# Soft Left

## Notes

#### I felt like kinda trolling at debateLA so I cut this soft left aff that reads like k aff nonsense

#### Tldr; interventions bad and ai causes homonationalism

## 1AC

#### The swarms of war are here and now – emerging tech in industrial states is now fueled by threat of the other – incorporation with current tech makes their development inevitable

Wilcox 17 [Lauren Wilcox, Deputy Director, University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, 2017, "Drones, Swarms And Becoming-Insect: Feminist Utopias And Posthuman Politics," Feminist Review, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44987305, accessed 1-11-2021]LHSBC

swarms of war The swarm as a figuration is currently undergoing a material transformation. Over the past few decades, it has become a transformative model underpinning military, technological and tactical innovation. As mentioned previously, the swarm is defined by self-organising capabilities that are non-linear and depend upon the adaptive coordination of individual bodies not necessarily commanded by a sovereign source. Swarming tactics have been part of the repertoire of war fighting for centuries, if not longer. However, what distinguishes emerging military manifestations of the swarm from earlier ones, is their composition as configurations of humans, technological artefacts and various artificial intelligence capacities. The development of these swarm assemblages is driven in part by the perception of a changing threat environment for the US and other advanced industrial states- of threats that stem not only from conventional state military forces or nuclear weapons but also from more mobile and unpredictable elements. As they are more adaptable and fluid, based on biological models rather than on the static model of a network (Scharre, 2014), swarms are seen as an evolved stage of networked warfare. The idea behind the drive to harness the material capabilities of the swarm is that bees, ants and such are not individually intelligent, but can exhibit much more complex behaviour collectively. In laboratories and bases, the US, UK and other militaries are developing what the US military has called 'SWARM capability', or 'Smart Warfighting Array of Reconfígurable Modules'. A key advantage this swarm intelligence is thought to enable is the ability for an entire swarm to be controlled or directed by a single operator rather than a vast network. The ability to adapt and communicate in real time, beyond the ability of humans to process and respond, is also see an advantage of swarm intelligence. The vision of the drone itself, in its most famous manifestation as 'Predator' or 'Reaper', can be seen as a kind of insect vision; the multiple lenses in the drone swarm are able to provide greater 'situational awareness' and monitor the environment from many different angles (see Chamayou, 2015, p. 38). Another foreseen advantage of the technological swarm is that it will not be affected by losses and casualties in the same way that human combatants are (Hambling, 2015, p. 183). In its LOCUST programme, the US Navy is working to develop low-cost swarming drone technology that would enable the formation flight of thirty drones without having to be individually controlled (ibid., pp. 189-190). To develop these capacities, many different kinds of 'microdrones' are being developed (see also Bumiller and Shanker, 2011; Thielman, 2015). Inspired by nature's ability to create small-scale flying machines, these many kinds of 'insect cyborgs' are primarily being developed to provide surveillance: they are to be mobile 'bugs'. Scientist Vijay Kumar at the University of Pennsylvania, for example, studies insects to learn principles upon which ants divide labour to perform different tasks, in order to some day apply these principles to program a fleet of aerial robots to interact with each other towards a common goal (Conner, 2014). Rosi Braidotti (2013, p. 124) describes a 'techno-beastiary' of military developments, such as 5 kg 'Sand Fleas' that can leap through windows or off of 30-metre ledges while stabilising and filming; six-legged robo-cockroaches that can climb walls; and the DelFly, a dragonfly-shaped surveillance drone with a camera weighing only a few grams. Some 'insect-cyborgs' are not technological reproductions of insect life, but modifications of insects themselves: the 'Beetle Commander' is a wired-up flower beetle controlled by signals sent to its brain via a backpack containing a radio receiver, battery and custom-built signal board connected to electrodes in the Beetle's brain (Anthes, 2013). 4 The UK government's Ministry of Defence has also recently announced a funding competition for the development of technologies that would enable a single operator to control drone swarms consisting of over twenty components (Innovate London, 2016). The US is adapting its popular F- 16 fighter jet, to allow a pilot to operate unmanned vehicles alongside it, as well as to deploy a swarm of drones (Axe, 2016). The capacities of insect life and the relations of the swarm are clearly no longer only a source of threat and danger, but a means by which that perceived threat is contained.

#### These killer robots are mobilized as yet another leg of the militaristic US empire which creates and replicates the conditions for necropolitical life and death

Wilcox 17 [Lauren Wilcox, Deputy Director, University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, 2017, "Drones, Swarms And Becoming-Insect: Feminist Utopias And Posthuman Politics," Feminist Review, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44987305, accessed 1-11-2021]LHSBC

Much of the debate about drone warfare has focussed on the prospect of 'killer robots' being deployed and of the lack of human control over the sovereign power of killing. Defenders of the use of artificial intelligence and automated targeting point to their benefits, such as the removal of emotion and human error that can result in increased deaths of civilians (among others, see Strawser, 2010; Byman, 2013; Lewis, 2013). Regardless of the merits of such arguments, the drone and increasingly drone swarm tactics constitute the terrain of war and the subjects who both wage and suffer from war. Eyal Weizman (2011) notes that the swarm plays a key role in the tactics of Israeli ground forces. Achille Mbembe (2003, p. 40, emphasis in the original) writes, 'in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living deaď. Mbembe's thesis amends Foucaulťs biopolitical concept and formulates contemporary politics as not only biopolitical but also necropolitical. The lines between war and politics are blurred as they are in biopolitics; however, according to Mbembe, power does not only 'make life live' but also creates certain categories of the 'living dead' as those always-already dead, and thus subject to massacre. In nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social evolutionary theory, studies of insects played a key role in naturalising racial and colonial hierarchies. Such work often read colonialism and slavery as present in insect 'societies' and classified certain insect societies as more or less like humans. 'The social construction of insect sociality was premised on colonial views of what defined civilization as the "highest" and all others as "lower" in the social scale' (Rodgers, 2008, p. 139). While 'drone' as a colloquialism comes from its ethological use as a term signifying zombie-like non-cognition, the place of the insect between life and death takes on new meaning in contemporary global violence. The militarised techno-swarms created on behalf of a project of biopolitical warfare with the ability to fight war without risk of death to human subjects on one side, also create entire populations who 'li [v]e under drones', in which the 'buzzing' sound of drone is a source of anxiety and fear. One member of a community in Pakistan affected by drones described the effect of hearing them buzzing overhead as spreading a 'wave of terror' over the community: 'Children, grown-up people, women, they are terrified ... they scream in terror' (international Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and Global Justice Clinic, 2012). As an apparatus that decides whose life is worthy of living and who is to be put to death, Allinson (2015, p. 120) describes the drone as 'a technology of racial distinction'. Its development and usage are part of a reconstitution of the theater of war as a frontier zone of American empire, a process that has, in Feldman's (2011, p. 329) words, 'contorted the temporality of warfare through notions of preemption and endurance, recalibrated Orientalist imagined geography through far more porous concepts of proximity that challenge received notions of state territoriality and national borders, and fixated on the mystique of "precision targeting" in highly ambiguous structures of race and space'. The description of people killed by drones as 'bug splats' in military slang further signifies the dehumanisation and abjectification of those killed by drones, whether targeted or accidentally killed.5 In these instances, figurations of the swarm are used as instruments of sovereign power to kill and manage other populations figured as inhuman 'swarms'. The threat of terrorism is figured as the threat of the multitude, of the swarm, of the concerted action of that which does not necessarily have a single head. US (former) Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black (2003) claimed 'the threat of international terrorism knows no boundaries'. The threat of terrorism is often represented as boundless and formless. The purported formlessness of such loosely connected organisations is partly due to the transnational organisation of various 'terrorist groups'; combined with their tendency to make use of territories beyond the reach of the administrative power of various states, this means that the contemporary figure of the 'terrorist' is dangerous in part because of his (or increasingly, her) lack of subjectification within the terms of state power and state identity. While marked by difference in this way, 'terrorist' figurations are also able to hide this difference. The terrorist, like the communist or homosexual, could be anybody- hiding in a 'sleeper cell' or blending in with the population with various forms of deception, such as shaving their beard. Al-Qaeda in particular has been conceptualised as a network- or, more specifically, as individuals who become radicalised- acting in the name of Al-Qaeda with no other formal affiliation. It is a collective that acts without a hierarchy. In this sense, the 'enemy' is represented in insect ways as well. In the shift to war technologies and tactics inspired by insect swarms, we may be seeing a final admission that traditional modes of warfare are not always able to control non-hierarchical, feminine/queer and networked spaces.6

#### The casualties of war are not just the soldiers – lowering the cost only incurs more of a cost

Umbrello, et al, 19—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, February 6th, 2019, SpringerLink, dml) [LAWs=lethal autonomous weapons]

To begin, one of the most compelling reasons for opposing nuclear non-proliferation efforts is that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons increases the threshold of use (W. Wilson 2012; Jürgen 2008). Thus, only in extreme circumstances would rational actors deem their use to be either morally or strategically acceptable. This strongly contrasts with the case of LAWs, whose cost would be small compared to the cost of paying military personnel. Consequently, states could maintain stockpiles of LAWs that are far larger than any standing army. The low cost of LAWs would also make them more expendable than human soldiers (Jenks 2010; Jacoby and Chang 2008; P. Singer 2009a), and they could strike the enemy with greater precision than human scolders can currently achieve (Ekelhof and Struyk 2014; Thurnher 2012). These four properties—low cost, military effectiveness, expendability, and precision—could drive proliferation while lowering the threshold for use and, therefore, undermine geopolitical security. Incidentally, similar claims could be made about anticipated future nanotech weaponry (see Whitman 2011).

#### The rhetoric of controlling the other creates an active feedback loop of endless violence that only serves to backfire against the empire.

Valentina Bartolucci 14, Associate Researcher at the Interdisciplinary Centre of Science for Peace, February 21, “Security vs. Liberty: The Discourse on Terrorism in the United States and Morocco and Its Societal Effects,” Democracy and Security, Volume 10, Issue 1, p. 15-16, fwang

This article aimed at providing indicative examples about some of the lasting effects that the governmental discourse on terrorism has had in two states 585 as different as the US and Morocco. In the US the constant reiteration in the discourse of an incoming terrorism attack of catastrophic proportions has led to the privileging of national security, even to the detriment of human rights. Furthermore, the governmental discourse on terrorism has allowed an unprecedented strengthening of presidential power and a still growing securitization of issues apparently not linked to terrorism, such as immigration and ﬁnance.95 According to Boykoff, who wrote extensively about suppression of dissent in the US, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 events “international terrorism became a powerful pretext for clamping down on domestic dissent.”96 The “new” environment demanded “obedience, compliance and conformity ... 595 and an acceptance of a heightened secrecy in the everyday activities of the government.”97 In Morocco, there have been attempts to link the issue of terrorism with long-term issues affecting the country, such as the “danger” of Islamists. There, the governmental discourse on terrorism, interlinked with other discourses, 600 has been used to marginalize groups represented as potentially dangerous such as the movement Justice and Charity; to further domestic agendas, such as the territorial expansion in the western Sahara; and to strengthen national support around the monarchy, through the narrative of unity in the face of a threat. In the ofﬁcial public discourse, Islamists have been often linked to the “terrorism threat” being depicted as “vulnerable” to “radicalism,” “obscurantism,” “extremism,” and, thus, “terrorism.” Similarly, Polisario members have been more and more associated with wider concerns and linked to the “terrorism scourge.”98 More generally, such a discourse has led to the a priori dismissal of nonviolent alternatives to rather exalt a zero-sum approach—an approach that has been proved to be counterproductive. In analyzing the North African region, Keenan has argued that: far from furthering political stability, security and democracy [the launch of a global ‘war on terror’] has taken North Africa and most of the Sahel into a 615 dangerous spiral of increased authoritarianism and repression, increased regional instability and insecurity, increased popular resentment of both Washington and the regimes of the region ...99 The exceptional measures adopted throughout the world to “ﬁght against terrorism” have contributed to a climate that has certainly caused more violence than enabled its reduction. Indeed, the elite political representation of terrorism has led to a logic that encourages hostility and to a generalized suspicion resulting in a generalized violence preventively adopted to ﬁght against terrorism.101 Although this article has focused on the US and Moroccan cases, similar effects have been registered in many other states, some of which 625 are currently under analysis as part of a broader research project.

#### There’s no taking it back – masculine control appropriates the feminine body of automata for its own ends.

Wilcox 17 [Lauren Wilcox, Deputy Director, University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, 2017, "Drones, Swarms And Becoming-Insect: Feminist Utopias And Posthuman Politics," Feminist Review, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44987305, accessed 1-11-2021]LHSBC

The swarm as represented in a figuration linking it to 'becoming-woman' poses a threat to the political ontology of the 'body polities', and thus to political order. The biological swarm, the technological network and the political multitude are variations of an ambivalent negotiation of a political body that bears a similarly ambivalent relationship with sovereignty (Thacker, 2004a, 2004b). The agency of the swarm is unclear; according to studies of animal behaviour going back to the nineteenth century (Thacker, 2004a), it emerges out of interactions between individuals, in response to environmental constraints, and within groups. But now multiplicity is also used on behalf of sovereign power and necropower. While Hardt and Negri (2003, pp. 91-92) celebrate the swarm as a network of a multitude of different creative agents solving problems without centralised control, the mere existence of a network does not necessarily make it more democratic. As Galloway and Thacker (2007) have argued, some swarms are compatible with centralised control; that is, swarms may be controlled or directed, or a swarm can be used for the purpose of control itself (see also Coeckelbergh, 2011). The swarm occupies an ambiguous categorisation between the 'many' and the 'one' in terms of individual independence and collective coordination. This figure of the 'swarm1 has much in common with Lauro and Embry's (2008) articulation of the 'zombie', in its indeterminate status between living and dead and in its posthuman consciousness that obliterates the distinction between subject and object. The inspiration and development of 'drone swarms' is reminiscent of the creation of the feminine automaton: a machine created in a feminine body designed to do men's bidding, such as in Metropolis (1927) or Ex Machina (2015). A key critique of automated drones guided by artificial intelligence, including drone swarms, is the potential or anticipated loss of human control over technologies of death. Part of the fear here, in alleged loss of humanity in warfare, is better theorised as the loss of an ideal of humanity associated with a certain form of masculinity: namely, the possessive liberal individual, whose agency is secured in a conscious mind (Hayles, 2005, p. 177, 1999). In her work My Mother Was a Computer (2005), N. Katherine Hayles notes the persistence of gendered representations of artificial intelligence, in which a male creator exacts his will through the use of female automata (female bodies controlled by another agent) against other men. This cultural trope is being realised in the creation of 'drone swarms': mechanical creations made to mimic insect and other forms of swarming life in the service of militaristic ends. More to the point, it seeks to harness the feminised power of the swarm for its own ends. As such, the swarm is now not only a metaphor but also a central mode of biopolitical and necropolitical life. Michel Foucault's (2007 [1978], pp. 21-22) biopolitical analysis of the emergence of different modalities of power revolves around a relationship with certain non-human forms of life/death in the form of disease-causing microbes and viruses- from the sovereign exclusion of infected bodies of leprosy, to the discipline and surveillance of the plague, to the regulation of different kinds of circulations of people and non-human objects in the 'milieu'. Our contemporary biopolitical analysis requires an analysis of the politics of life and death in the insect and the swarm, which, following Braidotti (2002), cannot be assumed to be a mere metaphor or representation for political life, but an animating materialist logic. The issue of the swarm that defies categorisation between the one and the many, of which sovereignty depends, is a central problem for political organisation. As Eugene Thacker (2011, p. 154, emphasis in original) writes, 'In the "problem of multiplicities" presented to the body politic concept by plague, pestilence, and epidemic, multiplicity is never separate from, and is always inculcated within, the problem of sovereignty ... it is multiplicity that plagues the body politic '

#### There’s more to the international system than what’s in front of the curtain – infinite volatility and black swans make linear readings of IR an impossibility

Taleb & Blythe 11 – \*Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University’s Polytechnic Institute, AND \*\*Professor of International Political Economy at Brown University (Nassim and Mark, May/June 2011, “The Black Swan of Cairo How Suppressing Volatility Makes the World Less Predictable and More Dangerous,”

Why is surprise the permanent condition of the U.S. political and economic elite? In 2007–8, when the global ﬁnancial system imploded, the cry that no one could have seen this coming was heard everywhere, despite the existence of numerous analyses showing that a crisis was unavoidable. It is no surprise that one hears precisely the same response today regarding the current turmoil in the Middle East. The critical issue in both cases is the artiﬁcial suppression of volatility—the ups and downs of life—in the name of stability. It is both mis- guided and dangerous to push unobserved risks further into the statistical tails of the probability distribution of outcomes and allow these high-impact, low-probability “tail risks” to disappear from policymakers’ ﬁelds of observation. What the world is witnessing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is simply what happens when highly constrained systems explode. Complex systems that have artiﬁcially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting ﬂuctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artiﬁcially con- strained systems become prone to “Black Swans”—that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers. Such environments eventually experi- ence massive blowups, catching everyone oª-guard and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems. Seeking to restrict variability seems to be good policy (who does not prefer stability to chaos?), so it is with very good intentions that policymakers unwittingly increase the risk of major blowups. And it is the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to both the economic crisis of 2007–8 and the current turmoil in the Arab world. The policy implications are identical: to make systems robust, all risks must be visible and out in the open— ﬂuctuat nec mergitur(it ﬂuctuates but does not sink) goes the Latin saying. Just as a robust economic system is one that encourages early failures (the concepts of “fail small” and “fail fast”), the U.S. gov- ernment should stop supporting dictato- rial regimes for the sake of pseudostability and instead allow political noise to rise to the surface. Making an economy robust in the face of business swings requires allowing risk to be visible; the same is true in politics. SEDUCED BY STABILITY Both the recent ﬁnancial crisis and the current political crisis in the Middle East are grounded in the rise of complexity, interdependence, and unpredictability. Policymakers in the United Kingdom and the United States have long promoted policies aimed at eliminating ﬂuctuation— no more booms and busts in the economy, no more “Iranian surprises” in foreign policy. These policies have almost always produced undesirable outcomes. For example, the U.S. banking system became very fragile following a succession of pro- gressively larger bailouts and government interventions, particularly after the 1983 rescue of major banks (ironically, by the same Reagan administration that trum- peted free markets). In the United States, promoting these bad policies has been a bipartisan eªort throughout. Republicans have been good at fragilizing large corpora- tions through bailouts, and Democrats have been good at fragilizing the government. At the same time, the ﬁnancial system as a whole exhibited little volatility; it kept get- ting weaker while providing policymakers with the illusion of stability, illustrated most notably when Ben Bernanke, who was then a member of the Board of Gover- nors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, declared the era of “the great moderation” in 2004. Putatively independent central bankers fell into the same trap. During the 1990s, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan wanted to iron out the economic cycle’s booms and busts, and he sought to control economic swings with interest-rate reductions at the slightest sign of a downward tick in the economic data. Furthermore, he adapted his eco- nomic policy to guarantee bank rescues, with implicit promises of a backstop—the now infamous “Greenspan put.” These policies proved to have grave delayed side effects. Washington stabilized the market with bailouts and by allowing certain com- panies to grow “too big to fail.” Because policymakers believed it was better to do something than to do nothing, they felt obligated to heal the economy rather than wait and see if it healed on its own. The foreign policy equivalent is to support the incumbent no matter what. And just as banks took wild risks thanks to Greenspan’s implicit insurance policy, client governments such as Hosni Mubarak’s in Egypt for years engaged in overt plunder thanks to similarly reliable U.S. support. Those who seek to prevent volatility on the grounds that any and all bumps in the road must be avoided paradoxically increase the probability that a tail risk will cause a major explosion. Consider as a thought experiment a man placed in an artiﬁcially sterilized environment for a decade and then invited to take a ride on a crowded subway; he would be expected to die quickly. Likewise, preventing small forest ﬁres can cause larger forest ﬁres to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics, price con- trols are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and extremely costly blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the beneﬁts accrued. The risks of a dictatorship, no matter how seemingly stable, are no diªerent, in the long run, from those of an artiﬁcially controlled price. Such attempts to institutionally engineer the world come in two types: those that conform to the world as it is and those that attempt to reform the world. The nature of humans, quite reasonably, is to in- tervene in an eªort to alter their world and the outcomes it produces. But government interventions are laden with unintended— and unforeseen—consequences, particularly in complex systems, so humans must work with nature by tolerating systems that absorb human imperfections rather than seek to change them. Take, for example, the recent celebrated documentary on the ﬁnancial crisis, Inside Job, which blames the crisis on the malfea- sance and dishonesty of bankers and the incompetence of regulators. Although it is morally satisfying, the ﬁlm naively over- looks the fact that humans have always been dishonest and regulators have always been behind the curve. The only diªerence this time around was the unprecedented magnitude of the hidden risks and a mis- understanding of the statistical properties of the system. What is needed is a system that can prevent the harm done to citizens by the dishonesty of business elites; the limited competence of forecasters, economists, and statisticians; and the imperfections of regulation, not one that aims to eliminate these ﬂaws. Humans must try to resist the illusion of control: just as foreign policy should be intelligence-proof (it should minimize its reliance on the competence of information-gathering organizations and the predictions of “experts” in what are inherently unpredictable domains), the economy should be regulator-proof, given that some regulations simply make the system itself more fragile. Due to the complexity of markets, intricate regulations simply serve to generate fees for lawyers and proﬁts for sophisticated derivatives traders who can build complicated ﬁnancial products that skirt those regulations. DON’T BE A TURKEY The life of a turkey before Thanksgiving is illustrative: the turkey is fed for 1,000 days and every day seems to conﬁrm that the farmer cares for it—until the last day, when conﬁdence is maximal. The “turkey problem” occurs when a naive analysis of stability is derived from the absence of past variations. Likewise, conﬁdence in stability was maximal at the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007. The turkey problem for humans is the result of mistaking one environment for another. Humans simultaneously inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability and the low degree of interaction among its components, which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability. Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misun- derstood, as “tipping points.” Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile, but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error. U.S. President Barack Obama may blame an intelligence failure for the gov- ernment’s not foreseeing the revolution in Egypt (just as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter blamed an intelligence failure for his administration’s not fore- seeing the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran), but it is the suppressed risk in the statis- tical tails that matters—not the failure to see the last grain of sand. As a result of complicated interdependence and conta- gion eªects, in all man-made complex systems, a small number of possible events dominate, namely, Black Swans. Engineering, architecture, astronomy, most of physics, and much of common science are linear domains. The complex domain is the realm of the social world, epidemics, and economics. Crucially, the linear domain delivers mild variations without large shocks, whereas the complex domain delivers massive jumps and gaps. Complex systems are misunderstood, mostly because humans’ sophistication, obtained over the history of human knowl- edge in the linear domain, does not transfer properly to the complex domain. Humans can predict a solar eclipse and the trajectory of a space vessel, but not the stock market or Egyptian political events. All man-made complex systems have commonalities and even universalities. Sadly, deceptive calm (followed by Black Swan surprises) seems to be one of those properties. THE ERROR OF PREDICTION As with a crumbling sand pile, it would be foolish to attribute the collapse of a fragile bridge to the last truck that crossed it, and even more foolish to try to predict in advance which truck might bring it down. The system is responsible, not the compo- nents. But after the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–8, many people thought that predict- ing the subprime meltdown would have helped. It would not have, since it was a symptom of the crisis, not its underlying cause. Likewise, Obama’s blaming “bad in- telligence” for his administration’s failure to predict the crisis in Egypt is symptomatic of both the misunderstanding of complex systems and the bad policies involved. Obama’s mistake illustrates the illusion of local causal chains—that is, confusing catalysts for causes and assuming that one can know which catalyst will produce which eªect. The ﬁnal episode of the upheaval in Egypt was unpredictable for all observers, especially those involved. As such, blam- ing the ciais as foolish as funding it to forecast such events. Governments are wasting billions of dollars on attempting to predict events that are produced by interdependent systems and are therefore not statistically understandable at the individual level. As Mark Abdollahian of Sentia Group, one of the contractors who sell predictive analytics to the U.S. government, noted regarding Egypt, policymakers should “think of this like Las Vegas. In blackjack, if you can do four percent better than the average, you’re making real money.” But the analogy is spurious. There is no “four percent better” on Egypt. This is not just money wasted but the construction of a false conﬁdence based on an erroneous focus. It is telling that the intelligence analysts made the same mistake as the risk-management systems that failed to predict the economic crisis—and oªered the exact same excuses when they failed. Political and economic “tail events” are unpredictable, and their probabilities are not scientiﬁcally measurable. No matter how many dollars are spent on research, predicting revolutions is not the same as counting cards; humans will never be able to turn politics into the tractable random- ness of blackjack. Most explanations being oªered for the current turmoil in the Middle East follow the “catalysts as causes” confusion. The riots in Tunisia and Egypt were initially attributed to rising commodity prices, not to stiﬂing and unpopular dictatorships. But Bahrain and Libya are countries with high gdps that can aªord to import grain and other commodities. Again, the focus is wrong even if the logic is comforting. It is the system and its fragility, not events, that must be studied—what physicists call “percolation theory,” in which the proper- ties of the terrain are studied rather than those of a single element of the terrain. When dealing with a system that is inherently unpredictable, what should be done? Diªerentiating between two types of countries is useful. In the ﬁrst, changes in government do not lead to meaningful diªerences in political outcomes (since political tensions are out in the open). In the second type, changes in govern- ment lead to both drastic and deeply unpredictable changes. Consider that Italy, with its much- maligned “cabinet instability,” is economi- cally and politically stable despite having had more than 60 governments since World War II (indeed, one may say Italy’s stability is because of these switches of government). Similarly, in spite of consis- tently bad press, Lebanon is a relatively safe bet in terms of how far governments can jump from equilibrium; in spite of all the noise, shifting alliances, and street protests, changes in government there tend to be comparatively mild. For exam- ple, a shift in the ruling coalition from Christian parties to Hezbollah is not such a consequential jump in terms of the country’s economic and political stability. Switching equilibrium, with control of the government changing from one party to another, in such systems acts as a shock absorber. Since a single party cannot have total and more than temporary control, the possibility of a large jump in the regime type is constrained. In contrast, consider Iran and Iraq. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Sad- dam Hussein both constrained volatility by any means necessary. In Iran, when the shah was toppled, the shift of power to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a huge, unforeseeable jump. After the fact, analysts could construct convincing accounts about how killing Iranian Communists, driving the left into exile, demobilizing the demo- cratic opposition, and driving all dissent into the mosque had made Khomeini’s rise inevitable. In Iraq, the United States removed the lid and was actually surprised to ﬁnd that the regime did not jump from hyperconstraint to something like France. But this was impossible to predict ahead of time due to the nature of the system itself. What can be said, however, is that the more constrained the volatility, the bigger the regime jump is likely to be. From the French Revolution to the triumph of the Bolsheviks, history is replete with such examples, and yet somehow humans remain unable to process what they mean. THE FEAR OF RANDOMNESS Humans fear randomness—a healthy ancestral trait inherited from a diªerent environment. Whereas in the past, which was a more linear world, this trait enhanced ﬁtness and increased chances of survival, it can have the reverse eªect in today’s complex world, making volatility take the shape of nasty Black Swans hiding behind deceptive periods of “great moderation.” This is not to say that any and all volatility should be embraced. Insurance should not be banned, for example. But alongside the “catalysts as causes” confusion sit two mental biases: the illusion of control and the action bias (the illusion that doing something is always better than doing nothing). This leads to the desire to impose man-made solutions. Greenspan’s actions were harmful, but it would have been hard to justify inaction in a democracy where the incentive is to always promise a better outcome than the other guy, regard- less of the actual, delayed cost. Variation is information. When there is no variation, there is no information. This explains the cia’s failure to predict the Egyptian revolution and, a generation before, the Iranian Revolution—in both cases, the revolutionaries themselves did not have a clear idea of their relative strength with respect to the regime they were hoping to topple. So rather than sub- sidize and praise as a “force for stability” every tin-pot potentate on the planet, the U.S. government should encourage countries to let information ﬂow upward through the transparency that comes with political agitation. It should not fear ﬂuc- tuations per se, since allowing them to be in the open, as Italy and Lebanon both show in diªerent ways, creates the stability of small jumps. As Seneca wrote in De clementia, “Repeated punishment, while it crushes the hatred of a few, stirs the hatred of all . . . just as trees that have been trimmed throw out again countless branches.” The imposition of peace through repeated punishment lies at the heart of many seemingly intractable conﬂicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. Further- more, dealing with seemingly reliable high-level officials rather than the people themselves prevents any peace treaty signed from being robust. The Romans were wise enough to know that only a free man under Roman law could be trusted to engage in a contract; by extension, only a free people can be trusted to abide by a treaty. Treaties that are negotiated with the consent of a broad swath of the populations on both sides of a conﬂict tend to survive. Just as no central bank is powerful enough to dictate stability, no superpower can be powerful enough to guarantee solid peace alone. U.S. policy toward the Middle East has historically, and especially since 9/11, been unduly focused on the repression of any and all political ﬂuctuations in the name of preventing “Islamic fundamentalism”— a trope that Mubarak repeated until his last moments in power and that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddaﬁ continues to emphasize today, blaming Osama bin Laden for what has befallen him. This is wrong. The West and its autocratic Arab allies have strengthened Islamic funda- mentalists by forcing them underground, and even more so by killing them. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it, “A little bit of agitation gives motivation to the soul, and what really makes the species prosper is not peace so much as freedom.” With freedom comes some unpredictable ﬂuctuation. This is one of life’s packages: there is no freedom without noise—and no stability without volatility.∂

#### The swarm is a wolf in sheep’s clothing – the guise of emancipatory posthuman politics only operates as a generative point of homonationalism via blurring the lines of war and human

Wilcox 17 [Lauren Wilcox, Deputy Director, University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, 2017, "Drones, Swarms And Becoming-Insect: Feminist Utopias And Posthuman Politics," Feminist Review, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44987305, accessed 1-11-2021]LHSBC

As the swarm relies on modes of communication and reproduction outside of evolutionary and heteronormative frames, the use of such forms of communication and reproduction in 'swarm' warfare participates in a kind of 'murderous inclusion' (Haritaworn, Kuntsman and Posocco, 2014) and normalisation of queer subjects and bodies. A related development is the increasing ability for women, gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people to serve openly in the US military. The increased reliance on drones in the US, and increasingly around the world,7 notably signals a change in the relationship between the military and masculinity. This is at least at the forefront of technology and war, with traditional military values associated with masculinity, such as physical strength and courage under fire, becoming less relevant to operational success (for example, see Bayard de Volo, 2016). One source suggests that 17 per cent of those assigned to drone activities at Creech Air Force Base are female, which is greater than the overall percentage of women serving in the US military (Manjikian, 2014). Today, the US military is more inclusive than ever in terms of gender and sexuality; since 2011, with the official repeal of the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy, it has allowed gays and lesbians to serve openly, and it is also in a contested process of opening up combat positions to women. On 30 June 2016, the US military also overturned its ban on transgender people serving in the military, and it is now required to provide transgender personnel with relevant medical care. In these ways, the military can be said to have shifted from a site of patriarchal values and homophobia to a nominally 'ungendered' site where women can be 'honorary men' (King, 2016), and to a site of homonationalism (Puar, 2007) that situates the US as a site of exceptional sexual tolerance in opposition to representations of Arab/Muslim sexuality as barbaric and perverse. One example of this form of 'murderous inclusion' can been seen in the The Daily Beast's reporting of a female drone pilot, nicknamed 'Sparkle' because of her bedazzled headset. Explaining her decorative choice, Sparkle reproduces the gendered, racialised logic that women need protection from Arab/Muslim men: 'I use it to emasculate the enemy in the afterlife. [...] Considering how they treat their women, I'm OK with rubbing salt in the wound' (Maurer, 2015). Here we see an example of a symbol of femininity- the frivolous and 'sparkly'- put into the service of a racialised necropolitics of high-tech death-dealing against dehumanised others, much in the way that the figuration of the insect/swarm has been. We see the drone swarm as a form of queer necropolitics that incorporates queer bodies and queer modes of signification into assemblages of racialised death-dealing; however, this does not exhaust the possibilities for the politics of the swarm.

#### Reject homonationalism – it’s a form of sexual exceptionalism that expels racial and sexual others from the American empire and valorizes ethnic cleansing to propagate the ascendancy of whiteness

Puar 07 (Jasbir K., PhD ethnic studies, *Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times*. Duke University Press. 2007)

National recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the segregation and disqualification of racial and sexual others from the national imaginary. At work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what I term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of American empire**.** Further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. There is a commitment to the global dominant ascendancy of whiteness that is implicated in the propagation of the United States as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. The fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. In what follows I explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. My goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. In the case of what I term ‘‘U.S. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. Collectively, they continue or extend the project of U.S. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the war on terror. The terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. I unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. The ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by Rey Chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘valorization of life’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. I elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death

#### Thus, the plan: States should ban lethal autonomous drone swarms.

#### It’s a new terrain of error prone mass destruction – the plan’s targeted ban solves regulatory uncertainty

Kallenborn 20 [Zachary Kallenborn, 10-14-2020, "A Partial Ban on Autonomous Weapons Would Make Everyone Safer," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/14/ai-drones-swarms-killer-robots-partial-ban-on-autonomous-weapons-would-make-everyone-safer/, accessed 1-11-2021]LHSBC

A thousand-drone swarm has a thousand points of potential error. And because drones in a true swarm communicate with one another, errors may propagate throughout the swarm. For example, one drone may misidentify a cruise ship as an aircraft carrier, then unleash the full might of the swarm on a few thousand civilians.∂ The same may occur if the drone correctly identifies the cruise ship as not a target, but the word not is lost, due to simple accident or adversary jamming. Swarm communication also leads to emergent behavior—collective behaviors of the swarm that do not depend on the individual parts—that further reduces both the [predictability and understandability](https://unidir.org/publication/black-box-unlocked) of the weapon.∂ As P.W. Singer, a strategist and senior fellow at New America, wrote in his book [Wired for War](https://www.pwsinger.com/wired-for-war/), “a swarm takes the action on its own, which may not always be exactly where and when the commander wants it. Nothing happens in a swarm directly, but rather through the complex relationships among the parts.”∂ Drone swarms pose a greater threat to powerful militaries, because [cheap drones](https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/the-future-of-warfare-small-many-smart-vs-few-exquisite/) can be flung one after another against expensive platforms until they fall∂ In 2018, a group calling itself the Free Alawites Movement claimed responsibility for launching [13 drones](https://tripwire.dhs.gov/news/209478) made largely of plywood, duct tape, and lawnmower engines that attacked Russia’s Khmeimim Air Base in Syria.∂ The movement claimed the successful destruction of a $300 million S-400 surface-to-air missile system. (The exact identity of the “Free Alawites Movement” is unclear. The only attacks it has claimed are the Khmeimim attacks and another drone attack on a [Russian naval base](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201801050017) in Syria on the same day. [Sources](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201801050017) have also attributed the attacks to the Islamic State, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Ahrar al-Sham.)∂ Russian officials acknowledged the drones flew autonomously and were preprogrammed to drop bombs on the base but claim no damage was done. (The Russian officials did not comment on whether the drones communicated with one another to make a true drone swarm.) However, in Libya, [Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones](https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-air-power/2020/08/06/libya-is-turning-into-a-battle-lab-for-air-warfare/) disabled [at least nine](https://africacenter.org/spotlight/shifts-libya-civil-war/) Russian air defense systems. The Bayraktar drones are considerably more advanced than those used in Syria, but they illustrate the same principle: Drones pose major threats to air defenses and other expensive systems.∂ An adversary could fling [tons of drones](https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/28669/12Dec_SE_Cohort_311-1120_Team_Crane.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) against a $1.8 billion USS Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer in an attempt to disable or destroy it and still have a cost advantage. Facing such a threat, great powers should choose to lead—rather than resist—the arms control charge for certain weapons. Yes, great powers would give up the potential to unleash their own massive swarms, but swarms are likely to favor weaker powers. If swarms are most effective when used [en masse](https://warontherocks.com/2015/02/robots-at-war-and-the-quality-of-quantity/) against big, expensive platforms, then major powers that possess such expensive equipment stand to lose the most. Swarms might also be easier to control.∂ A key arms control challenge for autonomous weapons is knowing if a weapon is actually autonomous. At root, autonomy is just a matter of programming the weapon to fire under given conditions, however simple or complex. A [simple landmine](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534567) explodes when enough weight is put upon it; an autonomous turret fires based on analyzed information collected from sensors and any design constraints. With autonomous weapons, an outside observer cannot tell whether the weapon operates under predesigned rules or is being controlled remotely. However, no human can reasonably control a swarm of thousands of drones.∂ The complexity is simply too much. They must monitor hundreds of video, infrared, or other feeds, while planning the swarm’s actions and deciding who to kill. Such a massive swarm must be autonomous, may be a [weapon of mass destruction](https://mwi.usma.edu/swarms-mass-destruction-case-declaring-armed-fully-autonomous-drone-swarms-wmd/) in its own right, and could [carry](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2018.1546902) traditional weapons of mass destruction.

#### Voting affirmative does not reject becoming insect – it scrambles the codex of militarism to reclaim the swarm for emancipatory BIPOC futures.

Wilcox 17 [Lauren Wilcox, Deputy Director, University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, 2017, "Drones, Swarms And Becoming-Insect: Feminist Utopias And Posthuman Politics," Feminist Review, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44987305, accessed 1-11-2021]LHSBC

Into this worldly figuration of the swarm, where models of insect life are appropriated by the force of militarism into a tool for the sovereign management of other-than-human figurations of the 'swarm', we may stumble upon revisionings of the 'swarm' and insectoid life that affirm their transgressive possibilities through new alliances and assemblages with such figurations.8 For example, Star Trek's Borg Queen finds a sister of sorts in black female musical icon Beyoncé. With her most enthusiastic fans known as the 'Beyhive' and herself as 'Queen B', Beyoncé embraces some of these insectoid metaphors and appropriates their imagery for a matriarchal black feminist collective.9 Beyoncé's performance at the 2017 Grammy awards also embraced maternal-goddess imagery at the head of a group of black women and children: wearing a gold crown and jewellery, heralding perhaps a past, present and future of black female power, Beyoncé positioned her pregnant body as Madonna, rebuking the exclusion of black women from and the degradation of the reproductive black body by the Western cult of motherhood.10 This not only recalls Halberstam's (1991) invocation of the fears of maternal reproductive power uncontrolled by racist or patriarchal forces; it also recalls Afrofuturism in its drawing upon black cultural life to imagine and enact possible future worlds, especially in terms of imagining less constrained modes of black subjectivity (see Womack, 2013, p. 9). This example suggests that the feminine, racialised threat of 'becoming-insect' can be reappropriated and reconfigured without reproducing the racist, colonialist roots of the entomological sciences upon which Perkins and others draw. Octavia E. Butler's trilogy of novels known as Lilith's Brood (2000) similarly explores this possibility. Butler's work is also an example of Afrofuturist literature that reimagines themes from the transatlantic slave trade as alien abduction and uses this voyage and resettlement on earth to explore the question of what it means to be human. After the earth's population is almost extinguished by an exchange of nuclear weapons, Lilith lyapo, a black woman, is rescued and held in stasis by an alien species, the Oankali. The Oankali are consensus-driven, with an interspecies kinship structure that mimics social insect formation, as well as queer interspecies sexuality (see also Cassel, 2016). They share some physical resemblance with both insects and molluscs, and initially elicit the same fear and disgust in Lilith that insects do. In both Butler's Lilith's Brood and her award-winning novella 'Bloodchild' (1996 [1984]), insectoid aliens use human bodies for reproductive purposes. However, Butler uses these figures to explore the idea that intelligence and hierarchical social organisation are not defining human characteristics, but rather fatal flaws. In the worlds that Butler creates, other beings exist and thrive outside of these characteristics and human interactions, with these 'alien' others changing human identity categories and desires.

#### The emancipatory nature of swarm assemblages is not to be underestimated – its insect nature allows for egalitarian modes of cooperation

Wilcox 17 [Lauren Wilcox, Deputy Director, University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, 2017, "Drones, Swarms And Becoming-Insect: Feminist Utopias And Posthuman Politics," Feminist Review, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44987305, accessed 1-11-2021]LHSBC

Like Memo in Sleep Dealer and Lilith in Lilith's Brood , we cannot go home again to our separate colonies of insect life as an alternative to masculine and heterosexual domination and racist, necropolitical worlds of violence; nor can we reject swarming figurations for prior models of liberal humanist agency. Perhaps we need not abandon the swarm as a useful figuration and inspiration from feminist utopias; its capacities for connections across borders, egalitarian modes of communication and coordination- not to mention the challenge it presents to heteronormative modes of sexuality and reproduction- serve as potential inspirations for confronting the necropolitical worlds threatened by these very swarm assemblages. The swarm forms a crucial figuration that informs both Utopian and dystopian imaginaries. It remains for us to fight for futures enabled by the swarm, in its multiple and complex manifestations, to construct new possibilities for connection and world-building.

#### All risks of extinction events together is 0.2% per year

Simpson 16 – Fergus Simpson, Mathematician at the University of Barcelona. [Apocalypse Now? Reviving the Doomsday Argument, https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.03072]//BPS

Whether the fate of our species can be forecast from its past has been the topic of considerable controversy. One refutation of the so-called Doomsday Argument is based on the premise that we are more likely to exist in a universe containing a greater number of observers. Here we present a Bayesian reformulation of the Doomsday Argument which is immune to this effect. By marginalizing over the spatial configuration of observers, we find that any preference for a larger total number of observers has no impact on the inferred local number. Our results remain unchanged when we adopt either the Self-Indexing Assumption (SIA) or the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA). Furthermore the median value of our posterior distribution is found to be in agreement with the frequentist forecast. Humanity's prognosis for the coming century is well approximated by a global catastrophic risk of 0.2% per year.

#### Util is not value neutral, but conducive to amoral and egoistic decision making – Turns portable skills

Park et al. 16 [Gewnhi Park, Assistant Professor Department of Psychology @ Azusa Pacific University, “At the heart of morality lies neuro-visceral integration: lower cardiac vagal tone predicts utilitarian moral judgment” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2016, 1588--1596]

Dual process theories of moral judgments argue that utilitarian responses are driven by deliberative reasoning and have been favored to be more rational moral judgments (Greene et al., 2008; see also Feinberg et al., 2012). However, growing research has reported that utilitarian moral judgments are associated with antisocial traits, such as primary psychopathy, rational egoism, and explicit amoral and self-centered judgments (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011; Kahane et al., 2015). Here, we provide additional evidence showing that utilitarian inclinations are associated with lower abilities to integrate visceral responses into moral judgment. Interestingly, it has been reported that people with antisocial and psychopathic traits—who are characterized by deficits in such pro-social traits—have lower cardiac vagal tone (Raine, 1997; Hansen et al., 2007). These findings cast further doubt on whether utilitarian moral judgments in standard dilemmas should be considered the optimal responses to these dilemmas. Furthermore, there is a growing concern that dominant research in moral psychology may not accurately capture the philosophical view of utilitarianism (Kahane et al., 2015). Utilitarian moral judgments typically observed in hypothetical moral dilemmas—which often reflects one’s willingness to harm or sacrifice few individuals in an attempt to save more people—may not correspond to the philosophical view of utilitarianism—which highlights an impartial concern for the greater good (Kahane et al., 2015). In fact, recent research has failed to find the direct relationship between utilitarian judgments in the hypothetical moral dilemmas and a wide range of traits, attitudes, judgment and behaviors that reflect an impartial concern for the greater good (Kahane et al., 2015). This new emerging perspective calls for further research to understand the nature of the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and strong utilitarian tendencies defined by a philosophical view— that is an impartial concern for the greater good.

### Framing+

#### Existential risks logic is Pascal’s Wager.

Munthe 15 – Christian Munthe, PhD, Practical Philosophy Professor Associate Head of Department for Research at the University of Gothenburg. [Why Aren't Existential Risk / Ultimate Harm Argument Advocates All Attending Mass? Philosophical Comment, 2-1-15, http://philosophicalcomment.blogspot.com/2015/02/why-arent-existential-risk-ultimate.html]//BPS

An increasingly popular genre in the sort of applied philosophy and ethics of technology, which does not so much engage with actual technological development as more or less wild phantasies about possibly forthcoming ones is the notions of "existential risks" or "ultimate harms", or similar expressions. The theme is currently inspiring several research environments at world-leading universities, such as this one and this one (where you can find many links to other sources, articles, blog posts, and so on), and given quite a bit of space in recent scholarly literature on a topic often referred to as the ethics of emerging technology. Now, personally and academically, as it has actually proceeded, I have found much of this development being to a large extent a case of the emperor's new clothes. The fact that there are possible threats to human civilizations, the existence of humanity, life on earth or, at least, extended human well-being, is not exactly news, is it? Neither is there any kind of new insight that some of these are created by humans themselves. Also, it is not any sort of recent revelation that established moral ideas, or theories of rational decision making, may provide reason for avoiding or mitigating such threats. Rather, both these theses follow rather trivially from a great many well-established ethical and philosophical theories, and are well-known to do so since hundreds of years. Still, piece after piece is being produced in the existential risk genre making this out as some sort of recent finding, and exposing grand gestures at proving the point against more or less clearly defined straw-men. At the same time, quite a bit of what is currently written on the topic strikes me as philosophically shallow. For instance, the notion that the eradication of the human species has to be a bad thing seems to be far from obvious from a philosophical point of view - this would depend on such things as the source of the value of specifically human existence, the manner of the imagined extinction (it certainly does not have to involve any sort of carnage or catastrophe), and what might possibly come instead of humanity or currently known life when extinct and how that is to be valued. Similarly, it is a very common step in the typical existential risk line to jump rather immediately from the proposition of such a risk to the suggestion that substantial (indeed, massive) resources should be spent on its prevention, mitigation or management. This goes for everything from imagined large scale geo-engineering solutions to environmental problems, dreams of outer space migration, to so-called human enhancement to adapt people to be able to handle otherwise massive threats in a better way. At the same time, the advocates of the existential risk line of thought also urges caution in the application of new hitherto unexplored technology, such as synthetic biology or (if it ever comes to appear) "real" A.I. and android technology. However, also there, the angle of analysis is often restricted to this very call, typically ignoring the already since long ongoing debates in the ethics of technology, bioethics, environmental ethics, et cetera, where the issue of how much of and what sort of such caution may be warranted in light of various good aspects of different the technologies considered. And, to be frank, this simplification seems to be the only thing that is special with the existential risk argument advocacy: the idea that the mere possibility of a catastrophic scenario justifies substantial sacrifices, without having to complicate things by pondering alternative uses of resources. Now, this kind of argument, is (or should be) well-known to anyone with a philosophical education, since it seems to share the basic form of the philosophical classic known as Pascal's Wager. In this argument, French enlightenment philosopher and mathematician, Blaise Pascal offered a "proof" of the rationality of believing in God (the sort of God found in abrahamitic monotheistic religion, that is), based on the possible consequences of belief or non-belief, given the truth or falsity of the belief. You can explore the details of Pascal's argument, but the basic idea is that in the face of the immense consequences of belief and non-belief if God exists (eternal salvation vs. eternal damnation), it is rational to bet on the existence of God, no matter what theoretical or other evidence for the truth of this belief exists and no matter the probability of this truth. It seems to me that the typical existential risk argument advocacy subscribes to a very similar logic. For instance, the standard line to defend that resources should be spent on probing and (maybe) facilitating), e.g., possible extraterrestial migration for humanity, seems to have the following form: 1) Technology T might possibly prevent/mitigate existential risk, E 2) It would be really, really, very, very bad if E was to be actualised 3) Therefore: If E was otherwise to be actualised, it would be really, really, very, very good if E was prevented 4) Therefore: If E was otherwise to be actualised, it would be really, really, very, very good if we had access to a workable T 5) Therefore: there are good reasons to spend substantial resources on probing and (maybe, if that turns out to be possible) facilitating a workable T That is, what drives the argument is the (mere) possibility of a massively significant outcome, and the (mere) possibility of a way to prevent that particular outcome, thus doing masses of good. Now, I'm sure that everyone can see that this argument is far from obviously valid, even if we ignore the question of whether or not premise 2 is true, and this goes for Pascal's Wager too in parallel ways. For instance, the existential risk argument above seems to ignore that there seems to be an innumerable amount of thus (merely) possible existential risk scenarios, as well as innumerable (merely) possibly workable technologies that might help to prevent or mitigate each of these, and it is unlikely (to say the least) that we have resources to bet substantially on them all, unless we spread them so thin that this action becomes meaningless. Similarly, there are innumerable possible versions of the god that lures you with threats and promises of damnation and salvation, and what that particular god may demand in return, often implying a ban on meeting a competing deity's demands, so the wager doesn't seem to tell you to try to start believing in any particular of all these (merely) possible gods. Likewise, the argument above ignores completely the (rather high) likelihood that the mobilised resources will be mostly wasted, and that, therefore, there are substantial opportunity costs attached to not using these resources to use better proven strategies with better identified threats and problems (say, preventing global poverty) - albeit maybe not as massive as the outcomes in the existential risk scenarios. Similarly, Pascal's Wager completely ignores all the good things one needs to give up to meet the demands of the god promising eternal salvation in return (for instance, spending your Sundays working for the allieviation of global poverty). None of that is worth any consideration, the idea seems to be, in light of the massive stakes of the existential risk / religious belief or non-belief scenarios. Now, I will not pick any quarrel with the existential risk argument as such on these grounds, although I do think that more developed ways to analyse risk-scenarios and the ethical implications of these already in existence and used in the fields I referred above will mean lots of troubles for the simplistic aspects already mentioned. What I do want to point to, however, is this: If you're impressed by the existential risk argument, you should be equally impressed by Pascal's Wager. Thus, in accordance with Pascal's recommendation that authentic religious belief can be gradually installed via the practice of rituals, you should – as should indeed the existential risk argument advocates themselves – spend your Sundays celebrating mass (or any other sort ritual demanded by the God you bet on). I very much doubt, however, that you (or they) in fact do that, or even accept the conclusion that you (or they) should be doing that.

