## Framing

#### I affirm. Spikes at the bottom. Brackets for clarity.

#### The metaethic is practical reason. Prefer:

This first part of the framework establishes that all agents are “practical reasoners” – this means we use reason to set and pursue all of our ends.

#### [1] Regress – We can always ask why we should follow a theory, so they aren’t binding because they don’t have a starting point. Practical reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself, so it’s the only thing we can follow

#### [2] Action Theory – Every action can be broken down to infinite moments, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason

#### [3] Culpability – Only reason let’s us hold people accountable – for example, I wouldn’t hold a hurricane accountable for destroying my house, but I would hold my neighbor accountable if they burned my house because they used reason to actively pursue the end. This outweighs – otherwise every action is permissible because there’s no effect if we do something bad

#### We have a unified perspective – If I say that 2+2=4, I understand not only that I know that 2+2=4, but that everyone around can arrive at the same conclusion too because they create practical syllogisms to justify their conclusion. But, willing a maxim that violates the freedom of others is a contradiction – that’s bad. Engstrom

Engstrom, Stephen (Professor of Ethics at UPitt). “Universal Legislation As the Form of Practical Knowledge.” <http://www.philosophie.uni-hd.de/md/philsem/engstrom_vortrag.pdf>

Given the preceding considerations, **it’s a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of action that assaults the freedom of others with a view to furthering one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law** in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law**. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends**, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency. In this passage, Kant mentions assaults on property as well as on freedom. But since property is a specific, socially instituted form of freedom, I have omitted mention of it to focus on the primitive case. Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, **applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person**—every subject capable of practical judgment—to share[s] the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. **Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom**. Since here **all persons are on the one hand deeming good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom**, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, **also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom.**

If we have proven that all agents are reasoners, it means that basis for action must be consistent for all reasoners. IF X action is justified to me, X action would also be justified to another reasoners since we all practical reasoners. That means imposition upon the freedom of others is bad, because they cannot be logically “universalized.” To universalize means to imagine a scenario in which every agent took a certain action and see if it remains logically consistent.

As a side note, on other Kantian frameworks you may see a standard of upholding the “categorical imperative.” Under the categorical imperative, to determine if an action is moral or not you must universalize the action and see if it leads to a contradiction. Take stealing, for example: if we universalize the action of stealing, then all agents steal from each other. If Person A stole from person B, by universalizing freedom, another agent would steal from Person A. That would lead to a contradiction – person A was trying to obtain more property, but in doing so, had property taken away from themselves as well. Therefore, stealing is immoral.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with equal and outer restraints of freedom – actions that terminate in contradictions when universalized are bad, so only our restrictions can solve. Impact Calc – Intentions come first – we can only know if the structure of an action is universalizable. Consequences assume that we can predict what happens in the future but that’s impossible – we only have prior knowledge of intentions, so they come first

#### Also Prefer Additionally –

#### [1] Changes in the subject stem from practical reason: that means the core of the subject remains the same, it’s an internal link.

**Tiberius:** [Tiberius, Valerie. “Practical Reason and the Stability Standard.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 5, No. 3, Papers Presented to the Annual Conference of the British Society for Ethical Theory, Glasgow, 13-15 July 2001 (Sep. 2002), pp. 339-354. Springer] \*\* brackets for clarity

The notion of stability at work here is not temporal endurance. The kind of reflection that is not to change the agent's attitudes is reflection she deems appropriate and the notion of 'appropriate reflection' here is irreducibly normative.5 Judgments about continued or stable attitudes are normative judgments, not empirical predictions. The emphasis on stability, then, should not be taken to imply that there is one, fixed, stable pattern that provides the ultimate and perpetual goal of all reasoning. The ideally stable pattern of attitudes I have described above is not a static ideal that could be represented by a hypothetical, idealized agent whose choices determine the choices that actual people have reason to make. Because on my view what counts as appropriate reflection is inherently normative, and the norms of appropriate reflection evolve along with the people who endorse them, there is no fact of the matter about what an ideally stable ver sion of a particular person would choose that can be determined outside of the context ofthat person's reflection and deliberation. The ideal of stability, then, is a regulative ideal, in the sense that we can use it to make judgments about the ways in which our own choices could be improved. It is not a fixed ideal that determines the correct choices independently of the process of reasoning.6 The point of the ideal is to urge us toward improvement, not to describe a state of perfection. An important implication of taking the ideal of stability in this way is that what a person has reason to choose is likely to change over time as the person has new experiences and improves her own views about ideal reflection. Furthermore, taking the ideal of stability to be one [is] of improvement rather than perfection also has implications for the appropriate goal of reasoning. According to the stability standard interpreted as a norm of improvement, it is not the goal of reasoners to arrive at a stable state at which [where] there is no further need for reasoning. Rather, a reasoner's proper goal is to make choices that are part of the most stable pattern now, with the knowledge that what

This is a good preempt to Deleuzian type frameworks; it basically establishes that we can have our own different identities even if we are all reasoners. Therefore, even if the NC framework wins that subjectivity is fluid it can still be under the guise of being a pracitcal reasoner.

