They will butcher every panda in the zoo before they see their children starve, they will torch every forest on earth before they freeze to death, and the cheaper and the meaner their lives are, the less energy or thought they will spare to the perishing world around them. But, thanks to shale and other unconventional energy sources, that isn’t where we are headed. We are heading into a world in which energy is abundant and horizons are open even as humanity’s grasp of science and technology grows more secure. A world where more and more basic human needs are met is a world that has time to think about other goals and the money to spend on them. As China gets richer, the Chinese want cleaner air, cleaner water, purer food — and they are ready and able to pay for them. A Brazil whose economic future is secure can afford to treasure and conserve its rain forests. A Central America where the people are doing all right is more willing and able to preserve its biodiversity. And a world in which people know where their next meal is coming from is a world that can and will take thought for things like the sustainability of the fisheries and the protection of the coral reefs. A world that is more relaxed about the security of its energy sources is going to be able to do more about improving the quality of those sources and about managing the impact of its energy consumption on the global commons. A rich, energy secure world is going to spend more money developing solar power and wind power and other sustainable sources than a poor, hardscrabble one. When human beings think their basic problems are solved, they start looking for more elegant solutions. Once Americans had an industrial and modern economy, we started wanting to clean up the rivers and the air. Once people aren’t worried about getting enough calories every day to survive, they start wanting healthier food more elegantly prepared. A world of abundant shale oil and gas is a world that will start imposing more environmental regulations on shale and gas producers. A prosperous world will set money aside for research and development for new technologies that conserve energy or find it in cleaner surroundings. A prosperous world facing climate change will be able to ameliorate the consequences and take thought for the future in ways that a world overwhelmed by energy insecurity and gripped in a permanent economic crisis of scarcity simply can’t and won’t do. Greens should also be glad that the new energy is where it is. For Monbiot and for many others, Gaia’s decision to put so much oil into the United States and Canada seems like her biggest indiscretion of all. Certainly, a United States of America that has, in the Biblical phrase, renewed its youth like an eagle with a large infusion of fresh petro-wealth is going to be even less eager than formerly to sign onto various pie-in-the-sky green carbon treaties. But think how much worse things would be if the new reserves lay in dictatorial kleptocracies. How willing and able would various Central Asia states have been to regulate extraction and limit the damage? How would Nigeria have handled vast new reserves whose extraction required substantially more invasive methods? Instead, the new sources are concentrated in places where environmentalists have more say in policy making and where, for all the shortcomings and limits, governments are less corruptible, more publicly accountable and in fact more competent to develop and enforce effective energy regulations. This won’t satisfy McKibben and Monbiot (nothing that could actually happen would satisfy either of these gentlemen), but it is a lot better than what we could be facing. Additionally, if there are two countries in the world that should worry carbon-focused greens more than any other, they are the United States and China. The two largest, hungriest economies in the world are also home to enormous coal reserves. But based on what we now know, the US and China are among the biggest beneficiaries of the new cornucopia. Gaia put the oil and the gas where, from a carbon point of view, it will do the most good. In a world of energy shortages and insecurity, both the US and China would have gone flat out for coal. Now, that is much less likely. And there’s one more reason why greens should thank Gaia for shale. Wind and solar aren’t ready for prime time now, but by the time the new sources start to run low, humanity will have mastered many more technologies that can used to provide energy and to conserve it. It’s likely that Age of Shale hasn’t just postponed the return of coal: because of this extra time, there likely will never be another age in which coal is the dominant industrial fuel. It’s virtually certain that the total lifetime carbon footprint of the human race is going to be smaller with the new oil and gas sources than it would have been without them. Neither the world’s energy problems nor its climate issues are going away any time soon. Paradise is not beckoning just a few easy steps away. But the new availability of these energy sources is on balance a positive thing for environmentalists as much as for anyone else. Perhaps, and I know this is a heretical thought, but perhaps Gaia is smarter than the greens.

### 2nr – t/ – renewables

#### Impact turns the case – decline tanks renewables and political will to fight warming

Tokic 12[(Damir, PhD, Professor @ ECS Rennes) “The economic and financial dimensions of degrowth” Ecological Economics Volume 84 Science Direct, December 2012] SJDI

In a broader sense, it is unlikely that even ecological concerns can be addressed by degrowth as illustrated in Fig. 1. First, the environmental issues would be less important during the economic implosion, which could delay the development of sustainable alternative energy. Second, while the environmental picture could temporarily improve during the economic implosion, the carrying capacity will eventually be exceeded yet again as the economic growth resumes, as we illustrate in Fig. 2. Third, given that crude oil is an investable asset, it is likely that the price of crude oil would correct during the implosion due to deleveraging, deflation, and the decrease in demand for energy, which are likely to be only temporarily positive for ecological concerns. However, the temporary lower crude oil prices would also put climate change issues on the backburner, and thus, limit the interest in development of alternative energy projects. Thus, in the long run, the economic implosion would be a net negative for ecological concerns. As soon as the economy rebounds, energy consumption growth would resume and eventually exceed the carrying capacity, this time perhaps even more damaging for the environment due to the significantly delayed development of effective alternative energy sources.

### 2nr – link – o/v

### at: clary

#### Clary’s uses a dataset of only dyadic rivals from 1950

Clary 15 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2015-­‐8, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712>)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5

#### That’s bad—it results in inaccurate conclusions because there are few diversionary opportunities—looking at territorial disputes resolves this problem and establishes economic downturns result in diversionary conflict.

Tir 10(Jaroslav, PhD, professor of political science at University of Colorado at Boulder, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2, April 2010, pp. 413–425)