#### Prioritize structural impacts – conventional worst case risk analysis causes policy inaction and justifies endless cycles of pre-emptive war Mueller & Stewart ’11 (John & Mark, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Cato Senior Fellow, and award winning author & Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle, “Terror, Security, and Money”, Oxford University Press, 9/9/11, <https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF>) \*edited for ableist language

Focusing on Worst-Case Scenarios Cass Sunstein, who seems to have invented the phrase "probability neglect," assesses the version of the phenomenon that comes into being when "emotions are intensely engaged." Under that circumstance, he argues, "people’s attention is focused on the bad outcome itself and they are inattentive to the fact that it is unlikely to occur." Moreover, they are inclined to "demand a substantial governmental response-even if the magnitude of the risk does not warrant the response." It may be this phenomenon that Treverton experienced. Playing to this demand, government officials are inclined to focus on worst-case scenarios, presumably in the knowledge, following Sunstein's insight, that this can emotionally justify just about any expenditure, no matter how unlikely the prospect the dire event will actually take place. Accordingly; there is a preoccupation with "low probability/ high consequence" events, such as the detonation of a sizable nuclear device in midtown Manhattan. The process could be seen in action in an article published in 2008 by Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) Michael Chertoff. He felt called upon to respond to the observation that the number of people who die each year from international terrorism, while tragic, is actually exceedingly small. "This fails to consider," he pointed out, "the much greater loss of life that Weapons of mass destruction could wreak on the American people." That is, he was justifying his entire budget-only a limited portion of which is concerned with weapons of mass destruction by the WMD threat, even while avoiding assessing its likelihood. It is sometimes argued that conventional risk analysis breaks down under extreme conditions because the risk is now a very large number (losses) multiplied by a very small number (attack probability). But it is not the risk analysis methodology that is at fault here, but our ability to use the information obtained from the analysis for decision making. A "high consequence" event has been defined to be a "disaster" or "catastrophe" resulting in "great human costs in life, property environmental damage, and future economic activity" However, depending on how one Weighs the words in that definition, there may have been only one terrorist event in all of history that qualifies for inclusion. Moreover, the vast bulk of homeland security expenditures is not focused on events that fit a definition like that, but rather on comparatively low-consequence ones, like explosions set off by individual amateur jihadists. Analyst Bruce Schneier has written penetratingly of worst-case thinking. He points out that it, involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social ~~paralysis~~ [inaction]. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. It leads to bad decision making because it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes. It also assumes "that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible," and it "can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy" And worst, it "validates ignorance" because, "instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know-and what we can imagine." In the process, "risk assessment is devalued" and "probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of possibilistic thinking." As Schneier also notes, worst-case thinking is the driving force behind the precautionary principle, a decent working definition of which is "action should be taken to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the harm has already occurred." It could be seen in action less than a week after 9/11, when President George W Bush outlined his new national security strategy: "We cannot let our enemies strike first . . . [but must take] anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States, will, if necessary act preemptively. America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed." The 2003 invasion of Iraq, then, was justified by invoking the precautionary principle based on the worst-case scenario in which Saddam Hussein might strike. If, on the other hand, any worst-case thinking focused on the potential for the destabilizing effects a war would have on Iraq and the region, the precautionary principle would guide one to be very cautious about embarking on war. As Sunstein notes, the precautionary principle "offers no guidance-not that it is wrong, but that it forbids all courses of action, including regulation." Thus, "taken seriously it is ~~paralyzing~~, [immobilizing] banning the very steps that it simultaneously requires."9 It can be invoked in equal measure to act or not to act. There are considerable dangers in applying the precautionary principle to terrorism: on the one hand, any action taken to reduce a presumed risk always poses the introduction of countervailing risks, while on the other, larger, expensive counterterrorism efforts will come accompanied by high opportunity costs." Moreover "For public officials no less than the rest of us, the probability of harm matters a great deal, and it is foolish to attend exclusively to the worst case scenario." A more rational approach to worst-case thinking is to establish the likelihood of gains and losses from various courses of action, including staying the current course." This, of course, is the essence of risk assessment. What is necessary is due consideration to the spectrum of threats, not simply the worst one imaginable, in order to properly understand, and coherently deal with, the risks to people, institutions, and the economy. The relevant decision makers are professionals, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that they should do so seriously. Notwithstanding political pressures (to be discussed more in chapter 9), the fact that the public has difficulties with probabilities when emotions are involved does not relieve those in charge of the requirement, even the duty to make decisions about the expenditures of vast quantities of public monies in a responsible manner.

### Tool of Control

#### There’s no taking it back – masculine control appropriates the feminine body of automata for its own ends.

Wilcox 17 [Lauren Wilcox, Deputy Director, University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, 2017, "Drones, Swarms And Becoming-Insect: Feminist Utopias And Posthuman Politics," Feminist Review, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44987305, accessed 1-11-2021]LHSBC

The swarm as represented in a figuration linking it to 'becoming-woman' poses a threat to the political ontology of the 'body polities', and thus to political order. The biological swarm, the technological network and the political multitude are variations of an ambivalent negotiation of a political body that bears a similarly ambivalent relationship with sovereignty (Thacker, 2004a, 2004b). The agency of the swarm is unclear; according to studies of animal behaviour going back to the nineteenth century (Thacker, 2004a), it emerges out of interactions between individuals, in response to environmental constraints, and within groups. But now multiplicity is also used on behalf of sovereign power and necropower. While Hardt and Negri (2003, pp. 91-92) celebrate the swarm as a network of a multitude of different creative agents solving problems without centralised control, the mere existence of a network does not necessarily make it more democratic. As Galloway and Thacker (2007) have argued, some swarms are compatible with centralised control; that is, swarms may be controlled or directed, or a swarm can be used for the purpose of control itself (see also Coeckelbergh, 2011). The swarm occupies an ambiguous categorisation between the 'many' and the 'one' in terms of individual independence and collective coordination. This figure of the 'swarm1 has much in common with Lauro and Embry's (2008) articulation of the 'zombie', in its indeterminate status between living and dead and in its posthuman consciousness that obliterates the distinction between subject and object. The inspiration and development of 'drone swarms' is reminiscent of the creation of the feminine automaton: a machine created in a feminine body designed to do men's bidding, such as in Metropolis (1927) or Ex Machina (2015). A key critique of automated drones guided by artificial intelligence, including drone swarms, is the potential or anticipated loss of human control over technologies of death. Part of the fear here, in alleged loss of humanity in warfare, is better theorised as the loss of an ideal of humanity associated with a certain form of masculinity: namely, the possessive liberal individual, whose agency is secured in a conscious mind (Hayles, 2005, p. 177, 1999). In her work My Mother Was a Computer (2005), N. Katherine Hayles notes the persistence of gendered representations of artificial intelligence, in which a male creator exacts his will through the use of female automata (female bodies controlled by another agent) against other men. This cultural trope is being realised in the creation of 'drone swarms': mechanical creations made to mimic insect and other forms of swarming life in the service of militaristic ends. More to the point, it seeks to harness the feminised power of the swarm for its own ends. As such, the swarm is now not only a metaphor but also a central mode of biopolitical and necropolitical life. Michel Foucault's (2007 [1978], pp. 21-22) biopolitical analysis of the emergence of different modalities of power revolves around a relationship with certain non-human forms of life/death in the form of disease-causing microbes and viruses- from the sovereign exclusion of infected bodies of leprosy, to the discipline and surveillance of the plague, to the regulation of different kinds of circulations of people and non-human objects in the 'milieu'. Our contemporary biopolitical analysis requires an analysis of the politics of life and death in the insect and the swarm, which, following Braidotti (2002), cannot be assumed to be a mere metaphor or representation for political life, but an animating materialist logic. The issue of the swarm that defies categorisation between the one and the many, of which sovereignty depends, is a central problem for political organisation. As Eugene Thacker (2011, p. 154, emphasis in original) writes, 'In the "problem of multiplicities" presented to the body politic concept by plague, pestilence, and epidemic, multiplicity is never separate from, and is always inculcated within, the problem of sovereignty ... it is multiplicity that plagues the body politic '

### Framework

#### Interpretation: The judge is an ethical researcher and this debate is about competing models of research – evaluate the plan for the justifications provided in the 1AC

#### Prefer because debate is subjectivity formation – Even if an individual ballot doesn’t prescribe ethical relationality, it does incentivize long-term research praxis that can influence our beliefs proven by the production of progressives, public defendants, philosophers, and scholars from debate

# 1AR

## Case

### Overview – Policy v2

#### Drone swarms are a new dangerous leg of the empire – they drive global pre-emption, lower the stakes of conflict, test the borders of nation states, and are tools of racialized intervention and surveillance which foster instability and conflict – plan solves through targeted ban of drone swarms which are unquestionably autonomous

#### Independently, the incorporation of AI blurs the line between human and non-human by making war not masculine but technological which queers the military and creates murderous inclusion of queer folk – causes valorization of the “inclusive” US versus “patriarchal” Muslim countries justifying islamophobia and interventionist wars

#### the concept of the swarm is appropriated by the military for colonial ends – the affirmative reclaims the concept of the swarm uses it to establish egalitarian communities of cooperation and communication that help implement utopian futures

### Overview – Policy

#### Vote aff to ben lethal autonomous weapon drone swarms – drones are mobilized as racialized tools of interventionist conflict and control to determine who lives and dies – that necropolitical condition of controlled life and death that opens up populations for and massacre

#### Outweighs because lives aren’t being saved if they’re already in the hands of the empire

#### Independently, the incorporation of swarm tactics and AI blurs the line between human and non-human by making war not masculine but technological which queers the military and creates murderous inclusion of queer folk – causes valorization of the US vis a vis Muslim countries justifying islamophobia and interventionist wars

### Overview – K v2

#### Drone swarms are constructed from the threat other and racialized tools of interventionist conflict and control to determine who lives and dies – that necropolitical condition of controlled life and death that opens up populations for and massacre

#### Independently, the concept of the swarm is appropriated by the military for colonial ends – the affirmative reclaims the concept of the swarm uses it to establish egalitarian communities of cooperation and communication that help implement utopian futures

#### Independently, the incorporation of swarm tactics and AI blurs the line between human and non-human by removing control which queers the military and creates murderous inclusion of queer folk – causes valorization of the US vis a vis Muslim countries justifying islamophobia and interventionist wars

### Overview – K

#### Vote aff to reject lethal autonomous weapon drone swarms – drones are mobilized as racialized tools of interventionist conflict and control to determine who lives and dies – that necropolitical condition of controlled life and death that opens up populations for and massacre

#### Independently, the incorporation of swarm tactics and AI blurs the line between human and non-human by removing control which queers the military and creates murderous inclusion of queer folk – causes valorization of the US vis a vis Muslim countries justifying islamophobia and interventionist wars

### Framework

#### The judge is an ethical researcher and they should endorse the most ethical epistemology – even if they get to answer the consequences of the aff, they still need to win their assumptions aren’t problematic – prefer because debate’s research practices alter subjectivities proven by the abundance of hyper-leftists

### Framing – Extinction

#### 1 – Use Pascal’s wager to frame out all their extinction arguments – wouldn’t give a rando 20 dollars just because they threatened to blow up earth which proves miniscule risk shouldn’t outweigh

#### 2 – Probability times magnitude collapses in on itself because the impact of extinction is infinite which means impact of everything is infinite

#### [3 – Timeframe – their tech isn’t here now – vote neg to live another day in the hope that future intervening actors can solve]

### Framing – Volatility

#### We can’t make linear decisions – IR is incredibly volatile and black swan events can pop up at anytime – the larger the magnitude the lower the probability – we couldn’t the most influential events of the 21st century like 9/11, 2008 economic crash, 2015 migration crisis in Europe, election of trump, and covid-19

### Framing – Util bad

#### Util and saying existential risks always outweighs actively creates unethical subjects – empirical social science studies prove it only primes people to be self-interested and act antithetical to the greater good

### Framing – Data

#### Best data science studies estimate chance of extinction at .2% every year which you can round down to zero – [their tech is decades in the future which means assign even higher skepticism to their claims]

### Framing – Nuclear war

#### Chance of extinction from nuclear war low – states target military installations, not population centers, for decapitating strikes

#### Nuke winter science bunk – toba-level eruptions launched equivalent ash into the air

#### Independently, survive on fish and southern hemisphere avoids the worst

### Autonomy

#### Yes autonomous – thousands of feeds are impossible to control by one single human meaning it must be autonomous

### AT Casualties

#### Increases war – lowers threshold

Umbrello, et al, 19—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, February 6th, 2019, SpringerLink, dml) [LAWs=lethal autonomous weapons]

To begin, one of the most compelling reasons for opposing nuclear non-proliferation efforts is that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons increases the threshold of use (W. Wilson 2012; Jürgen 2008). Thus, only in extreme circumstances would rational actors deem their use to be either morally or strategically acceptable. This strongly contrasts with the case of LAWs, whose cost would be small compared to the cost of paying military personnel. Consequently, states could maintain stockpiles of LAWs that are far larger than any standing army. The low cost of LAWs would also make them more expendable than human soldiers (Jenks 2010; Jacoby and Chang 2008; P. Singer 2009a), and they could strike the enemy with greater precision than human scolders can currently achieve (Ekelhof and Struyk 2014; Thurnher 2012). These four properties—low cost, military effectiveness, expendability, and precision—could drive proliferation while lowering the threshold for use and, therefore, undermine geopolitical security. Incidentally, similar claims could be made about anticipated future nanotech weaponry (see Whitman 2011).

### 1AR – Casualties

#### Fully autonomous are uniquely bad – no boots on the ground means little cost to great powers for conflict which drives up propensity for war – 1AC Umbrello 19

#### Drone Swarms can never be good – 1ac kallenborn

#### 1 – Emergent behavior – swarms are prone to small accidents that cascade and lead to fatal errors like targeting civilians

#### 2 – Communication errors – even accurate targeting is disrupted by accident or jamming

### 1AR – Deterrence

#### Increases likelihood of war – [that was above/ no boots on the ground means little cost to great powers for conflict which drives up propensity for war] –

#### umbrello says nukes already provide deterrence because of destructive capability but drone swarms don’t because they’re disposable and low impact

### AT Interventions Good

#### 1 – Individual drones fill-in – they haven’t made a swarming tactics key warrant

#### 2 – Empirics flow neg – vietnam, libya, afghanistan, iraq prove that unseating leaders only creates more instability – “democratic” leaders who filled in were just as bad

#### 3 – Timeframe outweighs – their discourse of putting down the others only creates authoritarian leaders and instability through the war on terror – bartolucci 14 – their ev is speculative about hyper specific tech that is too late

#### 4 – Targeted killing backfires and stops disarm

Braut-Hegghammer 20 Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, 1-6-2020, “2020 is the year to worry about nuclear weapons,” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/06/is-year-worry-about-nuclear-weapons/>, SJBE

2020 brings us more to worry about than the [U.S. airstrike](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/defense-secretary-says-iran-and-its-proxies-may-be-planning-fresh-attacks-on-us-personnel-in-iraq/2020/01/02/53b63f00-2d89-11ea-bcb3-ac6482c4a92f_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_2) that killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad early Friday. With North Korean leader Kim Jong Un [promising a new strategic weapon and abandoning the moratorium on nuclear and missile tests](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-koreas-kim-threatens-to-resume-nuclear-long-range-missile-tests/2019/12/31/71160958-2c31-11ea-be79-83e793dbcaef_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_2); Iran [dropping its commitment](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/body-of-commander-slain-by-us-strike-arrives-in-iran-to-crowds-of-mourners/2020/01/05/4ca3281a-2f17-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_2) to the 2015 nuclear deal and preparing to ramp up its nuclear program within days; and continuing tensions between nuclear weapons holders [India and Pakistan](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02578-5), 2020 could be an unusually [dangerous year](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-30/new-nuclear-age-upon-us). What’s more, governments face decisions that could undermine multilateral agreements that have curbed the risks of nuclear proliferation and arms races and prevented conflict. Below, I will examine three areas where the world could face greater challenges in 2020. 1. Escalating conflicts with Iran and North Korea Most immediate, [Iran promises retaliation](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iran-vows-revenge-for-us-killing-of-top-commander-as-trump-sends-more-troops/2020/01/03/35224048-2e47-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_6) for last week’s [killing](https://www.npr.org/2020/01/02/793134323/where-u-s-iran-relations-stand-after-airstrikes-and-embassy-security-breach) of Soleimani — and the United States is sending 3,500 more troops to the region. This confrontation could escalate into war, and that could happen through either side’s miscalculation. Or the U.S. government could encourage Iran to escalate — which would justify a stronger response, enabling the Americans to try to overthrow the regime, which former national security adviser John Bolton has [long argued for](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/bolton-keeps-trying-goad-iran-war/592108/). But Iran’s longer-term efforts in the nuclear realm could prove even more difficult to handle. Iran has responded to the [U.S. exit from the nuclear deal](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-will-announce-plans-to-pull-out-of-iran-nuclear-deal-despite-pleas-from-european-leaders/2018/05/08/4c148252-52ca-11e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_9) by scaling up its nuclear program bit by bit, in a [“less-for-less”](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-uranium-centrifuges.html) strategy, something that [the latest announcement](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/body-of-commander-slain-by-us-strike-arrives-in-iran-to-crowds-of-mourners/2020/01/05/4ca3281a-2f17-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_9) takes even further. Expect Iran’s willingness to comply with what is now effectively a [dead agreement](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/europe/soleimani-iran-nuclear.html) to decline rapidly. Although Iran has apparently not yet restarted a nuclear weapons program, its incentives to do so are obvious now. Trump argued that he could negotiate a [new and better deal](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/08/trump-wants-to-wring-a-better-deal-from-iran-heres-why-thats-so-unlikely/?itid=lk_inline_manual_10) than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which the United States and Iran negotiated alongside the European Union and the U.N. Security Council’s other permanent members. That will be much more difficult now. By killing a key regime figure, the Americans have closed off avenues for rapprochement — and have shown the Iranian regime that it is a target. In Pyongyang, the situation is dangerous for different reasons. For all practical purposes, North Korea is an established nuclear-weapons state — and has an incentive to escalate first if the regime believes it’s in a conflict that threatens its survival. Kim never did agree to roll back North Korea’s nuclear program and so is now unconstrained in his effort to expand its arsenal. The Trump administration’s apparent reluctance to admit its failure to curb the North Korean program makes responding difficult. Should the administration change its “maximum pressure” approach, which is essentially [rhetorical](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/22/politics/john-bolton-north-korea-trump/index.html) and has little potential to change North Korean behavior, things could get ugly quickly. 2. Nuclear proliferation pressures will increase This year is the 50th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which has been remarkably [successful](https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/60/3/530/2469879) in stopping nuclear weapons from spreading. Don’t expect much celebration. The United States and other traditional supporters express little enthusiasm for the treaty, while some critics [argue](https://thebulletin.org/2019/09/is-it-time-to-ditch-the-npt/) it can be replaced by the 2017 [Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons](https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/) (TPNW) once it enters into force. Governments supporting the TPNW [say they are frustrated](https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/the-nuclear-ban-treaty-how-did-we-get-here-what-does-it-mean-for-the-united-states/) that the NPT members with nuclear weapons have not yet completely disarmed those weapons. But the NPT has succeeded in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Leaders in [Saudi Arabia](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/mbs-saudis-pursue-nuclear-weapons-iran-180315152433732.html) and [Turkey](https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/21/middleeast/turkey-erdogan-nuclear-weapons-intl/index.html) speak openly about the appeal of nuclear weapons. If Iran leaves the NPT and acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has announced that his government [will develop](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-iran-nuclear-bomb-saudi-arabia/) nuclear weapons, too. Last year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said “[I cannot accept](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-nuclear-erdogan/erdogan-says-its-unacceptable-that-turkey-cant-have-nuclear-weapons-idUSKCN1VP2QN)” that Turkey is banned from possessing nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the United States’ [European](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/european-union-nuclear-weapons.html) and [Asian](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/were-headed-for-a-crisis-on-the-korean-peninsula-the-administration-isnt-ready/2019/11/27/c0de9f26-112f-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_20) allies question whether they can rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Some of these states abandoned early interest in nuclear weapons decades ago in exchange for U.S. extended deterrence. In Washington, there is [growing concern](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/11/05/its-time-to-get-us-nukes-out-of-turkey/) that the United States should not have nuclear weapons deployed on NATO’s base in Incirlik, Turkey. This heightens NATO allies’ worries that, with Trump in office, the United States is abandoning its commitment to their defense. France has [pledged to cover Germany](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/02/28/france-is-prepared-extend-its-nuclear-deterrent-germany/?itid=lk_inline_manual_20) with its own nuclear deterrence. German politicians are [arguing over](https://www.politico.eu/article/german-bomb-debate-goes-nuclear-nato-donald-trump-defense-spending/) whether to explore [nuclear weapons](https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/15/tracking-german-nuclear-debate-pub-72884). Australian politicians are having a similar [debate](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-nuclear-weapons-debate-shifting-the-focus/). These discussions don’t necessarily mean the governments will indeed seek to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the discussions themselves weaken the [nuclear taboo](https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2019/10/Tannenwald_TWQ_41-3.pdf) that has helped keep the weapons out of international conflicts. And nuclear weapons now have a place in domestic political debates that they have not had since the Cold War. 3. The demise of arms control as we know it Meanwhile, nations are backing away from, and even abandoning, treaties that prevent nuclear arms races. [New START](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NewSTART), the sole remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, is likely to expire in February 2021. This follows the [collapse](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/a-nuclear-treaty-is-about-to-vanish-its-demise-should-teach-a-lesson/2019/07/31/a22968c4-b3b8-11e9-951e-de024209545d_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_24) of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) after reports that Russia had violated it for several years. The Trump administration argues that China should join nuclear arms control treaties, including New START. China is [not interested](https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2019-08-23/chinas-stance-nuclear-arms-control-new-start). If that prompts the United States to abandon New START, the Americans and Russians could begin a nuclear arms race. If New START is not extended, that will be the collapse of arms control in its current form. Combine more dangerous weapons deployments with the Trump administration’s possible misperceptions of [Russian](https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold/) and [Chinese](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00359) nuclear strategy, and NATO and Russia could more easily stumble into dangerous misunderstandings. Technological advances will require [adaptations](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2019.1627521) in [arms control frameworks](https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/reports-of-the-death-of-arms-control-have-been-greatly-exaggerated/). This year could show us the importance of multilateral approaches to curbing proliferation risks and nuclear arms races and illuminate why more should be done to preserve them. The world will be more dangerous without the imperfect treaties we have to curb nuclear proliferation and arms races, increasing the risks that miscalculations lead to war and conflict.

### AT Interventions Good [K]

#### 1 – Individual drones fill-in – they haven’t made a swarming tactics key warrant

#### 2 – Empirics flow neg – vietnam, libya, afghanistan, iraq prove that unseating leaders only creates more instability

#### 3 – Massive perfcon with the K – thinking precision drone strikes good is the what culminated in obama’s drone strikes against yemeni weddings

#### 4 – Self-assurred destruction better than mutually assured destruction – MAD isn’t fool proof because countries can think they develop new tech with decapitating first strike capabilities, especially because LAWs are constantly evolving

#### 5 – Capabilities are reverse goldilocks – Just effective enough to provoke retaliation, but not enough to enable successful first strike

Johnson, Ph.D., 19 [Dr James Johnson is a visiting fellow with the School of History & International Relations, University of Leicester. James holds a Ph.D. in politics & international relations and a master’s degree in Asia-Pacific studies. 2019, “Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security,” DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600800//lhs-ap>]

Before leaving the Pentagon Robert Work established an algorithmic-warfare team (also known as “Project Maven”) to examine how AI might support U.S. counter-terrorism operations in Syria, and more accurately locate hidden North Korean and Russian mobile missile launchers.58 Recent reports indicate that the DoD has also developed an early proto-type AI-driven “missile-hunting system”, designed to detect and respond to signs of preparations for a missile launch. To support these efforts, the Trump administration has reportedly proposed to more than triple the funding for an AI-driven missile programme.59 Critics have highlighted the potentially high risks this programme carries. Not least, that it could provoke an AI arms race with China and Russia, upset the fragile global nuclear balance, and absent adequate safeguards, commanders could risk losing control of (and possibly accelerate) the escalation ladder. 60 In the case of AI applications to target mobile missile launchers, for example, the use of AI may be strategically destabilising “not because it works too well but because it works just well enough to feed uncertainty”. 61

#### 6 – Deterrence theory unethical – allows for great authoritarian powers to coerce other nations which creates the conditions necropolitical life and death

### AT Yoo

#### They should lose for reading evidence by John Yoo – sets a precedent for endorsing crimes against humanity – person has problematic calculus and thinks black and brown people shouldn’t live and you should round down their credibility to zero

Glenn **Greenwald 8**, J.D. from NYU, co-founded his own litigation firm where he litigated cases concerning issues of U.S. constitutional law and civil rights for ten years, contributor at Salon where he reported about the 2001 anthrax attacks and the candidacy of former CIA official John O. Brennan for the jobs of either Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) or the next Director of National Intelligence (DNI) after the election of Barack Obama, “**John Yoo's war crimes**”, Apr 2 2008, Salon, <https://www.salon.com/2008/04/02/yoo_2/>

Yet again, the ACLU has performed the function which Congress and the media are intended to perform but do not. As the result of a FOIA lawsuit the ACLU filed and then prosecuted for several years, numerous documents relating to the Bush administration's torture regime that have long been baselessly kept secret were released yesterday, including an 81-page memorandum (.pdf) issued in 2003 by then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo (currently a Berkeley Law Professor) which asserted that the President's war powers entitle him to **ignore multiple laws which criminalized the use of torture:** If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate a criminal prohibition, he would be doing so in order to **prevent further attacks on the United States** by the al Qaeda terrorist network. In that case, we believe that he could argue that the executive branch's constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his actions. As Jane Mayer reported two years ago in The New Yorker -- in which she quoted former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora as saying that "the memo espoused an extreme and virtually unlimited theory of the extent of the President's Commander-in-Chief authority" -- **it was precisely Yoo's torture-justifying theories,** ultimately endorsed by Donald Rumsfeld, that were communicated to Gen. Geoffrey Miller, the commander of both **Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib** at the time of the **most severe detainee abuses** (the ones that are known). It is not, of course, news that the Bush administration adopted (and still embraces) legal theories which vest the President with **literally unlimited power**, including the power to break our laws. There are, though, several points worth noting as a result of the disclosure of this Memorandum: (1) The fact that John Yoo is a Professor of Law at Berkeley and is treated as a respectable, serious expert by our media institutions, reflects the **complete destruction over the last eight years of whatever moral authority the United States possessed**. Comporting with long-held stereotypes of two-bit tyrannies, we're now a country that literally exempts our highest political officials from the rule of law, and have decided that there should be no consequences when they commit serious felonies. John Yoo's Memorandum, as intended, directly led to -- **caused** -- **a whole series of war crimes at both Guantanamo and in Iraq**. The reason such a relatively low-level DOJ official was able to issue such influential and extraordinary opinions was because he was working directly with, and at the behest of, the two most important legal officials in the administration: George Bush's White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales, and Dick Cheney's counsel (and current Chief of Staff) David Addington. Together, **they deliberately created and authorized a regime of torture and other brutal interrogation methods that are**, by all measures, **very serious war crimes.** If writing memoranda authorizing torture -- actions which then directly lead to the systematic commission of torture -- doesn't make one a war criminal in the U.S., **what does?** Here is what John Yoo is and what he did: "It depends on why the President thinks he needs to do that." Yoo **wasn't just a law professor theorizing about the legalization of torture**. He was a government official who, in concert with other government officials, set out to enable a **brutal and systematic torture regime**, and did so. **If this level of depraved criminality doesn't remove one from the realm of respectability and mainstream seriousness** -- if not result in war crimes prosecution -- **then nothing does.** That John Yoo is a full professor at one of the country's most prestigious law schools, and a welcomed expert on our newspaper's Op-Ed pages and television news programs, speaks volumes about what our country has become. We sure did take care of that despicable Pvt. Lyndie England, though, because we don't tolerate barbaric conduct of the type in which she engaged completely on her own. (2) While Yoo's specific Torture Memos were ultimately rescinded by subsequent DOJ officials -- primarily Jack Goldsmith -- the **underlying theories of omnipotent executive power remain largely in place**. The administration continues to embrace precisely these same theories to assert that it has the power to violate a **whole array of laws** -- from our nation's spying and surveillance statutes to countless Congressional oversight requirements -- and to detain even U.S. citizens, detained on American soil, as "enemy combatants." So for all of the dramatic outrage that this Yoo memo will generate for a day or so, **the general framework on which it rests**, despite being weakened by the Supreme Court in Hamdan, is the one under which we continue to live, without much protest or objection. (3) **This incident provides yet more proof of how rancid and corrupt is the premise** that as long as political appointees at the DOJ approve of certain conduct, then that conduct must be shielded from criminal prosecution. That's the premise that is being applied over and over to remove government lawbreaking from the reach of the law. That's the central argument behind both telecom amnesty and protecting Bush officials from their surveillance felonies (it's unfair to hold them accountable for their illegal spying behavior because the DOJ said they could do it). It's the same argument that CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden just made on Meet the Press as to why CIA interrogators should be immunized from the consequences of their illegal conduct ("when I go and tell him to do something in the shadows and point out to him it is perfectly lawful, that the Department of Justice has reviewed it . . . I need him to have confidence in that DOJ opinion"). The DOJ is not the law. They are not above the law and they do not make the law. They are merely charged with enforcing it. The fact that they assert that blatantly illegal conduct is legal does not make it so. DOJ officials, like anyone else, can violate the law and have done so not infrequently. High DOJ officials -- including Attorneys General -- have been convicted of crimes in the past and have gone to prison. Embracing this twisted notion that the DOJ has the authority to immunize any conduct by high government officials or private actors from the reach of the law is a **recipe for inevitable lawlessness**. **It enables the President to break the law, or authorize lawbreaking**, simply by having his political appointees at DOJ -- including ideologues like John Yoo -- declare that he can do it. As these incidents ought to demonstrate rather vividly, the mere fact that Bush officials at the DOJ declare something to be legal cannot provide license to break the law with impunity. (4) Since the Nuremberg Trials, "war criminals" include not only those who directly apply the criminal violence and other forms of brutality, but also government officials who authorized it and military officials who oversaw it. Ironically, the Bush administration itself argued in the 2006 case of Hamdan -- when they sought to prosecute as a "war criminal" a Guantanamo detainee whom they allege was a driver for Osama bin Laden -- that one is guilty of war crimes not merely by directly violating the laws of war, but also by participating in a conspiracy to do so. That legal question was unresolved in that case, but Justices Thomas and Scalia both sided with the administration and Thomas wrote (emphasis added): "[T]he experience of our wars," Winthrop 839, is rife with evidence that establishes beyond any doubt that conspiracy to violate the laws of war is itself an offense cognizable before a law-of-war military commission. . . . . In [World War II], the orders establishing the jurisdiction of military commissions in various theaters of operation provided that conspiracy to violate the laws of war was a cognizable offense. See Letter, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific (Sept. 24, 1945), Record in Yamashita v. Styer, O. T. 1945, No. 672, pp. 14, 16 (Exh. F) (Order respecting the "Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals" provided that "participation in a common plan or conspiracy to accomplish" various offenses against the law of war was cognizable before military commissions). The political reality is that **high government officials in the U.S. are never going to be held accountable for war crimes**. In practice, "international law" exists as a justifying instrument for powerful countries to impose their will on those which are less powerful, and war crimes tribunals are almost always a form of victor's justice. So **neither John Yoo, David Addington nor Alberto Gonzales**, and certainly not their bosses at whose behest they were working, are going to be sitting in a dock charged with war crimes **any time soon -- regardless of whether they ought to be.** But those who propound these principles and claim to believe in them ought to apply them consistently. **John Yoo is not some misguided conservative legal thinker with whom one should have civil, pleasant, intellectually stimulating debates** at law schools and on PBS. **Respectfully debating the legality and justification of torture regimes, and treating systematic torture perpetrators like John Yoo with respect, isn't all that far off from what Yoo and his comrades did**. It isn't pleasant to think about high government officials in one's own country as war criminals -- that's something that only bad, evil dictatorships have -- but, **pleasant or not, it rather indisputably happens to be what we have.** Lawyers can make really bad legal arguments that argue for very unjust things in perfectly legal sounding language. I hope nobody is surprised by this fact. It is very commonplace. Today we are talking about lawyers making arguments defending the legality of torture. In the past lawyers have used legal sounding arguments to defend slavery, the genocide of Native Americans, rape (both spousal and non-spousal), Jim Crow, police brutality, denials of habeas corpus, destruction or seizure of property, and compulsory sterilization. . . . . Orin [Kerr] wants to know whether John [Yoo]'s theories are consistent with my views of the living constitution. If he wants to know as a substantive matter whether John's theories of Presidential dictatorship are consistent with the Constitution's text and underlying principles, they are not. **The fact that a lawyer does something in his capacity as a lawyer does not mean it's proper, legitimate or legal**. **The fact that an argument is packaged in lawyerly wrapping doesn't mean it's reasonable or offered in good faith**. All sorts of lawyers -- from those representing crime families to those representing terrorists -- have been convicted of crimes because they concealed and/or promoted their clients' illegal acts. Lawyers aren't any more immune from the rule of law than anyone else. Harper's Scott Horton makes the point in much the same way: These memoranda have been crafted not as an after-the-fact defense to criminal charges, but rather as a roadmap to committing crimes and getting away with it. They are the sort of handiwork we associate with the consigliere, or mob lawyer. But these consiglieri are government attorneys who have sworn an oath, which they are violating, to uphold the law. Along those lines, Marcy Wheeler and Slate's Emily Bazelon both demonstrate how un-lawyerly Yoo's opinions were. Yoo wasn't acting as a lawyer in order legally to analyze questions surrounding interrogation powers. He was acting with the **intent to enable illegal torture and used the law as his instrument to authorize criminality.**

### 1AR – Yoo Ext

#### Yoo wrote memos providing a basis for torturing POC in the middle east – reject problematic authors because it only enhances their reputation – independently, be sus of his impact calc because he doesn’t care about collateral damage of POC

### AT Definition

#### Wilcox 17 defines SWARM tech – has self-organising capabilities, non-linear, and adaptive coordination of bodies

### AT Circumvention

#### 1 – Durable fiat – aff always loses to solvency – topic ed is about whether a ban would be beneficial, not whether it would work – would not should debates prevent in-depth clash on benefits of implementation

#### 2 – Non-binding still solves – chemical and bioweapon treaties empirically work through stigma

# 1AR – AT: T/Theory

## 1AR – AT: T

### 1AR – AT: Must Spec State

#### I meet I defend all states

#### I meet – evidence says US, UK, and other great powers

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to spec which countries they defend.

#### CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1-minute shell. Terminal defense to the interp – I could’ve met.

#### Default to reasonability – competing interps crowds out substantive clash and over punishes for marginal abuse – judge intervention is inevitable and competing interps creates a race to marginal benefits

#### No resolutional basis means infinitely regressive – forces spend 6 minutes specifying everything nebulous – crowds out substance and loses to marginal offense

#### It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

### 1AR – AT: T FW

#### I meet – garner offense off the enactment of the plan

### 1AR – AT: T Consequences Only

#### Non-unique – policy affs use scenario planning good and extinction reps good as offense vs. k’s – method discussions key to expanding clash from just a 5 second plan

### 1AR – AT: Future

#### CI: Affs can immediately ban future tech.

#### Yes preemptive bans

HRW 20 "Stopping Killer Robots," Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and 8-10-2020 RE

At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, Costa Rica warned that “many problems identified with the use of armed drones would be exacerbated by the trend toward increasing autonomy in robotic weapons.”[73] Costa Rica has proposed that critical functions of weapons systems be subject to meaningful human control.[74] It called for a preemptive ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in April 2016, advocating a preventive approach and citing the precedent provided by the ban on blinding lasers.[75] Costa Rica participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2016-2019.

#### 1 – Overlimiting – 1 aff under their interp – just sgr-a1

#### 2 – Clash – all literature says autonomous weapons are coming and being developed now and why there’s need for a pre-emptive ban

#### 3 – I meet – Being developed for out of the loop

Pasquale 15 [By&nbsp;Frank Pasquale, 11-8-2015, "The Doubtful Ethics of Drone Warfare," CHE, https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-doubtful-ethics-of-drone-warfare/?bc\_nonce=6bml8hbbf36efxe1clt8dt&amp;cid=reg\_wall\_signup, accessed 2-11-2021]LHSBC

As Andrew Bacevich has argued, maturely grappling with the [need for cooperation](http://www.amazon.com/Washington-Rules-Americas-Permanent-American/dp/0805094229) in an unmasterable world is a viable alternative to arms races. At present, though, the military-industrial complex is speeding us toward the development of “human out of the loop” drone swarms, ostensibly because only machines will be fast enough to anticipate the enemy’s counterstrategies.

#### 4 – Reasonability — defense means theory crowded out substance – judges inevitably intervene to adjudicate debates and competing interps causes infinite theory to race to most fair norm

### 1AR – AT: T Autonomous

#### I meet – we ban only lethal autonomous drone swarms – monitoring video feeds, independently targeting, and executing actions of hundreds of drones must be autonomous – kalleborn says it’s the only clear brightline

#### Plan text in a vacuum – aff only says “lethal autonomous drone swarms” – hold us to the plan – only non-arbitrary stasis point and everyone bases links and competition off of wording of the plan – irrelevant affs lose when the neg makes no solvency and fill-in arguments

#### Being developed for out of the loop

Pasquale 15 [By&nbsp;Frank Pasquale, 11-8-2015, "The Doubtful Ethics of Drone Warfare," CHE, https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-doubtful-ethics-of-drone-warfare/?bc\_nonce=6bml8hbbf36efxe1clt8dt&amp;cid=reg\_wall\_signup, accessed 2-11-2021]LHSBC

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#### Definitions prevent infinite theoretical goalpost shifting which crowds out substance

#### Reasonability — defense means theory crowded out substance – judges inevitably intervene to adjudicate debates and competing interps causes infinite theory to race to most fair norm

### 1AR – AT: T Lethal

#### I meet – we ban only lethal autonomous drone swarms – half the aff says they kill POC

#### Plan text in a vacuum – aff only says “lethal autonomous drone swarms” – hold us to the plan – only non-arbitrary stasis point and everyone bases links and competition off of wording of the plan – irrelevant affs lose when the neg makes no solvency and fill-in arguments

### 1AR – AT: T Ban

#### Counter Interpretation: States can ban specific types of lethal autonomous weapons.

#### Can ban certain forms

#### 1 – Courts

Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp. 13 [Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp., 3-14-2013, "Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 611," No Publication, https://casetext.com/case/freeman-v-dal-tile-corp, accessed 1-21-2021]LHSBC

The court notes that the word “ban” simply means “to prohibit.” Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (Unabridged) 169 (1993) (defining “ban” as “to prohibit, esp[ecially] by legal means or social pressure the performance, activities, dissemination, or use of”); Black's Law Dictionary 164 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “ban” as “[t]o prohibit, esp[ecially] by legal means”). Bans may take on various forms. They may be permanent or temporary, they may prohibit certain forms of communication ( e.g., communication over the telephone), but not others ( e.g., communication by letter or email), or they may encompass any number of different physical, temporal, or geographic restrictions ( e.g., a restraining order which bans contact within a certain number of feet). Here, plaintiff appears to be asking the court to infer that Dal–Tile “promised” (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 78, at 9, 12, 24, 27, 31) her an immediate, permanent ban that would keep her from ever having to communicate with or physically encounter Koester again. However, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record does not support such a finding. ( See, e.g., Pl.'s Dep., DE # 62–1, at 212:1–12; S. Wrenn Dep., DE # 78–4, at 31:18–32:4.)

#### 2 – Topic Lit

Crootof 15 [Rebecca Crootof is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law, Dr. Crootof earned a B.A. cum laude in English with a minor in Mathematics at Pomona College; a J.D. at Yale Law School; and a PhD at Yale Law School.] 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1837 (2015). “The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications” <https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2605&context=law-faculty-publications> | ahsBC

Finally, regardless of how autonomous weapon systems are defined, a ban might exclude certain types or uses no one seems to find objectionable, like autonomous weapon systems now employed for purely defensive purposes or “smart” weapons which better distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets.232 While such exclusions will likely increase ratification rates, they would also undermine many ban advocates’ goals, such as limiting military investment in weapon autonomy and preventing the proliferation of autonomous weapon systems.

#### Definitions prevent infinite theoretical goalpost shifting which crowds out substance

#### 1 – Clash – either no innovation or creates illogical and uneducational US drone swarms vs. korean SGR-A1 debates – depth outweighs because multiple rounds solve breadth

#### 2 – PICs flip their standards and make spec inevitable – it’s worse because the neg has other offs, 1NC spec is late breaking, and 1AR restarts are crushing

#### 3 – Reasonability — defense means theory crowded out substance – judges inevitably intervene to adjudicate debates and competing interps causes infinite theory to race to most fair norm

#### 4 – Generics – inevitable Soft Law, politics, ai innovation, and arms control means neg has ground and affs need a substantial unique advantage lest they get clapped – we force innovative research and critical thinking to find links.

#### Jurisdiction wrong – judges vote on non-T affs

#### Pics arg is wrong – competition is inevitable meaning people will read the best position to win

#### TVA doesn’t solve – our args are unique to reading speccing a weapon

### 1AR – AT: Nebel Weapons

#### Counter Interpretation: States can ban specific types of lethal autonomous weapons.

#### Can ban certain forms

#### 1 – Courts

Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp. 13 [Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp., 3-14-2013, "Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 611," No Publication, https://casetext.com/case/freeman-v-dal-tile-corp, accessed 1-21-2021]LHSBC

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Finally, regardless of how autonomous weapon systems are defined, a ban might exclude certain types or uses no one seems to find objectionable, like autonomous weapon systems now employed for purely defensive purposes or “smart” weapons which better distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets.232 While such exclusions will likely increase ratification rates, they would also undermine many ban advocates’ goals, such as limiting military investment in weapon autonomy and preventing the proliferation of autonomous weapon systems.

#### Grammar not predictable – topic literature is IR scholars defining terms of art, not convoluted linguistics

#### Definitions prevent infinite theoretical goalpost shifting which crowds out substance

#### 1 – Clash – either no innovation or creates illogical and uneducational US drone swarms vs. korean SGR-A1 debates – depth outweighs because multiple rounds solve breadth

#### 2 – PICs flip their standards and make spec inevitable – it’s worse because the neg has other offs, 1NC spec is late breaking, and 1AR restarts are crushing

#### 3 – Reasonability — defense means theory crowded out substance – judges inevitably intervene to adjudicate debates and competing interps causes infinite theory to race to most fair norm

#### 4 – Generics – inevitable Soft Law, politics, ai innovation, and arms control means neg has ground and affs need a substantial unique advantage lest they get clapped – we force innovative research and critical thinking to find links.

#### Jurisdiction wrong – judges vote on non-T affs

#### Pics arg is wrong – competition is inevitable meaning people will read the best position to win

#### TVA doesn’t solve – our args are unique to reading speccing a weapon

## 1AR – AT: Theory

### 1AR – AT: IR Spec

#### I meet – we’re constructivist

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to spec theory of IR

#### 1 – CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1-minute shell – independently, neg has generics like politics, innovation, and arms control K’s

#### 2 – Default to reasonability – competing interps crowds out substantive clash and over punishes for marginal abuse – judge intervention is inevitable and competing interps creates a race to marginal benefits

#### 3 – No resolutional basis means infinitely regressive – forces us to spend 6 minutes specifying everything nebulous – realist? Offensive? Neo? – crowds out substantive discussion and offense

#### 4 – It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

### 1AR – AT: Enforcement Spec

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to spec enforcement

#### 1 – CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1-minute shell – independently, neg has generics like politics, innovation, and arms control K’s

#### 2 – Default to reasonability – competing interps crowds out substantive clash and over punishes for marginal abuse – judge intervention is inevitable and competing interps creates a race to marginal benefits

#### 3 – No resolutional basis means infinitely regressive – forces us to spend 6 minutes specifying everything nebulous – on site inspections? Video controls? Article 36? Etc. – crowds out substantive discussion and offense

#### 4 – It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

### 1AR – AT: Spec – Short

#### Forcing us to specify is bad –

#### 1---Arbitrary and nonsensical – No resolutional basis makes their interp unpredictable – Kills clash since we didn’t know to meet it

#### 2---Infinite regress – How much specification is enough? They can add infinite possible conditions so we never meet – Kills clash

#### 3---No offense – Neg can read a definition, ask us in cross x, and we defined ban in solvency – that solves

#### 4---Reasonability to preserve substance

### Theory – Spec

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to specify past the resolution.

#### 1 - CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1 minute shell. Terminal defense to the interp – I could’ve met.

#### 2 - Default to reasonability – competing interps crowds out substantive clash and over punishes for marginal abuse

#### 3 - Infinitely regressive – forces the 1AC to become a 6 minute plan text that loses to substance every time – is the plan local? Targeted? A living wage? Federally funded? Workfare? Jobs banks? Transitional? Etc. prove

#### It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

### Theory – Spec Funding Source

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to specify funding source.

#### 1] CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1 minute shell. Terminal defense to the interp – I could’ve met.

#### 2] Default to reasonability – competing interps crowds out substantive clash and over punishes for marginal abuse

#### 3] Infinitely regressive – forces the 1AC to spend the entire time speccing – who do you tax, what are the income brackets, is it linear or exponential, what are the exact percentages, are there exemptions, does it apply to corporations

#### 4] It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

#### 5] Extra T – Carbon Taxes, cutting defense spending, cutting police spending, tax on the 1% etc. explode negative prep burdens.

### Theory – Util Spec

#### Counter Interpretation: Affirmatives don’t have to spec their type of util

#### 1 – CX checks – would’ve specified if you asked me. 30 seconds at most in CX matters less than their 1 minute shell. Terminal defense to the interp – I could’ve met.

#### 2 – Default to reasonability – competing interps crowds out substantive clash and over punishes for marginal abuse

#### 3 – Infinitely regressive – forces 1ac to spend entire time speccing and losing to substance and creates norm of infinite spec shells which crowds out substantive clash – i.e. what does util do in X situation, does it account for X people, etc.

#### 4 – It’s potential abuse – just because I “could’ve” done something doesn’t mean I would do it. We shouldn’t vote someone down because they could’ve read 7 NIBs.

### Theory – Don’t need to dislcose New Affs

#### Aff debaters don’t need to disclose new affs

#### Innovation – not disclosing new affs gives debaters an incentive to research because of the competitive advantage – impact turns all teir fairness claims.

#### No limits explosion – unless they prove our aff is non-topical we’re in the predictable realm of preparation which means they should have prep.

#### Generics debate is good – forces us to have in-depth discussions with deep literature bases

### Theory – New Affs Good

#### We get new affs

#### 1 – innovation – only old affs prevents new research which is necessary for more nuanced clash

#### 2 – inevitable – everyone reads a new aff beginning of the topic

#### 3 – reasonability – being topical means they should have prep – winning sufficient defense means they crowdout substantive clash

### 1AR – AT: Cite Trans People

#### Counterinterp – Affs don’t have to defend anything beyond the resolution if not asked before the round

#### 1---Request plank is terminal defense – If you asked, I would have complied

#### 2---Arbitrary and nonsensical – No resolutional basis makes their interp unpredictable – Kills clash since we didn’t know to meet it

#### 2---Infinite regress – How many citations enough? They can add infinite possible conditions so we never meet – Kills clash

#### 3---Your interp doesn’t solve – People will just read one sentence from a trans person, which obviously does not “center trans epistemology” as per 1nc Nicolazzo

#### 4---Aff isn’t epistemic extraction – We haven’t “objectified” trans perspectives – We get new 2ar answers if the 2nr gets new link explanation

#### 5---Your interp makes epistemic extraction worse – It allows cis people to just cite one trans person and pretend they’re super progressive and inclusive when they actually haven’t done anything to make debate more inclusive

#### 6---Not inspiration porn – Nicolazzo is critiquing the instrumentalization of trans experiences, which has nothing to do with the aff

#### 7---Reasonability to preserve substance

#### 8---No normsetting – Debaters will just prep out theory instead of improving practices especially if they’re punished with a loss

#### 9---No epistemology – They haven’t indicted specific claims in the aff, and if adding A ONE SENTENCE CARD solves our epistemology, then the rest of the aff’s claims are probably fine too

#### 10---Reasonability doesn’t allow oppression – Instead debating substance gives us skills from incentivizing clash, research, advocacy skills, etc. that enable advocacy outside the round

#### 11---Either intervention is inevitable from competing offense claims OR weighing solves

# 1AR – AT: K

## 1AR – AT: General

### 1AR – Weigh the aff – Fairness

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens and not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC – aff is an opportunity cost to the alt meaning case is a 6 minute disad

### 1AR – Perm

#### Permutation do both – the affirmative is part of a larger project of BIPOC futurisms that endorse swarms of black and brown folks working together to rupture the status quo in favor of a new utopian future – plan is key because the swarms of war surveil and kill BIPOC coopting the swarm and stamping out movements

### 1AR – Alt Can’t Solve

#### Alt can’t solve case – the empire is too powerful – but if they fiat the state away it’s utopian fiat which is a voter – impossible for the aff to generate offense vs. alts that wish away oppression

### 1AR – Fiat Good

#### Fiat is good –

#### A] It's a model of debate that puts US in charge of government action and DEMANDS that politicians like Trump shouldn't control the world, which resolves political passivity and motivates pursuing change through activism out of round -- spills over and outweighs on scope. Especially key since political apathy is widespread now and the alt only reinforces that by abstracting away from state action.

#### B] Focusing on consequences forwards a better method of cost benefit analysis that teaches us how to defend effective solutions and movements well– that bolster advocacy skills and controls the internal link into out of round change.