#### [2] Performativity – Argumentation presupposes one’s own freedom to act – this means contestations of my framework prove it true. Hoppe

From the Economics of Laissez Faire to The Ethics of Libertarianism, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, in Man, Economy, and Liberty: Essays in Honor of Murray N. Rothbard, The Ludwig von Mises Institute Auburn University

First, it should be noted that such a position assumes that at least the question of whether or not value judgments or normative statements can be justified is itself a cognitive problem. If this were not assumed, Mises could not even say what he evidently says and claims to be the case. His position simply could not exist as an arguable intellectual position. At first glance this does not seem to take one very far. It still seems to be a far cry from this insight to the actual proof that normative statements can be justified and, moreover that it is only the libertarian ethic which can be defended. This impression is wrong, however, and there is already much more won here than might be suspected. The argument shows us that **any truth claim, the claim connected with any proposition that it is true, objective or valid (all terms used synonymously here), is and must be raised and decided upon in the course of an argumentation.** And since it cannot be disputed that this is so ([since] one cannot communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue), and **it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to claim something to be true** ([since] one cannot deny this statement without claiming its negation to be true), this very fact has been aptly called "the a priori of communication and argumentation." 16 Now arguing never consists of just free-floating propositions claiming to be true. Rather, **argumentation is always an activity**, too. But then, **given that truth claims are raised and decided upon in argumentation and that argumentation, aside from whatever it is that is said in its course, is a practical affair, then it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms must exist—precisely those which make some action an argumentation—which have a special cognitive status in that they are the practical [as] preconditions of objectivity and truth.** Hence, one reaches the conclusion that norms must indeed be assumed to be justifiable as valid. **It is simply impossible to argue otherwise, because the ability to argue so would in fact already presuppose the validity of those norms which underlie any argumentation whatever**. In contradistinction to the natural rights theorists, though, one sees that the answer to the question of which ends can or cannot be justified is not to be read off from the wider concept of human nature but from the narrower one of argumentation. And with this, then, **the peculiar role of reason in determining the contents of ethics can be given a precise description; in clear contrast to the role of reason in establishing empirical laws of nature, in determining moral laws reason can claim to yield results which can be shown to be valid a priori. It only makes explicit what is already implied in the concept of argumentation itself;** and in analyzing any actual norm proposal its task is merely confined to analyzing whether or not it is logically consistent with the very ethics which the proponent must presuppose as valid insofar as he is able to make his proposal at all.

Performativity warrants are good pre-fiat methods to extend your framework. The argument here is that both you and your opponent concedes to freedom since we are using argumentation in the debate space.

#### [3] Consequentialism Fails – a] Induction Fails – You only know induction works because past experiences have told you it has, but that is in itself a form of induction, so you use induction to prove induction – that’s circular b] Butterfly Effect – Every action has an infinite number of consequences that stem from it – me picking up a pen could cause nuclear war a hundred years down – you can’t quantify the infinite amount of pain and pleasure to come c] Aggregation fails – everyone has different feelings of pain and pleasure, so you can’t universalize that and say it’s good – it’s impossible to measure something that’s completely subjective

Preempt to utilitarian frameworks.

#### [4] K Solvency – Oppression is caused by arbitrary exclusion of others – only universalizability makes sure that include everyone equally. Farr 02

Farr, Arnold. Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative? 2002, blog.ufba.br/kant/files/2009/12/Can-a-Philosophy-of-Race-Afford-to-Abandon-the.pdf.

The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. **The** Kantian **subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject.** However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. **We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check by something,** or else I behave like a Freudian id. **My empirical character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence**. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: **In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally significant is that it makes our own case no special exception** (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, **universalizable moral principles require that the individual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation**. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, **the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents.

Preempt to Kritiks.

## Offense

#### Advocacy Text: I’ll defend the resolution as a general principle and am willing clarify or specify whatever you want me to in CX if it doesn’t force me to abandon my maxim. Check all interps in CX – I could’ve met them before the NC and abuse would’ve been solved. PICs don’t negate: a] General principles don’t defend an absolute action, so they tolerate exceptions b] Fails under my framework because they create arbitrary exceptions, which means it’s not universalizable.

#### I contend that the possession of nuclear weapons is non-universalizable. Now vote aff –

#### [1] Contradictions – The possession of nuclear weapons is non-universalizable. States pursue nuclear arsenals so that they can protect themselves better, but universalizing that action entails that all states can proliferate. That’s a contradiction – states try to gain nukes to increase their security, but universalizing that action means they also put themselves under greater threat because other nations have nukes too.