Neglecting to link territorial and diversionary research is important because the link could be used to address important critiques leveled against the theory. The critiques have emerged from the literature’s inability to produce a set of unambiguous, supportive findings. Even though domestic problems may be encouraging leaders to contemplate diversions, other factors may prevent these incentives from being acted upon. Consequently, a reliable pattern between diversionary incentives and use of force may not be detectable. Below, I identify the two most relevant types of critiques and argue that they can be addressed successfully in the context of territorial diversion. First, Levy (1998; see also Tir and Jasinski 2008) observes that suitable diversionary targets are quite difficult to find. For just about all the states in the international system, the loss of strength gradient (Boulding 1962) is so serious that they are only able to interact militarily with their immediate neighbors. This would limit diversionary opportunities significantly for all but the most powerful states. Furthermore, many countries would make poor targets because they are important economic, security, or diplomatic partners or because the attack would go against the constraints posed by the democratic peace (Russett and Oneal 2001). Cognizant of these issues, Mitchell and Prins (2004), for example, focus on diversions between enduring rivals. Enduring rivals (e.g., India-Pakistan) have a history of antagonism, which indicates that they are willing and able to interacting militarily. Moreover, the context of rivalry can provide an aura of credibility to the leader’s claim that their actions are conducted not out of selfish interest but for the benefit of the country. And given their already poor relations, the attacks would not be particularly damaging to their relationship.6 The problem, however, is that rivalry-related diversionary opportunities are available to only few countries. Enduring rivals constitute only 5.4% of dyads that experience militarized international conflict (Diehl and Goertz 2000) and an even smaller fraction of all dyads (.4% to 3.75%, depending on how politically relevant dyads are defined). The above concerns may be lessened in the context of territorial diversion. First, the power projection capability is not necessarily an issue because most territorial conflicts take place precisely between neighboring countries (Tir 2003, 2006; Vasquez 1993). Second, diversionary action has to be perceived by the population as so important that it is persuaded that the conflict (i.e., the diversion) is worth the cost of damaging or even breaking the otherwise important ties. Territorial diversion is arguably in a good position to help the leader do this because territorial issues are seen as so central to the matters of national survival and protection of identity that economic, diplomatic, and other considerations can be subordinated. These important points suggest that diversionary behavior could be a cross-national phenomenon, not limited to the most powerful or rival states. The second critique challenges diversionary theory’s core logical mechanism, which is rooted in the ingroup, outgroup premise (Coser 1956). Diversions are launched to unify a fractured society (i.e., transform it into the ingroup) by painting the foreign enemy as the outgroup.7 Morgan and Anderson (1999; Morgan and Bickers 1992), however, argue that overcoming the societal division to create a cohesive ingroup is no easy task. If the leader calculates that surmounting this important obstacle is unlikely, then they would presumably be deterred from diverting. I argue below that territorial diversion provides what is probably the most promising option for unifying the society, because territorial issues have the unique ability to speak to and ‘‘connect’’ with the broad swaths of the population. Theoretical Argument In this section, I present arguments specifying why territorial diversion may be particularly attractive for an embattled leader. I contend that territorial diversion can provide the leader with certain advantages, which are unlikely to be found in the realm of conflicts over other issues. People have unique and strong bonds to land, which can be manipulated by the unscrupulous leader them to mask the true intents of their actions, which include rally effects and retention of power. In explaining why researchers have repeatedly found territory to be the most war prone issue (seeHensel 2000; Tir and Vasquez 2010), Vasquez (1993) notes that humans’ tendency to define themselves as territorial creatures is deeply ingrained into their collective genetic and/or cultural inheritance—arguments well known in the sociobiological and evolutionary psychology literatures (e.g., Buss 1995; Valzelli 1981). The tendency is seen in the great willingness of people to fight over economically and strategically worthless land, which suggests that the pursuit of territory is more than just about rational, calculating behavior. It may be either a function of how humans are wired or of learning ‘‘that territorial issues . . . are ‘best’ handled by the use of force and violence’’ (Vasquez 1993, 140). While the related literature debates whether the traits are more inherent or learned, the point is that the bond people feel to land, their anxiety over who controls it, and their willingness to support the use of force to act on territorial disagreements can all potentially be manipulated and exploited by the leader who is seeking to distract the people’s attention from the real problems plaguing the country. A related argument focusing on how people develop their conceptions of self is offered by the constructivist school of thought. Among others, Gottman (1973), Sack (1986), and Touval (1972) find that people become socialized and emotionally attached to the territory they think of as belonging to them. The land becomes an integral part of their identity, ingrained in the national psyche. This even holds in cases where there are only weak objective claims to the land in question. Witness, for example, the fervor by which ordinary Chinese respond to suggestions that Tibet is not legitimately Chinese territory. Or consider the Serbian attitude toward Kosovo. Despite the fact that few Serbs remain there, Milosevic successfully rallied the Serb nation in the late 1980s by arguing that it could hardly afford a repeat of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo where that land was lost. Such predispositions suggest that disagreements over territorial control quickly turn into highly emotionally charged affairs where objective facts hold little sway. In fact, the territorial conflict literature argues that the emotional connections and related proclivities feed into the perceptions of land as zerosum, indivisible, and unsubstitutable, where compromises are seen as improbable, territorial disputes are thought of as irresolvable, and brute force is counted on as the only real means of obtaining (temporary) control (Hensel and Mitchell 2005; Tir 2006; Vasquez 1993). Critically for this project, the emotions connected to the land are something the unscrupulous leader can attempt to tap into, manipulate, and exploit for their own gain—much like Milosevic did. Further relevant insights can be derived from prospect theory (e.g., Jervis 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1979). According to the theory, people are risk acceptant when they perceive that they are losing (as opposed to gaining) something they value, that is when they are operating in the domain of losses.8 The reference point separating gains from loses is set according to whether one is trying to protect existing ownership versus acquire something new. Yet, if an individual believes that the object outside of their control rightfully belongs to them, this would imply that the ‘‘loss’’ of the object took place at some point in the past and the person would be in the domain of losses. The psychological reference point is hence not the objective status quo but rather a mental image of the ‘‘rightful’’ distribution of valued resources (Berejikian 2004). Undoing the ‘‘loss’’ thus becomes a priority, even if it involves highly risky actions, because accepting the objective status quo would mean accepting the certain loss. Connecting these arguments with those of constructivism implies that the tendency to become emotionally attached to the land people think of as their own sets their reference point to the domain of losses, irrespective of whether the defense of currently held land (i.e., an objective loss) or acquisition of land that someone else is controlling (i.e., an objective gain) is in question. That is, by perceiving the disputed land as rightfully theirs, the people interpret not controlling it to mean a loss—regardless of whether this land ever belonged, or how long ago, to them. Consequently, the people become willing to support risky courses of action in the belief that they would be ‘‘retaking’’ the land. A series of important inferences follows from the above insights. The most basic one is that the above attitudes and tendencies toward territory are common human responses. As such, they apply to the populations of states, which opens them up for manipulation and exploitation by unscrupulous leaders for personal gain. The leader can manufacture, use, or escalate a territorial conflict with another country in an attempt to manipulate the people’s emotions into becoming willing to give the leader carte blanche or at least a greater benefit of the doubt for taking what under more objective circumstances may be seen as an unnecessary, questionable, and risky action. The end result, the leader hopes, is that via the mechanism of territorial conflict, the population will increasingly support and rally behind them. Importantly, the above indicates that the leader can expect their manipulation to be more successful when territorial issues are at stake, rather than some more poorly defined threats to the country, including low politics issues that can distract people’s attention but not elicit the same level of passion. Furthermore, because territorial issues are at the heart of human perceptions of identity, they can be used by the leader to overcome societal divisions. The leader can argue that the society as a whole is the ingroup with a common territorial interest and cast the state controlling, or attempting to control, the land that ‘‘rightfully’’ belongs to the leader’s country as the outgroup. Few other issues are expected to provide as strong of a bonding experience for a population. Examples of societies like South Korea, which is plagued by deep political divisions, suggest that in the face of territorial crises such as the dispute over the Dokto Islands with Japan, the society becomes more unified. Territory could therefore be one of the few issues that could, at least temporarily, be used by leaders to overcome internal divisions— including those that may be caused precisely by controversy over the leader’s rule. The traditional diversionary argument also relies on portraying the diversionary action as protecting a vital national interest. Yet, the leader’s initiation of a crisis with a far-away, unknown-to-the-public foreign enemy (a scenario satirized in the movie Wag the Dog) and over an issue not clearly vital to the national interest would have a hard time capturing the public’s attention and creating belief in—and let alone fervent support for—the leader. After all, many ordinary people know about the diversionary theory, so the leader has to overcome the public’s—and particularly the political opposition’s—natural skepticism that the action is a mere diversion meant to manipulate the populace. The issue of land control, via the above-described mechanisms—stands a much better chance of accomplishing these tasks. In sum, territorial diversions are able (1) to capture the public’s attention, (2) to tap into the people’s instincts and/or and feelings about their identity, and (3) to help the leader unify a fractured society behind them. The logic of territorial diversion is thus arguably more compelling and plausible than that of the more standard version of the theory. The discussion leads to the following hypothesis. H1: Domestic unpopularity problems that threaten the leader’s ability to retain effective control over their office are associated with an increased likelihood of territorial conflict initiation. Given the relative ease with which the leader can exploit the population’s instincts and/or attitudes toward territorial control may make territorial diversion appear a relatively risk-free, no-cost option. Yet, this is certainly not the case. The leader does not know that the diversion will for sure have the desired popularity-boosting effect. They are acting with the hope of a rally, but the rally is by no means guaranteed; prior research generally reports only small and short-lasting rallies (e.g., Lian and Oneal 1993; see also Chiozza and Goemans 2004, 424). Furthermore, engaging in prolonged or frequent diversions would likely outlast the desired rally effect, as the public tires of the issue and costs and casualties mount (Gartner and Segura 1998). The leader is hence expected to use diversion sparingly, such as during times when their leadership abilities are in question—just as the hypothesis suggests. Moreover, the diversion carries with it the inherent risk that the action will not go as planned. Becoming embroiled in protracted, escalating, stalemated, costly, or losing conflicts is likely to hurt the leader’s popularity (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Their calculus should therefore be affected by a variety of constraints; the key ones are considered control variables and are discussed in the next section. Research Design Dependent Variables, Spatial-Temporal Domain, and Method of Analysis In the diversionary research, diversionary activity is not measured directly but rather by associating governmental use of force with diversionary incentive variables that tap into domestic discontent with the government. I follow a similar approach but focus on uses of military force9 that concern the issue of territorial control. To check the findings’ robustness, I utilize three different operationalizations of my dependent variable. The first two versions rely on the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004), which identifies militarized disputes between countries, their timing, the dispute initiator, whether a territorial revision was sought, and fatality numbers.10 Combining this information, I identify (1) all territorial MID initiations (my main dependent variable) and (2) fatal territorial MID initiations; I use the fatality restriction because disputes involving fatalities may have an easier time capturing the public’s attention and inspiring a rally. Finally, the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project defines a foreign policy crisis as a situation in which the highest-level decision makers perceive ‘‘a threat to one or more basic values [to their state], along with an awareness of a finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities’’ (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 3). The project notes the timing of the crisis, perceived initiator (i.e., in this case the state from which the crisis-related threat is emanating), and whether a territorial threat is involved (i.e., threat of integration or annexation of a part of the target’s territory). By matching perceived initiators with territorial threats, I derive a list of (3) territorial crisis initiations. Each of the three dependent variables enters into the below-defined data set dichotomously, depending on whether the relevant event took place in a given year. The directed dyadic approach, which can simultaneously capture conditions within the prospective initiator country as well as the identity of and relationships with potential target states, is utilized. Monadic design, popular in early studies of diversion, is equipped to perform only the first task (Bennett and Stam 2000b). With the help of the EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000a), I create a directed dyad-year (my unit of analysis) data set of all contiguous (up to 400 miles of water)11 pairs of states. The analyses are restricted to the post-World War II period due to availability of economic data. Given the dichotomous structure of the dependent variables, I rely on logit for my analyses. Robust standard errors are employed to account for the observations from the same dyad being related. I use the Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) binary timeseries cross-section correction to account for the fact that my data are composed of several cross-sections (i.e., dyads) and to deal with potential duration dependence as these cross-sections are observed over time. To save space, the associated years of peace and natural cubic spline (with three interior knots) variables are omitted from the table. And finally, all the right-hand-side variables (with the exception of elections) are lagged by one year, in order to make sure that the presumed causes actually precede the use of force; such a setup is also reasonable as it may take a little bit of time for discontent to spur the leader into a territorial diversion. The Main Independent Variables The ideal indicator of the diversionary incentive, the leader’s popularity rating, is either unavailable for a broad range of countries or cannot be trusted as it is subject to governmental manipulation. As a substitute, I rely on two proxy indicators of the leader’s (un)popularity. The first one captures the extent to which the citizens of a country are visibly dissatisfied with their government. I sum the incidents of protests, strikes, and riots from the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Archive (2005) into an index reporting the number of unrest activities in a given country in a given year.12 Pickering and Kisangani (2005; Kisangani and Pickering 2007) have a similar approach. The second indicator, the economic (GDP) growth rate is typically used in the diversionary research (e.g., Hess and Orphanides 1995; James and Oneal 1991; Oneal and Tir 2006; Pickering and Kisangani 2005) because the state of the economy is seen as an important predictor of leaders’ popularity (Hibbs 1987; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). To check the robustness of my findings, I rely on two different sources for the growth rate, Gleditsch (2002), abbreviated below as KSG, and the CNTS Archive (2005).13 Control Variables I control for several influences that have been found to affect the likelihood of dyadic conflict. To capture countries’ relative power, I use the Correlates of War project’s combined index of military capabilities (Singer 1988) and create a measure that takes the natural logarithm of the ratio of the stronger country’s capabilities to those of the weaker member of the dyad. I control for whether the dyad is democratic by noting whether both member states achieve a score greater than 6 on Polity IV’s (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) scale. Allies may fight each other less because they share common security interests; I control for this with data from Gibler and Sarkees (2004). To capture the potential deterrent effects of trade, I divide the sum of the initiator’s exports and imports with the prospective target by the initiator’s GDP (all from Gleditsch 2002); the measure captures the extent to which the initiator’s economy is dependent on the target. Because for most states the ability to fight is determined primarily by geographic proximity—I control for the effects of distance between the dyad members (Stinnett et al. 2002); see also note 11. Finally, diversions are thought to be the most likely right before elections, because this is when the leaders are the most likely to need a boost in their popularity ratings (e.g., Hess and Orphanides 1995; Smith 1996). I code upcoming elections by using the CNTS Archive (2005). Results and Discussion Each Model in Table 1 employs a different combination of territorial conflict (the dependent variable) and economic growth (an independent variable) operationalizations. Starting the evaluation of H1 with the government unpopularity variable, its coefficient is consistently significant and positive in Models 1–6. The likelihood of territorial conflict initiation increases significantly as the government becomes more unpopular, and this finding is robust to all the alternate specifications of the dependent variable. With the hope of deflecting attention from domestic unrest and creating a rally effect, embattled leaders initiate territorial conflicts. By focusing on territorial diversions, my findings thus provide clear support for the detrimental effects of domestic unrest. Other than in Tir and Jasinski’s (2008) work on diversion against domestic ethnic groups, findings for domestic unrest proved to be elusive in Rummel (1963) and Tanter (1966) and inconsistent in Pickering and Kisangani’s (2005; see also Kisangani and Pickering 2007) study. None of these works, however, consider the possibility of territorial diversion. Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflictinitiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while ﬁxing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-proﬁle and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy). Next, I conduct a series of follow-up tests suggested by an anonymous Reviewer; results based on the reanalysis of Model 1 are presented in the online appendix. Evaluating the implication that territorial diversions are indeed more likely to result from diversionary conditions than nonterritorial diversions, I set up a multinomial logit model that contrasts the initiation of territorial MIDs versus nonterritorial MIDs (base outcome). The results show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the government unpopularity variable (ﬁrst column of Table 3), meaning that higher levels of government unpopularity are more likely to produce territorial rather than nonterritorial MIDs. Further checks include performing rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001) and population-averaged logit analyses to verify whether the rare events nature of the dependent variable or cross-sectional characteristics of the data alter the ﬁndings, respectively. The ﬁndings for the two independent variables remain unchanged (see Table 3, columns two and three). Finally, protesting behavior in more populous countries could be considered more ‘‘normal’’ and less threatening to the government, potentially lowering the incentive to divert. Dividing the government unpopularity variable by the log of country’s population (from the Correlates of War National Capabilities data set, Singer 1987) reveals that the population size-standardized government unpopularity variable remains positive and signiﬁcant; see Table 3, ﬁnal column. Concerning the control variables, the effects of power and distance are consistent with expectations and across the Models in Table 1. Democracy, alliance ties, and trade coefﬁcients have mostly the expected dampening inﬂuence on territorial conﬂict initiation; but only trade exhibits a signiﬁcant impact and only when the dependent variable is the fatal territorial MID (i.e., in Models 3–4). 16 These results are somewhat surprising, but the reader is reminded that the effects of alliance are highly contested (see Maoz 2000), while the impact of trade has not been established in the domain of territorial conﬂict. Similarly, recent research shows that the democratic peace weakens considerably in the context of territorial conﬂict (James, Park, and Choi 2006) and that the democratic peace may be epiphenomenal to territorial peace (Gibler 2007). 17 Importantly, the control variable results imply that some of the related interests (e.g., security, regime ties) may indeed be subordinated to the territorial diversion impetus. Revisiting the link between regime type and diversion, some scholars argue that democratic leaders have a greater motivation—due to the need for popular support—for diversion (e.g., Gelpi 1997; Russett 1990; Smith 1996). Yet, others (e.g., Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 1995; Pickering and Kisangani 2005) assert that authoritarian leaders need popular support in order to appear legitimate. Because they cannot derive legitimacy from democratic institutions and elections, they look to diversions to help them achieve this goal. Autocrats can also divert with greater impunity due to the lack of institutional checks and balances. In follow-up tests available from the online appendix, Table 4, I restrict the set of initiator countries in Model 1 to democracies only, autocracies only, all nondemocracies, and all nonautocracies. That the ﬁndings hold suggests that both democratic and autocratic leaders value territorial diversions. Nevertheless, resolving the broader debate is beyond the scope of this study.