#### Institutional action is necessary and more predictable than other forms of engagement because the state is the most powerful institution in the history of the world -- that makes it a better basis for developing skills and frames out their state bad offense

#### Our epistemology is inherently tied to the consequences of the plan so it makes no sense to separate the two

### 1AR – AT: Humanism

#### We’re not humanist – we reclaim insect like posthumanist images of the swarm that blur the lines between human and technology which ruptures status quo heteronormative humanist thought

### 1AR – AT: Robots Good

#### We also think that technology is fine – it’s only unacceptable when the empire coopts it as racialized tools of control which prevents their emancipatory nature

### 1AR – AT: Enslavement

#### Military enslaves robots as tools of control – we free them and embrace “robotic” forms of organizing like the swarm

### 1AR – AT: Sanitization

#### Not sanitizing – intervention is bad now but it could get infinitely worse

### 1AR – AT: Vora

#### Their ev is about campaign to stop killer robots – the aff specifically problematizes the necropolitical conditions that they critique – read blue

Vora 19, Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures, by Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi Vora, Duke University Press, 2019. //sid

Debates about killer robots conceptualize an ethics and a politics of life and death in the face of technological challenges to the bounds of the human. Yet, as we argue here, the presumption of an impossible morality for the killer robot in human rights discourses follows from the internationally sanc- tioned distinction between humane and inhumane, as well as human and inhuman, forms of violence undergirding the temporality of the surrogate effect as the racial grammar of the global human rights regime and its tech- noliberal updates.26 Killer robots bring into crisis how violence constitutes the human against the nonhuman, subsuming the racialized and gendered epistemologies of prior affirmations of authorized violence. Legitimated vio- lence has ranged in its end goals from colonial “civilizing” or “humanizing” occupation to humanitarian intervention.27 International law permits cer- tain forms of imperial and state violence unleashed upon populations whose full humanity has always been suspect. The idea that killer robots represent a radical break in how violence is defined in the end reaffirms imperial sov- ereignty by aligning moral violence with the (already) human. Even as the killer robot is tethered to dystopic futures, we approach autonomous weap- ons as a devastatingly familiar technology predated by colonialism, the Cold War, science fiction fantasies, and in our contemporary moment, the drone. As Lisa Lowe puts it, “We [continue to] see the longevity of the colonial divi- sions of humanity in our contemporary moment, in which the human life of citizens protected by the state is bound to the denigration of populations cast in violation of human life, set outside of human society.”28 At first glance, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the ngo founded in 2012 and consisting of human rights groups, activists, and scholars, as well as human rights organizations calling for a preemptive ban on autonomous lethal weapons, appears to reassert common humanity rather than differenti- ate populations whose right to live or thrive has been withdrawn. The Cam- paign to Stop Killer Robots argues that “[a]llowing life or death decisions to be made by machines crosses a fundamental moral line. Autonomous robots would lack human judgment and the ability to understand context. These qualities are necessary to make complex ethical choices on a dynamic battlefield, to distinguish adequately between soldiers and civilians, and to evaluate the proportionality of an attack. As a result, fully autonomous weap- ons would not meet the requirements of the laws of war.”29 The problem, as articulated here, is about maintaining human command and control over the decision about who lives and who dies (soldiers vs. civilians, appropri- ate “targets” vs. inappropriate “collateral damage”). Meanwhile, the group offers a solution to the problem of the loss of human control in the field of war in juridical terms. “A comprehensive, preemptive prohibition on the development, production and use of fully autonomous weapons—weapons that operate on their own without human intervention—is urgently needed. This could be achieved through an international treaty, as well as through national laws and other measures.”30 In this sense, the campaign conflates the human and the liberal rights-bearing subject. Furthermore, calls for pre- emptive bans collapse morality with human nature, and thus also with liberal development through law, which, as Esmeir demonstrates, asserts the colo- niality undergirding the rise of juridical humanity. For example, echoing Donnelly and other human rights scholars’ fram- ing of human nature as grounded in moral potential, Chris Heyns, the un special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, noted that what au- tonomous machines lack is “morality and mortality,” and that as a conse- quence they should not be permitted to make decisions over human life and death.31 Similarly, in its 2014 publication, Human Rights Watch argues that the creation of autonomous weapons would be a violation of human rights, human dignity, and the right to life because “humans possess the unique capability to identify with other human beings and are thus better equipped to understand the nuances of unforeseen behavior [when dis- tinguishing between lawful and unlawful targets] in ways in which ma- chines . . . simply cannot.”32 The report also proposes that because “fully autonomous weapons would lack emotions, including compassion and a resistance to killing,” civilians and soldiers would be in greater danger: “Humans possess empathy . . . and are generally reluctant to take the life of another human.”33 Unable to regard targets as relatable, a machine can- not make a moral choice about when, where, and against whom to enact violence. What emerges is a fantasy of shared humanity that is felt and created across difference through flashes of recognition (and reobjectifica- tion) that elicit compassion and empathy toward another who is suffering. As we argue in chapter 5, machines are not simply extensions of and mediations around a stable category of the “human”; rather, notions of human autonomy, agency, and fields of actions shift through machines even if they reiterate, reassert, or regenerate through well-worn racial and imperial epistemes. On the one hand, human rights operate through racial and gendered difference. Human beings demonstrate themselves as moral by being able to feel for the pain and suffering of others who are different from themselves. On the other hand, there is an emphasis on sameness (or at least a potential for similarity as distant others are welcomed into the “family of man” as liberal rights-bearing subjects). One must be judged to be human (or otherwise sentient in a humanlike manner) in order for suffering to be recognized as needing to be remediated. The scale of relat- ability, perceptible through what Hartman proposes is the precarity of em- pathy, then, not only parallels and reinforces the scale of humanness (that is, who can be judged to be human and who cannot); it also underwrites how notions of the “moral nature” of humanity come to take shape. This is a temporal relation that produces full humanity as part of liberal futurity and social development.

## 1AR – AT: Arms Control

### 1AR – AT: Arms Control

#### 1 – Permutation do both – the affirmative is part of a broader BIPOC futurism that envisions a utopia without militarized swarms – retaking the swarm is necessary to for cooperative coalitions that overthrow the status quo

#### 2 – Don’t justify other weapons – things are bad now but they can get worse

#### 3 – Utopian fiat is a voting issue – impossible for the affirmative to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression

#### 4 – Case is a 6 minute disad to the alt – it’s an opportunity cost which means we get to weigh the aff

#### 5 – Alt can’t solve – empire is too powerful which means we need to work from within

### Link – Humanitarian

#### Perm do both – Humanitarian discourse is compatible with the alternative’s radical agenda

Bolton and Minor 16 [Matthew Bolton is assistant professor of political science at Pace University in New York City. He has a PhD in government from the London School of Economics. He is author of Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance (IB Tauris, 2010) and co-editor of Occupying Political Science (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Elizabeth Minor is a researcher at UK-based NGO Article 36. She has a Masters in comparative politics from the London School of Economics. She previously worked as a researcher for the NGO Every Casualty and Oxford Research Group. The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay: The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons’ Operationalization of Critical IR Theories, Global Policy (2016) doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12343//lhs-ap]

However, strategic adoption of the discourse of humanitarianism and human security – with its problematic detente with militarism – does not mean campaigners are beholden to it. As Caliban retorts in Shakespeare’s Tempest, learning the language of his oppressors means he can now curse Prospero and Miranda in language they understand (Act 1, Scene 2: 363–364). One of the mistakes of many critical studies of humanitarian disarmament is an assumption that all campaigners have wholly bought into their own rhetoric. One can have a radical agenda while speaking the language of the diplomatic arena. The discourse of humanitarian disarmament has been subversive – as evidenced in this case by the fierce defensiveness of the nuclear-armed states. That a ban on nuclear weapons is a partial solution does not necessarily mean a legitimation of the ‘remainder’ problem. A ban can build a precedent, just as the landmine ban has done – having spin-off effects for many years and on unexpected sectors. Of course, it can be difficult for those who do wish to retain a more radical agenda in the everyday ‘common sense’ of nuclear discourse. It requires what Kapoor (2004) calls ‘hyperself-reflexivity’ – relentless self-examination to ensure that the strategic adoption of the humanitarian discourse does not shut down a more sweeping critique of militarization. In aiming to maintain their integrity, it may be useful for these disarmament campaigners to draw on the paradigm of ‘critical solidarity’ (Peters, 2014): humanitarian compassion must be augmented by recognition of privilege and a sense of mutuality with and accountability to those most oppressed by the nuclear order.

## 1AR – AT: Cap

### 1AR

#### 1 – Permutation do both – the 1AC affirms BIPOC futures which envision utopias that’ve dismantled oppressive structures like capitalism

#### 2 – Aff li­nk turns all their offense – research project of the aff endorses posthuman bipoc futures that embraces becoming insect which blurs the lines of gender, race, and species

#### 3 – Utopian fiat is a voting issue – impossible for the affirmative to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression

#### 4 – Case is a 6 minute disad to the alt – it’s an opportunity cost which means we get to weigh the aff

### Impact Turns

#### Warming irreversible---only cap solves through CCS and a bridge to renewables

**Graciela** 9/1/**16** – Professor of Economics and of Statistics at Columbia University and Visiting Professor at Stanford University, and was the architect of the Kyoto Protocol carbon market (being interviewed by Marcus Rolle, freelance journalist specializing in environmental issues and global affairs, “Reversing Climate Change: Interview with Graciela Chichilnisky,” http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/01/09/2016/reversing-climate-change-interview-graciela-chichilnisky)//cmr

GC: Green capitalism is a new economic system that values the natural resources on which human survival depends. It fosters a harmonious relationship with our planet, its resources and the many species it harbors. It is a new type of market economics that addresses both equity and efficiency. Using carbon negative technology™ it helps reduce carbon in the atmosphere while fostering economic development in rich and developing nations, for example in the U S., EU, China and India. How does this work? In a nutshell Green Capitalism requires the creation of global limits or property rights nation by nation for the use of the atmosphere, the bodies of water and the planet’s biodiversity, and the creation of new markets to trade these rights from which new economic values and a new concept of economic progress emerges updating GDP as is now generally agreed is needed. **Green Capitalism is needed** now **to** help **avert climate change** and achieve the goals of the 2015 UN Paris Agreement, which are very ambitious and universally supported but have no way to be realized within the Agreement itself. The Carbon Market and its CDM play critical roles in the foundation of Green Capitalism, creating values to redefine GDP. These are needed to remain within the world’s “CO2 budget” and avoid catastrophic climate change. As I see it, the **building blocks** for Green Capitalism are then as follows; (1) Global limits nation by nation in the use of the planet’s atmosphere, its water bodies and biodiversity - these are global public goods. (2) New global markets to trade these limits, based on equity and efficiency. These markets are relatives of the Carbon Market and the SO2 market. The new market create new measures of economic values and update the concept of GDP. (3) Efficient use of Carbon Negative Technologies to avert catastrophic climate change by providing a smooth transition to clean energy and ensuring economic prosperity in rich and poor nations. These building blocks have immediate practical implications in reversing climate change and can assist the ambitious aims of Paris COP21 become a reality. MR: What is the greatest advantage of the new generation technologies that can capture CO2 from the air? GC: These technologies build carbon negative power plants, such as Global Thermostat, that clean the atmosphere of CO2 while producing electricity. Global Thermostat is a firm that is commercializing a technology that takes CO2 out of air and uses mostly low cost residual heat rather than electricity to drive the capture process, making the entire process of capturing CO2 from the atmosphere very inexpensive. There is enough residua heat in a coal power plant that it can be used to capture twice as much CO2 as the plant emits, thus transforming the power plant into a “carbon sink.” For example, a 400 MW coal plant that emits 1 million tons of CO2 per year can become a carbon sink absorbing a net amount of 1 million tons of CO2 instead. Carbon capture from air can be done anywhere and at any time, and so inexpensively that the CO2 can be sold for industrial or commercial uses such as plastics, food and beverages, greenhouses, bio-fertilizers, building materials and even enhanced oil recovery, all examples of large global markets and profitable opportunities. Carbon capture is powered mostly by low (85°C) residual heat that is inexpensive, and any source will do. In particular, renewable (solar) technology can power the process of carbon capture. This can help advance solar technology and make it more cost-efficient. This means more energy, more jobs, and it also means economic growth in developing nations, all of this while cleaning the CO2 in the atmosphere. Carbon negative technologies can literally transform the world economy. MR: One final question. You distinguish between long-run and short-run strategies in the effort to reverse climate change. Would carbon negative technologies be part of a short-run strategy? GC: Long-run strategies are quite different from strategies for the short-run. Often **long-run strategies do not work in the short run** and different policies and **economic incentives are needed.** In the long run the best climate change policy is to replace fossil fuel sources of energy that by themselves cause 45% of the global emissions, and to plant trees to restore if possible the natural sources and sinks of CO2. But the fossil fuel power plant infrastructure is about **87%** of the power plant infrastructure and about $45-55 trillion globally. This infrastructure cannot be replaced quickly, **certainly not in the short time period in which we need to take action to avert catastrophic climate change**. The issue is that CO2 once emitted remains hundreds of years in the atmosphere and we have emitted so much that unless we actually **remove the CO2** that is already there, **we cannot remain** long **within the carbon budget**, which is the concentration of CO2 beyond which we fear catastrophic climate change. In the short run, therefore, **we face significant time pressure**. The **IPCC indicates** in its 2014 5th Assessment Report that we must actually **remove the carbon that is already in the atmosphere** and do so **in massive quantities**, this century (p. 191 of 5th Assessment Report). This is what I called a carbon negative approach, which works for the short run. Renewable energy is the long run solution. Renewable energy is too slow for a short run resolution since replacing a $45-55 trillion power plant infrastructure with renewable plants could take **decades**. We need action sooner than that. For the short run we need carbon negative technologies that capture more carbon than what is emitted. Trees do that and they must be conserved to help preserve biodiversity. Biochar does that. But trees and other natural sinks are too slow for what we need today. Therefore, negative carbon is needed now as part of a blueprint for transformation. It must be part of the blueprint for Sustainable Development and its short term manifestation that I call **Green Capitalism**, while in the long run renewable sources of energy suffice, including Wind, Biofuels, Nuclear, Geothermal, and Hydroelectric energy. These are in limited supply and cannot replace fossil fuels. Global energy today is roughly divided as follows: 87% is fossil, namely natural gas, coal, oil; 10% is nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric, and less than 1% is solar power — photovoltaic and solar thermal. Nuclear fuel is scarce and nuclear technology is generally considered dangerous as tragically experienced by the Fukushima Daichi nuclear disaster in Japan, and it seems unrealistic to seek a solution in the nuclear direction. Only solar energy can be a long term solution: Less than 1% of the solar energy we receive on earth can be transformed into 10 times the fossil fuel energy used in the world today. Yet **we need a short-term strategy that accelerates long run renewable energy**, or we will defeat long-term goals. In the short term as the IPCC validates, we need carbon negative technology, carbon removals. The short run is the next 20 or 30 years. **There is no time in this period of time to transform the entire fossil infrastructure** — it costs $45-55 trillion (IEA) to replace and it is slow to build. We need to directly reduce carbon in the atmosphere now. We cannot use traditional methods to remove CO2 from smokestacks (called often Carbon Capture and Sequestration, CSS) because they are not carbon negative as is required. CSS works but does not suffice because it only captures what power plants currently emit. Any level of emissions adds to the stable and high concentration we have today and CO2 remains in the atmosphere for years. We need to remove the CO2 that is already in the atmosphere, namely air capture of CO2 also called carbon removals. The solution is to combine air capture of CO2 with storage of CO2 into stable materials such as biochar, cement, polymers, and carbon fibers that replace a number of other construction materials such as metals. The most recent BMW automobile model uses only carbon fibers rather than metals. It is also possible to combine CO2 to produce renewable gasoline, namely gasoline produced from air and water. CO2 can be separated from air and hydrogen separated from water, and their combination is a well-known industrial process to produce gasoline. Is this therefore too expensive? There are new technologies using algae that make synthetic fuel commercially feasible at competitive rates. Other policies would involve combining air capture with solar thermal electricity using the residual solar thermal heat to drive the carbon capture process. This can make a solar plant more productive and efficient so it can out-compete coal as a source of energy. In summary, the blueprint offered here is a **private/public approach**, based on **new industrial tech**nology and **financial markets**, **self-funded** and using **profitable greenmarkets**, with securities that utilize carbon credits as the “underlying” asset, based on the KP CDM, as well as new markets for biodiversity and water providing abundant clean energy to stave off impending and actual energy crisis in developing nations, fostering mutually beneficial cooperation for industrial and developing nations. The blueprint proposed provides the two sides of the coin, equity and efficiency, and can assign a critical role for women as stewards for human survival and sustainable development. My vision is **a carbon negative economy** that **represents green capitalism** in **resolving** the Global Climate negotiations and **the North–South Divide**. Carbon negative power plants and capture of CO2 from air and ensure a clean atmosphere together innovation and more jobs and exports: the more you produce and create jobs the cleaner becomes the atmosphere. In practice, Green Capitalism means economic growth that is harmonious with the Earth resources.

#### The alt causes transition wars

**Harris 02** (Lee Harris, Hoover Institution and Author of The Suicide of Reason, “The Intellectual Origins of America-Bashing,” <https://www.hoover.org/research/intellectual-origins-america-bashing>//TU-SG)

For Marx it is absolutely essential that revolutionary activities be justifiable on realistic premises. **If they cannot be, then they are actions that cannot possibly have a real political objective** — and therefore, their only value can be the private emotional or spiritual satisfaction of the people carrying out this pseudo-political action. So in order for revolutionary activity to have a chance of succeeding, there is an unavoidable precondition: The workers must have become much poorer over time. Furthermore, there had to be not merely an increase of poverty, but a conviction on the part of the workers that their material circumstances would only get worse, and not better — and this would require genuine misery. This is the immiserization thesis of Marx. And it is central to revolutionary Marxism, **since if capitalism produces no widespread misery, then it also produces no fatal internal contradiction: If everyone is getting better off through capitalism, who will dream of struggling to overthrow it**? Only genuine misery on the part of the workers would be sufficient to overturn the whole apparatus of the capitalist state, simply because, as Marx insisted, **the capitalist class could not be realistically expected to relinquish control of the state apparatus** and, with it, the monopoly of force. In this, Marx was absolutely correct. No capitalist society has ever **willingly** liquidated itself, and it is **utopian** to think that any ever will. Therefore, in order to achieve the goal of socialism, nothing short of a complete revolution would do; and this means, in point of fact, **a full-fledged civil war** not just within one society, but **across the globe**. Without this is catastrophic upheaval, capitalism would remain completely in control of the social order and all socialist schemes would be reduced to pipe dreams. The immiserization thesis, therefore, is critical to Marx, for without it there would be no objective conditions in response to which workers might be driven to overthrow the capitalist system. If the workers were becoming better off with time, then why jump into an utterly untested and highly speculative economic scheme? Especially when even socialists themselves were bitterly divided over what such a scheme would be like in actual practice. Indeed, Marx never committed himself to offering a single suggestion about how socialism would actually function in the real world.

**Capitalism is sustainable and self-correcting---they can’t solve**

Seabra 12 (Leo, has a background in Communication and Broadcasting and a broad experience which includes activities in Marketing, Advertising, Sales and Public Relations, 2/27, “Capitalism can drive Sustainability and also innovation,” http://seabraaffairs.wordpress.com/2012/02/27/capitalism-can-drive-sustainability-and-also-innovation/)

There are those who say that if the world does not change their habits, even the end of economic growth, and assuming alternative ways of living, will be a catastrophe. “Our lifestyles are unsustainable. Our expectations of consumption are predatory.Either we change this, or will be chaos”. Others say that the pursuit of unbridled economic growth and the inclusion of more people in consumption is killing the Earth. We have to create alternative because economic growth is pointing to the global collapse. “What will happen when billions of Chinese decide to adopt the lifestyle of Americans?” I’ll disagree if you don’t mind… **They might be** wrong. **Completely wrong** .. Even very intelligent people wrongly interpret the implications of what they observe when they lose the perspective of time. In the vast scale of time (today, decades, not centuries) it is the opposite of what expected, because they start from a false assumption: the future is the extrapolation of this. But not necessarily be. How do I know? Looking at history. What story? The history of innovation, this thing generates increases in productivity, wealth, quality of life in an unimaginable level. It is innovation that will defeat pessimism as it always did. It was innovation that made life today is incomparably better than at any other time in human history. And will further improve. Einstein, who was not a stupid person, believed that capitalism would generate crisis, instability, and growing impoverishment. He said: “The economic anarchy of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the true source of evil.” The only way to eliminate this evil, he thought, was to establish socialism, with the means of production are owned by the company. A centrally controlled economy would adjust the production of goods and services the needs of people, and would distribute the work that needed to be done among those in a position to do so. This would guarantee a livelihood to every man, women and children. Each according to his possibilities. To each according to their needs. And guess what? What happened was the opposite of what Einstein predicted. Who tried the model he suggested, impoverished, screwed up. Peter Drucker says that almost of all thinking people of the late nineteenth century thought that Marx was right: there would be increased exploitation of workers by employers. They would become poorer, until one day, the thing would explode. Capitalist society was considered inherently unsustainable. It is more or less the same chat today. **Bullshit. Capitalism, with all appropriate regulations, self-**corrects. It is **an adaptive system that learns and changes by design. The design is just for the system to learn and change.** There was the opposite of what Einstein predicted, and held the opposite of what many predict, but the logic that “unlike” only becomes evident over time. It wasn’t obvious that the workers are those whom would profit from the productivity gains that the management science has begun to generate by organizing innovations like the railroad, the telegraph, the telephone .. to increase the scale of production and cheapen things. The living conditions of workers today are infinitely better than they were in 1900. They got richer, not poorer .. You do not need to work harder to produce more (as everyone thought), you can work less and produce more through a mechanism that is only now becoming apparent, and that brilliant people like Caetano Veloso still ignores. The output is pursuing growth through innovation, growth is not giving up. More of the same will become unsustainable to the planet, but most of it is not what will happen, will happen more different, than we do not know what is right. More innovative. Experts, such as Lester Brown, insist on statements like this: if the Chinese also want to have three cars for every four inhabitants, as in the U.S. today, there will be 1.1 billion cars there in 2030, and there is no way to build roads unless ends with the whole area used for agriculture. You will need 98 million barrels of oil per day, but the world only produces about 90 million today, and probably never produce much more. The mistake is to extrapolate today’s solutions for the future. We can continue living here for 20 years by exploiting the same resources that we explore today? Of course not. But the other question is: how can we encourage the stream of innovations that will enable the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, Africans .. to live so as prosperous as Americans live today? Hey, wake up … what can not stop the engine of innovation is that the free market engenders. This system is self correcting, that is its beauty. We do not need to do nothing but ensure the conditions for it to work without distortion. The rest he does himself. It regulates itself.

#### Cap solves food

Bandler 17 (Aaron, staff writer for The Daily Wire, 3/18/17, “This AMAZING Chart Shows Just How Capitalism Has Alleviated Global Hunger”, https://www.dailywire.com/news/16621/amazing-chart-shows-just-how-capitalism-has-aaron-bandler, AZG)

A truly remarkable chart has surfaced that reveals that capitalism has sharply curtailed the scourge of global hunger. The chart, provided by Human Progress, shows that the number of undernourished persons sharply declined from nearly 960 million to under 700 million: There is clearly still work that needs to be done to ameliorate global hunger — as a little under 700 million malnourished people is still too high — but a decline of over 260 million malnourished people in a span of over 20 years is nevertheless amazing. This Human Progress chart actually disproves two leftist myths: capitalism is causing hunger, and overpopulation threatens essential resources. For instance, businessman Drew Hanson argued in a February 2016 Forbes piece that "capitalism will starve humanity by 2050," citing misleading statistics and claiming that capitalism would dry up the world's resources as the population continues to increase. "How do we expect to feed that many people while we exhaust the resources that remain?" Hanson wrote. Another leftist who claimed something similar is environmentalist fear-mongerer Paul Ehrlich, as he actually argued in favor of population control. But economist Julian Simon believed that a rising population would result in more resources, not less, and Simon was proven right: Simon and Ehrlich made a bet in 1980: if Ehrlich was correct, then commodities price would drastically increase with population growth, as a dearth of resources would naturally lead to less supply. However, as population has increased from 2 billion to 7 billion over the past 100 years, the commodities prices have actually decreased, according to The Federalist. This is because, as economist Phillip Verlerger once said, "Technology moves so quickly today that any looming resource constraint will be nothing more than a blip. We adjust." Indeed, the beauty of capitalism is that its respect for individual liberty and private property allows a free and prosperous people to produce goods that balances their skill set with market demand, creating a system that while imperfect, has created wealth that vastly improved society and made it easier to lift the poor and the hungry out of poverty. Even as Western societies have started to embrace the welfare state, capitalism has still managed to touch the globe through free trade and globalization, allowing those who have never tasted freedom to have a chance at improving their living situations. Despite what the Left would have you believe, capitalism is the most humane system on the face of the Earth and is the true answer to alleviating global hunger and poverty, as the Human Progress graph illustrates.

#### Resource shortages cause nuclear war

FDI 12, Future Directions International, a Research institute providing strategic analysis of Australia’s global interests; citing Lindsay Falvery, PhD in Agricultural Science and former Professor at the University of Melbourne’s Institute of Land and Environment, “Food and Water Insecurity: International Conflict Triggers & Potential Conflict Points,” <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/workshop-papers/537-international-conflict-triggers-and-potential-conflict-points-resulting-from-food-and-water-insecurity.html>

There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources.¶ Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world.¶ In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. .¶ He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.”¶ “Hunger feeds anarchy.”¶ This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” ¶ He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.”¶ As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves.¶ Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry.¶ A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon.¶ The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

#### Cap is the only way to colonize space – solves sustainability.

**Ashworth 10** (Stephen, long-standing Fellow of the British Interplanetary Society. He works in academic publishing in the Voltaire Foundation, part of Oxford University – Towards the Sociology of the Universe, part 2 – 18 December 2010 – <http://www.astronist.demon.co.uk/space-age/essays/Sociology2.html>)

The point here is that, while the resources of Earth are limited, those of the Solar System are very much greater. Growth in population sizes and in the usage of energy and raw materials may therefore continue for a number of centuries into the future, provided that two conditions are met: \* Material growth on Earth levels off; \* Material growth in space and on other planets takes over the upward trend. Is this not equivalent to saying that Earth must settle down with a zero-growth society before space development begins? No, so long as the terrestrial and extraterrestrial economies are linked. While this remains true, it will be possible for investors on Earth to invest capital in extraterrestrial development, and receive dividends back from that development. While most Earth-dwelling people will remain on the mother planet, there will also be flows of people, goods and ideas between Earth and her colonies, which must also have a profound economic effect. A net inflow of value to Earth is in any case necessary in order that terrestrial investment in outer space does not merely produce inflation in the home economy. But that inflow need not be of material goods, and is more likely to consist of energy (solar power delivered on microwaves or lasers) and information (software and product development). But surely ultimately the limits of the Solar System will be reached, and the interplanetary civilisation have to settle down as a zero-growth society? Yes, granted. But this differs from a zero-growth planet Earth due to the immense size of the Solar System, which is larger than Earth by between four and six orders of magnitude, depending how far out one wants to go – to the distance of Mars, say, or to the Oort comet cloud far beyond Pluto. An interplanetary industrial civilisation is secure for the long term in a way that a monoplanetary one is not, because it is too large to form a unity, either politically or environmentally, and because it is forced to adapt to a wide range of hostile environmental conditions. It will therefore be secure against any conceivable environmental or military disaster, because such a disaster can only affect a single planet, or at most a limited region of the system. Climate change or world war on Earth has no effect on Mars, and vice versa. And with the majority of the population in orbiting artificial space colonies, even a major change in solar luminosity could be tolerated (though such a change is not expected to have a noticeable effect for hundreds of millions of years yet). With interplanetary civilisation, the social system as a whole can tolerate decline and collapse in particular locations, because they can then be recolonised from outside. Once humanity achieves interstellar status, this security factor is clearly vastly enhanced. However, in order for interplanetary growth to occur in the first place, an economic mechanism must be in place to drive it. The most suitable economic mechanism that has been demonstrated so far is capitalism. Its need for continuous expansion makes it highly appropriate as an economic system for a society colonising its local planetary system. It is not clear whether an economic system based on ideology could perform this function of capitalism. If the ideology was growth-oriented, then it would have no reason to conflict with the existing capitalist order, but would rather work in concert with it. But in the more plausible case that it was oriented towards social stability and economic stagnation, particularly in view of the environmentalist, anti-growth or anti-consumerist agendas it might very likely serve, then it would not want to promote disruptive new technologies such as those of access to space. The idea of a socially just socialist society (if such a hypothetical entity is possible) expanding into space is therefore a questionable one. If Earth remained divided among competing centres of power, then they might make the leap to interplanetary capability even without the driving force of capitalist economics. However, the competitive Moon-race of the 1960s showed, firstly, that if one competitor drops out, the other may well lose interest to the point of abandoning capabilities developed for that competition, and secondly, that an ideologically based collectivist society is unlikely to make a good showing in the technologies required. Economic growth, however, has a vested interest in preserving and extending gains made. Given that the opportunities for growth in space are so large, it seems unlikely that the present burst of growth will reach a plateau until space has been colonised. There is in fact an inconsistency about the idea of an industrial civilisation which does not move beyond its home planet – like a lone tree in the middle of a fertile plain. Such a tree will either die off, or it will naturally reproduce until it has engendered a whole forest, in which a far greater variety of life is possible than on the unsheltered plain.

#### **Extinction inevitable unless we colonize space** – the smartest man in human history agrees with us

Hawking 01 [Stephen Hawking, pretty much the smartest man ever, British theoretical physicist and profession of math, University of Cambridge, 10-16-01,<http://www.nutri.com/space/>

"The human race is likely to be wiped out by a doomsday virus . . . unless we set up colonies in space. Although Sept. 11th was horrible, it didn't threaten the survival of the human race like nuclear weapons do," said the Cambridge University Scientist. "In the long term, I'm more worried about biology. Nuclear weapons need large facilities, but genetic engineering can be done in a small lab. The danger is that, either by accident or design, we create a virus that destroys us. I don't think the human race will survive . . unless we spread into space. There are too many accidents that can befall life on a single planet." All of the above concerns were expressed a quarter century ago in this following article by Mr. Falconi. BUT, the "original" concept of escaping from earth in order to back up and preserve our civilization, as expressed by Mr. Falconi, was preconceived by over a quarter-century in the following prophetic paragraph: "We must keep the problems of today in true proportions: they are vital - indeed of extreme importance - since they can destroy our civilisation and slay the future before its birth. The crossing of space may do much to turn men's minds outwards and away from their present tribal squabbles. In this sense, the rocket, far from being one of the destroyers of civilisation, may provide the safety valve that is needed to preserve it."

#### Cap solves war – data

Lin 17 [Oon Yong; 4/23/2017; International Economics at SUNY Buffalo, under the supervision of Dr. Sandeep Bhakshar, PhD in economics; “Conflict and Trade,” http://geoeconomics.net/2017/09/13/conflict-and-trade/]

CONFLICT AND TRADE TODAY

In the post-cold war era, actual conflicts are relatively few and far between especially between developed nations due to advances in military hardware [nuclear options]. Conflicts took on other forms such as economic warfare and proxy wars. Fortunately, advances in military technology were met with advances in international relations which led to the founding of intergovernmental organizations in the 20th-century.

Trade in the modern context can be examined through globalization which serves as an all-encompassing word that represented progress, cultural exchange and increased trade. Development took off in the 1980s to 1990s, most notably from 1990 to 1996, capital inflows to developing countries increased by a massive 600% (Stiglitz, 2006). The World Trade Organization was formed in 1995, absorbing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], the organization enabled countries to have a combined platform to address international trade issues which developed and developing countries would both benefit in a world that was accelerating quickly in terms of trade.

China’s control of rare earth mineral exports in the global market and the usefulness of the WTO is an example worth observing. China has an effective 97% control of the rare-earth elements market (Müller, Schweizer, & Seiler, 2016). It posed an issue as the Chinese government applied export quotas, causing global firms that use these minerals to be fearful of a supply issue due to the concentration of the source. Rare earth metals were useful in many applications and that contributed to the concern, United States firms used them for several product developments ranging from technological turbines to lab purposes such as for their magnetic properties. In 2014, an argument was brought up to the World Trade Organization [WTO] by the European Union, United States, and Japan in 2012 about the control of rare earth exports (World Trade Organization, 2015). The timing was nearly 11 years after the accession of China to the WTO, the panel concluded in 2014 that China’s export tariffs on rare earth exports were inconsistent with their WTO obligations. A study conducted by Müller et. al. (2016) begs to differ and found that U.S. firms could have adopted defensive actions such as stockpiling these materials and that export control effects were not overtly damaging after China has joined the World Trade Organization. But it remained apparent that the Chinese government did use its policies to benefit Chinese firms at the expense of non-domestic companies before they had joined the WTO. On 20 May 2015, China responded to the WTO’s request to conform to its panel’s recommendations and to fulfill its obligations to WTO law. China accepted the panel’s judgment, and the issue was resolved amicably.

Bilateral agreements that increase cooperation through trade can also help reduce potential conflict. In 2010, a free trade agreement known as the Economic Framework Cooperation Agreement was initiated between ROC Taiwan and PRC China, details of the agreement were finalized in June 2013. The deal’s results were twofold, firstly Taiwan benefited from the trade potential that China provided. Secondly, the agreement led to reduced pressure by PRC China on ROC Taiwan’s agenda of pursuing free trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore (Kan & Morrison, 2013). The change in China’s political stance during that time allowed ROC Taiwan to ink deals in quick succession, initially [ANZTEC] with New Zealand on the 10th of July 2013, and subsequently with Singapore [ASTEP] on 7th November 2013. Bernard Cole of the National War College in Washington, DC shares that the possibility of ROC Taiwan and PRC China conflict has been reduced (Navarro, 2016) and the de-escalation can be partially attributed to the constant flow of trade between both countries.

The most revolutionary organization for trade was the formation of the intergovernmental organization known as the European Union [EU]. The EU was founded after World War II [the deadliest war] to prevent future wars. The EU expressed the primary motivation for the formation, “The first steps were to foster economic cooperation: the idea being that countries that trade with one another become economically interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict.” (European Union, 2017, para 2). At its founding the EU had six member countries, today it has 28 member countries some of which are fully committed to its economic and monetary union. Furthermore, the EU is at the forefront of democratic thought and champions a broad range of issues such as human rights, internet privacy, and democracy.

In support of the idea for the notion of trade and growth bringing peace to society, A Modern Peace? Schumpeter, the Decline of Conflict, and the Investment–War Trade-Off Professors Chatagnier and Castelli argues that

To sustain growth (a basic requirement for every industrialized economy), governments and entrepreneurs must reinvest profits in innovation. Political leaders also benefit, as they can extract more revenue from a richer society. Within industrialized economies, war threatens this virtuous mechanism of investment, innovation, profits, and taxes, rendering it materially unprofitable. (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016)

Their argument was based on the assumptions that industrialized economies which have grown to generate additional revenue for society, in general, tends not to prefer wars as it was contrary to the needs of an industrialized economy (Jentleson, 2007). Advocating that an extra dollar spent on military expenditures is one less dollar spent on economic growth for the society. They found that over the last fifty years from 2016, wars were not profitable and that industrialization does indeed reduce a nation’s incentive to enter conflicts due to the economic changes of industrialization. Additionally, the authors recognized that trade between industrialized societies potentially leads to peaceful attitudes (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016).

## 1AR – AT: Semiocap

#### 1 – Permutation do both – the 1AC affirms BIPOC futures which envision utopias that’ve dismantled oppressive structures like semiocapitalism

#### 2 – Aff li­nk turns all their offense – research project of the aff endorses posthuman bipoc futures that embraces becoming insect which blurs the lines of gender, race, and species – independently, drone swarms are tools of control by the empire to supress revolutionary movements

#### 3 – Utopian fiat is a voting issue – impossible for the affirmative to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression

#### 4 – Case is a 6 minute disad to the alt – it’s an opportunity cost which means we get to weigh the aff

#### 5 – Movements and Images of suffering good – inspired by George Floyd, BLM movements this summer caused material reductions in police budgets in cities like LA, Seattle, and New York

### 2ac –not empirical– yilmaz

#### Bifo is just a grumpy old man – no studies prove his claims

Yilmaz ’10 – BA in Film & Culture from the University of Amsterdam, and now follow the New Media masters program (Omar, “Review: Franco Berardi-Precarious Rhapsody”, 9/19/10, Masters of Media: News Media and Culture M.A., University of Amsterdam, http://mastersofmedia.hum.uva.nl/2010/09/19/review-franco-berardi-precarious-rhapsody/)//CW

The first two chapters of Precarious Rhapsody contain the entirety of Berardi’s arguments. However, these chapters are written in a dense, labyrinthine manner that makes it nigh on impossible to ascertain just what it is that is being argued. Berardi introduces all his concepts at once without defining them, and forgets to explain just how this premise leads to that conclusion. Over the course of the book the same points are repeated over and over again, becoming more clearer as the tightly spun manifesto of the opening chapters unspools into more intelligible arguments and lines of reasoning. It is as if Berardi placed the summary of his thesis at the very beginning of the book and worked backwards from there. Besides the obfuscating prose and circuitous way of presenting his arguments, the repeating pattern of the book leads to a great deal of redundancy. Some parts are repeated word for word from one chapter to the next, and deja vu sets in quite often. Part of this seems to owe to the fact that many of the chapters have appeared in various forms before being collected in this book. Whatever the case may be, Precarious Rhapsody would have benefitted a great deal from a bit of editing. Another issue is the underlying current of nostalgia that is present throughout. It is no surprise that Berardi places the last moment of true, hopeful revolt against the capitalist domination of everyday life in his student years. The notion that everything used to be better in the past and kids these days just don’t understand nags around the corner of every page. When Berardi argues that the disconnect between cyberspace and cybertime leads to an empty lifestyle where people have lost the ability to love, to imagine, to enjoy life, it comes across as condescending. Moreover, he fails to provide any evidence for his claims. No case studies or statistics. The same is the case when he states that pathological disorders like depression spring from labor relations in semiocapitalism. These are interesting claims, but they are built solely on rhetoric.

### 2ac – reactionary ptx – noys

#### **Bifo’s alternative is reactionary and can’t produce mass mobilization – “exhaustion” can’t convince the public to abandon capitalism because it maintains status quo conditions of deprivation**

Noys 14

(Benjamin Noys, UK-based theorist and critic who teaches at the University of Chichester, Malign Velocities: Accelerationism and Capitalism, pg. 94)

The few scattered anti-accelerationist critiques of our present moment often seem to leave untouched the libidinal core of accelerationism. These alternatives seem tepid, or even reactionary – take Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi’s invocation of a politics of exhaustion that would ‘become the beginning of a slow movement toward a “wu wei” civilization, based on withdrawal, and frugal expectations for life and consumption’.2 This postmodern Taoism hardly enchants, and its expectation of sacrifice and escape seems to mock those paying for the current financial crisis. ‘Frugal expectations’ are what many of us already have, and such promises can hardly compete with offers of acceleration and excess. For this reason it is not surprising that accelerationism gains adherents uncomfortable with such re-treads of the usual political moralisms.

### 2ac – exhaustion fails – noys

#### **Exhaustion fails and desire solves best – their dream of a “post-work” society is impossible to realize and distracts movements with counter-revolutionary nostalgia**

Noys 14

(Benjamin Noys, UK-based theorist and critic who teaches at the University of Chichester, Malign Velocities: Accelerationism and Capitalism, pgs. 98-99)

My perhaps minimal suggestion is recognition of this contradiction is the first necessary step. This returns us to ‘traditional’ problems of how we might intervene and negate the forms and forces of labor that mutilate and control our existence. Yet the discourses of the refusal of work or techno-libidinal fantasies of liberation from work do not operate. What are particularly absent are institutions and collective forms in which to engage the negation of work while considering the necessity and possibilities of sustainable existence. We encounter a capitalism that is, sometimes, quite happy to refuse us work while, at other times, to place extreme demands on us for work. A working solution, to be deliberately ironic, is to struggle for decommodification of our lives. Campaigns against privatization and for the return of privatized services to public control try to reduce our dependence on work by attacking the way work is supposed to account for all of our self-reproduction. These struggles are in parallel for struggles to defend public services, protect benefits, and sustain social and collective forms of support. While they may be unglamorous, especially compared to space travel, these struggles can negate the conditions of the impossibility of work by trying to detach ‘work’ from its ideological and material role as the validation of citizenship and existence. In relation to the Nietzschean rebels of absolute communism or absolute acceleration these struggles can be dismissed as reactive, but they react precisely to the contradiction in which we are currently bound. This is also true of the defence of workplace and employment conditions against new waves of privatization and outsourcing. The struggles at the University of Sussex over the outsourcing of support work, under much worse contracts and conditions, has forged an alliance of workers and students on the grounds of the precarity and impossibility of labor. It has also involved new experiments with forms and organizations against unresponsive unions and neoliberal management strategies. This impossibility of labor, I’m suggesting, does not simply mean abandoning work as an impossible site in the name of a dream of exit. Instead the negation of capitalist work can also be the struggle to free that true choice Timothy Brennan indicates by breaking our relation with constant ‘accelerative’ demand that we attend to the commodification of our lives.

### 2ac – exhaustion w affirm bad – smith

#### The aff can’t solve – Bifo admits that exhaustion via affirmation fails

Sterling ’14 – quoting Bifo – writer at Wired Magazine (Bruce, “Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi and Mark Fisher wringing their hands over exhaustion, the financial crisis, aesthetic resistance and the ‘slow cancellation of the future’”, 2/7/14, Wired Magazine, http://www.wired.com/2014/02/franco-bifo-berardi-mark-fisher-wringing-hands-exhaustion-financial-crisis-aesthetic-resistance-slow-cancellation-future/)//CW

“It isn’t easy for me to answer, because you’ve put your finger on a painful wound – that is, our present theoretical impotence in the face of the de-humanizing process provoked by finance capitalism. This feels like a sort of personal defeat. But I can’t deny reality, which seems to me to be this: the last wave of the movement – say 2010 to 2011 – was an attempt to revitalize a massive subjectivity. This attempt failed: we have been unable to stop the financial aggression. The movement has now disappeared, only emerging in the form of fragmentary explosions of despair. I use the term ‘the movement’ to refer to any form of mass action which is able to change the prevailing culture and perception. This is why I don’t think that in Greece at the moment we have a movement. It is only a despairing reaction to the devastation – it is reactive and isolated. “We should be able to produce a theoretical model which assumes that the form of subjectivation that we used to know is now over. The mutation that has infested the post-alphabetical generation – that is, the first generation to learn more words from the machine than from the mother – has deeply eroded the ability to solidarize. A process of social recomposition of precarious labour seems impossible, at least in the form of collective action, political solidarity and class consciousness. I really don’t know if that means that my generation is unable to see the new process of social composition that will one day give the new generation the opportunity to free themselves from fear and loneliness. “Mouffe writes that ‘various modes of artivist intervention influenced by the Situationist strategy of détournement like The Yes Men are very effective in disrupting the smooth image that corporate capitalism is trying to impose, bringing to the fore its repressive character’. This may be true, but the unveiling of the repressive character of power is not going to bring about rebellion. On the contrary, it only reinforces a sense of impotence. The techniques of subversion have been quite efficient in ‘revealing’ the true nature of financial capitalism, but consciousness of what is real is not class consciousness. It isn’t enough to only see the danger – you also need to be able to escape it or to dispel it. The majority of people hate finance capitalism but, as far as I can see, this hatred is turning into depression rather than into autonomy. “Mouffe adds: ‘One could also mention a variety of urban struggles like “Reclaim the streets” in Britain, the “Tute Bianche” in Italy, the “Stop Advertising” campaigns in France or the “Nike Ground-Rethinking Space” in Vienna – there exist a great variety of types of artistico-activist practices and of modes of communication-guerrilla.’ In the last 15 years, however, activism has been totally unable to stop the systematic offensive of corporations and financial agencies. Look at the last wave of struggles against the financial dictatorship, from UK Uncut to the Spanish acampada to Occupy Wall Street. This wave of movements has produced an effect of widespread awareness among the majority of the population, but it hasn’t slowed the dismantling of social life. “Not only is political activism unable to change the reality of finance capitalism, but the mainstream political parties cannot do anything if they do not follow the automatisms of power. Look at Barack Obama’s failure to change the American distribution of wealth, notwithstanding the huge support that he gathered in 2008. ‘Yes We Can’ turned swiftly into derision when he was obliged to bend to the force of financial power. I think that autonomy is only possible when people become able to change their daily lives – by breaking the links of dependence on consumerism and exploitation, for instance. In the last two or three years, however, I’ve started to believe that this precarious generation is unable to start a process of autonomization. This is because of a sort of psychic frailty produced by precariousness, competition and loneliness.

## 1AR – AT: Fem IR

### 1AR – AT HWL

#### 1 – Empirics prove perm is best and progress possible – arms control incorporating gender analysis

Acheson 18 (Ray, director of Reaching Critical Will, interviewed by Kristina Lunz, CFFP Germany Director, Center for Feminist Foreign Policy, 12/6/18, [https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/interviews/2018/12/5/ray-acheson)](https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/interviews/2018/12/5/ray-acheson%29)///AG

* GBV = Gender-based violence
* WILPF = Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

KL: The Arms Trade Treaty from 2014 was the first treaty on disarmament that included gender specific issues such as GBV. Can you elaborate a bit more on where gender specific aspects are included in disarmament work and especially what is missing? RA: Yes, there was a campaign that was lead by WILPF together with the [International Action Network on Small Arms](https://www.iansa.org/) and Amnesty International to ensure that [gender-based violence was included](https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20150317/) in the Arms Trade Treaty as a legally binding provision so that states would not be able to export arms if there was a risk of gender-based violence being committed. It was a tough campaign in the beginning, countries were not convinced at all about the relationship between gender-based violence and the arms trade, but we did a lot of work over a seven-year period to educate diplomats and other officials, and to work with civil society groups to raise these issues, and, by the end of the negotiations, we had over 100 countries agreeing that there should be a legally binding provision in the Treaty. That now is a **legally binding requirement** for any country that has joined the [Arms Trade Treaty](https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/att/). But what we're seeing is that a lot of countries keep saying that they don't really understand how to implement it, so a few years ago RCW did a big study on what resources export officials need to look at, how they can find information about the risk of gender-based violence and how to make proper decisions on this issue. Of course, for WILPF, it's a little bit tricky because we're opposed to militarism and the arms trade is a big contributor to the use and proliferation of weapons around the world, but we are trying to provide government with tools to implement this provision and think about how conflict and gender-based violence are intimately related. In the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons there is also a reference to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons specifically in relation to women and girls because of the impact that [ionising radiation physically has on women and girls’ bodies](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2017/07/20170707%2003-42%20PM/Ch_XXVI_9.pdf). There is also a recognition of the **importance of women's participation** in disarmament and **arms control** negotiations and policies and practices in the TPNW. Some other strides that been made; [recently at the UN, 57 countries came together to join a statement on gender and disarmament](https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/securing-our-common-future-promoting-gender-responsive-disarmament-and-security/) looking at the way in which countries need to take up the question of gender diversity, including **women's participation** in disarmament negotiations and processes, and also the **gendered impacts** of weapons. There was also a reference to the need to understand how gender norms impact disarmament and arms control policies. There is a **growing recognition** of the importance of women being included in peacebuilding and peace processes and disarmament, but it really often stops there. Sometimes we get acknowledgement of the gendered impacts, which means how women might be physically or even socially impacted differently from the use of proliferation of weapons, but we haven't gone further than that. The work that has been done so far largely leaves out an analysis of gendered norms and dynamics, such as consideration of violent masculinity and the ways in which ideas about the what is “feminine” and “masculine” affect our approaches to disarmament and disarmament issues. It also excludes anybody who does not identify as a **cisgender** man or a woman, as there is no recognition of a non-binary, transgender, genderqueer or other identities and experiences. Including these perspectives and people in disarmament discussions is going to be of vital importance moving forward in order to develop a robust understanding of gender and weapons, implications for disarmament, and for developing feminist foreign policies.

#### 2 – Aff link turns all their offense – research project of the aff endorses posthuman bipoc futures that embraces becoming insect which blurs the lines of gender, race, and species

#### 3 – Not exceptional – all war and deployment is bad now but it will get infinitely worse in the future

#### 4 – Not protectorship – get rid of the very tools that the US can use in the name of protectorship

#### 5 – Utopian fiat is a voting issue – impossible for the affirmative to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression

## 1AR – AT: Edelman

### 1AR – Edelman

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens and not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve and intrinsic good---debate is a game with switch sides and speech times

#### Independently, predictable engagement lets us determine the practical impacts of politics – that’s key to produce rigorous contestation which lets us test and refine our scholarship to produce the best political strategy

#### 1 – Permutation do both – the 1AC affirms posthuman BIPOC futures which envision utopias that’ve dismantled oppressive structures like anti-queerness

#### 2 – Aff li­nk turns all their offense – research project of the aff endorses posthuman bipoc futures that embraces becoming insect which blurs the lines of gender, race, and species

#### 3 – Alt is Utopian fiat which is a voting issue – impossible for the affirmative to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression – if it isn’t, can’t solve the aff because military won’t oblige to the alt

#### 4 – Perm do the alt in all instances except for the aff – double bind – either they can overcome one tiny instance of anti-queerness or they can’t solve it write large

#### 5 – Their theory is unethical - it brackets out bi, trans, and other queer folks who can have children

#### Reject psychoanalysis

#### 1 – Doesn’t scale

[it can’t explain group phenomena, is unique to the individual studied, and is not a universal theory]

Gunder 5 - Senior planning lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, previous president of the New Zealand Planning Institute (Michael Gunder, 2005, “Lacan, Planning and Urban Policy Formation”, *Urban Policy and Research*, 23.1)

Not surprisingly, the application of Lacanian theory to the understanding of society and culture is not without concern. Some clinical practitioners of Lacanian psychoanalysis are “suspicious of the wider ‘application’ of the theory to those not actually in analysis” (Parker, [2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib74), p. 69). Alternatively, Lacan's teachings have been criticised by social theorists as being only theoretical and void of empirical material (Sarup, [1993](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib84), p. 26). Further, in contrast to psychology ([Rose, 1998](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib79)), the inability to reconcile the nuance of each particular psychoanalytical case to a meaningful universal theory of the unconscious that is testable is a fundamental constraint for considering psychoanalysis a science, or by extension, a valid scientific body of thought applicable to the understanding of aggregate human behaviours ([Fink, 2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib29)). In this regard, Lacan was unable to successfully legitimise and advance Freud's psychoanalytical theory as a science of the unconscious even with his application of mathematical theory and linguistics to Freud's metapsychology ([Althusser, 1996](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib2); [Morel, 2000](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib71); [Fink, 2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib29)). Consequently, this author views Lacan's work in a manner originated by Althusser ([1996](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib2), p. 93), as best being understood as a “philosophy of psychoanalysis” from which subsequent understandings of society and culture may be derived and, where possible, tested.

#### 2 – Group the rant – it’s based on completely bogus science

**Bunge, McGill University philosopher, 2010**

(Mario, “Should Psychoanalysis Be in the Science Museum?”, 10-5, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827806.200-should-psychoanalysis-be-in-the-science-museum.html>)

We should congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy. Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body. Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513). More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups. In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience. This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted. For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on. As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies. Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

#### 3 – It’s non verifiable – Psychoanalysis requires there to be an unconscious drive, that we have no control over, dictate/significantly influence our actions. All of the examples that "prove" psychoanalysis rely on an assumption that a particular unconscious drive is causing that example – i.e. If everyone is invested within the death drive then you can't test/falsify it because that process of testing/falsifying will necessarily be invested in anti-queerness.

#### Their theory confuses the painting for the artist – the child is not literally the social order but is rather the representation of an anti-queer world

Whyman 19 [Tom Whyman, Tom Whyman, a contributing writer at The Outline, is a writer and philosopher from the UK., 09-10-2019, "It is perfectly moral to bring children into a shitty world," Outline, https://theoutline.com/post/7925/having-babies-climate-change-birthstrike?zd=1&amp;zi=m4jdphym, accessed 5-4-2020]LHSBC

A BirthStrike, then, is on one level a rejection of what the queer theorist Lee Edelman named in his 2004 book No Future as “reproductive futurism”: the ideology which casts the figure of “The Child” as “the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention” — what the Helen Lovejoys of this world just want “someone to please think of.” According to Edelman, reproductive futurism imposes an “ideological limit” on political discourse, preserving “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” by making any political intervention somehow not in the interests of children morally unthinkable. Reproductive futurism is thus a way of disciplining people — not least against queerness. “There is a fascism in the baby's face,” he writes.∂ At one point in the book, Edelman relates seeing an anti-abortion advert and believing it to be aimed against him — a cis gay man. “The sign, after all, might as well have pronounced, and with the same absolute and invisible authority that testifies to the successfully accomplished work of ideological naturalization, the biblical mandate ‘Be fruitful and multiply.’” “Fuck the social order,” he writes, “and the Child in whose name we're collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net... fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop.”∂ But Edelman’s argument misses something important. As Maggie Nelson puts this when discussing Edelman in her memoir of queer parenthood, The Argonauts: “Why bother fucking this Child when we could be fucking the specific forces that mobilize and crouch behind its image?” At one point in No Future, Edelman cites the example of Bernard Law, the former Cardinal of Boston, who in 1996 opposed legislation that would give health care benefits to the same-sex partners of municipal employees:∂ “He did so by proclaiming... that bestowing such access to health care would profoundly diminish the marital bond. ‘Society,’ he opined, ‘has a special interest in the protection, care and upbringing of children. Because marriage remains the principal, and the best, framework for the nurture, education and socialization of children, the state has a special interest in marriage.’”∂ Seven years later, Law was forced to resign over his failure to protect Catholic children from pedophile priests. He is an awful, bigoted hypocrite — but Edelman does not draw what seems like the most natural conclusion from this, namely that powerful men like Law, and the institutions they represent, have no real interest in the well-being of children at all; that they just want to use The Child as a sort of front.∂ The dominant social order only wants children insofar as it is concerned with its legacy; what it wants is to carry on the existing order of things. And this is why I don’t think the “resistance” of the BirthStrikers really makes much sense, in the face of climate disaster, a surfeit of actually existing children is in fact more of a threat to global capitalism’s ongoing hegemony than their scarcity.