#### [2] Hostage Holding – Nuclear deterrence uses innocent civilians as a hostage – that’s non universalizable because you use people as a means to achieve another goal. Lee 85

Lee, Steven. “The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: Hostage Holding and Consequences.” Ethics, vol. 95, no. 3, 1985, pp. 549–566. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/2381037](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381037). Scarsdale CC

A number of problems with this argument have been raised. One is that the argument assumes that nuclear deterrence involves an intention to retaliate, when in fact the policy may be one of bluff. Of course, **it is possible that nuclear deterrence is a policy of bluff, but there is strong reason to think that in fact it is not**.6 **Deterrence works only if it is credible, which requires that it create in the mind of the opponent a firm belief that retaliation would occur**. For this, bluff is not enough. A reality contrary to the appearance would tend to undermine the appearance to too great an extent. Nuclear deterrence is the policy of a large organization**. A single agent who threatens, and who is a good actor, can often engage in bluff without diminishing the credibility of the threat. But a large organization engaging in a policy of threat is not as able to do this.** For if such a threat were bluff, bureaucratic provisions would have to be made, contrary to the public posture, not to carry out the threat should it fail. The difference between an intention to carry out the threat and bluff would go beyond a difference in disposition of a single individual to a difference in dispositions of a number of individuals and to a difference in organizational structure. At the organizational level, a policy of threats which is bluff is too likely to be discovered or suspected to be such and so to be less effective. **Thus an effective policy of nuclear deterrence must involve the intention to retaliate**. However, there are other problems with this argument against nuclear deterrence that are not so easily dismissed. Consider two objections. First, the premise that it is wrong to intend what it would be wrong to do may not be acceptable. This premise, which Gregory Kavka has referred to as the wrongful-intentions principle,7 seems especially problematic given that the intention involved in deterrence is conditional rather than cat- egorical. Second, A may deter by threatening to use nuclear weapons in such a way that its intention is not to kill innocent persons. If the weapons are intended for use against B's military targets rather than against its population centers, then, it is argued, A has no intention to kill innocent persons, and the wrongful-intentions principle simply does not apply. Without entering into the debate over these two objections, we can see the advantage there would be in a nonconsequentialist argumentagainst nuclear deterrence that avoided them. There is such an argument. It can be found by attending not to the moral status of the intentions involved in the policy of nuclear deterrence but directly to the moral status of the activity that involves having those intentions. **This is an activity of threatening, but threatening of a special kind. The threat is largely against innocent third parties, persons who would not be responsible for the actions prompting the nuclear retaliation**. The persons whose behavior the threat seeks to control, the opponent's military and political leaders, are for the most part not the persons on whom harm would be visited should the threat be carried out. This kind of threat may be referred to as a third-party threat. **The making of a third-party threat is the holding of hostages, and nuclear deterrence, like vicarious punishment, is an institution of hostage holding.**8 It is often noted that nuclear deterrence is a policy of holding hostage the population of one's opponent to the good behavior of its leaders, but the moral implications of this have not always been fully appreciated.9 What is morally wrong with hostage holding? The basis of the non- consequentialist objection to hostage holding can be seen in the following terms. **Hostages are persons threatened with harm without their consent in order to control the behavior of some other person or group.** First, **central to the moral wrongness of hostage holding is that the persons threatened are not the same as the persons whose behavior the threatener seeks to control** (i.e., the threat is a third-party threat). **Those threatened are innocent in the sense that they generally have no control over, nor responsibility for, the behavior of the persons the threatener seeks to control. It is this feature of innocence and not the illegitimacy of the threatener's demands that makes hostage holding wrong**. If the tax man threatens your spouse unless you surrender your money, this is just as much a case of hostage holding as if a gunman does the same thing.

#### [3] Promise Breaking – Treaties mean states have left unfulfilled obligations to stop proliferation. That affirms – breaking promises means we won’t be willing to make promises anymore because we don’t trust them. Ritchie 14

RITCHIE, N. (2014). *Waiting for Kant: devaluing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons. International Affairs, 90(3), 601–623.* doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12129. Scarsdale CC

**Prominent NNWS have now decided to exercise their political agency and take greater ownership of the NPT’s Article VI commitment to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons**. Working with global civil society organizations **they have taken steps to strengthen themselves by marshalling normative power drawn from conceptions of a constitutional, cosmopolitan international order founded on** ///-1945 international institutions and the **international rule of law**.85 **This image of the NPT and nuclear disarmament moves beyond deep devaluing by challenging the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. It does so by reframing NPT nuclear politics away from a nuclear force reductions** process governed by the nuclear weapon states and **towards the unacceptable and unmanageable humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons**.

#### [4] Violence – The pursuit of violent action or threats of it is contradictory. Nuclear weapons are meant for things like war. Violence means that we can abuse other nations freely, but that entails that other states have the right to attack us too. This limits our freedom to attack them because our resources and populations are destroyed, which is a contradiction – states owning nuclear weapons means they extend and limit their own freedom.