# 1AC

#### The technical rationalization of education policy has entrenched social and economic inequality and cemented political passivity – the totalization of calculative metaphysics subverts deliberative politics and enrolls students in an abhorrent process of endless economic commodification

Notes – blue highlighting = direct connection to debate, etc

* Ptx/policy = about normative values/prioritization of values
* Standards/accountability are presented as technical efficiency, NOT values –
	+ neolib disavows ptcl nature
	+ framing through econ terms
	+ notions of intl comp/econ dominance
	+ link of edu/econ success
* these neoliberal practices undermine democracy of edu
* depoliticizes edu
	+ **naturalizes dominant ptcl thinking**
	+ obstructs considering socioecon factors that impact edu achievement
	+ edu as democratic 🡪 technical production process of means/end logic – “what works” – **at: skills** – also potentially - ToC
* inequality = invisible w/ standardized testing
* **instrumental discourse – current education**: nation-centric education policy discussions, utilitarian values
	+ retreat from ptx – reduced to technical/means end
* **communicative rationality – current debate**: super good fwk answer – attempt to achieve human rationality through consensus
	+ causes – hegemonic exclusion of constitutive outside
	+ also causes – denial of the political:

‘the refusal to acknowledge that society is always hegemonically constituted through a certain structure of power relations leads to accepting the existing hegemony and remaining trapped within its configuration of forces’ (2005, p. 63). The result is a denial of the political, in the sense of antagonistic debate, often leading to the disenchantment and disengagement with politics characteristic of our times.

* Modern discourse in schools (incl. debate) discussion of best technical solutions for achieving predetermined ends
* At expense of debate about critical questions/concepts.
* Instrumental aligns edu w imperatives of market – naturalizes edu as technical/instrumental rather than political –
	+ Policy debate = attempt to gain marketable skills that are “intrinsic goods” w/o questioning nature of skills
	+ AT: skills for *activism* – sure, but underlying motives of debate = get into good school, learn to do econ comparison, evaluate technical solutions – differentiation between skills to do something and motives to do something
	+ K debate = discussion of morals – evaluate your beleifs/question dominant structures/understandandings – that’s a prereq to their model bc it creates **incentive**for activism
* **debate must challenge** hegemonic ideas of values
* alternative views of debate prereq to renovating edu policy

Clarke 13 – Matthew Clarke is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Education at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. The (absent) politics of neo-liberal education policy, Critical Studies in Education Vol. 53, No. 3, October 2012, 297–310, msm

Introduction The relationship between policy and politics is marked by mutual imbrications (Ball, 1990; Dale, 1989) and reflects a shared etymology. As Codd argues, 'fundamentally, policy is about the exercise of political power and the language that is used to legitimate that process' (1988, p. 235). Both politics and policy are normative, rather than merely technical domains, in that each is concerned with values — their formulation, institution, reproduction and contestation. But whereas policy concerns 'the authoritative allocation of values' (Easton, 1953), politics concerns the process of prioritising those values (Strath, 2005). The inseparability of educational policy and politics stems from the social and economic value attaching to education and the inevitable requirement, given finite resources, to make decisions regarding its allocation. Yet, contemporary neo-liberal discourses, for example, those around issues of standards and accountability, are typically presented by politicians and policymakers as matters of technical efficiency rather than normative choices. As a consequence, their political nature, including the deep implication of these discourses with issues of sociopolitical power, is effectively backgrounded. My aim in this article is to examine some of the strategies through which this shift from the political to the technical is achieved, using the Australian 'education revolution' as a case study, and to consider possibilities for reinserting politics. The assertion that education policy has been reduced to a technical discourse is in itself not new. Writing over two decades ago, Shapiro (1990, p. 13) made the following, by now all too familiar, observation in relation to the educational pronouncements of Democratic candidates in the 1984 and 1988 US elections: Notions of quantifiable results, demonstrable competencies, the search for verifiable and empirical criteria for judging excellence (of students and teachers), an emphasis on performance and discrete skills —these permeated all the candidates' statements. There was a strongly shared desire to assimilate the process of schooling to the forms and methods of technology . . . to shape teaching and knowledge to a technical discourse. Since Shapiro wrote these words, the educational policy arena has been subject to the full onslaught of neo-liberal political intervention in the form of marketisation, privatisation, standardisation and accountability measures. Yet, although the assertion of the political nature of education policy may seem obvious to many readers, my argument here is that, despite its ideological saturation, contemporary neo-liberalism in education disavows its political nature in a number of ways. It does so, most notably, by refraining political issues in economic terms through processes of commodification and by assuming and promoting a broad consensus in relation to this economising agenda — in each case, backgrounding the struggle over values central to both policy and politics. Contemporary neo-liberal policy tendencies thus simultaneously undermine the democratic potential of education, posing the challenge for educators, in many ways a 'captive' profession (Reilly, 1996), and edu-cation policy analysts, of how to resist 'the process of de-politicisation of policy-making, the erasure of ideology, and the legitimisation of common sense' (Pykett, 2007, p. 307) and reinsert the political into policy debates. In what follows, I will illustrate this depoliticisation at work in neo-liberal education policy, using Australia's education revolution as an example. I will then take up the issues this example raises in a broader discussion of the nature of politics in education policy, drawing on the key distinction made by Mouffe (2000, 2005) and others between 'politics' and 'the political' in order to argue that a focus on the latter is key to renovating the absent politics of neo-liberal education policy. Depoliticisation and the performative production of the education revolution A key policy agenda of the Australian Federal Labor government since their election in 2007, after 11 years of Liberal (conservative) government, has been the so-called 'edu-cation revolution', announced in the 2008 policy manifesto, Quality education: The case for an education revolution in our schools' (Rudd & Gillard, 2008). As is evident in its design, including features such as the setting of the text against a deep red background and the choice of the somewhat dramatic term 'revolution', Quality Education is clearly a 'symbolic' (Privity, 1984, p. 5) policy document. Indeed, its deployment of the term 'revolution' can be read as an attempt to reference a wider social democratic tradition, while also suggesting a radical and dramatic shift in policy and practice. This conceit of new policies representing a clean break with the past is reiterated in subsequent pub-lic policy pronouncements making reference to the education revolution. For example, in a 2010 speech the then education minister and current Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, argued, 'As Australians we have an obligation to the future, an obligation to ensure the Australian school students of today and tomorrow each get a world class education .. . Through the Education Revolution, as a nation we are fatally shouldering that obligation and making progress' (Gillard, 2010a, emphasis added). The revolution trope also features prominently in the titles of a number of speeches (e.g. Gillard, 2008a, 2010a), while the 'clean break' theme can be found in the titles of media releases relating to the My School website,2 My School website to provide unprecedented school performance data (Garrett & Gillard, 2010) and My School 2.0 delivers a new era of school transparency (Garrett & Gillard, 2011). The use of such speeches and media announcements for the dissemina-tion, promotion and 'spinning' of policy (Gewirtz, Dickson, & Power, 2004), in addition to reflecting the increasing mediatisation of education policy (Lingard & Rawolle, 2004; Wallace, 1993), creates the space in which a high profile policy like the education revolu-tion can be (re)iterated, (re)cited and (re)performed. The result is that these rhetorical media acts to a large extent produce the very thing they claim to describe — politics via packaging rather than sustained debate (Franklin, 2004a, 2004b). But aside from its rhetorical and performative dimensions, what of the substantive content of the education revolution: in what ways is this also depoliticising? Depoitticisation and the substantive content of the education revolution The policy document, Quality Education, makes numerous references to the unprece-dented competitive global economic climate confronting Australia and the consequent need to reform Australian education. The following from the ministerial foreword to Quality Education (p. 5) is typical in this regard: Australia faces significant challenges to its social and economic environment though an aging population and increasing international competition. The nation must invest in developing a world class education system and drive development of a workforce that is highly skilled, flexible and adaptable in responding to increasing global competition for skills. Notions such as 'the tough reality of international competition' and the dominance of an economic agenda in general are stated categorically as matters of incontrovertible fact. Yet, as Steger (2008, p. 187) notes, 'public policy based on economic inevitability appears to be above politics', while simultaneously facilitating the political project of increasing the penetration and entrenchment of market modalities in all domains of society by inter-weaving ideological prescriptions with 'factual' explanations. This imperative modality reoccurs elsewhere in Quality Education, for example, page 35 emphasises the need to build a 'world-class' education system 'ready to face the challenges of a globally compet-itive world', while the conclusion reminds us of the 'fact' that 'as other countries continue to advance, we cannot afford to delay' (p. 36). This message is repeated in subsequent media announcements and speeches: as one example, in a speech in March 2010 to the Independent Education Union, Minister for Education, Julia Gillard (2010b), argued: The education revolution is about offering the best opportunities Australia can provide. But in the global village in which we live there is also a tough reality. The tough reality of international competition. A reality which gives us a moment of pause. A moment in which to ask in which areas do we really achieve a world class standards? The references to 'the global village', 'the tough reality of international competition' and the need to achieve 'world-class standards' reflect the powerful influence of the global imaginary on education policy (Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). But it is worth noting that the anx-ieties expressed here have surfaced regularly in times of socio-economic change or turmoil, both in Australia and in other international contexts, as reflected, for example, in the debate surrounding A Nation at Risk in the United States (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). Indeed, such anxieties are inherent to the competitive nation-building aims of modern state education systems (Green, 1990). Against the background of this dis-course of tough global economic competition, the promise of the education revolution to offer 'the best opportunities Australia can provide' suggests an unproblematic link between education and individual economic success, reflecting the hegemonic penetration of human capital theory in education and ignoring the positional, rather than purely substantive, nature of educational qualifications (Marginson, 1997; Wolf, 2002). It is important to note that a concern with the instrumental in education is not new or unique to neo-liberalism. As long ago as 1864, Herbert Spencer lamented 'the truth that with the mind as with the body the ornamental precedes the useful' and decried the Cinderella-like position of science in education, 'kept in the background that her haughty sisters might flaunt their fripperies in the eyes of the world' (1864, pp. 25 and 96). Concern with the economic imperatives of education was heightened in the attenuath of the Second World War (e.g. Halsey, Lauder, Brown, & Wells, 1961), receiving a further boost from human capital theory in the 1960s and becoming hegemonic from the 1980s onwards as education, like many other domains of life, came under the auspices of neo-liberalism's master signifier, the market. But importantly for the purposes of this article, neo-liberalism's augmentation of the instrumentalisation of education is also symptomatic of a wider shift in the relationship between the neo-liberal state and its citizens, one which 'has become less a political relationship — that is, a relationship between government and citizens who, together, are concerned about the common good — and more an economic relationship — that is, a rela-tionship between the state as provider and the taxpayer as consumer of public services' (Biesta, 2010, pp. 53-54). As Biesta goes on to argue, this pattern reflects the wider ero-sion of the political in contemporary neo-liberal society: 'Not only can it be argued that the relationship between the state and its citizens has been depoliticized. One could even argue that the sphere of the political itself has been eroded' (2010, p. 54). The instrumental conception of education evident in the education revolution relies on another key component of neo-liberal education policy, a logic of competition whereby students, teachers, schools and education systems are evaluated and compared in the belief that such a competition will improve the performance of all. In this vein, Quality Education asserts, 'there is good evidence, primarily from the United States and the OECD's Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), that the publication of school-level test scores tends to improve the performance of all schools' (p. 31). Yet, there are good rea-sons to query whether high-stakes testing and the publication of test results are forces for democratic openness as they claimed to be. Aside from the reduction of educational excellence to test scores (as if teachers and schools were previously unable to monitor and assess student progress), with its constraining effects on professional trust and collabora-tive relationships (Carless, 2009), and its narrowing effects on curriculum and pedagogy (Alexander, 2009; Au, 2009; Hursh, 2008; Stobart, 2008), competition is depoliticising insofar as it naturalises the current forms and content that are at stake in the game of education. In the process, it occludes wider structural and socio-economic factors that impact on educational achievement (Hyslop-Margison & Sears, 2006). Instrumentalism is thus linked to another tendency in neo-liberal education policy, a shift towards individuation or atomisation, whereby educational institutions and agents are viewed as isolated and distinct elements, with little or no recognition of how they also comprise larger systems or structures, or of how the meaning of each can only be understood in relation to that larger whole. This individualisation is evident in the frequent lack of recognition of the key role of context in understanding the work of individuals. For example, the Australian government's aim 'to ensure high-performing teachers and principals are working in those schools where they are needed and where they can have the biggest effect' (Rudd & Gillard, 2008, p. 23) assumes that outstanding teachers' per-formance is a purely individual achievement and that they can therefore perform equally well in any situation. This neo-liberal world of self-entrepreneurial individuals is also evi-dent in the policy intention to offer 'rewards for great teachers' (Garrett, 2011), which again assumes that individuals alone account for excellence and ignores material factors, such as resources, as well as less tangible factors, such as school ethos, all of which may play a significant role in individuals' performances. Such individualisation resonates with Wendy Brown's argument that 'no matter its particular form and mechanics, depoliti-cization always eschews power and history in the representation of its subject' (2006, p. 15). So far my analysis has focused on the instrumentalism at work in the education revolu-tion and has argued that an instrumental discourse, linked with and reinforced by discourses of competition and individualisation, has been part of a broader displacement of political questions by economic considerations. In this scenario, any idea of education as a public responsibility and site of democratic and ethical practice is replaced by education as a production process, a site of technical practice and a private commodity governed by a means/end logic - summed up, again, in that supremely techno-managerial question - 'what works?'. (Fielding & Moss, 2011, pp. 23-24) But this apolitical instrumental discourse is complemented and supported by another dis-course - which I shall refer to as the consensual discourse - that privileges consensus over contestation. We can see this discourse at work in a brief section of Quality Education on `What schooling needs to deliver for Australia'. In a key passage, the document asserts 'the need to move beyond an education debate that, until now, has been overwhelmingly focused on inputs rather than student outcomes and has been run along sectoral lines' and states that 'all governments acknowledge that we cannot hope to achieve the ambitious COAG3 schooling outcomes and targets unless we put this stale debate behind us' (Rudd & Gillard, 2008, p. 33). For those unfamiliar with the peculiarities of school funding in Australia this may seem rather cryptic, but the reference is to ongoing debates around the funding of the government, Catholic and independent school sectors. The details of this debate need not detain us here; the key point in terms of this article is the discursive work being done to promote and achieve consensus and pre-empt antagonistic debate - something we are urged to 'move beyond' and to 'put [this stale debate] behind us'. Further evidence of this resistance to antagonistic debate is offered by a speech from June 2008, in which the then education minister and current Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, notes 'over the last decade in Australia, the focus of the schooling debate has been the competitive relationship between government and non-government schools' (Gillard, 2008b). She goes on to state that the government supports the right of parents to choose a school for their children. We believe that diverse provision is needed to meet the needs of a diverse and growing population. But we reject the proposition that there is a conflict between diversity and universal excellence. (Gillard, 20086) In other words, there is only difference and diversity, not disadvantage. The refusal to encounter the possibility that some differences may be linked to systemic inequalities and structural disadvantages, and the belief that choice and diversity are the keys to social justice, all bears out Laclau's (2005, p. 78) comments about how neo-liberalism, under-pinned by the magic of the market — something evident in Gillard's emphasis on the right to choose — 'presents itself as a panacea for a fissureless society'. Resistance to any framing of education in Australia in terms of an antagonistic divide between advantage and disadvantage was taken up by the then education minister in another speech the following month: Let's not pretend to ourselves or to each other that our education system can be simply broken down into two groups with a disadvantaged public sector on one side and a highly resourced non-government sector on the other ... I specifically reject the proposition that the only way to debate differential need in our school system is through the prism of the public/private divide . . . I specifically reject the proposition that every difference in educational attainment in this country is explained by differences in the socio-economic status, broadly defined, of the students. The debate we need to be having is not a sterile debate about public versus private. Instead it should be a rich new debate in which we wrestle with and then resolve the question of how to measure the needs of the children in each school and each community across this country. (Gillard, 2008a) In addition to offering a classic case of setting up straw targets — those wishing to debate issues of the public/private sectors in Australian schooling are not necessarily saying that this is the sole explanation of any and all problems in Australian education — the line of argument sets up a false dichotomy between, on the one hand, viewing all education issues through a prism of public/private, disadvantaged/advantaged and, on the other hand, dis-counting these divisions entirely so as to focus on 'the needs of the children in each school'. The excluded middle ground that most critics of recent education policy in Australia would wish to occupy recognises issues of systemic social disadvantage as factors that need to be taken into account in concert with a number of other issues in debating equity in education. Gillard's strategy, evidenced here, of rejecting an antagonistic divide by pro-moting a consensus around the need to focus on individuals, is a prime example of the depoliticisation that Wendy Brown identifies as endemic to contemporary liberal democra-cies; such depoliticisation 'involves construing inequality, subordination, narginalization, and social conflict, which all require political analysis and political solutions, as personal and individual, on the one hand, or as natural, religious, or cultural on the other' (2006, p. 15). Gillard's consensual position, in urging a focus on 'the needs of the children in each school', resists any acknowledgement of the role of systemic or structural factors, such as social inequality, and hence works to disavow the political. Another classic instance of consensualism is found in the education revolution agenda to 'simultaneously deliver equity and excellence in our schools', an agenda that 'can only be achieved, however, with the concerted and united national effort that focuses on improving the productivity of all Australian schools' (Rudd & Gillard, 2008, p. 35). But aside from the consensualism, evident in the emphasis on all parties singing from the same song sheet, and the instrumentalism embodied in the characterisation of schools as a locus of improved productivity, this statement is worth noting as an illustration of the operation of fantasy —in the Lacanian sense — in education policy. As the notion of fantasy in this theorisation is somewhat different from the everyday meaning of the term fantasy, a brief explanation is in order. In everyday parlance, fantasy refers to illusory or wishful thinking. The Lacanian sense is subtly different in that 'fantasy is not the opposite of reality: it is what plugs the void in our being so that the set of fictions we call reality is able to emerge' (Eagleton, 2001, p. 41). The void that Eagleton refers to here is captured by the notion of 'lack', which is axiomatics to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. This fundamental lack is deemed to arise from the earliest ffickerings of our recognition of the distinctness of our individual being, our separateness in relation to the (m)other, prior to which we 'enjoyed' a state of harmo-nious fullness and unity with existence. This experience of alienation is redoubled on our entry into the symbolic system of language, within which we become placeholders in a sys-tem that precedes and exceeds our individual being. Within this theorisation, we incessantly seek to recapture the enjoyment — or jouissance — that characterised our preindividuated existence. Fantasy arises as the vehicle of potential amelioration of this alienation or lack, by offering an explanation for why our enjoyment is missing: for example, we could be meeting our teaching goals and getting satisfaction in our job, if only our students were not so demanding, or if only there was not so much administrative work to do and so forth. It thus holds out the promise of a harmonious, full and complete mode of existence — that is, the 'set of fictions' referred to by Eagleton. As Jodi Dean puts it 'what is crucial . . . is the way the fantasy keeps open the possibility of enjoyment by telling us why we are not really enjoying' (2006, p. 12). There is a clear parallel here between the endless but futile search for fantasmatic ful-filment and the ontological impossibility of ultimate 'closure' in Laclau and Mouffe's hegemony theory (2001), arising from the in-eliminable gap between discourse and the social reality it purports to capture. Indeed, Lacanian theorisations of the role of fantasy in politics can be read as a species within the wider genus of hegemony theory (Glynos, 2001). Just as fantasy sustains desire, so 'it is because our symbolic representations of soci-ety are constitutively lacking that politico-hegemonic struggle is made possible' (Glynos, 2001, p. 197). In this sense, fantasy and hegemony both serve to conceal the partial, contin-gent and constructed nature of what is taken for social reality and work to smooth over the inevitable contradictions, dislocations and antagonisms in the latter in favour of presenting a holistic vision of social harmony and consensus. Returning to the Australian federal government's agenda to 'simultaneously deliver equity and excellence in our schools', what seems to be overlooked in this fantasmatic vision is that the means of achieving quality — through the market-oriented policies of choice and managerialist-oriented performativity, and accountability policies grounded in instnunentalisation, competition and atomisation — are fundamentally at odds with the desired end of equity. As Savage recently noted in the context of Australian neoliberal education policies, 'the social capitalist political-educational imagination of schools as excellent and equitable learning communities is difficult to take seriously when infused into the architecture of a globalising education system (and society) that is deeply stratified and structured to economise and discriminate between individuals in line with performance hierarchies' (2011, pp. 55-56).6 This sort of neat resolution of the seemingly paradoxical is one indicator of the fantasmatic realm, since 'fantasies seek directly to conjure up —or at least presuppose — an impossible union between incompatible elements' (Glynos & Howarth, 2007, p. 147). Such fantasies also serve to decontest and hence depoliticise both equity and quality by harmonising all potential discord between them and hence draining them of any sociopolitical tension. We can also see the operation of fantasy-supported consensualism as a mode of depoliticisation in relation to the framing of teachers' work in the education revolution. Particularly, fantasmatic is the way teachers are positioned as the lynchpin of educational reform, student success and national competitiveness. Thus, in a passage on 'High Quality Teaching in All Schools', Quality Education asserts: It is well established that teacher quality is the single greatest in-school influence on student engagement and results. In addition evidence indicates that improving the quality of the teach-ing workforce is fundamental to any overall improvements in schooling. The impact of teaching is cumulative— a poor-quality teacher not only imparts less knowledge for the period they teach the student, but can leave the student worse off when they later attempt higher levels of work. The 2007 McKinsey report, which identified features common to the world's top-performing school systems, argues that the quality of an education system simply cannot exceed the qual-ity of its teachers and that the only way to improve outcomes is to improve instruction. (Rudd & Gillard, 2008, p. 21) Consensus is claimed in the opening assertion of 'well-established' truth regarding the pivotal position of teachers. But aside from the attempt at bracketing out factors like the socio-economic status of students by restricting the claim to 'in-school' influences — as if the in-school and out-of-school contexts could be neatly separated (cf. Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009) — this statement is worth noting as a classic instance of the 'discourse of teacher centrality' (Larsen, 2010). This discourse is underpinned by a fantasmatic element organised around a beatific, salvation narrative, whereby quality teachers and teaching will ensure the future success of all students. In parallel, education is positioned as the source of salvation for society, providing indispensible social and economic benefits — an implicit if unintended meaning implied in the very notion of an education revolution. The overall consequence, as the role of wider societal inequality in socio-economic and educational success is rendered invisible and irrelevant, is to add to the broader depoliticisation of education that is the focus of this article. Thus far, I have examined some of the ways in which Australia's education revolution as a policy agenda has inherently depoliticising tendencies and that these tendencies can be seen reflected in, and to a large extent are the result of, its structuring in terms of discourses of instrumentalism and consensualism. But in order to take my argument further, and thereby shine additional light on the workings of the education revolution as an instance of neo-liberal education policy, I need to locate the points made thus far within a broader discussion of politics and the nature of the political. On the political This 'neo'liberalism is usually presented not as a particular set of interests and political interventions, but as a kind of non-politics — a way of being reasonable, and of promoting universally desirable forms of economic expansion and democratic government around the globe. Who could be against greater wealth and more democracy? (Duggan, 2003, p. 10) In this section, I want to pick on some of the themes in the preceding discussion and link them to a broader consideration of the notion of 'the political' and what this implies for the presence/absence of politics in contemporary education policy. As an initial observation, it is worth noting that the late capitalist society has been characterised by an eschatolog-ical tendency, evident in proclamations of the 'end of history' or the 'triumph of liberal democracy'. Yet, despite what we might describe as late capitalism's penchant for prema-ture closure — what Mouffe describes as the contemporary 'post-political zeitgeist' (Mouffe, 2005, p. 8) and what Ranciere refers to as `postdemocracy' (1999, p. 95) — 'the project of a critical theory of democracy in late capitalist societies remains as relevant as ever' (Fraser, 1997, p. 69). It is useful at this point to highlight the distinction made by Connolly (1995) and Mouffe (2000, 2005), drawing on Heidegger's ontological/ontical distinction, between the onto-logical notion of 'the political' and the ontological notion of 'politics'. Whereas the former involves philosophical questions about the nature or essence of the political domain as such, the latter is concerned with the former's manifestations in procedures, practices and institutions. Mouffe goes on to argue that, despite the pervasive presence of politics in the media, contemporary late capitalist society lacks an adequate definition of the political in the sense of an arena of antagonism over fundamental questions regarding the nature of society. She argues that this in turn is the result of the dominance of, on the one hand, eco-nomic discourses and, on the other hand, moral discourses — moral in the sense of censuring the economic discourses and transcending their concern with utility in favour of interest-free, communicative rationality. In the following discussion, I shall refer to these as the instrumental and the consensual discourses. The dominance of instrumental discourses is clearly visible in neo-liberalism, which has also been described as economic rationalism. As we have seen in the preceding dis-cussion, the manifestations of instrumental discourses are evident in neo-liberal education policy, with its emphasis on utilitarian values as the philosophy underpinning the framing of nation-centric education policy. And of course, Australia is by no means unique in the subordination of education policy to utilitarian economic concerns. As Ranciere notes, 'the absolute identification of politics with the management of capital is no longer the shameful secret hidden behind the "forms" of democracy; it is the openly declared truth by which our governments acquire legitimacy' (1999, p. 113). Such a perspective reduces the political to the mere technical and ignores the political creation, as opposed to natural origins, of the 'free market' and other elements of the contemporary global economic system (Chang, 2010; Monck, 2005; see also Polanyi, 1944). It thus represents a retreat from politics. By contrast, the discourse of communicative rationality — evident in the work of thinkers like Habennas, Rorty and Giddens, and in 'third way' notions of 'beyond left and right' —seeks to displace, or at least temper, the instrumentalism of neo-liberalism with a deliberative and consensual political realm informed by free and rational discussion. What this consensual approach fails to recognise is that meaning is always relational, or differential, in the sense that it works through differences (e.g. 'good' is defined in relation to 'evil' rather than through purely positive meaning — content; cf. Howarth, 2000; Torfing, 1999), and that the establishment of any consensus relies on the hegemonic exclusion of its 'constitutive outside', upon which the consensual viewpoint relies to define itself. It is with this point in mind that Laclau declares the impossibility of society, that is, the logical impossibility of constituting the social but through a process of inclusion and exclusion (Laclau, 1983). This has conservative implications, for as Mouffe notes, 'the refusal to acknowledge that society is always hegemonically constituted through a certain structure of power relations leads to accepting the existing hegemony and remaining trapped within its configuration of forces' (2005, p. 63). The result is a denial of the political, in the sense of antagonistic debate, often leading to the disenchantment and disengagement with politics characteristic of our times. Consensus politics is also rejected by Ranciere, for whom the political is understood in terms of a fundamental collision between two processes. The first of these is the 'police' process, which refers, not to the state's law enforcement apparatus, but rather to the sed-imentation and naturalisation of particular distributions of roles, resources, spaces and places that define the visible, thinkable and sayable (Ranciere, 1999, p. 29). The second process is 'politics', a term Ranciere reserves for 'the open set of practices driven by the assumption of equality between any and every speaking being and by the concern to test this equality' (Ranciere, 1999, p. 30). The emphasis Rancilre places on the role of antag-onism between the conservative tendencies of the police process and the radicalising and disruptive thrust of politics means that for him a term like 'consensus democracy' is a con-tradiction in terms. Like Mouffe, Ranciere is deeply sceptical about consensus — which he describes as 'a catchword for our times' (RanciIre, 2010, p. 188) — arguing that 'it defines a mode of symbolic structuration of the community that evacuates the political core consti-tuting it, namely dissensus' (Ranciere, 2010, p. 188). Critically, for Ranciire, the political properly understood is constituted by difference and division: Apolitical community is in effect a community that is structurally divided, not between diver-gent interest groups and opinions, but divided in relation to itself. A political 'people' is never the same thing as the sum of a population. It is always a form of supplementary symboliza-tion in relation to any counting of the population and its parts. (Ranciere, 2010, pp. 188-189, emphasis in original) Although the consensual discourse may have arisen as a reaction to the perceived reduc-tiveness of the instrumental discourse,' we can nonetheless recognise the operation of both the instrumental and the consensual discourses in current education `policyscapes'. Indeed, the two discourses operate as a form of discursive duopoly, each supporting and reinforcing the other, reflected in the global nature of the consensus around the instrumental purposes of education (Hyslop-Margison & Sears, 2006; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010), as governments engage in policy borrowing (Finegold, McFarland, & Richardson, 1993; Lingard, 2010), as international tests like PISA increasingly shape policy in a number of countries (Grek, 2009) and as pervasive performativity and accountability regimes narrow conceptualisations of what it means to teach, learn and be educated (Alexander, 2009; Au, 2009; Biesta, 2010; Hursh, 2008; Moore, 2004; Stobart, 2008; Taubman, 2009). The task of renovating the political in educational policy discourses thus assumes a degree of urgency. The following section sketches out some initial steps than might be taken in this direction. Conclusion: repoliticising education policy/traversing the economic fantasy Our contention is that the political and ethical have been drained out of public discourse on education and schools: the discourse is reduced to discussion of the best technical solutions for achieving predetermined and self-evident ends at the expense, at the expense of debate about critical questions, purposes, values and understandings or concepts. But the draining of politics is political. (Fielding & Moss, 2011, p. 21, emphasis in original) My claim is not that economics has replaced politics on the neo-liberal stage. This would itself be too neo-liberal a claim. Rather, I am suggesting that there is an insistence within current discourse upon the separation between economics and politics itself, a separation that seeks to withdraw political stakes — that is, the presupposition of equality — from the economic realm and from economic struggle (May, 2011, p. 148). Using Australia's education revolution as a case in point, this discussion in this article adds support to Fielding and Moss's contention that a central effect of recent education policy directions has been to depoliticise education policy itself. This depoliticisation has been effected through a disavowal of both its own politics and of the inherently political nature of education policy. More specifically, I have argued that this depoliticisation work has been accomplished through a dominant discourse of instrumentalisation, underpinned by mutually reinforcing discourses of competition and atomisation that, as May notes, is seen as something separate to politics. This instrumental discourse has worked to align education with the imperatives of the market and managerial technologies of performativity, thereby naturalising a view of education as a technical, instrumental, rather than inescapably political, enterprise. I have also argued that the establishment and reproduction of this instrumentalism are supported by a consensual discourse, which resists reading the educational space in terms of social or political antagonism, with the consequence that the constitutive outside of consensus, that is, dissensus, is rendered unreadable and unthink-able. Underpinning this instrumental consensus are a number of fantasies — of the salvation of the harmonious and exponentially prosperous nation state through education — which go some way to account for the affective 'grip' of what I have referred to as the contemporary instrumental and consensual duopoly. One line of critical work for those who would challenge the depoliticisation effected by this duopoly is to name and confront the economic and political fantasies (what 2ilek (1989, p. 65), following Lacan, refers to as 'traversing' the fantasy) underpinning neo-liberal education policies at any and every opportunity. One way in which myself and some of my colleagues are attempting to pursue this line of work is by drawing pre-service teach-ers' attention to the contested and political nature of education, contrasting this view with the emphasis on teaching as an individual and technical craft implicit in the contemporary teaching standards movement. Such work needs to challenge a number of hegemonic ideas; for instance, that increased productivity should be our ultimate social and educational purpose; that the necessity of increased productivity is a reflection of economic reality rather than a political assertion; that increased accountability, rather than increased trust, is the key to educational excellence; that educational excellence achieved though a combination of managerial accountability mechanisms and market-oriented notions of choice is compat-ible with equity; that increased overall wealth benefits everyone in society; that there is no tension between the interests of individuals and that these can be unproblematically aggre-gated into some notion of overall social well-being; and that uncompromising support for the interests of the already advantaged in society can be reconciled with equity and social justice. To confront the contemporary policy consensus around these 'truths' and instead to advocate for a properly political — that is, one based on antagonistic debate between genuine alternatives — view of education is a vital step in the critical task of renovating the increasingly absent politics of education policy. The democratic potential of education deserves nothing less.