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#### He concludes aff—slow-growth aggregates instability that makes reform impossible—a) turns the aff because it decreases impetus for transition and b) independently sparks a new scenario for extinction.

Drezner 16 Daniel Professor of International Politics, Tufts; Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings, May 2016, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy”, Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, <http://www.anamnesis.info/sites/default/files/D_Drezner_2016.pdf>

A slow-growth economic trajectory also creates policy problems that increase the likelihood of even slower growth. Higher growth is a political palliative that makes structural reforms easier. For example, Germany prides itself on the “Hartz reforms” to its labor markets last decade, and has advocated similar policies for the rest of the Eurozone since the start of the 2008 financial crisis. But the Hartz reforms were accomplished during a global economic upswing, boosting German exports and cushioning the shortterm cost of the reforms themselves. In a low-growth world, other economies will be understandably reluctant to engage in such reforms. It is possible that concerns about a radical growth slowdown are exaggerated. In 1987, Robert Solow famously said, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”85 A decade later, the late 1990s productivity surge was in full bloom. Economists are furiously debating whether the visible innovations in the information sector are leading to productivity advances that are simply going undetected in the current productivity statistics.86 Google’s chief economist Hal Varian, echoing Solow from a generation ago, asserts that “there is a lack of appreciation for what’s happening in Silicon Valley, because we don’t have a good way to measure it.”87 It is also possible that current innovations will only lead to gains in labor productivity a decade from now. The OECD argues that the productivity problem resides in firms far from the leading edge failing to adopt new technologies and systems.88 There are plenty of sectors, such as health or education, in which technological innovations can yield significant productivity gains. It would foolhardy to predict the end of radical innovations. But the possibility of a technological slowdown is a significant “known unknown.” And if such a slowdown occurs, it would have catastrophic effects on the public finances of the OECD economies. Most of the developed world will have to support disproportionately large numbers of pensioners by 2036; slower-growing economies will worsen the debt-to-GDP ratios of most of these economies, causing further macroeconomic stresses—and, potentially, political unrest from increasingly stringent budget constraints.89 2. Are there hard constraints on the ability of the developing world to converge to developed-country living standards? One of the common predictions made for the next generation economy is that China will displace the United States as the world’s biggest economy. This is a synecdoche of the deeper forecast that per capita incomes in developing countries will slowly converge towards the living standards of the advance industrialized democracies. The OECD’s Looking to 2060 report is based on “a tendency of GDP per capita to converge across countries” even if that convergence is slow-moving. The EIU’s long-term macroeconomic forecast predicts that China’s per capita income will approximate Japan’s by 2050.90 The Carnegie Endowment’s World Order in 2050 report presumes that total factor productivity gains in the developing world will be significantly higher than countries on the technological frontier. Looking at the previous twenty years of economic growth, Kemal Dervis posited that by 2030, “The rather stark division of the world into ‘advanced’ and ‘poor’ economies that began with the industrial revolution will end, ceding to a much more differentiated and multipolar world economy.”91 Intuitively, this seems rational. The theory is that developing countries have lower incomes primarily because they are capital-deficient and because their economies operate further away from technological frontier. The gains from physical and human capital investment in the developing world should be greater than in the developed world. From Alexander Gerschenkron forward, development economists have presumed that there are some growth advantages to “economic backwardness”92 This intuitive logic, however, is somewhat contradicted by the “middle income trap.” Barry Eichengreen, Donghyun Park, and Kwanho Shin have argued in a series of papers that as an economy’s GDP per capita hits close to $10,000, and then again at $16,000, growth slowdowns commence.93 This makes it very difficult for these economies to converge towards the per capita income levels of the advanced industrialized states. History bears this out. There is a powerful correlation between a country’s GDP per capita in 1960 and that country’s per capita income in 2008. In fact, more countries that were middle income in 1960 had become relatively poorer than had joined the ranks of the rich economies. To be sure, there have been success stories, such as South Korea, Singapore, and Israel. But other success stories, such as Greece, look increasingly fragile. Lant Prichett and Lawrence Summers conclude that “past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Regression to the mean is the single most robust and empirical relevant fact about cross-national growth rates.”94 Post-2008 growth performance of the established and emerging markets matches this assessment. While most of the developing world experienced rapid growth in the previous decade, the BRICS have run into roadblocks. Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, these economies are looking less likely to converge with the developed world. During the Great Recession, the non-Chinese BRICS—India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa—have not seen their relative share of the global economy increase at all.95 China’s growth has also slowed down dramatically over the past few years. Recent and massive outflows of capital suggests that the Chinese economy is headed for a significant market correction. The collapse of commodity prices removed another source of economic growth in the developing world. By 2015, the gap between developing country growth and developed country growth had narrowed to its lowest level in the 21st century.96 What explains the middle income trap? Eichengreen, Park and Shin suggest that “slowdowns coincide with the point in the growth process where it is no longer possible to boost productivity by shifting additional workers from agriculture to industry and where the gains from importing foreign technology diminish.”97 But that is insufficient to explain why the slowdowns in growth have been so dramatic and widespread. There are multiple candidate explanations. One argument, consistent with Paul Krugman’s deconstruction of the previous East Asia “miracle,”98 is that much of this growth was based on unsustainable levels of ill-conceived capital investment. Economies that allocate large shares of GDP to investment can generate high growth rates, particularly in capital-deficient countries. The sustainability of those growth rates depends on whether the investments are productive or unproductive. For example, high levels of Soviet economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s masked the degree to which this capital was misallocated. As Krugman noted, a lesser though similar phenomenon took place in the Asian tigers in the 1990s. It is plausible that China has been experiencing the same illusory growth-from-bad-investment problem. Reports of overinvestment in infrastructure and “ghost cities” are rampant; according to two Chinese government researchers, the country wasted an estimated $6.8 trillion in “ineffective investment” between 2009 and 2013 alone.99 A political explanation would be rooted in the fact that many emerging markets lack the political and institutional capabilities to sustain continued growth. Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson argue that modern economies are based on either “extractive institutions” or “inclusive institutions.”100 Governments based on extractive institutions can generate higher rates of growth than governments without any effective structures. It is not surprising, for example, that post-Maoist Chinese economic growth has far outstripped Maoist-era rates of growth. Inclusive institutions are open to a wider array of citizens, and therefore more democratic. Acemoğlu and Robinson argue that economies based on inclusive institutions will outperform those based on extractive institutions. Inclusive institutions are less likely to be prone to corruption, more able to credibly commit to the rule of law, and more likely to invest in the necessary public goods for broad-based economic growth. Similarly, Pritchett and Summers conclude that institutional quality has a powerful and long-lasting effect on economic growth—and that “salient characteristics of China—high levels of state control and corruption along with high measures of authoritarian rule—make a discontinuous decline in growth even more likely than general experience would suggest.”101 A more forward-looking explanation is that the changing nature of manufacturing has badly disrupted the 20th century pathway for economic development. For decades, the principal blueprint for developing economies to become developed was to specialize in industrial sectors where low-cost labor offered a comparative advantage. The resulting growth from export promotion would then spill over into upstream and downstream sectors, creating new job-creating sectors. Globalization, however, has already generated tremendous productivity gains in manufacturing—to the point where industrial sectors do not create the same amount of employment opportunities that they used to.102 Like agriculture in the developed world, manufacturing has become so productive that it does not need that many workers. As a result, many developing economies suffer from what Dani Rodrik labels “premature deindustrialization.” If Rodrik is correct, then going forward, manufacturing will fail to jump-start developing economies into higher growth trajectories—and the political effects that have traditionally come with industrialization will also be stunted.103 Both the middle-income trap and the regression to the mean observation are empirical observations about the past. There is no guaranteeing that these empirical regularities will hold for the future. Indeed, China’s astonishing growth rate over the past 30 years is a direct contradiction of the regression to the mean phenomenon. It is possible that over time the convergence hypothesis swamps the myriad explanations listed above for continued divergence. But in sketching out the next generation global economy, the implications of whether regression to the mean will dominate the convergence hypothesis are massive. Looking at China and India alone, the gap in projections between a continuation of past growth trends and regression to the mean is equivalent to $42 trillion—more than half of global economic output in 2015.104 This gap is significant enough to matter not just to China and India, but to the world economy. As with the developed world, a growth slowdown in the developing world can have a feedback effect that makes more growth-friendly reforms more difficult to accomplish. As Chinese economic growth has slowed, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s economic reform plans have stalled out in favor of more political repression. Follows the recent playbook of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has added diversionary war as another distracting tactic from negative economic growth. Short-term steps towards political repression will make politically risky steps towards economic reform that less palatable in the future. Instead, the advanced developing economies seem set to double down on strategies that yield less economic growth over time. 3. Will geopolitical rivalries or technological innovation alter the patterns of economic interdependence? Multiple scholars have observed a secular decline in interstate violence in recent decades.105 The Kantian triad of more democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border trade is well known. In recent years, international relations theorists have stressed that commercial interdependence is a bigger driver of this phenomenon than previously thought.106 The liberal logic is straightforward. The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic interdependence act as a powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics. The global supply chain and “just in time” delivery systems have further imbricated national economies into the international system. This creates incentives for governments to preserve an open economy even during times of crisis. The more that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the less likely it was to raise tariffs after the 2008 financial crisis.107 Similarly, global financiers are strongly interested in minimizing political risk; historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of force in world politics.108 Even militarily powerful actors must be wary of alienating global capital. Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies through protectionism or military aggression. Interdependence can also tamp down conflicts that would otherwise be likely to break out during a great power transition. Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times.109 Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has elevated tensions without leading to anything approaching war. It could be argued that the Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has tamped down the great power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to reduce the likelihood of an extreme event—such as a great power war—from taking place. Will this be true for the next generation economy as well? The two other legs of the Kantian triad—democratization and multilateralism—are facing their own problems in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.110 Economic openness survived the negative shock of the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests that the logic of commercial liberalism will continue to hold with equal force going forward. But some international relations scholars doubt the power of globalization’s pacifying effects, arguing that interdependence is not a powerful constraint.111 Other analysts go further, arguing that globalization exacerbates financial volatility—which in turn can lead to political instability and violence.112 A different counterargument is that the continued growth of interdependence will stall out. Since 2008, for example, the growth in global trade flows has been muted, and global capital flows are still considerably smaller than they were in the pre-crisis era. In trade, this reflects a pre-crisis trend. Between 1950 and 2000, trade grew, on average, more than twice as fast as global economic output. In the 2000s, however, trade only grew about 30 percent more than output.113 In 2012 and 2013, trade grew less than economic output. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that global flows as a percentage of output have fallen from 53 percent in 2007 to 39 percent in 2014.114 While the stock of interdependence remains high, the flow has slowed to a trickle. The Financial Times has suggested that the global economy has hit “peak trade.”115 If economic growth continues to outstrip trade, then the level of interdependence will slowly decline, thereby weakening the liberal constraint on great power conflicts. And there are several reasons to posit why interdependence might stall out. One possibility is due to innovations reducing the need for traded goods. For example, in the last decade, higher energy prices in the United States triggered investments into conservation, alternative forms of energy, and unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. All of these steps reduced the U.S. demand for imported energy. A future in which compact fusion engines are developed would further reduce the need for imported energy even more.116 A more radical possibility is the development of technologies that reduce the need for physical trade across borders. Digital manufacturing will cause the relocation of production facilities closer to end-user markets, shortening the global supply chain.117 An even more radical discontinuity would come from the wholesale diffusion of 3-D printing. The ability of a single printer to produce multiple component parts of a larger manufactured good eliminates the need for a global supply chain. As Richard Baldwin notes, “Supply chain unbundling is driven by a fundamental trade-off between the gains from specialization and the costs of dispersal. This would be seriously undermined by radical advances in the direction of mass customization and 3D printing by sophisticated machines…To put it sharply, transmission of data would substitute for transportation of goods.”118 As 3-D printing technology improves, the need for large economies to import anything other than raw materials concomitantly declines.119 Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over economic growth. More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great power conflict going forward.