#### Edelman’s idea of futurism is fundamentally based on a level of privilege to live that is accessible only to white people

**Bliss 15** (James, Professor at the University of California, Irvine, Hope Against Hope: Queer Negativity, Black Feminist Theorizing, and Reproduction without Futurity” p. 85-86 [file:///C:/Users/crumb/Downloads/bliss.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/crumb/Downloads/bliss.pdf))

Critiques of Edelman(s) have run the gamut from accusations that his arguments amount to little more than a dissembled optimism, that he ignores the polymorphous perversity of really-existing children, that he misapprehends Lacan entirely, and that his polemic is overwritten by an intransigent, smirking whiteness that limits the applicability of his conclusions.1 Fair enough. For my part, I am interested in how the latter critique has been marshaled by some utopian (or, to borrow from José Muñoz, James Bliss 85 anti-antiutopian) queer theorists whose critiques rely on the figure of the “other” child.2 In a 2007 GLQ roundtable, Judith Halberstam described Edelman’s project as “utterly compelling [. . .] for certain subjects in certain social locations. For others, that place of pure critique might constitute **epistemological self-destruction**” (Dinshaw et al. 194). To which Edelman challenged, especially for Halberstam’s “unidentified ‘others,’” “why not endorse, to the contrary, ‘epistemological self-destruction’ for all? Why not accept that queerness, taken seriously, demands nothing less?” (195) In their endorsement of Muñoz’s Cruising Utopia, Halberstam restates this position, that “for some queers, particularly **for queers of color**, hope is not something one can afford to lose and for them giving up on futurity **is not an option**.”3 Indeed, Muñoz himself offers that “the future is only the stuff of some kids. Racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity” (95). For Halberstam and Muñoz, Edelman’s stubborn refusal of futurity is structured by **the privilege of having a guaranteed future**, foreclosing the possibility that his project can speak to the concerns of non-white queers. More interesting, perhaps, is to consider how Edelman’s avoidance of race weakens his critique of the Child and futurity. Neither Edelman nor his utopian critics seem willing or able to imagine a mode of reproduction that is not reproductive futurism; that is, **Black reproduction**. On this score, we can consider Hortense Spillers’s seminal essay, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book.” In her gloss of the Moynihan Report, Spillers seems to anticipate Edelman’s well known passage, quoted above: “According to Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s celebrated ‘Report’ of the late sixties, the ‘Negro Family’ has no father to speak of—his name, his law, his symbolic function mark the impressive missing agencies in the essential life of the black community” (204). On Spillers’s reading, the father, the L/law, and the “whole network of symbolic relations” that Edelman rejects in the name of the queer are **foreclosed a priori for the Black**. Spillers marks how “the Black family” is refused entry into the symbolic order except negatively as a site of pure dysfunction. This incoherence that accrues around Black filiation is also what Orlando Patterson has labeled “natal alienation.” One of the “constituent elements” of slavery described in his Slavery and Social Death, Patterson offers natal alienation as “what is critical in the slave’s forced alienation, the loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations” (7). I want to rest on this point for a moment because it is a point that queer negativity is unwilling to theorize and that queer anti-antiutopianism theorizes only to the extent that it can still enable an orientation toward the future. What does reproductive futurity mean for the natally alienated? What is the status of the Child or of the family for those “alienated from all ‘rights’ or claims of birth”? What does reproduction mean a “genealogical isolate”? Patterson offers a formulation much like those of Edelman and Spillers in describing the natally alienated: for the enslaved, seeking out, creating, or maintaining synchronic and diachronic bonds “meant struggling with and penetrating the iron curtain of the master, his community, his laws, his policemen or patrollers, and his heritage” (5). Rather than argue, following the anti-antiutopians, that “others” cannot “afford” to give up on hope for the future, we might argue instead that Edelman does not account for those modes of reproduction that are not future-oriented, the children who do not register as such, and the “families” that are not granted the security of nuclear bonds. And we might find in this reproduction without futurity not a crisis scenario demanding redoubled attention to either the family (Moynihan et al.) or the future (the anti-antiutopians), but an opportunity to develop a politics of position that inhabits the incoherence of Black reproduction. Reproduction without futurity, then, names nothing more (and nothing less) than the queer capacity of Blackness to reproduce without being productive and to orient lives extimate—simultaneously internal and external—to sociality as Edelman might understand it.

#### Studies don’t support death drive—replicable tests are impossible, variables are too vague to operationalize

Holowchak 12 [Andrew, teaches Philosophy at Rider University. When Freud (Almost) Met Chaplin: The Science behind Freud's "Especially Simple, Transparent Case" Project Muse]

The problem is that psychoanalytic concepts (e.g., "super-ego," "Oedipus complex," and "death drive"30 ), unlike them of say physics ("electron," [End Page 67] "muon," and "quark"), are logical constructs that have not been corroborated by precise observations and replicable tests. Hence Freud's logical constructs as proto-concepts are not even adequate as working hypotheses. As early as 1934, J. F. Brown, who claimed he was in sympathy with Freud's new science, urged, "But, and here almost all critics of psychoanalysis are in agreement, the theory has never been precise enough to allow formulation of working hypotheses for which adequate experimental situations could be found" (1933, p. 333). He went on to acknowledge, perhaps somewhat prophetically, given the amount of attention Freud gets today in philosophy of mind, "Freud's discoveries probably are the most striking and original contributions made to the science of mind in our time." He added, in a manner that vitiates the compliment, that Freud is more prophet than scientist—more Bruno than Galileo (1933, p. 226). Freud was aware of that. His own view of the concepts of psychoanalysis is ambivalent. At times, he shows impatience and becomes intolerant of his critics. "Only in psychology [is obscurity not tolerated]; here the constitutional incapacity of men for scientific research comes into full view. It looks as though people did not expect from psychology progress in knowledge, but some other kind of satisfaction; every unsolved problem, every acknowledged uncertainty is turned into a ground of complaint against it" (1916–7, S.E., XXII: 6). At other times, Freud seems to agree with his critics. In "Autobiographical Study," when he mentions difficulties with "compulsion to repeat," he adds: Although it arose from a desire to fix some of the most important theoretical ideas of psycho-analysis, it goes far beyond psychoanalysis. I have repeatedly heard it said contemptuously that it is impossible to take a science seriously whose most general concepts are as lacking in precision as those of libido and of drive in psychoanalysis. (1925, S.E., XX: 57) In "Why War?," Freud writes to Einstein in a manner to explain his ambivalence: "It may perhaps seem to you [Einstein] as though our theories are a kind of mythology and, in the present case, not even an agreeable one. But does not every science come in the end to a kind of mythology like this?" (1933, S.E., XXII: 211) In sum, the bedrock concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis are conceptually indeterminate. That means that the fundamental principles of Freudian psychoanalysis are conceptually indeterminate and, thus, obscure or meaningless. Unfortunately, as we have seen, Freud was evasive when it [End Page 68] came to the question of the status of the bedrock concepts of psychoanalysis and even said that psychoanalysis, with the exception of "repression" and "unconscious," could do just as well without them31 (1914, S.E., XIV: 16; 1925, S.E., XX: 32–3). Without referents to the concepts he employs so significantly, Freud is writing gobbledygook.A related difficulty is conceptual change. Freud, as a scientist, was committed to conceptual flexibility, insofar as his postulates were avowedly data-driven. Nonetheless, many of the conceptual changes he made—e.g., his rejection of his Seduction theory and his adoption of the death drive and structural model—were prompted more by theoretical difficulties than they were driven by observational data. In addition, Freud surrounded himself with lackeys, albeit intelligent lackeys, that allowed him, as founder of psychoanalysis, the privilege of being final arbiter on issues of conceptual change within psychoanalysis.32

## 1AR – AT: Psycho

### 1AR – Framework

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens and not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve and intrinsic good---debate is a game with switch sides and speech times

#### Independently, predictable engagement lets us determine the practical impacts of politics – that’s key to produce rigorous contestation which lets us test and refine our scholarship to produce the best political strategy

### 1AR – Scapegoating

#### Scapegoating link wrong –

#### 1 – US, UK, and other great powers developing swarms now

#### 2 – Fear of robots stems from being used as a tool of terror over black and brown folks in the global south

### 1AR – Nostalgia

#### This evidence is about conservatism and desiring a past which is distinct from the affirmative which envisions a future – the past is full of disastrous interventions

McGowan 13 Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London, SJBE

The prevalence of nostalgia has perhaps its most obvious impact in the shaping of contemporary political programs. The entirety of the contem- porary right-wing social and cultural agenda has its basis in the nostalgia for a time of plenitude. Nostalgia fuels the demand for school prayer, the opposition to gay marriage, the effort to eliminate abortion, the support for the death penalty, and so on. According to contemporary American conservatism, the abandonment of school prayer, for instance, has helped to bring about many of the social ills (teen pregnancy, school violence, incivility, etc.) that plague contemporary American society. Champions of school prayer see the epoch when students prayed in school as time prior to loss. At this earlier historical moment, subjects enjoyed a direct relation with their privileged object and achieved a perfect satisfaction. We exist in the aftermath of a fall, and from the perspective of the fall, we can see the possibilities for complete satisfaction in the world we have lost. Similarly, eliminating the threat of gay marriage allows conservatives to imagine a time when marriage itself was a pure institution, a bond that permitted a direct link to one’s object. Within the nostalgia framework that conservatism offers, loss has a place only as a limit to overcome through the return to a nonlacking past. Conservatism cannot admit the notion of a constitutive or necessary loss. Though right-wing political activity is unthinkable without nostalgia, emancipatory politics often succumbs to its power as well. Within certain forms of environmentalism, the alternative medicine campaign, and the antiglobalization movement, we can see prominent examples of this. In each case, the leftist political goal — protecting the environment, providing people more health options, countering global capitalism — becomes intertwined with the idea of a return to an earlier epoch and to a less alienated way of relating to the world. Implicit in this idea is the image of a nonlacking sub- jectivity, and this image stains the political goal with the tint of nostalgia. Those who argue for a return to harmony with nature, for privileging non-Western and homeopathic forms of medicine, and for forsaking global capitalism by supporting only local producers all take up a politics of nos- talgia. The idea that we might return to a stable relation with the natural world posits a prior time in which this stability existed, a time lost with the onset of subjectivity. By appealing to the inherent nostalgia of subjects, the forces of emancipation undoubtedly gain adherents. Many people drawn to the idea of “buying local” would not otherwise find common cause with emancipatory projects, for instance. But the long-term cost of this strategy is not worth the supporters that it wins for the emancipatory politics. Though conservatism doesn’t have a monopoly on nostalgia, nostalgia does have an inherently conservative structure to it. Nostalgia is fundamentally conservative insofar as it works to obscure the gap within the social order. It posits the possibility of an order that works without interruption and thus leaves no room for subjectivity itself. The freedom of the subject depends on the imperfection of the social order, its inability to achieve completion or harmony. A political philosophy that represses this failure also inherently represses the opening through which freedom emerges. In effect, the nostalgic subject longs to access a past prior to its subjectivization. To retreat into nostalgia is to flee one’s own freedom. In order to accomplish this and to close the gap within the social order, nostalgic projects necessarily rely on a strong authority figure who promises to reinvigorate the lost past rather than on the freedom of the subject.34 The emancipatory goal placed in a nostalgic appeal loses touch with the overall emancipatory project of freeing the subject from its sub- mission to authority figures. What’s more, nostalgia works only in theory, not in practice. Nostalgic appeals always create disappointment in the last instance. We long for a time before loss, but this time only comes into existence with its loss: the birth of subjectivity retroactively creates the object that it loses. The politics of nostalgia involves never actually following through on the nostalgic promise, as contemporary conservatism’s social politics makes evident. In contrast to their vigorous pursuit of a conservative economic program, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush (the two great proponents of a politics of nostalgia in the last fifty years) did not actively try to enact their social agenda. For Reagan and Bush, the dream of a return has a politi- cal effectiveness that an actual return could not have. If school prayer again became the norm in public classrooms, the nonexistence of the former wholeness would be revealed. If the threat of the gay lifestyle were really eliminated, the banality of heterosexual marriage would once again show itself. Nostalgia remains a useful political tool only insofar as one doesn’t effectuate it. This is the limit of its power.

### 1AR – McGowan

#### Perm do both – McGowan votes for the perm---can integrate K’s insights and the 1AC

Daniel Tutt 13, Interviewing Todd McGowan, October 27, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: Interview with Philosopher Todd McGowan”, http://danieltutt.com/2013/10/27/enjoying-what-we-dont-have-interview-with-philosopher-todd-mcgowan/

DT. It seems to me that a frequent critique of psychoanalysis and politics is that in its inability, and perhaps unwillingness to propose concrete policy reforms or political projects, it falls back on a notion that everyone should just undergo analysis. Do you think that a political project that is informed by psychoanalytic teachings implies that we should all undergo analysis? You write in your book for instance that fantasy is a crucial point for facilitating a sort of un-bonding process from the larger capitalist mode of subjectivity. What do you see as the role of analysis and political emancipatory work?¶ TM. I will alienate many of my analyst friends with this response, but I have no political investment at all in psychoanalytic practice. I’ve undergone some analysis myself. However, I don’t believe that everyone undergoing psychoanalysis would change much at all politically. What is important about psychoanalysis to me is its theoretical intervention, its discovery of the death drive and the role that fantasy plays in our psyche. This is the great advance. And political struggle can integrate these theoretical insights without any help from actual psychoanalysis. What allows one to disinvest in the capitalist mode of subjectivity is not, in my view, the psychoanalytic session. Instead it is the confrontation with a mode of enjoyment that ceases to provide the satisfaction that it promises. This prompts one to think about alternatives. Obviously, not everyone can become a theorist, but in a sense, everyone already is a theorist. We theorize our enjoyment when we think through our day and plan out where we’re going to do. Even watching a television show requires an elaborate theoretical exercise. Making this theorizing evident and thus arousing an interest in theory is to me much more important than having a lot of people undergo psychoanalysis. In response to your question about the universalization of psychoanalytic practice, I have more faith in a universalization of psychoanalytic theory.

### 1AR – Lundberg

#### Lundberg is criticizing anti-state Mexican globalization protestors who wanted to be put on a list of “dangerous criminals” and says that paradoxically legitimized state power – that’s distinct from the aff which thinks the state can be contingently good if it dismantles oppressive structures – if anything, the alternative that “demands” to be recognized as a disruption of debate only replicates their impacts

Lundberg 12 Dr. Christian Lundberg, 2012, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” The University of Alabama Press, Dr. Lundberg is an associate professor and co-director of the University Program in Cultural Studies at UNC, he has a B.A. from the University of Redlands, a Master of Divinity from Emory University, and a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University

first, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the be- ginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the de- mand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such in- stitutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTo often function at the cost of addressing how practices of glob- alization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state’s actions.

Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of de- mands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Gross- berg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the “politics of policy and public debate.”45 Although Grossberg identi es the problem as a specific coordination of “theory” and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state’s refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, im- plying a stifliing commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of pater- nal “no.” instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hys- terical politics is in the incredibly dif cult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition.

### 1AR – Psycho Wrong

#### 1 – Doesn’t scale

[it can’t explain group phenomena, is unique to the individual studied, and is not a universal theory]

Gunder 5 - Senior planning lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, previous president of the New Zealand Planning Institute (Michael Gunder, 2005, “Lacan, Planning and Urban Policy Formation”, *Urban Policy and Research*, 23.1)

Not surprisingly, the application of Lacanian theory to the understanding of society and culture is not without concern. Some clinical practitioners of Lacanian psychoanalysis are “suspicious of the wider ‘application’ of the theory to those not actually in analysis” (Parker, [2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib74), p. 69). Alternatively, Lacan's teachings have been criticised by social theorists as being only theoretical and void of empirical material (Sarup, [1993](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib84), p. 26). Further, in contrast to psychology ([Rose, 1998](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib79)), the inability to reconcile the nuance of each particular psychoanalytical case to a meaningful universal theory of the unconscious that is testable is a fundamental constraint for considering psychoanalysis a science, or by extension, a valid scientific body of thought applicable to the understanding of aggregate human behaviours ([Fink, 2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib29)). In this regard, Lacan was unable to successfully legitimise and advance Freud's psychoanalytical theory as a science of the unconscious even with his application of mathematical theory and linguistics to Freud's metapsychology ([Althusser, 1996](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib2); [Morel, 2000](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib71); [Fink, 2004](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib29)). Consequently, this author views Lacan's work in a manner originated by Althusser ([1996](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/0811114042000335287#bib2), p. 93), as best being understood as a “philosophy of psychoanalysis” from which subsequent understandings of society and culture may be derived and, where possible, tested.

#### 2 – Group the rant – it’s based on completely bogus science

**Bunge, McGill University philosopher, 2010**

(Mario, “Should Psychoanalysis Be in the Science Museum?”, 10-5, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827806.200-should-psychoanalysis-be-in-the-science-museum.html>)

We should congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy. Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body. Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513). More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups. In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience. This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted. For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on. As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies. Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

## 1AR – AT: Baudrillard

### 1AR – Framework

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens and not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve and intrinsic good---debate is a game with switch sides and speech times

#### Independently, predictable engagement lets us determine the practical impacts of politics – that’s key to produce rigorous contestation which lets us test and refine our scholarship to produce the best political strategy

### 1AR – Top level

#### 1 – Permutation do both – the 1AC affirms BIPOC futures which envision utopias that’ve dismantled oppressive structures like the colonial war machine – independently, drone swarms are tools of control by the empire to supress revolutionary movements

#### 2 – Aff li­nk turns all their offense – research project of the aff endorses bipoc futures that embraces a post humanist ethic of becoming insect which expands the category of the human to stop otherization – 1AC Wilcox 17

#### 3 – Utopian fiat is a voting issue – impossible for the affirmative to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression – if it isn’t, alt can’t solve case because they can’t force the state to cede to their demands

#### 4 – Case is a 6 minute disad to the alt – it’s an opportunity cost which means we get to weigh the aff

### 1AR – Fiat Good

#### Fiat is good – puts US in charge of government action and DEMANDS that politicians like Mitch Mcconnel shouldn't control the world, which resolves political passivity and motivates change through activism out of round -- spills over and outweighs on scope. key because political apathy is widespread now and the alt only reinforces that by abstracting away from materiality

### 1AR – Lundborg

#### We turn Lundborg – drone swarms are created because of the threat of the other

### 1AR – Death

#### Fear of death from drone swarms good – makes sure that populations under the control of the empire don’t suffer more than they already have

#### It’s inevitable – evolution and science mean we’re naturally averse to death and pain

### 1AR – Schwarz

#### This link flows aff – we criticize the logic of precision, legality, and effectiveness that justifies the war machine and development of drone swarms

#### Independently, endless interventions get worse when the US can mobilize thousands of robots without boots on the ground

### 1AR – Hoofd

#### No link – their ev is about virtualization of war in video games which is distinct from the aff which makes arguments about how people of color are suffering in the status quo

### 1AR – Movements Good

#### Movements and Images of suffering good – inspired by George Floyd, BLM movements this summer caused material reductions in police budgets in cities like LA, Seattle, and New York – this is offense for us because the alt rejects these movements

### 1AR – More Things

#### The critique of truth-telling destroys global politics – truth commissions and protests across the Global South rely on making public governmental lies and atrocities, which the K’s politics foreclose. There is a zero-sum tradeoff between their approach and ours.

Kivisto ‘14(Peter, Richard Swanson Prof. of Social Thought, Chair of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Welfare @ Augustana College, “Postmodernity as an Internal Critique of Modernity”, *Postmodernism in a Global Perspective*, pp. 105-108)

Because signs no longer refer to real referents, because the real has collapsed into the hyperreal, meaning has evaporated. In a rather notorious instance of applying this thinking to a concrete event, Baudrillard (1991) claimed that the Gulf War was nothing more than a television and computer graphics spectacle—the difference between this war and the war games in a video arcade presumably having essentially disappeared. Of course, there is an element of truth to this claim. Indeed, a similar claim was made by Slavoj Zizek (2002: 37) about the war in Afghanistan that took place in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, which he depicted as “a virtual war fought behind computer screens.” Lost in Baudrillard’s vision, however, as David Lyon (1994: 52) pointedly noted, is the fact that there really (i.e., not hyperreally) were “blood—stained sand and bereaved families.” Lost, too, are beliefs about patriotic duty, geopolitical realities, the economics of oil, and similar very real considerations that lead nations into war. In his book on terrorism, which is described in the subtitle as a “Requiem for the Twin Towers,” Baudrillard (2002) describes Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States in terms of the “symbolism of slaughter” and “sacriﬁcial death” as a mode of challenging American hegemony. Again, he treats a bloody event only as a spectacle and not as the consequence of a complex interplay of political, economic, and social forces that underlie the spectacle. Incidentally, and not noted by Baudrillard, the architect of the Twin Towers was Minoru Yamasaki, who had earlier designed the ill-fated Pruitt-Igoe. My criticism of Baudrillard revolves around the obvious point that there is a reality that people experience, emotionally respond to, and attempt in some fashion to shape. There is a life outside of the television set and outside of cyberspace. The emotionless and meaningless worlds depicted in ﬁlms such as David Lynch’s Blue Velvet and Quentin Tarantino’s ﬁlms from Pulp Fiction to his more recent offerings, Inglourious Basterds and Django Unchained, are not synonymous with our lived experiences, nor do most people convolute the two (Denby, 2009; Bauman, 1992: 149-55; Best and Kellner, 1991: 137-44). Although it is certainly true that the world of consumerism has changed considerably in recent years, little evidence can be mustered to claim that we have left modern culture for postmodern culture. The continued potency of religious belief, for example, calls into question the pervasiveness of meaninglessness Baudrillard envisions. The existence of the new social movements concerned with such issues as the environment, peace, feminism, civil rights, and poverty also calls into question the extent to which people in advanced industrial societies have opted for political passivism and escapism. By claiming that we have moved from production to consumption, this version of postmodernism shows evidence of a serious blind spot. It is obvious that goods continue to be produced, although in a global economy this might mean that they are being produced in poor countries, where workers are paid abysmal wages and are forced to work exploitatively long hours in unsafe and unsanitary factories. The clothes purchased at the shopping mall and online are the products of this darker side of our contemporary culture. Moreover, as Alex Callinicos (1989: 162) has pointedly noted, not only are most of the world’s inhabitants excluded from the consumerism Lyotard and Baudrillard describe but also poor people in the advanced industrial societies have only a limited involvement in this kind of consumption. In a generous assessment of Baudrillard that appeared shortly after his death in 2007, Robert Antonio (2007: 2) pointed out that Baudrillard’s abandonment of leftist politics was a reflection of his assessment of the failure of the 1968 student/worker protests. This event led to his the abandonment of the Marxist dream of a radiant future. Unlike Zizek (2008), who some continue to describe as a Marxist, Baudrillard was not inclined to argue “in defense of lost causes.” Nor was he prepared to endorse the anti-utopian pragmatism of liberal democracy. Rather, in relentlessly promoting his often contradictory but deeply pessimistic diagnoses of our times, he became a media star, which included homage to him in one of the Matrix ﬁlms and a US lecture tour that was part of the Institute of Contemporary Arts’ “Big Thinkers” series. He played a major role in creating and sustaining the postmodern moment, but near the end of his life he claimed that the term that best deﬁned him was nihilist. Liquid Modernity Baudrillard was the most explicit and insistent advocate for radical postmodernism (Lemert, 2005: 36-40). Other postmodemists have offered more tempered assessments of the postmodern condition, viewing it in many respects as a new phase of modernity rather than constituting a radical rupture between past and present. No one better exempliﬁes this position than the Polish-born sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman, who has published a series of books explicitly devoted to postmodern concerns (Bauman, 1993, 1995, and 1997). Of particular emphasis in these theoretical reflections is an appreciation of the signiﬁcance of ambivalence in postmodernity. Peter Bielharz (2009: 97) sees a parallel between Bauman’s thought and that of Simmel, contending that in both one ﬁnds a commitment “to the idea of ambivalence as a central orienting device and motif of modernity." By the turn of the century, Bauman (2000) opted to replace the term postmodern with the idea of “liquid modernity.” Perhaps to avoid the confusions and incessant debates about postmodernism and perhaps also to distance himself from postmodernism’s more radical proponents, this original term can be seen as useful in carving out an intellectual space in which to articulate his own position. Agreeing with the claim that grand narratives had ceased to be compelling, Bauman (2007) sees the present as an “age of uncertainty.” The preceding stage of modernity can be characterized as “solid.” In contrast, the current stage is “liquid” insofar as patterned social conduct and the social structures essential to making such forms of everyday social relations durable no longer exist. Instead, we live during times in which these structures no longer keep their shape for very long, “because they decompose and melt faster than the time it takes to cast them...” The consequence is that structured forms today “cannot serve as frames of reference for human actions and long-term life strategies because of their short life expectations" (Bauman, 2007: 1). In short, people in the contemporary world are consigned to living out their lives with a far greater focus on the present and immediate future rather than with the “open horizon of the future" that Wagner (2008: 1) associated with the early phase of modernity. What makes Bauman so dramatically different from someone like Baudrillard is that his assessment of our current condition does not lead him to nihilism. On the contrary, he thinks that today, more than ever before, ethical conduct must be grounded in a sense of personal responsibility. We may live in uncertain times, but we don’t live in amoral times. It’s for this reason that Bauman continues to deﬁne himself as a socialist. He would thus likely agree with Bielharz (2009: 140) that socialism today should be viewed, not so much as an alternative economic system to capitalism, but as its “alter ego.”

#### Oversaturation and disengagement is not absolute – individual actions are context specific have a material impact in spite of the linguistic economy

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While I find Liesegang’s argument plausible, **there are** other explanations **for this apparent disinterest and disengagement outside of Baudrillard’s theory of the postmodern condition** or a desire to neutralize the German past, although it does have to do with socio-economic status. One of the things that many of us familiar with German culture admire about it is the state’s commitment to creating livable conditions for virtually all of its citizens. The social welfare network in Germany (indeed in Western Europe more broadly) may be under siege in the current economic climate, but from health care to housing the state has managed to offer its citizens a level of basic support that Americans cannot really fathom and—as the most recent health care debate demonstrated—in large numbers appear not to condone. Thus, **the** glaring **need for individual citizens** **to offer their services to their fellow human beings has remained somewhat underdeveloped** in Germany (Wiedermann and Held) **and has led to a set of expectations that the government will address the society’s most basic needs**. **Recent studies of volunteerism** in Germany indicate that this is changing **and that a substantive portion of the population** **now gives of its time to myriad social organizations** in ways that would seem entirely futile to the characters in the texts analyzed here.13 Furthermore, sociological and social psychological studies indicate that **people who volunteer do feel a greater connection to other people and a greater level of personal satisfaction than those who do not.**14 The findings of this research, as mentioned above, [End Page 258] have led me to question whether the literature analyzed in this article reflects the perspective of a highly specific section of German society far more than it offers a broader portrait of central European society today, namely that of a disaffected, disengaged intellectual class that no longer sees itself as called upon to participate in the improvement of society now that the great German political problem of the 20th century appears to have been “solved.” This may have something to do with the specific situation of Germany in the first decades after the fall of the Wall but it may also be a result of the socio-economic structures of the Federal Republic. **I do not wish to present here an overly simplified** and naïve **argument** **that Hermann’s characters should go out and get involved in volunteer organizations** and that doing so would make the pervasive sense of sadness and ennui vanish. **Nor would it necessarily reorient the consumerist attitudes or patterns of consumption** of Naters’ group of friends or Regener’s Herr Lehmann into more socially productive outlets. **However, I do question the individual, social, and even aesthetic value of** wallowing in indecision **and isolation and presenting them as representative of a crisis in human subjectivity**. Steven **Best describes the world** according to Baudrillard **as “an abstract non-society devoid of cohesive relations**, social meaning, and collective representation” (Best 51). The characters of Mau Mau, Herr Lehmann, and the stories of Sommerhaus, später and Nichts als Gespenster inhabit the same or at least a similar world to Baudrillard’s. Thus **Baudrillard’s work offers an effective tool in understanding the implications of the world these literary characters inhabit and their creators’ perspective** on contemporary German society. **Their world, however, is itself a human projection**, a choice**. It is an** interpretation of reality **that allows individuals to become resigned and passive.** Furthermore, it is a perspective possible only from a position of relative affluence. **I shall not venture to judge whether Baudrillard’s diagnosis** of postmodern society **is accurate**, although it appears that many of Germany’s current writers agree with him or were influenced by postmodern theories of late 20th-century consumerist societies**. I can**, however**, say in conclusion that it** is not helpful **or productive on either an individual or social level in imagining ways of living in today’s world**. As Steven Best points out: **Baudrillard’s radical rejection** **of referentiality is premised upon a one-dimensional, No-Exit world of self-referring simulacra. But**, **however, reified and self-referential postmodern semiotics is,** signs do not simply move in their own signifying orbit. **They are** historically produced **and circulated and while they may not translucently refer to some originating world, they none the less can** be socio-historically contextualized, **interpreted, and critiqued.**(57) In other words, **human beings generate the simulacra in specific historical contexts that are** subject to interpretation and challenge. **Regardless of** how pervasively the media spin our reality**,** real people suffer **and**—**occasionally** [End Page 259] prosper—**because of political decisions made at the local, national, and international level**. **Media images may overpower us, but they** shouldn’t make us lose sight of the real ramifications of political and economic development. **Many critics have suggested that Baudrillard’s chief accomplishment** **was to serve as an agent provocateur.** In an interview with Mike Gane, **Baudrillard himself saw his method of reflection as “provocative, reversible**, [ . . . ] **a way of raising things to the ‘N’th power** [ . . . ] It’s a bit like a theory-fiction” (Poster 331). **One could argue that this is precisely the function of such novels and short stories as the ones examined here: to provoke us**. But to what end? Naters, Regener, and Hermann all write very readable literature, and they challenge us to understand the world of the insipid, self-centered, and myopic characters that they have created. **It would indeed be a disservice to the authors to imply that they do not view their own characters with** critical distance. Thus, I am not suggesting that they believe their readers should emulate the characters they have created. **They have not, however, successfully demonstrated either why we should care about them or**—**more importantly**—**what we can learn from them**.

#### It’s not all simulacra --- reality still exists outside the text --- should take into account the people whose lives are actually affected by these images

Simon Blackburn 7, professor of philosophy at Cambridge University, 4-29-07, “Au revoir Baudrillard,” Prospect , http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/04/aurevoirbaudrillard/---- {hors texte = outside the text}

Baudrillard was not concerned with the artist’s touch but with what happens when television and other media purport to take us to the field of action. The 1990 Gulf war was modelled by planners using simulations; it was won, if we call a massacre a victory, largely by pilots looking at computer screens; and it was relayed to the public by television. Most consumers of these images get no reality check; the image is all we have to go on. And the image does not come to us innocently. What happened in 1990 may, indeed, have been something more than a war: an episode in America’s cultural narcissism, a hallucinatory projection of its fears and fantasies, a Faustian pact between developed capitalism and virtual reality, a promotional video, or a simulacrum indistinguishable from Disneyland. So Baudrillard’s hyperbole had a serious point. He often provoked outrage by it, but when, for instance, he tactlessly suggested that the iconic place of Nazi atrocities as a symbol of evil makes it “logical” to ask whether they even existed, his point was not to ally himself with the David Irvings of this world, but to suggest that for many political and cultural purposes, the answer is irrelevant. As with God, it is our investment that matters, not whether it is invested in a fiction.¶ Baudrillard’s ideas about simulated reality seem to have touched on an old philosophical panic. Perhaps our senses are no better than our televisions. Perhaps nature has varnished and spun the pictures we receive. They too are commodities, bought in to provide sustenance. Perhaps, at the limit, we live in a virtual reality, unable to comprehend our real position, sentenced to a woeful life of dreams, myth, fiction and illusion. Baudrillard, the inspiration for the Matrix films, tried to distance himself from the trite opposition of one moment seeing through the glass darkly and then coming face to face with reality, yet he enjoyed playing with its ingredients. I do not think this was wise, since generalised scepticism implies that there is nothing especially wrong about America or late capitalism or consumer society—and would any self-respecting culture critic want to draw that conclusion?¶ In any event, it is not all simulacra. We are participants in a public world, not hermits trapped in our own private cinemas. The cure for the sceptical nightmare is action. Nobody stays sceptical while crossing the street, or choosing dinner. Nor while dodging bombs and shells, even if they are sent by people watching computer screens. In the hurly-burly of survival, there isa lot that is hors texte—although this is more true for the artisan driving nails or baking bread than for the politician (or academic) whose work is confined to the production of signs and messages.

#### **1) they’re just a reproduction of Michigan KM who didn’t do shit to change debate other than get high schoolers to emulate them. Disproves all their solvency claims.**

#### **2) If info is dissuasive, they shouldn’t have communicated at all**

#### **3)The NC is a double turn – despite their posturing, they communicate, isolate acts of violence like at the top of the 1NC, and use empiricism to make all their impact claims – proves you have to evaluate the contextual instances of their theories**

#### Governments listen to citizens concerns – impact turns the alts passivity

Matthews 16 -- Dylan Matthews is one of the staff members at Vox, an online media venture along with Ezra Klein, Melissa Bell, and Matthew Yglesias, 5-9-2016, "Remember that study saying America is an oligarchy? 3 rebuttals say it's wrong.," Vox, accessed 9-14-2017 at https://www.vox.com/2016/5/9/11502464/gilens-page-oligarchy-study#czou

Since its initial release, **the Gilens/Page paper**'s findings **have been targeted in three separate debunkings**. Cornell professor Peter Enns, recent Princeton PhD graduate Omar Bashir, and a team of three researchers — UT Austin grad student J. Alexander Branham, University of Michigan professor Stuart Soroka, and UT professor Christopher Wlezien — have all taken a look at Gilens and Page's underlying data and found that their analysis doesn't hold up. Gilens and Page used a database of 1,779 policy issues — which included data on the opinions of median-income Americans, the rich, business interests, and non-business interest groups like unions or the National Rifle Association — to determine whose opinions correlated most closely with actual government policy. But the researchers critiquing the paper found that **middle-income Americans and rich Americans** **actually agree on an overwhelming majority of topics**. Out of the 1,779 bills in the Gilens/Page data set, majorities of the rich and middle class agree on 1,594; there are 616 bills both groups oppose and 978 bills both groups favor. That means the groups agree on 89.6 percent of bills. That leaves **only 185 bills on which the rich and the middle class disagree**, and even there the disagreements are small. On average, the groups' opinion gaps on the 185 bills is 10.9 percentage points; so, say, 45 percent of the middle class might support a bill while 55.9 percent of the rich support it. Bashir and Branham/Soroka/Wlezien find that **on these 185 bills, the rich got their preferred outcome 53 percent of the time and the middle class got what they wanted 47 percent of the time. The difference between the two is not statistically significant.** And there are some funny examples in the list of middle-class victories. For instance, the middle class got what they wanted on public financing of elections: in all three 1990s surveys included in the Gilens data, they opposed it, while the rich favor it. That matches up with more recent research showing that wealthy people are more supportive of public election funding. So it's hard to say definitively, based on this data, that the rich are getting what they want more than the middle class. And **it's hard to claim, as Gilens and Page do, that "ordinary citizens get what they want from government only when they happen to agree with elites or interest groups that are really calling the shots."** Even when they disagree with elites, ordinary citizens get what they want about half the time. Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien also look at which specific issues spur disagreement: Do they fall down on ideological lines? Sort of, but not dramatically so. The authors find that the middle class got 26 liberal policy wins (either a bill they supported passing or one they opposed getting blocked), 20 conservative wins, and 29 ideologically neutral wins. The rich got 28 liberal wins, 26 conservative wins, and 37 neutral wins. The rich's wins are slightly more conservative on average, but not hugely so. Okay, but maybe those conservative wins for the rich were all on issues that mattered most to the rich. Maybe the middle class wins occasionally on social issues, but the rich succeed in preventing redistribution and other economic policies they don't like. Again, not really. **The researchers found the rich’s win rate for economic issues where there's disagreement is 57.1 percent, compared with 51.1 percent for social issues. There's a difference, but not a robust one.** "The win rates for the two issue types are not statistically different from one another," Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien conclude. They also looked at the views of the poor — those at the 10th percentile of the income scale. Here, too, there's lots of agreement. The poor, middle class, and rich agree on 80.2 percent of policies. But here they find more evidence for differences in income-based representation. Bills supported just by the rich but not the poor or middle class passed 38.5 percent of the time, and those supported by just the middle class passed 37.5 percent. But policies supported by the poor and no one else passed a mere 18.6 percent of the time. "These results suggest that the rich and middle are effective at blocking policies that the poor want," the authors conclude. "Policy ends up about where it would have been" social security One place where the rich lose: They are more favorable to cutting Social Security. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images Bashir's paper prods at the Gilens data even more and finds a number of holes. Bashir concludes that strong support from the middle class is about as good a predictor of a policy being adopted as strong support from the rich. **"In the original data set, change is enacted 47 percent of the time that median-income Americans favor it at a rate of 80 percent or more," Bashir writes. "Yet change is enacted 52 percent of the time that elites favor it at that rate."** And the two groups fare roughly as poorly when interest groups are pitted against them: "The rich get their favored outcome despite the combined opposition of [interest groups and the middle] at a rate of 32 percent; meanwhile, average Americans’ favored outcome occurs 30 percent of the time that they face combined opposition from interest groups and the wealthy. " Bashir also notes that the Gilens and Page model explains very little. Its R-squared value is a measly 0.074. That is, 7.4 percent of variation in policy outcomes is determined by the measured views of the rich, the poor, and interest groups put together. So even if the rich control the bulk of that (and Bashir argues they do not), the absolute amount of sway over policy that represents is quite limited indeed. Peter Enns's paper takes another approach to analyzing cases of rich versus middle-class disagreement. He notes that it's not just that the rich and middle class agree a lot; their levels of support for various policies also move in tandem. If policy A is more popular among the rich than policy B, then it's probably more popular than policy B among the middle class as well. This means the policies you'd most expect to pass, based on rich people's opinions, are also the policies you'd most expect to pass based on middle-class people's opinions. So the actual policy outcomes you'd predict based on a model where only the rich matter aren't very different from the ones you'd predict based on a model where only the middle class matters. "Even when policy preferences differ across groups … policy ends up about where it would have been if those in the middle received the exact same representation as the wealthy," Enns concludes. "These conclusions hold when we only consider economic and social welfare policies and when we include the preferences of organized interest groups in the statistical model." **Gilens and Page's defense doesn't really rescue the argument** I reached out to Gilens and Page to see what they made of the emerging critique of their work, and in particular the one included in the Bashir and Branham/Soroka/Wlezien papers. Gilens made four main points. First, the definition of "rich" here is "at the 90th percentile of the income distribution." Households at the 90th percentile currently make $160,000 a year. They're rich, for sure, but not superrich. It's impractical to use surveys to measure the opinions of the ultra rich (millionaires, billionaires), but Gilens argues that their opinions would diverge from the middle class more dramatically. That might be, but it's somewhat orthogonal to the claims about the influence of the 90th percentile made in the original Gilens/Page paper. Second, he insists that the issues where the rich win despite middle-class opposition are important ones relating to redistribution and economic policy. But Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien found that win rates for the rich weren't significantly different between economic and social issues. Third, he writes that even though the middle class and rich agree on most things, "a political system that responds to the preferences of average citizens is profoundly different from one in which average citizens get their way only when they happen to agree with the preferences of the well to-do." This is a fair point, but again, the average citizen does not only win when they agree with the well-to-do. When they disagree, they win about half the time anyway. Finally, Gilens argues that the use of "win rates" by Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien is misleading. By focusing on whether majorities of each group support a policy, they ignore gradations in the level of support. He also takes issue with them lumping in wins that consisted of a policy not passing — pretty common in a system with strong status quo bias, like American politics — with ones that consisted of a policy passing, a much rarer event: When the rich (but not the middle-class) favor a policy, the policy is adopted 37 percent of the time; when the middle-class (but not the rich) favor a policy, the policy is adopted 26 percent of the time. Conversely, when the rich (but not the middle-class) oppose a policy, the policy fails 74 percent of the time and when the middle-class (but not the rich) oppose a policy, the policy fails 63 percent of the time." In other words, the tiny gap in win rates gets somewhat wider when you break it down a little. Branham, Soroka, and Wlezien say this criticism misses the point. "While the rich do slightly better when explicitly taking into account the status quo, the rich still do not dominate the middle," they note. The middle class still gets its preferred policies enacted 26 percent of the time even when the rich are opposed. The picture Gilens and Page painted of a world where the opinions of the middle class literally count for nothing doesn't hold up. "Our argument is not that American democracy is perfect," they say in a prepared response to Gilens. **"Our paper responds to a specific claim made by Gilens and Page, namely, that when a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose." That contention, they argue, is vastly overstated.** How much does representation really matter? mission accomplished aircraft carrier A high point in the representativeness of American government. Steven Jaffe/AFP/Getty Images The implicit argument behind the Gilens/Page paper, and of Gilens's book Affluence and Influence, is that in a democracy, there should be strong congruence between policy outcomes and the opinions of the American middle class — or, at the very least, between policy outcomes and the views of the American public as a whole. This might seem intuitive. In a democracy, if 80 percent of people want universal health care, shouldn't there be universal health care? But this contention relies on a rather literal, and implausible, definition of democracy. As Vox's Matt Yglesias once put it, "The idea that the point of democracy is to implement legislative outcomes that are supported by broad-based surveys seems almost like a straw man dreamed up by an eighteenth-century monarchist." Think about it. Most Americans aren't very politically engaged — and most don't want to be politically engaged, preferring that professional policymakers make decisions for them, so long as the economy stays on track. What are the odds that they've formed stable, durable opinions on dozens of highly specific policy issues? For example, the Gilens data set includes a 1986 poll about the creation of an investment tax credit for corporations, a 2002 poll asking if the federal government spends enough on HIV/AIDS research and treatment, a 1997 poll asking whether trade agreements should be subject to a simple up-or-down vote, and a 1991 poll on whether non-bank corporations like GE should be allowed to own banks. These are all fairly technical points that require a decent amount of background knowledge to understand, let alone develop a coherent opinion about. I write about economic policy for a living and you'd have to give me a couple of days before I had a real, informed opinion about investment tax credits. What are the odds that people whose jobs don't mandate they follow policy debates would have that kind of background knowledge? What are the odds that the 2002 respondents even knew how much the US was spending on HIV/AIDS, let alone whether that was too high or too low? This is known in public opinion research as the problem of "non-attitudes," and while Gilens and Page do what they can to address it, it's hard to eliminate entirely. And if you look at the times in history when government was most responsive to public opinion, it doesn't appear that responsiveness is super well-correlated with good governance. For example, Affluence and Influence finds that the nadir of representativeness was the mid-1960s, when Medicare, the war on poverty, and the Voting Rights Act were enacted; and the peak was George W. Bush's first term. Does that mean LBJ's administration was a democratic failure and Bush's was a democratic success? Or does it just suggest that the Bush administration was effective at getting highly persuadable voters to back big tax cuts and the Iraq War, rather than reflecting their wishes? It's for reasons like this that most political theorists don't use pure representation as their test of whether a democracy is functioning well. **Political theorist Andrew Sabl writes that while empirical political scientists like Gilens "assume that the normative standard for a well-functioning democracy is whether policy outcomes track public preferences," political theorists argue that the standard should be "something — as it might seem, almost anything — else." There are "deliberative democrats," who think democracies should strive to enact the policies the people would support after calm, careful deliberation; there are small-r republicans, who measure democracies' success by the civic virtue of their residents; but you won't find basically any support for the idea that democracies should enact the people's opinions exactly as currently stated. It's entirely possible, of course, to think the political theorists are wrong and that responsiveness really is the most important thing. These are matters of values, not of empirical truth or falsity. But strict responsiveness is not obviously the most important feature of a democracy.**

#### Specifically research and switch sides moves the needle

**Gurney 2/23** [Kyra Gurney, 2-23-2018, "Debate program prepared Parkland students to speak out," miamiherald, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/education/article201678544.html, accessed 9-10-2018] BC

When students at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High debated gun control in class last November, they never imagined they were preparing to lead a national discussion on how to prevent school shootings. As the debate team filled Google docs with research on state laws, brainstormed arguments for and against universal background checks and wrote speeches, they were amassing information that would later help them formulate arguments on national TV, in face-to-face meetings with Florida legislators and at vigils for their murdered classmates. And it’s not just the students at Stoneman Douglas. Since a gunman opened fire at the high school last Wednesday, killing 17 people, teenagers from across Broward County have [joined the call](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article201013139.html) for stricter gun control policies. They have been praised for their composure and well-articulated arguments, which often appear so polished they have [fueled conspiracy theories](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article201177359.html) that the students are “crisis actors.” Top of Form But what really explains the students’ poise, said Broward Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie, is the school district’s system-wide debate program that teaches extemporaneous speaking from an early age. Every public high school and middle school in the county has a debate program, along with more than two dozen elementary schools. It’s one of the largest debate programs in the country — and, amid the heartbreak, it has helped Broward students position themselves on the front lines of the #NeverAgain movement. “I’m like a parent that is just beaming with pride in terms of how they have been able to express themselves, how they’ve exhibited a kind of courage that everybody needs to have and how they’re working to reclaim their future and do what they know is right,” Runcie said. “In some ways it seems like we’ve been preparing our kids for this moment without realizing it.” The debate program has certainly helped prepare David Hogg, a senior at Stoneman Douglas who has appeared on nearly every major network and cable news program over the past week. “It’s been immensely helpful because I’ve been able to speak articulately about these current events,” Hogg said Wednesday evening on his way to a [CNN town hall at the BB&T Center](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article201486604.html) in Sunrise. With no time to prepare any new arguments in recent days, Hogg said he’s relied on the research he conducted in debate class last fall. “Exhausted is an understatement, but I like it,” he added, referring to the frequent media appearances. “The fast pace of the media cycle is what keeps me going.” Hogg said he joined Stoneman Douglas’ debate program on a whim in ninth grade. At the high school, debate is both a class and an after-school activity. Roughly 80 percent of the 150 students who take the class also participate in competitions, which means they spend time preparing for debates in the afternoons and on weekends. Although Hogg said he’s not a star on the team, he enjoys arguing about current events. “I’ve never won a single debate tournament, even come in 10th place,” he said. “I guess it shows you don’t have to be great at something to make an impact.” Sophomore Sari Kaufman has also used her debate training to advocate for stricter gun control policies. On Sunday, the 15-year-old Stoneman Douglas student wrote a letter to lawmakers, which was grounded in her debate class research, that has been shared hundreds of times on social media. Kaufman also brought her debate notes on a trip to Tallahassee earlier this week to meet with lawmakers. “I don’t think we made a huge change, but we definitely moved the needle a little more than it was before,” she said. Gun control isn’t the only lesson from debate class that’s come in handy this past week. Students recently studied special interest groups and lobbying, said debate teacher and program director Jesus Caro. They talked about political action committees, the groups that raise money for candidates, and about groups like the National Rifle Association. “Just to see that these kids aren’t bound by any of these rules ... it’s really moving,” Caro said. “It does make me proud.” Katherine Guerra, a sophomore at Stoneman Douglas and a debate team captain, has stayed out of the limelight. But she said the debate program has helped her classmates respond to the shooting. “We know what we want, and we have the research,” she said. “We know how things work and that gives us more liberty to speak out because we’re not unsure of things.” “The thing is in debate you have to argue both sides, which is also beneficial because as much as we want to change things we also need to see the different views,” she added. In recent years, some of the students on the team, which Caro described as “up and coming,” have traveled around the country to attend tournaments. This year, the national tournament will be held in Fort Lauderdale in June. The location was decided before the shooting, but Runcie said he plans to ask the National Speech & Debate Association to make gun control one of the topics at the competition. The Stoneman Douglas team has a long road ahead before the national competition. A beloved member, [14-year-old Alyssa Alhadeff](http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article200918174.html), was killed during the shooting and the team is grieving the loss of other classmates and staff as well. Caro said he hopes the open environment in debate class, where students have space to discuss controversial issues, will give them the opportunity to share what they’re feeling. “I just know I’m going to try to give everybody a chance to speak, try to create some sense of normalcy and definitely give them opportunities to develop solutions,” he said.

## 1AR – AT: Posthumanism

### 1AR – Framework

#### Framework – debate should be about the hypothetical consequences of the plan – most fair because the plan is the only predictable stasis point – infinite reps and epistemologies explodes prep burdens and not weighing the aff moots 6 minutes of the 1AC

#### Fairness outweighs – Only impact the ballot can solve and intrinsic good---debate is a game with switch sides and speech times

#### Independently, predictable engagement lets us determine the practical impacts of politics – that’s key to produce rigorous contestation which lets us test and refine our scholarship to produce the best political strategy

### 1AR – Dartmouth Anthropocene

#### 1 – No link – the aff is post-human – we understand that humans as interconnected with the technology – we just think that technology is only violent in this specific instance

#### 2 – Link Turn – great powers use drone swarms to control and extract resources from the global south

#### 3 – No Link – we think humans irrationally construct weapons and use them as tools of control

#### 4 – Perm Do Both – Embracing the swarm as an organizing formation is a posthuman analysis understands humans as akin to insects and allow for adaptive coordination and communication with others to establish posthuman utopian futures

#### 5 – Utopian fiat is a voting issue – impossible for the affirmative to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression – if it isn’t, alt can’t solve case because they can’t force the state to cede to their demands

#### 6 – We are a shift – we think insect life and it’s configurations are valuable

#### 7 – Perm---do both---IR is still useful and valid when applied to states, combining it with Planet Politics is the only way to solve the alt

Hannes Peltonen 17, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Tampere, 11/12/17, “Planet Politics and International Relations,” https://duckofminerva.com/2017/11/planet-politics-and-international-relations.html

Accepting the Anthropocene/Capitalocene as a background condition has several important dimensions. One of them is the effect minuscule pathogens have on human communities and the relations between them. To give an example somewhat different from the usual discussions concerning the international spread of infectious diseases, consider how infectious microbes may determine human borders.

More importantly, by including the Anthropocene/Capitalocene we gain a deeper understanding of how humans are embedded in a geography of life with other forms of life. And that the geography of life that we are used to is experiencing a global shifting. Largely due to anthropogenic climate change, some species redistributions affect human communities, and thereby indirectly relations between human communities, as well as create feedbacks on the climate system, thereby affecting climate change, thereby affecting human communities and their responses to climate change, which in turn affect the geography of life – and so on.

