# Kenya PIC

### Notes

Read vs AFRICOM/general Africa affs, there are better country pics if they’re defending whole res

DA scenario kinda out of date, first card is fine

### \*\*1NC – Core \*\*

#### CP: The United States \*actor\* ought to maintain military aid to the Republic of Kenya, and ought not provide military aid to \*plan\*

#### Kenya’s the exception to their studies – improved counterterrorist efforts and police reform

**Kelly 9/22** Kevin J. Kelley, SEPTEMBER 22 2018, "Kenya an exception to failure of US military aid: study," Daily Nation, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenya-an-exception-to-failure-of-US-military-aid-study/1056-4772710-nm9lh/index.html> OHS-AT

The studies do not examine specific conflicts, but Kenya is cited in one of the analyses as a seemingly rare example of an African country whose security forces have performed more effectively as a result of US assistance.

“The Kenyan security units that have worked closest with US officials have demonstrated their capacity for counterterrorism, including in challenging contexts,” this evaluation finds. Kenyan troops that received US training “performed well in Amisom operations — for example, successfully retaking territory from Al-Shabaab,” the Rand study team adds.

In addition to supporting KDF contingents deployed in Somalia, the US has focused on enhancing the capacity of Kenyan police, including through the creation of specialised anti-terrorism units, this country-specific report notes.

RECCE SQUAD

US assistance has also been directed to institutional police reforms following the 2007-2008 “outbreak of communal violence in which the police were heavily implicated,” the study says.

“Similarly,” the study adds, “the elite paramilitary police General Services Unit, which has received substantial US support, performed more competently than other units responding to the Westgate Mall attack in 2013, although the overall security forces’ response was plagued by ‘significant shortcomings’.”

Kenyan police forces became “less politicised and more professional” due in part to US assistance from 2008 to 2013, “resulting in better performance in the 2013 elections,” the Rand assessment states.

“Also, some evidence suggests that, following US training, the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit is carrying out fewer extrajudicial killings, collecting better evidence, and making more arrests than in the past.”

#### Assistance sustains US-Kenya ties and protects key naval bases – also stabilizes East Africa and maintains the leveraging power to push for human rights reform - turns case.

**Johns 90** Michael Johns [Michael Johns is a former policy analyst for African and Third World Affairs at The Heritage Foundation], April 24, 1990, "Strengthening U.S. Ties With Kenya," Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/africa/report/strengthening-us-ties-kenya> OHS-AT

766 April 24,1990 INTRODUCIION Among the many dividends of communism's collapse in Eastern Europe is the emergence of a new-found respect in Africa for the United States. From Pretoria, South Africa, to Lagos, Nigeria, African governments are seeking stronger relations with what they perceive to be the world's sole surviving superpower. Yet, at the very moment that Washington could begin devising a creative U.S. policy for Africa, some members of Congress are attacking those African nations that could anchor expanded American engagement in Africa In particular jeopardy is Washington's relationship with one of America's strongest African allies, Kenya. Some members of Congress want to suspend economic and military assistance to Kenya due to alleged human rights viola tions by the Ken y an government Supporting U.S. Interests. Since achieving independence from Britain in 1963, Kenya has been one of the few African nations to pursue a pro-Western political course. In contrast to most African governments, Kenya has permitted and even welcomed American military access to its naval and air bases. U.S. naval-forces’ dock-adBGel-at Mombasa, Kenya's principal seaport, located on Kenya's southeastern Indian Ocean coast. More important, American use of Mombasa enables the U.S. to project air and naval power in the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf in the event of emergencies or threats to American security interests in these regions.

Kenya supports American political interests in Africa as well. With Washington's endorsement, Kenyan Pres ident Daniel arap Moi says he wants to mediate settlements to long-standing civil wars in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan In Sudan, Moi cooperates with Washington's famine relief efforts, which have saved tens of thousands of Sudanese from starvation. Keny a has been the largest provider of famine relief supplies to Sudan.