#### This is a neoliberal tactic of parasitic violence that stems from the western injunction to metaphysically manipulate the globe – the role of critical educators is to foster creative alternative futures outside the bounds of the dehumanization of commodity fetishism

* School functions as – you need skill x to get skill y to get skill z to get skill a… all the way until skills are just replaced by work
	+ econ conception
	+ students = commodities
	+ needs are those of capitalism
* schools = complicit w capitalism
* pedagogical project must be anti-capitalist
* everything is solely a function of exchange value, not use value – use value is fetishized
* utility =/= natural – rather, construct of social realities
* western knowledge limits worth of edu – edu is only marketeable skills/etc
* assumptions of edu – those of social norms – oppresses students who do not come to school w/ same experience/knowedge of oppressor class
* school determines students’ lives – oppressive ways that uses need to legitimize itself
* students = nothing but consumers of knowledge
	+ quantified to gauge worth
	+ satisfy needs of state
	+ ensure there is always a workforce to maintain heg
* no social mobility – school trains u to be subservient – vicious cycle
* ability to imagine realities outside of capitalism = ev of working class creativity – that creativity must be starting point to reconceptualize needs of students
* task as critical intellectuals = name complex forces of cap to reveal conflicts/weak spots w/in order

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The needs of students are often used as justification for actions in schools and in school policy. The concept of needs, however, and the role that the formulation of needs currently plays in the maintenance and reproduction of capitalism in schools is woefully under theorized in the field of education. While this claim may at first seem unfounded, or over exaggerated, we can see the evocation of the needs of students everywhere from individual classrooms to the nation‘s highest office within the United States. In a speech delivered on August 9, 2010 at the University of Texas at Austin, President Barack Obama told those in attendance, We also know that in the coming decades, a high school diploma is not going to be enough. Folks need a college degree. They need workforce training. They need a higher education. And so today I want to talk about the higher education strategy that we‘re pursuing not only to lead the world once more in college graduation rates, but to make sure our graduates are ready for a career; ready to meet the challenges of a 21st century economy (my emphasis, Obama, 2010). We can see the very same move, of making public education explicitly serve the needs of the capitalist economy, in classrooms across the country. This process works as follows: the teacher explains to her fourth grade students that they must learn x because they will need to know x for fifth grade. The fifth-grade teacher explains to her students that they must learn x plus y in order to move on to sixth grade, which they will need for seventh grade, and so on. This notion of needs permeates the public school classroom from the very earliest grades through college. The entire structure of school operates in this way: deferring ―need‖ on to the next grade and the next until those grades are replaced with college and work. In this way student needs are never authored by students themselves, rather they are inscribed on students from their very earliest experiences in classrooms. The concept of ―needs‖ in education, therefore, is divorced from the actual human needs of students and rather confers on students an economistic conception of needs that positions students as commodities in the national and international economic order. These needs are reinterpreted and reinscribed on students as if they were students‘ own individual needs. The actual needs of students, tied to the critical pedagogical project of becoming more fully human (Freire, 2000), are mystified and abstracted to the point that student needs are no longer student needs at all: they are the needs of the capitalist economy and the needs of the state. In this paper I review Marx‘s (1990) conceptions of use value and exchange value before turning to Baudrillard‘s (1981) critique of both in the capitalist construction of needs. I then use Baudrillard‘s conception of the ̳system of needs‘ to identify how this same process works in schools and classrooms. Namely, how students become conceptualized as commodities and how schools as the sites in which these commodities are produced become complicit with capitalist social reproduction. Finally, I take up the pedagogical project of redefining (humanizing) needs in a critical pedagogy that is decidedly anti-capitalist, while accounting for the various structural mechanisms in place in our present school system within the United States that work against such a critical pedagogy. Use Value and Exchange Value in Marx and Baudrillard Marx (1990) tells us that the commodity is an external object that satisfies human needs. The ―physical body of the commodity itself‖ constitutes the object/commodity‘s use value (p. 126). Here one might think of examples such as yarn, potatoes, or iron as examples of commodities with use value. The use value of a commodity is not tied to the labor required for its production. Thinking of potatoes once again, the use value of a potato does not take into account the labor of the farmer who planted, grew, and harvested the potato. Exchange value enters here, as the way in which ―use-values of one kind exchange for use-values of another kind‖ (p. 126). Again thinking about potatoes, a potato can be exchanged for other commodities through its exchange value, what it is worth in relation to other commodities. This ratio fluctuates and changes over time and is not necessarily tied to the use value of the commodity. Rather, the commodity‘s exchange value emerges from the labor power that went into the production of the specific commodity. Marx writes, ―What exclusively determines the magnitude of the value of any article is therefore the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour-time socially necessary for its production‖ (p. 129). Marx also notes that this labor is ―equal human labour,‖ meaning that ―The total labour-power of society, which is manifested in the values of the world of commodities, counts here as one homogenous mass of human labour- power, although composed of innumerable individual units of labour-power‖ (p. 129). That is, in a given society the amount of labor-time that goes into a commodity can be understood as equal in terms of ―socially necessary labour-time‖ or the amount of time in a given society to produce a commodity that is considered normal given the society‘s conception of the skill and intensity common for that particular society (Marx, 1990). Baudrillard (1981) elaborates on Marx‘s conception of use value by stating that ―the status of use value in Marxian theory is ambiguous,‖ and shows this by detailing the process of ―commodity fetishism‖ (p. 130). To understand this point, Baudrillard explains, It appears that commodity fetishism (that is, where social relations are disguised in the qualities and attributes of the commodity itself) is not a function of the commodity defined simultaneously as exchange value and use value, but of exchange value alone (emphasis in original, p. 130). We find here a problem with the ambiguity of use value, because use value is a ―fetishized social relation.‖ That is, it is not only exchange value that leads to commodity fetishization, but rather both use and exchange value that are both fetishized and come together ―to constitute commodity fetishism‖ (p. 131). It is from this point that we can see that Marx has underdeveloped the socially constructed nature of use value. Baudrillard next moves to critique the notion of needs (the system of needs) and utility as caught up in the very same oppressive reality as exchange value. In doing so, Baudrillard posits that we must examine more closely the ways in which use values are themselves also rationalized and abstracted in order to enable the exchange of commodities with varying levels of utility. Framed another way, in order for a commodity to be exchanged, its use must also be understood in relation to other commodities. Commodity fetishization thus results in a conception of needs divorced from actual human needs, as these needs are socially constructed and thus the whole of the capitalist economy bears down on these needs, warping them into the needs of the capitalist economy. It is from this vantage point that needs become a central focus of Baudrillard‘s elaboration of use value. Baudrillard tells us, ―use value is very much a social relation‖ (p. 132). To understand this, we need only think of how we learned what the utility of a given commodity is, and question to what extent we came to the conclusion or valuation of the commodity on our own, or whether cultural and social perspectives from outside ourselves as individuals constituted our conception of that particular commodity. This practice shows the absurdity in thinking our own conception of utility (and of use, and of needs) comes from either nature or our own unmediated desires. We are born into symbolic systems of meaning; examples include the marking of gender and race on birth certificates (Lewis, 2003), and the ways in which we learn what we ―need‖ in schools. Because of this, it becomes essential to uncover the ways in which utility and the system of needs that utility responds to are not in any way natural but are rather constructs of the social realities in a given society. It is specifically to this task that Baudrillard turns to. An individual‘s concept of utility, and of use value therein, is in fact a product of the economic system in which said individual finds herself. Baudrillard shows this by flipping the seemingly apolitical concept of human needs leading to the exchange of commodities on its head. He writes, ―Far from the individual expressing his needs in the economic system, it is the economic system that induces the individual function and the parallel functionality of objects and needs... The individual is nothing but the subject thought in economic terms‖ (p. 133). It becomes impossible, then, to formulate an individual‘s needs outside of their social reality and the social conditions that determine(d) that reality. From this, Baudrillard posits that there exists a ―metaphysic of needs and use values‖ wherein ―abstraction, reduction, rationalization and systematization are as profound and as generalized at the level of ̳needs‘ as at the level of commodities‖ (p. 135). As socially constructed actors in the current political economy of the United States, we are unable to ever retreat from the capitalistic formulation of needs. Emerging from Baudrillard‘s critique of use value is the notion that in a capitalist society human beings are defined by their needs, that needs constitute what it means to be human, and that the use value of a commodity is seen falsely as emerging solely from these natural needs. From this he writes, ―Every revolutionary perspective today stands or falls on its ability to reinterrogate radically the repressive, reductive, rationalizing metaphysic of utility‖ (p. 139). To me, this implies a pedagogical project: one in which the constructed nature of utility is thrown open for students to probe and question the ―metaphysic‖ of needs and come to know their world more wholly by interrogating the ways in which needs in a capitalist economy are not natural, but conferred onto human bodies. Before proceeding with this line of inquiry, however, we must first better understand how Baudrillard‘s conception of use value and of needs plays out on students in classrooms. Toward the Student as Commodity: What Students Need It is not necessarily new or novel to talk about the student as a commodity in the current system of education in the United States (see Barrier-Ferreira, 2008; Lewis, 2003). Additionally, critical work has examined the ways in which education itself has been commodified and marketized to suit the needs of both local and global capitalism (Trnavcevic, 2008). What one does not find in this work, however, is the case for a link between the concept of student needs and how those needs are not in fact dictated by the individual student, her parents, or even her teachers, but rather by the political economy of the society in which she finds herself. Baudrillard can help us make better sense of how students‘ supposed needs are used to oppress them, and in so doing, can point to pedagogical responses for critical educators dedicated to combating oppression in classrooms. The notion that all students need an education is a bourgeois invention emerging out of the Enlightenment. The notion that young people have not always been receiving an education, that is, learning from peers and adults their entire lives, also stems from a Western tradition which limits the worth of what students know to what Michael Apple (2000) has called ―official knowledge.‖ The fact that we refer to learning only certain prescribed facts and skills as ―receiving an education‖ is then laden with innumerable socially constructed assumptions and biases which serve to oppress students who do not come to school with the requisite knowledge of the dominant-oppressor class (Freire, 2000; Kumashiro, 2009). If one were to concede that young people are always already learning - that from the very moment they are alive they are making meaning from their experiences – the notion that the sole purpose of school is simply to learn would seem nonsensical. Rather schooling, and public state-funded schooling at that, serves to teach students a particular set of meanings and relations. More so, schools exist as determiners of students‘ lives. That is, schooling in capitalist societies determines students‘ lives in oppressive ways and then uses the notion of the needs of students to justify and legitimize the process. Returning to Baudrillard, needs emerge as a concept in schooling because of the seemingly natural human proclivity of needing an education. The value of such an education, however, is rarely elaborated in terms of the individual student in and of herself, but rather value is given to education because of the collective social good(s) of having an educated populace. Students ought to know how to read, so this logic goes, in order for them to make informed decisions as voters in a participatory democracy. Let us take account then of how this particular conception of needs, the need to know how to read in order to vote, is imbued with the effects of the political economy from which it emerges. First, students are not encouraged to be producers of knowledge, rather only consumers of knowledge with which to base their votes on. Second, the fixity of the form of governance is held intact, as without time or place, as the thing students must adapt to, rather than as a form of organizing human beings in response to the demands of those directly impacted in the present historical moment. Here we see Baudrillard‘s critique of use value emerge explicitly, ―value in the case of use value is enveloped in total mystery, for it is grounded anthropologically in the (self-) ̳evidence‘ of a naturalness, in an unsurpassable original reference‖ (p. 139). Learning to read is depoliticized even as it is defended for its use in the lone political act deemed worthy in the United States. This is the status of the needs discourse in schooling. The needs of students, were we to actually ask of them what they needed from school, would likely be far closer to Deweyan (2007) progressive education than it would be to our current practice. Dewey emphasized the need for learning to be for what is at stake presently for students, to take account of their world as they are currently experiencing it, and to ground all education in the lives of those engaged in the educative process (Dewey, 2001; 2007). The value of education, then, would truly rest in the lived experiences of individual students. Students as commodities moves us away from such a conception, however, as students are quantified to gauge the relative worth of teachers, of schools, and according to the President‘s remarks, the worth of an entire country. Yet if we consider the very first definition of commodity, as an object that satisfies human needs, we are left with two possible conclusions as to whether or not students may be rightfully regarded as commodities. In the first sense, they are commodities because they satisfy the needs of a state engaged in social reproduction. They maintain the status quo and ensure that American hegemony will not falter in the coming decades, and in this way must be produced very specifically in order to ensure that there is no break with the current model of producing workers for a capitalist economy. The use value of students as commodities in this way stems from their future surplus labor that will be exploited as part of their work in a capitalist economy. But upon further consideration, students – human beings – can never be fully reduced to the status of objects. While banking education (where the teacher deposits information into the students to later reap the benefits of said information) objectifies students, a problem-posing education grounds all interactions in classrooms on the basis that students are dynamic subjects who create knowledge from their lived experiences (Freire, 2000). It is imperative that we understand how banking education as a pedagogical practice in classrooms emerges from a school-wide system of banking education that determines life chances of both students and teachers. For a pedagogical project of reimagining needs to become possible, we must know what we are up against in classrooms to fully understand what becomes possible with a richer account of needs for and with students. Determinism in and as Schooling It is crucial before proceeding to the pedagogical project of producing a richer account of the needs of students that we not lose site of the oppressive reality of schooling in capitalist systems. We can view Bowles and Gintis‘ (1976; 2002) analyses of schooling in the capitalist economic system of the United States as well as the work of Luis Althusser (2008), on ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), as exemplars of the conception of class determinism and the role that schooling plays in determining outcomes for individuals in a capitalist society. For Althusser (2008), schools exist as institutions (ISAs) that reproduce the current class relationship and relations to the means of production. These institutions, rather than exerting the state‘s control via force40 instead control through ideology. The school in modern times has become the most dominant ISA in terms of the state‘s role in the reproduction of the relations of production. This has not only been well theorized, but can be seen using empirical economic data in the United States. Bowles and Gintis (2002) for example, in their article ―Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited,‖ write of their original work, We showed that parental economic status is passed on to children in part by means of unequal educational opportunity, but that the economic advantages of the offspring of higher social status families go considerably beyond the superior education they receive (p. 2). Bowles and Gintis showed the ways in which social class, ―economic status‖ in their terms, is maintained intergenerationally and the role that schools play in this maintenance. Specifically, they argue, schools are structured to enable ―the legitimacy of being subservient in the workplace, that benefit in this case employers, at the expense of another [group], the employees‖ (p. 20). Schools are then conceptualized as training grounds for the class-based future employment of students. This is precisely what Jean Anyon (1981) found: classrooms are set up to model the dominant expectations for students‘ future employment, enabling different kinds of school activities based on the income of students‘ parents. In the United States, one is extremely likely to remain in whatever social class they are born into and in this way, students‘ lives are determined (Sullivan, 2010). Schools therefore work in such a way as to train those who are to be subservient to be subservient and those who are to be executives to be executives. Schools can thus be understood using the following framework: people are born into a class, attend schools where they are treated in ways that prepare them to have their labor exploited while remaining in that same social class, and then have children themselves and the whole cycle repeats seemingly without end. In this way schools are as much a determiner of student lives, as they are themselves already determined by the social class of those attending them. Thinking of modern day state terminology regarding schools, ―failing‖ schools can be read as a stand-in for working class or poor schools. Using a determining framework, these schools are in economically depressed areas where they seek to train students for jobs that largely no longer exist in this country, manufacturing being the most prescient example (Anyon, 1981). They do this seemingly without care or notice to the shifting economic realities outside of the school, and thus the status quo is reproduced ad naseum. Deterring Determinism As a framework for conceptualizing life in a class-based capitalistic society, Marxism sheds light on the structural forces that shape people‘s lives in material ways. Marx‘s own use of the concept of determinism stems largely from the inherent flaw in capitalism, that its anarchic pursuit of profit produces economic crises, which then also determines a response from the subjugated proletariat to social revolution. Raymond Williams (1977) adds to this, writing, ―A Marxism without some concept of determination is in effect worthless. A Marxism with many of the concepts of determination it now has is quite radically disabled‖ (p. 83).41 Williams is pointing to an uncertain middle ground here, a place between a determined ―economism,‖ ―the setting of limits,‖ and ―pressures‖ (p. 86-87). Economism here refers to the notion that the economic system dictates the social conditions and actions of those within it, denying agency and the Marxist doctrine that we, as human actors, make our own history. William‘s definitions of determine as both the setting of limits, the laws of a capitalist economy for example, as well as the exerting of pressures, as a compulsion to act, are especially useful here because they point to two different but interconnected processes. That is, the setting of limits is solely negative, negatively determining the lives of individuals within a rigid and fixed economic system. Pressures, on the other hand, convey what for Williams can be understood as positive determinants. They are positive here in the sense that they are productive (of social relations and other social processes), rather than solely restrictive (negative) as in the case with the setting of limits. The danger, for Williams, is that economism leads us to only see the negative determinants of limits rather than both the setting of limits and exertion of pressures as both being essential characteristics of determinism. Limits are rigid, whereas pressures are more fluid and vary over time and space. While this distinction is extremely helpful, it can be more concretely understood by looking for examples in school settings. In Paul Willis‘ (1977) now infamous Learning to Labor, we see a group of young white working class men who construct what Willis terms a ―counter-school culture.‖ The students who embrace this counter-school culture reject the standards and norms of traditional public schooling and position themselves in opposition to the students who are receptive and responsive to the authority figures within schools. The lads, as Willis refers to them, refer to the students who do not embrace their counter- school culture as ―ear‘oles.‖ Willis‘ ethnographic work shows the ways in which these students‘ counter-school identities actually make their transition to work in shop floors all the more seamless as the essential relationship they develop to work as school-aged students is maintained in their work after leaving school. Willis‘ findings, therefore, seriously complicate the easy narrative discussed earlier of the economic determinism which schools feed into in order to reproduce the existing status quo. That is, if schools function to instill in students the attitudes that are essential to their future exploitation as workers, how do students who completely reject school still find their way into the types of work that the school is supposed to be sending them to? It would seem that if students completely reject school and the culture it asks them to fit themselves into these students would not go on to occupy the position in the capitalist system that school is structured to lead them to. Willis discusses this, writing, The fact that kids from the counter-school culture nevertheless do go forward relatively willingly to wage labour – the final Reproduction effect which I do accept – suggests that schools work through contradiction and difference from other social sites rather than through reflection, correspondence, similarity, or whatever (emphasis in original, p. 206). It is my contention that we can understand this process by incorporating Williams‘ (1977) notions of the exertion of pressures. The limits imposed on the lads are continually refuted and superceded as they consistently challenge the status quo imposed in their school. The lads perform subversive acts such as never writing anything in class, to sneaking into bars to drink and dance, to simply leaving school to smoke a cigarette with their friends. Each of these acts refutes the limits imposed on student behavior in school, which in economism are the mechanisms that lead students to their essential attitudes regarding their position to the means of production. Thinking about pressures as opposed to limits on the lads, however, opens up the possibility of understanding their lives in a way that avoids a simple economism. As the lads come from working class homes, they must work while in school to afford things like beer and cigarettes. Work is seen as something required for material survival, and we can thus imagine the pressure of finding ways to pay for these habits. While the limits imposed on students are real, the lads‘ refusal to accept these limits (a very literal example is the legal drinking age limit) point to another way to understand how the lads end up in the types of jobs the school is set up to train them for. Willis (1977) contends that the lads end up in shop floor jobs because these jobs, ―allow the fullest expression of [the lads‘] developing cultural skills‖ (p. 95). That is, shop floors represent sites for the lads to maintain their counter-school cultural selves in that they are able to demonstrate masculinity, to celebrate drinking and sex, and generally avoid ear‘oles (p. 96). These are not limits on the lads, but rather cultural pressures, that contain within them the lads‘ own sense of agency in that they are able to carve out their own sense of self even in spite of their exploitation and the abuse of their surplus labor. Carving Out A Pedagogical Stance on Determinism There is a danger, in my interpretation of Willis‘ account of the lads, to view the lads‘ choosing an exploited line of work as false consciousness on their part. That is, one might make the claim that the lads‘ choice to work in shop floors stems from their embrace of hegemonic bourgeois capitalism. But Willis responds to this fear, writing, The working class is the only class not inherently structured from within by the ideological intricacy of capitalist organization... The working class is the only group in capitalism that does not have to believe in capitalist legitimations of its own survival‖ (p. 123). This is what Willis characterizes as the ―potential [of] working class cultural creativity and insight‖ (p. 122). The fact that the working class is in no way legitimized by capitalism, unlike a middle class or owner class identity, enables working class people to not ―mystify‖ themselves and to maintain a sense of creativity which leaves the potential for alternative realities, for revolution, intact. Further, it makes an account of actual human needs possible, as the needs of the working class, while exploited, are not identical to the needs of the capitalist economy. This creativity of the working class is determined to an extent, but not solely by economism and the structural limits imposed on working class people. That we are even able to imagine alternative realities, alternative ways of being outside of capitalism, is evidence of the creativity of the working class which cannot be wholly determined by either pressures or limits otherwise it would simply cease to be. And this creativity must be the starting point of a pedagogical project aimed at reconceptualizing the needs of students. It is in fact creativity that is the antithesis of determinism. Creativity, born of human agency, is the active motivating impulse of the lads. It is also the limit of the setting of limits. The lads‘ creativity in finding ways to ―have a laff‖ in utter opposition to the limits put on them by the school is not necessarily evidence of a revolutionary impulse, but rather proof that that impulse is still possible. Determinism is an extremely useful concept, but when placed in the right light, fails to account for all the messiness of life and the ways in which structures actually reproduce oppressive reality. This reproduction does not occur in the same fixed way endlessly, but rather is constantly shifting based on material human action. We must never lose sight of creativity, of agency, and the insistence that human actors make history. Our task then, as critical teachers and researchers, is to not be seduced by neat and tidy accounts of determinism but rather to continually name the ever-shifting complex forces and human actions that make up our oppressive reality. It is no longer sufficient to hide behind deterministic accounts of reproduction, or to write off schools as simply reproducing the existing means of production based on the classed identities of the students that attend them. And revealing students‘ true needs and their inherent conflicts with the capitalist order must become a central animating project for every critical educator working to combat the oppressive and dehumanizing reality of capitalism in their classrooms.