### at: interdependence solves war

#### It’s the other way around—there’s no interdependence if economic collapse occurs.

#### Interdependence doesn’t solve war — ideology outweighs and history disproves.

Kat 15 — Mazhid Kat, Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at King's College London, (“A Conceptual Analysis of Realism in International Political Economy,” *E-IR*, April 16th, Accessible Online at [http://www.e-ir.info...itical-economy/](http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/16/a-conceptual-analysis-of-realism-in-international-political-economy/), Accessed On 02-08-2016)

The main critics of realism are liberals. They argue that growing integration of the world economy and interdependence among states will create a more peaceful and stable global order because aggressive actions will lead to huge economic losses. However, this concept misses several points. Firstly, even greatly economically interdependent states may start wars with one another, as was seen with the British Empire and Germany in the beginning of the 20th century.[xxix] Moreover, interdependence is usually not perfectly symmetrical. In many cases, weak states become more dependent on major powers.[xxx] Leading powers, in turn, use their economic power to promote global regimes more favourable to themselves. Also, interdependence can le[a]d to economic crises becoming more wide spread, which in turn leads to negative consequences in different parts of the world.[xxxi] For instance, the Great Depression in the United States during the 1930s was one of the reasons for huge economic problems in Germany, which were used by Hitler in his rise to power. Finally, some states have ideologies which prevail over economic interests. For example, North Korea conducts a Juche policy of self-sufficiency and Russia continues to experience significant economic losses because of its imperialistic turn.

### at: industry survives

#### Their ev doesn’t assume the perceptual impact of the US completely withdrawing subsidies—that decimates faith in the system that causes a mass exodus of investors and forces firm bankruptcy, further driving up prices—it’s a divergent dynamical system.

#### They’re wrong—oil gets more elastic at high prices and substitutions away are behaviorally permanent—that causes recursive loops that a) collapse the industry and b) independently aggregate instability.

Carlson 14 (Debbie, 12/3/2014 “Collapse of oil prices leads world economy into trouble” <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/dec/03/oil-collapse-leads-world-economy-trouble>) DLuo