IR with its usual starting position in anarchy between independent, sovereign states may be heuristically or pedagogically useful, but it is not an accurate description of reality, not even according to usual IR. While IR could continue to narrate its own story through anarchy between states, and while useful research can be completed on that basis, we may be facing a situation analogous to Physics.

Despite proven to be inadequate, Newtonian physics is still highly applicable, unless we examine very small or very big things. Similarly, “normal” IR is still applicable in its usual foci, but it fares less well if we consider for instance the impact very small things, like pathogens, or very large things, like climate change, have on human communities and their relations.

The points above call for new ways of thinking that might be able to bring together IR, the Anthropocene/Capitalocene, and our growing awareness of being embedded in a global, complex, and dynamic geography of life.

Planet Politics

Planet Politics is an effort to re-think the starting premises of IR and to draw attention to the relations between human and non-human.

Planet Politics was introduced in IR in a 2016 Manifesto in Millennium. The Manifesto argues that IR has failed and needs to be reformed: IR’s usual starting position (anarchy between states) should be replaced with human interaction or relations with the biosphere.

According to the Manifesto, at the heart of IR should be the wellbeing of all species that live in different worlds on our planet. Human communities are not ignored in Planet Politics. They are exactly the executioners and practitioners of politics and policies that may be useful or harmful for other life.

A central aim of the Manifesto is to move away from anthropocentricity and to give voice to other forms of life and species. Another aim is to advance the wellbeing of all life on Earth. While both of these aims are noble and as such agreeable, they are also problematic.

Biopolitics, the politics of life and death, encompasses all life and it aims, justifiably, at the destruction of some species (e.g. viruses).

Giving voice to other species does little to remove anthropocentricity. Humans, on our terms, give voice to others. We also remain as the audience and as the interpreters of what we “hear,” all of which is done from our, anthropocentric positions.

This is not to argue that we should not be emphatic. We should place ourselves in the metaphorical shoes of other species. But we should not fool ourselves into thinking that we have therefore avoided anthropocentricity.

Despite such and other teething problems in the Manifesto, the idea and conceptual innovation of Planet Politics is promising. Yet, its scope should be widened.

Planet Politics should be understood to include the biosphere and the planet’s other spheres (atmosphere, hydrosphere, and lithosphere) and the planet itself.

This highlights better the anthropogenic and anthropocentric politics and the use of power exercised vis-à-vis the planet and its spheres, and the means and processes through which the planet is governed. It also enables one to connect Planet Politics more directly to non-life sciences.

Moreover, we should distinguish positive from negative planet politics.

Anthropogenic climate change and its causes are examples of negative planet politics. Our actions may not have aimed at causing climate change, but for hundreds of years we have nevertheless exercised destructive power whose object has been our planet and its spheres.

An example of positive planet politics is the use of power aimed at countering climate change. Positive planet politics aims to improve the conditions for life on Earth.

In a nutshell, in Planet Politics the object of direct and indirect use of power is the Earth and its spheres.

Note that in this formulation we need not remain centered only on humans, even though humans wield unprecedented planet political power. Other species “have” power, too, even over humans.

A paradoxical answer to IR’s need for renewal?

Planet Politics is unrefined and much needs to be done. Yet, it has raised interest in the discipline, and hopefully also beyond. Potentially, it might be a disciplinary big idea that is of interest far beyond IR.

At the core of Planet Politics is the Anthropocene/Capitalocene, which is highly relevant and increasingly an important background condition in many other fields and disciplines.

Moreover, Planet Politics is a way to transcend the separation between human and nature and an attempt to see these as intertwined. It thus connects various, highly diverse disciplines and enables them to communicate with each other, with politics as that which is “between” them (inter).

Yet, the need, identified by Rosenberg, for a disciplinary big idea, defining and separating IR from other disciplines, is undermined by Planet Politics.

Where Rosenberg’s suggestion underlines IR as a distinct discipline, in search of its own big idea so that other disciplines recognize IR as an independent discipline, embracing Planet Politics might result in a decline of such disciplinary distinctions. This is because, inherently, Planet Politics crosses, combines, and transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries.

For us to understand anthropogenic use of power, its multiple forms, and its complex repercussions on Earth, we must weave a new, complex intellectual fabric by drawing from multiple fields and disciplines at the same time.

We must go beyond and sometimes ignore old boundaries. Even more so, if we recall that the non-human is not some stable, passive background condition.

Thus, we may have here a somewhat paradoxical situation. Planet Politics might be IR’s disciplinary big idea, of interest to other disciplines, but simultaneously, the more it is embraced, the less such disciplinary “ownership” matters.

Although it may have been introduced in IR, it seems to contain a seed for the relative irrelevance of disciplines.

Planet Politics is an effort at disciplinary fusion and synthesis in the age of Anthropocene/Capitalocene. Only in this manner can we comprehend in a more encompassing manner and find truly novel ways to think about the organization of human communities, and the relations between them and the non-human.

Planet Politics may be neither the answer to IR’s perceived need to have its own disciplinary big idea nor a challenge to IR’s traditional strengths. It could be, however, that IR will borrow from Planet Politics at some point in the future.

#### 8 – Root cause IR is fake which means they can’t explain or solve the aff

Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement.

For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### 9 – No impact

Kareiva & Carranza 18 (Peter Kareiva & Valerie Carranza. Institute of the Environment and Sustainability,. “Existential Risk Due to Ecosystem Collapse: Nature Strikes Back.” Volume 102, September 2018, Pages 39-50)

The interesting question is whether any of the planetary thresholds other than CO2 could also portend existential risks. Here the answer is not clear. One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is biodiversity (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2012), with the proposed safety threshold being a loss of greater than .001% per year (Rockström et al., 2009). There is little evidence that this particular .001% annual loss is a threshold—and it is hard to imagine any data that would allow one to identify where the threshold was (Brook et al., 2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013). A better question is whether one can imagine any scenario by which the loss of too many species leads to the collapse of societies and environmental disasters, even though one cannot know the absolute number of extinctions that would be required to create this dystopia.

While there are data that relate local reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced as species number declines locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al 2017; Vellend et al., 2013). Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk.

What about the remaining eight planetary boundaries? Stratospheric ozone depletion is one—but thanks to the Montreal Protocol ozone depletion is being reversed (Hand, 2016). Disruptions of the nitrogen cycle and of the phosphorous cycle have also been proposed as representing potential planetary boundaries (one boundary for nitrogen and one boundary for phosphorous). There are compelling data linking excesses in these nutrients to environmental damage. For example, over-application of fertilizer in Midwestern USA has led to dead zones in the Gulf of Mexico. Similarly, excessive nitrogen has polluted groundwater in California to such an extent that it is unsuitable for drinking and some rural communities are forced to drink bottled water. However, these impacts are local. At the same time that there is too much N loading in the US, there is a need for more N in Africa as a way of increasing agricultural yields (Mueller et al., 2012). While the disruption of nitrogen and phosphorous cycles clearly perturb local ecosystems, end-of-the-world scenarios seem a bit far-fetched.

Another hypothesized planetary boundary entails the conversion of natural habitats to agricultural land. The mechanism by which too much agricultural land could cause a crisis is unclear—unless it is because land conversion causes so much biodiversity loss that is species extinctions that are the proximate cause of an eco-catastrophe. Excessive chemical pollution and excessive atmospheric aerosol loading have each been suggested as planetary boundaries as well. In the case of these pollution boundaries, there are well-documented mechanisms by which surpassing some concentration of a pollutant inflicts severe human health hazards. There is abundant evidence linking chemical and aerosol pollution to higher mortality and lower reproductive success in humans, which in turn could cause a major die-off. It is perhaps appropriate then that when Hollywood envisions an unlivable world, it often invokes a story of humans poisoning themselves. That said, it is doubtful that we will poison ourselves towards extinction. Data show that as nations develop and increase their wealth, they tend to clean up their air and water and reduce environmental pollution (Flörke et al., 2013; Hao & Wang, 2005). In addition, as economies become more circular (see Mathews & Tan, 2016), environmental damage due to waste products is likely to decline. The key point is that the pollutants associated with the planetary boundaries are so widely recognized, and the consequences of local toxic events are so immediate, that it is reasonable to expect national governments to act before we suffer a planetary ecocatastrophe.

## 1AR – AT: Set Col

### 1AR – Presentation

#### 1 – Aff link turns all their offense – drone swarms are tools of intervention that exponentially increase the power of the settler state

#### Independently, research project of the aff endorses posthuman bipoc futures that embraces becoming insect which blurs the lines of gender, race, and species and envisions a post colonial future

#### 2 – Aff is a rupturing of IR – we valorize black and brown perspectives who live under the swarms of terror – dropped that conceptions of the swarm relies on a western conception of superiority

#### 3 – Not saviorism – drone swarms override native cultures by bolstering the US empire – aff bans the very tools they criticize

#### 4 – Homonationalism link turns assimilationism – queering of tech means queer folk are assimilated in the military to justify exceptionalism of whiteness

#### 5 – Permutation do both – the affs reclaiming of the swarm is a form of incommensurability – refusing to be pinned down and continually adaptive it establishes a network of communication that ruptures the heteronormativity of the militarized state

#### 6 – Utopian fiat is a voting issue – impossible for the affirmative to generate offense against alternatives that wish away oppression

# 1AR – AT: NC

## 1AR – AT: Kant

#### Shmagency answers practical reason

David Enoch 11 [studied law and philosophy in Tel Aviv University, where he earned his B.A. and LL.B. in 1993. After completing his military service and clerking for Justice Dorit Beinisch at the Supreme Court, David turned to graduate studies in philosophy, first in Tel Aviv University, and then at the NYU Philosophy Department, where he earned his Ph.D. in May, 2003], “Shmagency revisited”, In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave Macmillan (2011), BE

If it can be defended, then, constitutivism promises to yield significant payoffs3. But constitutivism seems to be subject to a powerful objection. For agents need not care about their qualifications as agents, or whether some of their bodily movements count as actions. They can, it seems, be perfectly happy being shmagents – non-agent things that lack the thing purportedly constitutive of agency, but that are as similar to agents as is otherwise possible – or perhaps being something else altogether. If so, constitutivism cannot make good on its promises: For when Korsgaard replies to the agent who asks, say, "Why should I care about the hypothetical and categorical imperatives?" with "Well, otherwise you wouldn't even count as an agent, you wouldn't even be in the game of performing actions.", the skeptic can discard this reply with a simple "So-what?". What is it to her, as it were, if she qualifies as an agent or not? She would be analogous not to the chess-player who asks why she should play according to the rules, but to someone who enjoys the aesthetic qualities of (what we call) the chess board and pieces. If we tell this person that he must not move his king to a certain position because it's against the rules, and if he breaks them he won't count as playing chess, he can shrug us off with a simple "So-what?". He doesn’t care whether his manipulation of the chess pieces qualifies as chess-playing. And at this point the objectivity Velleman hopes for also collapses, because the practical reasons whose objectivity Velleman wants to secure will not reach the person who is happy being a shamgent-rather-than-an-agent, or perhaps something else entirely. The general point here is that the status of being constitutive of agency does not suffice for a normatively non-arbitrary status. Of course, if there were some independent reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shmagent), or to perform actions, this objection would go away. But the price would be too high, for such an independent reason – one not accounted for by the constitutivist story, but rather presupposed by it – would make it impossible for constitutivism to be the whole, or the most foundational, account of normativity, or to deliver on its promised payoffs.

#### Irresolvable – if I liked listening to loud music by Weezer and it annoyed you, kant can’t reconcile whether I should turn off my music or not

#### Death outweighs – only way I can exercise agency is if I’m alive

#### Kant’s humanist btw

Dierksmeier 11 [Claus&nbsp;Dierksmeier, 2011, "Kant’S Humanist Ethics," Humanistic Ethics In The Age Of Globality., https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230314139\_6, accessed 2-6-2021]LHSBC

In this chapter we investigate how Kant’s philosophy contributes universalistic arguments in favor of a humanistic ethics. Kant moved the idea of freedom to the center of his philosophy, arguing that from a reflection on the nature of human freedom a self- critical assessment of its morally appropriate use could be gleaned. Therein, that is, in construing his ethics from (subjective) self- reflection rather than from presumed (objective) values, and in construing norms of interpersonal validity from the individual perspective (“bottom- up”) rather than from (“top- down”) references to prearranged ethical or metaphysical orders, lies Kant’s innovation in ethics theory.

#### Humanism bad – allows for states to write off genocidal violence and intervention by categorizing populations as sub-human

## 1AR – AT: LogCon

#### Reject log con---Makes being aff impossible because we’re either not inherent or not a logical consequence---kills substantive education, which outweighs because we only have the topic for 2 months

**Reject philosophical interpretations that auto-negate---Incentivizes reusing arguments and intellectual laziness instead of doing research. At best, the research they do do is worthless and doesn’t mirror academic research practices that are the only portable skill.**

#### Textuality cuts both ways---Dictionaries also define ought as a moral obligation. That means you should default to pragmatics because we’re both semantically correct, which we’ve won because log con always negates, so you should reject it because it causes stale debates

#### Debatability goes neg---Log con is impossible for the aff to win and everyone preps for moral obligation, check the wiki AND we coopt your offense because we can use empirical trends in deciding morality of the resolution

#### No is/ought fallacy [Extend FW Warrants]

# 1AR – AT: CP

## CP – Theory

### 1AR – Condo – Short

#### Condo’s a voter for deterrence – the time crunched 1AR can’t read its best offense against multiple worlds with different uniqueness conditions – they collapse to what’s undercovered which wrecks engagement. Dispo solves—they can kick it if we perm—they get to test the aff but we get strategic options like pointing out contradictions and straight turns

### 1AR – Condo – Long

#### Condo’s a voter for deterrence:

#### 1] Strat skew – splits the 1ar by forcing me to argue against multiple worlds with different uniqueness conditions which precludes taking advantage of strategic interactions and contradictions

#### 2] Clash – incentivizes reading many short advocacies and going for the least covered which moots 1ar responses and prevents going in-depth on their position’s nuances. Outweighs because external education and multiple rounds solve their education impacts but clash only occurs in-round

#### 3] Dispo solves—they can kick it if we perm—allows sufficient neg flexibility while preserving 1ar strategic decision-making

### 1AR – Condo PICs Bad (DD)

#### Condo PICs are a voting issue – they make the 1AR functionally impossible and kill clash cuz you can turn parts of the case that the CP links to *and* steal the whole aff, which lets them get rid of a chunk of the 1AR since we have to go for the case to have a shot—destroys clash cuz they don’t have to defend their arguments against well-researched objections since they can kick what they’re losing

### 1AR – PICs Need SAs (DD)

#### PICs without solvency advocates are a voting issue—they kill clash since they don’t have to answer most of the 1AC *and* we can’t predict and answer it since it’s not in the literature—neither of us have to defend our positions against well-researched objections

### 1AR – UQ PICs Bad

#### Uniqueness PICs are a voting issue—they moot the 1ac and are unpredictable because there’s no literature their arbitrary uniqueness claim – they arbitrarily inflate neg DA ground by blowing up tiny changes, moot key aff answers like uniqueness presses, and are unpredictable since it’s not a relevant consequence of the plan

### 1AR – UQ CP Bad

#### Uniqueness counterplans are a voting issue—generate artificial competition for disads not in the topical prep burden—means we lose every time killing fairness, also kills education because we have nothing to clash with a disad that shouldn’t exist.

## CP – Competition

### 1AR – Competition – Long

### 1AR – AT: Consult

#### Resolved means to consult.

**Webster’s ‘9** (Merriam Webster; 2009; Meriam Webster Dictionary, “Resolved,” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): resolved; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult, **deliberate**

### 1AR – AT: Process

#### PDCP – Plan is a rough draft

United States 20 [Last Updated: September 17, 2020, “How Laws Are Made and How to Research Them,” https://www.usa.gov/how-laws-are-made//lhs-ap]

Steps in Making a Law∂ A bill can be introduced in either chamber of Congress by a senator or representative who sponsors it. ∂ Once a bill is introduced, it is assigned to a committee whose members will research, discuss, and make changes to the bill. ∂ The bill is then put before that chamber to be voted on. ∂ If the bill passes one body of Congress, it goes to the other body to go through a similar process of research, discussion, changes, and voting. ∂ Once both bodies vote to accept a bill, they must work out any differences between the two versions. Then both chambers vote on the same exact bill and, if it passes, they present it to the president. ∂ The president then considers the bill. The president can approve the bill and sign it into law or not approve (veto) a bill. ∂ If the president chooses to veto a bill, in most cases Congress can vote to override that veto and the bill becomes a law. But, if the president pocket vetoes a bill after Congress has adjourned, the veto cannot be overridden.

### 1AR – AT: Immediate

#### “Ought” isn’t immediate

English Grammar 10 [“Must and Ought to”; English Grammar; August 16, 2010; <https://www.englishgrammar.org/must-and-ought-to/> //BWSWJ]

Ought expresses ideas such as duty, necessity and moral obligation. It is not as forceful as must, but it is stronger than should. You ought to be punctual. We ought to help the poor. You ought to visit your friends once in a while. Ought generally points to present and future time. It can point to past time when it is followed by the perfect infinitive (have + past participle).

### 1AR – AT: PICs

#### Permutation do the counterplan – ‘should’ tolerates exceptions

County of Riverside ‘15

(“Introduction,” Draft General Plan Amendment No. 960, p. I-12) BW

For a policy to be useful, it must be clear. However, not all policies are the same; they differ in terms of expected results, commitment of resources, and indication of importance or urgency. Therefore, it is important to simplify the language used in the General Plan and understand the distinctions between the different levels of policy. The following definitions of terms provide guidance in interpreting the policy language of the General Plan: • Shall: Policies containing the word “shall” indicate that an action must be taken in all cases. This represents absolute commitment to the policy, and the expectation is that the policy will always be carried out. • Should: Policies containing the word “should” indicate that an action will be taken in most cases, but exceptions are acceptable for good reason.

## 1AR – AT: Advantage

### 1AR – AT: Moratorium

#### Perm do both – ban can be temporary

Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp. 13 [Freeman V. Dal-Tile Corp., 3-14-2013, "Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 930 F. Supp. 2d 611," No Publication, https://casetext.com/case/freeman-v-dal-tile-corp, accessed 1-21-2021]LHSBC

The court notes that the word “ban” simply means “to prohibit.” Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (Unabridged) 169 (1993) (defining “ban” as “to prohibit, esp[ecially] by legal means or social pressure the performance, activities, dissemination, or use of”); Black's Law Dictionary 164 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “ban” as “[t]o prohibit, esp[ecially] by legal means”). Bans may take on various forms. They may be permanent or temporary, they may prohibit certain forms of communication ( e.g., communication over the telephone), but not others ( e.g., communication by letter or email), or they may encompass any number of different physical, temporal, or geographic restrictions ( e.g., a restraining order which bans contact within a certain number of feet). Here, plaintiff appears to be asking the court to infer that Dal–Tile “promised” (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J., DE # 78, at 9, 12, 24, 27, 31) her an immediate, permanent ban that would keep her from ever having to communicate with or physically encounter Koester again. However, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record does not support such a finding. ( See, e.g., Pl.'s Dep., DE # 62–1, at 212:1–12; S. Wrenn Dep., DE # 78–4, at 31:18–32:4.)

### 1AR – AT: Arkin

#### 1---Perm do both

#### 2---Vagueness causes circumvention – Nobody knows what “guiding principles” or some rando’s recommendations are

#### 3---Guiding principles and IHL fail – Competitive incentives ensure non-compliance – That’s Altmann and Sauer and Maas

#### 4---Prolif measures don’t solve – States are developing tech now and dual use means circumvention

#### 5---Links to the net benefit – Regulations chill research because people are scared weapons won’t be used

#### 6---Research fails – Complexity, speed, secrecy, automation bias, lack of context, and security dilemma ensure miscalc and accidents

#### 7---Terrorism plank doesn’t solve – Our scenario is about states

#### 8---No ban circumvention – States are incentivized to promote compliance and inspections solve

## 1AR – AT: Harker Reform/Overwatch

### 1AR – AT: Sætra

#### Sætra evidence doesn’t’ apply – About political governance, not warzones – Doesn’t assume short reaction times, which cause miscalculation – That’s Altmann and Sauer

#### Even if AI is theoretically perfect, implementation ensures miscalculation –

#### 1--- Unique situations that can’t be tested and competitive incentives ensure faulty equipment – That’s Altmann and Sauer

#### 2---Complexity, automation bias, incomplete information, and secrecy ensure misuse that escalates and won’t be corrected – That’s Maas

#### 3---Security Dilemma – Other countries think AI to deescalate is actually a first strike – That’s Johnson

### 1AR – AT: Humans Bad

#### Even if human deterrence isn’t perfect, decision times ensure they’re at least better than AI – Prefer Altmann and Sauer – That’s the only evidence in this round that compares emerging AI technology that will be deployed soon with human reactions specifically in the context of nuclear decisions

### 1AR – AT: King

#### Humans solve deterrence – Even if they’re not perfect, slower reaction times allow communication and reconsideration that prevent miscalculation – That’s Altmann and Sauer

### 1AR – AT: Scarry

#### Scarry just says former presidents considered first use without answering the reconsideration defense from Altmann and Sauer

### 1AR – AT: Del Re/Barash

#### No stress impact – Del Re is in the context of a battlefield, not nuclear decisionmaking AND doesn’t assume decision time checks emotional reactions – Also answers Barash

### 1AR – AT: Wolff

#### AI Testing fails –

#### 1---Security Dilemma – Leaders prioritize new capabilities over safety – That’s Maas

#### 2---Secrecy – Competitive pressures incentivize leaders to hide failures and accelerate deployment of faulty AI – That’s Maas

#### 3---Quantity – Too many contingencies to test – ensures miscalculation – That’s Altmann and Sauer and Maas

#### 4---Bias – Human programmers transfer their cognitive biases – That’s Johnson

## 1AR – AT: Process

### 1AR – AT: Congressional Consultaiton

#### Squo solves Congressional input---there’s robust informal consultation. BUT the plan removes the incentive to work with Congress in good faith.

Rachel **Stohl 10**. Associate Fellow of Chatham House, London, based in Washington, DC. April 2010. “U.S. Policy and the Arms Trade Treaty.” Working Paper 10-1. https://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/WP10.1.pdf

**While Congress does have a statutory responsibility to review sales, very rarely** **does Congress step in** **to** **stop** **a potential sale. To** **prevent a sale** from proceeding, **both the House and the Senate must pass identical joint resolutions of disapproval** **within a very short timeframe and then the resolution must be signed** into law by the President. **A Presidential signature is highly unlikely, however, since the administration supports the sale in the first place. Therefore, the resolution** of disapproval **would have to be passed by a two-thirds majority to be able to override the presidential veto. Because the process is so difficult,** **Congress prefers to work behind the scenes**, **highlighting** **potentially troublesome sales to the administration before the formal review** process. **In the past, the administration has provided** **informal** **reviews to Congress to** **test the waters** **on potential sales and avoid the** **embarrassment of Congressional opposition**. However, in July 2006, the Bush administration decided to waive the customary 20-day pre-notification for a major arms sale. As a result, House International Relations Committee (HIRC) Chairman Henry Hyde (R-IL) expressed his outrage to Assistant Secretary of State John Hillen in a public hearing, calling the attempt a “deliberate and wholly inappropriate maneuver to diminish **Congress’** lawful **oversight of arms sales**.” Hyde promised that the Congress would “take all appropriate actions to prevent the reoccurrence of the flouting of the Arms Export Control Act”. In fact, Rep. Hyde and ranking Democrat Tom Lantos (D-CA) introduced a bill (H.R. 5847) soon after that was intended to “reinforce longstanding oversight practices” of U.S. arms sales (Schroeder 2006). The hearing **embarrassed** **the** Bush **administration** and Pakistan, **which had not wanted** **concerns about the sale** **– namely the country’s poor human rights record, its questionable democratic processes, the possibility of diversion** of U.S. weapons and technology to China, **and** the **issues related to nuclear prolif**erator ringleader AQ Khan – **to be discussed in an open setting, and forced** Hillen to reveal **specifics** **about the sale not generally made public. Such a** **public vetting of the displeasure of Congress** **over a potential arms sale is something the executive branch wants to avoid**. **Thus, Congress and the executive** branch **generally** try to **work out kinks in the deal** **before it is made public. In addition, Congress may work to influence the** **budget authority** **of the agencies involved in the export process, request certifications** **or** **reports** related to a particular export, or simply establish a law that prohibits arms sales to a specific country. For example, in November 2005, Congress placed conditions on U.S. Foreign Military Financing – grants that allow eligible states to purchase weapons, training, and other defense articles and services from the United States – and lethal military exports to Indonesia, until Indonesia undertook steps to counter international terrorism, establish military reforms, and protect human rights and punish rights violators, except in cases of national security interests. One week after Congress passed the bill, the Bush administration announced that the legislative provisions were being waived due to U.S. national security interests, allowing Indonesia to receive weapons from the United States without delay.

### 1AR – AT: Tort

#### Tort fails – 9th circuit precedent proves harm is greenlighted as long as an official is doing their duty even if it violates ILaw

Practical Law Litigation 17 [Practical Law Litigation, 2-14-2017, "Bush Administration Officials Immune From Iraq War-Related Tort: Ninth Circuit," No Publication, https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I308af191f20c11e698dc8b09b4f043e0/View/FullText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&amp;transitionType=Default&amp;firstPage=true, accessed 1-16-2021]LHSBC

On February 10, 2017, in Saleh v. Bush, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that former Bush administration officials were entitled to official immunity under the Westfall Act from a suit alleging violations of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) related to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. ([No. 15-15098 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2017)](http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/02/10/15-15098.pdf).)∂ An Iraqi plaintiff sued former Bush administration officials under the ATS on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals who suffered damage due to the invasion of Iraq. She claimed that the defendants had advocated for an invasion of Iraq before taking office and continued to pursue the policy once in office even when the available evidence failed to justify the invasion, thereby demonstrating an intent to invade Iraq from the beginning. She alleged that this constituted a "crime of aggression" which violated the "law of nations" under the ATS.∂ The US filed a certification that the defendants had been acting within the scope of their federal employment and under the Westfell Act, [28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)](https://content.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS2679&originatingDoc=I308af191f20c11e698dc8b09b4f043e0&refType=SP&originationContext=document&transitionType=PLDocumentLink&billingHash=B2E3920A8ACE7C4C0D53204EEA03613C1484BB463549D03F92EBB40A802A1754&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_e07e0000a9f57), the US was substituted as the sole defendant. Because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims against the US, the district court dismissed the action. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the defendants were not acting within the scope of their office and therefore should not be afforded immunity.∂ The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the Westfell Act, federal employees enjoy absolute immunity from tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties. Federal courts apply the principles of respondeat superior of the state in which the alleged tort occurred to decide whether the acts were undertaken in the scope of employment. Applying the District of Columbia's respondeat superior principles, the Ninth Circuit decided that the defendants were acting in the scope of their employment because:∂ The alleged tortious act, the invasion of Iraq, took place once the defendants were in office, so they could not plan the invasion before they took office but could merely advocate for it.∂ Pre-employment statements of intent or belief cannot take the later acts of public officials outside the scope of their employment.∂ A preference for a certain policy, followed by an implementation of that policy, is not the same as performing an official act for personal gain, which would put it outside the scope of employment.∂ The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendants' alleged performance of an act condemned by a treaty put it outside the scope of employment

#### Nuke terror has insurmountable barriers.

Mueller 18 John Mueller, Political Science Professor at Ohio State University. [Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter but Nuclear Hysteria Does, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter]//BPS

As for nuclear terrorism, ever since al Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively to hijack commercial airplanes, alarmists have warned that radical Islamist terrorists would soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to make and deliver nuclear weapons so as to destroy various so-called infidels. In practice, however, terrorist groups have exhibited only a limited desire to go nuclear and even less progress in doing so. Why? Probably because developing one’s own bomb from scratch requires a series of risky actions, all of which have to go right for the scheme to work. This includes trusting foreign collaborators and other criminals; acquiring and transporting highly guarded fissile material; establishing a sophisticated, professional machine shop; and moving a cumbersome, untested weapon into position for detonation. And all of this has to be done while hiding from a vast global surveillance net looking for and trying to disrupt such activities.

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### 1AR – AT: NGA

#### Uncoop fism bad – means red states violate Biden admin EPA standards

#### **Wrecks the rule of law and gets overturned because it violates the Supremacy Clause**

Rakove 14 [Jack N. Rakove; 2014; William Robertson Coe Professor of History and American Studies, and Professor of Political Science and (by courtesy) Law, Stanford University; “Some Hollow Hopes of States'-Rights Advocates”; Arkansas Law Review, lexis]

Nullification is the easiest concept to eliminate. De minimis, beyond its plain absence from the text of the Constitution, nullification faces two major objections. The [\*83] first objection is the Supremacy Clause. n7 This momentous provision generated remarkably little discussion at Philadelphia, but it silently evolved into one of the most powerful tools of the final text. In its origins within the Constitutional Convention, the Supremacy Clause appeared as an element in the New Jersey Plan, and it first gained traction after the framers rejected James Madison's congressional negative on state laws. n8 Initially, the Clause bound state judges only to federal laws and treaties, "any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding." n9 Article VI of the New Jersey Plan was silent, however, on what might happen should a state constitution impose some version of a loyalty test on provincial judges. n10 This language survived when Luther Martin moved to substitute it for Madison's negative on state laws on July 17, the day after the ostensible, if misnamed, Great Compromise over representation. n11 The decision to substitute was non-controversial, n12 but so were the subsequent changes that made the Federal Constitution - as well as national laws and treaties - superior to the constitutions and laws of the individual states, requiring state judges to abide thereby. n13 The change came in two parts: first, by the work of the committee of detail; and then, in an amendment proposed by John Rutledge of South Carolina, which made the Constitution the supreme law of the land. n14 No one at the time suggested that the states should retain some opt-out mechanism to negate federal laws they found deeply objectionable. The strongest complaint came later from Luther Martin, who claimed that the changes in the Clause rendered his original proposal ""worse than useless'" [\*84] because national acts ""were intended to be superior [only] to the laws of our state government, where they should be opposed to each other,' but not "to our constitution and bill of rights.'" n15 Yet at the time, Martin evidently did not object to the non-controversial amendments. n16 Thus, the Supremacy Clause provides a sufficient basis for rejecting the idea of nullification. But beyond the Supremacy Clause, one further consideration weighs heavily against nullification. The whole premise of rethinking American federalism in 1787, as seen from Madison's perspective, was to make national laws directly enforceable on the people of the United States - rather than allowing the states to implement the resolutions of the national government, as had been the case under the Articles of Confederation. n17 That premise was the genius of Madison's brilliant assessment of the underlying federalism problem of the Articles of Confederation in item seven of the Vices of the Political System of the U. States. n18 Any system of federalism that allowed the states to judge the propriety and necessity of federal decisions, Madison concluded, "will never fail to render federal measures abortive." n19 In this sense, the states should be thought of in relation to the Union as counties were in relation to the states. "If the laws of the States were merely recommendatory to their citizens, or if they were to be rejudged by County authorities, what security, what probability would exist, that they would be carried into execution?" n20 Whatever homage one would pay to the later genius of John C. Calhoun - and there is no doubt that his was indeed a formidable mind - he was not a founder of the federal [\*85] republic. Nullification is a terribly interesting argument, but it is neither part of the Constitution nor consistent with its meaning. Nullification advocates in South Carolina in the late 1820s and early 1830s understood that the ordinary state legislature could not apply the doctrine - saying a great deal about the doctrine's authority. n21 To make nullification effective, it had to be pronounced by a specially elected convention - one whose authority would somehow become tantamount to that of the ratification conventions of 1787-1788. n22 This convention would revive a potential exercise of popular sovereignty in a way that the ordinary processes of political representation and legislation could not, bringing the people of South Carolina closer to the original condition that permitted ratification of the Constitution in 1788. n23 No system of national legislation could work if states retained the capacity to threaten nullification. What possibility of collective deliberation would exist if states, somehow acting though their delegations, could ratchet up their opposition to particular measures and thwart the decision of constitutionally qualified majorities? However, a lesser version of state opposition to national legislation exists that is distinguishable from outright nullification: interposition.

#### Independently solves nuclear war

Kellman 89 (Barry, Professor @ Depaul University, “"JUDICIAL ABDICATION OF MILITARY TORT ACCOUNTABILITY: BUT WHO IS TO GUARD THE GUARDS THEMSELVES", December, 1989 Duke L.J. 1597, lexis)

In this era of thermonuclear weapons, America must uphold its historical commitment to be a nation of law. Our strength grows from the resolve to subject military force to constitutional authority. Especially in these times when weapons proliferation can lead to nuclear winter, when weapons production can cause cancer, when soldiers die unnecessarily in the name of readiness: those who control military force must be held accountable under law. As the Supreme Court recognized a generation ago, the Founders envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds. Their fears were rooted in history. They knew that ancient republics had been overthrown by their military leaders. . . .. . . We cannot close our eyes to the fact that today the peoples of many nations are ruled by the military. We should not break faith with this Nation's tradition of keeping military power subservient to civilian authority, a tradition which we believe is firmly embodied in the Constitution. 1 Our fears may be rooted in more recent history. During the decade of history's largest peacetime military expansion (1979-1989), more than 17,000 service personnel were killed in training accidents. 2 In the same period, virtually every facility in the nuclear bomb complex has been revealed to be contaminated with radioactive and poisonous materials; the clean-up costs are projected to exceed $ 100 billion. 3 Headlines of fatal B-1B bomber crashes, 4 the downing of an Iranian passenger plane, 5 the Navy's frequent accidents 6 including the fatal crash of a fighter plane into a Georgia apartment complex, 7 remind Americans that a tragic price is paid to support the military establishment. Other commentaries may distinguish between the specific losses that might have been preventable and those which were the random consequence of what is undeniably a dangerous military program. This Article can only repeat the questions of the parents of those who have died: "Is the military accountable to anyone? Why is it allowed to keep making the same mistakes? How many more lives must be lost to senseless accidents?" 8 This Article describes a judicial concession of the law's domain, ironically impelled by concerns for "national security." In three recent controversies involving weapons testing, the judiciary has disallowed tort accountability for serious and unwarranted injuries. In United States v. Stanley, 9 the Supreme Court ruled that an Army sergeant, unknowingly drugged with LSD by the Central Intelligence Agency, could not pursue a claim for deprivation of his constitutional rights. In Allen v. United States, 10 civilian victims of atmospheric atomic testing were denied a right of tort recovery against the government officials who managed and performed the tests. Finally, in Boyle v. United Technologies, 11 the Supreme Court ruled that private weapons manufacturers enjoy immunity from product liability actions alleging design defects. A critical analysis of these decisions reveals that the judiciary, notably the Rehnquist Court, has abdicated its responsibility to review civil matters involving the military security establishment. Standing at the vanguard of "national security" law, 13 these three decisions elevate the task of preparing for war to a level beyond legal accountability. They suggest that determinations of both the ends and the means of national security are inherently above the law and hence unreviewable regardless of the legal rights transgressed by these determinations. This conclusion signals a dangerous abdication of judicial responsibility. The very underpinnings of constitutional governance are threatened by those who contend that the rule of law weakens the execution of military policy. Their argument -- that because our adversaries are not restricted by our Constitution, we should become more like our adversaries to secure ourselves -- cannot be sustained if our tradition of adherence to the rule of law is to be maintained. To the contrary, the judiciary must be willing to demand adherence to legal principles by assessing responsibility for weapons decisions. This Article posits that judicial abdication in this field is not compelled and certainly is not desirable. The legal system can provide a useful check against dangerous military action, more so than these three opinions would suggest. The judiciary must rigorously scrutinize military decisions if our 18th century dream of a nation founded in musket smoke is to remain recognizable in a millennium ushered in under the mushroom cloud of thermonuclear [destruction] ~~holocaust.~~

## 1AR – AT: PIC – State

### 1AR – Top

#### State PICs don’t solve the aff – States won’t comply if they think another country is getting an unfair advantage from not being part of the ban – That’s 1AC Altmann and Sauer

#### Global regulation of emerging tech is key – excluding states sparks arms races

Wilson 13 (Grant Wilson, Deputy Director, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. J.D. from Lewis & Clark Law School, 2013. “MINIMIZING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC AND EXISTENTIAL RISKS FROM EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW.” Virginia Environmental Law Journal, Volume 31, No 2 (2013), pp. 307-364. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44679544?seq=1#page\_scan\_tab\_contents)

A. New International treaty GCRs/ERs arising out of emerging technologies are unique in that a single event can result in widespread destruction. If a GCR/ER regulatory regime only regulates some states but not others, dangerous emerging technologies could instead be developed and utilized in the unregulated states. An example of this is when Richard Seed, an American physicist who wished to be the first person to clone a human, threatened to conduct his cloning in Mexico or Japan if the United States banned human cloning.251 And if some states ban or regulate emerging technologies while others do not, this could threaten global security because rogue states would have a monopoly over dangerous emerging technologies.252 Furthermore, without a truly global treaty, countries competing to quickly develop emerging technologies may engage in a race to arms that promotes speed over safeguards.253 Finally, some states may believe that, absent regulations binding upon all states, their emerging technology industries will be placed at a competitive disadvantage to unregulated countries. Thus, all states should agree to an international treaty imposing evenhanded regulations.

### 1AR – Heg Bad

#### Heg is bad

#### 1 – Asian prolif

Fettweis 18

Christopher J. Fettweis, an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, “Chapter 2: Unipolarity and Nuclear Weapons,” *Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy,* Columbia University Press, 2018, accessed through Georgetown Libraries

First and most obviously, the second nuclear age is likely to be marked by a great deal more proliferation than the first. According to Bracken, the “overarching theme” of the age will be the “breakdown of the major power monopoly over the bomb.”6 Unipolarity provides strong incentives for smaller states, who have no hope of balancing the United States, to pursue nuclear weapons. No matter how much effort the United States puts into non- and counterproliferation, “nuclear weapons will nevertheless spread, with a new member occasionally joining the club,” predicted Kenneth Waltz. 7 “The most likely scenario in the wake of the Cold War,” argued John Mearsheimer, “is further nuclear proliferation in Europe,” and “it is not likely the proliferation will be well managed.”8 Instability and insecurity would spread, as would nuclear weapons, throughout the global South.9 Since new nuclear states were almost inevitable, both Waltz and Mearsheimer felt that it was in the interest of the West to attempt to manage, and indeed even to encourage, gradual proliferation to help stabilize the system.

These chains of proliferation will lead to new, potentially unstable nuclear rivalries. Were North Korea to be accepted as the ninth nuclearweapons state, Graham Allison warned in 2004, South Korea and Japan would build their own arsenals “by the end of the decade.”10 The second nuclear age will be “much more decentralized,” with “many independent nuclear decision centers.”11 A “multipolar nuclear order” is on the horizon, if it has not already arrived.12

The new nuclear powers are not likely to resemble the old. The second major assumption of the SNA literature is that proliferation will reach less enlightened parts of the globe, those led by unpredictable, semirational tyrants. The old rules of deterrence may not apply, since the motivations of these actors are not only less knowable but often ruled by passions and nationalism. “The idea of budding defense intellectuals sitting around computer models and debating strategy in Iran or Pakistan defies credulity,” or at least Bracken’s estimation, since in these states “hysterical nationalism” overrules rationality.13 The “overdetermined” cascades of proliferation across Asia will bring a host of new, less trustworthy actors into the nuclear camp, from rogue states to nonstate actors, all of whom will be essentially undeterrable by traditional means.14 Their motivations will be less rational or simply less transparent to the outside world.

In the second nuclear age, not just an accidental but the intentional use of nuclear weapons by new nuclear actors cannot be ruled out.15 Rogue states do not seek nuclear weapons for the reasons that motivated earlier proliferants. While all U.S. observers believe that Washington’s arsenal exists for defensive purposes, to deter any attack that our enemies would otherwise contemplate, the primary use of new nuclear weapons will be offensive. The possibility for irrationality in new nuclear powers inspired the United States to scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and begin thinking about how to “tailor” deterrence to target smaller actors.16 A nuclear Iran will use its weapons to bully or even attack, not deter. In 2017, experts warned that North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles would be coercive, to extract concessions from U.S. allies. “North Korea’s contempt for its neighbors suggests that it would hold them hostage with its nuclear weapons,” wrote the widely respected ambassador Chris Hill. “Would proliferation stop with South Korea and Japan? What about Taiwan?”17 As a result, the basic assumptions of deterrence need to be rethought.

#### 2 – Alliances create commitment traps and incentivize probing – that causes entanglement and war

O’Hanlon 19

Michael E. O’Hanlon, a senior fellow, and director of research, in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy, “The Senkaku paradox: Preparing for conflict with the great powers,” Brookings Institute, May 2, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/02/the-senkaku-paradox-preparing-for-conflict-with-the-great-powers/>

However, what about smaller efforts to nibble away at the existing world order that Beijing and Moscow often find objectionable? What if China decided to land forces on one of the eight Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea?∂ These remote rocks are claimed by both Japan and China, uninhabited and effectively worthless except for surrounding fishing waters, but they are covered by the U.S.-Japan security treaty, as President Obama and Secretary Mattis have both publicly reaffirmed in recent years.∂ Or, what if Russia decided to fabricate a “threat” to native Russian speakers in a small town in eastern Estonia or Latvia to create a pretext for “little green men” to swoop in (perhaps bloodlessly) to save the day? Scenarios involving the Philippines or other countries can be imagined, too.∂ Why would Moscow or Beijing consider such actions? China or Russia might like the idea of sowing their hegemonic oats and getting back at neighbors they have not forgiven for past events.∂ But Moscow’s or Beijing’s real purpose might be to weaken American alliance systems, and with them the U.S.-led global order, so as to increase its own power and dominance, especially in regions near its borders.∂ For example, a Russian grab of just one small Baltic town could be expected to throw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance into existential crisis.∂ Some member nations would likely seek nonmilitary solutions to the threat, whereas others might favor a prompt military response—with the ensuing debate casting into doubt the whole purpose of the alliance. ∂ The state of military technology and expected trends in future innovation compound the problem. Deployment of large U.S.-led military force packages into the lion’s den near China’s coasts or into the Baltic regions of Europe near Russia is becoming a harder proposition to entertain.T∂ The spread of the type of precision technology that the United States once effectively monopolized accounts for much of the reason why. The problem is exacerbated by other new or imminent weapons:∂ miniaturized robotics that function as sensors or even weapons, individually or in swarms;∂ small satellites that could function as clandestine space mines against larger satellites;∂ homing anti-ship missiles and various types of superfast hypersonic missiles in general; and∂ threats to computer systems from both traditional human-generated hacking and artificial intelligence (AI)-generated algorithms.∂ No mid-sized U.S. defense buildup can likely reverse these dynamics.∂ A scenario of the type sketched above would create a huge dilemma for the United States and allies—a situation I call the “Senkaku Paradox.” Mutual-defense treaty commitments under Article V of both the NATO and U.S.-Japan treaties would appear to commit Washington to defend or liberate such allied territory.∂ Yet, that could lead to direct war with a nuclear-armed great power over rather insignificant stakes. A large-scale U.S. and allied response could seem massively disproportionate. But a non-response would be unacceptable and invite further aggression.

#### 3 – The only comprehensive study proves retrenchment is comparatively more peaceful

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United [End Page 41] States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99

A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

#### C**onflict of interest – Brands is funded by the military**

Johnson 19 ([Adam Johnson is a contributing analyst for FAIR.org.] “Bloomberg’s Armsmaker-Funded Columnist Wants You to Know: Military Spending Is Woke.” Mar. 19, 2019, <https://fair.org/home/bloombergs-armsmaker-funded-columnist-wants-you-to-know-military-spending-is-woke/>) LHSLA LH

Bloomberg identifies Brands as the “Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.” “Kissinger” is [ominous enough](https://fair.org/home/and-now-a-word-from-henry-kissinger/), but surely Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is some innocuous, wonky academic institution, no?∂ In a piece explicitly defending bloated military budgets, however, perhaps it would be useful to know what exactly the “Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments” is. We can start by reading this [section](https://csbaonline.org/about/contributors) taken directly from their website (unabridged):∂ Below is a list of organizations that have contributed to our efforts over the past three years.∂ Aerojet Rocketdyne∂ Army Strategic Studies Group∂ Army War College∂ Austal USA∂ Australian Department of Defence∂ BAE Systems Inc.∂ Carnegie Corporation of New York∂ Chemring Group∂ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)∂ Department of the Navy∂ Embassy of Japan∂ Fincantieri/Marinette∂ Free University Brussels∂ General Atomics∂ General Dynamics—National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO)∂ Harris Corporation∂ Huntington Ingalls Industries∂ Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies∂ Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force∂ Kongsberg Defense Systems, Inc.∂ L3 Technologies, Inc.∂ Lockheed Martin Corporation∂ Maersk Line, Limited∂ Metron∂ National Defense University∂ Navy League of the United States∂ Northrop Grumman Corporation∂ Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Net Assessment (ONA)∂ Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)∂ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (AT&L)∂ Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych (PISM)∂ Raven Industries∂ Raytheon Company∂ Sasakawa Peace Foundation∂ Sarah Scaife Foundation∂ SEACOR Holdings∂ Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program∂ Smith Richardson Foundation∂ Submarine Industrial Base Council∂ Taiwan Ministry of National Defense∂ Textron Systems∂ The Boeing Company∂ The Doris & Stanley Tananbaum Foundation∂ The Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation∂ United Kingdom Royal Air Force∂ Brands is a senior fellow at an organization funded almost entirely by those with a clear interest in the upcoming $750 billion defense budget Brands is pushing for. While we don’t have a tax filings for CSBA since Brand was hired there, and thus we do not know his specific income, the average senior fellow at the organization, as of its last tax filing, makes just under $300,000 a year. They can call it whatever they wish—”think tank,” “nonprofit,” “Center”—but by any objective metric, this organization is just a lobbying entity for the weapons industry and Western militaries. A cursory glance at their policy briefs reveals they, unsurprisingly, always support more spending on weapons systems. Unlike other weapons-funded lobbying groups such as Center for Strategic and International Studies (FAIR.org, 8/12/16), they don’t even bother throwing some banks or soda companies in there to give the appearance of being anything other than a weapons industry trade group. (Don’t be fooled by the “Sasakawa Peace Foundation”—that’s an organization founded by far-right Japanese business executive Ryoichi Sasakawa, who was jailed as a war crimes suspect after World War II, and who once described himself as the “world’s richest fascist”—Time, 8/26/74.) Setting aside its disqualifying conflicts of interest, Brands’ piece is an assortment of sophistry about how weapons systems create middle-class jobs for Americans. Given that any meaningful definition of “progressive” must take into account the 95 percent of the world who are not Americans—e.g., those on the other end of these weapons systems and military occupations—the column rests its premise on a massive category error. One passage in particular displays a rather goofy notion of what “progressive” means (emphasis added):∂ The progressive critique misses the fact that military spending already serves progressive ends. Yes, defense spending benefits the executives who run major defense contractors, just as infrastructure spending benefits the executives of companies that build highways and airports and schools. But the Pentagon budget also serves as a huge jobs program and source of economic security for the middle class. This includes the roughly 2 million people who serve either on active duty or in the reserves and 730,000 civilian employees. The vast majority of them qualify as middle class and enjoy precisely the sort of healthcare and other benefits progressives seek to provide for the population as a whole.∂ See, if only all 330 million Americans could work in the military industry, building bombs and F-35s, no one would die due to preventable disease or an inability to afford chemotherapy. To Brands, the most “progressive” vision for society is the Klingon Empire—a perpetual war state where service to large-scale mechanized violence is the cost of survival. The idea that healthcare could, maybe, not be tethered to exporting weapons, occupation, hundreds of military bases, CIA dirty tricks and bombings is simply not an option. Progressives’ only hope: piggyback off US imperialism which evidently, to Brands, is simply a law of nature like ocean tides or entropy.∂ Brands also suggests that you can’t have trade except at gunpoint:∂ Defense spending produces massive positive spillovers in the form of national security and the ability to protect access to the global commons – critical to promoting U.S. trade and improving living standards at home.∂ And he says that what progressives should be worrying about as a “long-term threat to America’s ability to invest in infrastructure, education and other progressive priorities is not the Pentagon,” but “runaway entitlement spending.”∂ New York’s Eric Levitz ([3/18/19](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/03/the-left-is-right-to-hate-the-military-industrial-complex.html)) does a good job debunking Brands’ argument, such as it is, and his piece is well worth reading. But it’s not totally clear how useful it is to assume good faith from someone with such deep, undisclosed conflicts. We learned years ago to dismiss out of hand experts funded by the tobacco industry commenting on the effects of smoking, or climate scientists funded by big oil; why, exactly, do we take at all seriously organizations like CSBA when they comment on military budgets, and broader questions of US militarism, while receiving the vast bulk of their funding from those with a vested interest in bloating the US military machine?∂ The reason is, compared to the fossil fuel industry and tobacco, the military-think tank complex’s mercenary experts are 100-fold more intertwined into the US bipartisan consensus. It’s a product of ubiquity and professional courtesy borne from having influence with both Democrats and Republicans, rather than just the increasingly fringe and anti-science GOP. From an ontological standpoint, there’s little difference between experts on the take pushing cigarettes and those on the take pushing weapons; it’s simply a matter of scope and sophistication.∂ In addition, Brands’ Bloomberg bio omits Brands is also a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, which also receives sizable funds from the weapons industry. While its funders are not posted on its website, Rightwing Web, a website that monitors the influence of right-wing funding, does [report](https://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/foreign_policy_research_institute/) that major supporters listed in the group’s 2012 annual report include Boeing, Piasecki Aircraft… Historically, FPRI has also benefited from the largesse of conservative foundations. Between 1985 and 2005, FPRI received nearly $5 million from the Lynde and Harry Bradley, John M. Olin, Earhart, Smith Richardson and Sarah Scaife Foundations, among others.

### 2AR – US

#### Heg is bad

#### 1 – Prolif – adversaries like Iran and North Korea fear a unipolar power projecting themselves which means they develop nuclear weapons to deter that great power – causes action-reaction cycles where allies like Japan South Korea and Brazil proliferate their own nuclear weapons to hedge against the new proliferators

#### Outweighs great power war – new proliferators lack a second strike capability which means nationalism and miscalc incentivize them to strike first to gain the upper hand but the US and China posses secure second strike capabilities meaning mutually assured destruction checks,

#### 2 – Alliances – Ties with allies embolden them to be aggressive because they have a great backer behind them – US gets drawn in to maintain credibility causing great power wars

#### Even if they win transition wars, no reason they would draw in the US – the only scenario where the US gets drawn in is if they have alliances which means we control their internal link

#### They can’t go for transition wars - Parent and Macdonald says that when the US is declining China [or Russia] won’t step up and go to war because the US would still incredible offensive and defensive capabilities to prevent invasion and strikes of the homeland – backed up by empirical study of instances unipolar retrenchment

#### Even if you judge kick winning heg bad is still offense for us because all else equal the US will lose dominance once laws are banned

### 1AR – SoKo

#### South Korea will develop fully autonomous drone swarms

Kallenborn 5/28 [(Zachary, a freelance researcher and analyst, specializing in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, CBRN terrorism, drone swarms, and emerging technologies. His research has appeared in The Nonproliferation Review, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Defense One, The Modern War Institute at West Point, and other outlets.) “SWARMS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE CASE FOR DECLARING ARMED AND FULLY AUTONOMOUS DRONE SWARMS AS WMD” Modern War Institute, 5/28/2020] BC

Although slaughterbots are fiction, numerous states are developing both drone-swarm technology and autonomous weapons. Every leg of the US military is developing drone swarms—including the Navy’s swarming boats and the Air Force’s plan to employ swarms in a wide range of military roles, from intelligence collection to suppression of enemy air defenses. Russia, China, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and others are developing swarms too. At the same time, a range of states have developed or are developing autonomous (primarily stationary defensive) weapons, from South Korea’s SGR-A1 gun turret to the United States’ Phalanx close-in weapon system. Combining these technologies creates a slaughterbots­-style weapon: an armed, fully autonomous drone swarm—or AFADS. (For the purposes of this article, I define “fully autonomous” to mean weapon systems that are both self-targeting and self-mobile; “drone” as any unmanned platform operating on land, sea, air, or space; and “drone swarms” as the use of multiple drones collaborating to achieve shared objectives.)