Despite this, Representative Howard Wolpe, the Michigan Democrat, is leading the attack against Kenya. Though Wolpe mutes his criticism of some of Africas most egregious human rights violators, like Ethiopias Mengistu Haile Mariam he has lashed out at Kenya, and threatened to seek the termination of U.S. military and economic assistance unless human rights in Kenya are improved prosperous Kenya, the Bush Administration and Congress should be consistent in using human rights as a determinant of American policy. The U.S surely cannot ignore violations by communist regimes like those in Ethiopia and Angola while criticizing governments like Mois that not only are friendly to the U.S but which are less repressive than other nations in Africa.

Seeking Stronger Ties. More important, besides the value of preserving U.S.-Kenyan strategic and political cooperation, healthy relations with Kenya will allow Washington to nudge Moi toward a better human rights record. The U.S. thus should seek an even stronger U.S.-Kenyan relationship in which the U.S. can play a constructive role in encouraging political pluralism, a free market economy, and respect for human rights and liberties, while continuing to benefit from U.S.-Kenyan strategic cooperation. To protect strong U.S.-Kenyan relations and help foster a free and To achieve these objectives, the Bush Administration should Maintain U.S. access to the Kenyan air and naval facility at Mom Invite Kenyan Presid e nt Daniel arap Moi to visit Washington to re basa emphasize the importance of U.S.-Kenyan relations. Bush and Moi should discuss increased political, strategic, and trade cooperation between Washington and Nairobi, and Mois role as a peacemaker in Africa E ncourage Kenya to initiate free market reforms, such as privatizing state enterprises and eliminating price and marketing controls. Despite enormous potential, the Kenyan economy is seriously hampered by too much government involvement Assist financially, through the National Endowment for Democracy NED those-Kenyan-organizations that support democraticf free market values Continue military aid, currently $15 million per year, to Kenya to maintain U.S. air and naval access to Kenyan military facilities and assist Kenya in defending itself from external aggression. Kenya borders heavily armed nations such as Ethiopia and Uganda, and U.S. security assistance is important for Kenyas defense Organize a U.S.-Kenyan business council to identi0 and resolve problem s of U.S. investors in Kenya, including burdensome bureaucratic procedures and corruption 2 FROM COLONIALISM TO MOI Before winning independence in 1963, Kenya was a British colony. Britain obtained control over Kenya at the 1885 Berlin Conference, where th e major European powers divided East Africa into spheres of influence.

Britain declared Kenya a British Protectorate in 1895, and Kenya was made an official colony in 1920 rule reached a high point when members of Kenyas Kikuyu tribe launched the Mau Mau rebellion against the British in October 19

52. Mau Mau was a secret organization of Kikuyus who terrorized the British, and often killed other Kikuyus who refused to take an oath swearing not to cooperate with the British Britis h security forces aiding Kenyan police brought the insur rection to an end in 1956, but only after some 13,500 Kenyans were killed. Tens of thousands of suspected and known Mau Mau were detained by the British leaders of the Kenya African Union (KAU an an ti-colonial nationalist party, were arrested and accused of organizing the rebellion.

Prompted in part by the Mau Mau rebellion, London in 1955 began taking steps toward grant ing Kenyaindependence A- ban on Kenyan political parties was partially lifted th at year, ena bling local level political associa tions to organize freely As political activity in Kenya increased, debate intensified among Kenyans over how political power should be distributed in an independent Kenya.

Kenyas two major political par Kenyan opposition to colonial 3 ties -the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and the Kenya African National Union KANU differed strongly on how to share political power.