#### That imposition of standardized educational regulations locks us into an ontology of being, freezing the potentiality of becoming and reinforcing technological nihilism

Matt notes:

* the ontological essence of what it is to be human is to learn, evolve, and change. so making the conceptual mistake of thinking we simply are one static thing prevents us from continuing to actively realize that role and denies us of what it means to be fully human
* kinda a vtl impact
* i think deleuze says something similar just replace ‘ontological becoming’ with ‘we’re always in a state of flux’. standardized testing locks us into one thing cuz it thinks it’s possible to statically describe and objectify humans as tools

my notes

* becoming is the real deal
* When we think we are something (being) that prevents us from becoming which denies us humanity/makes life suck
* Saying “humans r objects w/ properties/qualities” doesn’t describe existence v well – life is a continual struggle not once-and-for-all
* We can only be something by continuing to become it
* Modern grading/instruction/standardized testing reinforces this approach of being – downgrades deviations from homogenizing standard (fwk da?) this standard imposes conformity/being
* Forecloses meaning
* What we need to do – encourage teachers + students to develop distinct tallents
* Disclose vs impose
* Impose reinforces nihilism/meaninglessness of technological framing, disclosure is only path beyond that

Thomson 16 – Iain, associate professor of philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Rethinking education after Heidegger: Teaching learning as ontological response-ability, Educational Philosophy and Theory, msm

Making a virtue out of necessity (an alchemical miracle the existential importance of which should not be underestimated, however dubious it might appear to be from a narrowly psychological perspective), let me now take one or two steps further by adding the following view. This is a view I first learned from Kierkegaard and Heidegger—the latter influentially teaching that ‘Dasein is its possibility,’ or that we are the future we projectively disclose—as well as from such innovative inheritors of this existential tradition as Hubert Dreyfus and Jonathan Lear (Heidegger, 1962, p. 68; 1993, p. 42). It is only by continuing to learn to be what we are—continuing to learn to be a teacher, for example, or a husband, a father, a son, a brother, a friend, a citizen, a student, a human being—that we can continue to be anything at all, for however long or short a time we dwell on this earth. (This all-too-brief existential sojourn or Aufenthalte is a temporal ‘stop-over’ in intelligibility, a temporary visitation, as it were, into existing as a self-disclosive individual being, a being caught up in all the other arrivals and departures that can sometimes feel endless—until they end.) For us mortal earthlings, this ontological truth—that we can only ‘be’ anything by continuing to become it—holds for all the existential roles, projects, and commitments that most profoundly constitute and define our lived sense of self as a ‘being-in- the-world’. Indeed, when we make the existential mistake of thinking we simply are something, and so inadvertently stop learning to become it, we thereby begin to stop being it. The husband who thinks he simply is a husband and so need not work on his marriage soon finds it falling apart, just as the brother who thinks he simply is and will always be a brother eventually grows apart from his siblings, the complacent father from his children, the aging teacher clinging to the past from his or her students, friends from friends, and so on, in an existential tragedy made no less painful by its ubiquity. The growing banality of this broad-spectrum spectacle of people treating themselves (and each other) like things can lead us to overlook such ‘reification’ (itself a contingent consequence of the metaphysics of substance), but disregarding such reification dangerously numbs us to this fundamental ontological category mistake, rendering us all the more likely to fall victim to it ourselves. To rephrase the point (in terms Heidegger made famous), we could say that what is most essential about human beings is not that that we are objects with properties. That is only part of what we are, an undeniable aspect of our ‘facticity’, but one that fails to capture what most essentially distinguishes human beings from those entities which are more pervasively objective (but still never truly objects ‘all the way down’). What essentially defines our human mode of ‘existence’ (a word which derives from the Latin ek-sistere and so connotes, for the existential tradition, our ‘standing-out’ into a temporally-structured world of intelligibility) is that we are an embodied stand on the meaning of our own lives. We are a living, and so learning, answer to the question of the meaning of life. Taking such a stand authentically means owning our own existences and so finding ways to make peace with and even embrace the universal finitude that pervades and defines every aspect of our being. That, moreover, is a continual struggle, a broad-spectrum existential lesson in becoming who we are that we can learn and relearn only in medias res (in the midst of things), or along the way (if often slowly and sometimes not at all), never some once-and-for-all-time achievement (however important some individual lessons may well prove to be, nonetheless). The lesson for today (and perhaps for tomorrow) is that if we can only be anything by continuing to learn to become it, then this means that for us, to put it boldly, to be is to learn. If the highest and most exemplary form of learning is teaching learning (in which we teach to learn by learning-in-public), then human beings come into their own by teaching learning.11 Indeed, we mortals can continue to be only by teaching; for, it is only by learning-in-public (in any and all of the dimensions of our being) that we can continue to be anything at all. To sum up in the most general terms, then, we realize being—creatively discerning and responsibly disclosing the inchoate possibilities of meaning—by teaching learning (or, as Heidegger put it, by doing and allowing the essential in each particular case). This holds true whether our learning-in-public takes place when we are alone with our emerging selves (in a solitude that inevitably remains haunted by more or less ghostly others) or when we face matters of shared concern together with others ‘in the flesh’—be that in the classroom or the kitchen, on the picket line or the soccer field, on our most narcissistic social media or even in our most solipsistic asocial immediacy (in all our words made flesh and embodied existences becoming new or remembered words). If we can only be by becoming, then to continue to be calls for us to teach learning. Or as Heidegger beautifully put it: ‘Thinking is thanking [Denken ist Danken]’: To think is to respond to being, that intelligible domain of emerging meaningfulness from which we are never entirely absent so long as we are here at all. Given the importance I accord to such views, it is perhaps not too surprising that I seem to have done little else than develop my thinking about how we can best culti- vate such ontological response-ability in all my ‘published’ works (all my works deliber- ately ‘made public’, as that both literally and philosophically means). In the face of that ineliminable finitude which both unites and divides us, however, must we not all acknowledge and learn to affirm that such published work (however maniacally or peacefully we pursue the ‘publish or perish’ imperative, and however freely and care- fully we learn to let ourselves speak) can only ever be the iceberg tip of the work that all of us teachers of learning do in public (however solitary we existential thinkers might otherwise remain)?12 We might even begin to discern the seemingly fixed and reassuring contours of the ‘public/private’ dichotomy self-deconstructing here. Let us stretch beyond that for now, since I promised to respond, publically, and in so doing I pledged (as if from my own most private solitude) to make another public appearance, to once again embody in my practice and thereby teach that public learning which marks all mortal philoso- phy. (To make such a pledge or profession is thus already to begin to bridge the pri- vate and public domains, and in fact these intersecting domains can never be made fully heterogeneous or dichotomous to one another. Indeed, it is only from this ine- liminable overlap or indistinction between the public and the private that the philo- sophical way of life reemerged as hermeneutic phenomenology, helping to give voice back to that dynamic feedback-loop between life and thought that originally defined all philosophy—before this living love of wisdom became so thoroughly professional- ized, too often depersonalizing and so devitalizing the profession). When I promised to respond I also committed myself to avoiding mere repetition, since (as we saw at the beginning) to respond means to pledge to answer again. ‘Again’ originally means to face (the English ‘again’ derives from the German entgegen, ‘standing opposite’). As answering again, responding means pledging to confront and vigilantly employ that thinking (or that response-ability) without which any answer so-called devolves into the thoughtlessness of a mere ‘reaction’, the mechanical trig- gering of some learned response. Such indifferent automatism would be a ‘response’ in name only, however authentic (or directly derived from that matter itself) the learn- ing that shapes it might once have been, however widespread such automatism is becoming in this age in which technological reproduction pre-enframes our answers (if only as ‘TL;DR’: ‘too long; didn’t read’), and however impossible it remains ever simply and purely to respond, without the slightest hint of reactionary automatism.13 I hope thus far to have risen at least to the level of recapitulation (what the early Heidegger called Wiederholung), that is, rediscovery through creative repetition. When we dis-cover again we bring something at least partly different to light, or to a differ- ent light, and face it. Such changes of lighting can help us to see the light through which we ordinarily see, too often without really seeing (which is why Heidegger him- self deeply prized the transformative effect of such a Lichtung).14 In what follows, I can only offer a series of brief ontological responses, offered simply as humble attempts to respond in kind (to respond to responses), and so perhaps to help discern and disclose some of the inchoate possibilities still underway (in my view anyway) toward the light of shared intelligibility in the works of Duarte, Ehrmantraut, Rocha, Shepperd, and Hassidim. My brevity should be understood as following from limits of space and time rather than enthusiasm. Heidegger teaches that the guilt of finitude is unavoidable; the more pressing question is how to reconcile ourselves to our inescapable limitations (and to do so ever anew, as perpetual re-beginners, that is, phenomenologists in the ineluctably hermeneutic school of life). To be a teacher is to have many ‘children’ (adult and otherwise), and while it may sometimes be tempting to label some legitimate and others bastard, in fact no conclu- sive test for pedagogical paternity has ever been devised. Even the attempted patricide is no proof either way. (When confronted with the fact that Far ́ıas had once been a student of Heidegger, Derrida knowingly replied: ‘These things happen.’) Fortunately, the Oedipal tensions that inevitably shape and distort our pedagogical relationships usually take subtler forms than the murderous rage of the unrecognized child or the suicidal despair of the overlooked scholar. Usually, but not always, and inheritances remain fraught in even the best circumstances (and with the best intentions—those infamous paving stones—concealing, occasionally, the beach beneath). As philosophical disseminators surveying a field in which we have labored long and hard, we cannot hope fully to escape (what Derrida called) ‘the rage of the pure and the proper’ that would seek to equate what we ourselves have generated with the lim- its of respectability. We should try to avoid such excessive propriety nonetheless. For it is only by moving beyond the pre-established limits of what we already recognize that we can creatively and responsibly disclose being, discerning the contours of that which has yet to come to light in order to help bring it more fully into intelligibility. This requires us to negotiate between what has been and what will be, between the same and the other, between propriety and expropriation (and even between the earth and the heavens, or the already established grounds and the horizons of possibility). Such negotiations can never be perfect for finite beings like ourselves, and yet—pre- cisely in their imperfection, their incompletion—they remain the only way the future can ever be born. Keeping an eye on the limits of finitude (since Heidegger teaches us that questioning these limits can both disclose and help us affirm being in its enduring futurity, as whatever remains ‘to-come’, Zu-kunft), then, let me first respond to Michael Ehrmantraut’s most impressive chapter, which I enthusiastically recom- mend to your careful hermeneutic attentions. (I shall assume you have read or will soon read the works to which I am responding, since I cannot possibly recapitulate their many fine points in this limited space.) Ehrmantraut’s fidelity to Heidegger’s texts is remarkable, so much so that it might initially remind some readers (erroneously, let me immediately emphasize) of the kind of periphrastic recapitulation that marked earlier generations of Heidegger scholarship, in which scholars too often trapped themselves in the cul-de-sac of intertextual citation and Heideggerese jargon instead of creatively ‘opening up the open’ of whatever phe- nomenological and hermeneutic fields they were investigating. Such insular scholarship was even celebrated as a significant achievement, which I suppose such incremental clarifications occasionally were, as baby steps in the early reception of Heidegger’s dif- ficult and often jarring thinking. Nonetheless, as a Daoist sage once famously remarked: ‘When the wise man points at the moon, the fool stares at the finger.’ Echo- ing the sage, Heidegger repeatedly complained that: ‘Few are experienced enough in the difference between an object of scholarship and a matter thought.’ In other words: Instead of playing off one thinker against another, the task is rather to think through the contents of the things themselves [or ‘to think through the heart of the matter of the things themselves,’ die Sachverhalte der Sachen selbst zu durchdenken] and become at home with that in them which is wor- thy of question. (see Heidegger, 1954, p. 9; 1971, p. 5; Richardson, 1968, pp. 19, 21) Fortunately, in Ehrmantraut’s case, any superficial resemblance to those fools still mesmerized by Heidegger’s finger quickly proves misleading. Ehrmantraut’s hermeneutic faithfulness—a truly exemplary practice of the art of close reading (a craft sharply honed as a Tutor at St. John’s College in Santa Fe, one of the greatest of the ‘Great Books’ programs)—is vindicated by the clarity his restatements achieve, espe- cially by the illuminating way his clarifications extend the light cast by Heidegger’s original critique of education onto other aspects of our contemporary educational cri- sis. (The crisis of the modern university is congenital, but it is nonetheless real and increasingly pressing, as I have argued elsewhere, see Thomson (2005), chapters three and four). Perhaps most importantly, Ehrmantraut helps us to understand the fundamental problem with our current (post-NCLB) obsession with standardized testing and the style of instruction and grading it reinforces. Such pedagogical approaches evaluate students according to how well they approximate an anonymous educational template, downgrading them for any deviations from this uniform and thus homogenizing standard. The core philosophical problem with such pedagogical approaches, to risk my own post-Heideggerian formula, is that they impose rather than disclose—and that they thus fail to respond. Such pedagogical approaches impose rather than disclose in that they require students to conform to a homogenizing external standard instead of helping them identify and cultivate their own distinctive talents and capacities. Such ‘teaching to the test’ is a growing problem, then, not merely because it serves the privatization of public education (which explains why private textbook and testing companies now contribute so heavily to the campaigns of those politicians who promise to make public education increasingly ‘accountable’ in these ‘free-market’ ideologizing ways), quietly contributing to the selling-off (and selling out) of public goods to for-profit corporations. The deeper ontological disaster here is that such approaches—which impose pre-established standards on students rather than seeking to help disclose and develop students’ distinctive talents and capacities—work to foreclose (what I have called) the perfectionist path to a meaningful life. For, the very key to a meaningful post-Heideggerian pedagogy is to encourage teachers to help students (and so also themselves) find ways to develop their own distinctive talents, thereby enabling each of us to learn to respond to what we take to be the most important problems of our time and generation (see Thomson, 2004).15 It is thus worth emphasizing the importance of this simple but revealing post- Heideggerian heuristic, for it gives us a tool we can use to begin to judge the ontologi- cal merits of any approach (and not just any particular ‘pedagogical’ approach but all broadly existential ones). Let us learn to ask: Does this approach seek to disclose the distinctive meanings of what(ever) it focuses on, or does it instead try to impose its own predetermined meanings on that with which it deals? (If the latter, it often makes the problem worse by evaluating the matter it focuses on primarily by asking how flexibly amenable that matter proves to be to this projective imposition: How easily is any resistance ignored or repressed? It does not think to learn to respond to and cre- atively disclose the source of such resistance.) The key question is simple: Disclose or impose? This simple key helps unlock a realm of deeper ontological significance. For such imposure follows from and reinforces the nihilism (or spreading meaninglessness) of technological ‘enframing’, whereas ontological disclosure remains the only path leading beyond such technological nihilism. Disclose or impose: This is not some black-and-white dichotomy but, instead, it names the poles of a continuum that stretches between meaning and nihilism.16 This simple (but not simplistic) heuristic can thus give us a balancing rod capable of helping to guide us on our educational path forward through these difficult and often tricky times. Because this positive path remains inchoate in Ehrmantraut’s nonetheless thoughtful and insightful critique, I have focused on disclosing and developing these suggestions for finding our way forward here.

#### Voting affirmative is a symbolic embrace of ontological thinking to interrupt pre-conceived hegemonic understandings of being in favor of that which exceeds technological mastery and the reductionist nihilism of modernity

* Academia sees world as competing forces
	+ i.e. biology – self-replicating pattern of information guiding fight for survival
	+ psychology – consciousness as emergent of random competing drives
* this “ontotheology” leads to understanding of entities as resources – leads to optimization/things we saw before
* rather – think ontologicaly – that uncovers solution to nihilism – don’t conceive world as objects to be controlled, nor as meaningless resources but rather as a dynamic source of intelligibility that informs but is greater than attempt to understand
* focus on gap – encounter w unknown interruption that frustrates our plans – at: predictability/stasis
* step beyond limits of current world by doing so – another creativity standard
* allows transformation into meaning

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The later Heidegger abandons this misguided metaphysical quest for a fundamental ontology capable of unifying the University. Instead, he comes to recognize that all the different academic disciplines are already unified; they all implicitly derive their guiding understandings of the being of the classes of entities they study from the nihilistic ontotheology that underlies our late-modern age of technological ‘enframing’. In Heidegger’s later view, all the academic disciplines increasingly understand the being of the classes of entities they study in terms of ‘eternally recurring will-to-power’, that is, they understand the being of all entities as nothing but competing forces coming together and breaking apart with no end beyond the maximal perpetuation of force itself. (We can see this in biology’s guiding understanding of life as a self-replicating pattern of information interacting with an environment; in psychology’s guiding under- standing of consciousness as a randomly emergent faculty that confers evolutionary advantages by coordinating the competing information from the earlier emergence of the various sensory modalities; in the understanding of literature as an arena for the struggle between competing voices and perspectives; in the historian’s understanding of history as a study of those clashes between forces which subsequently shaped us the most; and so on.) This nihilistic Nietzschean ontotheology, Heidegger insightfully sug- gests, increasingly leads all the academic domains, and all of us, to pre-understand entities technologically, as mere ‘resources’ or Bestand, intrinsically meaningless stuff on stand by for efficient optimization. As a result, Heidegger’s later goal for education in general and the university in particular becomes to teach the other disciplines to think ontologically in order to help them uncover other, non-nihilistic ways of understanding being at the frontiers of their own research.17 Heidegger’s hope is to uncover ways of thinking being that no longer reductively preconceive ‘it’ as a modern realm of objects to be mastered and controlled by a subject, nor as an undifferentiated late-modern domain of intrinsically meaningless resources standing by to be efficiently optimized. Heidegger hoped the other disci- plines could instead help us discover other, more meaningful ways of thinking being, just as he thought he had already found a genuinely postmodern understanding of being at work in the art of Van Gogh and the poetry of Ho ̈lderlin. Their artwork is postmodern avant la lettre, in Heidegger’s view, because it helps us understand ‘the being of entities’ neither in terms of modern objects to be mastered, nor as late-modern resources to be optimized, but, instead, as a phenomenologically dynamic source of intelligibility that both informs and also exceeds our every meaningful attempt to conceptualize or otherwise make sense of things.18 It is precisely here, in my view, that we should situate Shepperd’s insightful focus on the pedagogical significance of the ‘gap’, that is, the situational encounter with a profound breakdown, aporia, or interruption which exceeds our mastery and so frustrates our pre-existing plans and intentions. When we teachers of learning effectively ‘open up a space, a gap in the world’, we not only serve the important Socratic first step of disabusing (all of us) students of our ignorance about our own ignorance; by enduring such an initially humbling and anxiety-provoking confrontation with genuine aporia, we can learn to step beyond the limits of our current world into an unmastered space beyond. Doing so helps us see (in the Heideggerian terms Shepperd adduces) that learning is not primarily about acquiring ‘information’ but, rather, about ‘freeing vision’. Stepping into the open beyond what-is (I would emphasize), we can encounter that ‘noth-ing’ from which the not-yet comes to be. A positive encounter with this dynamic ‘noth-ing’—or this texture-rich ‘earth’, or this phe- nomenologically unstillable ‘presencing’—becomes the crucial pivot that helps us learn to respond ontologically and so ‘turn’ beyond our current technological under- standing of the being of entities as nothing but meaningless resources. By learning to creatively and responsibly respond to this initially inchoate ‘noth-ing’ as the ‘not yet’ of what is coming to be (and so not as nothing at all but instead as ‘the noth-ing’ of that which needs our disclosive efforts to help name and so bring it into being), we post-Heideggerian thinkers of ontological education can help serve a larger historical transformation from nihilism into a genuinely meaningful postmodernity. It is, in my considered judgement, this vision of spiritual revolution that makes Heidegger’s think- ing so dangerous and yet also so suggestive, important, and inspiring (Thomson, 2011, chapters seven and eight).

#### Modern education’s devotion to scientific rationalism, ideals of social progress and efficiency results in the worst atrocities – an embrace of radical responsibility that imagines social justice as an ontological imperative is a prerequisite to political theorization

* industrial revolution -> individuals as commodities used by technocrats
* nothing but cogs in machine
* led to nationalism – bc ppl from lower classes had nothing else to identify with
* nationalism spread bc of this – stoked by capitalist demand for resources
* advancement of military/economic might
* also caused nazis
	+ objectification/processing of human body for scientific/rational ends
	+ scientific method into policy was embracing human as resource w/o autonomy
	+ that led to elimination of jewish body
* also – Hiroshima and Nagasaki at same time:
	+ modernity ==== elimination of human face from body + scientific processing of that body
	+ atomic bomb as exclamation of modernity
	+ Nietzschean will to power embraced as human identity becomes DNA
	+ People are just info blips
	+ Scientific reductionism of race (eugenics impact)
* Conflict = inherent to human relations bc of subject/object distinction, subject as origin of freedom
	+ Util is thus the only way to resolve conflicts
	+ That is privileged essentalism
	+ Human costs prove
* Levinasian interpretation 🡪 ethics + justice + the state – precursor to legitimacy
	+ Levinas – ontological imperialism
	+ Re imagining social justice w/ radical responsibility as center
	+ Loosening of traditional barriers of sovereign
	+ Coexistence (break sub/obj dist.)
	+ Just war against war
	+ Political ethics can triumph
	+ Ex – israel and Egypt – they decided to get over their differences and work it out
* Also affects study of IR
	+ Rn – scholarly productivity is measured by high profile journal articles
	+ Academia as business
	+ Reconceptualize this pls!

