# Shells

# Core

## Thesis

### 1NC – Debt

#### Intelligibility of the future is structured by the concept of debt. Debt is a model of control which creates the future by modulating the possibilities of the present. Secular capitalism positions blackness as incapable of inheriting debt relegating blackness to a perpetually delayed state of non-being.

**Barber ’16**, *The Creation of Non-Being,* (<http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/pdf/barber.pdf>)

This capacitation of being is structured by a logic of inheritance. Lazzarato, despite his ultimate collusion with such capacitation, already espied this logic when he observed a certain undividedness of Christian power and capitalist power. Nonetheless, his analysis of inheritance (in terms of debt) evades encounter with the essence of the power that inheritance enacts: the power to damn non-being. This logic of inheritance is the logic of the contemporary world;[24] the contemporary, or the presently given, is given precisely as inheritance. Such a claim refuses the understanding of the contemporary world as secular—that is, as divided from, in supersession of, an historically prior period of Christianity.[25] In doing so, it serves to emphasize the constitutive violence of the secular.[26] [40] Essential to the secular is the disavowal of its own violence, which it accomplishes by referring such violence to a domain of religion that is cast into the past. The gratuitous violence of secular antiblackness exceeds the self-definition of the secular, but this excess is warded off, denied contemporary appearance, insofar as the secular treats violence as a matter of religion, which it claims to supersede in principle and to inevitably progress beyond in practice. To insist on the inheritance of Christianity by secular capitalism, then, is to refuse any operation whereby the violence of the secular—indexed, via Christianity, as (a) being that gratuitously damns—is disavowed. It is to insist that damnation perdures within a purportedly distinct secular frame. [41] The logic of inheritance thus refuses any narrative according to which the secular divides from and thereby progresses beyond the Christian. Yet to refuse this division is not to reduce capitalist power to Christian power—as if capitalism were simply Christianity in disguise. Nor is it to understand the antiblackness of secular capitalism as reducible to—and thus as a ruse for—the mode of domination set forth by Christianity. On the contrary, there is—amidst the undividedness of inheritance—a qualitative intensification of violence. [42] In other words, just as the logic of inheritance tracks the secular "backward" into the Christian, so it tracks the Christian "forward" into the secular. This last is partially indicated by Lewis R. Gordon's claim that Christian being was inherited by or passed on as anti-black being: "Th[e] problematic of blackness is symbiotically linked to the world in which Christendom was transformed into Europe, where Germanic and Mediterranean Christians were transformed into whites ... blackness is fundamental to the formation of European modernity as it is one that imagines itself legitimate and pure through the expurgation of blackness" (Gordon 2013: 728-9). The qualitative intensification at issue in this passage from Christian to secular may be articulated by way of the passage from the (Christian) positioning of Jews and Muslims to the (secular) positioning of blackness. [43] Christianity subjected Jews and Muslims, who had "wrong religion," to the choice between conversion and death. Importantly, having-wrong-religion was simultaneously racialized: Christian religion named the properly human, and so having-wrong-religion also meant being on the wrong side of the human race. Not only does the secular world inherit the Christian religio-racial discourse, it also intensifies this discourse as anti-blackness: Jews and Muslims, due to their possession of religion, were positioned as being capable (in theory) of converting to the full humanity named by Christianity and thereby retained a minimum of humanity;[27] blacks, however, were denied the possibility of humanity. In other words, when Jews and Muslims were damned by Christianity, they were damned as possible humans—humans who lacked the actualization of full humanity (Christian being), but humans nevertheless. In secular capitalism, on the other hand, the form of actualization is no longer Christian being but a more generalized human being—one that is denied to blackness, to the position of the slave, as