Since KADU drew its support from a coalition of Kenyas smaller tribes, it advocated a decentralized or federal constitution to prevent political domina tion by Kenyas largest tribe, the Kikuyu. KANU, by contrast, advocated a centralized system of government KANU was led by the charismatic Jomo Kenyatta, who was previously impriso!ed.by t he-Bgtish .as an organizer of the Mau Mau rebellion and who became the first black African insurgent to be known world-wide ber 12,19

63. At first it appeared that Kenya would become a federal state similar to that advocated by KADU. Kenyas first independe nt constitution finalized by KADU and KANU in London in September-1963, gave local governments considerable political autonomy. But in August 1964, Kenyatta announced his intention to make Kenya a centralized republic, abolishing regional autonomy and cre a ting a strong presidency. The proposal was heated ly debated, but when the proposal was voted upon in November 1964, KADU was unable to prevent its passage. Recognizing that the measure was likely to pass, KADU announced that it was dissolving its party a n d merging with KANU On the first anniversary of independence, Kenya was proclaimed a republic. Kenyatta was elected Kenyas president, the first of only two presi dents to rule Kenya. Campaigns for Kenyas parliament have been contested by a multiplicity of KANU candidates, and debate within the party has been uncharacteristically wide for a one-party state. Nonetheless, the centraliza tion of political power within KANU has spawned limited political freedom in Kenya with opposing political parties banned. T h e Kenya Peoples Union KPU), a small political party, was formed in 1966, but the party was banned officially bythe government in 1969 Centralized Republic. Britain granted Kenya full independence on Decem When Kenyatta died on August 22,1978, Vice Preside n t Daniel arap Moi assumed the presidency, in accordance with the countrys constitution. As Kenyatta before him, Moi also serves as president of KANU, which remains Kenyas only legal political party. Unlike Kenyatta, Moi is not a Kikuyu, but comes from the Kalenjin tribe which, at 11 percent of Kenyaspopulation; is about half the size of the Kikuyus. Under Mois leadership, the ethnic base of Kenyas-government has been broadenedtg include-such smaller Kenyan eth nic groups as the Luo and Kamba. Those of Soma l i origin are dso better rep resented MODERN KENYA Kenya is located on Africas east coast, bordering the Indian Ocean to its east and five African countries Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda to the north, west, and south tive prosperity in a r e gion characterized by political chaos, successive coups Since independence in 1963, Kenya has been an island of stability and rela I 4 detat, violence, and poverty. Kenyas neighbors include some of the worlds most egregious human rights violators such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.

Four of Kenyas neighbors Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda are embroiled in devastating civil wars. And in each of Kenyas neighbors, hunger and starvation are commonplace Human Rights Improvements. Though Moi has kept his n ation at peace Kenyas seven major ethnic groups the Kalenjin, Kamba, Kikuyu, Kisii Luhya, Luo, and Meru -remain bitter rivals. As such, the potential for violence is a major Kenyan concern. Kenyas human rights climate, though often criticized by Western l i berals, is better than such East African neigh bors as Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. According to the U.S. Department of State, there were no political murders in Kenya last year, no reports of disap pearances, and Kenyans were free to engage in private e c onomic activity and own property without government interference.\* Additionally, last June Moi freed all political prisoners detained without trial or charge? Living standards also are higher in Kenya than in other black African nations. The best baromete r of this may be life expectancy In Kenya it is 58 years, the highest of any East African nation.This compares with 53 years inTanzania 49 years in Burundi and in Rwanda, 48 years in Uganda, 47 years in Ethiopia and 47 years in Somalia4 (U.S. life expectan c y is 75 years; Egyptian is 61 Kenya also has fared better economically than its neighbors. Though the Kenyan economy has been hampered by stifling regulations such as govern ment control of major financial institutions and price.controls on many agricultu ral and industrial products and by corruption in many business sec- tors, Kenyas per capita gross national product is the largest in East Africa.