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), the largest crude-oil cartel in the world, wanted others to feel its pain as oil prices collapsed. “Opec wanted … to cut off production … and they wanted other non-Opec [countries], especially in the US and Canada, to feel the pinch they are feeling,” says Abhishek Deshpande, lead oil analyst at Natixis. But in its rush to influence others, Opec ended up hurting everyone in the process – including itself. Low oil prices, pushed down further by Opec’s meeting last week,have impacted world economies, energy stocks, and several currencies. From the fate of the Russian rouble to Venezuelan deficits to American mutual funds full of Exxon or Chevron stock, Opec’s decision was the shot heard round the world for troubled commodities. So how low could oil go? Standard Chartered analysts expect a “chaotic” quarter ahead, saying Opec’s decision to keep the production target unchanged is “extremely negative for oil prices for 2015”. The bank slashed its 2015 average price forecast for Brent crude oil by $16 a barrel to $85. [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/dialog/share?app_id=180444840287&href=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fbusiness%2F2014%2Fdec%2F03%2Foil-collapse-leads-world-economy-trouble%3FCMP%3Dshare_btn_fb%26page%3Dwith%3Aimg-2%23img-2&picture=https%3A%2F%2Fstatic.guim.co.uk%2Fsys-images%2FGuardian%2FPix%2Fpictures%2F2014%2F12%2F2%2F1417557121262%2F622a79f0-473d-489d-b075-2238348b5531-2060x1393.jpeg)[Twitter](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Collapse%20of%20oil%20prices%20leads%20world%20economy%20into%20trouble&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fbusiness%2F2014%2Fdec%2F03%2Foil-collapse-leads-world-economy-trouble%3FCMP%3Dshare_btn_tw%26page%3Dwith%3Aimg-2%23img-2)[Pinterest](http://www.pinterest.com/pin/create/button/?description=Collapse%20of%20oil%20prices%20leads%20world%20economy%20into%20trouble&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fbusiness%2F2014%2Fdec%2F03%2Foil-collapse-leads-world-economy-trouble%3Fpage%3Dwith%3Aimg-2%23img-2&media=https%3A%2F%2Fstatic.guim.co.uk%2Fsys-images%2FGuardian%2FPix%2Fpictures%2F2014%2F12%2F2%2F1417557121262%2F622a79f0-473d-489d-b075-2238348b5531-2060x1393.jpeg) A fisherman sails his boat in front of an oil tower Maracaibo Lake, located in the border state of Zulia, in western Caraca. With their precious oil income slipping away, some Opec members like Venezuela and Ecuador had tried in vain to convince fellow oil producers to slash production and force up prices. Photograph: Juan Barreto/AFP/Getty Images Other forecasts are lower. Citi Research estimated an average 2015 price of $72 for WTI and $80 for ICE Brent. Natixis’s Deshpande said their average 2015 Brent forecast is around $74, with WTI around $69. [By Fostering An Open And Honest Culture, Bridgewater Encourages Employees To Bring Their Authentic Selves To Work Each Day. Our Head Of Investment Research Karen Kar...](https://eb2.3lift.com/pass?tl_clickthrough=true&redir=https%3A%2F%2Frtb-us-east.linkedin.com%2Flax%2Fclk%3Ftrk%3DCwEAAAFuJJfaJsCAX6bT4ALeXPt8C7NacWihrIH3TYySyhkAJTyfZv6ByQ9huusotnMV_nyF2_d42BMqSiw8vceUgWDAv4z_niO1fSHx4S7SevSv4MyhL_a44iIzjeIp7P2sa475XvVrlZvYnnBK0jk3TkrIIjX8ZBd1-M9iTOuSfiiz3uJL5Fi-GITt0cCYJ17kVYfE3D5BaBOBFPetYHLZnqmo6FXy7CAeweTh60mz8qAq4Pt0LaBCGPDnmEpJwm3uKg_2FeqZxjZpV5zPZf9-W9ESaYAq6LzImM2nBPaezHGErp3QhlRyGd3DQkixclnQW49dar-mpkaUSR-fgu4gJmKhYMCltVp_OXqEI5Gj9h-Ae4nD4mIYGLN1oetleBq91DvWQvlouIykKN1f0UU8OCtRBq5EZjrIA4JsTKZaYSMjRoLmX3cpyMUZ-1xMGhU-yzYMwCxWXLrfDF66u2PmPQeaRiq-g_zQIGi7EhAiNA5dL3EmapmCFMjHS9q6UbOq51XYAURRKXnpcj4-Bf16W3LDRzMpU9Hl-QPZBTBmSbGwcZ1YFaXCngkZPtsfVWYLhLeqxa65Hf0JH2yhIDfLIg-zUVciBHwMh_YOF4EY3qti4I5Ryx6JnEg0xpY_KixQUTP34LKuI1D3DACOFPPtmxp-hj9csfz__z8rR4LZlqCnNJusHtSWW8Rq_JgD226rxwsV96Op1tNFfXZoPDY2nNkEMwwWD6ZPQXmYuolPMYfFOgDudtoUzTnlXruoioWuZyGf37wxsR8wG97CTxx1Gzu1hb4IdwV9CmbAZCFIrLdfBIFmTE5PBUOQxdvQdxC5JQsxwYw0TpPS83p9R2WGOO_NPflNthlLJT0IZBMiYar50HFdTBrHUFmCpwla6RFgYuP1dCI3bypT7cISBfBD_2OrGLjz0DkI2R3tDIRFrmot8x4wVcMRoR-2AxHFFKXoKEnDKnUIsEiXxfHtl_U7iVGDAYSPuZU0OTx-lVkvpMPaq8I5fuilgvTETeqRss_J8hXoHCBPIE2upv8EKKSZgSnGGhFw4-0FYKXTvT6jLo6PGpAAlzkChcow1D2xnEFi7q4SxmUvAtXgh-qZXTNzhfAF7FrZdhM4JQIGMHW-TiODPP7V2vDGLjVdSqEN4sHG54n06J1GOkztqkATWs318YnoDhr141tk2HiXY-Xe_X6fk4gyHd3E-8-pGr7-zZjL4gt82dmTCFxOYVNsdhXSGw4MgcczHAZTIJm1J-L8sWXL7wpEsMHsOQaptnhyrGaKhTO3W3hGcHQ1NqmP0cMiXwpw4jwUkpS2pzwv3p4PCzEZ1pS9LnTdbNMeBaZHvyqeXnpRu-gvOlN3kKvy_l6zVln_KgEdXc5hiW8H%26action%3Dclick%26laxrid%3Da97e5966-e16e-40c5-901e-f63122cc2919%26laxbid%3D2%26eid%3D3%26laxerid%3D160626302750600173710%26adfmt%3D6%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fwww.bridgewater.com%26urlhash%3Ds9Re) These prices have real-world effects on world economies. Everyone in the sector is smarting. Deshpande said because of how Saudi Arabia uses its oil well to support its entire economy, the country’s budget calls for $90 a barrel to break even, despite that the cost of production is closer to $30. Other Opec members have even higher budgetary breakevens. Saudi Arabia is sitting on a “war chest” of money it stockpiled when prices were high, Deshpande said. Citi analysts said Saudi Arabia has about $800bn in cash reserves. Venezuela, on the other hand, is a prime example of a country squandering its riches. Citi said for every $10 drop in oil prices [Venezuela](https://www.theguardian.com/world/venezuela) loses about $7.5bn in revenues. “Already weak fiscally, this should call for reducing energy subsidies. But domestic politics including the 2015 election makes this nearly impossible,” they said. Opec countries as a whole could lose $200bn in revenue if Brent prices stay at $80, which is about $600 per capita annually, Citi said. How did things get so bad? Business Today: sign up for a morning shot of financial news Last week, when Opec nixed the idea of cutting its targeted production level of 30m barrels a day, the decision roiled the global crude oil markets. The news sent prices down 10% for the three main oil prices: US benchmark, West Texas Intermediate, and the Brent global benchmark. On Monday prices came off their Friday lows, but much of the damage remains intact. In the short term, meaning at least for the rest of 2014 and for the first half of 2015, prices are likely to be weaker as production will overshoot the expected demand. Advertisement The picture may be clearer in the second half of the year as production growth in the US shale oil fields taper off and output elsewhere slows later in 2015. It’s the longer-term outlook that may really change and can hurt the cartel. In essence, Opec has declared open season. Opec’s decision may cause some of the US shale-oil producers to look for ways to save on costs, and other non-Opec producers may try to find ways to lower their production costs. Picture released by the Venezuelan presidency’s press office showing President Nicolas Maduro during the closing act of the first Congress of Venezuela’s Working Class. Photograph: Miguel Angulo/AFP/Getty Images Here are the consequences: countries like Venezuela and [Nigeria](https://www.theguardian.com/world/nigeria), which are already facing social unrest, may see even more domestic trouble. They didn’t have the fiscal or investment discipline to invest in their industry or save for a rainy day when they were flush with cash. The Middle East members of Opec may be able to sweat out several months of low crude oil prices. For the rest of the world economy, low oil prices are a boon. They can help global gross domestic product growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that each $10 a barrel fall in oil prices increases world growth by 0.2%. In the US, for instance, the lower oil prices may spur growth by boosting discretionary spending by Americans. Don’t tell that to [Europe](https://www.theguardian.com/world/europe-news) and Japan. Weaker energy prices will be another demon to fight in their attempts to keep away deflation. As oil supply outstrips demand, some industries will feel the pinch. Advertisement These low oil prices will hamper investment in infrastructure development, particularly outside the US. David Pursell, managing director at Tudor, Pickering, Holt & Co, an energy investment and merchant banking firm, says international exploration record is “abysmal”. It’s likely that companies that supply shale oil – obtained by fracking – and crude oil will slow down operations. Already some big producers like Apache announced production cuts even before the Opec meeting, and he said to expect more announcements from others in December and January. In 2014 the US pumped about 11m barrels a day of both crude oil and natural gas combined. Pursell said an average price of $70 WTI will mean no further expansion of US shale oil. His firm still estimates US crude oil production will grow by 500,000 barrels daily next year, but that will come in the beginning of 2015 as firms halt expansion. 2016’s output to see now added growth, he said, as firms forgo drilling for new wells. The low prices mean it will be harder for firms to raise cash either through debt financing or by issuing new shares of stock. “A lot of companies are sitting down as we speak with board members figure out capex [capital expenditures] next year,” he said. Security staff pushes journalists back as a meeting of OPEC oil ministers is due to begin at OPEC’s headquarters in Vienna. Photograph: Heinz-Peter Bader/Reuters What happens next? Don’t get used to cheap oil forever, Pursell said. There might be a supply glut now, but when global growth increases, it will sponge up the excess. “The only scenario where the US can’t grow and oil stays at these levels is if global demand is in tatters for the next two to three years. And we don’t believe that will happen,” he said. Adam Longson, analyst at Morgan Stanley, agreed the lack of investment could push prices much higher in 2017 and 2018. Some international projects that were supposed to be developed are expensive and may be mothballed, meaning that when demand rises, supply might not be able to keep up. That could cause prices to rise sharply. Consumers get whiplash from big swings in oil prices, he said. That ultimately hurts demand as it gives buyers reasons to “wean [themselves] off oil”, he added. Unlike in the past, there the potential for users to go to alternative energies is greater. “The potential for substitution at higher oil prices is quite substantial, and permanent once in place,” he said.

### at: recession moderate

#### Shift to G-Zero world means economic decline now triggers war – US leadership was able to prevent escalation during the 08 recession.

Bremmer and Kupchan 17 [Ian Bremmer, President, American political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk, Cliff Kupchan, Chairman, American political analyst and former government official. He is the chairman of the political risk consulting and advisory firm Eurasia GroupEurasia Group, Top Risks 2017: The Geopolitical Recession, January 3, 2017, http://www.eurasiagroup.net/issues/top-risks-2017]

It’s been six years since we first wrote about the coming G-Zero world—a world with no global leader. The underlying shifts in the geopolitical environment have been clear: a US with less interest in assuming leadership responsibilities; US allies, particularly in Europe, that are weaker and looking to hedge bets on US intentions; and two frenemies, Russia and China, seeking to assert themselves as (limited) alternatives to the US—Russia primarily on the security front in its extended backyard, and China primarily on the economic front regionally, and, increasingly, globally. These trends have accelerated with the populist revolt against “globalism”—first in the Middle East, then in Europe, and now in the US. Through 2016, you could see the G-Zero picking up speed on multiple fronts: the further deterioration of the transatlantic alliance with Brexit and the “no” vote on the Italy referendum; the end of America’s Asia pivot with the collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Philippine president announcing a break with the US; the Russian victory in Syria after backing President Bashar al Assad through nearly six years of war. But with the shock election of Donald Trump as president of the US, the G-Zero world is now fully upon us. The triumph of “America first” as the primary driver of foreign policy in the world’s only superpower marks a break with decades of US exceptionalism and belief in the indispensability of US leadership, however flawed and uneven. With it ends a 70-year geopolitical era of Pax Americana, one in which globalization and Americanization were tightly linked, and American hegemony in security, trade, and promotion of values provided guardrails for the global economy. In 2017 we enter a period of geopolitical recession. This year marks the most volatile political risk environment in the postwar period, at least as important to global markets as the economic recession of 2008. It needn’t develop into a geopolitical depression that triggers major interstate military conflict and/ or the breakdown of major central government institutions. But such an outcome is now thinkable, a tail risk from the weakening of international security and economic architecture and deepening mistrust among the world’s most powerful governments.

### at: warming

#### No impact to warming—their estimates are overstated

Bodkin 17. Henry The Telegraph. The Telegraph is an award-winning, multimedia news brand that has been synonymous with quality, authority and credibility for more than 160 years. We are renowned for the analysis, perspective, opinion and insight that our journalism provides to a diverse and discerning audience. Every day the content we create – in print, online, in our apps and across many other platforms – is setting the news agenda, sparking debate and provoking comment. 9/18/17. “Climate change not as threatening to planet as previously thought, new research suggests” <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/09/18/immediacy-threat-climate-change-exaggerated-faulty-models/> Accessed 7/11/18 //WR-NCP

Climate change not as threatening to planet as previously thought, new research suggests Climate change poses less of an immediate threat to the planet than previously thought because scientists got their modelling wrong, a new study has found. New research by British scientists reveals the world is being polluted and warming up less quickly than 10-year-old forecasts predicted, giving countries more time to get a grip on their carbon output. An unexpected “revolution” in affordable renewable energy has also contributed to the more positive outlook. Experts now say there is a two-in-three chance of keeping global temperatures within 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the ultimate goal of the 2015 Paris Agreement.

#### Adaptation solves the impact—it’s wildly overestimated

Murphy 18 Robert P. 2018Robert P. Murphy is a Senior Economist with IER specializing in climate change. His research focuses on the estimation of the "social cost of carbon.” Murphy received his Ph.D. in economics from New York University in 2003, where he wrote his dissertation on capital and interest theory. 4/4/18. “Oren Cass Points Out Major Flaw in Climate Change Studies” <https://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/oren-cass-points-major-flaw-climate-change-studies/> Accessed 7/11/18 //WR-NCP \*graph omitted \*\*we don’t endorse gendered language \*\*\*edited for reading clarity (numbers changed to letters), changes denoted by [brackets]

The Flaw The tremendous flaw with this method, of course, is that it assumes humans will not adapt to the warmer climate, even though they have eight decades to do so (and will be far richer in 2100 than we are now). But it is well known that if, say, someone moves from the north down south, that his or her body eventually adjusts. Beyond this physiological adaptation, there are obvious changes in building design and work routines that could reduce mortality rates from extreme heat. This isn’t speculation. Oren Cass provides the following, absolutely devastating argument against the absurdly high predictions coming from these particular studies: [GRAPH OMITTED] To repeat, the alarmist estimates of “damages from climate change” are driven by predictions that northern cities will suffer huge increases in heat mortality by the year 2100. Yet as Cass’ Figure 2 shows, these warnings assume that northern cities in the year 2100 will have mortality rates from “extremely hot days” that are forty to seventy-five times as high as what southern cities experienced in the year 2000. A Snow Analogy It might be difficult for the reader to understand just how silly this is, so let’s use an analogy. (Cass himself used the same one.) People from up north are used to driving in the snow: They know how to handle their vehicles better, and the authorities have more plows, salting trucks, etc. to deal with a major storm. Consequently, if a snowstorm of a given magnitude hits a city like Boston, it doesn’t cause nearly as many fatalities as if the same storm were to hit Atlanta. But suppose that over the course of decades, people living in Atlanta got hit with as much snow during a typical year as Boston experiences right now. In that case, the people of Atlanta would begin to exhibit Bostonians’ resilience in the face of Mother Nature. They too would learn how to drive better in the snow, and the local governments would buy the appropriate equipment to keep the roads operable. It would be foolish to look at the spike in traffic fatalities in Atlanta during the worst snowstorm it got in the year 2000 [2k], and assume the experience would stay the same even if Atlanta got hit with 70 such storms during the year. Conclusion Oren Cass’ new paper shows how several recent studies have grossly exaggerated the potential harms from climate change. In this blog post, I outlined one of the most obvious problems in the techniques used. Specifically, these studies looked at extreme weather events in the past, and assumed that even if such events became commonplace by the year 2100, that humans would be unable to adapt and reduce their vulnerability during the 80 years in between.