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Levinas’s reference to Reason encapsulates the long intellectual history rooted in Enlightenment thought and including subsequent developments in scientific and social theory, which came to be grouped under the rubric of modernity. I identify among the formative thinkers of the modern era Hegel, whose dialectical theory of history imbued modernity with the ideal of progress through time. Hegel’s work cemented the relationship between Western consciousness and the seemingly unalterable course of history, particularly for those who attempted to understand (and utilize) his philosophy in isolation from his theology. Like Kant before and Kierkegaard after him, Hegel maintained a dialectical division between faith and reason, one that flourished during industrialization and fast became the hallmark of modern thought. Indeed, the division inspired a humanist movement which sought to improve the condition of humanity without reference to divine inspiration or authority. Paradoxically, humanism found its greatest challenge in a coincident occurrence – the dawn of mass production. The Industrial Revolution had ramifications throughout economic, cultural and martial relations. Individuals as laborers, citizens or soldiers were transformed into commodities to be manipulated by managers, politicians and other ancestors of today’s technocrats. Left with little local or even regional political significance (apart, of course, from their role as cogs in the machine of the new economy), the expanding lower classes found identification within the freshly-delineated borders of 12 the nation-state. Benedict Anderson illustrates how the fires of nationalism spread throughout the Western world, stoked by capitalist necessity for resources and new markets.14 In this way, the advancement of the nation-state (taken to include both economic and military might) was inextricably tied to that of humanity. This relationship assumed fascist dimensions in Nazi Germany, where the German working classes rallied behind a message triumphing their state, economy, culture and race. The rise of Hitler and the success of National Socialism can thus be read as the reification of modern ideals; specifically, Nazism embraced the rational discipline of progress via purity of the nation-state and its fractal counterpart, the body. It is important to recall that the dialectical system of history marked the continuing presence of the Jewish people as an historical aberration (the coming of Christ, in fulfilling Old Testament prophecy, had rendered Judaism obsolete).15 Therefore, Nazi anti-Semitism, insofar as it participated in the intellectual culture of modernity, conformed to the rationality of historical progress. The true significance of Hitlerism for modernity, however, lies not in historical theory, but in the objectification and subsequent processing of the human body for ends that were both scientific and rational. Earlier in the nineteenth century, political scientists had introduced the systematic construction, maintenance and improvement of the nationstate via the manipulation of strategic resources and statistical accounting. By the time of Hitler, the implementation of scientific methods into policy formulation and enforcement was gaining in popularity, particularly after the disaster of World War I. The German dictator’s unique contribution was embracing the body – in all its composite parts and signifiers – as a strategic resource of the state. 13 The Nazis, operating within an essentially Euclidean conception of the nation in political space, relocated the borders of the nation-state along racial lines. Human bodies, eugenically-delineated, became the basis of nationalist identity and the target of competitive aggression. The logic of nationalist conflict, in which the opponent is acted upon without consequence to the actor, was transferred into the calculated elimination of the Jewish body. In its faceless savagery, genocide is the progeny of modern scientific warfare. The fact that the Holocaust and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki happen concurrently is not a coincidence. Characterizing modernity as the elimination of the human face and the scientific processing of the human body recasts the introduction of the atomic bomb (a sterile, faceless technology of holocaust) as the exclamation, rather than the unexpected event, of modernity and the modern nation-state. The Holocaust emerged, for Levinas, as a powerful and painful example of rationalized hell. By reducing human identity to blood and genetics, Nathan Bracher argues, the Nazis had renounced ‘in no uncertain terms the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of freedom, according to which the soul, distinct from the body, stands apart from the material conditions of existence and can freely choose its destiny, therefore transcending the bonds of history’.16 Instead, a Nietzschean will-to-power was embraced, and the moral Self was sacrificed to the biological Self in pursuit of a society based on race. This was but one socio-political outcome of philosophical solipsism. A second one was the incredible ability of the German ideology and its foot soldiers to deny the community of their non-Aryan fellows. In an account of his experience as a Nazi prisoner of war, Levinas describes how he was placed in a unit solely composed of Jews. Their interactions with other soldiers and citizens, denigrating 14 in the extreme, stripped them of their humanity, made them ‘subhuman, a gang of apes’. 17 Only a stray mutt named Bobby, whose barks and yelps simultaneously called for play and demarcated animal and man, helped them to recall their fundamental humanness. Raoul Mortley rightly points out that the final and most significant horror of the Holocaust was, for Levinas, not so much the number of his fellow Jews and other innocent people murdered, but the way they were processed and killed…without faces, without names, without recognition that the bodies ransacked for resources were indeed human.18 Ultimately, the horrific thread unifying these three observations is the rationality informing each of them – the scientific reductionism of race, the ideologically-based denial of community, the production-minded processing of human bodies. …And a Philosophical One For Levinas, the evidence of God in the Other’s face confers extraordinary significance upon the human person. In this sense, his philosophy might be considered humanist. However, this would only be true in a sense radically different from the contemporary humanism of secular intellectual culture. Levinas is deeply troubled by the secularization of ideals originally rooted in the Scriptures.19 Absent the patient character of Scriptural study, Greek wisdom ‘demystifies, depoeticizes, demythicizes’ the Infinite; in short, it risks dissolving into ‘lie and ideology’ masked by the rhetoric of humanism.20 Levinas is thus disappointed but not surprised by an academy that takes delight in fetishizing difference, while falling dramatically short of assuming responsibility for the Other. He denounces humanism as inhumane,21 and charges ‘the little humanity that adorns the earth’ with pursuing justice via responsibility and sacrifice, not rhetoric and Self-indulgence. ‘One has to find for man another kinship than that which ties him to 15 being’, Levinas exhorts, ‘one that will perhaps enable us to conceive of this difference between me and the Other, this inequality, in a sense absolutely opposed to oppression’.22 Levinas directly criticizes Western philosophy and the State for their refusal to acknowledge the interruption of the ontological by the transcendent. This criticism, including its origins and formulation, is explored in greater detail throughout this and the following sections. For now, briefly, he argues that while philosophy and government rest upon true human relationality (which for him necessarily includes an element of transcendence), their ontological structure precludes language vested with originary meaning in favor of the thematized ‘said’. 23 Put another way, philosophy and government go astray because their essential foundations – human relationships infused with transcendent responsibility – are obscured by language that filters everything, even the mysterious, through the lens of scientific rationalism. The difference between the saying and the said constitutes, for Levinas, the heart of what is problematic about ethics. Otherwise than Being is his attempt to get at the substance of saying (that is, the non-totalizable interactions permeating dialogue) without perverting it. While the said is an active claim to knowledge, saying is a non-reciprocal permeability of the Self to the approach of another.24 Levinas describes a saying that is more than a communication of the said, that signals a commitment to the Other, a refusal to cover, extinguish and absorb, a willingness to be open, without excuses, evasions or alibis.25 In communication, saying is one’s responsibility to the Other. Western philosophy presumes to capture saying in an ontological said. But saying disappears before we can grasp it, transcending time as if a disturbance. For example, at the deathbed of one’s mother, where the significance of the relationship and the moment defy 16 linguistic containment, the said becomes irrelevant. Saying, a non-erotic sensuousness, an intimacy, celebrates the mother-child relationship and infuses death with meaning and dignity. The distinction between saying and said is crucial to ethics, in part because Good cannot be represented.26 Outside of that which philosophy claims to know, the Infinite commands me to approach my neighbor, to participate in a saying which is my responsibility, to expose myself in recognition of the trace of God in my neighbor’s face. The temporal transcendence of the divine cannot be captured in ontological language, groping with themes and constructions of logic to contain an anarchic challenge. This divine whisper runs throughout Otherwise than Being. Representing neither being nor its negation, there is indicates the haunting murmur debasing all certainty. Behind every essentialist statement, saturating all claims to pure knowledge, there is a horrifying lack of finality, a mute and anonymous rustling, beckoning each of us beyond being. As Levinas writes, ‘this ignorance and openness, an indifference to essence, is designated in the title of this book by the barbarous expression ‘otherwise than being’’.27 The quest to move beyond being stems from the ultimate impossibility of ethics within ontology. Here, Levinas turns to the story of Cain and Abel, and the former’s response to God’s question, ‘Where is Abel thy brother’? Cain replies, ‘Am I my brother’s keeper’? Levinas accepts Cain’s response as sincere, arguing that its ontological assertion ‘I am I, and he is he’ eliminates the ethical charge implicit in God’s question.28 We are our brother’s keepers, Levinas insists. To accept his assertion requires nothing less than an inversion of Greek philosophical tradition. 17 Western philosophy is rooted in essence – to be as I, to self-refer, to be active, aggressive, aware of self-need. ‘Esse is interesse; essence is interest’.29 Truth and identity proceed from one who first thinks and then expresses the fruits of self-discovery in a theme – in being. This process occurs independent of all relationality, divorced from social and spiritual interaction. One exists egoistically, impermeably; the subject is thus the initiator, the origin, the source of freedom.30 The subject is pregnant with possibilities, all concepts at once present within it. Being centers upon the competition of egos. Conflict is thus inherent to human relations. Social contract theory makes perfect sense to those who accept this primary assumption. Utilitarianism emerges as the only rational system of conflict resolution – a secular ethics born of our worst quality. Egoism transmutes into ideology, and the dialectic embraces ‘humanist rhetoric and existentialist pathetics’ to the exclusion of that which ideology can never encompass, Good.31 Levinas acknowledges that philosophy has, in rare moments, broken the boundaries of ontology and stated the beyond being; more commonly, however, philosophers have privileged essentialism.32 The human costs of this are tragically reflected in history, including that recounted above. Levinas radically reconstructs the ego so as to escape the limitations of being, and it doing so, sets himself directly at odds with a Heideggerian phenomenology of being. Heidegger’s philosophy can be read as emphasizing the Self as a body in competition and the Other as a force that constantly threatens extinction.33 The resulting obsession with one’s own death might rationally excuse aggression, between people or nations, in order to secure survival. Levinas, however, situates the person not as an entity capable of choosing to survive or expiate for another, but as one whose identity begins with 18 expiation.34 Simon Critchley eloquently summarizes this point: ‘Ethics, for Levinas, is critique; it is the critical mise en question of the liberty, spontaneity, and cognitive emprise of the ego that seeks to reduce all otherness to itself’.35 More importantly, the one, in its servitude to the Other, is irreplaceable. I cannot buy or bargain or retreat my way out of the responsibility to which I am uniquely called to serve.36 This transformation of the ego into a Self shatters ontological essence and makes possible disinterestedness – a subversion of for-the-Self to for-the-Other. Ethics depends on this movement, for ‘all human relations as human proceed from disinterestedness’.37 III. Toward an Ethics of Encounter: The Phenomenological Epistemology of the Face-to-Face Relation The question thus arises as to how a Levinasian interpretation of our relations with each other leads to an alternate understanding of political ethics, justice and the ontology of the State. In Levinas’s writings, the face-to-face relation acts as a precursor to all discussion of State legitimacy or illegitimacy. ‘A state in which the interpersonal relationship is impossible, in which it is directed in advance by the determinism proper to the state, is a totalitarian state’. 38 He therefore restores transcendence to the first order. Justice and just institutions can be accomplished only in response to the trace of God in the face of an approaching neighbor. What some call the crisis of modernity is thus the inability of Reason to respond to the very suffering it propagates – the ‘spiritual misery of the industrial era’. 39 Levinas is appalled by a world that considers the exchange of human lives for commodities to be part of a rational order, and worse, the defense of such inhumanity by appeals to principled notions including freedom. Implicit in his writing is 19 a challenge to recognize in ontological imperialism the roots of modernity’s failure, and further, to pursue the ethical relation of radical responsibility as the true path to a just polity. To begin, Levinas locates the vitality of the West in the tension between proximity (an ethic informed by religious transcendence) and peace (used here in reference to the political sphere). He defines the ethical as ‘the field outlined by the paradox of an Infinite in relationship with the finite without being belied in this relationship’. 40 That is, transcendence necessarily interrupts philosophical and political systems, infusing the latter with the possibility of ethical action, while maintaining the mysteries of transcendence. Yet, the anarchic interruption of politics by the transcendent is not competitive; Levinas’s scheme favors neither one. Instead, he postures a re-imagining of social justice with radical responsibility at the foundation. Justice must no longer be perceived as a legal system or social contract regulating human masses, or as a technique for harmonizing antagonistic forces. 41 Such would be justice based upon political expediency, rather than proximity. The judge, as the third party in a conflict, finds himself intimately bound in the ethical relation. The State, political institutions and commerce (political economy) cannot be conceived ethically outside of the one-for-the-Other because, in sociality, the plurality of Others raises the question of justice. To paraphrase Levinas, nothing is outside the control of this primary, pre-ontological ethical relation. The radical responsibility of the one-for-the-Other is characterized by a remarkable permeability, a loosening of traditional barriers associated with the sovereign Western individual, a fluidity signifying ultimate vulnerability. Essence crumbles before 20 the opening of the animate body; signification undoes identity, exposes in the manner of an unwrapped wound. 42 The very skin that hangs from my flesh becomes permeable and ceases to command the space it occupies. ‘Substitution operates in the entrails of the self, rending its inwardness, putting its identity out of phase and disrupting its recurrence’. 43 The curtain of Euclidean space draws back to reveal absolute coexistence.44 Spatial rigidity embedded in the ego, or the nation-state, fractures. Simultaneously, the one confronts the Other and the other’s Other, and the impossibility of separating the two along temporal or spatial lines. Proximity bears the problem of plurality, the problem of the third party, society. 45 Levinas describes the third party as one who interrupts the face-to-face relation and initiates the question of justice. 46 The entry of the third in no way removes or substitutes for the responsibility of the one-for-the-Other, but makes further demands upon the oneself. The third party problematizes relationality, approaching as a neighbor of the one, and a neighbor of the Other, but also other than the neighbor who approaches the one. 47 Lines of asymmetrical responsibility begin to cross and consciousness is born. My relationship with the Other who approaches makes my relationship with every neighbor meaningful; thus, for Levinas, the radical responsibility of one-for-the-Other (disinterestedness) infuses all human relations with meaning. 48 Clearly, the third party is crucial to Levinasian ethics. For example, it completely alters the relationship between the persecuted and the persecutor, for while one victim is responsible for her oppressor, she demands formal justice for the oppression of her neighbor. Levinas elaborates: For me, it would be to fail in my first-personal responsibility – in my pre-judicial responsibility with regard to the one and the other – fellowmen – were I to ignore 21 the wrongs of the one toward the other because of this responsibility, prior to all judgment, of proximity. This does not mean the taking account of possible wrongs I may have suffered at the hands of one or the other, and denying my disinterestedness; it means not ignoring the suffering of the other, who falls to my responsibility. 49 In short, Levinas calls us to social action based not on Self-interest, but on responsibility for all the Others comprising society. However, Levinas does not wish us to mistake his ideas about community with historical notions of a social contract. Thus, to avoid possible confusion, Levinas introduces the term ‘sociality’. In a personal interview, Levinas chastises the West for what he believes is a mistaken assumption of the superiority of the solitary Self. 50 He triumphs sociality above solitude, arguing that human society can only be accomplished by moral action rooted in responsibility to the Other.51 Responsibility is human fraternity; thus, solitude precludes responsibility and, by extension, the possibility of circumscribing ideological egoism and violence. 52 The sociality of which he speaks begins in the relationship between one and the Other, and it is extended with the entry of the third party – the Other’s Other. With this entry, Levinas wants to re-inform Greek philosophical tradition; that is, he aims to show how the radical responsibility of one-for-the-Other interrupts society, altering popular notions of justice, and creating a critical dialogue between the ethics of Jerusalem and the politics of Athens. This is not a purely academic exercise; rather, to witness in the face of the Other the command ‘You shalt not kill’ is already to hear ‘Social Justice’. 53 With this movement, Levinas introduces highly nuanced understandings of equality, violence, freedom, and, ultimately, the foundation of a just State. Equality. Nothing lies beyond the authority of the one-for-the-Other precisely because, in sociality, the plurality of Others raises the question of justice. The very 22 nature of my responsibility to the Other means the impossibility of passing by either the one closest to me or the one farthest off. 54 I am responsible to them all. The third party thus introduces a new reciprocity, a degree of equality – not of the rights of individuals, but of the infinite responsibility of one to all the Others. One might say consciousness occurs here at two levels: first, individual consciousness is born of the question, ‘what do I have to do with justice?’; second, social consciousness arises when the necessity of answering to all Others generates a thematization (equality) and a codification (law). The result is, as Merold Westphal points out, a ‘social order based on comparative reason in which rights are balanced against other rights, not in terms of calculating self interest but in light of the absoluteness of the original claim…justice is not the child of compromise but of disinterested obligation’. 55 Violence. According to Levinas, this transition from radical responsibility to sociality is not without a degree of violence. In fact, John Llewelyn argues that for Levinas, failure to fulfill one’s responsibility to the Other all of the time is violent. 56 Levinas claims that ‘violence is to be found in any action in which one acts as if one were alone to act; as if the rest of the universe were there only to receive the action; violence is consequently also any action which we endure without at every point collaborating in it’. 57 He hastens to distinguish, however, between the illegitimate violence of tyranny and the legitimate violence of justice. The tyrant inflicts his will upon Others with a Selfproclaimed ‘legitimate’ violence that refuses recognition of their humanity. Contrarily, the hand of the just person is compelled to action by the suffering of the Other, and the legitimacy of its violence resides in a code of ethics. What legitimates the latter is a 23 profound understanding of radical responsibility, of the need to serve all Others, and also, a subsequent recoiling from the very violence that justice demands. 58 Freedom. For a Western society that recognizes in freedom the possibility of a fulfilling existence, the lack of choice (as in Levinas’s assertion of radical responsibility) appears to be a violence precluding freedom. 59 Yet, he finds such objections coming from ‘hasty and imprudent’ reflection, from the failure to recognize that freedom actuated by responsibility liberates one from the violence characterizing a truly egoistic state of nature. 60 Responsibility precedes freedom, is a condition of it, is the means by which freedom is dignified. 61 Freedom conceived in finitude signifies goodness, the goodness that is prior to being – passive, not willful. Just as a single-cell organism is distinct from the water it inhabits only by virtue of its membrane, so too, responsibility limits the obliterating multiplicity of infinite choice and, in reifying ethical relationality, makes us humane. In other words, political ethics bound freedom. The State. Levinas sees in the commitment to a third party the call for a State. The question thus arises, if the ‘forgetting of self moves justice’, what is the origin of the just and egalitarian State in which human society finds fulfillment? 62 A common rendition of social contract theory asserts that self-interested individuals, in order to avoid endless conflict and maximize personal utility, limit freedom to secure liberty in society. But as history testifies, a society founded on an agglomeration of individuals recognizing the ‘rights’ of others only insofar as their own well-being is promoted simply trades one kind of conflict (e.g., institutional) for another (e.g., natural). The West thus seems resigned to a self-fulfilling prophecy of perpetual antagonism and war. Levinas recognizes the reductionism of secular realpolitik as the true problem plaguing Western 24 society. 63 We must wage a just war against war, he challenges, and it must be marked by a new conceptualization of death. Paul Ricoeur clarifies Levinas on this point by suggesting that rather than seeing, as Heidegger did, the possibility of Self-annihilation in the approach of the Other, we must recognize in the Other’s face the prohibition against murder and be ourselves willing to suffer or die rather than allow another to perish. 64 The new State of Levinas’s devising will be instructed by the patience necessary for true revolution, 65 one in which the passivity, the ethical relation of one-for-the-Other informs social peace. The neighbor near and the neighbor far off are to be equally respected and served, peace to and for them both made possible by the Infinite’s interruption of essence and its corollary, war. Levinas envisions a political order that seeks to raise up its lowliest members, where even the most destitute are approached in their nobility by a non-totalizing Citizen-state. He calls for an open-eyed ignorance in governance that will be enlightened, inspired and ultimately ennobling in its interior and exterior relations. Despite the prevailing significance of a turn toward the local, nation-states and international relations do not disappear in ethical political economy. The countries and peoples of the world can be said to exist as Others at a meta-level and, therefore, in ethical relation to the nation-state as a Self or one-for-the-Other. By extension, the approach of the neighbor occurs within diplomatic relations, and the emergent challenge is thus to recast the context of diplomacy. Closed-door policies, pre-encounter stipulations, ultimatums and the like have no place in diplomatic ethics. Foremost, each (whether nation-state, representative organization, ambassador or political leader) must be understood as approaching within the responsibility-centered ethical relation. 25 The Camp David Peace Accord of 1979 provides an excellent example of how such an approach might find success, one cited by Levinas himself. After thirty years of declared war, Egypt and Israel met in the U.S. to sign a treaty ending the conflict, reestablishing diplomatic relations and formally recognizing each other for the first time. Fierce antagonism seemed to preclude peace between the two nations, and yet through what Levinas calls ‘open-eyed ignorance’, 66 leaders on each side chose to de-emphasize nation-state sovereignty in favor of cooperative action. Despite ontological conditioning, political ethics can triumph over political egoism. The example of Israel and Egypt offers evidence and hope of political ethics rooted in encounter and recognition. IV. Conclusion: Restoring Relationality to International Relations Levinas’s narrative of the path from Enlightenment to Holocaust implicates not only the practice, but also the study of international relations. Over the past twenty to thirty years, the discipline has slowly evolved to include otherwise-than-positivist ideas and theories. This is due in no small part to scholarly pioneers like J. Ann Tickner, as well as to journals like Millennium that have had the vision to publish them. But the modus operandi of the field has changed very little: for all our talk about the importance of narrative, dialogue, cross-cultural research and critical theory, for all the students that we mentor and conferences that we attend, scholarly productivity is measured and hence professional advancement is tied (at least in the United States) to sole-authored publications in high-profile journals. Moreover, despite methodological divides, there is little real difference in their final form. Every article is sourced like a comprehensive exam, which fosters the illusion 26 of engagement with ‘the literature’ but in reality is closer to serial monologues. In these articles, we talk at rather than with each other; we do not have conversations, we have schools of thought. Feminism and critical race theory make in-roads, but women and minorities are still significantly underrepresented among the ranks of tenured faculty. This should not be surprising – knowledge as production, academia as business is hardly emancipatory. We are disembodied and amorphous, and though we are experts on matters of international security, how many of us have looked into the eyes of someone raped, maimed or killed in war? Thus, in keeping with Levinas’s call to re-conceptualize the ontology of the State, I suggest that we re-conceptualize the ontology of the discipline. Levinas grounds justice in the face-to-face relation, in an ethics of encounter. So, too, we should privilege scholarship that (recalling the introduction) allows us to speak meaningfully about political action in its moments of great triumph alongside its moments of deep horror, to make room in international relations for politics as the pursuit of justice and not just of publication.

# 1AC CX

Why vote aff?

* Because we win the debate

How does the judge decide that?

* By determining if the aff is a good idea

How do you solve your impacts?

* The aff

How do you get the plan enacted?

* We don’t, u vote aff if it’s a good idea

Why that model good?

* Only system that makes sense for debate, there is a value judgement inherent in the ballot that makes it break down if u abandon this model
* The fact that you are writing either “affirmative” or “negative” derives from a demarcation of us four individuals into teams with sides. This already assumes contestation, and you are adjudicating that contestation. At the end of the round, that adjudication will result in either an affirmation or a negation of what the 1ac presented.
* Since the ballot already has an inscribed value judgement in it, so two possibilities: either a.) you agree with that value judgement and thus use the ballot as a method to express your opinion on the contestation, or b.) you decide that the ballot-form is bad, in which case, why would you use the ballot-form to express that opinion? The fact that they conclude this argument with “so vote negative” proves that any decision is still tethered to the theory of contestation that substantiates the “vote aff cuz it’s a good idea” model.

Our arg is not knowledge is bad – its about enframing vs being in the world – know the world as an object we can make the world unforld – find object of truth vs being in the world presumes its something inextrimicble from what we are – process of unfolding

Skills vs ontological approach – what students learn vs who they become – less skills/knowledge, more understanding/reflection/contemplation

# Case

## Overview

### 1AR – O/V

#### The world is in a constant state of becoming and flux – life is defined by continual struggle for existence – within this, education, debate and standardized testing lock us into a static being, a war against flux, that attempts to homogenize and assimilate all to achieve ultimate technical efficiency – students are then taught to become cogs in the machine of capitalism and that the values of efficiency hegemony are intrinsic and not political [this also creates nationalism and reinforces military might as consumers have nothing left to identify with, creating nationalistic violence against the other and legitimizes eugenic violence against bodies reduced to pure genetics] Independently, it creates ressentiment as existence is smothered by the denial of becoming, teaching us to live in fear of flux

#### Against this, we should think ontologically – understand the world as a complex, dynamic source of information and flux, and, instead of running from this or trying to control and tame it, embracing it and creating alternative solutions within it – this collapses militarized us vs them distinctions and allows for a peaceful ethic of social justice and care that resolves the antagonistic violence that plagues modernity

### 1AR – O/V New

#### The world is in a constant state of flux – life is defined by continual struggle for existence – within this, education, debate and standardized testing lock us into a static being against flux that attempts to homogenize all to achieve ultimate technical efficiency and use-value – that creates nihilism as we can no longer see bodies as anything other than resources precluding value – students become cogs in the machine of capitalism, taught that values of efficiency and hegemony are intrinsic and not political, creating nationalistic violence against the other as consumers have nothing to identify with but the nation-state – this results in a perception of the world as an object to be controlled and ressentiment as we live in fear of the flux and deny all becoming

#### against this, we should see the world as something inextricable from ourselves through a form of ontological thinking that sees existence as complex and dynamic and that embraces that instead of running from the chaos or trying to tame it – this collapses the subject/object distinction [which turns all their war impacts] and allows for a peaceful ethic of social justice and care that resolves the antagonistic violence that plagues modernity

#### [with impact turns] – absent that we get serial policy failure – the attempt to master the world to resolve [x] just creates spirals of violence as we create new ecological crises, econ collapse and drone strikes

### 2AR – O/V

The world is in a constant state of becoming – education debate and testing attempt to luck us into being and end all chaos, assimilating all difference to achieve technical efficience as students are taught to become cogs of capitalism, without ever learning that those market values are at their heart political – [this creates violent nationalistic violence as individuals are left with no identity but that of the nation state and allows for violence against the scientifically dehumanized body]. That also creates ressentiment as all becoming is denied, teaching us to fear living life in the flux.

Against this, we defend ontological thinking, understanding the world as flux and embracing and living in it rather than running away or trying to control it – that collapses violent us vs them distinctions that cause otherization and allows for an ethic of care for the world

### 2AR – Overview – New

The world is in a constant state of becoming – education debate and testing attempt to luck us into being and end all chaos, assimilating all difference to achieve technical efficience as students are taught to become cogs of capitalism, without ever learning that those market values are at their heart political – [this creates violent nationalistic violence as individuals are left with no identity but that of the nation state and allows for violence against the scientifically dehumanized body]. That also creates ressentiment as all becoming is denied, teaching us to fear living life in the flux. Indipendantly, the valuation of use-value over all else precludes meaning bc we see ourselves as nothing more than resources which destroys vtl

Against this, we defend ontological thinking, understanding the world as flux and embracing and living in it rather than running away or trying to control it – that collapses violent us vs them distinctions that cause otherization and allows for an ethic of care for the world

## AT: Case

### AT: Heidegger’s a Nazi

#### No impact – Heidegger both supported and later critiqued Nazism – we only use later sources that only use his later writing that is adamantly anti-Nazi – if they say “it’s about what they justify” then make them draw an actual internal link about how our approach leads to Nazism

#### We aren’t Heidegger – we just use some of his terms to explain the world – literally all of philosophy after the 1960s uses them bc he was really influential

#### Link turn – they’re Nazism – [explain]

### ---Card

#### His nazism wasn’t a result of his philosophical theorizing – he was blindsided by a life-long fascination with german traditionalism

McManus 19

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Heidegger’s writings during that period seem to reflect this new emphasis, reaching a pitch in his criticisms of liberalism and communism, and his suggestion that Nazi Germany had a unique destiny in rescuing the Western world. Some of this may also be attributable to personal arrogance on Heidegger’s part, and his belief that a totalitarian political movement could carry out the kind of sweeping philosophical reforms he wished to see take place on a grand scale. Heidegger later admitted that he was naïve when it came to politics, though I think his lover Hannah Arendt expressed it better. He was a great fool to think that Nazism, a hyper-modern totalitarian movement bent on world conquest and the submission of all individual wills to Adolph Hitler, was an ideological instrument useful to the project of creating a more authentic world. It is likely that his own life-long attraction to German traditionalism and national identity blinded him to the extremism of its policies. Ironically, in his efforts to escape from the world of the “they,” he submitted his immense philosophical intelligence to the most inauthentic movement imaginable. Conclusion: What Can We Learn from Heidegger Heidegger was one of the greatest philosophers in the twentieth century, despite his contemptible politics. There remains much we can learn from him, if we take care to isolate the gems of insight from the dangerous currents underneath. This is often a challenge whenever one is dealing with a critique of modernity that is powerful enough to be convincing. One must always take care not to trade the imperfect for the tyrannical. Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity remains more pressing than ever in our postmodern culture. Many people believe that our purpose in life remains a form of self-satisfaction. Today, however, this includes an emphasis on the expression of a given identity, various forms of left-wing agitation, and the emergence of postmodern conservatism. At his best, Heidegger would warn us that this emphasis on identity can lead us to live inauthentic existences. The efforts of postmodern conservatives to provide stability for their sense of identity by excluding those who are different reflects this tendency; a temptation Heidegger himself fell into against the better inclinations of his philosophy. We long for a sense of stability in our identities, but this longing is antithetical to the quest for true authenticity. What we must recognize is that identity is always unstable because it is framed by the tasks we set for ourselves. Our identity is always unstable because an authentic person is always seeking to become something greater than they were before. The choice available is to accept this instability or retreat into the world of the “they.”