For 1987 it was $330, compared with $300 for Rwanda 290 for Somalia 260 for yganda 250 for Burundi 180 for Tan zania, and $130 for Ethiopia. Kenya has the most developed roads in the region, and it is the only East African nation with a notable industrial capability, producing beverages, tobacco, textiles, cement, metals, and other products. The Kenyan 1 For a ful l er discussion of human rights and political conditions in the Horn of Africa,.see.Michael Johns Preserving American Security Ties to Somalia, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 745, December 26 1989; Michael Johns, A Cautious Welcome for Sudans New Gove r nment, Heritage Foundation Executive Ethiopia, Heritage Foundation Bacmunder No. 692, February 23,1989 2 U.S. Department of State, Counby Reports on Human Rights for-1989: Kenya,-pp. 159-160 3 Kenya Orders Detainees Freed, The Washington Post, June 8,1989 , p. A28 4 The World Bank, World Development Report 1989: Financial Systems and World Development Indicators June 1989, Table 1 (Basic indicators), p. 164 5 The World Bank, World Tables (Baltimore: The Johns Hopb Un;VerS;ty Press, 1989 country tables Memor andum Nor245,-Jdy-28,-1989; and Michael Johns,-!A U.S. Strategy to Foster Human Rights in 5 industrial sector is growing over 12 percent each year. Kenya also is, by far, the largest exporter of goods in East Africa.

Nonetheless, Kenya is one of only 42 co untries listed by the World Ba&p low income economies. Agriculture is the base of the Kenyan economy, ac counting for approximately 30 percent of gross domestic product and engaging over 75 percent of the population, and earning about 66 percent f Kenyas f oreign exchange. In recent years tourism has sur passed coffee and tea as Kenyas main foreign revenue earner as commodity prices for these agricultural products have fal len. Last years earnings on tourism are estimated to have been 340 million, with over 700,000 tourists visiting Kenya.

Unlike Angola, Nigeria, Zaire and other African countries that have natural resources like coal copper, diamonds, and oil Kenya can boast no significant natural resources 9 8 AMERICA AND KENYA Kenyas beauty and splendor ar e well known to Americans about 78,000 of them visit Kenya each-year,Moreover,-some--l20 U.S. firms have subsidiaries, af filiates, or branch offices in Kenya, making the country 6 World Development Report 1989, op. cit.,Table 1 (Basic indicators p. 164 7 U.S. Department of Commerce, Foeign Economic Tends and Their Implications for the United States prepared by the American Embassy, Nairobi March 1990, p 8 8 Roger Throw, Capital Flight Strains Kenyan Economy, Wall SbLeet Journal, August 17,1989 6 among the most attractive African nations for U.S. investment. American firms in Kenya include Cheesbrough-Ponds Incorporated, Delmonte General Motors Corporation, and Mobil Oil Corporation. Kenya is Africas fastest growing commercial market for U.S. goods. U.S. ex p orts to Kenya last year totalled $133 million and included fertilizers, locomotives, industrial and agricultural chemicals, computers, and other products This makes Kenya the third.largest market in Sub:S-aharan Africa. for U.S, goods. after South Africa and Nigeria. Imports from Kenya were 68.3 million, and included coffee tea, and insecticides.

Kenya is important strategically to the U.S. Access to Kenyan air and seaports facilitates American capability to project air and naval power in the Indian Ocean to ensure the free flow of international commerce and to respond to any crisis or security threat, such as terrorism, in the region Important Port. As a result of these threats, the U.S. signed a military agreement with Kenya in April 1980 which permits t h e U.S. Navy to use Mombasa as a liberty port for refueling and docking. Also under the 1980 agreement, the U.S. Navy and Air Force can use Kenyan air facilities if air forces are needed to counteract aggression in the region. The agreement stipulates that either party can renegotiate its terms this year was used extensively for docking and refueling of American warships The U.S. has not used Mombasa for any other major military operations in the past decade, and the facility is considered less important fo r American security interests than the naval and air base in Berbera, Somalia, along Somalias northern coast. Nonetheless, Mombasa continues to play a valuable role as a potential launching point should American forces need to counter terrorism or foreign aggression in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, or Sub Saharan Africa. These are important, though unstable, regions for American security interests. Because an estimated 500,000 barrels of crude oil pass through the region every day, much of which is destine d for the U.S and because the region contains such unpredictable states as Ethiopia and Iran, the U.S. needs to maintain its access to Mombasa.