### at: world order resilient

#### They’re wrong—

#### 1. interdependence—decline removes costs for war but magnify benefits as the real value of resources increases—that makes war more attractive

#### 2. nationalism—decline sparks it—that decrease cooperation and leads to leaders more likely to engage in conflict

#### 3. diversionary theory—decline forces leaders to wag the dog to create rally around the flag effects—worldwide recession guarantees great-power draw-in

#### AND, their defense doesn’t assume Trump

Homer-Dixon 17 (March 19th, 2017, Thomas, CIGI chair of global systems in the Balsillie School of International Affairs, “Crisis analysis: How much damage can Trump do? (A lot),” <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/crisis-analysis-how-much-damage-can-trump-do-a-lot/article34341100/>)

As Adam Schiff, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, tweeted on March 6: “We must accept possibility that POTUS does not know fact from fiction, right from wrong. That wild claims are not strategic, but worse.” The entirely predictable chaos of the new administration’s first weeks has many liberals fantasizing that Mr. Trump will be removed from office before his term finishes. But we’ve seen enough of him to know he’s unlikely to leave willingly through any legitimate and lawful political mechanism, like impeachment. Instead, if Mr. Trump feels cornered, he’ll declare that his enemies are conspiring against him and call his supporters – many of whom are heavily armed – to come to his aid. It’s also possible that Mr. Trump will find his groove, allowing things to settle down. Yet his performance so far suggests his administration will instead lurch from crisis to crisis. To make some sense of these outcomes, I’ve charted the most likely crisis types. Drawing on analysis by a wide range of scholars, I’ve also estimated the probabilities of each type at one, two, and five years into a Trump administration (the latter timeline assumes that Trump is re-elected in 2020). There are four principal types, I’d argue: financial crisis, civil violence, authoritarianism, and war. Each crisis type then has various possible levels of intensity. “Moderate” authoritarianism could involve, for instance, use of federal resources to intimidate or constrain journalists and judges; substantially increased application of force to track, detain and deport immigrants; and criminalization of protest. Mr. Trump, or in the case of criminalization of protest, his acolytes at the state level are already checking some of these boxes, so I estimate the probability of this degree of authoritarianism in the administration’s first year to be 70 per cent. “Severe” authoritarianism would involve actions like a declaration of a state of emergency, federalization of the National Guard, or suspension of key civil liberties. This outcome is much less likely; even after five years, I don’t think it’s higher than 30 per cent. A “moderate” war crisis, by my definition, would include any regional conflict between the United States and an intermediate power like Iran, or a great power like China, say in the South China Sea. “Severe” war would involve use of massed military force against a great power like Russia. The category would also include any conflict, for instance, with North Korea, that carries a substantial risk of nuclear escalation. In part, because of Mr. Trump’s expressed hostility towards Iran and China, and his tendency to see all international relations in zero-sum terms, I estimate the five-year probability of a “moderate” war crisis to be high, at 60 per cent. The four crisis types are likely to be causally linked. In particular, civil violence or war could create conditions that Mr. Trump might use to justify an authoritarian crackdown. Financial crisis could also be a consequence of war. The administration’s decision-making incompetence increases the risk of financial crisis, civil violence, and war. For instance, Mr. Trump’s team of advisers contains little high-level economic expertise, so his administration could be out of its depth should serious trouble develop in financial systems overseas, say in China or Europe. The specific probabilities that one plugs into this model are not entirely speculative. Experts can argue about the details, but they’re largely in agreement that, for instance, the risk of nuclear war has jumped, which is why The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists recently moved the minute-hand of its doomsday clock closer to midnight.

### 2nr – ddv – topshelf

#### Nuclear war causes extinction and turns the environment—overwhelming scientific consensus.

-- Even small nuke wars

-- Beats their Toon/Robock indicts---those studies were themselves studied and validated

-- EMPs and reactor meltdowns are a distinct warrant

-- De-escalation and primacy are wrong

Starr 14 Steven the Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri, 5/30/14, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2014/05/30/lethality-nuclear-weapons/

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate[i] and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii] These peer-reviewed studies---which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error---also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race.[iv] In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices[viii], including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.[ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrinex---used by both the US and Russian military---emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.[xii] Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. Yet top political leaders and policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference). I asked them if they were familiar with the recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power contained in the operational and deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate, and that a nuclear war fought with their strategic nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both answered “no.” More recently, on April 20, 2014, I asked the same question and received the same answer from the US officials sent to brief representatives of the NGOS at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting at the UN. None of the US officials at the briefing were aware of the studies. Those present included top officials of the National Security Council. It is frightening that President Obama and his administration appear unaware that the world’s leading scientists have for years predicted that a nuclear war fought with the US and/or Russian strategic nuclear arsenal means the end of human history. Do they not know of the existential threat these arsenals pose to the human race . . . or do they choose to remain silent because this fact doesn’t fit into their official narratives? We hear only about terrorist threats that could destroy a city with an atomic bomb, while the threat of human extinction from nuclear war is never mentioned---even when the US and Russia are each running huge nuclear war games in preparation for a US-Russian war. Even more frightening is the fact that the neocons running US foreign policy believe that the US has “nuclear primacy” over Russia; that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak attack against Russian (and Chinese) nuclear forces and completely destroy them. This theory was articulated in 2006 in “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy”, which was published in Foreign Affairs by the Council on Foreign Relations.[xiii] By concluding that the Russians and Chinese would be unable to retaliate, or if some small part of their forces remained, would not risk a second US attack by retaliating, the article invites nuclear war. Colonel Valery Yarynich (who was in charge of security of the Soviet/Russian nuclear command and control systems for 7 years) asked me to help him write a rebuttal, which was titled “Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy”.[xiv] Colonel Yarynich, who was on the Soviet General Staff and did war planning for the USSR, concluded that the “Primacy” article used faulty methodology and erroneous assumptions, thus invalidating its conclusions. My contribution lay in my knowledge of the recently published (in 2006) studies, which predicted even a “successful” nuclear first-strike, which destroyed 100% of the opposing sides nuclear weapons, would cause the citizens of the side that “won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear famine, just as would the rest of humanity. Although the nuclear primacy article created quite a backlash in Russia, leading to a public speech by the Russian Foreign Minister, the story was essentially not covered in the US press. We were unable to get our rebuttal published by US media. The question remains as to whether the US nuclear primacy asserted in the article has been accepted as a fact by the US political and military establishment. Such acceptance would explain the recklessness of US policy toward Russia and China. Thus we find ourselves in a situation in which those who are in charge of our nuclear arsenal seem not to understand that they can end human history if they choose to push the button. Most of the American public also remains completely unaware of this deadly threat. The uninformed are leading the uninformed toward the abyss of extinction. US public schools have not taught students about nuclear weapons for more than 20 years. The last time nuclear war was discussed or debated in a US Presidential election was sometime in the last century. Thus, most people do not know that a single strategic nuclear weapon can easily ignite a massive firestorm over 100 square miles, and that the US and Russia each have many thousands of these weapons ready for immediate use. Meanwhile, neoconservative ideology has kept the US at war during the entire 21st century. It has led to the expansion of US/NATO forces to the very borders of Russia, a huge mistake that has consequently revived the Cold War. A hallmark of neconservatism is that America is the “indispensable nation”, as evidenced by the neoconservative belief in “American exceptionalism”, which essentially asserts that Americans are superior to all other peoples, that American interests and values should reign supreme in the world. At his West Point speech on May 28, President Obama said, “I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being.” Obama stated his bottom line is that “America must always lead on the world stage,” and “the backbone of that leadership always will be the military.” American exceptionalism based on might, not diplomacy, on hard power, not soft, is precisely the hubris and arrogance that could lead to the termination of human life. Washington’s determination to prevent the rise of Russia and China, as set out in the Brzezinski and Wolfowitz doctrines, is a recipe for nuclear war. The need is dire for the president of the US, Russia, or China to state in a highly public forum that the existence of nuclear weapons creates the possibility of their use and that their use in war would likely mean human extinction. As nuclear war has no winners, the weapons should be banned and destroyed before they destroy all of us.

#### Growth sustainable—tech solves resource scarcity.

Adjaye 15 John Asafu, associate professor of economics at the University of Queensland, et al., April 2015, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto,” http://www.ecomodernism.org/s/An-Ecomodernist-Manifesto.pdf

At the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist.¶ Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves?¶ The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged.¶ Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future.¶ To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium or thorium fuel cycle, or from hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive.¶ There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses.¶ Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering.¶ 2¶ Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts.¶ Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow.¶ Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two.¶ The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline.¶ Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates.¶ Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts.¶ g with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does.¶ As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy.¶ These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half.¶ Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. the “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines.¶ Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations.¶ Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shifted away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive.¶ As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies.¶ Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends.