### AT: University Good

### ---AT: Research/Etc

### AT: Fatalist

#### This arg misinterprets our theory

Thomson 2k – Iain Thomson is a professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico. The author of two books and dozens of articles in philosophical journals, essay collections, and reference works, Thomson is a leading expert on the thought of Martin Heidegger and his potential contributions to our thinking about education From the Question Concerning Technology to the Quest for a Democratic Technology: Heidegger, Marcuse, Feenberg, Inquiry, 43:2, 203-215, msm

But for Feenberg, Heidegger’s faith in Gelassenheit is too ‘nostalgic’ (p. 199) and passive; Heidegger’s ‘fatalism’ gives over too much human autonomy to the technological order. In fact, Feenberg’s fundamental objection appropriates Marcuse’s most powerful political criticism of Heidegger. As Marcuse put it, Heidegger succumbed to a ‘hopeless heteronomism’, that is, he lost faith in the Enlightenment’s understanding of freedom as the capacity for substantive rational self-determination, the ability to direct the ends as well as the means of human life. Feenberg expresses this Marcusean criticism in a Marxist register: Heidegger is a ‘technological fetishist’ (p. viii). In the Marxist vocabulary, fetishism occurs when a ‘social relation between men’ assumes ‘the fantastic form of a relation between things’.21 For a Marxist (and let us not forget that critical theory is post-Marxian Marxism), to fetishize something is to detach it from the human labor that produced it but to continue nevertheless to project human meanings upon it, mistaking these projections for an independent reality. The fetishist’s anthropomorphic projection endows a humanly created thing with the magical appearance of possessing a telos independent of human ends. Heidegger’s technological fetishism is visible in the fact that, in his view (as Feenberg reconstructs it), ‘technology rigidi es into destiny’ (p. 14). But just as Feenberg downplays the active element in Gelassenheit, so here he overlooks the fact that for Heidegger enframing is our ‘destiny’, but it is not necessarily our ‘fate’. As Dreyfus puts it, ‘although our understanding of things and ourselves as resources to be ordered, enhanced, and used efficiently has been building up since Plato and dominates our practices, we are not stuck with it. It is not the way things have to be, but nothing more or less than our current cultural clearing’. In fact, the critical force of Heidegger’s ‘history of being’ comes from his hope for a new historical beginning in which we would no longer treat everything as resources to be optimized.

### AT: Regressive

#### Heidegger isn’t regressive

Thomson 19 – Iain Thomson is a professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico. The author of two books and dozens of articles in philosophical journals, essay collections, and reference works, Thomson is a leading expert on the thought of Martin Heidegger and his potential contributions to our thinking about education. We have never been postmodern, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 50:14, 1322-1323, msm

In Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity, I seek to show that Heidegger is best understood not simply as another regressive or reactionary ‘antimodernist’ but, instead, as a potentially progressive and so still promising ‘postmodernist.’ My perhaps perverse hope here is to help rehabilitate a term that has become thoroughly ‘unfashionable’ (or unzeitgemäß, as Nietzsche put it, literally ‘not cut to the measure of the time’). Heidegger contends in Being and Time that a formerly hyper-trendy term like postmodern ‘can first become free in its positive possibilities only when the idle chatter covering it over has become ineffectual and the “common” interest has died away.’ In other words, once everyone stops talking about ‘The Next Big Thing’ (like our fabled visions of ‘postmodernity’), it becomes possible to understand what was so inspiring about it in the first place, letting us uncover those enduringly inspirational sources that tend to get obscured by the noise that engulfs a major trend during its heyday (see Thomson, 2011, pp. 1–6, 213–20). Heidegger teaches us to be highly critical of modernity’s metaphysical foundations, including (1) its axiomatic positing of the Cartesian cogito as the epistemological foundation of intelligibility; (2) the ontological subject/object dualism generated by (1); (3) the fact/value dichotomy that follows from (1) and (2); and (4) the growing nihilism (or meaninglessness) that follows (in part) from (3), that is, from the belief that what matters most to us world-disclosing beings can be understood as ‘values’ projected by human subjects onto an inherently meaningless realm of objects (see Thomson, 2004a, 2011, pp. 53–62). I still find myself provoked and inspired by Heidegger’s phenomenological efforts to undermine modern Cartesian ‘subjectivism,’ but I remain even more concerned with Heidegger’s subsequent deconstruction of late-modern ‘enframing’ (Gestell), that is, with his ontological critique of global technologization, especially with the ongoing objectification of subjectivity that transforms the self into just another resource to be optimized, as in the growing monoculture of ‘educational outcomes assessment’ (see Thomson, 2005, pp. 141–181). Here, however, it is crucial to recognize that the later Heidegger’s overarching goal is not only to undermine but also to transcend modernity, to help guide us into a postmodern understanding of being. The interconnected and enduringly important issues I focus on thus include (1) Heidegger’s constructive critique of Western metaphysics as ontotheology; (2) the ways in which the Nietzschean ontotheology underlying our own late-modern age generates troublingly nihilistic effects in our ongoing technologization of our worlds and ourselves; and (3) Heidegger’s complementary vision of learning to transcend such technological nihilism through ontological education, that is, an education centered on the ‘perfectionist’ task of ‘becoming what we are’ or coming into our own as human beings leading meaningful lives. It is here, I try to show, that we can find compelling phenomenological and hermeneutic reasons that help explain (4) the enduring appeal of Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian visions of postmodernity and so also of (5) the continuing relevance of art and poetry in helping us learn to understand being in more enduringly meaningful, postmodern ways, allowing us to transform the nihilistic ontology that underlies most contemporary views on education (see esp. Thomson, 2004b, 2005, 2016).

### AT: Util

#### Any value system that starts with utility as its rubric for determining inclusion ends in violent interpersonal relationships – anyone found to be non-productive is disposable – we have to justify our own existence which is precisely the position Nazi Germany put Jews in as once they were not helpful they were eliminated

### AT: Extinction 1st

#### Extinction not first – it’s infinitely regressive – evaluating it as prior in every instance makes violence inevitable and precludes value

#### Independently – if life is a net negative then extinction isn’t bad

## AT: Theory

### 2AC – Value Theory

#### The idea that voting negative on rejoinder is value neutral is false – it presumes that we should preserve the current rules of debate which themselves are tautological – it’s impossible to escape

### 2AC – Structural Inherency

#### C/I – all the other types of inherency

#### The aff is structurally inherent – framework is a barrier which all the DAs on that flow will prove

#### Framework impact turns any reason why Structural Inherency is good or important

### AT: New Affs Bad

#### C/I – we don’t have to disclose new affirmatives

#### 1. New affs are good – they create a strategic incentive to research through the ability to not disclose new which pushes the community towards aff innovation and exploring new areas of literature.

#### 2. Coaching skews mean pre round prep is not an actionable standard – obviously small schools can never take advantage of preround disclosure when a team has 17 coaches cutting case negs and updates before the round

#### 3. No brightline – theory shouldn’t be about best out of round practices. That inevitably devolves to "you were a few minutes late, took too long with coaches before disclosure, etc. all of which are at the expense of substance.

## AT: Cap Good

### 1AR – Top

#### No link – we’re SPECIFIC TO DEBATE and analysis here does not scale – they must win advantages to capitalist subjectivities in the context of debate – prefer this model of competition: it’s the only tangible and transformative education we can garner – extrapolating us to other situations for the sake of clash is the same will to equitable debate we critique which means case is a DA – that’s not severance – the desires analyzed in the 1AC don’t scale to the analysis of a political body which is exactly the argument we’ll make on framework

#### Err aff on evidence – capitalism creates epistemic blindspots that are used to hide its structural contradictions

### AT: Transition Wars

#### The 1AC creates new possibilities not currently imaginable which means you should hold their analysis to this context – their transition wars analysis anticipates prior methods of rejecting capitalism

#### The 1AC is specific to our speech acts and their implications which means any transition wars impact at best amounts to the PRL 2.0 which failed anyway

#### They’re myths

Kassiola 3. Dean at San Francisco State, Joel Jay, “Questions to Ponder in Understanding the Modern Predicament”, Explorations in Environmental Political Theory, ed. Kassiola, M.E. Sharpe

As we reflect upon the causes of the potentially lethal modern predicament, we face the central question of how modern societal trans­formation will occur. This raises the concomitant, apparently insur­mountable, obstacle of the current elite’s opposition to such change in values and social institutions: How will the rich accept the lower material levels necessitated by environmental limits, and create a more just world order through a redistribution of wealth and power? The unhappy experience and knowledge of increasing environmental degradation with threats to all planetary life should move the industrial rich to recognize the self-defeating and unsatisfactory nature of modern values and social practices. They may come to accept the necessity of a new, postmodern social order, one not so characterized by the ideolo­gies of capitalism, industrialism, and Hobbesianism. In this new order citizens—including the rich—can have more leisure time to experience and contemplate the nonmaterial and more fulfilling aspects of the hu­man condition, like nature.

### AT: Democracy

#### Stats go aff

Gilens and Page 14. Martin, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and Benjamin, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making at Northwestern University, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, American Political Science Association, Perspectives on Politics, September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3, p. 575-577

Each of our four theoretical traditions (Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Interest-Group Pluralism, and Biased Pluralism) emphasizes different sets of actors as critical in determining U.S. policy outcomes, and each tradition has engendered a large empirical literature that seems to show a particular set of actors to be highly influential. Yet nearly all the empirical evidence has been essentially bivariate. Until very recently it has not been possible to test these theories against each other in a systematic, quantitative fashion. By directly pitting the predictions of ideal-type theories against each other within a single statistical model (using a unique data set that includes imperfect but useful measures of the key independent variables for nearly two thousand policy issues), we have been able to produce some striking findings. One is the nearly total failure of “median voter” and other Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy. The failure of theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy is all the more striking because it goes against the likely effects of the limitations of our data. The preferences of ordinary citizens were measured more directly than our other independent variables, yet they are estimated to have the least effect. Nor do organized interest groups substitute for direct citizen influence, by embodying citizens’ will and ensuring that their wishes prevail in the fashion postulated by theories of Majoritarian Pluralism. Interest groups do have substantial independent impacts on policy, and a few groups (particularly labor unions) represent average citizens’ views reasonably well. But the interest-group system as a whole does not. Overall, net interest-group alignments are not significantly related to the preferences of average citizens. The net alignments of the most influential, business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes. So existing interest groups do not serve effectively as transmission belts for the wishes of the populace as a whole. “Potential groups” do not take up the slack, either, since average citizens’ preferences have little or no independent impact on policy after existing groups’ stands are controlled for. Furthermore, the preferences of economic elites (as measured by our proxy, the preferences of “affluent” citizens) have far more independent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens do. To be sure, this does not mean that ordinary citizens always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically-elite citizens who wield the actual influence. Of course our findings speak most directly to the “first face” of power: the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But they also reflect—to some degree, at least—the “second face” of power: the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers consider. The set of policy alternatives that we analyze is considerably broader than the set discussed seriously by policy makers or brought to a vote in Congress, and our alternatives are (on average) more popular among the general public than among interest groups. Thus the fate of these policies can reflect policy makers’ refusing to consider them rather than considering but rejecting them. (From our data we cannot distinguish between the two.) Our results speak less clearly to the “third face” of power: the ability of elites to shape the public’s preferences.49 We know that interest groups and policy makers themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping opinion. If they are successful, this might help explain the high correlation we find between elite and mass preferences. But it cannot have greatly inflated our estimate of average citizens’ influence on policy making, which is near zero. What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it. A possible objection to populistic democracy is that average citizens are inattentive to politics and ignorant about public policy; why should we worry if their poorly informed preferences do not influence policy making? Perhaps economic elites and interest-group leaders enjoy greater policy expertise than the average citizen does. Perhaps they know better which policies will benefit everyone, and perhaps they seek the common good, rather than selfish ends, when deciding which policies to support. But we tend to doubt it. We believe instead that— collectively—ordinary citizens generally know their own values and interests pretty well, and that their expressed policy preferences are worthy of respect.50 Moreover, we are not so sure about the informational advantages of elites. Yes, detailed policy knowledge tends to rise with income and status. Surely wealthy Americans and corporate executives tend to know a lot about tax and regulatory policies that directly affect them. But how much do they know about the human impact of Social Security, Medicare, food stamps, or unemployment insurance, none of which is likely to be crucial to their own well-being? Most important, we see no reason to think that informational expertise is always accompanied by an inclination to transcend one’s own interests or a determination to work for the common good. All in all, we believe that the public is likely to be a more certain guardian of its own interests than any feasible alternative. Leaving aside the difficult issue of divergent interests and motives, we would urge that the superior wisdom of economic elites or organized interest groups should not simply be assumed. It should be put to empirical test. New empirical research will be needed to pin down precisely who knows how much, and what, about which public policies. Our findings also point toward the need to learn more about exactly which economic elites (the “merely affluent”? the top 1 percent? the top one-tenth of 1 percent?) have how much impact upon public policy, and to what ends they wield their influence. Similar questions arise about the precise extent of influence of particular sets of organized interest groups. And we need to know more about the policy preferences and the political influence of various actors not considered here, including political party activists, government officials, and other noneconomic elites. We hope that our work will encourage further exploration of these issues. Despite the seemingly strong empirical support in previous studies for theories of majoritarian democracy, our analyses suggest that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts. Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened. Clearly, when one holds constant net interest-group alignments and the preferences of affluent Americans, it makes very little difference what the general public thinks. The probability of policy change is nearly the same (around 0.3) whether a tiny minority or a large majority of average citizens favor a proposed policy change (refer to the top panel of figure 1).

### AT: Disease

#### 1. Capitalism encourages ineffective responses to disease crises – Ebola proves.

Wood 14. Preston, 10-8-2014, "The Ebola crisis and capitalism," Liberation News, https://www.liberationnews.org/diagnosis-of-shame-the-ebola-crisis-in-the-capitalist-world/

While the World Bank, the United States and Europeans are now promising to build hospitals and clinics, it is unlikely that many such projects will come to fruition. The United States has explicitly stated that U.S. personnel would not staff the centers. Clearly, the U.S. medical system once again has shown itself to be unable and unwilling to prepare to cope with a major epidemic, where, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, 1.4 million people will be infected by the year 2015. Under capitalism, reserve cadres of trained health care workers are not available to be mobilized to combat an outbreak of such a disease, whether it is due to the spread of a virus or the aftermath of a natural disaster such as a hurricane or earthquake. There’s no profit in treating people in need. While vast sums of money flow into the U.S. war machine, where endless billions are spent on weapons of mass destruction aimed at civilian populations around the world, the inequalities of the society come into stark view when a large medical crisis occurs. Racism, denial of access to poor people to health care without adequate insurance, uneven levels of care, inadequate staffing and training of health care workers, all come into play. Surrounding the recent surge of Ebola infections, people in Africa and people living overseas from Africa are being blamed, scapegoated and demonized across the span of television, radio and social media. In the capitalist world, science, reason, compassion and care are submerged while hysteria, bigotry, fear and panic flourish. Instead of mobilizing the scientific and health care community to find organizational pathways to control the spread of the virus, instead of supporting those infected, and instead of educating and mobilizing public opinion towards a collective effort to combat and stop the epidemic, chaos rules and suffering flourishes. Quarantine, a necessary means of controlling a highly contagious pathogen, becomes a brutal lock-down. In Dallas, the family of the deceased was locked in their tiny apartment, unable to leave.

#### 2. It’s not like science goes away after the affirmative and disease prevention can still occur – it’s ridiculous to assume the opposite

### AT: Human Nature

#### Even if we are biologically predisposed to favor the in-group over the out-group that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t reject manifestations of it like racism and xenophobia

### AT: Environment

#### Capitalism guarantees environmental destruction—eco-reforms are coopted by corporate interests who place their goals before societies guaranteeing continued eco-destruction

Smith 5. Richard, *The Engine of Eco Collapse*, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism Vol 16 Iss 4, Proquest

In the last part of the book, Diamond turns to our current crisis and lists a dozen critical environmental problems that, he says, will doom our own society unless we solve them. We all know what these problems are: global warming, fossil fuel consumption, natural habitat destruction, species extinction, fresh water consumption, industrial pollution, etc. And we also all know, at least in broad terms, what we must do to solve these problems: urgently wean ourselves off fossil fuels, stop deforestation, find alternative energy sources, stop overfishing and hunting species to extinction, stop dumping toxics in the environment, and so on. So if we all know what needs to be done and have the advantage of hindsight, w**hy aren't we doing it?** Why aren't we "choosing to succeed?" The short answer is that under capitalism, the choices we need to make are not up to "society," while the ruling classes are incapable of making sustainable choices. In Chapter 9, Diamond relates some success stories-mostly those of small Pacific Island societies-where economic and environmental decisions were up to "society." Unlike Easter Island or Mayan society, these were small tribal village democracies where there were no distinctions of rank or class and no elite/mass conflict. Diamond's favorite example is the highland society of New Guinea. Over thousands of years they built a mini-Switzerland of interrelated villages, terraced farms and tree plantations. The society was, and still is today, chiefless. Within each village diere are just individuals and so-called "big-men" with no special privileges, who by force of personality, intelligence and experience were more influential than other individuals but still lived in a hut and tilled a garden like everyone else's. "Decisions were (and often still are today) reached by means of everybody in the village sitting down together and talking, and talking, and talking. The big-men couldn't give orders, and they might or might not succeed in persuading others to adopt their proposals." Diamond remarks that "To outsiders today (including not just me but often New Guinea government officials themselves), that bottom-up approach to decision-making can be frustrating, because you can't get a quick answer to your request; you have to have the patience to endure talk-talk-talk for hours or days with every villager who has some opinion to offer." (pp. 284-85). But it works. By getting everyone's input and approval, New Guinea societies successfully ensured consensus, rationally managed their economy, society, and environment-and survived sustainably for more than 40,000 years. **But ours is not a "bottom-up" democratic society.** In our capitalist society, ownership and control of the economy are largely in the hands of private corporations who pursue their own ends and don't answer to society. And that's the problem. So it seems curious, even perverse, that when Diamond turns to address our contemporary environmental crisis, he inexplicably forgets his own lesson and presents no comparable exploration of contradictory (class) interests and (class) conflict in modern capitalist society. This is unfortunate because Diamond's reluctance to discard his own pro-market "core values" prevents him from applying the same critical analysis to our own society that he so effectively deploys to analyze pre-modern societies. The fact that he fails to do so makes his book weakest in its concluding "What-do-we-do-now?" chapters on big business and the environment. For after stressing the need for urgent radical change to avert collapse, Diamond then ignores the systemic problems of capitalism that stand in the way of that needed radical change and instead, falls back on the standard tried-and-failed strategy of lobbying, consumer boycotts, eco labeling, green marketing, asking corporations to adopt benign "best practices," and so on-the stock-in-trade strategy of the environmental lobbying industry that has proven so impotent to date against the global capitalist juggernaut of eco-destruction. Of course this is not at all to demean reforms. Lots of problems can be and have been significantly ameliorated and even solved without overturning the economic system. **But despite significant victories here and there**, the big problems-global warming, deforestation, overfishing, pollution, resource exhaustion, species extinction, and environmentally caused human health problems-are not getting better. They are getting worse. And they are getting worse because **environmental reforms are always and everywhere subordinated to profit and growth.**

### AT: War

#### War is not down but rather IMPLOSIVE and INSIDIOUS – while the United States has technically not declared war since the 70s, we have still seen the instantiation of dictators in Iran and South America, and the violence in Iraq and worldwide – this proves that these wars are not counted as traditional but are violent nonetheless.

## AT: Heg Good

### 1AR – Top

#### Top level – you should have a high threshold when comparing this to 1AC ev – our authors assume theirs but their authors definitely aren’t assuming ours

#### We don’t link – our ethic of radical responsibility doesn’t preclude interventions, it just means they should stay defensive, peaceful and consensual

#### Heg is unsustainable

Slaughter 17 (Anne-Marie, Anne-Marie Slaughter is the President and CEO of New America, a think ​and action tank dedicated to renewing America in the Digital Age. She is also the Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor Emerita of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. From 2009–2011 she served as director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State, the first woman to hold that position. She received a B.A. from Princeton, an M.Phil and D.Phil in international relations from Oxford, where she was a Daniel M. Sachs Scholar, and a J.D. from Harvard. “The Return of Anarchy?” *Journal of International Affairs* <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/return-anarchy>)NFleming

Barack Obama re-embraced multilateralism with logic and fervor. The United States needed to prove that it was once again a good global citizen, not only to uphold and strengthen a rules-based order at a time when rising and returning powers were increasingly challenging those rules, but also to leverage and extend America’s declining resources as much as possible. Rushing to fix every crisis, with diplomacy, sanctions, or the threat or use of force, raised expectations the United States could not, and should not, try to meet. The Security Council, meanwhile, returned to its Cold War habits, meaning that multilateralism is once again a prescription for inaction. By Obama’s lights, he has played an honorable game; he also made a virtue of necessity, recommitting to the global order to reduce imperial overstretch. The next four to eight years may well see the end of the United Nations as a serious forum for global decisionmaking about peace and security. That may sound melodramatic, but consider Frederic Hof’s characterization of “the West” in the Washington Post as a “hollow, demoralized, leaderless coalition of the frightened and unwilling.” Hof warns of the consequences of standing by and watching as the Syrian government and its allies systematically killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and destroyed the country to “save” it. “Having protected no Syrians from mass murder; having given Russia, the regime, and Iran a green light to do as they wished by chanting endlessly about there being no ‘military solution’ to the problem of Syria; having watched the Kremlin draw lessons from Syria to apply in Europe—where does it now end?” Now ask yourself what a Trump presidency will do to change any of that. He and his generals will be highly willing to fight the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and any other terrorist groups that could strike America. They will be completely unwilling to use force to stop a government’s treatment of its own people, no matter how savage, and inclined to cut deals with other great powers that allow the big players to have spheres of interest, in the best nineteenth-century style. After all, what is most important is to make the world safe for business. Based on the extrapolation of current trends (a foolhardy thing to do, but often the only alternative), I see the following dangers shaking and perhaps toppling the current world order. A Transactional America. Obama expressed one of the fundamental precepts of his foreign policy in the 2010 National Security Strategy: “America has not succeeded by stepping outside the currents of international cooperation. We have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice.” His was an institutional America, committed to alliances and organizations that the victors of World War II created and developed to safeguard, however imperfectly, global peace and prosperity. Trump’s will be a transactional America, looking for the best deal it can get to advance its interests wherever, whenever, and with whomever. UN approval will become a nice-to-have rather than a need-to-have. A Preoccupied Europe. Even the cloudiest crystal ball yields this prediction. Although I am a euro-optimist over the long term, meaning that I believe that European integration will survive and will prove to be a powerful precedent for other regions over a century or so, the European Union has no bandwidth for anything other than its own internal challenges. EU countries may be able to pull together on issues like refugees and direct threats to regional security, but European leaders will step back from global leadership for the foreseeable future. The strongest traditional partner for the United States, Great Britain, is contending with the same war-weariness and public mistrust of government-led foreign misadventures as the U.S. government is. Chinese and Russian Cynicism. Both China and Russia have a major stake in preserving the current UN-based order because both are permanent members of the Security Council with the right to veto resolutions that contravene their national interests. Both nations talk a good game with developing countries, periodically presenting themselves as BRICS—emerging or at least returning powers. But when it comes to the world order, they are deeply status quo. They show much less interest in actually using the Security Council to authorize actual action (as opposed to resolutions “deploring” or “regretting” action taken by other nations) to bolster global peace and security. Both are willing to authorize almost any kind of action taken in the name of fighting global terrorism, because their governments are genuinely afraid of terrorism and because labeling their domestic opponents “terrorists” has proved handy. Overall, however, a United Nations used as a prestige platform by Russia and China and a hand-writing forum by everyone else will become steadily more irrelevant to anything but global humanitarian issues. Value-Free Foreign Policy. In 1945, the most important article in the UN Charter was 2(4), by which all UN members pledge not to use force against the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of any state. The goal was to avoid a repeat of the two great world wars that humanity had endured over thirty years. The Security Council was supposed to act whenever a state broke this pledge, deploying the resources of all states against the aggressor, in furtherance of the opening line of the preamble, to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Over time, however, the second clause of the preamble has become more and more salient, promising “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” That provision gave rise to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, and a host of human rights treaties and resolutions commanding the assent—at least on paper—of almost all nations. Even the sovereignty guardians (many of them with the bitter experience of imperialist interventions behind them) have steadily recognized that unless the international community cares about what happens to citizens and not just states, chaos, terrorism, lawlessness, disease, and mass migration result. But although these values will continue to adorn the “whereas clauses” of UN resolutions, they will be merely a screen for the classic pursuit of great-power interests. Rising Regional Institutions. In the absence of meaningful action by global institutions, regional organizations will have no choice but to fill the vacuum. NATO is an experienced practitioner of this game, although NATO members much prefer to act with UN authorization whenever possible. The African Union has also played a valuable security role with UN authorization over the past several decades and the Organization of American States may now be reinvigorated with the United States finally able to talk to Cuba again. The coming disintegration of Venezuela will test OAS resolve and offer a harbinger of either continued inertia or more active things to come. ASEAN has also stepped up its level of activity in recent years, which was made easier by the thaw between the United States and Myanmar. But we will also see more activity from newer regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other new regional and particularly sub-regional organizations, that can usefully serve the interests of the biggest power in the neighborhood, just as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States authorized the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. The United States will be getting a taste of its own medicine, as it did with Warsaw Pact authorizations of Soviet incursions during the Cold War. But with a growing number of powers using these tactics, the world will be a more chaotic place.