Mombass importance is magnified further in light of mounting political instability in Somalia. Mohammed Siad B arre, Somalias leader, disbanded his cabinet this January in a last ditch effort to save his fledgling regime. Anti months, and political opposition to Siad has reached an all-time high. Should Siad fall, the U.S. stands to potentially lose its right to operate from Berbera and Mogadishu, Somalia’s two military bases, leaving Mombasa as the only remaining military facility in the region to which the U.S. has access. During American naval patrols in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s, Mombasa SiIdreEels have mount e d-military offensives-with growing-success-in-recent 9 9 For a Mer discussion of the importance of Somalias military facilities for US. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, see Johns, Preserving American Security Ties to Somalia, op. cit 7 KENYAS IMPORTANCE TO EAST AFRICA Because of its economic and political stability, Kenya has the potential of becoming an influential economic and political example of success for East Africa if Kenya achieves steady economic growth and greater p olitical liberty.

Because Nairobi serves as the commercial center for East Africa, and be cause SMombasa is the central port of the region,-Kenya is well positioned for becoming the hub of regional economic growth.

Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and other neighbors that trade with Kenya could follow Kenya down the road of free market and democratic reform, opening the door potentially for peace and greater prosperity in em battled East Africa. A prerequisite of su c h regional influence already exists in West Africa, where Nigerias democratic, free market reforms are influencing the attitudes of West Africans. In Nigerias western neighbor, Benin, for in stance, calls for democratic change led to the toppling this mon th of Benins dictator Mathieu Kerekou. In the West African nation of Ivory Coast, too calls are now intensifying for multi-party democracy. If Kenya is successful, it could have a similar impact on Somalia, Tanzania, or even Marxist-controlled Ethiopia.

**Effective naval power prevents global nuclear war**

Seth **Cropsey 16**, Director, Center for American Seapower, 4/13/16, “New American Grand Strategy,” http://www.hudson.org/research/12409-new-american-grand-strategy