#### **South Korea created the decapitation unit to take out Kim Jong Un**

Brown 17 [(Daniel Brown, reporter and photographer on the military and defense team at Business Insider, previously worked for the Chicago Sun-Times as a breaking news and crime reporter, freelanced at Standing Rock and on the front lines of the war in Ukraine, master's degree from the Medill School of Journalism) “A South Korean 'decapitation unit' aimed at taking out Kim Jong Un will be armed with drones and grenade machines guns” Business Insider, December 8, 2017] MCM

South Korea is planning to arm its newly-formed special forces unit known as the "decapitation unit" with suicide drones and other lethal weapons to take out North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, according to the Korea Herald.

The South Korean defense ministry announced on Wednesday that the decapitation unit was allocated $310,000 for the weapons and equipment, and an anonymous defense ministry official told the Herald that the unit will receive $24 million altogether.

The "equipment includes suicide drones, surveillance drones, and grenade machine guns,” the defense ministry official told the Herald.

The decapitation unit is an army brigade consisting of 1,000 special operators. It was established on Dec. 1 with the aim of assassinating Kim and his top leaders.

It's expected to be modeled off SEAL Team 6, but it's not yet operational as it requires more equipment, such as low-flying aircraft to take the operators into North Korea, the Herald reported.

South Korean officials have been openly discussing the formation of the unit since Summer 2015. It's considered strange for a government to freely talk about assassinating world leaders.

#### Decapitation strikes causes Korean war and draw in the US and China

Keck 17 [(Zachary, the Wohlstetter Public Affairs Fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center where he is co-authoring a book on how allies and partners acquiring nuclear weapons impacts U.S. security. Previously, he conducted research on nuclear issues and U.S.-China relations at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, was Managing Editor of The National Interest, and the Managing Editor of The Diplomat) “4 Reasons Why Assassinating Kim Jong Un Could Become A Total Disaster” Task and Purpose, 12/3/2017] BC

With regard to the decapitation strikes, the most important question not being asked is—what comes next? Although South Korea depicts its threats of decapitation strikes as a way to deter Kim Jong-un from launching an attack, the North Korean threat would not simply go away if Seoul had to execute this strategy. There are myriad different potential outcomes likely to result from a successful decapitation strike. It is worth considering the consequences of some of these.∂ 1. General War∂ As one of the most closed societies in the world, there is much that we do not know about North Korea. This absolutely includes its military command structure, as well as the loyalties of its senior leadership. Thus, while it is impossible to know for sure, it seems likely that the military would still feel compelled to fight for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea even if Kim Jong-un were killed.∂ After all, the military elite benefits from the current political system and, given the heavy indoctrination since birth, may very well be loyal to the Kim family even if Kim Jong-un is dead. Moreover, if the country were under attack and the senior political leadership were taken out, it is reasonable to assume that a conservative military establishment would simply execute the existing war plans.∂ This would almost certainly include shelling Seoul and its nearly ten million inhabitants with the tens of thousand artillery pieces that are stationed just north of the demilitarized zone. It would also mean trying to attack U.S. military bases in the region with North Korea’s growing arsenal of missiles. Some of these rockets could be armed with chemical or biological weapons. And, of course, North Korea’s military could respond with nuclear attacks on South Korea and/or the United States, especially if the country were invaded following its initial retaliation for the decapitation strikes.∂ 2. Civil War∂ Kim Jong-un is believed to rule North Korea with an iron fist. If he were suddenly dead, along with his inner circle, it would be difficult to know who was in charge of the country. Rather than the military turning its guns on the external enemy, there could be a jockeying for power among different factions in the military and the remaining civilian leadership.∂ While this outcome would be preferable to a general war with South Korea, it would hardly be a walk in the park. A civil war would send refugees flooding into China, and Beijing’s response to this would be uncertain. A Chinese invasion to restore order couldn’t be ruled out, and this would greatly undermine Seoul’s ultimate goal of reunifying the peninsula under its leadership. Some chaos could also cross into South Korea.∂ The greatest concern for South Korea, China, the United States and the world, of course, would be the possession of North Korea’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. There would be extreme pressure for these parties to intervene in order to secure the weapons of mass destruction, and this could produce the general war scenario outlined above.∂ 3. State Collapse∂ A related outcome is that, without the Kim family’s leadership, the North Korean state could simply collapse into chaos. This would result in many of the same issues that would occur in the event of a civil war. For instance, in order to control the chaos and secure North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, both China on the one hand, and South Korea and the United States on the other, might invade the country.∂ The greatest danger here is not that these outside forces would fight the remnants of North Korea’s military, though that certainly could happen. Instead, the biggest risk is that Chinese and U.S./South Korean forces would eventually meet up somewhere in North Korea. Amid the chaos of a failed state, this could quickly turn into a shooting war between two nuclear-armed countries.∂ That is not the only danger, however. Even if China, the United States and South Korea could coordinate their actions to avoid conflict—and reports this weeksuggest there are quiet talks taking place between Beijing and Washington about how to do that—it is still possible that they would have a violent insurgency on their hands. After all, Koreans are nationalistic and have a long history of Chinese imperialism. Moreover, North Koreans have been fed a steady diet of vehement anti-Americanism under the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the last seventy years. America’s recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest it is ill equipped to handle insurgencies, and there is no reason to think China or South Korea would be any better at quashing the rebellion.

#### Drone swarms compromise deterrence

SIPRI 19 [(STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public.) “The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk Volume II East Asian Perspectives” SIPRI, 8/2019] BC

III. The impact on the Korean peninsula ∂ Unmanned systems∂ One of the key concerns over unmanned systems is the possibility that a nucleararmed state would use a UAV or UUV to deliver a nuclear weapon as an alternative to an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Such technology already exists, and North Korea already possesses nuclear warheads.26 However, technological constraints and international sanctions mean that this development is unlikely to appear in North Korea in the near future. While North Korea has found the means to circumvent financial constraints through cyber means, sanctions have made it difficult for it to import the necessary components and technologies.∂ In contrast, South Korea has the economic and technical foundations that better enable integration of AI technology into its unmanned systems. One development in South Korea that may affect nuclear risks on the Korean peninsula is Dronebot Jeontudan. The primary purpose of this unit is to carry out reconnaissance tasks targeting North Korea’s nuclear and missile sites. It could also launch swarm attacks in the event of a conflict.27 Depending on the actual effect when the unit operates, this has the potential to undermine the nuclear deterrence capabilities of North Korea.

### 1AR – China

#### Erodes US hard power dominance

[Matt Bartlett (6-11-2020), University of Auckland Faculty of Law, “The AI Arms Race in 2020”, towards data science, https://towardsdatascience.com/the-ai-arms-race-in-2020-e7f049cb69ac]//[CHS](https://towardsdatascience.com/the-ai-arms-race-in-2020-e7f049cb69ac%5D//CHS) PK

While states might debate whether lethal autonomous weapon systems (or ‘killer robots’ in the popular imagination) are “unacceptably immoral”, there can be no doubt that Guterres is right on the urgency of the risk: development and use of autonomous weapons are both accelerating, and the stakes — ethical and political — are high.

The world’s military powers have been competing to dominate this new class of intelligent weapons for years, with this AI arms race occurring against a contentious global landscape where an advantage in military AI could make a real difference to the balance of power. This geopolitical game theory driving such advancement in the sophistication of war machines has an unwanted blind spot — historically, human rights factor little into strategic calculations.

With Covid-19, the acceleration of automation has taken on greater speed across a variety of different fronts. Military operations have had to be completely re-thought — physical distancing on a submarine is much harder than physical distancing in a supermarket. Lethal AI already had some mounting advantages over human equivalents, and can now add ‘immunity from catastrophic viruses’ to that list. For all of these reasons, keeping track of the AI arms race is more vital than ever.

If It’s A Race, Who’s Winning?

Almost every month, another innovation in autonomous weapons leaps off the headlines in military news — the autonomous Chinese Blowfish A3 helicopter drone equipped with machine guns or the Russian army of unmanned ‘Marker’ ground vehicles armed with mortars and grenade launchers. There is no question that new inventions in the world of military AI abound, but it is far less clear which country boasts the strongest tech.

Key figures in the United States military have been forthright in warning of China’s might in this area. The US Defense Department’s relatively new Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is building command-and-control AI capability for the first time, explicitly citing the Chinese threat as the reason for the department’s urgency. The Center’s director Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan has been clear about his desire to automate as much of the American military machine as possible:

“What I don’t want to see is a future where our potential adversaries have a fully AI-enabled force and we do not.”

In the last year, officials as senior as the US Defense Secretary have warned that Chinese technology may, in fact, already be more advanced than America’s. Secretary Mark Esper predicted that China might have “leapfrogged” existing American technology. With the military establishment suitably concerned, spending on lethal autonomous weapons in all branches of the American military seems set to go to another level in 2020 after already increasing in 2019.

For China’s part, mounting investment in autonomous weapon development is a key plank in its ongoing effort to usurp American military dominance. Almost all large-scale AI programs in China benefit from massive governmental support and a huge trove of data, and its autonomous weapons program is the jewel in Beijing’s AI crown. China’s huge investment in lethal autonomous weapons predates other militaries, and its military theorists are ahead of the rest of the world in building futuristic “intelligentized” models of human-machine operations.

A further dimension to China’s AI strategy is economic, with Beijing seemingly interested in profiting from its autonomous weapons program as a new export product. Already, China appears to be exporting many of its most high-tech aerial drones to wealthy buyers in the Middle East, explicitly marketing them as capable of advanced autonomous operations like assassinations. Last year, Zeng Yi, a senior executive at Norinco, China’s third-largest defense company, predicted that as early as 2025, “there will be no people fighting in battlegrounds”.

#### Global regulation of emerging tech is key – excluding states sparks arms races

Wilson 13 (Grant Wilson, Deputy Director, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. J.D. from Lewis & Clark Law School, 2013. “MINIMIZING GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC AND EXISTENTIAL RISKS FROM EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW.” Virginia Environmental Law Journal, Volume 31, No 2 (2013), pp. 307-364. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44679544?seq=1#page\_scan\_tab\_contents)

A. New International treaty GCRs/ERs arising out of emerging technologies are unique in that a single event can result in widespread destruction. If a GCR/ER regulatory regime only regulates some states but not others, dangerous emerging technologies could instead be developed and utilized in the unregulated states. An example of this is when Richard Seed, an American physicist who wished to be the first person to clone a human, threatened to conduct his cloning in Mexico or Japan if the United States banned human cloning.251 And if some states ban or regulate emerging technologies while others do not, this could threaten global security because rogue states would have a monopoly over dangerous emerging technologies.252 Furthermore, without a truly global treaty, countries competing to quickly develop emerging technologies may engage in a race to arms that promotes speed over safeguards.253 Finally, some states may believe that, absent regulations binding upon all states, their emerging technology industries will be placed at a competitive disadvantage to unregulated countries. Thus, all states should agree to an international treaty imposing evenhanded regulations.

#### China bad – Uyghur camps and African neocolonialism proves they’re also an unethical authoritarian nation – gives them unprecedented control over the asian theater

### 1AR – PDCP

#### PDCP – States can leave

Gubrud and Altmann 13 [physicist Dr. Mark Avrum Gubrud from the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. “Compliance Measures for an Autonomous Weapons Convention,” ICRAC Working Paper #2, May 2013, https://autonomousweapons.org/compliance-measures-for-an-autonomous-weapons-convention//lhs-ap]

In case of a serious concern about strategically threatening noncompliance, a state party may seek private diplomatic conversation with the suspected perpetrator, formal consultations or inquiries through the treaty-mandated consultative bodies, or bring the matter to the attention of the UN Security Council. In the last resort, a state party may withdraw from the treaty, although this would be a highly provocative and destabilizing move.

## 1AR – AT: PIC – Weapon

### 1AR – AT: UAVs PIC

#### UAVs are automated not autonomous

Anderson and Waxman 13 [Kenneth Anderson is a professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC, and a member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law. He is the author of Living with the UN: American Responsibilities and International Order (2011) and specializes in international law, human rights, and international business law. Matthew C. Waxman is a professor of law at Columbia Law School, an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and Law. He previously served in senior positions at the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council. “LAW AND ETHICS FOR AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: WHY A BAN WON’T WORK AND HOW THE LAWS OF WAR CAN,” American University Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2013-11, Columbia Public Law Research Paper, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty\_scholarship/1803//lhs-ap]

The incremental march toward automated lethal technologies of the future, and the legal and ethical challenges that accompany it, can be illustrated by looking at today’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).10 Unmanned aircraft piloted from afar are already a significant component of the U.S. arsenal. At this writing, close to one in three U.S. Air Force aircraft is remotely piloted (though this number also includes many tiny tactical surveillance drones) and the unmanned aircraft proportion will only grow.11 Many other states are developing or importing such technology.12 Current unmanned military aircraft are not autonomous in the firing of weapons—the weapon must be fired in real-time by a human controller—and so far there are no known plans or, apparently in the view of U.S. military planners, reasons today to take the human out of the weapon firing loop.13

Nor are today’s UAVs truly autonomous as aircraft—they require human pilots in real-time to fly them, even when they are located far away. They are, however, increasingly automated in their flight functions—self-landing capabilities, for example, and particularly automation to the point that a single pilot can operate several unmanned aircraft at once, increasing efficiency considerably. The automation of flight is gradually increasing as sensors and aircraft control through computer programming improves. Looking into the future, some observers believe that one of the next generations of jet fighter aircraft will no longer be manned or, at least, that manned fighter aircraft will be joined by unmanned aircraft.14 Given that speed in every sense—including turning and twisting in flight, and reaction and decision times—is an advantage, design will emphasize automating as many of these functions as possible, in competition with the enemy’s systems.15

### 1AR – AT: Landmines PIC

#### 1---Permutation do the counterplan – Autonomous refers to complex information processing. Mines, proximity fuses, and heat-seeking missiles are automated, not autonomous

Gubrud and Altmann 13 [physicist Dr. Mark Avrum Gubrud from the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. “Compliance Measures for an Autonomous Weapons Convention,” ICRAC Working Paper #2, May 2013, https://autonomousweapons.org/compliance-measures-for-an-autonomous-weapons-convention//lhs-ap]

Careful and explicit definitions will need to be given for each of the terms used; for example, “autonomous” is generally understood, in this context, to mean functioning independently of human action, though possibly under human supervision and with the possibility of human intervention. Here a distinction must be made with the word “automatic.” The general sense is that “autonomous” implies a higher level of complexity in a system’s ability to collect and process relevant information and in the relationship between that information and behavior; in other words, a higher level of (artificial) intelligence. It is possible to give a technical definition of “autonomy” in this sense which permits us to distinguish “autonomous” from “automatic” quantitatively, on the criterion of a measure of complexity.

As an alternative, it may be sufficient to define an “autonomous weapon” (AW),13 as any system that acts independently of human action in “engagement-related functions” such as the acquisition, tracking, identification, grouping, selection, prioritization and engagement of targets.14 Each step in this so-called “kill chain” or “loop” involves functions which the weapon system might fulfill autonomously. If any of these functions are autonomous, the weapon system may be classified as an AW, and if all of them are autonomous, the system is a fully autonomous weapon (FAW).

Under this paradigm, the treaty definition may simply exclude certain very simple systems, to be considered as merely “automatic” and not as AW. These exclusions, such as proximity fuses, mines, and heat-seeking missiles, can be enumerated and described in detail, either as an exhaustive list or as a set of typical examples. General technical criteria can also be given, including weapons type and complexity.

#### 2---Prefer for predictability – This definition best reflects academic debates

Sauer 16 [Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer at Bundeswehr University in Munich. He is the author of Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons (2015) and a member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control. October 2016, “Stopping ‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-09/features/stopping-%E2%80%98killer-robots%E2%80%99-why-now-time-ban-autonomous-weapons-systems//lhs-ap]

The Basics

Some weapons systems used for defensive purposes already can identify and track incoming targets and engage them without a human pushing the metaphorical button. Deemed precursors to autonomous weapons systems, they can react to incoming missiles or mortar shells in cases in which the timing does not allow for human decision-making. The Phalanx Close-In Weapon System on Navy ships is one example for such a weapons system, Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system is another.

Yet, these defensive systems are not the focus of the mainly forward-looking autonomous weapons systems debate. Juxtaposing automatic and autonomous systems is a helpful way to understand why. Defensive systems such as the Phalanx can be categorized as automatic. They are stationary or fixed on ships or trailers and designed to fire at inanimate targets. They just repeatedly perform preprogrammed actions and operate only within tightly set parameters and time frames in comparably structured and controlled environments.

Autonomous weapons are distinguish-able from their precursors. They would be able to operate without human control or supervision in dynamic, unstructured, open environments, attacking a variety of targets. They would operate over an extended period of time after activation and would potentially be able to learn and adapt to their situations. To be fair, this juxtaposition is artificial and glosses over an important gray area by leaving aside the fact that autonomous functionality is a continuum. After all, automatic systems, targeting humans at borders or automatically firing back at the source of incoming munitions, already raise questions relevant to the autonomy debate.

There arguably is a tacit understanding in the expert community and among diplomats in Geneva that the debate’s main focus is on future, mobile weapons platforms equipped with onboard sensors, computers, and decision-making algorithms with the capability to seek, identify, track, and attack targets autonomously. The autonomy debate thus touches on but is not primarily concerned with existing automatic defensive systems. In fact, depending on how the CCW ends up defining autonomous weapons systems, it might be well within reason to exempt those from regulation or a possible preventive ban if their sole purpose is to protect human life by exclusively targeting incoming munitions.

#### 3---Condo PICs are a voting issue – they make the 1AR functionally impossible and kill clash cuz you can turn parts of the case that the CP links to *and* steal the whole aff, which lets them get rid of a chunk of the 1AR since we have to go for the case to have a shot—destroys clash cuz they don’t have to defend their arguments against well-researched objections since they can kick what they’re losing

### ---AT: DMZ Landmines

#### Perm do the counterplan – Landmines already removed AND spur further demilitarization

Min-hyung 18 [Lee Min-hyung, reporter, 2018-10-19, “Two Koreas finish landmine cleanup in JSA. What's next?” The Korea Times, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/10/356\_257291.html//lhs-ap]

The two Koreas have finished their joint work to remove landmines in the Joint Security Area (JSA), laying the groundwork for them to begin their next military disarmament activities in the border area, the United Nations Command (UNC) said Friday.

Following the announcement, Seoul and Pyongyang plan to speed up their bilateral efforts to further disarm areas near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) next week. They include the withdrawal of guard posts and firearms there.

"The UNC, in close cooperation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in South Korea, has reviewed and verified the landmine clearance work done to date at the JSA in the inter-Korean border village of Panmunjeom as part of the comprehensive military agreement between the two Koreas," the UNC said in a statement.

Last month, Seoul and Pyongyang signed the agreement on the sidelines of this year's third inter-Korean summit between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

Both sides agreed on a package of bilateral measures to ease military tension on the Korean Peninsula, and the removal of landmines in the JSA ― starting Oct. 1 ― came against this backdrop.

The two Koreas are also expected to remove guard posts and weapons in the JSA by Oct. 25, according to the agreement. The North operates five posts, while the South has four.

"Future potential actions may include additional mine clearance, removing guard posts, reducing security personnel, removing certain weapons, and the return of the remains of service members to their parent nation," the UNC said.

Representatives from the two Koreas and the UNC gathered at Panmunjeom, Tuesday, to discuss the upcoming military disarmament measures. The three-way consultation body will continue holding additional talks for disarmament near the border area, according to the Ministry of National Defense.

UNC Commander Vincent Brooks pledged to continue negotiating with the two Koreas in order for them to fulfill their joint agreement in the future.

"The verification of initial land mine clearance operations in the DMZ lays the foundation for future progress of the implementation of the agreement," he said. "The UNC will continue to work closely with the two Koreas to synchronize implementation efforts on the way ahead."

The JSA disarmament, when finished, will allow for civilian and foreign tourists to visit the border area from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. without restrictions about what they can wear.

### 1AR – AT: Iron Dome

#### PDCP – Iron Dome is automated not autonomous

Haas and Fischer 17 [Michael Carl Haas is a researcher in the Global Security team at the Center for Security Studies at ETH and a doctoral student at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University. Sophie-Charlotte Fischer is a PhD candidate at the Center for Security Studies at ETH. Prior to her PhD studies, she held a Mercator Fellowship on International Affairs. 2017, The evolution of targeted killing practices: Autonomous weapons, future conflict, and the international order, Contemporary Security Policy, 38:2, 281-306, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1336407//lhs-ap]

However, this classification does not capture another relevant—and much more fine-grained—dimension of autonomy: namely, the complexity of machines’ decision-making processes. This dimension emphasizes the capability of a machine to incorporate uncertainties in its environment into the decision-making process and adapt to them (Boulanin, 2016a, p. 3). While systems that are classified as automatic, such as landmines, simply respond more or less mechanically to some well-defined input (Scharre, 2015, p. 10), the distinction between automated and autonomous weapons is more difficult. Often, missile defense systems such as Israel’s Iron Dome are considered highly automated as they are pre-programmed rule-based systems, which provide largely predictable outcomes (Scharre, 2015, p. 10). Truly autonomous systems are far more complex, as they would be able to reason probabilistically based on a set of inputs, compose different courses of actions, and then select and execute the best option without human intervention at any of these stages (Cummings, 2017, p. 3).

### 1AR – AT: Mines/Proximity Fuses/Heat Seeking Missiles

#### Perm do the counterplan – Mines, proximity fuses, and heat-seeking missiles are automated not autonomous

Gubrud and Altmann 13 [physicist Dr. Mark Avrum Gubrud from the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC), Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. “Compliance Measures for an Autonomous Weapons Convention,” ICRAC Working Paper #2, May 2013, https://autonomousweapons.org/compliance-measures-for-an-autonomous-weapons-convention//lhs-ap]

Careful and explicit definitions will need to be given for each of the terms used; for example, “autonomous” is generally understood, in this context, to mean functioning independently of human action, though possibly under human supervision and with the possibility of human intervention. Here a distinction must be made with the word “automatic.” The general sense is that “autonomous” implies a higher level of complexity in a system’s ability to collect and process relevant information and in the relationship between that information and behavior; in other words, a higher level of (artificial) intelligence. It is possible to give a technical definition of “autonomy” in this sense which permits us to distinguish “autonomous” from “automatic” quantitatively, on the criterion of a measure of complexity.

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Under this paradigm, the treaty definition may simply exclude certain very simple systems, to be considered as merely “automatic” and not as AW. These exclusions, such as proximity fuses, mines, and heat-seeking missiles, can be enumerated and described in detail, either as an exhaustive list or as a set of typical examples. General technical criteria can also be given, including weapons type and complexity.

### 1AR – AT: Defensive/Stationary Systems

#### PDCP – Defensive systems in structured environments are automatic not autonomous

Altmann and Sauer 17 [Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control. (2017) Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability, Survival, 59:5, 117-142, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263//lhs-ap]

It is worth noting that some weapon systems, so far used only for defensive purposes, have long been able to identify, track and engage incoming targets on their own. These systems can already be set up so that humans are cut out of decision-making, a capability deemed necessary because there can be instances in which there is not enough time for humans to react, as during attacks with missiles or mortar shells.

These defensive weapons are stationary or fixed on ships or trailers, and are designed to fire at inanimate targets. They repeatedly perform pre-programmed actions within tightly set parameters and time frames in comparably structured and controlled environments. Consequently, they are commonly thought to be only the precursors to AWS, and might be described as automatic, as distinct from the autonomous systems currently being developed. The latter will be able to operate without human control or supervision in dynamic, unstructured, open environments, attacking various sets of targets, including inhabited vehicles, structures or even individuals. They will operate over an extended period of time after activation – and will potentially be able to learn and adapt their behaviour.

#### No distinction

Simpson 15 [Tom Simpson, 2015, "Will killer robots be the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow?," No Publication, https://www.ox.ac.uk/Research/will-killer-robots-be-kalashnikovs-tomorrow#, accessed 12-19-2020]LHSBC

One of the applications of small-scale automated weapons could be ‘swarm’ attacks, where hundreds of such units attack in simultaneous, coordinated assaults. Defending against swarms will require your own swarm. Whether the algorithm is set to identify machines rather than people is a matter of detail. So there is no relevant distinction between ‘offensive’ versus ‘defensive’ killer robots.

### 1AR – AT: Ban Weapon

#### PDCP – Aff bans use of weapon for war not its construction

Altmann and Sauer 17 [Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control. (2017) Autonomous Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability, Survival, 59:5, 117-142, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1375263//lhs-ap]

In short, preventive arms control for AWS would not mean the regulation or prohibition of specific technologies, nor even countable (stockpiles of) individual weapon systems.59 Instead, it would mean regulating or prohibiting a defined military practice, particularly certain applications of specific technologies for military purposes. An example of such an approach can be found in the preventive prohibition on blinding laser weapons added to the CCW in 1995.60 This prohibition protects soldiers’ eyes on the battlefield without banning laser technology in all its other military and civilian uses.

### 1AR – AT: SGR-A1

#### Not autonomous because of its algorithm—their definition is misleading.

Caron 19, Jean-François, French military scholar (“Defining semi-autonomous, automated and autonomous weapon systems in order to understand their ethical challenges,” 24 Nov. 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s42984-020-00028-5)

Secondly, we find automated weapon systems that possess a destructive and/or lethal capacity. The best examples in this regard are the Israeli Iron Dome and the South Korean SGR-A1. Contrary to semi-autonomous weapons, these systems are able to fire at specific targets without the direct intervention of a human operator. Indeed, both systems are programmed to either identify incoming rockets and other projectiles or enemy combatants and to intercept or fire at them.Footnote2 We can also add to the list of examples the Sea Hunter, a prototype unmanned submarine tracking vessel developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) that will very soon join the US Naval fleet and has been described as “a highly autonomous unmanned ship that could revolutionize US maritime operations” and “a new vision of naval surface warfare” (Turner 2018). Even if the initial goal was to use this type of vessel for surveillance purposes, the US Navy tested the Sea Hunter in August 2017 with an offensive anti-submarine payload system which means that the likelihood is high that it might be able to locate, track, and engage enemy submarines in the near future. If the Navy ever decides to move forward with this vessel, it would become very similar to the Iron Dome. Similar to the Israeli defense system, the vessel could potentially replace whole fleets of destroyers that were previously dedicated to anti-submarine warfare thanks to a pre-programmed system that would only engage specific targets which would be detected because of their unique characteristics, such as Yasen or Akula class Russian submarines whose dimensions and features are different from US Los Angeles class submarines. Even though these systems are often referred to as being “autonomous” (see for instance Sparrow 2007,Footnote3 63), this designation is misleading. Indeed, the notion of autonomy refers clearly to features that are not associated with the previously discussed weapons systems, since an autonomous agent is someone who is first and foremost able to pose a deliberate and independent action that results from his own will. This means that breathing is not sufficient in itself to define a living creature as an autonomous agent, since this action is involuntary and a natural result of the parasympathetic nervous system. The same logic would apply to the photosynthesis process of plants and other organisms. On the contrary, an autonomous action refers to an act that results from deliberate intent, which implies free will. Similarly, an individual who is under hypnosis or whose mental faculties are impaired cannot be considered an autonomous agent. This also implies that the intended action must result from a deliberative process that takes into account the difference between what is right and wrong. This faculty is at the core of how criminal responsibility is understood.Footnote4 In the case of military technologies, this understanding of autonomy would refer to their capacity to determine on their own and without any form of human interference when and against whom to use lethal force. This is clearly not the case with these aforementioned weapons systems since their lethal potential lies either with humans (as in the case of drones) or through a pre-programmed algorithm. In order to talk about autonomous weapons systems, these technologies would need to possess the capacity to exercise moral judgment in their killing process. However, it must be noted that these weapons do not exist at the current time and considering the inherent difficulties associated with their potential development, it is impossible to say if scientists will ever be able to create them. On the contrary, it is clear that there is an intention to transform this fantasy into a reality. This conclusion is supported by the rhetoric of many senior military officers and by the tremendous investments that states have allocated in recent years for the research and development of these weapons. Indeed, we cannot ignore the fact that Russian military commanders have openly said that “a fully robotized unit will be created [in the near future], capable of independently conducting military operations”, while it has been stated by the US Department of Defense that the option of developing autonomous weapons able to determine on their own who should be targeted ought to be on the table (Scharre 2018, 6). Moreover, the Pentagon has recently announced that it will invest USD 18 billion in the research and development of such technologies.

# 1AR – AT: DA

## 1AR – AT: AI Research DA

### 1AR – AI DA SoKo

#### 1 – No Link – Swarm capabilities rely on self-organizing, non-linear, adaptive algorithms meant to respond to military threats – neg needs to prove those specific types of tech are dual-use

#### 2 – Current investment should overwhelm or structural barriers thump

Walch 18 [Kathleen Walch, Kathleen Walch is Managing Partner &amp; Principal Analyst at AI Focused Research and Advisory firm Cognilytica (http://cognilytica.com), a leading analyst firm focused on application and use of artificial intelligence (AI)&nbsp;in both the public and private sectors. She is also co-host of the popular AI Today podcast, a top AI related podcast that highlights various AI use cases for both the public and private sector as well as interviews guest experts on AI related topics., 9-7-2018, "Is South Korea Poised To Be A Leader In AI?," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2018/09/07/is-south-korea-poised-to-be-a-leader-in-ai/?sh=4150157bfa2f, accessed 2-11-2021]LHSBC

South Korea another strong contender∂ South Korea has AI capabilities and ambitions of their own and is looking to strategically position themselves as a global contender. In 2016 South Korea famously hosted the match where DeepMind’s AlphaGo defeated Go’s world champion Lee Sedol, a Korean-native. They are also known throughout the world for their strong semiconductor, automotive, and electronics industry, as well as their use of industrial robotics technology. The country is home to many large well established tech companies such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai, that have each shown significant appetite to invest in AI.∂ In response to a shortage of AI engineers in the country, the Korean government plans to to create at least six new AI schools by 2020, and educate more than 5,000 high quality Korean engineers. It also plans to invest in AI on a national level. An R&D challenge similar to those developed by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as well as funding AI projects related to areas such as public safety, medicine, national defense are also in the plans. Many in the country see the creation and development of AI startups and businesses is also vital to building a strong AI ecosystem, and as a result the government is supporting the creation of an AI-oriented startup incubator to help develop emerging AI businesses and funding for the creation of AI semiconductors by 2029. Clearly, the government and Korean companies alike think that AI is an important technology for the country.∂ Despite this intense investment in AI, South Korea faces some sizable challenges to long term growth of the local AI ecosystem. The country doesn’t have a well-developed venture capital ecosystem and has a small number of significant AI focused startups. South Korea’s current AI efforts are almost entirely concentrated in the activities of the major technology incumbents already in the market and government initiatives and funding. In addition, like most countries, South Korea faces an engineering talent gap for experienced, skilled AI talent. As such, the country is focused on building AI capabilities and skills through its education system, but this will take time to reap rewards.

#### 3 – Ban increases civilian research

Sauer 16 [Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer at Bundeswehr University in Munich. He is the author of Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo and the Non-Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons (2015) and a member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control. October 2016, “Stopping ‘Killer Robots’: Why Now Is the Time to Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-09/features/stopping-%E2%80%98killer-robots%E2%80%99-why-now-time-ban-autonomous-weapons-systems//lhs-ap]

This underlines the importance of the current opportunity for putting a comprehensive, verifiable ban in place. The hurdles are high, but at this point, a ban is clearly the most prudent and thus desirable outcome. After all, as long as no one possesses them, a verifiable ban is the optimal solution. It stops the currently commencing arms race in its tracks, and everyone reaps the benefits. A prime goal of arms control would be fulfilled by facilitating the diversion of resources from military applications toward research and development for peaceful purposes—in the fields of AI and robotics no less, two key future technologies.

#### 4 – No Link – profit incentives means private sector will still develop AI – means AI is slightly delayed, not full stopped –

#### 5 – Their impacts are hyped – financial bias

**Henderson 6** Mark, Drugs companies 'inventing diseases to boost their profits', Science Correspondent, Online

The practice of “**diseasemongering” by the drug industry is promoting non-existent illnesses or exaggerating minor ones for the sake of profits, according to** a set of essays published by **the** open-access journal Public **Library of Science Medicine***.* The special issue, edited by David Henry, of Newcastle University in Australia, and Ray Moynihan, an Australian journalist, reports that conditions such as female sexual dysfunction, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and “restless legs syndrome” have been promoted by companies hoping to sell more of their drugs. Other minor problems that are a normal part of life, such as symptoms of the menopause, are also becoming increasingly “medicalised”, while risk factors such as high cholesterol levels or osteoporosis are being presented as diseases in their own right, according to the editors. “Disease-mongering turns healthy people into patients, wastes precious resources and causes iatrogenic (medically induced) harm,” they say. “Like the marketing strategies that drive it, disease-mongering poses a global challenge to those interested in public health, demanding in turn a global response.” Doctors, patients and support groups need to be more aware that pharmaceutical companies are taking this approach, and more research is needed into the changing ways in which conditions are presented, according to the writers. **Disease-awareness campaigns are** often **funded by drug companies,** and “more often designed to sell drugs than to illuminate or inform or educate about the prevention of illness or the maintenance of health”, they say.

#### 6 – No impact to disease

Farquhar et al 17 [Sebastian Farquhar (PhD Candidate in Philosophy at Oxford and Project Manager at Future of Humanity Institute), John Halstead (climate activist and one of the co-founders of 350 Indiana-Calumet), Owen Cotton-Barratt (PhD in pure mathematics at Oxford. Previously worked as an academic mathematician and as Director of Research at the Centre for Effective Altruism), Stefan Schubert (Researcher at Department of Experimental Psychology at University of Oxford), Haydn Belfield (Associate Fellow at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence. He has a background in policy and politics, including as a Senior Parliamentary Researcher to a British Shadow Cabinet Minister, as a Policy Associate to the University of Oxford’s Global Priorities Project, and a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oriel College, University of Oxford), Andrew Snyder-Beattie (Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, Holds degrees in biomathematics and economics and is currently pursuing a PhD in Zoology at Oxford), Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project (Bostrom’s Institute), 2017-01-23, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf] TDI

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

#### 8 – States don’t listen to AI – Brazil, US, etc. all had the data and info but chose not to act on it because of irrationality

### 1AR – AI DA BioD

### 1AR – AI DA BioD + Warming

### 1AR – AI DA Covid

#### 1 – No Link – Swarm capabilities rely on self-organizing, non-linear, adaptive algorithms meant to respond to military threats – neg needs to prove those specific types of tech are dual-use

#### 2 – Private sector thumps

Brookings 20 [Brookings, ranked #1 thinktank in the world for 12 years straight, 9-29-2020, "What investment trends reveal about the global AI landscape," https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/what-investment-trends-reveal-about-the-global-ai-landscape/, accessed 1-13-2021]LHSBC

“We aren’t what we were in the ’50s and ’60s and ’70s,” former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter [recently reflected](https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/13/18617081/secretary-defense-ash-carter-ai-lethal-kill-ethics-harvard-facebook-kara-swisher-decode-podcast). “In those days, all technology of consequence for protecting our people, and all technology of any consequence at all, came from the United States and came from within the walls of government. Those days are irrevocably lost.” To get that technology now, “I’ve got to go outside the Pentagon no matter what,” Carter added.∂ The former Pentagon chief may be overstating the case, but when it comes to artificial intelligence, there’s no doubt that the private sector is in command. Around the world, nations and their governments rely on private companies to build their AI software, furnish their AI talent, and produce the AI advances that underpin economic and military competitiveness. The United States [is no exception](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf).

#### 3 – Their UQ card says open-market innovation is the engine – READ BLUE

Brookings 9/29 Brookings [nonprofit public policy organization], 9-29-2020, "What investment trends reveal about the global AI landscape," <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/what-investment-trends-reveal-about-the-global-ai-landscape/> SM

The bottom-line on global AI The world’s AI landscape is changing fast, and a plethora of unpredictable geopolitical factors, from U.S.-China “decoupling” to COVID-related disruptions, counsel against confident claims about where the global AI landscape is headed next. Still, our estimates of investment around the world point to fundamental, longer-term trends unlikely to vanish anytime soon. These trends have important implications for policy: Don’t panic about China. It’s a serious competitor and has made massive gains, but China’s AI prowess is still often oversold. Our data suggest that America still leads in AI venture capital and other forms of private-market AI investment, and Chinese investors don’t seem to be co-opting American AI startups in large numbers. Policymakers should focus on reinforcing the vibrant, open innovation ecosystem that fuels America’s AI advantage, and take a deep breath before acting against China’s technology transfer efforts and AI abuses. Action is necessary, but misunderstanding China’s overall position in AI could lead to rushed or overbroad policies that do more harm than good. AI is a global wave, not a bipolar contest. The data are clear: AI is booming around the world, not just in the United States and China. In particular, U.S.-friendly nations from Western Europe to India, Japan, and Singapore have vibrant and rapidly growing AI sectors. Policymakers shouldn’t think of AI as a U.S.-China showdown. America will be even stronger in AI if it collaborates effectively with its allies in domains including trade policy, export controls, and R&D.

#### 4 – No Link – Government still pours tons of funding into research universities – computer science programs still do research and construct super computers

#### 5 – Covid evolves to become less lethal.

Al Jazeera 8/17 (“Mutated coronavirus may be less deadly, expert suggests,” 17 Aug. 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/mutated-coronavirus-deadly-expert-suggests-200818040211070.html#:~:text=Singapore%20infectious%20disease%20doctor%20says,with%20drop%20in%20death%20rates.&text=Tambyah%20said%20most%20viruses%20tend%20to%20become%20less%20virulent%20as%20they%20mutate>.) LHSLA LH

An increasingly common mutation of the novel coronavirus found in Europe, North America and parts of Asia may be more infectious but appears to be less deadly, according to a prominent infectious disease specialist. Paul Tambyah, senior consultant at the National University of Singapore and president-elect of the International Society of Infectious Diseases, said evidence suggests the proliferation of the D614G mutation in some parts of the world has coincided with a drop in death rates, suggesting it is less lethal. "Maybe that's a good thing to have a virus that is more infectious but less deadly," Tambyah was quoting by a Reuters report published on Tuesday. Tambyah said most viruses tend to become less virulent as they mutate. "It is in the virus' interest to infect more people but not to kill them because a virus depends on the host for food and for shelter," he said. Scientists discovered the mutation as early as February, and it has circulated in Europe and the Americas with no evidence that it has led to more severe disease, the World Health Organization (WHO) said.

### 1AR – AI DA Econ

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#### 2 – Private sector thumps

Brookings 20 [Brookings, ranked #1 thinktank in the world for 12 years straight, 9-29-2020, "What investment trends reveal about the global AI landscape," https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/what-investment-trends-reveal-about-the-global-ai-landscape/, accessed 1-13-2021]LHSBC

“We aren’t what we were in the ’50s and ’60s and ’70s,” former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter [recently reflected](https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/13/18617081/secretary-defense-ash-carter-ai-lethal-kill-ethics-harvard-facebook-kara-swisher-decode-podcast). “In those days, all technology of consequence for protecting our people, and all technology of any consequence at all, came from the United States and came from within the walls of government. Those days are irrevocably lost.” To get that technology now, “I’ve got to go outside the Pentagon no matter what,” Carter added.∂ The former Pentagon chief may be overstating the case, but when it comes to artificial intelligence, there’s no doubt that the private sector is in command. Around the world, nations and their governments rely on private companies to build their AI software, furnish their AI talent, and produce the AI advances that underpin economic and military competitiveness. The United States [is no exception](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf).

#### 3 – Their UQ card says open-market innovation is the engine – READ BLUE

Brookings 9/29 Brookings [nonprofit public policy organization], 9-29-2020, "What investment trends reveal about the global AI landscape," <https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/what-investment-trends-reveal-about-the-global-ai-landscape/> SM

The bottom-line on global AI The world’s AI landscape is changing fast, and a plethora of unpredictable geopolitical factors, from U.S.-China “decoupling” to COVID-related disruptions, counsel against confident claims about where the global AI landscape is headed next. Still, our estimates of investment around the world point to fundamental, longer-term trends unlikely to vanish anytime soon. These trends have important implications for policy: Don’t panic about China. It’s a serious competitor and has made massive gains, but China’s AI prowess is still often oversold. Our data suggest that America still leads in AI venture capital and other forms of private-market AI investment, and Chinese investors don’t seem to be co-opting American AI startups in large numbers. Policymakers should focus on reinforcing the vibrant, open innovation ecosystem that fuels America’s AI advantage, and take a deep breath before acting against China’s technology transfer efforts and AI abuses. Action is necessary, but misunderstanding China’s overall position in AI could lead to rushed or overbroad policies that do more harm than good. AI is a global wave, not a bipolar contest. The data are clear: AI is booming around the world, not just in the United States and China. In particular, U.S.-friendly nations from Western Europe to India, Japan, and Singapore have vibrant and rapidly growing AI sectors. Policymakers shouldn’t think of AI as a U.S.-China showdown. America will be even stronger in AI if it collaborates effectively with its allies in domains including trade policy, export controls, and R&D.

#### 4 – No Link – Government still pours tons of funding into research universities – computer science programs still do research and construct super computers

#### 5 – No economy impact.

Clary ’15 (Christopher; 4/25/15; Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, M.A. in National Security Affairs, Postdoctoral fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University; MIT Political Science Department Research Paper, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns **encourage austerity and economizing behavior** in foreign policy? This paper provides **new evidence** that economic stress is associated with **conciliatory policies** between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on **data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950**, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately **twice as likely to terminate** during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may **result from economic troubles**. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing **quantitative literature** most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from **1494 to 2010** that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to **austerity pressures**, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to **cut defense expenditures**. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to **threat deflation**, where elites attempt to **downplay** **the seriousness** of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to **consider threat prioritization**, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from **international economic cooperation**. Leaders **seek foreign aid**, **enhanced trade**, and **increased investment** from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as **capable of resolving economic difficulties**, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it **much more likely** that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this **causal logic** in greater detail, while also providing **historical examples** that these mechanisms recur in practice. Economic Crisis Leads to **Austerity** Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish. Planning almost **invariably assumes growth** rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be sizable. When growth slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are **felt** most **acutely** in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit expenditures. This is **especially the case** when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however, intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes called “expansionary austerity”—generates **incentives to curtail expenditure**. These incentives to cut occur precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,” where people are **very reluctant** to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their availability.6 As Paul Pierson has argued, “The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes **tangible losses** on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”7

#### 6 – Stats prove

Drezner 16 Daniel W. Drezner, International Politics Professor at Tufts University. [The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression, Oxford University Press, Reprint Edition (2016), Chapter 3: Why the Misperception?]//BPS

Finally, the Great Recession did not lead to a deterioration in international security. Because political instabil¬ity and violence can impinge on cross-border flows, in¬creases in international conflict can dampen cross-bor¬der trade and exchange. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the Great Reces¬sion would lead states to increase the use of political viol¬ence as a tool to stay in power.44They voiced genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater in¬ternal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great-power rivalries. Violence in the Middle East, piracy on the high seas, border disputes in the South China Sea, riots in European cities, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impres-sions of a global surge in public disorder. As fiscal aus¬terity in the developed economies curtailed social spend¬ing, economists predicted an explosion of unrest.45 Initially, there was some evidence of deterioration. Following the 2008 financial crisis, there was a spike in global piracy, particularly off the Horn of Africa. The In¬ternational Maritime Bureau reported that in 2009 alone, there was a 40 percent surge in piracy attacks, with attacks near Somalia quadrupling during the same period. The Institute for Economics and Peace, which has constructed the Global Peace Index annually since 2007, reported in 2013 that there had been a 5 percent deterioration in global peace since 2008.46 72/452 A closer look at the numbers, however, reveals more encouraging findings. What seemed to be an inexorable increase in piracy, for example, turned out to be a blip. By September 2013, the total numbers of piracy attacks had fallen to their lowest levels in seven years. Attacks near Somalia, in particular, declined substantially; the total number of attacks fell by 70 percent in 2012 and an additional 86 percent in the first nine months of 2013. Actual hijackings were down 43 percent compared to 2008/9 levels.47 The US Navy's figures reveal similar de¬clines in the number and success rate of pirate attacks.48 Security concerns have not dented the opening of the global economy. As for the effect of the Great Recession on political conflict, the aggregate effects were surprisingly modest. A key conclusion of the Institute for Economics and Peace in its 2012 report was that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."49 The institute's concern in its 2013 report about a decline in peace was grounded primarily in the increase in homicide rates—a source of concern, to be sure, but not exactly the province of global governance. Both interstate violence and global military expenditures have declined since the start of the financial crisis. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict. Looking at the post-crisis years, Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude, "The pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."50 The de-cline in secular violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker 73/452 observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."51

### 1AR – AI DA Warming

#### 1 – No Link – Swarm capabilities rely on self-organizing, non-linear, adaptive algorithms meant to respond to military threats – neg needs to prove those specific types of tech are dual-use

#### 2 – Private sector thumps

Brookings 20 [Brookings, ranked #1 thinktank in the world for 12 years straight, 9-29-2020, "What investment trends reveal about the global AI landscape," https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/what-investment-trends-reveal-about-the-global-ai-landscape/, accessed 1-13-2021]LHSBC

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### 1AR – AI DA Warming Impact Turn

#### AI generates CO2 now – outweighs all their offense on timeframe

Toews 20 [Rob Toews, 6-17-2020, "Deep Learning’s Carbon Emissions Problem," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/robtoews/2020/06/17/deep-learnings-climate-change-problem/?sh=7b7c34a06b43, accessed 1-13-2021]LHSBC

Modern AI models consume a massive amount of energy, and these energy requirements are growing at a breathtaking rate. In the deep learning era, the computational resources needed to produce a best-in-class AI model has on average doubled [every 3.4 months](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/); this translates to a 300,000x increase between 2012 and 2018. GPT-3 is just the latest embodiment of this exponential trajectory.∂ The bottom line: AI has a meaningful carbon footprint today, and if industry trends continue it will soon become much worse. Unless we are willing to reassess and reform today’s AI research agenda, the field of artificial intelligence could become an antagonist in the fight against climate change in the years ahead.∂ Bigger Is Not Always Better∂ In today’s deep learning-centric research paradigm, advances in artificial intelligence are primarily achieved through sheer scale: bigger datasets, larger models, more compute.∂ GPT-3 illustrates this phenomenon well. The model consists of a whopping 175 billion parameters. To put this figure in perspective, its predecessor model GPT-2—which was considered state-of-the-art when it was released last year—had only 1.5 billion parameters. While last year’s GPT-2 took a few dozen petaflop-days to train—already a massive amount of computational input—GPT-3 required [several thousand.](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.14165.pdf)∂ The problem with relying on ever-larger models to drive progress in AI is that building and deploying these models entails a tremendous amount of energy expenditure and thus carbon emissions.∂ In a widely discussed [2019 study](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.02243.pdf), a group of researchers led by Emma Strubell estimated that training a single deep learning model can generate up to 626,155 pounds of CO2 emissions—roughly equal to the total lifetime carbon footprint of five cars. As a point of comparison, the average American generates 36,156 pounds of CO2 emissions in a year.∂ To be sure, this estimate is for a particularly energy-intensive model. Training an average-sized machine learning model today generates far less than 626,155 pounds of carbon output.∂ At the same time, it is worth keeping in mind that when this analysis was conducted, GPT-2 was the largest model available for study and was treated by the researchers as an upper bound on model size. Just a year later, GPT-2 looks tiny—one hundred times smaller, in fact—compared to its successor.∂ Why exactly do machine learning models consume so much energy?∂ The first reason is that the datasets used to train these models [continue to balloon](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.10597.pdf) in size. In 2018, the BERT model achieved best-in-class NLP performance after it was trained on a dataset of 3 billion words. XLNet outperformed BERT based on a training set of 32 billion words. Shortly thereafter, GPT-2 was trained on a dataset of 40 billion words. Dwarfing all these previous efforts, a weighted dataset of roughly 500 billion words was used to train GPT-3.∂ Neural networks carry out a lengthy set of mathematical operations (both forward propagation and back propagation) for each piece of data they are fed during training, updating their parameters in complex ways. Larger datasets therefore translate to soaring compute and energy requirements.∂ Another factor driving AI’s massive energy draw is the extensive experimentation and tuning required to develop a model. Machine learning today remains largely an exercise in trial and error. Practitioners will often build hundreds of versions of a given model during training, experimenting with different neural architectures and hyperparameters before identifying an optimal design.∂ The 2019 paper mentioned above includes a telling case study. The researchers picked an average-sized model—much smaller than headline-grabbing behemoths like GPT-3—and examined not just the energy required to train the final version, but the total number of trial runs that went into producing that final version.∂ Over the course of six months, 4,789 different versions of the model were trained, requiring 9,998 total days’ worth of GPU time (more than 27 years). Taking all these runs into account, the researchers estimated that building this model [generated](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/06/06/239031/training-a-single-ai-model-can-emit-as-much-carbon-as-five-cars-in-their-lifetimes/) over 78,000 pounds of CO2 emissions in total—more than the average American adult will produce in two years.∂ To this point, the discussion has only addressed training machine learning models. But training is just the beginning of a model’s lifecycle. After a model is trained, it is then put to use in the real world.∂ Deploying AI models to take action in real-world settings—a process known as inference—consumes [even more energy](https://towardsdatascience.com/deep-learning-and-carbon-emissions-79723d5bc86e) than training does. Indeed, Nvidia [estimates](https://www.forbes.com/sites/moorinsights/2019/05/09/google-cloud-doubles-down-on-nvidia-gpus-for-inference/#244ad92a6792) that 80% to 90% of the cost of a neural network is in inference rather than training.∂ As an example, consider the AI underlying an autonomous vehicle. The neural networks first must be trained upfront to learn to drive. After training is completed and the autonomous vehicle is deployed, the model then performs inference on a continuous basis in order to navigate its environment—nonstop, day after day, for as long as the vehicle is in use.∂ Needless to say, the more parameters the model has, the steeper the energy requirements are for this ongoing inference.∂ Energy Use and Carbon Emissions∂ An assumption at the heart of this topic is the relationship between AI’s energy use and carbon emissions. What is the best way to think about this relationship?∂ According to the EPA, one kilowatt-hour of energy consumption [generates](https://www.epa.gov/energy/emissions-generation-resource-integrated-database-egrid) 0.954 pounds of CO2 emissions on average in the United States. This average reflects the varying carbon footprints and relative proportions of different electricity sources across the U.S. energy grid (e.g., renewables, nuclear, natural gas, coal).∂ Strubell’s analysis, mentioned above, applies this U.S.-wide average in order to calculate the carbon emissions of various AI models based on their energy needs. It is a reasonable assumption. The power source mix for Amazon Web Services, for instance, roughly mirrors that of the U.S. as a whole, and most AI models are trained in the cloud.