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### 1AR – In Round Only

#### No link – we’re SPECIFIC TO DEBATE and analysis here does not scale – they must win advantages to capitalist subjectivities in the context of debate – prefer this model of competition: it’s the only tangible and transformative education we can garner – extrapolating us to other situations for the sake of clash is the same will to equitable debate we critique which means case is a DA – that’s not severance – the desires analyzed in the 1AC don’t scale to the analysis of a political body which is exactly the argument we’ll make on framework

# Framework

## 1AR

### 1AR – Top

#### We meet – we’re an embrace of non-standardized education – they still get access to all their topic disads – this is defense to all their standards

#### Counterinterp – affirmatives must reject the imposition of standardization onto education

### 1AR – DAs

#### Vote aff –

#### First is technomanagerial violence – approaching policy w/ a “what works” mindset occludes debates over structural conditions that create violence – 1AC Clarke – that recreates all the 1ac impacts and turns all their idea-testing standards because we never consider the ideologies that brought us the knowledge – that prevents analysis of ontological becoming and neoliberalism – and it outweighs – communication is more intrinsic to the game than fairness

#### Second is bodies as resources – 1AC Kalanges – when the only value in debate becomes knowledge production [as proven by skills/etc], anyone deemed not useful is excluded manifesting in debaters striking all black judges because they aren’t conducive to a “good valuable policy debate” and excludes all value which creates nihilism which is impacted out on case – they position students as resources of debate

#### Third is knowledge as production – 1AC Thomson – the logic of things only being worthwhile if we can test them recreates exclusion of all things not value-maximized which creates nihilism – in opposition, we should use debate to comes to terms with what it means to exist in the world – that allows for genuine meaning to exist

### 1AR – Theory of Communication

#### Their model of communicative rationality forecloses genuine communication – this is a conceded thesis claim from the 1ac – extend Clarke – [it’s WAY better than their \_\_\_ card] – modern debate’s attempt to achieve complete rationality, truth and consensus through successive debates [as proven by their idea testing/skills/research standards] only serves to naturalize the mindset we started with – despite posturing about the failures of education and testing, we’ll just redeem the university and modern metaphysics – that leads to eugenic exclusion of all outside that paradigm and a denial of the political nature of those beliefs, as we leave debates thinking that something is normatively right rather than that opinion being politically influenced and disenchantment with modern politics

#### That turns their

#### [Idea testing] offense because playing within the rules of normative thinking just reinforces that type of thinking – only our model of debate can allow for more creative critiques from outside the system

#### [Fairness] offense because it presumes playing the game is good – they are tautological because they say that we ought to preserve the game because it’s a game and games are good which isn’t a reason why the game itself or fairness matters

#### Independently that comes before fairness – communication is more intrinsic to the game than fairness – it’s called debate not fair debate

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### ---T/ Idea Testing – Long

#### Idea testing – only working within that normative thinking just creates self-perpetuation of knowledge

Thomson 5 – Iain, Professor of Philosophy University of New Mexico. “Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education.” Cambridge University Press, 2005

Put simply, Heidegger holds that our metaphysicians’ ontological understandings of what entities are ‘as such’ ground intelligibility from the inside-out (as it were), while their theological understandings of the way in which the ‘totality’ of beings exist simultaneously secure the intelligible order from the outside-in. Western history’s successive constellations of intelligibility are thus ‘doubly grounded’ in a series of ontotheologically structured understandings of ‘the being of beings’ (das Sein des Seienden), understandings, that is, of both what and how beings are, or of ‘the totality of beings as such’ (as Heidegger puts it above).8 This account answers our worry; for although none of these ontotheological grounds has served the history of intelligibility as an unshakeable ‘foundation’ (Grund), nor have any of the major ontotheologies instantly given way like a groundless ‘abyss’ (Abgrund). Rather, each ontotheology has served its historical constellation of intelligibility as an Ungrund, ‘a perhaps necessary appearance of ground’, that is, as that point at which ontological inquiry comes to a rest.9 Because each ontotheology serves for a time as the point where ‘the spade turns’ (as Wittgenstein put it), the history of intelligibility has taken the form of a series of relatively durable, overlapping historical ‘epochs’ rather than either a single monolithic understanding of what-is or a formless ontological  ux.10 Thus metaphysics, by repeatedly supplying intelligibility with dual ontotheological anchors, is able ‘to hold back’ (epoche) the  oodwaters of intelligibility for a time – the time of an Heidegger on Ontological Education 247 ‘epoch’. It is this ‘overlapping’ historical series of ontotheologically grounded epochs that Heidegger calls the history of being. 2. The History of Being as the Ground of Education With this philosophical background in place, we can now understand the reasoning behind Heidegger’s claim that our changing historical understanding of ‘education’ is grounded in the history of being.11 Heidegger defends a kind of ontological holism: By giving shape to our historical understanding of ‘what is’, metaphysics determines the most basic presuppositions of what anything is, including ‘education’. As he puts it: ‘Western humanity, in all its comportment toward beings, and even toward itself, is in every respect sustained and guided by metaphysics.’12 The ‘great metaphysicians’ focus and disseminate an ontotheological understanding of what and how beings are, thereby establishing the most basic conceptual parameters and ultimate standards of legitimacy for their historical epochs. These ontotheologies function historically like self-fulfilling prophecies, reshaping intelligibility from the ground up. For as a new ontotheological understanding of what and how beings are takes hold and spreads, it transforms our basic understanding of what all entities are.13 Our understanding of education is ‘made possible’ by the history of being, then, since when our understanding of what beings are changes historically, our understanding of what ‘education’ is transforms as well. This conclusion is crucial; not only does it answer the question that has guided us thus far, it positions us to understand what exactly Heidegger finds objectionable about our contemporary understanding of education (and the educational institutions which embody this understanding). For Heidegger, our changing historical understanding of what ‘education’ is has its place in an historical series of ontological ‘epochs’, holistic constellations of intelligibility which are themselves grounded in a series of ontotheological understandings of what and how beings are. In order fully to comprehend Heidegger’s critique of contemporary education, then, we need to answer three interrelated questions: First, what exactly is the nature of our own ontological epoch? Second, in which ontotheology is our constellation of intelligibility grounded? And third, how has this underlying ontotheology shaped our present understanding of education? I will take these questions in order. Heidegger’s name for our contemporary constellation of intelligibility is, of course, ‘enframing’ (das Gestell). Heidegger chooses this polysemic term because, by etymologically connoting a gathering together (‘Ge-’) of the myriad forms of stellen (‘to set, stand, regulate, secure, ready, establish’, and so on), it succinctly conveys his understanding of the way in which our present ‘mode of revealing’ – a ‘setting-upon that challenges forth’ – forces the ‘presencing’ (anwesen) of entities into its metaphysical ‘stamp or mold’ (Pra¨gung).14 Yet this is not simply to substitute etymology for argument, as detractors allege. Heidegger uses etymology in order to come up with an appropriate name for our contemporary ‘mode of revealing’, but the argumentative work in his account is done by his understanding of metaphysics. This means that to really understand why Heidegger characterizes our contemporary epoch as das Gestell, we must take the measure of his claim that ‘enframing’ is grounded in an ontotheology transmitted to us by Nietzsche. On Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche’s staunch anti-metaphysical stance merely hides the fact that he actually philosophized on the basis of an ‘unthought’ metaphysics. Nietzsche’s Nachlab clearly demonstrates that he conceptualized ‘the totality of beings as such’ ontotheologically , as ‘eternally recurring will-to-power’, that is, as an unending disaggregation and reaggregation of forces without purpose or goal.15 This Nietzschean ontotheology not only inaugurates the ‘metaphysics of the atomic age’, it grounds enframing: Our unthinking reliance on Nietzsche’s ontotheology is leading us to transform all beings, ourselves included, into mere ‘resources’ (Bestand), entities lacking intrinsic meaning which are thus simply optimized and disposed of with maximal efficiency.16 Heidegger famously characterizes enframing as a technological understanding of being. As an historical ‘mode of revealing’ in which entities increasingly show up only as resources to be optimized, enframing generates a ‘calculative thinking’ which, like the mythic touch of King Midas, quantifies all qualitative relations. This ‘limitless “quantification”’ which absorbs all qualitative relations (until we come to treat ‘quantity as quality’) is rooted in enframing’s ontologically reductive mode of revealing, whereby ‘[o]nly what is calculable in advance counts as being’. Enframing thus tends to reduce all entities to bivalent, programmable ‘information’, digitized data, which increasingly enters into ‘a state of pure circulation’.17 Indeed, as Heidegger’s phenomenological meditation on a highway interchange revealed to him in the 1950s – and as our ‘information superhighway’, the Internet, now makes plain – we exhibit a growing tendency to relate to our world and ourselves merely as a ‘network of long distance traffic, paced as calculated for maximum yield’.18 Reading quotidian historical developments in terms of this ontohistorical logic, Heidegger believed our passage from Cartesian modernity to Nietzschean postmodernity was already visible in the transformation of employment agencies into ‘human resource’ departments. The technological move afoot to reduce teachers and scholars to ‘on-line content providers’ merely extends – and so clarifies – the logic whereby modern subjects transform themselves into postmodern resources by turning techniques developed for controlling nature back onto themselves.19 Unfortunately, as this historical transformation of subjects into resources becomes more pervasive, it further eludes our critical gaze; indeed, we come to treat ourselves in the very terms which underlie our technological refashioning of the world: no longer as conscious Cartesian subjects taking control of an objective world, but rather as one more resource to be optimized, ordered, and enhanced with maximal efficiency – whether cosmetically, psychopharmacologically, or educationally . Here, then, Heidegger believes he has uncovered the subterranean ontohistorical logic guiding the development of our educational institutions. But how does contemporary education redirect this nihilistic logic of enframing? In what sense are today’s educational institutions caught up in an unlimited quanti cation of qualitative relations which strips beings of their intrinsic meanings, transforming them into mere resources to be optimized with maximal ef ciency? 3. Education as Enframing Heidegger began developing his critique of higher education in 1911 and continued elaborating it well into the 1960s, but perhaps his most direct answer to this question comes in 1929.20 Having  finally been awarded a full professorship (on the basis of Being and Time), the 39-year-old Heidegger gives his of cial ‘Inaugural Lecture’ at Freiburg University, the famous ‘What is Metaphysics?’ He begins boldly, directing his critical attention to the university itself by emphasizing philosophy’s concrete ‘existential’ foundations (since ‘metaphysical questioning must be posed from the essential position of the existence [Dasein] that questions’). Within the lifeworld of the university, Heidegger observes, ‘existence’ (Dasein) is determined by Wissenschaft, the knowledge embodied in the humanities and natural sciences. ‘Our Dasein – in the community of researchers, teachers, and students – is determined by science or knowledge [durch die Wissenschaft bestimmt]’.21 Our very ‘being-in-the-world’ is shaped by the knowledge we pursue, uncover, and embody. When Heidegger claims that existence is fundamentally shaped by knowledge, he is not thinking of a professoriate shifting in the winds of academic trends, nor simply arguing for a kind of pedagogical or performative consistency, according to which we should practice what we know. His intent, rather, is to emphasize a troubling sense in which it seems that we cannot help practicing what we know, since we are ‘always already’ implicitly shaped by our guiding metaphysical presuppositions. Heidegger’s question thus becomes: What is the ontological impact of our unquestioned reliance on the particular metaphysical presuppositions which tacitly dominate the academy? ‘What happens to us essentially, in the ground of our existence’, when the Wissenschaft pursued in the contemporary university becomes our guiding ‘passion’, fundamentally shaping our view of the world and of ourselves? Heidegger’s dramatic answer introduces his radical critique of the hyperspecialization and consequent fragmentation of the modern university: 250 Iain Thomson The fields of science are widely separated. Their ways of handling the objects of their inquiries differ fundamentally. Today only the technical organization of universities and faculties consolidates this multiplicity of dispersed disciplines, only through practical and instrumental goals do they maintain any meaning. The rootedness of the sciences in their essential ground has dried up and died.2 2 Here in 1929 Heidegger accurately describes the predicament of that institution which, almost half a century later, Clark Kerr would satirically label the ‘Multi-versity’: an internally fragmented Uni-versity-in-name-only, where the sole communal unity stems from a common grievance about parking spaces.23 Historically, as the modern university loses sight of the shared goals which originally justifed the endeavors of the academic community as a whole (at first, the common pursuit of the unified ‘system’ of knowledge, then the communal dedication to the formation of cultivated individuals), its members begin to look outside the university for some purpose to give meaning to lives of research. Since only those disciplines (or sub-disciplines) able to produce instrumentally useful results regularly found such external support, all disciplines increasingly try to present themselves in terms of their use-value. Without a counter-ideal, students too will adopt this instrumental mentality, coming to see education merely as a means to an increased salary down the road. In this way fragmentation leads to the professionalization of the university and, eventually, its deterioration into vocationalism. At the same time, moreover, the different disciplines, lacking any shared, substantive sense of a unifying purpose or common subjectmatter, tend by the logic of specialization to develop internal standards appropriate to their particular object-domains. As these domains become increasingly specialized, these internal standards become ever more disparate, if not simply incommensurable. In this way, disciplinary fragmentation leaves the university without common standards – other than the now ubiquitous but entirely empty and formal ideal of excellence. Following in Heidegger’s footsteps, critics such as Bill Readings and Timothy Clark show how our contemporary ‘university of excellence’, owing to ‘the very emptiness of the idea of excellence’, is ‘becoming an excellent bureaucratic corporation’, ‘geared to no higher idea than its own maximized self-perpetuation according to optimal input/output ratios’.24 Such diagnoses make clear that the development of our educational institutions continues to follow the underlying metaphysical logic of enframing, the progressive transformation of all entities into mere resources to be optimized. Unfortunately, these critics fail to recognize this underlying ontohistorical logic, and so offer diagnoses without cures. Indeed, Readings’ materialist explanation for the historical obsolescence of Bildung as the unifying ideal of the modern university (the result of an ‘implacable bourgeois economic revolution’) leads him to succumb to a cynicism in which future denizens of the university can hope for nothing more than ‘pragmatic’ situational responses in an environment increasingly transformed by ‘the logic of consumerism’.25 While such critiques of the university convincingly extend and update aspects of Heidegger’s analysis, they lack his philosophical vision for a revitalizing reuni cation of the university.

### 1AR – Defense – Top

#### Some defense –

#### Deterrence is a myth – voting for them empirically causes teams to end up moving farther to the left to garner better impact turns to T – means your politics are strictly a reactionary penalization of difference

#### Framework checks framework – a debate about the resolution is always predictable

#### Questioning the structure of the activity is good – it’s a systemic inversion of how education works

### 1AR – Fairness

#### Fairness presumes playing the game is good – they are tautological because they say that we ought to preserve the game because it’s a game and games are good which isn’t a reason why the game itself or fairness matters

### 1AR – Truth Testing

#### Impossible – conceded thesis claim of the aff – there is no capital-T truth because all of existence is predicated on fluidity

#### Bad – the endless positivistic analyses and attempt to understand and know everything culminates in a war on difference – this is offense

#### You could truth test – case debate proves and literally the first three cards of 1AC are standardized tests bad

### 1AR – Skills

#### The only thing you’re going to learn on this topic is how to get into college

#### Even if you gain good skills we’ve won that you’ll also gain motivation to use those skills to support the structures we critique

#### The means/end logic of do debate to gain skills justifies education’s commodification of students that pipelines them into the system of capitalism

### ---Impact Turn

#### Their ontological distancing from the world is the root cause of violence – technological rationality’s flawed construal of reality deprives consciousness of meaning – makes global war inevitable

Shkliarevsky 15 – Gennady Shkliarevsky is a professor of history at Bard College. OVERCOMING MODERNITY AND VIOLENCE, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 1, 2015, msm

The above explanation shows that one and the same process constructs, on one hand, objects of reality as they appear to us and, on the other, organizes our mind. In other words, it is this process of construction that constitutes true ontological reality, not the subject or the object that are merely its products. This process plays a vital role in the development of our mind and in the construction of our consciousness, or what we call reason. It is the source of reason. Our representations of reality will change; our consciousness will change. But the process of construction will remain the same in all of its essential features. Yet despite the importance of the process of construction for understanding human reason and how it operates, we exclude the process of construction from our view of reality and represent its products—the subject and the object—as the true ontological reality. Despite the absolute primacy of the process of construction, the conception of reality prevalent in modern culture focuses either on the subject (anti-realists) or on the object (realists) that are merely its products. Thus our conception of reality is fundamentally flawed. It is hard to overestimate the role of mind and consciousness in our individual lives and our civilization as a whole. Operations performed in our consciousness powerfully affect the way we interpret reality, which, in turn, shapes our actions. Therefore, the exclusion of the process of construction from our view of reality and our conception of reason also has a powerful effect on how we interpret reality and, consequently, how we act. The exclusive focus on the products of construction creates a framework for interpreting reality that leaves out the most important part of reality. It should, therefore, come as no surprise then that when we use this deficient framework, we get a very distorted view of reality. When we apply this framework to interpreting reality, we squeeze reality into the Procrustean bed of our extremely limited vision and thus commit an act of violence. Our interactions with reality involve two principal operations: assimilation and adaptation. Assimilation is an operation that integrates objects of reality into internal functional schemata of the organism. This operation reduces the multiple and diverse world to the internal functions of our organism. Assimilation deprives objects of their autonomy and subordinates them to the functions of the organism. It is a very violent operation that is best exemplified by the devouring of one organism by another. By contrast, adaptation involves recognition of the autonomy of reality and its objects. It essentially adjusts the functions of the organism to these autonomous objects. For example, due to adaptation, the child begins to modify the mode of prehension depending on the object’s shape and texture. Due to adaptation, the organism can establish a more balanced relationship with reality. It creates a possibility for knowing reality as it is rather than reducing it to the functions of the organism. As an operation, adaptation plays an exceptional role in the origin and evolution of human intelligence and knowledge.24 In his studies of intelligence Piaget shows that both operations are closely interrelated and play a very important role in the origin and evolution of human consciousness and symbolic thought. When we use a deficient framework for interpreting reality, when we reduce reality to our mental functions, we essentially limit ourselves to performing only one operation—assimilation. Unrestrained by adaptation, assimilation severely limits our capacity for understanding the multiple and diverse world; it does not recognize the autonomy of this reality; it subordinates reality to our own internally generated schemes. The result is a one-sided and self-centered representation of reality Human reason (consciousness) regulates our interactions with reality. When our consciousness excludes the process of construction from its field of vision, it creates an inadequate and flawed interpretation of reality. This violence is not exclusively symbolic—that is, producing merely an inadequate knowledge of reality. It has real physical effects. As a product of the evolution, our consciousness has much in common with the rest of nature. One of the most fundamental processes that operate in our consciousness, as it does in the rest of nature, is conservation. When our consciousness excludes the process of construction from its field of vision, it excludes the most important part of reality. With the process of construction out of the frame, our consciousness can only focus on the disconnected products of this process—the subject or the object—rather than the process itself. As a result, it tends to conserve the products rather than the process; it fetishizes and absolutizes those products and regards them as the only true reality, thus disrupting the process of construction and limiting its creative capacity. As the process of construction evolves and the old products are subjected to the pressure of change, a one-sided consciousness experiences this process of change as a loss of reality. There are few traumatic experiences that can compare to loss of reality, that is, situations when people get a feeling that they can no longer understand reality or interpret it correctly. For a consciousness that experience such situation, reality becomes a void, an abyss devoid of any meaning, or worse, filled with negative meaning. In words of Shakespeare, time gets “out of joint.” Such consciousness develops a sense of disorientation, confusion, and fear; and violence is a very common corollary of fear. To make things worse, the capacity of such severely limited consciousness to cope with this condition is reduced to only one cognitive operation— assimilation. Such consciousness is incapable of critically examining itself; it simply cannot see the internal sources of its predicament. Rather than address the real source of its fear within itself, this consciousness tends to look for the cause of the fear outside itself: it develops the need to construct the enemy, to create a scapegoat on whom it can project its fears.25 Since fear causes violent reactions, the enemy becomes the object of this violence and the destruction of the enemy becomes an obsessive but also elusive goal—elusive because the true cause of fear is never addressed. Freud clearly understood the internal mechanism of the need to construct the enemy when he made a perceptive remark in reference to the Bolshevik revolution: “When Bolsheviks destroy all the capitalists, what are they going to do?” No destruction could possibly assuage the Bolshevik or Nazi anxiety, their fear, and consequently their need to construct and pursue the imaginary “enemy.” No matter how many victims they sacrificed to their “jealous god,” it continued to demand more sacrifices.

### ---Aff Prior

#### Ethical work on the self is better than the neg’s hubristic strategy of attempting to change the external world which only creates resentment and stifles the potentiality of becoming

David Chandler 13, prof of IR @ Westminster, The World of Attachment? The Post-humanist Challenge to Freedom and Necessity, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 41(3), 516– 534

I wish to argue that the rule of blind necessity removes the liberal political content of government practices – in effect, reducing the problematic of rule to the generic or ‘everyday’ problems of individual behaviour and practices and the institutional milieu (cultural and social values, identities, power asymmetries and information flows) which shapes these. As Foucault indicated, this shift away from sovereign and disciplinary power constituted ‘the population as a political problem’ and, within this, focused on the real lives or the everyday of individuals and communities ‘and their environment, the milieu in which they live…to the extent that it is not a natural environment, that it has been created by the population and therefore has effects on that population’ (2003: 245). It is this ‘milieu’ which accounts ‘for action at a distance of one body on another’ and thereby ‘appears as a field of intervention’ (Foucault 2007: 20-21). In this framework, governance operates indirectly, through work on the informal level of societal life itself, rather than through the formal framework of public law in relation to individuals as citizens: ‘action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than on the players’ as Foucault states in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008: 260). The world of becoming thereby is an ontologically flat world without the traditional hierarchies of existence and a more shared conception of agency. For Bennett, therefore, ‘to begin to experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take a step toward a more ecological sensibility’.78 Here there is room for human agency but this agency involves a deeper understanding of and receptivity to the world of objects and object relations. Rather than the hubristic focus on transforming the external world, the ethico-political tasks are those of work on the self to erase hubristic liberal traces of subject-centric understandings, understood to merely create the dangers of existential resentment. Work on the self is the only route to changing the world. As Connolly states: ‘To embrace without deep resentment a world of becoming is to work to “become who you are”, so that the word “become” now modifies “are” more than the other way around.’ Becoming who you are involves the ‘microtactics of the self’, and work on the self can then extend into ‘micropolitics’ of more conscious and reflective choices and decisions and lifestyle choices leading to potentially higher levels of ethical self-reflectivity and responsibility. Bennett argues that against the ‘narcissism’ of anthropomorphic understandings of domination of the external world, we need ‘some tactics for cultivating the experience of our selves as vibrant matter’. Rather than hubristically imagining that we can shape the world we live in, Bennett argues that: ‘Perhaps the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating. Such ethical tactics include reflecting more on our relationship to what we eat and considering the agentic powers of what we consume and enter into an assemblage with. In doing so, if ‘an image of inert matter helps animate our current practice of aggressively wasteful and planet-endangering consumption, then a materiality experienced as a lively force with agentic capacity could animate a more ecologically sustainable public’. For new materialists, the object to be changed or transformed is the human – the human mindset. By changing the way we think about the world and the way we relate to it by including broader, more non-human or inorganic matter in our considerations, we will have overcome our modernist ‘attachment disorders’ and have more ethically aware approaches to our planet. In cultivating these new ethical sensibilities, the human can be remade with a new self and a ‘new self-interest’.

### 1AR – Predictability

#### We haven’t made an overarching claim about the world – we’re just about the nature of debate – they still get access to all their topic disads – it’s just a different political strategy

### 1AR – Predictability – Impact turn

#### They’ve conceded that engagement with the Gap is good – extend Thomson – being willing to engage with the surprising and unknown should be celebrated – anything else turns us into debate robots that just read our case neg every round and never do critical thinking about the affirmative and just teaches us to fear that sudden surprise of the flux which just creates ressentiment because that flux is inevitable – new affs and big topics are inevitable – their ideal model is breaking a new agenda politics DA and process CP every round which is obviously bad

### 1AR – Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning is nothing but a technocratic strategy to refine machineries of power and elitist decision-making within the next generation of students, continuing violent cycles of social metabolism – that internal link turns their deliberation arguments

Paglia 92 – Camille, professor of humanities at the University of the Arts in Philadelphia, THE TRIUMPH OF THE TECHNOCRATS, Book Review, Voltaire’s Bastards: The Dictatorship Of Reason in the West, John Ralston, Washington Post, September 6, 1992, msm

Saul argues that democracy is subverted by the dominance of rational systems of control that are essentially unreformable. The modern science of administration is king. Capitalism has been transformed; it is not the owners, the stockholders, but their amoral, faceless hirelings, the managers, who have unbalanced and bled the marketplace at no risk to themselves. The West is obsessed with a frenzied, sterile quest for ultimate efficiency. "Our obsession with expertise" has produced a master caste, technocrats who are consummate mediocrities. Whether in corporations or government, they are merely "number crunchers," "highly sophisticated grease jockeys" with "a talent for manipulation," who keep the machine humming. Our elites, like sycophantic 18th-century courtiers, stand for nothing but "cynicism, ambition, rhetoric, and the worship of power." Saul's blistering indictment hits a great variety of targets -- though not, regrettably, American academe, where self-propagating, overpaid technocrat-administrators are strangling education in a way that exactly proves his points. His account of the origins and influence of the Harvard Business School is fascinating: The founding Harvard deans were admirers of Frederick Winslow Taylor, whose theories of "Scientific Management" for industrial reorganization were also adopted by Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin, and by Albert Speer in Nazi Germany. The business schools and schools of public policy in America and Europe enshrine "abstract, logical process" and an "obsession with structures." Their students become "addicts of pure power," without goals or vision. The economic transition from manufacturing to a top-heavy service sector has exacerbated social problems. Nearly three-quarters of business-school graduates go on to cushy nonmanufacturing jobs like consulting and banking. They avoid Pittsburgh and Birmingham, where the factories are, and settle in "the great centres of postindustrial self-gratification," like New York and London. Saul thinks this steering of top managerial talent away from nuts-and-bolts experience is a major cause of our industrial decline.