#### Collapse only further maintains the system.

Mead 09. Walter Russell Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World. Lauren Gottlieb provided research assistance for this article. The New Republic. 2/3/09. “Only Makes You Stronger” [https://newrepublic.com/article/63068/only-makes-you-stronger Accessed 7/9/18](https://newrepublic.com/article/63068/only-makes-you-stronger%20Accessed%207/9/18) //WR-NCP

Even before the Panic of 2008 sent financial markets into turmoil and launched what looks like the worst global recession in decades, talk of American decline was omnipresent. In the long term, the United States faces the rise of Asia and the looming fiscal problems posed by Medicare and other entitlement programs. In the short term, there is a sense that, after eight years of George W. Bush, the world, full of disdain for our way of life, seems to be spinning out of our--and perhaps anybody's--control. The financial panic simply brought all that simmering anxiety to a boil, and the consensus now seems to be that the United States isn't just in danger of decline, but in the full throes of it--the beginning of a "post-American" world. Perhaps--but the long history of capitalism suggests another possibility. After all, capitalism has seen a steady procession of economic crises and panics, from the seventeenth-century Tulip Bubble in the Netherlands and the Stop of the Exchequer under Charles II in England through the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles of the early eighteenth century, on through the crises associated with the Napoleonic wars and the spectacular economic crashes that repeatedly wrought havoc and devastation to millions throughout the nineteenth century. The panics of 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907 were especially severe, culminating in the Great Crash of 1929, which set off a depression that would not end until World War II. The series of crises continued after the war, and the last generation has seen the Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970, the first Arab oil crisis of 1973, the Third World debt crisis of 1982, the S&L crisis, the Asian crisis of 1997, the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001, and today's global financial meltdown. And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system, centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United States. After more than 300 years, it seems reasonable to conclude that financial and economic crises do not, by themselves, threaten either the international capitalist system or the special role within it of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite seems true--that financial crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development. Indeed, many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery. Marx noted that financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones. Setting aside the flaws in both these overarching theories of capitalism, this analysis of economic crises is fundamentally sound--and especially relevant to the current meltdown. Cataloguing the early losses from the financial crisis, it's hard not to conclude that the central capitalist nations will weather the storm far better than those not so central. Emerging markets have been hit harder by the financial crisis than developed ones as investors around the world seek the safe haven provided by U.S. Treasury bills, and commodity-producing economies have suffered extraordinary shocks as commodity prices crashed from their record, boom-time highs. Countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, which hoped to use oil revenue to mount a serious political challenge to American power and the existing world order, face serious new constraints. Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad must now spend less time planning big international moves and think a little bit harder about domestic stability. Far from being the last nail in America's coffin, the financial crisis may actually resuscitate U.S. power relative to its rivals.

#### Even without tech it’s sustainabile—our ev. assumes all their warrants.

- assumes peak oil, carrying capacity, thermodynamics

Epstein 14. Alex Founder of the Center for Industrial Progress. National Post. 12/24/14. “Alex Epstein: The sustainability myth” [https://nationalpost.com/opinion/alex-epstein-the-sustainability-myth Accessed 7/7/18](https://nationalpost.com/opinion/alex-epstein-the-sustainability-myth%20Accessed%207/7/18) //WR-NCP

Exploring the evidence about mankind’s use of fossil fuels so far, we have seen that the fossil fuel industry is far and away the world leader at producing cheap, plentiful, reliable energy and that that energy has radically increased our ability to create a flourishing society, a more livable climate, and greater environmental quality. On these fronts, so long as we are able to use fossil fuels, the evidence is overwhelming that life can get better and better across the board, as we use fossil fuel technology and other technologies to solve more problems — including those that fossil fuel technology and other technologies create. [np\_storybar title=”Alex Epstein: Wrapping our minds around climate change” link=”http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/12/23/alex-epstein-wrapping-our-minds-around-climate-change/”%5DGrowing up in Chevy Chase, Md., a suburb inside the Beltway of the D.C. metro area, I learned only one thing about fossil fuels in school for the first 18 years of my life: They were bad because they were causing global warming. It wasn’t very clear in my mind what warming was or how it worked, but the gist was this: The CO2 my parents’ SUV was spewing in the air was making the Earth a lot hotter, and that would make a lot of things worse. Oh, and there was one more thing I learned: that everyone who knew the relevant science agreed with this. Perhaps this would make a better story if I told you that I promptly joined Greenpeace and fought fossil fuels until discovering a massive hoax that I will reveal later in this chapter. Continue reading… [/np\_storybar] One big question remains: What are the long-term prospects for this way of life? While today we are rich in fossil fuel resources and the wealth they help us create, what is in store for the future? With so much consuming, can this way of life really last? Is it sustainable? The answer is better than yes. Not only can our way of life last; it can keep getting better and better, as long as we don’t adopt “sustainability” policies. Earlier, we saw that the amount of unused fossil fuel raw material currently in the Earth exceeds by far the amount we’ve used in the entire history of civilization by many multiples and that the key issue is whether we have the technological ability and economic reason to turn that raw material into a resource. For years, actually centuries, opponents of fossil fuels — and some supporters of fossil fuels — have said that using fossil fuels is unsustainable because we’ll run out of them. Instead, we keep running into them. The more we use, the more we create. Fossil fuel energy resources, as we discussed, are created — by turning a non-resource raw material into a resource using human ingenuity. And there is plenty of raw material left. In the last few years, the shale energy revolution has unlocked vast new oil and gas resources, making the “running out of fossil fuels” claim seem implausible for the foreseeable future. Many environmental leaders have therefore shifted from saying that we’re running out of fossil fuels to saying that our abundance of fossil fuels is causing us to run out of other resources — arable land and water, most alarmingly, but also a whole host of other materials that are crucial for civilizations. “Consuming three planets’ worth of resources when in fact we have one is the environmental equivalent of childhood obesity — eating until you make yourself sick,” says David Miliband, at the time secretary of state for the environment, food, and rural affairs in the United Kingdom. In response to criticisms of renewable energy plans as utopian and far-fetched, environmentalist Bill McKibben says, “Perhaps it’s the current scheme, with its requirement of endless growth in a finite world, that seems utopian and far-fetched.” The theory behind these predictions is that Earth has a finite “carrying capacity,” an idea that was spread far and wide in the 1970s. Two of the leading exponents of this view were Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren. In their landmark book, Global Ecology, they wrote: “When a population of organisms grows in a finite environment, sooner or later it will encounter a resource limit. This phenomenon, described by ecologists as reaching the ‘carrying capacity’ of the environment, applies to bacteria on a culture dish, to fruit flies in a jar of agar, and to buffalo on a prairie. It must also apply to man on this finite planet. These theories were not idle banter — they were used by many to call for drastic restrictions on fossil fuel use, much as we have today. Ehrlich and Holdren announced, “A massive campaign must be launched to restore a high-quality environment in North America and to de-develop the United States.” This meant an attempt to reverse industrial development — by law: “This effort must be largely political.” These ideas were viewed highly enough that Holdren’s body of work, which stresses these themes over and over, gave him the prestige to become science adviser to President Barack Obama. As we’ve discussed earlier, these predictions were wrong, but why, exactly, were they wrong? The most direct reason is that there are far more fossil fuel raw materials and far more human ingenuity to get them than Ehrlich and Holdren expected. But there is a deeper error here, an error at the root of the whole concept of sustainability. The error is a backward understanding of resources. The believers in a finite carrying capacity think of the Earth as something that “carries” us by dispensing a certain amount of resources. But if this was true, then why did the caveman have so few resources? Those who believe in the ideal of human non-impact tend to endow nature with godlike status, as an entity that nurtures us if only we will live in harmony with the other species and not demand so much for ourselves. But nature gives us very few directly usable machine energy resources. Resources are not ;taken from nature, but created; from nature. What applies to the raw materials of coal, oil, and gas also applies to every raw material in nature — they are all potential resources, with unlimited potential to be rendered valuable by the human mind. Ultimately, a resource is just matter and energy transformed via human ingenuity to meet human needs. Well, the planet we live on is 100% matter and energy, 100% potential resource for energy and anything else we would want. To say we’ve only scratched the surface is to significantly understate how little of this planet’s potential we’ve unlocked. We already know that we have enough of a combination of fossil fuels and nuclear power to last thousands and thousands of years, and by then, hopefully, we’ll have fusion (a potential, far superior form of nuclear power) or even some hyper-efficient form of solar power. The amount of raw matter and energy on this planet is so incomprehensibly vast that it is nonsensical to speculate about running out of it. Telling us that there is only so much matter and energy to create resources from is like telling us that there is only so much galaxy to visit for the first time. True, but irrelevant. Sustainability is not a clearly defined term. According to the United Nations, it has over a thousand interpretations, but the basic idea is “indefinitely repeatable.” For example, the idea of renewability, which is usually synonymous with sustainability in the realm of energy, is that the fuel source keeps replenishing itself over and over without the need to do anything different. But why is this an ideal? In most realms, we accept and desire constant change. For example, you want the best phone with the best materials, regardless of whether those materials will be there in 200 years and regardless of whether it would be more “renewable” to use two cups and a string. Why would we use solar panels or windmills over and over if they keep giving us expensive, unreliable energy? Why should we want to use solar panels or windmills over and over (leaving aside the fact that they quickly deteriorate and thus require a continuous series of mass-mining projects) if they keep giving us expensive, unreliable energy? Why not use the best, the most progressive form of energy at any given time, recognizing that this will change as we advance and the best becomes better? At the beginning of this book, we observed that human beings survive by using ingenuity to transform nature to meet their needs — i.e., to produce and consume resources. And we observed that the motive power of transformation, the amplifier of human ability, the resource behind every other resource, is energy — which, for the foreseeable future, means largely fossil fuel energy. There is no inherent limit to energy resources — we just need human ingenuity to be free to discover ways to turn unusable energy into usable energy. This opens up a thrilling possibility: the endless potential for improving life through ever-growing energy resources helping create ever-growing resources of every kind. This is the principle that explains the strong correlation between fossil fuel use and life expectancy, fossil fuel use and income, fossil fuel use and pretty much anything good: human ingenuity transforming potential resources into actual resources — including the most fundamental resource, energy. Growth is not unsustainable. With freedom, including the freedom to produce energy, it is practically inevitable. We are not eating the last slice of pizza in the box or scraping the bottom of the barrel; we are standing on the tip of an endless iceberg.

#### Specifically, it spurs worse environmental destruction but continued extaction is sustainable and solves every impact—solves decarbonization and sustainability.