The U.S. today faces a heretofore unfamiliar strategic challenge, the possibility of **three linked hegemonies** that span the Eurasian land mass. Russia is on the ramparts in Ukraine, Georgia, and the Middle East. Its Baltic State ambitions are not a secret. NATO’s failure to respond in a real crisis means the alliance’s end and a maturing Russian hegemony that stretches from Central Asia to the Atlantic. China actively seeks to become Asia’s hegemon. Iran’s rulers, armed with missiles of increasing range, added financial resources, and the likelihood of nuclear weapons, have their eye on dominating the strategic space between Moscow’s influence and Beijing’s. A single hegemony on the Eurasian land mass threatens U.S. markets, our ability to keep conflict at a distance, regional stability, and democracy. At a minimum, the three hegemonies would **overturn the current liberal international order**. If the U.S. does not take effective action to prevent this, its run as a pre-eminent global power will end. **Proximity to the oceans and seas** offers the U.S. the opportunity to leverage its **still-dominant seapower** as **the key** to countering or if necessary opposing the three would-be hegemons. Since Woodrow Wilson, the goal of American foreign policy has been to prevent regional hegemony. Two decades after Wilson, President Roosevelt led the United States in another global conflict, against Nazi Germany and the Empire of Japan. Both Europe and Asia were—and remain— critical to our hopes for greater prosperity, security, and an increasingly democratic world. The United States and its allies destroyed both totalitarian hegemons. Finally, the United States contained the Soviet Union for almost half a century, blunting its threat to Europe, and confronting its expanding influence in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Emerging from this century of nearly continuous global conflict, the United States was the unquestioned global power. No state could challenge it economically, politically, or militarily. The U.S. destroyed the Iraqi military twice in slightly over a decade, and put a stop to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. New threats have ended this brief period of America’s benevolent international leadership. Three competitors are at odds with the American-led international system. The sum of their ambitions is to undermine U.S. global power. A resurgent Russia aims to reclaim its previous glory, and capitalize on the current U.S. administration’s idea that a small America translates into a more secure world. The European refugee crisis and potential destabilization in the European Union challenge the American alliance system in Europe – the cornerstone of American security policy since the end of World War II. America’s remaining allies show little resolve. Meager European defense budgets make matters worse. In Asia, a rising China focuses on cultivating its economic resources and marshalling them to develop its military power. China’s island-building campaign that seeks to extend its territorial claims into international waters directly confronts the international order. As Admiral Harry Harris, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific recently told Congress, “China has unilaterally changed the (region’s) status quo.” Beijing combines its land reclamation campaign with high-tempo presence operations, conducted by the PLAN and coast guard in contested areas of the South and East China Seas. The Chinese are also **accelerating their ability to project naval power** and control the seas by constructing troop transports, large surface combatants, and a second aircraft carrier. This situation bears a resemblance to the world America faced before World War II when Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan initially overwhelmed the European powers that had refused to rearm following World War I. But the semblance is passing. America faces not two aspiring hegemons, but three. The Middle East is the critical link between Europe and Asia. Its oil-rich states supply a large amount of the world’s energy resources, and facilitate exchange between the two hemispheres. With the Red Sea and Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea in the South, the Mediterranean to the West, and the Caspian and Black Sea to the North, the Middle East is more like an island than a contiguous land mass. On this island Iran attempts to assert its dominance. Russia aids Iran with weapons transfers and its support of Iranian proxy Bashar al-Assad. Relieved of sanctions, the Islamic Republic has begun to receive massive financial inflows, and has actively directed some of its profits towards obtaining dual-use military technology like jet engines. Iranian Special Forces, known as the Quds Force, conduct paramilitary operations in Iraq and Syria, expanding Tehran’s influence over its neighbors. Although America’s adversaries have worked with one another in the past, the current degree of cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran is a strategic terra incognita. Iranian oil shipped into Chinese ports generates financial resources that the Islamic Republic uses to purchase advanced weapons from Russia. Russia helps Iran fight its proxy wars while Iran supports growing Russian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. America’s three strategic competitors oppose the U.S. in similar ways. China, Russia, and Iran understand the lessons of the First Gulf War. Since the Cold War’s end, America’s style of warfare has been to build coalitions, amass men and resources in neighboring countries, and launch combined arms assaults that overwhelm the enemy technologically and operationally. The American-led coalition in the First Gulf War of nearly one million soldiers eviscerated an entrenched Iraqi army of over 1.5 million. However, without neighboring Saudi Arabia’s willingness, the U.S. would