such. The damnation of Christian power is thus inherited, and qualitatively intensified, through the positioning of blackness by secular power as that which is denied even the possibility of human being. [44] This passage "forward," while a qualitative intensification, did not have the effect of leaving Christianity behind. On the contrary, secular anti-black racialization was able to be "retroactively" applied by Christianity to the subjects of its domination. This is evident, for instance, in the case of the Moriscos (Muslims baptized as part of their forced conversion to Christianity). As Ramón Grosfoguel observes, "Despite the Christian church prohibition to enslave Christians and people baptized as Christian," after the historical establishment of anti-blackness "Moriscos were massively enslaved in Granada" (Grosfoguel 2013: 85). In other words, a position that Christianity had prohibited or saved from enslavement was, in view of a consequent anti-blackness, subjected to the violence of such antiblackness. [45] The argument that I am advancing must be made precise. It is not that the violence of anti-blackness was already articulated by Christianity, such that the position of blackness was the mere extension of a position here exemplified by the Moriscos. This cannot be the case, since Christianity had already positioned Moriscos so as to be saved from enslavement. Nor is the point that the position of Moriscos, after enslavement, became analogous to the position of blackness—unlike blacks, Moriscos have the capacity to narrate enslavement as the loss of a prior being-saved from enslavement. The point is simply that once anti-blackness is articulated, Christianity does not mitigate—much less refuse—such violence. On the contrary, it renders such violence operable within its own logic. In this sense, Christian damnation recognizes the anti-blackness operative under secular capitalism as its own heir, as a violence whose qualitative intensification remains something that Christianity is able to recognize and claim as its own. [46] Christianity's readiness to recognize and claim this violence as its own demonstrates its ultimate commensurability with the anti-black violence of secular capitalism. To attend to this commensurability is to understand that the limits of any Christian humanitarianism—when posed as a possible ally in combating anti-blackness—stem from (intrinsic) logical operation rather than from (extrinsic) historical conjuncture. This is to say, for instance, that an abolitionist claim motivated by Christian humanitarianism is contradictory at essence. In fact, even to grant such contradictions of intention is already too generous: if Christianity is ultimately commensurable with anti-blackness, then such a call for abolition is the capture of antagonism toward anti-blackness by means of the (redemptive) possibility of human being or freedom. It reproductively modulates the anti-black world through the possibility of emancipation —a possibility that is already narratively inscribed within Christian salvation as the redemption from sin, or debt. And debt remains a matter of inheritance. [47] The logic of inheritance is meant to emphasize not only the undividedness of Christian power and secular power, of Christian being and secular being, but also the means by which this world makes (and continuously remakes) the division between being and non-being: kinship. This is to follow Hortense J. Spillers' argument concerning the central role played by (the denial of) kinship in anti-blackness. She remarks, for instance, that this establishment is one in which kinship, in terms of blackness, "loses meaning, since it can be invaded at any given and arbitrary moment by property relations" (Spillers 1987: 74). Blackness is subjected to a violence, enacted in slavery, from which kinship saves. Hence it is not just blackness, but also the possibility of kinship within or for blackness, that is subjected to expurgation: "under conditions of captivity, the offspring of the female does not 'belong' to the mother, nor is s/he 'related' to the 'owner,' though the latter 'possesses' it, and in the African-American instance, often fathered it, and, as often, without whatever benefit of patrimony" (Spillers 1987: 74). The gratuitous violence to which blackness becomes subject, then, is both brought about by and reproduced as the denial of kinship. [48] It is this violence, this uninheritability, that remains unthought in Lazzarato and thereby marks the commensurability of his analysis of debt with the anti-black world.