## 2AR

###  2AR – Top

We meet – we’re an embrace of non-standardized education – they still get access to all their topic disads – this is defense to all their standards

Counterinterp – affirmatives must reject the imposition of standardization onto education

### 2AR – Theory of Communication

Modern debates goal of achieving complete human rationality through consensus and successive debates only naturalizes dominant mindsets and ideologies – we’ll just leave the tournament redeeming modern metaphysics – that leads to exclusion of all forms of discourse outside of that paradigm, demonizing alternate ways of seeing the world, and denial of the political nature of our ideologies, seeing them instead as cold hard normative facts rather than politically influenced opinions

T/ idea testing – just reinforces normative thinking

T/ fairness – presumes playing the game is good

o/w fairness – communication = more instrinsic

### 2AR – Skills

We’ve straight turned this – debating about technical minutia and quick fixes does not equip us to challenge US political culture – it engenders a depoliticization while only focusing on efficiency – only our model of rejecting normative thinking can encourage effective political action

Independently, absent a reconsideration of ideologies, those skills just get reincorporated into the cogs of neoliberalism

# K

## Generic

### Yes Perms

#### The aff gets permutations:

#### a. Clash—method debates are only productive if we use them to hone in the benefits of different methods—providing a stable advocacy and requiring the negative to say “should not” is the only way to test the advantages.

#### b. Coherence – any model without the permutation justifies arbitrary pics and plan plus counterplans that make being affirmative impossible

### Form DA

#### Even if they win every other argument you still vote aff because we have won a critique of the form of debate which comes first because it determines how content is filtered. Absent reorientation of debate away from perfect rationality, people will continue to drive to make debate into an educationally productive activity, manifesting in debaters striking all black judges because they aren’t conducive to a “good valuable policy debate.”

## Cap

### Top

#### Turn - atomized violence strips the value to life because of its efficiency and speed - expanding the ultimate control tool to decide who lives and who dies because their geographical location is identified, dehumanized and destroyed – capitalism invents catastrophes to coerce new markets and control property – if the impetus to invent these catastrophes is gone, capitalism becomes far less destructive

#### Perm use capitalism as a motivation for the aff

#### Their ideal world is one of radical responsibility – means aff solves the impacts of the K

#### We control the root cause – elimation of the potential for becoming of the laborer is what drives modern capitalism – only an affirmation of deviance from that model allows new possibilities

### AT: Political Engagement Link

#### huge link turn - we’re the opposite of abandoning politics - modern education conceived notions such as the market economy as intrinsically useful and valuable, disavowing the political nature of those values of capitalism - that allows students to be commodified and exported into the labor force, brainwashed to think that it’s the best and only possible way the world can work - only our opening of education to include and cultivate multiple understandings of becoming in the world can ALLOW for engagement with the political

#### it's a link of omission – just because we don’t engage with the political doesn’t mean we can’t – the 1ac obviously isn’t refusal of politics – means perm do both shields it

### AT: Communist Horizon

#### perm do both – the aff is a prereq to imagining alternate possibilities – absent the aff’s reorganizing of education and rejection of rational debate, their discussion will never be included or listened to – that’s Clarke

#### perm do alt – imagining alternate futures outside capitalism is the aff

#### alt fails – unwavering focus on one thing precludes other possibilities/is bad – it means we can never truly understand the world outside of capitalism – only openness to change and new ideas allows us to find the best solutions and anything else leads to demonization of anything outside their model

### 1AR – Bottom/Extra

#### Capitalism is ultimately a question of value, not economics – the left’s historical failure was to rebel against the structure of capital without creating a new system of values; ressentiment that is the closure of creation

Cohen ’95 /Sande, Professor of History, Cal Institute of the Arts, Academia and The Luster of Capital, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, pg. xv-xix/

Following some remarks of Karl Lowith's, it can be said that the Hegelian-Marxian tradition of criticism is based on "philosophical historicism," which is to theorize, or totalize in a conceptual way, contradictions and which, paradoxically, results in an "idolization of the actual." To apply Roman Jakobson, the axis of metaphoric equivalence — class conflict or Oedipus — has been canonized and projected onto the axis of substitution, the struggle of dialectics. It is irrelevant whether class conflict or ideological distortion (or the phallus, or the repressed masculine, or the morcellated feminine ad infinitum) composes the metaphorical paradigm or not; the temporal is entirely underwritten by a dialectic that specifies the ends and means, politics and morality, of "the social drama." With Marx this became, as Baudrillard has argued, the acceptance of the very category of labor as defining of the human condition. Within the Euro-American left, this failure to contest the lines of temporal integration (career, accumulation, result, but also randomness, chaos, and unpredictability) parallels the banalization of an opposition that is reduced to psychological wailing and moaning before a triumphant Capital. The Hegelian-Marxian fold is continued in many intellectual and political strands, including Sartrean and Lacanian formations. It always presents itself as the only true rival to capitalism because it conceives itself as the only claimant worthy of the "whole of history" (or psyche) and the latter's "journey." An altogether speculative "knowledge of history" is transposed or displaced onto the political-cultural realm as "critical theory" or "unity of theory and practice" or "historical awareness," phrases devoted to judging claims (to represent, to mean). What makes Nietzsche a more interesting writer about the cultural relations that help to define capitalism as nonhistorical and nondialectical is that Nietzsche is able to argue that Capital is nihilistic, not "historical." Capital drains, yet exposes, energy for continued waste: it is, after all, literally a waste of time to spend time in a securing of unnecessary means of subsistence or whose subsistence is entirely arbitrary. Beyond Good and Evil was unsparing — the language is near-impersonal — in its portrayal of modern Europe as becoming reactive: "The production of a type prepared for slavery in the most subtle sense of the term . . . numerous, talkative, weak-willed, and very handy workmen who require a master, a commander as they require their daily bread . . . the democratising of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the rearing of tyrants."16 The money form of early and middle and late Capital — Eternal Capital — recapitulates the largely uninteresting waste of oneself in the antispectacle (television?) of ignoble feelings. The protestating of what one lacks postpones the self-transformative difficulty of a labor without, perhaps, a "return." By standing for the acceptance of the cultural and intellectual division of labor, the academy actively controls the dangers and opportunities of the world's nihilism, and in this it helps define the social sciences and humanities as memory, monument, nostalgia, hope, despair — becoming "worldly" as becoming deadened. Which is to say that normative intellectual categories such as class conflict and Oedipus provide "regions" of being that render theory as something constant, as being about something constant. Class, some thing to be contested and resisted, is nonetheless defining of one's definitions of the social — the idea of the social as something perhaps nonsocial is thereby expunged; Oedipus, the unequivocal equivocation of split-up eros and autonomous death, defines perception, and so the traces pursued by critical knowledge are thought to be both intellectually adventurous and politically important. These are but some of the reductions through which the type called intellectual is spared the all but impossible task of affirming potentially unsayable interests, for example, that we are more interested in how things are carried out than in what they might "mean." A Nietzschean perspective links up with formalism and deconstruction precisely where Nietzsche doubted the authority of phraseological commands like the injunction to accept "to infer from," the latter stabilized only on an assumption of the type that held logic to be a deproblematized form of identity. The misunderstanding of Hegelian Marxism concerning capitalism was to theorize Capital as a narrative subject and not directly a challenge to values**.** (Obviously, a "right-wing" strategy is available here — but then what is to be made of certain "right-wing" truths, that Capital despises children?) The opposition to Capital mobilized by the left as such was really an identification with a form of the slave mentality recoded as the images and thoughts of a decisive, positive, reversal or as endless attempts to postpone the final orgy of nothingness attendant on a fully capitalized world. In this, Marxism shifted (through Lukacs in the German-reading academy) to considerations of culture; the more the category of labor proved intractable — or, in the Soviet Union, was simultaneously idealized and despised — and employment in mass society a quasi horror, the more came the incessant demands that cultural analysis "liberate" the repressed subjective desires for the Good and Right and True. The American left now has no strong idea of life, of existence, without its attendant ressentiment toward what it is dependent upon, Capital. Nietzsche's writings, on the other hand, suggest a definition of Capital as a challenge to one's existence that is both perpetual and immediate. In this version, Capital is not one with the category of labor, or even of assigned values (division of labor), but is instead associated with the success of nihilism. Wage slavery and the difficulty of securing stimulating and interesting work are horrifyingly familiar as a Capital that can twist itself into a bewildering "conformity with the irresistible 'progress' of each vanishing moment."17 Mass society stands in the blazing light of lemmings chasing each other into one straight line after another. Culturally considered, it is the historians who legitimize the collective denial that "Nihilism is the origin of modernity" and not the fairy tales of progress, growth, development, result, end. Tellingly, that is, nonnarratively, one of Nietzsche's more, uncanny images for the success of Capital was the "noose" that puts "an end to all culture."18 Hannah Arendt and Matei Calinescu reinforce this in their respective discussions of cultural models, Arendt emphasizing the distortion brought by the demands of specialization, philistinism, Calinescu demonstrating that kitsch, the "aesthetics" of the middle classes, is a response to the "terrors of change" that ebb and flow with the accelerations and displacements of Capital. 19 Thus the Final Solution, as I will argue, is an example of an event whose modernity thwarts our sense of "historical understanding" because it raises the nihilism of modernity to the surface; there are relations of Capital that may not be understandable as "historical" or "normal criticism." I am aware that some of these ideations are quite unpleasant to university-based criticism — a system that stresses social promise. Capital is treated as profoundly anticultural, since it promotes that "trainability of man" that has "grown to monstrous proportions because they [individuals] have nothing to say to each other."20 Is there a cultural will-to power sustained by those university ideations such as neo-asceticism, inflated accusations, and impossible memories? Isn't this also about overcoming instead of reacting?21 To conclude these still prefatory remarks on the Nietzschean version of cultural issues, it is the oxymoronic setup of Capital — the terror that one give one's labor to it in exchange for payments that do not themselves, for billions of people, translate into pleasure — which indexes conflicts that are not going to be resolved by (to keep to the examples given) class or Oedipal models. The exchange of human labor power (time) for money (exchange) reduces the time available for nonexchange. The cultural and political controls, left, right, and center, on how people are able to spend time are more acute than the resolutions promised by these groups. Capital produces the worst prison of all: it locks time up.22 The form of exchange becomes the immovable metaphysic capable of operating at the speed of instantaneity (a credit decision which ricochets, generating immanent chaos), and a question here is why such rapidity and viciousness is matched by "critical demands" and calls for more politics as usual? If Capital can effect an increase in the capacity for desocialization, in which negatives are misidentified as affirmations — one has recourse to the law to solve a problem but the solving makes one poor, so that in protecting one's rights one is impersonally coerced — then what are options of difference? The Nietzschean critique of that much-discussed term, modernity, emphasizes that the elaboration of one's consciousness as self-protective work and labor rather than a spending and an excess of oneself, perpetuates the grounds of critique and opposition, the latter supporting polarization, binarism, and thus reducing meanings to values of identity. All of this results from the misidentification of Capital as something to negotiate with, the reduction of "have no choice but to" to the consequential order "it's for the better." If the cultural expansion of Capital is subject to erratic fits; if the surplus value of the code gives way to the surplus value of flux, a transformation that Deleuze denotes as the rule that "things work well only providing they break down";23 if, as Deleuze writes, "capitalism's supreme goal" is the "production of lack," for only by increasing production can production be the screen of what we don't have, then a critical intellectual perspective cannot be attached to the virtues of intellectual translation and mediation, opposition, negation, synthesis, hope, restoration, melancholy.

#### Stasis DA – situating capitalism as a monolithic system fails – our intersectional approach is key to prevent pessimism and stasis

## Afropess

### CX

cx - how do u define a black person

pre middle passage, ab was not onto, RIGHT?? okay so if u separated babies from system of ab and then brought them back would they be ab? Tea

excuse but wtf is the link

### 1AR – Top

#### Top level – the aff is a prerequisite the K – absent the aff’s reorganizing of education and rejection of rational debate, their discussion will never be included or listened to – that’s Clarke

#### Perm – do both – our model of thinking definitionally isn’t exclusive of any form of analysis or worldview – the affirmative enabling of moments of non-normative expression doesn’t preclude pessimism about political institutions

#### There’s a Purity Politics DA – the attempt to staticize and define ontological imperatives of antiblackness just leads to violent imposition of arbitrary metrics like the blood quantum restriction – that creates violence because their attempt to generate an exclusive ‘community of the dispossessed’ calcifies dehumanization – the boundaries to race will never complete –If it is skin color, how dark? If it is ethnicity, what percentage of your ethnicity? The inability of the negative to confront this leads to lash-out against those bodies that do not conform to their movement and independently disproves their theory

#### Affirming ontology and structuralism fights on the grounds given by modernity which ensures they are beaten before they begin – only affirming the affective points of deviance within the structures of anti-blackness can enable resistance

Koerner 11. Michelle Koerner, professor of women’s studies at Duke, “Lines of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson,” Genre, Vol. 44, No. 2 Summer 2011 pg. 161-64

The force of Jackson’s line in Deleuze’s books—considered as an insinuation of blackness in the sense discussed above—is intensified when we consider the historical circumstances that drew Soledad Brother into Deleuze and his col- laborators’ orbit (the links between prison struggle in France and in the United States, the GIP’s interest in Jackson, Genet’s involvement in the publication and translation of Soledad Brother). And this force becomes even stronger when we consider the deeper trajectories of black resistance it carries. It is here, however, with respect to the question of history and of blackness’s relation to history, that a serious problem asserts itself. Each time Jackson’s name appears in Deleuze’s work it is without introduction, explanation, or elaboration, as though the line were ripped entirely from historical considerations. There is a temptation to dismiss this use of Soledad Brother as an ahistorical appropriation of Jackson’s thought by a European theorist or, worse, a decontextualization that effectively obscures the intolerable social conditions out of which Jackson’s letters were produced. But to do so would perhaps miss the way blackness claims an unruly place in philosophy and philosophies of history. In “The Case of Blackness” Moten (2008b: 187) perceptively remarks, “What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies.” What if we were to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming? How might such a thinking transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of history and the thinking of history (Moten 2008a: 1744)? Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition, a “lived experience,” and in doing so effectively eradicate its unruly character as a transformative force. Deleuze and Guattari, I think, offer a compelling way to think of this unruliness when they write, “What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self- positing as concept, escapes History” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). To bring this relation between blackness and becoming further into the open—toward an affirmation of the unexpected insinuation of blackness signaled by the use of Jackson’s line as an “event in its becoming”—a few more words need be said about Deleuze’s method.The use of Jackson’s writing is just one instance of a procedure that we find repeated throughout Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where we constantly encoun- ter unexpected injections of quotations, names, and ideas lifted from other texts, lines that appear all of sudden as though propelled by their own force. One might say they are deployed rather than explained or interpreted; as such, they produce textual events that readers may choose to ignore or pick up and run with. Many names are proposed for this method—“schizoanalysis, micropolitics, pragmat- ics, diagrammatism, rhizomatics, cartography” (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 94)—but the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation of texts, proposing instead that we think of a book as “a little machine” and ask “what it functions with, in connection with what other things does it or does it not transmit intensities?” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 4).8 Studying how Soledad Brother functions in Deleuze’s books, connect- ing Jackson’s line to questions and historical issues that are not always explicitly addressed in those books, involves one in this action. And further, it opens new lines where the intensities transmitted in Jackson’s book make a claim on our own practice. This method can be seen as an effort to disrupt the hierarchical opposition between theory and practice and to challenge some of the major assumptions of Western Marxism. In an interview with Antonio Negri in the 1990s, Deleuze (1997: 171) clarifies that he and Guattari have “remained Marxists” in their concern to analyze the ways capitalism has developed but that their political philosophy makes three crucial distinctions with respect to more traditional theoretical approaches: first, a thinking of “war machines” as opposed to state theory; second, a “consideration of minorities rather than classes”; and finally, the study of social “lines of flight” rather than the interpretation and critique of social contradictions. Each of these distinctions, as we will see, resonates with Jackson’s political philosophy, but as the passage from Anti-Oedipus demonstrates, the concept of the “line of flight” emerges directly in connection to Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter with Soledad Brother. The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts. It is above all for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari insist that society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,” because such a concept enables the thinking of the movements, energies, and intensities (i.e., the lines of flight) that such machines transmit. The thinking of machines forces us not only to consider the social and historical labor involved in producing soci- ety but also the ongoing potentials of constructing new types of assemblages (agencement). One of the key adversaries of this machinic approach is “interpretation” and more specifically structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions. According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 293), structuralism persisted in the “submission of the line to the point” and as a result produced a theory of subjectivity, and also an account of language and the unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction. Defining lines only in relation to finite points (the subject, the signifier) produces a calculable grid, a structure that then appears as the hidden intelligibility of the system and of society generally. Louis Althusser’s account of the “ideological State apparatus” as the determining structure of subjectivity is perhaps the extreme expression of this gridlocked position (an example we will come back to in a later section). Opposed to this theoretical approach, diagrammatism (to invoke one of the terms given for this method) maps vectors that generate an open space and the potentials for giving consistency to the latter.9 In other words, rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system, Deleuze and Guattari’s method aims to map the ways out of it.

#### VALUE DOUBLE BIND – either the alternative mandates absolute focus on social death all the time, which clearly precludes value, or it simply requires the recognition of social death to allow for moments of value which means that the permutation’s recognition shields the link

#### Permutation and the aff solves the k – only the aff fully and accurately accounts for the ontological structure that motivates racial violence

Taylor 16 James Michael Taylor, PhD in Philosophy, A Dissertation Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts, TECHNO-RACISM: HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY AND CRITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF RACE, Doctoral Dissertation, https://dsc.duq.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=etd, msm

Yet whiteness is also insufficient to stand as the true cultural attitude which dominates all in our age. Though it may be easy enough to see whiteness as dominating human affairs, yet when it comes to the human attitude towards plants or non-human animals a different kind of thinking appears to be employed. Although whiteness seems to proceed by dehumanizing the non-white through the categorization of blackness, in fact it must proceed by this dehumanization. That is, whiteness establishes the identity of human beings, white men, over and against other beings which are deemed subhuman, non-white non-men. Yet this accomplishment would have no meaning, fixity, or significance if the creation of white identity was in opposition to the identity of a carrot. The notion of white identity as significant is caught up in the notion of whiteness as supreme. The white is supposedly better than the black because she exceeds her in all relevant activities such as speech, culture, and intellect. There would be no 141 victory inherent in whiteness, and thus no certainty in the establishment of the white, without the threat of competition. The black competes with the white for intellectual superiority, the Black competes for athletic prowess, and the Black competes for political prominence. Of course, each of these competitions has been defined by and for the white body. For proof of this, recall Robert Fullinwider’s analogy of the land of giants.20 Thus the game is rigged, which means that even if a non-white individual is to win, he must win by approximating and achieving the white standard. However, even this sense of competition is part of the logic of whiteness, since it is whiteness which creates the conditions that draw nonwhites into competition. If one places oneself in the position of being supreme, then the other is always a potential threat to that supremacy. Ultimately, the standard of whiteness retains little meaning beyond the sphere of direct human interaction and comparison, and so it is not even as far reaching or as expansive as the idea of the enframing. This dilemma could be made even more problematic if we also considered that there are other systems like sexism, Christian supremacy, or classism which vie for absolute control. To even construct this dilemma we must restrict our investigation to the two notions which have so far made this project what it is. The temptation is to say that there are innumerable competing attitudes, all of which vie for supremacy. Yet that very notion of competition and supremacy points to the realization that there exists some basic cultural attitude which underpins even our ability to understand the various systems as battling for domination. More basic than sexism, whiteness, or classism is the attitude which is comprised of supremacy, conflict, violence, domination, silencing of the other, the advocating of self-importance, and the ability to objectify and simultaneously create the self as subject. This attitude is what properly deserves the label of 142 actually being our cultural attitude, technoracism, and all the other systems thus far investigated should be understood as expressions, or manifestations, of that thinking. This true cultural attitude I have defined by stipulating the term technoracism. This term is not absolute, and in an obvious sense this term exists as a placeholder and a first attempt to define something which is basic and essential to all the visible manifestations of this attitude. The term itself, technoracism, has been crafted from a union of “technology” and “racism”, and it illustrates the way in which the moral problem of racism proceeds from a more fundamental and technical way of seeing the world. The prefix techno evokes a mode, and a way of seeing a subject, and that subject is racism as whiteness. But this term also seeks to turn the analysis of the problem of racism as whiteness, back against the structure which puts it into play, back against that technical cultural attitude. Yet this attitude exists historically, and so to understand it we must first investigate its origins. Technoracism is the cultural attitude which comes to predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of the modern age, roughly the late sixteenth century. It is instantiated discursively by a shared Christian European cultural identity, an emphasis on reason and universal categorization, and the assertion of the value of the subject as individual. It is characterized by the non-discursive aspects of violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism. Since technoracism is ontologically prior to whiteness and the enframing then it should be unsurprising that it shares a similar structure. The notion of the Christian European cultural identity presents itself as the everyday aspect and the visible surface of technoracism. In its nondiscursive aspect Christian European Cultural identity is a force of violent exclusivity. Modern Atheists and Marxists alike are quick to point out that the failings of modern society may all be traced back to the dominance of the Christian religion over the development of western society. 143 This accusation is not far off, even if it is too simplistic, for the appearance of technoracism first shows up as the face of Christian Supremacy. Yet the deeper problem of technoracism is exposed when one sees the disconnect that exists between medieval and modern Christianity. At the advent of the modern age, and the dawn of technoracism, there is a different sort of character operating through European Christian culture. The deeper problem of technoracism, and the structure which lies below the face of Christian supremacy, is the emphasis on the universality of categorization. In its non-discursive aspect this universality can be understood as a kind of overemphasis on precise particularity. The deeper problem is that the world, and everything in it, should become always available to the gaze which seeks to define, categorize, and reduce all things into terms and concepts which lend themselves to a sense of mastery. An insidious form of absolute rationality dominates technoracism, but of a sort which seeks to convert the world into concepts which can be mastered. However, the supreme danger of technoracism is not simply that the world is everywhere forced to bend and be rationalized into a system of power. Rather the supreme danger of technoracism is that in so categorizing the entities of the world such that one may master them, we ultimately lose the world altogether and are left with only ourselves. In discursive terms this is the assertion of the value of the subject as individual. In its non-discursive form this proceeds from a place of paranoia which can only be resolved by an absolute subjectivism. Much has been made of the subjectivist turn in philosophy, but in the cultural attitude of technoracism the subjectivist turn is a turn towards an absolute subjectivity. In the European quest to know the world and everything in it as it really is, and thus bring everything under the power of European society, the Europeans lose the world entirely and are left only with a hollow image of their own projected ego. By seeking to bring all truth under that power they are ultimately left with a picture of the world which only ever sees the human.

#### Black existential experience continuously denies their theory.

Brown 9 [2009, Vincent Brown, "Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery", The American Historical Review (2009) 114 (5): 1231-1249., ahr.oxfordjournals.org/content/114/5/1231.full]

THE PREMISE OF ORLANDO PATTERSON'S MAJOR WORK, that enslaved Africans were natally alienated and culturally isolated, was challenged even before he published his influential thesis, primarily by scholars concerned with “survivals” or “retentions” of African culture and by historians of slave resistance. In the early to mid-twentieth century, when Robert Park's view of “the Negro” predominated among scholars, it was generally assumed that the slave trade and slavery had denuded black people of any ancestral heritage from Africa. The historians Carter G. Woodson and W. E. B. Du Bois and the anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits argued the opposite. Their research supported the conclusion that while enslaved Africans could not have brought intact social, political, and religious institutions with them to the Americas, they did maintain significant aspects of their cultural backgrounds.32 Herskovits examined “Africanisms”—any practices that seemed to be identifiably African—as useful symbols of cultural survival that would help him to analyze change and continuity in African American culture.33 He engaged in one of his most heated scholarly disputes with the sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, a student of Park's, who emphasized the damage wrought by slavery on black families and folkways.34 More recently, a number of scholars have built on Herskovits's line of thought, enhancing our understanding of African history during the era of the slave trade. Their studies have evolved productively from assertions about general cultural heritage into more precise demonstrations of the continuity of worldviews, categories of belonging, and social practices from Africa to America. For these scholars, the preservation of distinctive cultural forms has served as an index both of a resilient social personhood, or identity, and of resistance to slavery itself.35 Scholars of slave resistance have never had much use for the concept of social death. The early efforts of writers such as Herbert Aptheker aimed to derail the popular notion that American slavery had been a civilizing institution threatened by “slave crime.”36 Soon after, studies of slave revolts and conspiracies advocated the idea that resistance demonstrated the basic humanity and intractable will of the enslaved—indeed, they often equated acts of will with humanity itself. As these writers turned toward more detailed analyses of the causes, strategies, and tactics of slave revolts in the context of the social relations of slavery, they had trouble squaring abstract characterizations of “the slave” with what they were learning about the enslaved.37 Michael Craton, who authored Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies, was an early critic of Slavery and Social Death, protesting that what was known about chattel bondage in the Americas did not confirm Patterson's definition of slavery. “If slaves were in fact ‘generally dishonored,’” Craton asked, “how does he explain the degrees of rank found among all groups of slaves—that is, the scale of ‘reputation’ and authority accorded, or at least acknowledged, by slave and master alike?” How could they have formed the fragile families documented by social historians if they had been “natally alienated” by definition? Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, if slaves had been uniformly subjected to “permanent violent domination,” they could not have revolted as often as they did or shown the “varied manifestations of their resistance” that so frustrated masters and compromised their power, sometimes “fatally.”38 The dynamics of social control and slave resistance falsified Patterson's description of slavery even as the tenacity of African culture showed that enslaved men, women, and children had arrived in the Americas bearing much more than their “tropical temperament.” The cultural continuity and resistance schools of thought come together powerfully in an important book by Walter C. Rucker, The River Flows On: Black Resistance, Culture, and Identity Formation in Early America. In Rucker's analysis of slave revolts, conspiracies, and daily recalcitrance, African concepts, values, and cultural metaphors play the central role. Unlike Smallwood and Hartman, for whom “the rupture was the story” of slavery, Rucker aims to reveal the “perseverance of African culture even among second, third, and fourth generation creoles.”39 He looks again at some familiar events in North America—New York City's 1712 Coromantee revolt and 1741 conspiracy, the 1739 Stono rebellion in South Carolina, as well as the plots, schemes, and insurgencies of Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner—deftly teasing out the African origins of many of the attitudes and actions of the black rebels. Rucker outlines how the transformation of a “shared cultural heritage” that shaped collective action against slavery corresponded to the “various steps Africans made in the process of becoming ‘African American’ in culture, orientation, and identity.”40 Like scholars of resistance before him, Rucker effectively refutes any contention that the enslaved were socially dead. At the same time, his focus on the making of African American culture obscures a crucial dimension of the politics of slavery. In The River Flows On, resistance is the expression of culture, and peoplehood is the outcome of resistance, but Rucker places much less emphasis on the kinds of existential problems highlighted by Hartman and Smallwood. He does not ignore the violence of slavery, but he invokes bondage and its depredations as the antithesis of black self-making, rather than as a constitutive part of it. If for Hartman dispossession “had made us an us,” Rucker believes that resistance was the crucible in which black people forged identity from a vital inheritance.41 How might his approach account for the dislocations, physical violations, and cosmic crises that preoccupy Hartman and Smallwood? Here is where scholars of retention and resistance may yet have something to learn from the concept of social death, viewed properly as a compelling metaphysical threat. African American history has grown from the kinds of people's histories that emphasize a progressive struggle toward an ultimate victory over the tyranny of the powerful. Consequently, studies that privilege the perspectives of the enslaved depend in some measure on the chronicling of heroic achievement, and historians of slave culture and resistance have recently been accused of romanticizing their subject of study.42 Because these scholars have done so much to enhance our understanding of slave life beyond what was imaginable a scant few generations ago, the allegation may seem unfair. Nevertheless, some of the criticisms are helpful. As the historian Walter Johnson has argued, studies of slavery conducted within the terms of social history have often taken “agency,” or the self-willed activity of choice-making subjects, to be their starting point.43 Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that many historians would find themselves charged with depicting slave communities and cultures that were so resistant and so vibrant that the social relations of slavery must not have done much damage at all. Even if this particular accusation is a form of caricature, it contains an important insight, that the agency of the weak and the power of the strong have too often been viewed as simple opposites. The anthropologist David Scott is probably correct to suggest that for most scholars, the power of slaveholders and the damage wrought by slavery have been “pictured principally as a negative or limiting force” that “restricted, blocked, paralyzed, or deformed the transformative agency of the slave.”44 In this sense, scholars who have emphasized slavery's corrosive power and those who stress resistance and resilience share the same assumption. However, the violent domination of slavery generated political action; it was not antithetical to it. If one sees power as productive and the fear of social death not as incapacity but as a generative force—a peril that motivated enslaved activity—a different image of slavery slides into view, one in which the object of slave politics is not simply the power of slaveholders, but the very terms and conditions of social existence.