## 1AR – AT: Authoritarianism DA

### 1AR – AT: DA – Authoritarianism

#### 1---No link – Other tech solves – Their internal link is precision, not autonomy – Insert yellow

Rabkin and Yoo '17 [Jeremy and John; 9/1/17; Professor of Law at the Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; Professor of Law at the University of California Berkeley; Striking Power: How Cyber, Robots, and Space Weapons Change the Rules of War, Chapter 1]//GJ

Two trends now seem to be converging. On the one hand, the underlying architecture of international politics is becoming more disordered. Instability is spreading throughout the world, in Eastern Europe, East Asia and Central Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. The European Union has not developed any military capacity of its own but NATO is under more internal stress than ever before. Meanwhile, insurgent or revanchist forces have found ways to project intimidating force without the risk of full-scale military invasion. We face hybrid war in Eastern Europe, terror campaigns in Western Europe, and the construction of new islands to extend maritime claims in the South China Sea.

Part of the response may be new weapons technologies, but only if they are accompanied with new thinking on how and where they can be used. The most important characteristic of new technologies, in cyber, drone, and robotic weapons, is the capacity for remarkable degrees of precision. It was once possible to claim that bombs aimed at “military objectives” were only incidentally working “collateral damage” on civilian objects. Now, military technology gives us the capacity to strike with precision, which means destroying relatively little beyond intended targets. New technologies may offer a compelling response to the challenges of our time by allowing western nations to respond to the provocations of authoritarian aggressors or reach out to strike terrorists far removed from a battlefield.

We are not claiming that new weapons will, by themselves, resolve every challenge and deliver us to a new era of stability and peace. Every weapon, even supposedly autonomous or robotic ones, requires human guidance and strategy in the background. We may misjudge our challenges or our opportunities. We may underestimate the resolve of enemies or overrate the immediate threats they pose. Technology does not make statecraft obsolete. It simply offers more tools and options.

Embracing new technologies does not require us to believe in literal magic bullets that will render confrontational opponents supine after one volley. Nor would relaxing current understandings of the laws of war. The point is to provide alternatives to avoid the choice between all-out war and fatalistic resignation. The aim of many interventions would not be so much to disable the military capacity of the opposing side as to indicate the Western capacity and willingness to impose costs.

Short of completely incapacitating the opposing side, even large-scale war is a tacit bargaining situation, as Thomas Schelling pointed out more than fifty years ago.67 Part of the bargaining may involve inflicting harm on an opponent to signal readiness to do so on a larger scale. It may not be feasible to penetrate the delusions of the most crazed, megalomaniacal dictator—but even sobering those in his circle may be helpful. At any rate, most tyrants have concerns about preserving themselves. Signaling, as we will argue later on, is an important element of military exchanges. One might think of new technologies as providing us the capacity to communicate with more exclamation points, and to indicate that our enemies cannot rely on the protections afforded by highly restrictive interpretations of the laws of war.

#### 2---No link – Drone warfare is for controlling racialized others, not gaddafi

#### 3--No internal link – US never succeeded in past – Iraq, Vietnam, El Salvador, Libya, Afghanistan etc. – deposing dictators doesn’t create democratic forms of governance

## 1AR – AT: Primacy DA

### 2ac Arms Control – K2 Primacy (Generic)

#### Arms control is good – it is key to lock in a US competitive edge over Russia and China on emerging tech

Maurer 18 (John, Henry A. Kissinger Postdoctoral Fellow at International Security Studies and the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University, "THE FORGOTTEN SIDE OF ARMS CONTROL: ENHANCING U.S. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, OFFSETTING ENEMY STRENGTHS," https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/the-forgotten-side-of-arms-control-enhancing-u-s-competitive-advantage-offsetting-enemy-strengths/)

In the spring of 1988, President Ronald Reagan described the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as an agreement that would, “for the first time, eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles.” Reagan’s description of the INF Treaty as a historic and mutually beneficial reduction of nuclear arms remains the conventional wisdom. This narrative is not wrong, of course, but it is incomplete: Arms control has never been purely cooperative. Rather, the United States employed arms control negotiations to build military-technological advantages over the Soviet Union. From the 1940s onwards, U.S. leaders sought to “offset” the Soviet Union’s advantage in conventional weapons by developing advanced military technologies that their Cold War opponent did not have. Arms control played an important role in advancing this offset strategy. American leaders raced the Soviets in military technologies where the United States was perceived to enjoy significant advantages, while simultaneously entangling the Soviet Union in an arms control regime that would limit areas of Soviet strength. By combining arms racing and arms control, the United States pursued a holistic offset strategy. The relationship between arms control and offset strategies has been obscured because most accounts of U.S. arms control policy ignore its competitive dimensions. The traditional scholarly accounts emphasize the incredible dangers of nuclear weapons, the mutual U.S.-Soviet interest in limiting nuclear competition, and the importance of this dialogue to stabilizing U.S.-Soviet relations more generally. These accounts, however, only tell half of the story. More recent historical accounts have called into question this benign interpretation, noting instead America’s long-term strategy to employ negotiations to promote its own advantages. Some of this newer scholarship has focused on the self-serving motives behind U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, but as more and more documents are declassified, historians are increasingly noting that the United States also employed superpower arms limitation to promote American advantages. Today, U.S. policymakers would do well to consider how arms control can contribute to sustaining America’s military-technological competitiveness. The First Offset: Seeking Quantitative Parity The United States began seeking competitive advantage over the Soviet Union through arms control from the very beginning of the Cold War. The First Offset strategy depended on maintaining overwhelming nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. To support this objective, U.S. leaders sought to entrap the Soviets in arms control agreements that would preserve America’s lead in nuclear weapons. Because the United States enjoyed a head start in the arms race, efforts to freeze that race at any given point would have frozen U.S. nuclear advantages, sustaining the First Offset indefinitely. Indeed, America’s first major nuclear arms control proposal, the 1946 Baruch Plan, would have allowed the United States to retain its own nuclear arsenal in exchange for a promise of eventual disarmament while banning any other country (especially the Soviets) from procuring its own nuclear weapons. Negotiations over a nuclear test ban were similarly loaded, with the Eisenhower administration seeking to prevent the Soviets from catching up to the United States in testing data, especially important for developing smaller, missile-capable warheads. The initial impetus for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) also involved an effort to freeze Soviet deployments of ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missiles while the United States still retained the lead in nuclear weapons. The Soviets rejected early American arms control proposals as nonstarters. Soviet leaders quickly concluded that nuclear weapons were essential to their national security, and rejected any framework that would deny them the same nuclear rights as the United States. Especially after their perceived humiliation during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet leaders were unwilling to conclude an arms control agreement that would enshrine American advantage in number of weapons. The single major arms control success of the era, the 1963 Limited Test-Ban Treaty, was only concluded after the Soviets had caught up to the United States in atmospheric testing. In this regard, early U.S. efforts at competitive arms control were simply too transparent. Furthermore, America’s disastrous intervention in Vietnam undermined both the financial and political capital necessary to sustain the arms race. By the early 1970s, the Soviets were approaching numerical parity in nuclear weapons and the First Offset was coming to an end. Perceiving the correlation of forces to be in their favor, Soviet leaders were unwilling to make serious arms control concessions to the United States. The Second Offset: Qualitative Advantages The end of U.S. numerical nuclear superiority required a new strategy for military-technological competition. American leaders embarked on a Second Offset that leveraged American advantages in electronics, precision manufacturing, and digital computing to generate sustainable qualitative military-technological advantages. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote to Congress in January 1981, “Technology can be a force multiplier, a resource that can be used to help offset numerical advantages of an adversary.” Even as it necessitated a new offset strategy, nuclear parity with the Soviets allowed for greater progress in arms control negotiations, in part because it allowed American leaders to claim that the resulting agreements were “fair,” even when they were promoting U.S. military-technological advantages. Within this framework of rough numerical equivalence, U.S. arms control policy advanced American advantages in three main ways: dictating the pace of key military-technological developments; promoting competition in environments more conducive to U.S. organizational and cultural advantages; and denying the Soviets the ability to respond to U.S. qualitative improvements by increasing their numerical strength. First, arms control agreements allowed the United States to slow (but not halt) military-technological competition until more favorable political, economic, and technical circumstances emerged. The best example of manipulating the pace of competition in this way was the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. By the late 1960s, the Soviets were making rapid progress on anti-ballistic missile technology. On the U.S. side, Congress would not fund a comparable American anti-ballistic missile system, which was both too expensive and insufficiently technologically mature. In effect, the ABM Treaty limited the Soviet Union to anti-ballistic missile levels comparable to those that the U.S. Congress would allow, preventing the Soviets from pulling ahead in large-scale anti-ballistic missile deployments – an echo of earlier attempts at quantitative arms control. At the same time, the treaty promoted American qualitative advantages by allowing continued testing of new anti-ballistic missile concepts at Kwajalein Test Facility, buying time until superior American anti-ballistic missile technology matured. As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated in his June 1972 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, even under the treaty the United States would “vigorously pursue a comprehensive ABM technology program…[to] examine ABM deployment options that might be exercised if permitted by future agreements, or otherwise necessary.” By limiting both deployments and testing, the ABM Treaty allowed American leaders to postpone a key area of military-technological competition for nearly a decade. It also provided some flexibility to re-escalate that competition under more favorable political and technological circumstances in the 1980s, when the Reagan administration proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative, the distant predecessor of America’s current ballistic missile defense technology. Second, arms control agreements allowed the United States to promote competition in environments more conducive to its organizational and cultural advantages. For instance, the INF treaty emerged as a response to the Soviet deployment of new SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which posed a direct threat to America’s NATO allies. NATO responded by adopting the Dual-Track Decision, in which the United States deployed its own next-generation intermediate-range capabilities in Europe while also seeking an arms control agreement to eliminate the SS-20. The resulting negotiations eventually culminated in the INF Treaty. The agreement is widely hailed as a major arms control achievement, but it is very specific in the types of weapons it limits: not all intermediate range weapons, but only land-based intermediate range weapons. Air- and sea-launched cruise missiles of any range were still allowed. Secretary of State George Shultz explained, “[The INF Treaty] eliminates the SS-20 threat which directly led to the dual track decision. It does not limit U.S. aircraft, which make a critical contribution to NATO’s defense. It strengthens deterrence by significantly complicating Soviet attack planning.” As a result, even as both sides dismantled their land-based intermediate-range missiles, the United States made rapid progress on its air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet Union was free to compete with the United States in the naval and aerial domains, but in practice these were areas in which the United States enjoyed significant geographic, organizational, and alliance advantages. In fact, the United States repeatedly proposed arms control agreements that would incentivize the Soviets to compete against American strengths in the aerial and naval domains, whether by insisting that tactical aircraft be excluded from strategic arms negotiations, allowing replacement of land-based missiles with sea-based ones, or by insisting on permissive “counting rules” for missile-armed bombers. While on paper these proposals seemed neutral, in practice they shaped competition in ways that favored the United States. The INF Treaty was the most successful instance of this general approach. Finally, arms control agreements denied the Soviets the ability to respond to American qualitative improvements by increasing the size of their forces. From the early 1970s onwards, American leaders pushed the Soviets to consider not just limitation but reduction of both missile numbers and size. Reduction had an obvious public motive in making the world safer from nuclear weapons. In private, however, American leaders emphasized that reducing the number and size of both sides’ nuclear weapons would prevent the Soviets from offsetting U.S. advances in weapons accuracy and reliability by doubling down on the scale of their own missile deployments. To this end, the SALT process placed absolute limits on the number of launchers, while allowing the United States to proliferate increasingly accurate warheads through technologies like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and air-launched cruise missiles (which did not add to the overall number of launchers). In private conversation with President Richard Nixon, Laird emphasized that under the SALT I agreement: [The United States] can still keep ahead of [the Soviet Union]. There is a lot more we can even do with the Minuteman at the site as far as getting it even more accurate…and we can do it at a very small price, because we have the technological capability that far outstrips the Soviet Union. This is important to maintain this leadership. However, the Soviets were reluctant to accept limits on missile size, so for a time U.S. improvements were generally offset by Soviet advantages in sheer scale, as their larger missiles could carry more warheads. The SALT II Treaty ultimately foundered in the Senate amid conservative criticism that it failed to limit the size of the Soviet missile force. Following SALT II’s failure, the Reagan administration focused once again on limiting both the number and size of missiles, the better to emphasize American advantages in smaller and more accurate weapons. In 1983 the Scowcroft Commission endorsed the deployment of a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as a means of incentivizing the Soviets to accept limitations on missile throw weight. Driven in part by this expanding U.S. missile force, the Soviets agreed to the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991. START I was consistent with America’s longtime approach to arms reduction, requiring the Soviets to dismantle half of their heavy ICBMs and reduce their missile throw weight by nearly 50 percent. The treaty required no similar reductions by the United States, which had no “heavy” ICBMs and whose light and accurate missile forces were already below the agreed-upon weight limit. As with the ABM and INF Treaties, START I’s seemingly neutral language in fact promoted American military-technological advantages. START I was one of the high points of the Second Offset strategy in the nuclear realm. By preventing the Russians from matching U.S. qualitative force improvements with quantitative offsets of their own, the treaty kicked off a “New Era of Counterforce,” in which the United States enjoyed superior nuclear capabilities over its Russian rival. The Second Offset was also bolstered by conventional force reductions, about which the Soviets were similarly intransigent during the 1970s, before eventually agreeing to large-scale downsizing in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. By equalizing the sizes of the two sides’ nuclear and conventional forces while permitting the United States to retain a qualitative edge in practice, START I and CFE supported the Second Offset Strategy of building qualitative military-technological advantage over the Soviet Union. Opportunities and Challenges From the perspective of the competitive offset, arms control has a mixed track record, but one worth pondering. While the Soviets rejected obvious early efforts to hem them in via arms control negotiations, American strategy in the second half of the Cold War bore greater fruit, as “equal” and “fair” quantitative restrictions allowed the United States to pursue qualitative force advantages with greater success and at less cost. Today, arms control is viewed solely as a tool for promoting international cooperation, lauded by doves and disdained by hawks. Contemporary policymakers would do well to also recognize the competitive dimension that has historically undergirded arms control, for three reasons. First, this perspective can help sustain the arms control process by building a broader base of support for legacy arms control achievements. The United States retains a significant competitive incentive to uphold arms control successes like the INF Treaty, which continues to shape U.S.-Russian nuclear competition in ways beneficial to U.S. interests. While Russia cannot be allowed to cheat, critics of the agreement should consider how the treaty, properly observed, enables the United States to exploit its advantages in aerial and naval forces to the full. Similarly, defenders of the treaty ought to make the case for the agreement on its significant competitive merits, not solely on the basis of mutual interest with the Russians. Recognizing both the cooperative and the competitive elements of the INF Treaty creates a much stronger case for why the United States should seek to sustain, and perhaps even expand, the ban on land-based intermediate-range missiles. Second, the strong association of “arms control” with “peace and cooperation” often distorts our understanding of real arms control successes. For example, some defenders of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have argued that Iran’s willingness to participate in an arms control agreement is indicative of a broader desire for cooperation with the United States. At the same time, some critics of the agreement have pointed to Iran’s continued military competition with the United States as evidence that the Iranians are not serious about arms control. Because they conflate arms control with cooperation, both defenders and critics often miss one of the JCPOA’s major strengths: It promotes U.S. military advantage over Iran by limiting Iran’s access to nuclear weapons, while requiring no similar changes in American military capability. And the agreement accomplishes this objective whether or not the Iranians are truly interested in expanding cooperation. Arms control does not need to end military competition entirely for it to be an effective tool of American foreign policy. Finally, U.S. leaders ought to think about how arms control might promote competitive advantage in the area of emerging technologies like cyber weapons, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. Proponents of arms control for these fields have recently staked out maximalist positions that would prohibit all countries from pursuing military applications of emerging technologies. For U.S. policymakers considering the Third Offset, however, the appropriate questions are how these technologies can be used to enhance American military-technological competitiveness and how arms control restrictions can be tailored to further that competitive advantage. In an era labeled as a return to great power competition, American leaders can take a page out of the history of the Cold War to devise strategies that keep the United States ahead of its rivals.

### 1ar Arms Control – K2 Primacy

#### U.S. advantage won’t last – establishing rules of the road and treaties are essential.

Mette 17 – Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK ( Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Why the World Needs an International Cyberwar Convention, Philos. Technol. (2018) 31:379–407 DOI 10.1007/s13347-017-0271-5

The arguments presented in this article should not be read as a statement of ingenuous optimism. Negotiating an ICWC will be fraught with difficulty given the diverse interests at stake, and the task will not be accomplished overnight. Nonetheless, I argue, most standard objections to embarking on a process of international negotiation (including difficulties of verifying compliance and problems of rapid technological change) fail on closer inspection. In the end, the main barrier to an international agreement on governing cyberconflict may be opposition by powerful (mainly) western states, whose desire to exploit current strategic advantages in the cyber-domain leads them to reject a treaty. For example, many observers judge that America’s enduring hostility towards binding international rules for cyberspace is driven largely by its technological superiority in the realm of tactical electronic warfare, which provides a strong incentive to maintain maximum freedom of action in this domain (see Baruah 2013; Clarke and Knake 2010; Sanger 2015; Lindsay 2015, 46, 61–62; Sanger 2015; Goldsmith 2011). Not only would America be reluctant to bargain away its ability to exploit current tactical advantages, but as the world’s strongest cyber power, American decision-makers may fear that by accepting binding international constraints on the conduct of cyber warfare, they would be trying their own hands while allowing other nations to rapidly catch up (see Singer and Friedman 2014). Such reservations are too shortsighted. Given the current global rush to invest in offensive cyber power, America’s unrivaled position in the cyber domain may well be temporary. For now, however, America’s leading position provides a unique opportunity to shape international rules and norms for cyber conflict. By assuming a global leadership role, Washington might succeed in encouraging other states to accept constraints on the use of cyber offensive power before these states acquire significant offensive capabilities of their own.39 During the 1950s and 1960s, American leaders were sufficiently foresighted to see that they could exploit US superiority in the realm of nuclear technology to shape international rules regarding nuclear arms control. By promising self-restraint and by offering to share civilian nuclear technology, Washington succeeded in persuading other states to accept the norm of an international nuclear hierarchy and thereby prevented an uncontrolled global nuclear arms race. A similar opportunity is currently spurned in the cyber domain. The arguments presented in this article suggest it is time US policy-makers change course and give their support to negotiating an ICWC.

## 1AR – AT: Deterrence DA

### 1AR – Strake

#### 1 – Individual drones fill-in – they haven’t made a swarming tactics key warrant

#### 2 – Increases war – lowers threshold

Umbrello, et al, 19—Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, University of Turin (Steven, with Phil Torres, Project for Future Human Flourishing, and Angelo De Bellis, University of Edinburgh, “The future of war: could lethal autonomous weapons make conflict more ethical?,” AI & Society, February 6th, 2019, SpringerLink, dml) [LAWs=lethal autonomous weapons]

To begin, one of the most compelling reasons for opposing nuclear non-proliferation efforts is that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons increases the threshold of use (W. Wilson 2012; Jürgen 2008). Thus, only in extreme circumstances would rational actors deem their use to be either morally or strategically acceptable. This strongly contrasts with the case of LAWs, whose cost would be small compared to the cost of paying military personnel. Consequently, states could maintain stockpiles of LAWs that are far larger than any standing army. The low cost of LAWs would also make them more expendable than human soldiers (Jenks 2010; Jacoby and Chang 2008; P. Singer 2009a), and they could strike the enemy with greater precision than human scolders can currently achieve (Ekelhof and Struyk 2014; Thurnher 2012). These four properties—low cost, military effectiveness, expendability, and precision—could drive proliferation while lowering the threshold for use and, therefore, undermine geopolitical security. Incidentally, similar claims could be made about anticipated future nanotech weaponry (see Whitman 2011).

#### 3 – Self-assurred destruction better than mutually assured destruction – MAD isn’t fool proof because countries can think they develop new tech with decapitating first strike capabilities, especially because LAWs are constantly evolving

#### 4 – LAWS will proliferate quickly and increase the risk of nuclear escalation by enabling more frequent grey-zone attacks---BUT only large numbers of drones can provoke retaliation

Johnson, Ph.D., 19 [Dr James Johnson is a visiting fellow with the School of History & International Relations, University of Leicester. James holds a Ph.D. in politics & international relations and a master’s degree in Asia-Pacific studies. 2019, “Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security,” DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600800//lhs-ap>]

Unlike nuclear weapons, autonomous weapons do not require expensive, heavily regulated, or hard to acquire raw materials. Moreover, the ubiquity and rapidly declining unit costs of drones will mean that these capabilities will become increasingly capable, autonomous, and easy to mass-produce.66 In contrast to human-operated automation systems, the recent proliferation of autonomous systems will inevitably complicate the ability of states to anticipate, and attribute, drone attacks.67 These challenges will likely increase the propensity for state (and non-state) actors to deploy drones in “grey-zone” operations – to test an adversary’s deterrence posture and resolve, but without tipping the threshold into warfare with a more powerful opponent.68 Under crisis and conflict condition, these asymmetric tactics could exacerbate strategic ambiguity, erode deterrence, and increase escalation risks.69 In 2016, for example, North Korea employed small drones to spy on South Korea’s defences that resulted in a potentially escalatory military skirmish in the demilitarised zone.70Perceived as relatively low-risk capability with ambiguous rules of engagement, and absent robust normative and legal frameworks, autonomous weapons will become increasingly attractive as a means to erode a superior adversary’s deterrence posture and resolve.71

According to analyst Paul Scharre: “ultra-cheap 3D-printed mini-drones could allow the United States to field billions of tiny, insect-like drones” on the future networked battlefield.72 Autonomous systems, unlike human operators, are unable to function beyond the limits baked into their algorithmic codes; and thus, apply common sense and contextualisation to the situation at hand.73 A lone wolf low-cost drone in isolation would unlikely pose a significant threat to a U.S. F-35 stealth fighter, but hundreds of AI augmented autonomous drones in a swarming sortie might overwhelm these weapon systems; possibly rendering them redundant altogether. 74 Chinese strategists have reportedly conducted research on data-link technologies for “bee swarm” UAVs, which emphasise network architecture, navigation, and anti-jamming operations. The Russian military also plans to incorporate AI into unmanned aerial and undersea vehicles for “swarming” missions.75 Kalashnikov, a Russian defence contractor, has reportedly built an unmanned ground vehicle (the Soratnik), and plans to develop a broad range of autonomous systems infused with sophisticated AI machine learning algorithms.76 Swarms of robotic systems fused with AI machine learning could presage a powerful interplay of enhanced range, mass, co-ordination, intelligence, and speed in future warfare.77

#### 5 – Capabilities are reverse goldilocks – Just effective enough to provoke retaliation, but not enough to enable successful first strike

Johnson, Ph.D., 19 [Dr James Johnson is a visiting fellow with the School of History & International Relations, University of Leicester. James holds a Ph.D. in politics & international relations and a master’s degree in Asia-Pacific studies. 2019, “Artificial intelligence & future warfare: implications for international security,” DEFENSE & SECURITY ANALYSIS, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2019.1600800//lhs-ap>]

Before leaving the Pentagon Robert Work established an algorithmic-warfare team (also known as “Project Maven”) to examine how AI might support U.S. counter-terrorism operations in Syria, and more accurately locate hidden North Korean and Russian mobile missile launchers.58 Recent reports indicate that the DoD has also developed an early proto-type AI-driven “missile-hunting system”, designed to detect and respond to signs of preparations for a missile launch. To support these efforts, the Trump administration has reportedly proposed to more than triple the funding for an AI-driven missile programme.59 Critics have highlighted the potentially high risks this programme carries. Not least, that it could provoke an AI arms race with China and Russia, upset the fragile global nuclear balance, and absent adequate safeguards, commanders could risk losing control of (and possibly accelerate) the escalation ladder. 60 In the case of AI applications to target mobile missile launchers, for example, the use of AI may be strategically destabilising “not because it works too well but because it works just well enough to feed uncertainty”. 61

## 1AR – AT: Dip Cap DA

#### No link –

#### New START expiration is key to US nuclear deterrence---solves first strike incentives and motivates genuine arms control in the future

Geller 20 - Policy Analyst for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for Foreign Policy and National Security, at The Heritage Foundation. (Patty-Jane, “New START: The U.S. Should Not Extend the Dangerously Flawed Treaty for Five More Years,” *Heritage Foundation*, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/new-start-the-us-should-not-extend-the-dangerously-flawed-treaty-five-more-years>)//BB

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia is set to expire on February 5, 2021. The treaty officially restricts the number of delivery systems and warheads that each country can deploy, and technically provides a monitoring and verification regime—but the treaty’s many flaws have allowed Russia to build up its forces without even violating the treaty. Arms control advocates have encouraged the President to extend New START for another five years, but extending a flawed treaty would only create a false sense of security. While the current Administration should continue its worthwhile effort to engage the Russians in nuclear discussions, absent concrete progress on fixing the treaty, the Administration should let New START expire and continue to focus on modernizing U.S. nuclear programs. Russia will ultimately have an incentive to negotiate an improved arms control agreement once the United States begins to field new systems.∂ New START: Flawed and Outdated∂ New START was a flawed agreement from the very beginning. It did not require Russia to reduce its deployed warheads or delivery vehicles; instead it allowed Russia to build up its forces to reach treaty limitations.1∂ Mark B. Schneider, “New START: The Anatomy of a Failed Negotiation,” National Institute for Public Policy, July 2012, p. 45, https://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/New-start.pdf (accessed March 2, 2020).∂ As Russia built up its forces in accordance with the treaty, it took advantage of the capabilities not covered by New START. The treaty does not contain limits on the throw-weight of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which measures the weight of the payload the ICBM can carry, or on the number of warheads that can be deployed as multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).2∂ Michaela Dodge, “New START and the Future of U.S. National Security,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3407, May 21, 2019, p. 5, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/BG3407\_0.pdf (accessed February 20, 2020).∂ Russia took advantage of this lack of constraint by deploying ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with MIRVs, a destabilizing force posture that places a premium on having a Russian first-strike capability.3∂ Dodge, “New START and the Future of U.S. National Security,” p. 4.∂ If Russia can use a smaller number of missiles with MIRVs to take out the U.S. strategic deterrent, it will have an incentive to do so and strike first.

## 1AR – AT: Terror DA

### 1AR – AT: Terror DA

#### 1---No link – Rabkin and Yoo is about all developing tech – No reason full autonomy is key

#### 2---No turns case---Durable fiat or aff loses to inherency, incentives to reduce tensions and inspections solve, and Scharre doesn’t assume ban

#### 3---No link---Defense isn’t AWS

Future of Life Institute [Future of Life Institute, xx-xx-xxxx, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems," https://futureoflife.org/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/, accessed 12-20-2020]LHSBC

Myth: Adopters of human control can’t defend against lethal AWS. Fact: The best anti-drone technology isn’t drones, just as the best defense against chemical weapons isn’t chemical weapons.∂ The defense systems required for lethal AWS are likely to be different technologies than lethal AWS. Furthermore, if a technology is developed using AI to defend against lethal AWS, much like missile defense systems, it would not be subject to any requirement for human control as the target of the weapon is another weapon as opposed to a human target.

#### 4--- Turn---Ban stigmatizes laws preventing use

**Ware 19** - Jacob Ware (Jacob Ware holds a master’s in security studies from Georgetown University and an MA (Hons) in international relations and modern history from the University of St Andrews. His research has previously appeared with the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague), "Terrorist Groups, Artificial Intelligence, and Killer Drones," War on the Rocks, 9-24-2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/ WJ

Counter-Terrorism Options∂ Drones and AI provide a particularly daunting counter-terrorism challenge, simply because effective counter-drone or anti-AI expertise does not yet exist. That said, as Daveed Gartenstein-Ross has noted, “in recent years, we have seen multiple failures in imagination as analysts tried to discern what terrorists will do with emerging technologies. A failure in imagination as artificial intelligence becomes cheaper and more widely available could be even costlier.” Action is urgently needed, and for now, counter-terrorism policies are likely to fit into two categories, each with flaws: defenses and bans.∂ Firstly, and most likely, Western states could strengthen their defenses against drones and weaponized AI. This might involve strengthening current counter-drone and anti-AI capabilities, improving training for local law enforcement, and establishing plans for mitigating drone or autonomous weapons incidents. AI technology and systems will surely play an important role in this space, including in the development of anti-AI tools. However, anti-AI defenses will be costly, and will need to be implemented across countless cities throughout the entire Western world, something Michael Horton calls “a daunting challenge that will require spending billions of dollars on electronic and kinetic countermeasures.” Swarms, Scharre notes, will prove “devilishly hard to target,” given the number of munitions and their ability to spread over a wide area. In addition, defenses will likely take a long time to erect effectively and will leave citizens exposed in the meantime. Beyond defenses, AI will also be used in counter-terrorism intelligence and online content moderation, although this will surely spark civil liberties challenges.∂ Secondly, the international community could look to ban AI use in the military through an international treaty sanctioned by the United Nations. This has been the strategy pursued by activist groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, while leading artificial intelligence researchers and scientific commentators have published open letters warning of the risk of weaponized AI. That said, great powers are not likely to refrain from AI weapons development, and a ban might outlaw positive uses of militarized AI. The international community could also look to stigmatize, or delegitimize, weaponized AI and lethal autonomous weapons sufficiently to deter terrorist use. Although modern terrorist groups have proven extremely willing to improvise and innovate, and effective at doing so, there is an extensive list of weapons — chemical weapons, biological weapons, cluster munitions, barrel bombs, and more — accessible to terrorist organizations, but rarely used. This is partly down to the international stigma associated with those munitions — if a norm is strong enough, terrorists might avoid using a weapon. However, norms take a long time to develop, and are fragile and untrustworthy solutions. Evidently, good counter-terrorism options are limited.∂ The U.S. government and its intelligence agencies should continue to treat AI and lethal autonomous weapons as priorities, and identify new possible counter-terrorism measures. Fortunately, some progress has been made: Nicholas Rasmussen, former director of the National Counterterrorism Center, admitted at a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee hearing in September 2017 that “there is a community of experts that has emerged inside the federal government that is focused on this pretty much full time. Two years ago this was not a concern … We are trying to up our game.”∂ Nonstate actors are already deploying drones to attack their enemies. Lethal autonomous weapon systems are likely to proliferate to terrorist groups, with potentially devastating consequences. The United States and its allies should urgently address the rising threat by preparing stronger defenses against possible drone and swarm attacks, engaging with the defense industry and AI experts warning of the threat, and supporting realistic international efforts to ban or stigmatize military applications of artificial intelligence. Although the likelihood of such an event is low, a killer robot attack could cause massive casualties, strike a devastating blow to the U.S. homeland, and cause widespread panic. The threat is imminent, and the time has come to act.

#### 5---Nuke terror has insurmountable barriers.

Mueller 18 John Mueller, Political Science Professor at Ohio State University. [Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter but Nuclear Hysteria Does, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter]//BPS

As for nuclear terrorism, ever since al Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively to hijack commercial airplanes, alarmists have warned that radical Islamist terrorists would soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to make and deliver nuclear weapons so as to destroy various so-called infidels. In practice, however, terrorist groups have exhibited only a limited desire to go nuclear and even less progress in doing so. Why? Probably because developing one’s own bomb from scratch requires a series of risky actions, all of which have to go right for the scheme to work. This includes trusting foreign collaborators and other criminals; acquiring and transporting highly guarded fissile material; establishing a sophisticated, professional machine shop; and moving a cumbersome, untested weapon into position for detonation. And all of this has to be done while hiding from a vast global surveillance net looking for and trying to disrupt such activities.

#### 6---No attacks, and public health institutions solve

Seitz 16 (Sam, Director of Nuclear Security Studies @ the Global Intelligence Trust, “Why WMD Terrorism Isn’t as Scary as it Seems” https://politicstheorypractice.wordpress.com/2016/08/26/why-wmd-terrorism-isnt-as-scary-as-it-seems/)

Biological attacks are equally unlikely to occur for many of the same reasons. There simply aren’t many biological weapons programs because the use of these kinds of systems is prohibited by international law. Thus, few individuals have the requisite knowledge to engineer and produce effective bio-agents. Without proper expertise and infrastructure, it is unlikely that terrorist networks will ever possess the knowledge or means to produce weapons grade biological agents (7). Like chemical weapons, biological weapons also have a poor track record when it comes to inflicting serious damage. As Alan Dove explains, “Terrorist groups have… deployed biological weapons twice… The first was [in] 1984… [when] a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella… 751 people got sick, but nobody died.” The second biological terrorist attack was conducted by another cult, the same one that launched the chemical attack in Tokyo; its bio-attack was even less effective than its chemical attack. Despite the cult being “well-financed, and [having] many highly educated members… Nobody got sick or died” (8). Finally, it’s important to remember that the United States and other Western countries have impressively modern and well-funded public health institutions. Thus, even if terrorists are able to execute a potent biological attack against metropolitan areas in North America or Europe, it is unlikely that casualties would be high, as well-stocked hospitals and emergency response units would be able to mitigate the impact and prevent worst case scenarios.

### 1AR – AT: Terror

#### Only a coordinated multilateral ban solves – the aff is key.

**Ware 19** - Jacob Ware (Jacob Ware holds a master’s in security studies from Georgetown University and an MA (Hons) in international relations and modern history from the University of St Andrews. His research has previously appeared with the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague), "Terrorist Groups, Artificial Intelligence, and Killer Drones," War on the Rocks, 9-24-2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/ WJ

Counter-Terrorism Options

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#### Defenses to AWS aren’t AWS themselves – aff doesn’t ban them

Future of Life Institute [Future of Life Institute, xx-xx-xxxx, "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems," https://futureoflife.org/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/, accessed 12-20-2020]LHSBC

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#### We don’t stop research on AI in general, and intel agencies should solve counterterror—solves the examples of reprogramming robots their ev gives.

#### Drones should solve—there’s no reason the weapons need to be fully autonomous, drones let us counter terror without risking American lives.

#### The Rabkin and Yoo link isn’t about LAWs, AT ALL—it just says new tech, obviously we don’t stop researching that.

#### Chertoff link—makes their DA inevitable—terrorists are pursuing in the squo where great powers are getting LAWs, nothing about the aff changes this

### Inevitable

#### Terrorism is inevitable.

Bing West 17, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 7/26/17, "The Middle East: Terrorism Forever?" https://www.hoover.org/research/middle-east-terrorism-forever

The short response is yes. Crime forever? Also, yes. Turbulence, terror, pestilence, famine, love, procreation, taxes, families, sunsets, rain, shine, etc.—all are components of the human condition. There is no arc toward perfection in human nature. The jihadists will remain our mortal enemy; no negotiations or deterrence theories will alter their murderous intent. Unlike in the case of the Vietnam War, there is no strong, unified domestic political opposition to waging a low-level war against terrorists. The mainstream press acknowledges that the jihadists are abhorrent. We are at war against Islamist terrorists. As Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has repeatedly said, the goal should be their annihilation. Our martial resources for achieving that goal, however, should be modest and no time horizon should be set. Promises or assurances pointing toward to a “political endgame” should be avoided. We should pace ourselves and run a steady course. Gradually the jihadist disease within the Islam religion will run its course and be rejected or at least largely contained. That will take decades, given the despotic or chaotic nature of far too many Arab governments. In essence, our Mideast strategy is to remain a pivotal player, not to “win” the war against jihadist terrorists by maintaining a large military force and heavy diplomatic/political influence in Arab capitals, as we did in South Korea. Our military strategy in Iraq and Syria appears sensible. We are shrewdly employing our relative advantages—extraordinary overhead surveillance, sound logistics, precision firepower, and experienced advisers and fire control teams. At the same time, we are largely avoiding American casualties. Under President Obama, our diplomatic strategy focused upon reaching an accord—a détente—with Iran. Our traditional Sunni de facto allies—Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States—were spurned. Indeed, they were told to “share the neighborhood” with a Shiite Iranian theocracy intent upon regional sedition and upheaval. President Trump has pivoted back to our Sunni friends. Granted, the political aftermath in Iraq will be messy. Iran is emerging with more influence than the U.S., and the Sunnis in Iraq will continue to be mistreated. In Syria, the Assad regime will persist, and Russian and Iran will consolidate power inside the Assad/Alawite enclave. Gradually, all overt territorial holdings of the Islamic State—cities like Raqqa—will be seized. The Sunni eastern sector of Syria will be an impoverished, violence-wracked ward of some Arab and Kurdish martial coalition, aided in the background by the U.S. The de facto Kurdistan, partially in Iraq and partially in Syria, will remain at odds with Turkey and Iraq. In none of these cases will America take the lead as the key decision-maker. We can sustain interminable “skirmishing” in the Middle East due to geography and military prowess. Most of the countries consist of open terrain, deserts and plains devoid of vegetation. Most of the populations live in villages or urban centers, with vehicles essential for transportation. Our CIA has not been given the public credit it deserves for establishing vast networks of informers. Combining open terrain with information about the transit of terrorists ensures systematic destruction by our drones loitering overhead. Taking the next step of bringing forward small artillery bases with our advisers and fire control teams several hundred meters behind the frontlines has resulted in the gradual but inevitable destruction of the Islamic State in Mesopotamia. We should not extend this second step to other states like Yemen, Somalia, Chad, and Libya. However, we obviously should undertake air strikes and ground raids whenever our commanders perceive targets of opportunity. Amongst all the boiling cauldrons in the Middle East, remote and medieval Afghanistan presents the most vexing challenge. Our goal is not to permit an overt terrorist sanctuary or safe haven. That is an elastic concept. Put bluntly, our baseline objective is not to permit the Taliban to seize major cities or to drive us from Kabul, as we were driven from the roof of our embassy in Saigon in 1975. Unlike in Mesopotamia, the terrain works against us. The vast mountain ranges and the “Green Zone” along the major rivers provide shelter for the hardy Taliban who walk and hide in small groups to coordinate attacks. The challenge we face is complex. Afghans have a scant concept of nationalism. Tribal identity is pervasive, with the Pashtuns comprising the Taliban core and with most Afghan soldiers belonging to other tribes. The central government lacks cohesion, with no charismatic leaders. The opium/heroin trade provides half of GDP, with corruption affecting all levels from the farmer to the ministries in Kabul. Pakistan is determined to continue with its policy of providing the Taliban both shelter and aid. President Trump, as our commander-in-chief, has made clear his impatience and exasperation with this civil war that sputters on and on. The Taliban are so inextricably entangled with other Islamists that a political compromise seems no more possible than it was with the North Vietnamese during the Nixon/Kissinger years. Under current conditions, a political settlement would be a fig leaf, unlikely to provide even a “decent interval” before a bloody and total collapse. Thus it is likely we will commit several thousand more troops, using roughly the model now employed in Iraq and Syria. It will not, due to the terrain and other factors mentioned above, be as effective. America’s major challenge is not with violence and terrorism in the Middle East. Conditions there are not critical to our future. Some problems you don’t solve. You mitigate them and apply resources and strategies to avoid catastrophe.

### Yoo War Criminal

#### They should lose for reading evidence by John Yoo – sets a precedent for endorsing crimes against humanity

Glenn **Greenwald 8**, J.D. from NYU, co-founded his own litigation firm where he litigated cases concerning issues of U.S. constitutional law and civil rights for ten years, contributor at Salon where he reported about the 2001 anthrax attacks and the candidacy of former CIA official John O. Brennan for the jobs of either Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) or the next Director of National Intelligence (DNI) after the election of Barack Obama, “**John Yoo's war crimes**”, Apr 2 2008, Salon, <https://www.salon.com/2008/04/02/yoo_2/>

Yet again, the ACLU has performed the function which Congress and the media are intended to perform but do not. As the result of a FOIA lawsuit the ACLU filed and then prosecuted for several years, numerous documents relating to the Bush administration's torture regime that have long been baselessly kept secret were released yesterday, including an 81-page memorandum (.pdf) issued in 2003 by then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo (currently a Berkeley Law Professor) which asserted that the President's war powers entitle him to **ignore multiple laws which criminalized the use of torture:** If a government defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might arguably violate a criminal prohibition, he would be doing so in order to **prevent further attacks on the United States** by the al Qaeda terrorist network. In that case, we believe that he could argue that the executive branch's constitutional authority to protect the nation from attack justified his actions. As Jane Mayer reported two years ago in The New Yorker -- in which she quoted former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora as saying that "the memo espoused an extreme and virtually unlimited theory of the extent of the President's Commander-in-Chief authority" -- **it was precisely Yoo's torture-justifying theories,** ultimately endorsed by Donald Rumsfeld, that were communicated to Gen. Geoffrey Miller, the commander of both **Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib** at the time of the **most severe detainee abuses** (the ones that are known). It is not, of course, news that the Bush administration adopted (and still embraces) legal theories which vest the President with **literally unlimited power**, including the power to break our laws. There are, though, several points worth noting as a result of the disclosure of this Memorandum: (1) The fact that John Yoo is a Professor of Law at Berkeley and is treated as a respectable, serious expert by our media institutions, reflects the **complete destruction over the last eight years of whatever moral authority the United States possessed**. Comporting with long-held stereotypes of two-bit tyrannies, we're now a country that literally exempts our highest political officials from the rule of law, and have decided that there should be no consequences when they commit serious felonies. John Yoo's Memorandum, as intended, directly led to -- **caused** -- **a whole series of war crimes at both Guantanamo and in Iraq**. The reason such a relatively low-level DOJ official was able to issue such influential and extraordinary opinions was because he was working directly with, and at the behest of, the two most important legal officials in the administration: George Bush's White House counsel, Alberto Gonzales, and Dick Cheney's counsel (and current Chief of Staff) David Addington. Together, **they deliberately created and authorized a regime of torture and other brutal interrogation methods that are**, by all measures, **very serious war crimes.** If writing memoranda authorizing torture -- actions which then directly lead to the systematic commission of torture -- doesn't make one a war criminal in the U.S., **what does?** Here is what John Yoo is and what he did: "It depends on why the President thinks he needs to do that." Yoo **wasn't just a law professor theorizing about the legalization of torture**. He was a government official who, in concert with other government officials, set out to enable a **brutal and systematic torture regime**, and did so. **If this level of depraved criminality doesn't remove one from the realm of respectability and mainstream seriousness** -- if not result in war crimes prosecution -- **then nothing does.** That John Yoo is a full professor at one of the country's most prestigious law schools, and a welcomed expert on our newspaper's Op-Ed pages and television news programs, speaks volumes about what our country has become. We sure did take care of that despicable Pvt. Lyndie England, though, because we don't tolerate barbaric conduct of the type in which she engaged completely on her own. (2) While Yoo's specific Torture Memos were ultimately rescinded by subsequent DOJ officials -- primarily Jack Goldsmith -- the **underlying theories of omnipotent executive power remain largely in place**. The administration continues to embrace precisely these same theories to assert that it has the power to violate a **whole array of laws** -- from our nation's spying and surveillance statutes to countless Congressional oversight requirements -- and to detain even U.S. citizens, detained on American soil, as "enemy combatants." So for all of the dramatic outrage that this Yoo memo will generate for a day or so, **the general framework on which it rests**, despite being weakened by the Supreme Court in Hamdan, is the one under which we continue to live, without much protest or objection. (3) **This incident provides yet more proof of how rancid and corrupt is the premise** that as long as political appointees at the DOJ approve of certain conduct, then that conduct must be shielded from criminal prosecution. That's the premise that is being applied over and over to remove government lawbreaking from the reach of the law. That's the central argument behind both telecom amnesty and protecting Bush officials from their surveillance felonies (it's unfair to hold them accountable for their illegal spying behavior because the DOJ said they could do it). It's the same argument that CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden just made on Meet the Press as to why CIA interrogators should be immunized from the consequences of their illegal conduct ("when I go and tell him to do something in the shadows and point out to him it is perfectly lawful, that the Department of Justice has reviewed it . . . I need him to have confidence in that DOJ opinion"). The DOJ is not the law. They are not above the law and they do not make the law. They are merely charged with enforcing it. The fact that they assert that blatantly illegal conduct is legal does not make it so. DOJ officials, like anyone else, can violate the law and have done so not infrequently. High DOJ officials -- including Attorneys General -- have been convicted of crimes in the past and have gone to prison. Embracing this twisted notion that the DOJ has the authority to immunize any conduct by high government officials or private actors from the reach of the law is a **recipe for inevitable lawlessness**. **It enables the President to break the law, or authorize lawbreaking**, simply by having his political appointees at DOJ -- including ideologues like John Yoo -- declare that he can do it. As these incidents ought to demonstrate rather vividly, the mere fact that Bush officials at the DOJ declare something to be legal cannot provide license to break the law with impunity. (4) Since the Nuremberg Trials, "war criminals" include not only those who directly apply the criminal violence and other forms of brutality, but also government officials who authorized it and military officials who oversaw it. Ironically, the Bush administration itself argued in the 2006 case of Hamdan -- when they sought to prosecute as a "war criminal" a Guantanamo detainee whom they allege was a driver for Osama bin Laden -- that one is guilty of war crimes not merely by directly violating the laws of war, but also by participating in a conspiracy to do so. That legal question was unresolved in that case, but Justices Thomas and Scalia both sided with the administration and Thomas wrote (emphasis added): "[T]he experience of our wars," Winthrop 839, is rife with evidence that establishes beyond any doubt that conspiracy to violate the laws of war is itself an offense cognizable before a law-of-war military commission. . . . . In [World War II], the orders establishing the jurisdiction of military commissions in various theaters of operation provided that conspiracy to violate the laws of war was a cognizable offense. See Letter, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific (Sept. 24, 1945), Record in Yamashita v. Styer, O. T. 1945, No. 672, pp. 14, 16 (Exh. F) (Order respecting the "Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals" provided that "participation in a common plan or conspiracy to accomplish" various offenses against the law of war was cognizable before military commissions). The political reality is that **high government officials in the U.S. are never going to be held accountable for war crimes**. In practice, "international law" exists as a justifying instrument for powerful countries to impose their will on those which are less powerful, and war crimes tribunals are almost always a form of victor's justice. So **neither John Yoo, David Addington nor Alberto Gonzales**, and certainly not their bosses at whose behest they were working, are going to be sitting in a dock charged with war crimes **any time soon -- regardless of whether they ought to be.** But those who propound these principles and claim to believe in them ought to apply them consistently. **John Yoo is not some misguided conservative legal thinker with whom one should have civil, pleasant, intellectually stimulating debates** at law schools and on PBS. **Respectfully debating the legality and justification of torture regimes, and treating systematic torture perpetrators like John Yoo with respect, isn't all that far off from what Yoo and his comrades did**. It isn't pleasant to think about high government officials in one's own country as war criminals -- that's something that only bad, evil dictatorships have -- but, **pleasant or not, it rather indisputably happens to be what we have.** Lawyers can make really bad legal arguments that argue for very unjust things in perfectly legal sounding language. I hope nobody is surprised by this fact. It is very commonplace. Today we are talking about lawyers making arguments defending the legality of torture. In the past lawyers have used legal sounding arguments to defend slavery, the genocide of Native Americans, rape (both spousal and non-spousal), Jim Crow, police brutality, denials of habeas corpus, destruction or seizure of property, and compulsory sterilization. . . . . Orin [Kerr] wants to know whether John [Yoo]'s theories are consistent with my views of the living constitution. If he wants to know as a substantive matter whether John's theories of Presidential dictatorship are consistent with the Constitution's text and underlying principles, they are not. **The fact that a lawyer does something in his capacity as a lawyer does not mean it's proper, legitimate or legal**. **The fact that an argument is packaged in lawyerly wrapping doesn't mean it's reasonable or offered in good faith**. All sorts of lawyers -- from those representing crime families to those representing terrorists -- have been convicted of crimes because they concealed and/or promoted their clients' illegal acts. Lawyers aren't any more immune from the rule of law than anyone else. Harper's Scott Horton makes the point in much the same way: These memoranda have been crafted not as an after-the-fact defense to criminal charges, but rather as a roadmap to committing crimes and getting away with it. They are the sort of handiwork we associate with the consigliere, or mob lawyer. But these consiglieri are government attorneys who have sworn an oath, which they are violating, to uphold the law. Along those lines, Marcy Wheeler and Slate's Emily Bazelon both demonstrate how un-lawyerly Yoo's opinions were. Yoo wasn't acting as a lawyer in order legally to analyze questions surrounding interrogation powers. He was acting with the **intent to enable illegal torture and used the law as his instrument to authorize criminality.**

#### John yoo is a war criminal – reject him

**Wiener 2014** – Citing Chemerinsky, Dean of Law @ UC Irvine
Jon, "Prosecute John Yoo, Says Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky," Dec 12, https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecute-john-yoo-says-law-school-dean-erwin-chemerinsky/

Torture is a crime, a violation of the Federal Torture Act. Those who engaged in the torture documented in such exhaustive detail in the Senate Intelligence Committee’s torture report should be prosecuted, and those who conspired in that torture should also be prosecuted. They include UC Berkeley law professor John Yoo, says Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the Law School at the University of California Irvine.∂ Yoo was co-author of the infamous “torture memo” of 2002, when he was Deputy Assistant US Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel of the Bush Justice Department. In the memo he declared that—in the words of Jane Mayer in her book The Dark Side—“cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment of detainees could be authorized, with few restrictions.”∂ Yoo’s memo “directly led to the torture policy that resulted,” Chemerinsky said in an interview, citing Mayer’s evidence. “That’s being part of a conspiracy to violate a federal statute. Someone isn’t excused from criminal liability just because they work for the federal government.”∂ The Federal Torture Act defines torture broadly, as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering…upon another person within his custody or physical control.” The penalty for violating the Torture Act is imprisonment “for not more than 20 years.”∂ Most important for the case of John Yoo, the Federal Torture Act specifically includes conspiracy, stating that “a person who conspires to commit an offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties…as the penalties prescribed for the offense.” That means Yoo could be sentenced to up to twenty years in prison if found guilty.∂ “I think he should be,” Chemerinsky said. “All who planned, all who implemented, all who carried out the torture should be criminally prosecuted. How else do we as a society express our outrage? How else do we deter it in the future—except by criminal prosecutions?”∂ Chemerinsky, an authority on constitutional law who has argued cases before the Supreme Court, is the founding dean of the law school at UC Irvine, a sister campus of Berkeley in the University of California System. He is the author of hundreds of law review articles and eight books, including most recently The Case Against the Supreme Court.∂ Yoo defended his work on torture in an op-ed published by the New York Daily News. “In 2002,” he wrote, “I believed that the federal law prohibiting torture allowed the CIA to use interrogation methods that did not cause injury—including, in extraordinary cases, waterboarding—because of the grave threat to the nation’s security in the months after the 9/11 attacks.” He added that he was “swayed by the fact” that he believed “the CIA would use the technique only on top Al Qaeda leaders thought to have actionable information on pending plots.” He said the Senate report was wrong in its conclusion that torture was ineffective in exposing plots, citing CIA head John Brennan’s statements to that effect.∂ But, Chemerinsky said, there’s nothing in the federal torture law that provides an exception for “pending plots.”∂ For a law school dean to call for the criminal prosecution of a law professor at another campus of the same university is unprecedented. When demands were raised in 2008 that Berkely fire Yoo, the dean of the law school at Berkeley at the time, Christopher Edley Jr., said that, while he agreed that “Yoo offered bad ideas and even worse advice during his government service,” he believed that advocating “bad ideas” was protected by academic freedom, and such advocacy “would not warrant dismissal” from Berkeley. The only ground for dismissal, he said, was specified in the official university policy: “Commission of a criminal act which has led to conviction in a court of law and which clearly demonstrates unfitness to continue as a member of the faculty.”∂ Chemerinsky’s argument is that Yoo has committed a criminal act—conspiracy to torture—and that he should be put on trial for it.