have been unable to conduct the operation. A naval assault would have been smaller, and Kuwait’s crowded coastline could have meant high casualties. The First Gulf War suggested a clear strategy to counter the U.S. Deny American forces access to a region, and the U.S. loses power. Chinese, Russian, and Iranian efforts have all focused on denying America access to their respective regions. As it turns up the heat on the Baltic States, Russia is proscribing options for a rapid buildup by deploying long-range air defense and strike missiles at NATO’s borders. This is consistent with U.S. European Command commander General Philip Breedlove’s late February statement to Congress that “President Putin has sought to undermine the rules-based system of European security and attempted to maximize his power on the world stage.” China’s land reclamation campaign, increasing naval power, and anti-ship missiles aim to keep American forces at a distance from which effective combat power cannot readily be applied. Iran’s low-cost missile boats, midget subs, large numbers of ballistic and cruise missile as well as mines, and its influence at the Strait of Hormuz seek to offset American escalation. Instability in Iraq and the U.S.’s shaky relations with Pakistan further restrict staging points for an American attack. Declining U.S. military budgets and a shrinking force combined with poor treatment of critical allies have made things worse calling into question the US’ ability to honor its commitments. The current administration’s abrogation of ballistic missile defense agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic; its prolonged interruption of defensive arms sales to Taiwan; and its failure to keep the Saudis informed about last year’s deal with Iran are examples of treating allies shabbily. As a result, the U.S. is less able to rely on adequate basing rights where they are needed both to deter and if necessary to fight. The man or woman who takes office 10 months from now faces a new challenge to U.S. national security. It calls for changes to American strategy. The access that once allowed us to deter the Soviets has been eroded. Its resurrection in today’s Europe is unlikely. Such access is largely nonexistent in the Middle East and tenuous in East Asia. Coalitions of allied and partner nations remain extremely important—as they have since the U.S. became a major power. U.S. ground forces will not go it alone. They rarely have. Even the 1994 operation to remove Haiti’s military junta engaged coalition partners: Poland and Argentina. The combat operation, had it been necessary, would have been staged out of the U.S, Puerto Rico and Guantanamo. Equally reliable options are limited in Eurasia. So, while alliances and partnerships—for example, of Sunni states opposed to ISIS—are vital, they may not always be available, or dependable. If North Korea were to invade the South, there is no guarantee that Japan would allow its bases to be used for repelling the invaders or striking deep into North Korea. **Seapower** possesses the advantages of geography, mobility, and—with sufficient investment—numbers and growing technological edge. It will be **essential in future conflicts** because it depends less on nearby bases. Logistics ships in sufficient number can keep battle groups including amphibious forces on station, present, and combat-ready largely independent of basing agreements. Maritime coalitions will likely offer more security in the future. But there is **no alternative to dominant U.S. seapower today**. Allies like Japan lack the industrial capacity to make up the deficit between the U.S. Navy and the expanding PLAN. Newer partners like Vietnam cannot hope to hold against a Chinese onslaught without American support. Seapower is the surest means to assure constant access to effective combat capability in the Western Pacific. The same shift in thinking applies to the greater Middle East. Its gulfs and seas allow access that is largely independent of diplomatic agreement. Robust seapower may not be sufficient to cover our security interests in the Middle East, but its usefulness increases proportionately to the territorial holdings on which ISIS makes its claim as a caliphate. The Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman are Iran’s southwest and southern borders. It’s a long haul from there or from the Eastern Mediterranean to Tehran but a doable one with refueling tankers based in Gulf States or carrier-launched drones of the foreseeable future that can refuel the ship’s strike aircraft. The Cold War plan to mass land forces in defense of Europe has been voided by continental hopes that perpetual peace arrived. Even the most stalwart American partners, such as the UK, have cut military capacity and capability. But Europe is a peninsula. It is surrounded by accessible waters from St. Petersburg to Crimea. Seapower cannot stop a Russian ground invasion of the Baltics but it can snap the supply lines of an attack and give such ground forces as NATO can muster a chance to prevail. **Naval vessels’ ability to project power inland can also deter Russia**. The U.S. has emerged into a new world. To the potential for **nuclear warfare with a would-be peer competitor**—**China**—that American statesmen most wished to avoid after the Cold War have been added threats from a **nuclear-armed Russia**, **North Korea**, and sooner or later, **Iran**. The more immediate prospect of a triple hegemony may not be an existential threat. But its outcome would cripple our markets, destroy our alliances, and endanger us where we live. **All can be avoided** by a change in grand strategy that continues to hold threats at a distance as it relies on the **independence, accessibility, and technological superiority of seapower**.

### \*\*2NR – Frontlines\*\*

### 2nr – xt

### at: perm do the cp

### \*\*2NR – Theory\*\*

### at: pics bad

### -- at: moots the aff