#### REFLEXIVITY DA – their demand that party formation can only occur around race inevitably reproduces other hierarchies absent the recognition of the stratification of bodies with respect to supposed value – sexism in the black panther party that arose from absolute focus in a certain direction

### 1AR – Not Ontological

#### Saying historical examples prove ontology ignores that all those examples took place w/in capitalism - even if anti blackness is ontological w/in structure of cap you can’t rlly apply that to alt futures – means it’s try or die for the aff’s opening of new possibilities that might not be antiblack

#### Claims of empirics and historical proof are only proven by history and empirics which is utterly tautological

#### Neurological bias is malleable

Cikara and Van Bavel 15. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. [https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/)](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/%29)//Xain

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of [Freddie Gray](http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/), a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On [April 4th](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html?_r=0), Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On [March 8th](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/08/frat-racist-sae-oklahoma_n_6828212.html), Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N\*\*\*\*\* In SAE.” On [March 1st](http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-on-skid-row-empathy-for-homeless-man-fatally-shot-20150302-story.html#page=1), a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including [hiring](http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873), [sentencing](http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1998-07453-006), [housing](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2915460/pdf/nihms222293.pdf), and even [mortgage lending](http://webarchive.urban.org/publications/1000504.html). It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. [Early](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/089892900562552#.VVoK7NNVhBc) [studies](http://pss.sagepub.com/content/15/12/806.full) found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural [fear response](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/309/5735/785.short) to racial out-groups. There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on [arbitrary grounds](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.2420010202/abstract), such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form *coalitions*. ADVERTISEMENT Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. [For example](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12152/full), both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. [Our research](http://psp.sagepub.com/content/35/3/321.short) has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with *all* of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups [produced similar effects on brain activity](http://pss.sagepub.com/content/19/11/1131.short)—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves.

### AT: L – Western Knowledge

#### No link – the 1AC is literally a critique of Western metaphysics and static understandings of the world

#### Just saying all western philosophy is bad is nonsensical because there’s a fuck ton of different theories

### AT: No Agency

#### All sentient beings have agency – their argument is the worst form of negativity

Robinson 4. Reginald Leamon, prof law @ Howard U, researcher on the relation between race and academic thought “Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity, and White Structural Oppression: An Analysis of Critical Race Practive/Praxis” American University Law Review 53, no.6 (August 2004): 1361-1419

Under Praxis, Yamamoto argues that left scholars must serve ordinary people’s practical needs.25 Right now, these scholars do not relate to political lawyers and community activists. By existing in separate worlds, neither group has helped to co-create26 “racial justice.” As such, theoretical writings and traditional civil rights strategies move institutions not toward racial justice, but toward liberal solutions.27 So long as this gap continues, law will retreat from racial justice. In surmounting this gap, Yamamoto requires scholars, lawyers, and activists to work together (e.g., consortium). Under Practice or Praxis, Williams and Yamamoto intend to pursue a justice concept, in which antisubordination becomes the singular end.28 This end promises to give to ordinary people, especially those engaged in interracial conflict, the human agency (or empowerment) that they lack. For example, Yamamoto advocates for a “racial group agency,” one oddly standing on racial identity and personal responsibility.29 Unfortunately, Practice and Praxis cannot achieve this end. Relying on classical CRT methodology, Williams and Yamamoto assume that ordinary people like blacks lack human agency and personal responsibility. They presume that white structural oppression buries ordinary people alive under the weight of liberal legalisms like Equal Protection, rendering them subtextual victims.30 I disagree. Pure consciousness is always prior, and all sentient beings have agency. Despite the sheer weight of the legal violence, slaves never forgot their innate right to be free; they retained a pure consciousness that never itself was enslaved.31 Moreover, slaves acted purposefully when they picked cotton and when they fought to be free. Slaves planned revolts, killed masters, overseers, and each other, ran away, picked cotton, and betrayed other co-conspirators; all examples of human agency. Today, despite danger and violence, ordinary people co-create lives of joy, peace, and happiness. Antebellum slaves co-created spaces in which they knew joy, peace, and happiness. In the modern era, ordinary people like blacks have pure consciousness and human agency too. Despite daily examples of human agency, Williams and Yamamoto posit that ordinary people lack real, practical control over their lives.32 By taking this position, they reproduce a major premise in CRT: slavery, Jim Crow, racism, and racial discrimination have subordinated the lives of ordinary people.33 Put succinctly, white structural oppression (e.g., supremacy) impacts the micropractices of ordinary people. By implication, it negates their racial identity, social values, and personal responsibility. If so, then criminal courts mock ordinary people like blacks when the state punishes them for committing crimes.34 If so, the New York Times unfairly punished Jayson Blair, and he was correct to fault it for encouraging plagiarism and for rewarding his unprofessional behavior.35 Failing to address these implications, Williams and Yamamoto direct us to white structural oppression and divert us from the real, practical control that ordinary people exercise when they go to work or commit a crime. In this way, Williams and Yamamoto can only empower ordinary people if they eradicate white racism, for only then will ordinary people have human agency. Practice and Praxis fail because they ignore how ordinary people use mind constructs. A mind construct means any artificial, causal, or interdependent arrangement of facts, factors, elements, or ideas that flows from our inner awareness.36 Representing core beliefs,37 a mind construct allows us to make sense of our personal experiences and social reality. A mind construct is not reality, but ordinary people believe that it is.38 Practice and Praxis also fail because they refuse to deconstruct mind constructs of ordinary people. Intending to adhere to CRT’s methodology, Williams and Yamamoto believe that these mind constructs cannot cocreate experiences, and thus white structural oppression must be an external, objective reality. By refusing to interrogate these mind constructs, they tell us that the proper locus of white structural oppression must be white mindsets. By and large, while white mindsets co-create racial oppression, other mind constructs cannot. Whites have power; others do not. Whites victimize blacks; ordinary people cannot co-create their own oppression experience.39 Working within CRT methodology, Williams and Yamamoto cannot re-imagine ordinary people as bearers of human agency, the power to act purposefully that includes how we use our mind constructs to co-create and to understand experiences and realities. By failing to see ordinary people as powerful agents, Williams and Yamamoto have tied personal liberty not only to liberal legalism and white appreciation, but also to CRT’s liberal agenda.40

### 2AR – Koerner

### 2AR – Brown

### 2AR – Robinson

## Settler Colonialism

### 1AR – Top

#### Top level – the aff is a prerequisite the K – absent the aff’s reorganizing of education and rejection of rational debate, their discussion will never be included or listened to – that’s Clarke

#### Perm – do both – our model of thinking definitionally isn’t exclusive of any form of analysis or worldview – the affirmative enabling of moments of non-normative expression doesn’t preclude pessimism about political institutions

#### There’s a Purity Politics DA – the attempt to staticize and define ontological imperatives of antiblackness just leads to violent imposition of arbitrary metrics like the blood quantum restriction – that creates violence because their attempt to generate an exclusive ‘community of the dispossessed’ calcifies dehumanization – the boundaries to race will never complete –If it is skin color, how dark? If it is ethnicity, what percentage of your ethnicity? The inability of the negative to confront this leads to lash-out against those bodies that do not conform to their movement and independently disproves their theory

#### We control the root cause – the goal of terra nullius and was staticizing the native and the land in pursuit of being and homogenization and it’s modern educational indoctrination of capitalism that are the foundation of settlerism

#### Permutation – do both – the affs movement outside of dominant power structures is not mutually exclusive with \_\_\_\_ – they’re basically the same thing

#### VALUE DOUBLE BIND – either the alternative mandates absolute focus on social death all the time, which clearly precludes value, or it simply requires the recognition of social death to allow for moments of value like Native cultural expression in literature or the Rain Dance movement which means that the permutation’s recognition shields the link.

#### Our theory is key to challenging the flow of settler society, which seeks to manufacture the social. Only our form resistance escapes its mechanisms of codification to create an opposition to power.

Svirsky 16 (Marcelo Svirsky is a Senior Lecturer at the School for Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, "Resistance is a structure not an event", March 7 2016, Pgs 27-29)

Deleuze and Guattari are important for a focus on resistance. Pivotal to a DeleuzianGuattarian ontology is that its ‘elements’ – defined in terms of forces, fluxes and their relations – exist in a processual state. For them, ‘the general theory of society is a generalized theory of flows’. 59 It may be argued that the settler colonial paradigm does investigate processes, as, for instance, in Wolfe’s three-phased genealogy of settler domination. But the problem with this genealogy is the majoritarian role the monologue of oppression plays in it. To become a truly critical enterprise, settler colonial theory must foster an ethical sensibility towards the coexistence and competition of the myriad forces that aggregatively produce transformation or its arrest, and to translate this sensibility into a new methodology. Deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations occur, as Deleuze and Guattari explain, as ‘strictly complementary and coexistent, because one exists only as a function of the other’. 60 This ontological perspective may promote in settler colonial studies interpretations that acknowledge the multiplicity of the field of forces manufacturing the social. Deleuze and Guattari add: ‘It is in terms not of independence, but of coexistence and competition in a perpetual field of interaction, that we must conceive of exteriority and interiority, war machines of metamorphosis and state apparatuses of identity’. 61 The question is how to translate this ontology of social forces and flows into a model for what we commonly term ‘resistance’. The problem of theory with ‘phenomena of resistance’ is not only how we conceptualise the material and discursive manifestations of these phenomena and their potentialities, but also how we carry the linguistic burden of a concept – resistance – that etymologically and semantically, in all its various fields of application, speaks of ‘opposition to’ an acknowledged arrangement of organised force (electrical current, motion of solids or fluids, erosion, political power, and so forth). This convention is indeed problematic not only because there is more to ‘phenomena of resistance’ than operations of counterattack, but also because operations of counterattack have a low liberatory theoretical status, or as Wolfe puts it, because ‘in generating its own resistance, settler-colonial power also contains it’. 62 In my attempt to develop a model for ‘phenomena of resistance’, I propose firstly to retain the term resistance as employed in public discourse, and also in the humanities and the social sciences. In retaining the name of resistance for ‘phenomena of resistance’, I aim to challenge not only the straightjacket of designation (or denotation), but also the cuff of existent significations that make resistance as ‘opposition to’ to be the condition of truth and falsehood of the phenomena.63 Secondly, beyond controversies over the term resistance, what matters is the sense of ‘phenomena of resistance’, that is, an affection of dis-alignment of bodies (material and non-material bodies) in relation to common sense and the consensual patterns and directions of society.64 In resistance, as Deleuze put it, we resist ‘the temptation against being forced’ in the majoritarian directions of society and popular opinion.65 To move this discussion one step forward, we would need to provide an answer to the problem of the location of the initial gesture of dis-alignment. Given the arrangements of power, I would like to argue that ‘phenomena of resistance’ or dis-alignment may take place both before and after processes of capture, organisation and signification by forces operating in the space of interiority of systems. This suggestion risks being seen SETTLER COLONIAL STUDIES 27 as going against Deleuze and Guattari’s choices: in 1977 Deleuze writes to Foucault in a letter, I myself don’t wonder about the status resistance phenomena may have, since flights line are the first determinations, since desire assembles the social field, power arrangement are both products of these assemblages and that which stamps them out or seal them up.66 Lines of flights come first, power stratifies them after. Three years after, in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari ratify this view that ‘power is a stratified dimension of the assemblage’, and that ‘lines of flight are primary’, that lines of flights ‘are not phenomena of resistance and counterattack’. 67 Hence, here they distinguish between flow/forces that in their nature are pre-capture, and other forces – of resistance or counterattack – operating as a reaction to power arrangements. Again, it is commonplace to see this distinction as a cautionary measure against mixing up always-already reterritorialised challenges of power with the exteriority of lines of flights. But this distinction omits some materialisations of ‘phenomena of resistance’. I would like to suggest that three modus operandi under the general name of resistance derive from this view on social flows and forces. The first form of resistance is Deleuze and Guattari’s lines of flights, or resistance ‘A’: as Ronnen Ben-Arie explains following Deleuze and Guattari, ‘there is always an excess of flows and forces that escape the mechanisms of organisation, codification and management’ of power;68 ‘there is always something that flows or flees; that escapes the binary organizations’. 69 It is this excess, produced as external to the operations of systems, that eludes the attempts of power to organise and codify it. In their nature, these movements of life do not retaliate directly against state power – though doubtless they do not dwell in a state of unawareness in relation to it. But they challenge power by speaking and acting outside of the common institutional and normative boundaries. One example of this resistance is the Boycotts, Divestments and Sanctions movement (BDS), led by Palestinian civil society since 2005. BDS weakens the dominance of the normative discourse about IsraelPalestine in the international arena because it refuses to engage with the traditional topics and assumptions of that discourse while at the same time it confronts Israel’s violence on a new terrain of action in which Israel finds itself struggling.70 The Palestinian efforts to build economic and social self-sufficiency and independence in the West Bank and Gaza is yet another example of civil resistance that does not face Israeli power directly, and in fact, it is a form of resistance that forces Israel to react.71 Yet, these forms do not exhaust the entirety of forces misaligning with state power; the two remaining forms of resistance gesture their motion as countering forces. Resistance ‘B’: these are displays of resistance compelling majoritarian forces to adjust and at times to redefine themselves, even if this is a countering operation still functioning within the space of interiority of state power. In the Palestinian case, Supreme Court appeals countering unjust laws and policies, is a classic attempt to actualise this type of resistance. Resistance ‘C’: these displays of resistance become actualised in the way Wolfe conceives it, that is, they remain locked in the space of interiority of state power (or other systems) without affecting bodies in any significant way.72 For instance, the main aspects of the actions led by the Zionist left in Israel fall into this category. These operations take the name of resistance in vain. Whether we produce lines of flight or adjacent existential territories to the system (resistance ‘A’), or we force it to deflect (resistance ‘B’), we create dis-alignments in relation to the arrangements of power. It is in this way I suggest listening to Deleuze in L’Abécédaire, seven 28 M. SVIRSKY years after the publication of A Thousand Plateaus, when answering Claire Parnet’s question (‘what do we resist exactly?’): ‘whenever one creates, one resists’. 73 A caveat and a conclusion in regard to this model of resistance are of relevance at this point: we should not see the three modes as each corresponding to a different homogenous and shut-off operation of resistance. That is, the three modes of affection of resistance are not mutually exclusive, and in fact, are to be found always-already intermingling at different and changing intensities and degrees in any action that at prima facie is claimed to challenge power. We rarely find a pure operation of resistance. For instance, elsewhere I have analysed the operations of resistance of the Arab-Jewish bilingual schools in Israel and there I noted that while some aspects of these assemblages invest in weaving new forms of cooperation and lifestyles, these are being partially stifled by the interests of identity and ethnicity.74 The history of the Palestinian armed struggle is replete with lines of flights and reterritorialisations; the undertakings of legendary leader Izz al-Din al-Qassam who in the early 1930s called for armed revolt were ground-breaking both in creating alternative territories of leadership (i.e. rural vs. urban), and in organising farmers displaced by Zionist takeovers of land.75 More generally, Yezid Sayigh’s thesis is that the armed struggle was pivotal in the building a national Palestinian persona, even though it proved many times to carry a too high price for the Palestinian people to bear.76 Therefore, acts of resistance need to be analysed in their complexity to diagnose how and to what extent they submit to, confront or evade power.

### 1AR – Alt

#### And even if they win a root cause it isn’t reverse causal – even if violence originated from colonization people latch onto specific signifiers post-facto broken off from the root cause which means only the permutation resolves the specific historical instances we isolated above

#### Reflexivity DA – their demand that party formation can only occur around race inevitably reproduces other hierarchies absent the recognition of the stratification of bodies with respect to supposed value – sexism in the black panther party that arose from absolute focus in a certain direction – the permutation is a reflexive opening to difference through a literal combination of strategies that attunes itself to the reiteration of the oppressions they isolate and prevents them from endlessly reoccurring

### 1AR – AT: Ontology

#### Saying historical examples prove ontology ignores that all those examples took place w/in capitalism - even if anti blackness is ontological w/in structure of cap you can’t rlly apply that to alt futures – means it’s try or die for the aff’s opening of new possibilities that might not be antiblack

#### Neurological bias is malleable

Cikara and Van Bavel 15. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. [https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/)](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/%29)//Xain

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of [Freddie Gray](http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/), a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On [April 4th](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html?_r=0), Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On [March 8th](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/08/frat-racist-sae-oklahoma_n_6828212.html), Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N\*\*\*\*\* In SAE.” On [March 1st](http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-on-skid-row-empathy-for-homeless-man-fatally-shot-20150302-story.html#page=1), a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including [hiring](http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873), [sentencing](http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1998-07453-006), [housing](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2915460/pdf/nihms222293.pdf), and even [mortgage lending](http://webarchive.urban.org/publications/1000504.html). It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. [Early](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/089892900562552#.VVoK7NNVhBc) [studies](http://pss.sagepub.com/content/15/12/806.full) found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural [fear response](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/309/5735/785.short) to racial out-groups. There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on [arbitrary grounds](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.2420010202/abstract), such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form *coalitions*. ADVERTISEMENT Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. [For example](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12152/full), both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. [Our research](http://psp.sagepub.com/content/35/3/321.short) has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with *all* of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups [produced similar effects on brain activity](http://pss.sagepub.com/content/19/11/1131.short)—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves.

#### Their theory is overly pessimistic – gains are limited but they’re still gains – the age of Trump and Brexit requires specificity and contingency towards changes in how settler colonialist violence is actualized, not platitudes and generalities that collapse important historical differences. “No DAPL” proves that such demands are possible and necessary to create political change.

## Gender

### 1AR

#### Heidegger’s philosophy is sex-neutral because being precedes corporeality – ontology is prior to sex

Escudero 2015

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Sartre was one of the first French phenomenologists to point out that “Heidegger does not make the slightest allusion to the body in his existential analytic, resulting in Dasein appearing to us as sexless.” (Sartre, 1980: 433)Nevertheless, it is precisely this that is one of the main ontological features of Dasein. As determined by its constitutive openness to the world, Dasein does not refer to “man” or “woman” or their corresponding physiological attributes. In ontological terms, this openness is what makes corporeality and sexuality possible. As pointed out in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, the lectures of the summer semester of 1928, exactly one year after the publication of Being and Time, Dasein is present there before any determination as “man” and “woman.” In fact, “the peculiar neutrality of the term ‘Dasein’ is essential, because the interpretation of this being must be carried out prior to every factual concretion” (Heidegger, 1990: 171-2; engl. tr.: 136), this is to say, independent of its gender, class, religion, culture, or ethnicity. This neutrality also indicates that “Dasein is neither of the two sexes.” (Heidegger, 1990: 172; engl. tr.: 136) One must not forget that the original purpose of Heidegger’s analytic is none other than to articulate the foreunderstanding that Dasein has of Being and not to develop a philosophical or ethical anthropology. For this reason, Heidegger does not use the word “man” or “person” but the neutral German term “Dasein.” 3.1 Feminist Stance Regarding Dasein’s Sexual Neutrality: the Gender/Sex Distinction At first, it might seem strange to speak of Heidegger from the point of view of feminist theory, since its views on the meaning of Being are far from the real concerns of social, political, and ethical philosophy. At the beginning of the 1980s, the absence of the phenomenon of the body in Heidgger’s thoughts was severely criticized.7 All the same, as Huntingdon comments, one could uphold the theory that the feminist appropriation of elements from Heidegger’s thought is indirect, primarily through the influence of Jacques Derrida and Luce Irigaray (Huntington, 2001: 2, 6-9). It is worth recalling once more that Heidegger avoids a thematic discussion of the body since his analysis of human life centers on the ontological structures which make any significant bodily experience possible by virtue of its being-inthe-world. Moreover, these ontological structures, which we can also call conditions of possibility of any bodily experience, are asexual (geschlechtlos) and neutral (neutral), because they are more primary than the biological characteristics particular to men and women and more primary than any gender difference. Ever since Gayle Rubin’s pioneering essay of 1975, many feminist philosophers have adopted the distinction between gender and sex (Rubin, 1984; Moi, 2005: 23-30). Sex has become a concept that describes the biological components that characterize men and women, while gender refers to the culturally constructed norms which are interpreted as masculine and feminine. The category of sex tends to imply a universalist point of view in that it refers to the biological body as an invariable base; gender, in contrast, has a mainly anti-essentialist connotation in that social practices are not permanently fixed, but rather are determined by historical changes. Thus, feminists have long rejected the idea that biological differences between the sexes justify differences in social norms. Therefore, the problems of oppression and discrimination are not of biological nature. They are products of historically variable norms, practices, and institutions. This being said, to what extent does the sex-gender distinction correspond with Heidegger’s conception of human existence understood as Dasein? Heidegger’s reluctance to speak about Dasein’s sexuality should be understood based on his attempt to break down the classical metaphysics of substance. As has been previously pointed out, the individual is not a mere res extensa, a mere material body. The anatomical and biological characteristics of human beings are not crucial to the analytic of existence because such a materialistic approach does not pay attention to the question of what it means to be a “biological being”. Interpreting human existence in materialistic and sexual terms means considering humans as things, but Dasein is a peculiar type of being. Dasein is not a static entity that is physically present there like a thing among other things; on the contrary, it is a dynamic being subjected to a constant process of fulfillment. Hence, it is a mistake to refer to Dasein in terms of a material body, as a physical thing, as a sexed being with biological properties which can be theoretically examined. Heidegger refers back to the everyday activities of human existence which make any theorization possible, including the one of the body and of sex. From the perspective of the gender-sex difference, one could assert that Heidegger is critical of the essentialist category of sex. It is a mistake to interpret human beings in terms of a fixed and objective presence (Anwesenheit); instead, they are characterized by their “having to be” (Zu-sein) within the framework of the public norms that govern everyday life. In this context, the category of “gender” can be applied since this expresses precisely the social and cultural character of our constant process of self-interpretation. Nevertheless, the “There,” the Da in Dasein, that is to say, the space of intelligibility, should remain sexless and neutral, since the “There” exists before we interpret ourselves in terms of gender practices, biological characteristics, religious preferences, and ethnic features. In the lectures of the winter semester of 1928/29, Introduction to Philosophy, we read: “In its essence, the entity we are, is neutral, (…) that is, it is neither masculine nor feminine: it is simply a sexual creature (Geschlechtwesen).” (Heidegger 2001: 152) This tension between a gendered Dasein and a neutral Dasein can only be relieved keeping in mind the philosophical program that is articulated in Heidegger’s early work. Dasein is, in its factical existence, masculine or feminine. On this level, Dasein is a gendered creature that is part of a symbolic universe. As follows, these ontic and existentialistic classifications of each particular individual should be distinguished from the ontological and existential analysis that determines the constitutive structures of Dasein, regardless of its sex, social condition, religious affiliation, ethnic background, and cultural context. Therefore, we find ourselves facing two different, but interrelated, concepts of Dasein. On the one hand, Dasein is interpreted as factical—as a concrete being that embodies an activity or represents a role. Each individual—whether man or woman—is an instantiation of Dasein. On the other hand, Dasein should be understood as “Da–sein”— as the being where the “There” (Da) comes to manifestation. The emphasis is not on concrete activities and roles but rather on the “There” as a horizon of meaning and space of openness. The “There” is condition of possibility of our world understanding and of our own self-understanding. The purpose of Dasein’s analytic, as has already been asserted on different occasions, is to show the basic ontological and, by extension, neutral structures of Dasein. Nevertheless, to accept public interpretation of things and people is problematic because it is guided by the acceptance of the prejudices of the social world into which we are thrown. Heidegger intends to go beyond the cultural classifications of man and woman with an interest to grasp the invariable structures which make it possible for each human being to give meaning to the world and, by extension, to itself. What is important to remember is that the structural conditions that comprise Dasein are asexual and neutral. Dasein, as thrown into an open space of meaning, not only precedes the particular characteristics and the concrete practices of individual human beings, but already always guides any interpretation that we can make about the world, making it possible that things appear as masculine and feminine. In contrast, the feminist perspective claims that, if the meaning of things is manifested in the “There,” understood as a horizon of historically mediated social practices, that same horizon is already marked by androcentric criteria, favoring from the beginning a particular set of institutions and habits. Is perhaps the openness into which Dasein is thrown not already ordered into gender hierarchies?