Mead 12. Walter Russell Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow in U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. *The American Interest.* Since its founding in 2005, The American Interest has been one of the leading sources for understanding American policy, politics, and culture. 7/28/18. “The Energy Revolution 4: Hot Planet?” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/07/28/the-energy-revolution-4-hot-planet/> Accessed 7/10/18 //WR-NCP \*edited for gendered language which we do not endorse

Over a series of recent posts, I’ve been looking at the energy revolution that is changing the look of the 21st centuries. Some countries are losers, but the U.S. in particular stands to make big gains at home and in its foreign policy. On the whole, this news is about as good as it gets: trillions of dollars of valuable resources are now available to power the US economy, cut our trade deficit and reduce our vulnerability to Middle East instability. Hundreds of thousands of well paid blue collar jobs are going to reduce income inequality and help rebuild a stable middle class. Many of the resources are exactly where we would want them: in hard hit Rust Belt states. World peace is also looking more possible: the great powers aren’t going to be elbowing each other as they fight to control the last few dribs and drabs of oil. Nasty dictatorships and backward-facing petro-states aren’t going to be able blackmail the world as easily. But there is one group (other than the Russians and the Gulf Arabs and the Iranians) that isn’t sharing in the general joy: the greens. For them, the spectacle of a looming world energy crisis was good news. It justified huge subsidies for solar and wind power (and thereby guaranteed huge fortunes for clever green-oriented investors). Greens outdid themselves year after year with gloom and doom forecasts about the coming oil crunch. They hoped that public dislike of the Middle East and the costs of our involvement there could be converted into public support for expensive green energy policies here at home: “energy independence” was one of the few arguments they had that resonated widely among average voters. Back in those salad days of green arrogance, there was plenty of scoffing at the ‘peak oil deniers’ and shortage skeptics who disagreed with what greens told us all was settled, Malthusian science. “Reality based” green thinkers sighed and rolled their eyes at the illusions of those benighted techno-enthusiasts who said that unconventional sources like shale oil and gas and the oil sands of Canada would one day become available. Environmentalists, you see, are science based, unlike those clueless, Gaia-defying technophiles with their infantile faith in the power of human creativity. Greens, with their awesome powers of Gaia-assisted intuition, know what the future holds. But those glory days are over now, and the smarter environmentalists are bowing to the inevitable. George Monbiot, whose cries of woe and pain in the Guardian newspaper have served as the Greek chorus at each stage of the precipitous decline of the global green movement, gave voice to green grief at the prospect of a wealthy and prosperous century to come: “We were wrong,” he wrote on July 2, ”about peak oil. There’s enough to fry us all.” Monbiot now gets the politics as well: There is enough oil in the ground to deep-fry the lot of us, and no obvious means to prevail upon governments and industry to leave it in the ground. Twenty years of efforts to prevent climate breakdown through moral persuasion have failed, with the collapse of the multilateral process at Rio de Janeiro last month. The world’s most powerful nation is again becoming an oil state, and if the political transformation of its northern neighbour [a reference to Canada] is anything to go by, the results will not be pretty. In other words, a newly oil rich United States is going to fight even harder against global green carbon policies, and the new discoveries will tilt the American political system even farther in the direction of capitalist oil companies. Capitalism is not, Monbiot is forced to admit, a fragile system that will easily be replaced. Bolstered by huge supplies of oil, it is here to stay. Industrial civilization is, as far as he can now see, unstoppable. Gaia, that treacherous ~~slut~~, has made so much oil and gas that her faithful acolytes today cannot protect her from the consequences of her own folly. Welcome to the New Green Doom: an overabundance of oil and gas is going to release so much greenhouse gas that the world is going to fry. The exploitation of the oil sands in Alberta, warn leading environmentalists, is a tipping point. William McKibben put it this way in an interview with Wired magazine in the fall of 2011: I think if we go whole-hog in the tar sands, we’re out of luck. Especially since that would doubtless mean we’re going whole-hog at all the other unconventional energy sources we can think of: Deepwater drilling, fracking every rock on the face of the Earth, and so forth. Here’s why the tar sands are important: It’s a decision point about whether, now that we’re running out of the easy stuff, we’re going to go after the hard stuff. The Saudi Arabian liquor store is running out of bottles. Do we sober up, or do we find another liquor store, full of really crappy booze, to break into? A year later, despite the success of environmentalists like McKibben at persuading the Obama administration to block a pipeline intended to ship this oil to refineries in the US, it’s clear (as it was crystal clear all along to anyone with eyes to see) that the world has every intention of making use of the “crappy liquor.” Again, for people who base their claim to world leadership on their superior understanding of the dynamics of complex systems, greens prove over and over again that they are surprisingly naive and crude in their ability to model and to shape the behavior of the political and economic systems they seek to control. If their understanding of the future of the earth’s climate is anything like as wish-driven, fact-averse and intellectually crude as their approach to international affairs, democratic politics and the energy market, the greens are in trouble indeed. And as I’ve written in the past, the contrast between green claims to understand climate and to be able to manage the largest and most complex set of policy changes ever undertaken, and the evident incompetence of greens at managing small (Solyndra) and large (Kyoto, EU cap and trade, global climate treaty) political projects today has more to do with climate skepticism than greens have yet understood. Many people aren’t rejecting science; they are rejecting green claims of policy competence. In doing so, they are entirely justified by the record. Nevertheless, the future of the environment is not nearly as dim as greens think. Despairing environmentalists like McKibben and Monbiot are as wrong about what the new era of abundance means as green energy analysts were about how much oil the planet had. The problem is the original sin of much environmental thought: Malthusianism. If greens weren’t so addicted to Malthusian horror narratives they would be able to see that the new era of abundance is going to make this a cleaner planet faster than if the new gas and oil had never been found. Let’s be honest. It has long been clear to students of history, and has more recently begun to dawn on many environmentalists, that all that happy-clappy carbon treaty stuff was a pipe dream and that nothing like that is going to happen. A humanity that hasn’t been able to ban the bomb despite the clear and present dangers that nuclear weapons pose isn’t going to ban or even seriously restrict the internal combustion engine and the generator. The political efforts of the green movement to limit greenhouse gasses have had very little effect so far, and it is highly unlikely that they will have more success in the future. The green movement has been more of a group hug than a curve bending exercise, and that is unlikely to change. If the climate curve bends, it will bend the way the population curve did: as the result of lots of small human decisions driven by short term interest calculations rather than as the result of a grand global plan. The shale boom hasn’t turned green success into green failure. It’s prevented green failure from turning into something much worse. Monbiot understands this better than McKibben; there was never any real doubt that we’d keep going to the liquor store. If we hadn’t found ways to use all this oil and gas, we wouldn’t have embraced the economics of less. True, as oil and gas prices rose, there would be more room for wind and solar power, but the real winner of an oil and gas shortage is… coal. To use McKibben’s metaphor, there is a much dirtier liquor store just down the road from the shale emporium, and it’s one we’ve been patronizing for centuries. The US and China have oodles of coal, and rather than walk to work from our cold and dark houses all winter, we’d use it. Furthermore, when and if the oil runs out, the technology exists to get liquid fuel out of coal. It isn’t cheap and it isn’t clean, but it works. The newly bright oil and gas future means that we aren’t entering a new Age of Coal. For this, every green on the planet should give thanks. The second reason why greens should give thanks for shale is that environmentalism is a luxury good. People must survive and they will survive by any means necessary. But they would much rather thrive than merely survive, and if they can arrange matters better, they will. A poor society near the edge of survival will dump the industrial waste in the river without a second thought. It will burn coal and choke in the resulting smog if it has nothing else to burn. Politics in an age of survival is ugly and practical. It has to be. The best leader is the one who can cut out all the fluff and the folderol and keep you alive through the winter. During the Battle of Leningrad, people burned priceless antiques to stay alive for just one more night. An age of energy shortages and high prices translates into an age of radical food and economic insecurity for billions of people. Those billions of hungry, frightened, angry people won’t fold their hands and meditate on the ineffable wonders of Gaia and her mystic web of life as they pass peacefully away. Nor will they vote George Monbiot and Bill McKibben into power. They will butcher every panda in the zoo before they see their children starve, they will torch every forest on earth before they freeze to death, and the cheaper and the meaner their lives are, the less energy or thought they will spare to the perishing world around them. But, thanks to shale and other unconventional energy sources, that isn’t where we are headed. We are heading into a world in which energy is abundant and horizons are open even as humanity’s grasp of science and technology grows more secure. A world where more and more basic human needs are met is a world that has time to think about other goals and the money to spend on them. As China gets richer, the Chinese want cleaner air, cleaner water, purer food — and they are ready and able to pay for them. A Brazil whose economic future is secure can afford to treasure and conserve its rain forests. A Central America where the people are doing all right is more willing and able to preserve its biodiversity. And a world in which people know where their next meal is coming from is a world that can and will take thought for things like the sustainability of the fisheries and the protection of the coral reefs. A world that is more relaxed about the security of its energy sources is going to be able to do more about improving the quality of those sources and about managing the impact of its energy consumption on the global commons. A rich, energy secure world is going to spend more money developing solar power and wind power and other sustainable sources than a poor, hardscrabble one. When human beings think their basic problems are solved, they start looking for more elegant solutions. Once Americans had an industrial and modern economy, we started wanting to clean up the rivers and the air. Once people aren’t worried about getting enough calories every day to survive, they start wanting healthier food more elegantly prepared. A world of abundant shale oil and gas is a world that will start imposing more environmental regulations on shale and gas producers. A prosperous world will set money aside for research and development for new technologies that conserve energy or find it in cleaner surroundings. A prosperous world facing climate change will be able to ameliorate the consequences and take thought for the future in ways that a world overwhelmed by energy insecurity and gripped in a permanent economic crisis of scarcity simply can’t and won’t do. Greens should also be glad that the new energy is where it is. For Monbiot and for many others, Gaia’s decision to put so much oil into the United States and Canada seems like her biggest indiscretion of all. Certainly, a United States of America that has, in the Biblical phrase, renewed its youth like an eagle with a large infusion of fresh petro-wealth is going to be even less eager than formerly to sign onto various pie-in-the-sky green carbon treaties. But think how much worse things would be if the new reserves lay in dictatorial kleptocracies. How willing and able would various Central Asia states have been to regulate extraction and limit the damage? How would Nigeria have handled vast new reserves whose extraction required substantially more invasive methods? Instead, the new sources are concentrated in places where environmentalists have more say in policy making and where, for all the shortcomings and limits, governments are less corruptible, more publicly accountable and in fact more competent to develop and enforce effective energy regulations. This won’t satisfy McKibben and Monbiot (nothing that could actually happen would satisfy either of these gentlemen), but it is a lot better than what we could be facing. Additionally, if there are two countries in the world that should worry carbon-focused greens more than any other, they are the United States and China. The two largest, hungriest economies in the world are also home to enormous coal reserves. But based on what we now know, the US and China are among the biggest beneficiaries of the new cornucopia. Gaia put the oil and the gas where, from a carbon point of view, it will do the most good. In a world of energy shortages and insecurity, both the US and China would have gone flat out for coal. Now, that is much less likely. And there’s one more reason why greens should thank Gaia for shale. Wind and solar aren’t ready for prime time now, but by the time the new sources start to run low, humanity will have mastered many more technologies that can used to provide energy and to conserve it. It’s likely that Age of Shale hasn’t just postponed the return of coal: because of this extra time, there likely will never be another age in which coal is the dominant industrial fuel. It’s virtually certain that the total lifetime carbon footprint of the human race is going to be smaller with the new oil and gas sources than it would have been without them. Neither the world’s energy problems nor its climate issues are going away any time soon. Paradise is not beckoning just a few easy steps away. But the new availability of these energy sources is on balance a positive thing for environmentalists as much as for anyone else. Perhaps, and I know this is a heretical thought, but perhaps Gaia is smarter than the greens.

# Future Research:

<https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bfriedman/files/why_a_dual_mandate_is_right_for_monetary_policy.pdf>

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/10/24/the-front-runner-for-joe-bidens-treasury-boss-has-a-mighty-cv

https://faculty.smu.edu/millimet/classes/eco7321/papers/pallais%202014.pdf