## 1AR – AT: China Heg DA

### 1AR – AT: China Heg Good DA

#### Non-unique – Military asymmetry is eroding now

Schadlow 9/1 [Nadia Schadlow, Nadia Schadlow is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute Dr. Schadlow was most recently U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy. Prior to joining the National Security Council, she was a senior program officer in the International Security and Foreign Policy, 9-1-2020, "The End of American Illusion," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2020-08-11/end-american-illusion, accessed 9-22-2020]LHSBC

* Read green only vs. liberalism

Although liberal internationalism encouraged interdependence and multilateralism, it also rested on a faith in Washington’s ability to indefinitely maintain the uncontested military superiority it enjoyed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In reality, U.S. military dominance is now challenged in virtually every domain. The United States is no longer able to operate freely in the traditional spheres of land, sea, and air, nor in newer ones such as outer space and cyberspace. The spread of new technologies and weapon systems and the pursuit of asymmetric strategies by adversaries have limited the U.S. military’s ability to find and strike targets, supply and safeguard its forces abroad, freely navigate the seas, control sea lines of communication, and protect the homeland. Nothing is likely to reverse these trends.∂ Since the 1990s, the United States has become more dependent on space for its national security, because so many military and intelligence functions depend on assets, such as satellites, that are based there. But China, Russia, and other states now have the ability to field antisatellite weapons systems. Meanwhile, private commercial activities in space have increased exponentially, as well. Since 2014, a majority of satellite launches have been conducted by countries other than the United States—primarily China, India, Japan, and members of the EU, further eroding the United States’ ability to maneuver freely in space and increasing the amount of debris orbiting the earth, which threatens all space assets. ∂ In cyberspace, hardware and software vulnerabilities have emerged across military supply chains, potentially reducing the effectiveness of important platforms. In 2018, David Goldfein, the U.S. Air Force’s chief of staff, described the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as “[a computer that happens to fly](https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/a-computer-that-happens-to-fly-usaf-raf-chiefs-on-multi-domain-future/)”—and thus, like all computers, it is vulnerable to cyberattacks. That same year, the Defense Science Board warned that since so many weapons systems were connected, a vulnerability in one could affect others, too. ∂ At the same time, bureaucratic requirements have made it harder for the military to innovate. More than 20 years passed from when the Joint Strike Fighter program was envisioned to when the first combat squadron of F-35s was declared operational. The military demands unrealistically high levels of performance, which companies, hungry for contracts, promise to deliver. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has bemoaned the armed forces’ unwillingness to settle for an [“80 percent” solution](https://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4404) that could actually be built and fielded in a reasonable time frame. Given how quickly countervailing technologies develop, these frictions in the U.S. defense industry pose serious questions about the country’s ability to fight and win wars, especially against near-peer competitors. ∂ Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow have developed so-called anti-access/area-denial weapons systems, which reduce Washington’s ability to project power in East Asia and Europe. China has developed and modernized its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and has invested heavily in technologies to improve its conventional forces. Russia has built an array of exotic “doomsday weapons” and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, despite arms control agreements with the United States. And both countries are also pouring resources into hypersonic weapons whose speed and maneuverability render conventional missile defense systems ineffective. ∂ In addition, smaller rivals such as Iran and North Korea have continued to develop and refine their nuclear programs. Despite visions of a world in which no one could challenge American force, the era of U.S. military dominance proved to be relatively short.

#### A unipolar system prevents war – Thousands of years of history prove

**Wohlforth 8** William, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, October, World Politics, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” www.­polisci.­wisc.­edu/­Uploads/­Documents/­IRC/­Wohlforth (2009)­.­pdf)

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. The clearest empirical implication of the theory is that status competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: "The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity."39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

#### The best studies confirm our impact---err on the side of a consensus of empirical research---our evidence assumes every skeptic

Brooks & Wohlforth 16 [William, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Page 103-108]

Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms— assurance and deterrence— and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them.∂ This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two major bodies of evidence are most important: general empirical findings concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms and regionally focused research.∂ General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security?∂ Deterrence Effectiveness The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire. 1 Many quantitative findings, mean- while, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support: ∂ Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.” Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits. 2 3 ∂ The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key. 4 ∂ Forward- deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances with overseas allies. 5 ∂ Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence. 6 ∂ Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard.∂ The most important finding to emerge from this voluminous research is that alliances— especially with nuclear- armed allies like the United States— actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. The United States is more inclined to offer— and protégés to seek— alliance rela- tionships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy.∂ More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if the United States is interested in deterring military challenges to the status quo in key regions, relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by retrenchment proponents.∂ The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists. 9 8∂ Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10∂ Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are:∂ The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.” In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states. 12 11 ∂ Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13 ∂ Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.” 15 14 ∂ Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks. 17 ∂ Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur. But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program. 18 19 16∂ In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.” Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. 20∂ The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them. It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. 21∂ This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.” 22 23∂ Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use. If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of 24 nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. ∂ Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.” Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises. As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?” The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. 27 26 25

### 1AR – CCP Collapse Good

#### CCP collapse key to democratic reform

Ping 15 (Hu Ping – Hu Ping is the chief editor of Beijing Spring, a long-running New York-based Chinese democracy magazine. Mr. Hu has been one of the best known Chinese liberal thinkers and commentators since early 1980s, and his essay On Freedom of Expression influenced many intellectuals and students in China in the 80s when he was a graduate student of philosophy at Peking University. – “How the Tiananmen Massacre Changed China, and the World” – China Change – June 2, 2015 – https://chinachange.org/2015/06/02/how-the-tiananmen-massacre-changed-china-and-the-world/)

Even today, there are still some who believe that with further development, and the growth of a middle class, China will gradually evolve towards liberal democracy. This long-held narrative presupposes that China is on the right path now. But it isn’t. It isn’t, because of choices made through political expediency after the Tiananmen Massacre. Continuing down this crooked path is simply going to move China further away from democracy, and this has become plainly evident especially over the last couple of years since Xi Jinping took power. For 26 years, precisely because too many people have accepted the faulty premise of economic development inevitably leading to political reform, the proper and righteous resistance to the Party’s dictatorship has been forgotten. Instead, the world sits and watches, or even helps the hydra grow.

#### Democratic reform checks aggressive China-solves multiple scenarios for conflict

Aaron Friedberg 11 (Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics” National Interest July/August 2011, http://users.clas.ufl.edu/zselden/coursereading2011/friedberg.pdf

This expectation is rooted in more than mere wishful thinking. As the values and institutions of liberal democracy become more firmly entrenched, there will begin to be open and politically meaningful debate and real competition over national goals and the allocation of national resources. Aspiring leaders and opinion makers preoccupied with prestige, honor, power and score settling will have to compete with others who emphasize the virtues of international stability, cooperation, reconciliation and the promotion of social welfare. The demands of the military and its industrial allies will be counterbalanced, at least to some degree, by groups who favor spending more on education, health care and the elderly. The assertive, hypernationalist version of China’s history and its grievances will be challenged by accounts that acknowledge the culpability of the Communist regime in repressing minorities and refusing to seek compromise on questions of sovereignty. A leadership obsessed with its own survival and with countering perceived threats from foreign powers will be replaced by a government secure in its legitimacy and with no cause to fear that the world’s democracies are seeking to encircle and overthrow it. A democratic China would find it easier to get along with Japan, India and South Korea, among others. The trust and mutual respect that eventually grows up between democracies, and the diminished fear that one will use force against another, should increase the odds of attaining negotiated settlements of outstanding disputes over borders, offshore islands and resources. A democratic government in Beijing would also stand a better chance of achieving a mutually acceptable resolution to its sixtyyear standoff with Taiwan. In contrast to today’s ccp rulers, a popularly elected mainland regime would have less to gain from keeping this conflict alive, it would be more likely to show respect for the preferences of another democratic government, and it would be more attractive to the Taiwanese people as a partner in some kind of federated arrangement that would satisfy the desires and ease the fears of both sides.

#### Escalation in the South China Sea would go nuclear

Rando 15 (9/29, Consultant- Asymmetric Global Solutions DBA, MPH/MS-Biomedical Sciences & US Correspondent-Chemical, Biological, Nuclear Warfare Journal, Fire on the Water: The South China Sea and Nuclear Confrontation, <http://www.cbrneportal.com/fire-on-the-water-the-south-china-sea-and-nuclear-confrontation/>)

The dependence of China and other regional nations surrounding the South China Sea on the Strait of Malacca is analogous in geopolitical and economic terms, to the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Approximately one -third of all global trade funnels through the strait and also serves as a conduit for raw materials and energy needs for China and other adjacent nation-states. Such potential dominance in any region, leads to a high-stakes game of brinkmanship, and at least the possibility of a regional war which could conceivably escalate to engulf nation-states external to the regional sphere. Tensions and skirmishes have the propensity to evolve into armed conflict and full-scale war, and apprehensive leaders and military planners in such a contested region serve as the facilitators for disaster. China continues to assert sovereignty by constructing man made islands using sand dredged from the sea bottom and these artificial islands could be militarized. China has even affirmed its desire to have a military presence on these islands; however, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also professes the use of these land masses to facilitate commerce via shipping lanes and to protect Chinese fishing and other vessels from piracy. China will never cease its quest for supremacy and its perceived “ownership” of the South China Sea, as the legitimacy and structure of the Chinese government is based on nationalism and achievement of the “Chinese Dream”. The Chinese regime continues to vehemently assert their perceived “right” to the South China Sea, and it forges ahead with plans and operations that could lead to naval warfare and conflict escalation. The knowledge that China possesses formidable naval capacity and capabilities, including nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines, is, indeed, disconcerting at the very least. As we examine and evaluate the “submarine factor”, it is evident that China’s submarines have no practical value in its disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. Essentially, nuclear ballistic missile capable submarines serve as a deterrent against thermonuclear war. Without doubt, the primary reason that China possesses nuclear-capable submarines is to deter an American attack, although India’s nuclear weapons are also a consideration for Beijing. Nuclear capable submarines are capable of deep dive capabilities and shorter launch to target times. While China’s submarine capabilities may appear worrisome to some, sudden deployment from port in a geopolitical crisis would serve as a critical indicator to the US and Western allies, and its submarine fleet still remains somewhat noisy and detectable. China has already demonstrated its aggression at sea in several instances, such as the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat in disputed waters claimed by both countries in the region and an ominous presence and military mobilization exercises which have been monitored by military and intelligence assets. A report by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, indicates that Chinese SSBNs are able to target portions of the U.S. from strategic operational positions near the Chinese coast. China’s Global Times published an unprecedented report that revealed a nuclear missile strike on the western U.S. with JL-2 missiles could generate up to 12 million American fatalities. The Obama administration and senior U.S. naval officials have not retorted to China’s claims of a potentially devastating nuclear threat, which included graphics showing radiological plumes and collateral damage induced by radiation. The possibilities of China’s anti-satellite strategies to disable communications and intelligence-gathering capabilities must also be taken seriously. Most assuredly, **the South China Sea would serve as an obvious arena for the projection of Chinese power, including** conventional and, potentially, **nuclear scenarios.** Rando2China’s South Sea naval facilities have seen significant upgrading and expansion, such as the facilities on Hainan, and the nuclear submarine base at Longpo serves as the first nuclear submarine base in the South China Sea. The base also includes a submarine tunnel that is part of an underwater complex of nuclear facilities on Hainan. Also, Chinese-Russian wargames are worrisome, which **adds to the concerns of nuclear confrontation and consequences globally**. The Chinese have asserted their right to defend its territories, which in their view, includes the South China Sea, and they have stated verbally, and by their aggressive actions, that they will continue to pursue their strategic goals despite the threat of confrontation and conflict. Many of the issues in contention in the South China Sea will remain unresolved for, probably, several years to come. We must remain balanced, and not overzealous in our approaches to assisting with conflict resolution in the area. We must apply reasonable diplomacy, without stirring up a hornet’s nest that would serve to be counterproductive and enhance animosities. However, **the US**, its allies, and other concerned nation-states **must not refrain from being ever so vigilant and proactive in achieving peaceful resolution**, while at the same time maintaining our national defense and security postures

### 1AR – AT: Taiwan

#### Crisis over Taiwan draws in the US

Charles Glaser 11, GWU political science professor, “Will China's Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, March/April, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-03-01/will-chinas-rise-lead-war>)

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

## 1AR – AT: FON DA

### 1AR – AT: FON DA

#### 1---No uniqueness – Yoo doesn’t say LAWS are getting deployed for FON now

#### 2---No uniqueness – Swarm LAWS are for nuclear first strike, not FON – That’s 1AC Altmann and Sauer

#### 3---Turn – China LAWS create underwater great wall that interferes with FON – That’s 1AC Johnson

#### 4---Empirics prove no escalation

Ian Bowers 18, Associate Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, PhD in War Studies from King’s College London, Escalation at Sea: Stability and Instability in Maritime East Asia, Naval War College Review, Volume 71, Number 4, Article 5, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7672&context=nwc-review

Despite such sentiments, to date the Chinese have not challenged U.S. FONOPs substantially on an operational level, instead preferring to engage on a political and rhetorical one. Under the Obama administration, U.S. naval vessels conducted five widely reported FONOPs in the South China Sea, and at the time of this writing the U.S. Navy has conducted four more FONOPs since President Trump took office. 68 So far no case of FONOPs has resulted in escalation to the use of substantial force; however, robust incidents have occurred. These incidents, as with clashes over maritime disputes, conform to the pattern of low-level instability seen in recent years at sea. The now-infamous 2009 incident of Chinese harassment of USNS Impeccable highlighted the potential for diverging views of freedom of navigation to lead to isolated clashes at sea. The general Chinese response has been to shadow vessels conducting such operations with naval and coast guard assets. Additionally, it has been reported that in the case of USS Lassen a number of Chinese fishing and merchant ships maneuvered around the U.S. ship as it sailed by the Chinese installation on Subi Reef. 69 In December 2016, a Chinese vessel removed a U.S. underwater drone from the water within eyeshot of a U.S. naval vessel. 70 This was a blatant obstruction of U.S. navigation rights, yet it did not result in an escalation to violence. FONOPs also were carried out during the Cold War. The initial Soviet response was diplomatic, but the Soviets felt that such FONOPs were unnecessarily provocative, and responses escalated to more-forcible measures, notably the ramming of USS Yorktown in 1988 while it was conducting a FONOP in the Black Sea. However, the parties found military and political solutions. 71 The military solution prescribed further rules for interaction between vessels. The political solution, agreed to in 1988, saw the Soviet Union acceding to the U.S. interpretation of the law of the sea and the United States determining that it no longer needed to assert its right of freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. 72 This was an elegant solution for both sides, in that the United States did not give up its right to perform FONOPs, yet it got the USSR to agree to the established laws of the sea, while the Soviet Union put a stop to what it perceived as destabilizing behavior. This suggests that political solutions to freedom of navigation issues can be found and that clashes over FONOPs, if they occur, can be managed once it is in the interests of both parties to do so. The Potential for Escalation Currently, available data suggest that the trend of maritime interactions in the seas of East Asia is mirroring that seen during and after the Cold War. This would indicate that sustained low-level instability will continue to characterize the strategic picture, but that escalation is unlikely.

#### 5---Economic interdependence as a theory oversimplifies why states go to war and ignores counter-examples

Joel Einstein 17, Masters of Strategic Studies at the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at Australian National University, reviewed by Charles Miller, Ph.D. in Political Science from Duke University, Professor at Australian National University, 1/17/17, “Economic Interdependence and Conflict – The Case of the US and China,” https://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/17/economic-interdependence-and-conflict-the-case-of-the-us-and-china/

Economic Interdependence and Conflict¶ The theory that increased economic interdependence reduces conflict rests on three observations: trade benefits states in a manner that decision-makers value; conflict will reduce or completely cut-off trade; and that decision-makers will take the previous two observations into account before choosing to go to war. Based on these observations, one should expect that the higher the benefit of trade, the higher the cost of a potential conflict. After a certain point, the value of trade may become so high that the state in question has become economically dependent on another. Proponents of this theory argue that if two states have reached this point of mutual dependence (interdependence), their decision-makers will value the continuation of trade relations higher than any potential gains to be made through war.[3] It is on this argument that Pinker rests his statement that the economic relationship between the US and China precludes war. One can see evidence of this when analysing US views on China as trade rises. A 2014 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey indicates that only a minority of Americans see China as a critical threat, compared to a majority in the mid-1990s. This number is even higher when analysing Americans who directly benefit from trade with China.[4]¶ As compelling as this argument may be, high levels of economic interdependence have not always resulted in peace. The decades preceding WW1 saw an unprecedented growth in international trade, communication, and interconnectivity but needless to say, war broke out.[5] This instance alone is not enough to disprove Pinker’s logic. War may become very unlikely but began nonetheless.[6] Let us take two hypothetical scenarios, one in which the chances of war is 80% and the other in which trade has reduced the likelihood of war to 10%. Just knowing that war did indeed take place does not tell us which scenario was in play. Similarly, the fact that WW1 took place gives us no information about whether economic interdependence made war unlikely or not. In fact, evidence even exists to suggest that economic linkages prevented a war from breaking out during the sequence of crises that led up to WW1.[7] However, the fact that a war as detrimental as WW1 could break out despite a supposed reduction of the likelihood of conflict gives us an impetus to examine whether this reduction does take place. Additionally, if this is the case, what variables can weaken this pacifying effect?¶ Does Conflict Cut off Trade?¶ Economic interdependence theory makes the assumption that conflict will reduce or cut-off trade. This assumption appears to be logical, as one would expect that the moment two states are officially adversaries, fear of relative gains would ensure that policy makers want to completely cut-off trade. However, there are many historical examples of trade between warring states carrying on during wartime, including strategic goods that directly affect the ability of the enemy to carry out the war.[8] For example, in the Anglo-Dutch Wars, British insurance companies continued to insure enemy ships and paid to replace ships that were being destroyed by their own army.[9] Even during WW2, there are numerous examples of American firms continuing to trade strategic goods with Nazi Germany.[10] Barbieri and Levy argue that these examples and their own statistical analysis suggest that the outbreak of war does not radically reduce trade between enemies, and when it does, it often quickly returns to pre-war levels after the war has concluded.[11]¶ In response to this result, Anderton and Carter conducted an interrupted time-series study on the effect war has on trade in which they analysed 14 major power wars and 13 non-major power wars. Seven of the non-major power wars negatively impacted trade (although only four of these reductions were significant), but in the major war category, all results bar one showed a reduction of trade during wartime and a quick return to pre-war levels at its conclusion.[12] Accompanying this contradictory finding one must take into account that even if war does not radically reduce trade, if a state believes that it does then potential opportunity cost would still figure in their calculations.¶ Variables that Impact the Pacifying Effect of Economic Interdependence¶ The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is not constant. It achieves this via a discussion of the effect of changes in a number of variables pertaining to how and what a state trades. Once it is established that changes in such variables may alter the effect of economic interdependence on the likelihood of conflict, Pinker’s statement (that the level of trade between the US and China makes conflict unlikely) can be considered to be an over-simplification.

#### 6---SCS retrenchment averts conflict

**Yoder 18** (Brandon Yoder is a Research fellow at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, and was previously an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Old Dominion University, 10/11/18, “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals,” American Journey of Political Science, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12395>)SEM

Conclusion This article introduces a novel theoretical insight to the retrenchment debate. Both optimists and pessimists regarding the efficacy of retrenchment have heretofore considered it a “last resort” strategy for a declining state to reduce its foreign commitments after it has already lost the power to sustain them. Both sides in the debate agree about the content of the costs and benefits of retrenchment, and simply disagree about their relative magnitudes. In contrast, the retrenchment game suggests that retrenchment early in a power shift can benefit a declining state for an entirely different (though not mutually exclusive) reason: By removing constraints over a rising state's behavior in a particular region, retrenchment makes that behavior more informative as a signal of the riser's future intentions elsewhere. That information, in turn, allows the declining state to adopt a more optimal strategy toward the riser, increasing its degree of cooperation with benign rising states, while more effectively opposing the rise of hostile types. These findings have substantial implications for contemporary U.S. foreign policy, particularly regarding a rising China. First, they identify conditions under which China's cooperative signals are more or less credible. Over the course of China's rise, the United States has adopted a “hedging” strategy that imposes constraints over China's behavior through a combination of deterrent threats and positive inducements.32 This strategy has been quite effective in achieving its intended purpose of inducing China to cooperate under the rule of the U.S.‐led liberal order in the short term. However, the argument in this article implies that by imposing high constraints over a rising China, the United States has increased China's incentives to misrepresent any hostile intentions, and thus reduced the credibility of China's cooperation as a signal of its long‐term intentions. Although this effect has been recognized by some (e.g., Goldstein 2005), much of the academic and policy literature on U.S.–China relations has taken China's cooperative behavior under high constraints at face value.33 Conversely, this article suggests that China's cooperation is more credible on issues where U.S. influence is low and China's behavior is relatively unconstrained. This implies that there may be a previously unrecognized silver lining to two recent U.S. foreign policy choices that have been roundly derided by U.S.–China experts: failure to join the China‐led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or to prevent U.S. allies from doing so in 2015, and the recent U.S. withdrawal from its own initiative, the Trans‐Pacific Partnership. Although expert consensus is that these policy outcomes are clearly harmful to U.S. interests, they also open up space for China to assume a leadership role regarding regional economic governance in an institutional setting where U.S. power is not immediately present (e.g., Babones 2016; Parameswaran 2016). The argument here suggests that how China shapes regional institutions under relatively low constraints is more informative of its long‐term preferences for the broader, global international economic order than its previous cooperation within U.S.‐led institutions has been. Second, this article identifies informational benefits of retrenchment that are likely novel to policy makers, as evidenced by the absence of informational considerations in the academic or policy literature on retrenchment. The magnitude of this informational incentive for retrenchment in U.S.–China relations—like the magnitude of noninformational incentives—is difficult to measure and requires extensive empirical work. Yet given the ambiguity about the net costs and benefits of American retrenchment manifested in the current retrenchment debate, even relatively small informational incentives for retrenchment vis‐à‐vis China could potentially alter the U.S. calculus. This is particularly true regarding issues that both the model and the existing literature suggest are strong candidates for U.S. retrenchment, such as the maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and the status of Taiwan (e.g., Glaser 2015). Each of these issues is significantly more valuable to China (which considers them “core national interests”) than to the United States, which is when the informational benefits of retrenchment are greatest. Of course, Taiwan and the SCS still have significant strategic value to the United States, which may outweigh the net informational and material benefits of withdrawal. This is ultimately an empirical question. Answering it will require that the informational effects of retrenchment be included alongside noninformational variables in subsequent work on retrenchment in U.S. foreign policy.

## 1AR – AT: Xi Diversion DA

#### Host of thumpers outweigh

Blanchette ‘19 --- Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies [Jude Blanchette, 8-30-2019, "Red Flags: Why Was China’s Fourth Plenum Delayed?" CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-flags-why-was-chinas-fourth-plenum-delayed]

One important point stands out from the announcement from China’s Xinhua News Agency and the four minutes dedicated to the meeting on the flagship nightly TV news program, Xinwen Lianbo. First, the documents to be reviewed by the Central Committee in October all relate internal CCP governance rather than focusing on economic reform. Given that last year’s Third Plenum was used to discuss governance reforms in the lead-up to the NPC, the Fourth Plenum might well be used to focus on the economy, as discussed above. Clearly, Xi Jinping views political concerns and Party governance as taking precedence over adhering to convention. This comes through in the longer statement made on the Xinhua website, which reads: “The meeting will be held during a time of significant upheaval not seen for 100 years, and a critical period for China as it realizes the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This undoubtedly relates to events in Hong Kong, the deterioration of relations with the United States, and the upcoming Taiwan presidential election, to name just a few. Xi Jinping and his administration are facing challenging times, perhaps the most precarious period of his rule thus far.

#### No Xi diversion.

Yin 19 George Yin, government PhD from Harvard, political economy MSc from the London School of Economics, Dickey Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security at Dartmouth College. [Domestic repression and international aggression? Why Xi is uninterested in diversionary conflict, 1-22-2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/domestic-repression-and-international-aggression-why-xi-is-uninterested-in-diversionary-conflict/]//BPS

Crucially, diversionary war theory rests on a number of assumptions, two of which do not hold for Xi today. Assumption 1: Leaders prefer foreign adventure over addressing domestic troubles. As discussed earlier, in the realm of domestic policies, Xi has been criticized for primarily two things: his promotion of his cult of personality and a slowing Chinese economy overly focused on inefficient SOEs. It is easy for Xi to dial back his cult of personality, and he has already done so. Reverting his policy of guo jin min tui (“as the state advances, the private sector retreats”) is not going to be easy and would entail important financial system and legal reforms (see discussions from the 2018 Chinese Economists 50 forum), but is quite doable. There is little reason why Xi would want to create international tension to distract his critics when it is much more straightforward to directly address the domestic issues. Furthermore, a diversionary skirmish involving Vietnam or the Philippines over one of the South China Sea islands would hardly be significant enough for diversion. To rally the nation behind him, Xi must pick on Taiwan, Japan, or even the United States. The problem is that a confrontation with either Taiwan or Japan is highly risky. The Chinese military, which has not fought a war since the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979 and is embroiled in corruption scandals, might well suffer defeat. Perhaps China could take on the United States in the economics arena, but China has been unable to react effectively to the ongoing trade war with the United States. CCP elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States. Assumption 2: Key domestic political players want conflict. Most importantly, the CCP elites do not want international conflict, especially one involving the United States. This is not because the CCP elites like the United States, which is still seen by many as an imperial power that supports Japanese militarism and secessionism in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang. However, in Fan’s words, it is important “to deal with domestic issues before pacifying the barbarians” (an nei rang wai). In the eyes of his critics, any foreign adventure would indicate that Xi was getting the priorities wrong and further deviate from Deng’s grand strategy of fostering a favorable foreign environment to promote development. A diversionary conflict is therefore likely to further galvanize Xi’s opposition. In conclusion, the Xi administration’s performance since 2012 has been attacked by a wide range of groups that constitute China’s governing elites; Xi can do little to eliminate rival factions who are waiting for the opportune moment to strike back. Xi is unlikely to be interested in a foreign adventure that would at best distract him from domestic power struggles, and at worst provide more political ammunition for his opponents to use against him. Instead, Xi actually faces a lot of pressure to improve China’s relations with the U.S. in his second term, which could help him deal with his domestic troubles or at least not exacerbate them.

#### Mounting challengers thump OR Xi’s inevitably powerful.

Bloomberg ‘19 --- Singapore/Beijing coverage [Bloomberg, 8-31-2019, "Chinese Communist Party's top leadership to convene in October," Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/08/31/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/chinese-communist-partys-top-leadership-convene-october/#.XW-2yehKh0l]

China is facing greater international push back as U.S. President Donald Trump piles tariffs on the country’s goods in an effort to secure trade concessions. That dispute has exacerbated concerns about the China’s economic slowdown and contributed to diplomatic tensions over pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and American military support for Taiwan. The plenum will be the fourth Central Committee conclave since Xi secured a second term as the party’s general secretary in October 2017. In February 2018, the committee held an additional summit to discuss ending the constitutional provision that barred China’s head of state from serving more than two consecutive terms — paving the way to Xi staying in power indefinitely.

#### Concentration of power AND decline are inevitable.

Cheng ‘19 --- Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation [Dean Cheng, 6-6-2019, "The Perfect Storm Confronting Xi Jinping," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/the-perfect-storm-confronting-xi-jinping]

Entering 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping appeared to be charting a very new path not only for China but for himself. With the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi effectively ended term limits, amending the constitution of the People’s Republic of China to ensure he could remain president indefinitely. Since there are not formal term limits on the position of general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the actual top position of power, nor on the attendant chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, this meant Xi could hold the reins of power for as long as he wished. Xi was now the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping. Not only had Xi overturned Deng’s efforts to ensure orderly and regular transfers of power within the CCP system, he was also ever more clearly abandoning Deng’s famous dictum governing foreign policy: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” This was evidenced in Xi’s willingness to take up the challenge posed by President Donald Trump on U.S.-China trade relations. Whether it was confidence due to his growing domestic strength, a belief that the balance of economic power in the U.S.-China relationship had already shifted, or a concern about appearing weak in front of Trump, Xi seems to have reached the conclusion that China, under his leadership, can successfully challenge the United States. This appears to have been a dangerous miscalculation. Xi may soon find that a perfect storm of agricultural problems, internal unhappiness, and his own chosen hard line on the trade war could undermine the domestic power he has worked so hard to consolidate. Even before the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi had been steadily consolidating power. Since rising to the position of general secretary in 2012, he has become the head of many of the “leading small groups,” which coordinate interactions between the CCP (which sets policy) and the various ministries of the government (which have the bureaucratic means of implementing power). In essence, he has been concentrating power in himself to an extent not seen since Deng, if not Mao Zedong. Xi’s efforts to concentrate power, however, have had the ironic effect of also increasing internal duress. Juliette Genevaz, for example, has noted the impact of divergent national and local economic policies, the anti-corruption campaign, and the crackdown on social media and dissent in elevating pressures on his leadership.

#### At worst, the government spins it – media and censorship.

Chen ‘19 --- Cornell University - Department of Government, Associate Professor [Jessica Chen, 3-7-2019, "How Hawkish Is the Chinese Public? Another Look at “Rising Nationalism” and Chinese Foreign Policy," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2019.1580427]

The Chinese government has also strategically minimized the publicity its propaganda organs have given to foreign actions or incidents that could incite public opinion. The PRC has often chosen to downplay international incidents that could derail U.S.-China relations, including the 2001 EP-3 incident and the 2009 Impeccable incident. Nonetheless, the Chinese government is not able to hide events altogether, particularly when reported by foreign media. As recent research by Molly Roberts suggests, censorship can backfire by encouraging information-seeking. Given the limited efficacy of censorship, the Chinese government often chooses to broadcast but frame international events in a way that casts the government’s actions in a positive light. For example, the international publicity surrounding the October 2015 resumption of US Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea made it difficult for the Chinese government and media not to publicize and denounce US actions in strong terms.

#### No Senkaku impact.

Beauchamp 14 — Zach Beauchamp, Writer for *ThinkProgress* and *Vox*, M.Sc. in international relations from the London School of Economics, 2014 (“Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China,” *ThinkProgress,* February 7th, Accessible Online at <https://thinkprogress.org/why-everyone-needs-to-stop-freaking-out-about-war-with-china-29354eaa709d#.iwfkfwd3p>, Accessed On 09-15-2016)

This is all dramatically overblown. War between China and Japan is more than unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. It’s not that a replay of 1914 is impossible. It’s just deeply, vanishingly unlikely.

Power

One of the easiest ways to evaluate the risks of Sino-Japanese war is by reference to three of the most important factors that shape a government’s decision to go to war: the balance of power, economic incentives, and ideology. These categories roughly correspond to the three dominant theories in modern international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and there’s solid statistical evidence that each of them can play a significant role in how governments think about their decisions to use military force. So let’s take them in turn.

The main source of tension is an East China Sea island chain, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyus in China. While there are other potential flashpoints, the current heightened tensions are centered on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Japan currently controls the islands, but China claims them, and the Chinese military has made increasingly aggressive noises about the islands of late.

But there’s one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for World War I in 1914 — “The War To End All Wars” — would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war’s end would be accomplished by the world’s end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, East Asia’s great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University’s Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the “preemption temptation;” nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands.

That also helps explain why the most commonly-cited Senkaku/Diaoyu spark, accidental escalation, isn’t as likely as many suggest. When The Wall Street Journal’s Andrew Browne writes that there’s a “real risk of an accident leading to a standoff from which leaders in both countries would find it hard to back down in the face of popular nationalist pressure,” he’s not wrong. But it won’t happen just because two planes happen across each other in the sky. In 2013, with tensions running high the whole year, Japan scrambled fighters against Chinese aircraft 433 times.

Indeed, tensions have flared up a number of times throughout the years (often sparked by nationalist activists on side of the other) without managing to bleed over into war. That’s because, as MIT East Asia expert M. Taylor Fravel argues, there are deep strategic reasons why each side is, broadly speaking, OK with the status quo over and above nuclear deterrence. China has an interest in not seeming like an aggressor state in the region, as that’s historically caused other regional powers to put away their differences and line up against it. Japan currently has control over the islands, which would make any strong moves by China seem like an attempt to overthrow the status quo power balance. The United States also has a habit of constructive involvement, subtly reminding both sides when tensions are spiking that the United States — and its rather powerful navy — would prefer that there be no fighting between the two states.

Moreover, the whole idea of “accidental war” is also a little bit confusing. Militaries don’t just start shooting each other by mistake and then decide it’s time to have a war. Rather, an incident that’s truly accidental — say, a Japanese plane firing on a Chinese aircraft in one of the places where their Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) overlap — changes the incentives to go to war, as the governments start to think (perhaps wrongly) that war is inevitable and the only way to win it is to escalate. It’s hard to envision this kind of shift in calculation in East Asia, for all of the aforementioned reasons.

Money

It’s wrong to talk about incentives to go war in purely military terms. A key component of the Senkaku/Diaoyou is economic: the islands contain a ton of natural resources, particularly oil and gas. But far more valuable are the trade ties between the two countries. China is Japan’s largest export market, so war would hurt Japan more than China, but it’d be pretty painful for both.

Proponents of the World War I parallel find a lot to criticize about this point. They like to cite Norman Angell, a pre-World War I international relations theorist famous for arguing that war was becoming economically obsolete. Angell is now often used interchangeably with Dr. Pangloss in international relations talk, a symbol of optimism gone analytically awry.

But Angell gets a bad rap. He didn’t actually say war was impossible; he merely claimed that it no longer was worth the cost (if you remember the aftermath of World War I, he was right about that). The real upshot of Angell’s argument is that, unless there’s some other overwhelming reason to go to war, mutually profitable trade ties will serve as a strong deterrent to war.

Despite a year of heated rhetoric and economic tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, bilateral trade has been recovering nicely of late.

Angell may have been wrong about Europe, but he’s probably right about East Asia. M.G. Koo, a political scientist at Chung-Ang University, surveyed several Senkaku-Diaoyu flareups between 1969 and 2009. He found that economic ties between the two countries played an increasingly large role in defusing tensions as the trade relationship between the two countries deepened.

### 1AR – Straight Turn

#### Straight turn –

#### A---US China war coming now – Interdependence, leadership, and deterrence don’t solve

Layne 20 [CHRISTOPHER LAYNE is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University and the author of the forthcoming book After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. “Coming Storms The Return of Great-Power War,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/coming-storms//lhs-ap]

Since the closing days of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers, pundits, international relations scholars, and policy analysts have argued that great-power war is a relic of a bygone age. In 1986, the historian John Lewis Gaddis termed the post–World War II era a “Long Peace” because the Soviet Union and the United States had not come to blows. A few years later, the political scientist John Mueller suggested that changing norms had made great-power conflict obsolete. By 2011, the psychologist Steven Pinker was arguing that the Long Peace had morphed into a “New Peace,” marked by a generalized decrease of violence in human affairs.

Of course, as evidenced by ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, to name a few, there is currently no shortage of organized armed violence involving smaller countries. Still, given the blood-drenched course of politics since the start of the modern international system in the sixteenth century, the absence of war among great powers since 1945 is striking. That does not mean, however, that these kinds of conflicts are off the table. In fact, despite attempts by academics and politicians to write off great-power war as a real threat, the conditions that make it possible still exist. Tensions persist among today’s great powers—above all the United States and China—and any number of flash points could trigger a conflict between them. These two countries are on a collision course fueled by the dynamics of a power transition and their competition for status and prestige, and without a change in direction, war between them in the coming decades is not only possible but probable.

MISPLACED OPTIMISM

Even as geopolitical competition between the United States and China intensifies, most Americans who think seriously about foreign policy and grand strategy refuse to believe that war is likely. This optimism is primarily rooted in several prominent theories of state behavior. The first is that a high level of economic interdependence between two countries reduces the risk of violent conflict. But history provides many examples to counter this hypothesis. The countries of Europe were never more interdependent—both economically and culturally—than they were just before the outbreak of World War I, and the economies of two of that conflict’s main belligerents, the United Kingdom and Germany, were closely linked. And even if the interdependence of the United States and China might theoretically reduce the risk of war between them, their economic ties have begun to unravel in recent years, as each begins to decouple from the other’s economy.

Skepticism about the prospect of a great-power war also stems from faith in the strength of nuclear deterrence. The risk of mutual assured destruction from a nuclear war surely played a role in preventing the Cold War from turning hot. In recent decades, however, technological advances have weakened this deterrent. The combination of miniaturized, low-yield nuclear warheads and highly accurate delivery systems has made thinkable what once was unthinkable: a “limited” nuclear war, which would not result in apocalyptic destruction.

Finally, other scholars have argued that the so-called liberal international order will preserve peace. In this view, U.S. leadership—through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund—and the spread of the principles of peaceful cooperation now provide regularity and predictability in international conduct. Some, such as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry, optimistically forecast that this order can survive for many decades into the future, notwithstanding China’s rise and the eventual end of U.S. predominance. This assumption, however, is problematic. The order is being challenged not only by changing international dynamics but also by political developments in the countries that have traditionally defended it. In the United States and Europe, the rise of populism and illiberal democracy is a backlash against the current order and the elites who champion and profit from it. As domestic support for the order decreases and the balance of power shifts toward other countries, the system will inevitably become less effective at mediating conflict. Rising powers may also see an opening to revise the structure entirely, raising the likelihood of war.

#### B---Backlash deescalates conflicts

Linus Mattsson 16, Uppsala Universitet Department of Government, Fall 2016, “Unrest as Incentive for Cooperation? The Diversionary Peace Theory, Turkish-Syrian Relations and the Kurdish Conflict,” [http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1067590/FULLTEXT01.pdf](http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2%3A1067590/FULLTEXT01.pdf)

3. Theoretical framework 3.1 Diversionary War theory First, let us look at the founding theory again. The Diversionary war theory, as previously explained, is claimed to be an explanation of the outbreak of war. The theory assumes that in times of domestic turmoil or discontent, leaders initiate conflict in the international arena in order to divert the citizens' attention away from the politically unpopular domestic situation, thus making sure they stay in office. The breakout of a large number of conflicts in history, from the Middle Ages to modern times, has been explained in terms of diversionary use of force. The actions of Napoleon III have been interpreted as frequent uses of diversionary tactics: not only did the Emperor provoke the Crimean war (1852-1856) to “divert the eyes of Frenchmen from their own government's weaknesses” (Blainey, 1988:72), but also the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 has been interpreted in the same way. Perhaps the most well-known example is the RussoJapanese war of 1904. The Russian Interior Minister at that time, Plehve, is cited in the memoirs of Count Witte, Minister of Finance, as saying “you are not familiar with Russia's internal situation. We need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution” (Blainey, 1988:76). The theory has been widely supported and is a long-lived one, appearing long before the established scholarly field of International Relations. Historically, it has been a conventional wisdom on the outbreak of war, based upon a number of ad hoc observations rather than a well-established theoretical scientific hypothesis. As Morgan and Bickers put it: “virtually every war since 1800 has been attributed, at least in part, to efforts of state leaders to deal with domestic problems” (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:27). However, throughout the years, this enigma has become widely researched by political scientists, resulting in a more developed theory. What theoretical arguments do the advocates of the Diversionary War theory rely upon? In summary, the main mechanisms of the DWT have said to be three: The In-group/Out-grouphypothesis or Rally-Round-The-Flag-Effect, Scapegoating and Gambling for Resurrection (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). The first one, the In-group/Out-group theory, or conflict-cohesion theory, originates from the field of sociology and the two sociologists Simmel and Coser. It suggests that identities of a group, in this case national identities, become stronger in times of external threats – that the in-group identity becomes more united during conflicts with the out-group (Levy, 1989:261). The Rally-Round-The-FlagEffect is a consequence of this. Not only does external pressure strengthen the group identities – in addition, it also leads to the group's unification around leader. The tenure of the leader should therefore be extended in times of external crisis (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). However, for the theory to be effective, there are some conditions that should be met: the group has to be fairly salient to begin with, has to already perceive itself as a group and also view the survival of the group as something worthwhile (Levy 1989:261). In addition, Simmel recognized that the outcome of conflict might be of importance: “[War] might either cause domestic quarrels to be forgotten, or might on the contrary aggravate them beyond reconciliation” (Levy, 1989:261). The second mechanism, Scapegoating, means that leaders retort to war to shift the blame of failed policies onto the states enemies (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). This is a consequence of the first theory, implying that leaders are aware of the psychological effect external pressure has on national identity and, in turn, their own tenure. The third mechanism, Gambling for resurrection, stemming from rational choice literature, argues that state leaders who are confronted with a possible loss of power can afford starting a foreign conflict, since their risk of losing office is imminent. If creating a conflict increases their chance of staying in office even by a small percentage, it would be worth it (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:446). Consequently, we should be able to observe the following patterns or mechanisms, according to the theory: When a domestic issue in a state threatens the legitimacy or political power of the ruling elite, said elite should a) be likely to use aggressive foreign policy behaviour as a tool to divert the attention of the public from the domestic issue, since a) the leaders are aware that the people will become more united or nationalistic under such external pressure, b) the people will give more support to the leader leading to c), a return of the popular support of the political elite. However, as already touched upon in the introduction, most of the research in support of the DWT have been either backed up by anecdotal evidence or lack quantitative evidence, which leads to both theoretical and empirical issues. 3.2 The Critiques of Diversionary War Theory The Diversionary War theory has been heavily criticized throughout the years. Only few modern scholars working on the subject ultimately support the initial theory. The main critique against the DWT is that there are insignificant links between the theory and the empirical findings (Levy, 1989:282). The historical and theoretical literature strongly suggests that political leaders should use diversionary force to strengthen their own positions, while the empirical studies, often quantitative, have found little or no support for the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict. The reasons for this are, in summary, two: 1. There might be something wrong with the theory itself. 2. The methodology used (mostly statistical analysis of a large number of states) might not be the right one (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:28). Regarding the theory, the idea that external enemies unite the group might not be as strong as initially thought. As Simmel himself explained, the in-group/out-group theory needs strict conditions to work – one of them is the in-group being fairly small. Thus, extrapolating the concept from small group psychological behaviour into a large, complex entity as modern day states might be difficult (Morgan and Bickers 1992:32). Although commonly treated almost as a general law, some scholars have paid attention to under what circumstances diversionary tactics would be used. The level of internal conflict should matter for the use of diversionary tactics. If the level of internal conflict is too low, aggressive foreign policy should be an exaggerated tool to use. If the level of internal conflict instead is too high, it would not be wise to turn to diversionary tactics. Blainey noted that during open civil war, diversionary use of force is rare since states turn to deal with their internal issue first as a part of its rational calculations (Blainey, 1988:86). In conclusion, we should only be able to observe diversionary actions at the moderate levels of internal strife. Another issue with the Diversionary War theory has to do with the assumptions that it makes regarding the management of conflict (or war). It presumes that war is something that can be easily managed. However, war requires a warring opponent who the state leaders cannot control. The situation is very likely to get out of hand and therefore open conflict should probably be an unlikely goal for leaders who seek to divert the attention of the public. Thus, actions short of war, like escalation of threat of force should be observable (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:29). However, this has also been challenged. Rummel, conducting a study on the link between internal and external conflict upon 77 states between 1955-57 found that “foreign conflict behavior is generally completely unrelated to domestic conflict behavior” (Levy 1989:262). These two facts about the variables give us some clue to why the quantitative studies that have been conducted might fail to produce any results in favor of the DWT. Large scale studies of the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict using correlation analysis and regressions all rely on the assumption that the relationship between the variables should be linear. The problem is that the theory does not imply that this is the case. Rather, the relationship should differ depending on the level of internal strife. There are more clues as to why the large, statistical analyses have failed to produce any results. One reason could be that scholars mainly have focused on correlations rather than offering any explanations through causality. One such scholar is Blainey. In his observations, he finds support for the linkage between civil strife and foreign conflict, but not due to diversionary actions. Instead, a state torn by civil strife often end up in conflict because it is perceived as weakened, and thus easily become a target for other states seeking to exploit the shift in power balance (Blainey 1988:82). It has also been argued that the direction of the relationship between internal and external conflict could be reversed. Foreign conflict could easily lead to internal turmoil and finally revolution at the home front, giving us internalization of external conflict rather than externalization of internal conflict (Levy, 1989:267). However, that this could happen would not per se be a problem for the theory – it is only problematic when the direction of the relationship is unaccounted for, given that there probably should be different casual mechanisms active during externalization and internalization of conflict, which would affect the results. In summary, the biggest obstacle to the research is a common, cumulative theoretical framework. As Levy puts it: “Little attention is given to questions of under what kinds of conditions what kind of states resort to what kinds of external conflict in response to what kinds of threats to the security of political elites” (Levy, 1989:283). 3.3 Diversionary Peace Theory The Diversionary Peace Theory, as put forward by Fravel is an alternative critical engagement with the Diversionary War Theory. In a case study on China and its territorial disputes, he finds that in times of internal turmoil or regime insecurity, China seeks compromises with foreign states, rather than confrontation (Fravel, 2005:47). Internal or domestic turmoil is referred to as regime insecurity. Fravel specifically dwells on social discontent, such as protests and legitimacy crises, and ethnic violence or uprisings. His observations are that when China is in a state of regime insecurity, the state chooses not to escalate any of the territorial conflicts with the neighbouring states. Instead, China seeks cooperation, contrary to what the DWT predicts. Instead of diversion, good relations with foreign state is one key way to solve internal problems, in addition to domestic tools. This is connected to the theoretical concept of Omnibalancing (David, 1991:235), which explains that leaders of third-world countries would be inclined to cooperate with an adversary, if there is an enemy deemed as more threatening. There are several ways leaders could benefit from cooperating with other states to deal with regime insecurity: they can gain direct assistance in dealing with the domestic threat, such as an external state denying rebel groups a harbor, as in Syria harboring Öcalan in our case, or they can improve border patrols. They can avoid a costly two-front war, and focus their resources on the domestic issues instead of the defense budget. Cooperation could also lead to an improvement of the regimes' international recognition, which would delegitimize any domestic contestors (Fravel, 2005:52). According to Fravel, leaders have three strategy options in ongoing disputes: they can delay, i.e. maintain claims to the issue, escalate via threat or use of force, and finally cooperate by dropping claims or offering concessions (Fravel, 2005:52). The least costly alternative is the delaying strategy, whereas escalation is costly due to risk of ending up in a military defeat, and cooperation is costly since it can be perceived as weakness by domestic audiences and lead to a removal from office. However, his argument is that when facing regime insecurity, the cost of the cooperation strategy is significantly lowered, since whatever one might lose on domestic discontent is won through the assistance in dealing with the original threat (Fravel, 2005:53). This is especially true if the threat to the regime emerges in the form of a threat to territorial integrity, which would drastically enhance the incentives to offer concessions to the neighbouring countries to prevent them from aiding events such as uprisings (Fravel 2005:53). This has clear implications for our case. When the armed Kurdish struggle for independence (i.e. a threat to territorial integrity) escalates, Turkey would have strong incentives to cooperate with or give concessions to Syria, an adjacent state that could serve as a base for the rebels. Fravel mainly studies behavior in territorial issues as the main independent variable. In this study, I will broaden this framework and include other contested foreign policy issues as well as long as there is a bargain situation for the two related states where concessions can be made. Although he backs his claims by an empirical study, only some attempt is made by Fravel to theoreticize his findings. He claims it is a “counterintuitive argument about the effects of domestic conflict on foreign policy” (Fravel, 2005:49). He does elaborate on why states would chose to cooperate, but does not offer any deeper explanation of the intervening variables in action. However, we can draw some theoretical conclusions from Fravel's observations and thoughts. First, we assume that leaders are rational. They would, in times of a crisis, assess the problem, identify possible courses of action and then choose the alternative that is most effective. By assuming this, we can draw the conclusion that leaders do not engage in a new conflict simply because the conflict is not manageable. The logic of the DWT is that leaders can control new conflicts – otherwise they would not be able to initiate them in order to divert attention. For Fravel, in contrast, leaders choose to focus on what they can control, which leads to cooperation rather than war. Secondly, we can assume that conflict is costly. The resources of the state might be too scarce to manage two crises. Therefore, it is not rational to engage in a new, foreign conflict before the domestic one is solved.

# 2AR

## 2AR

## Case

### 2AR – Incommensurability

#### Vote affirmative to endorse BIPOC futurisms that embrace the swarm as a form of becoming insect and rejection of heteronormativity – we envision the future not as drone swarms appropriated by the military but rather swarms of black and brown folks who shed the category of the human in favor of a network of communication and cooperation that combines knowledge to envision new utopian futures like the alternative that have disassembled settler structures

### 2AR – AI Impact turn

#### Dropped impact turn to AI on the case page - incorporation of the AI makes war no longer about masculinity but rather technological prowess – that queers the military and creates a murderous inclusion whereby the United states can point to inclusiveness as superior to savage muslim states

#### That impact of Homonationalism outweighs - creates widespread islamophobia and wars of intervention to correct the ways of black and brown folx

## T

#### Spec is inevitable because the aff can read a plan and the neg can read a pic – infinite weapon affs also means infinite weapons the neg can pic out of – The debate is no longer a question of whether or not spec is good bad but rather whether it’s better in the 1AC or the 1NC

#### 1 - The neg has other offs like heg da, terror da, ai innovation disad, casualties da, setcolk , IR k’s including topic specific arms control, phil nc’s which means they can always react but the 1AR restart to the pic is impossible because it moots the 1AC and there’s no unifying ground vs. these weapons proven by the 1NC caselist

#### 2 - There’s no universal advantage area which means it’s impossible to answer every single pic

#### 3 - It’s late breaking – Specifying in the 1NC makes debates late breaking and less developed as oppossed to spec in the 1AC

#### 4 - Time skew – the Neg has 7 minutes to read a specific case neg versus an aff but the 1AR has only 4 minutes PLUS it’s split between flows

#### It’s not potential abuse but rather about the structural incentive to read more pics

#### Reading 1ar theory is obviously terrible because it means every round comes down to theory AND the 2nr can just dump for 6 minutes to justify the pic being good