### \*\*\*2NR – Barber 16

## Lonks

### 1NC - Rehab

#### The integration of individuals into systems of public health preys on the plastic nature of cognition in order to supplant it with a neural flexibility that reproduces neoliberal systems of power.

**Szymanski ’17**, *The Neuroplastic paradox,* (<http://www.inflexions.org/exhaustion/PDFs/06_Szymanski.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

A brief contextualization of neuroplasticity’s primacy within neuroscientific discourse will help to frame this paradox of neuroplasticity in which we are snared. Long gone are the days when scientists thought that the brain finished developing during childhood, and that adults were stuck with a “hard wired” brain that could only diminish in capacities due to psychical trauma, mental illness or aging. The rationale that the adult brain can heal from even severe impairments is now commonplace, and constitutes the basis for a vast array of therapeutic options, that all seek, through different means, to modify the plastic structure of the brain into some non-pathological form. According to Catherine Malabou, plasticity has become “the dominant concept of the neurosciences.” “Today,” Malabou argues, “it constitutes their common point of interest, their dominant motif, and their privileged operating model, to the extent that it allows them to think about the brain as at once an unprecedented dynamic, structure, and organization” (Malabou 4). The brain’s ability to be rewired, even into adulthood, has promised a new wave of hope for the treatment of “mental illnesses” (now also frequently referred to as “brain disorders”) and a host of other conditions. [7] As the shift in emphasis from the “psy” to the “neuro” continues to intensify across a broad range of societal discourses and institutions, especially those pertaining to the management of health [8], the reductionist temptation to desubjectify the depression pandemic we are living through presents itself as strongly as ever. Take for example, the words of pioneering researcher in brain plasticity, Michael Mezernich: “Contemporary neuroscience is revealing, for the first time in our history, our true human natures,” he says. “Human wisepersons and societies have had great fun pondering about the mysteries of the origins of the ‘self’.… We now have first-level scientific answers to these questions. We now understand the basic processes that underlie the genesis of the ‘self’” (Mezernich). If the self can be reduced to primary brain processes, then what distinguishes a life coloured by depression from an exuberant one, a life on the verge of suicide from a life with an appetite for more? According to this material reductionist viewpoint [9], the difference between these two tendencies of life lies in the brain. And make no mistake, it undoubtedly does, but only if the brain is granted an expanded sense that confounds its orthodox usage in the neurosciences. As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s own theoretical turns from the “psy” to the “neuro” in the 1980s and 1990s attest, theories of subjectivity production that seek to break from established analytic topographies are apt to explore the neurological dimension. The real schism between a reductionist scientism and a politicization of subjectivity is that the former thinks the brain in isolation, “outside of organism and milieu” (Rose 2016), whereas the latter thinks the brain as milieu, “event,” or “screen” (Deleuze 2000: 366; Deleuze 1995: 176). By constructing an isolated brain as the essence of subjectivity (and psychological affliction), neuroscience and the hegemonic therapies couched in it, all too frequently treat the “social as a supplement” (Rose 2016), effectively effacing the political contingency of the brain’s plastic composition. Deleuze may have advanced a “materialist psychiatry,” but his take on the brain couldn’t differ more from material reductionist schemas. That’s because the materiality of the brain is thoroughly “psychosocial,” a membrane at the limit of the desire and the social: “the brain is precisely this boundary of a continuous twoway movement between an Inside and Outside, this membrane between them” (Deleuze 1995: 176). Deleuze’s brain-as-screen is material; a materially constituted milieu which includes the reality of relation between polymorphous flows of desire (or “stimuli”). Read in this expanded sense, the brain is indeterminate, a brain for the making and in the making, shaped by the movements of desire that impress upon it. As Deleuze writes: “Cerebral circuits and connections do not preexist the stimuli, the corpuscles, or particles that trace them” (Deleuze 2000: 366). Such a conception of the brain may seem a bit counter-intuitive at first; it is not the brain inside of the head, but the brain as the screen, as materially immanent to the (plastic) movement of the psychosocial event. Deleuze elaborates: One might equally well speak of new kinds of event, rather than processes of subjectification: events that can’t be explained by the situations that give rise to them, or into which they lead. They appear for a moment, and it’s that moment that matters, it’s the chance we must seize. Or we can simply talk about the brain. […] I think subjectification, events, and brains are more or less the same thing. (Deleuze 1995: 176) Rather than the originator of experience, or the building block of some essential human self, as is posited by the material-reductionist hypothesis, the brain is an eventful milieu of subjectivity production—a milieu that can engender the hardened confines of an unshakeable depression, or even the most unexpected of therapeutic recompositions. The shift in neoliberal strategies of governance from industrial capitalism’s emphasis on discipline towards deployment of control, has seized the potential of brain plasticity. “Control society” is the term that Deleuze uses to describe a new type of power that emerges in the late 20th Century, in contradistinction to Europe’s “disciplinary” and “sovereign” societies that figure prominently in Michel Foucault’s work on discipline and punishment in the 19th and 18th centuries. Strategies of control augment the state-run disciplinary institutions of confinement such as the military barracks, the classroom and the psychiatric ward by governance through more decentralized and corporatized means. New forms of subjectivity have been produced as a consequence of this shift in power. Whereas disciplinarity operates by molding its subjects from the outside (through confinement, repetitive drills and exercises as well as moral strictures), control works more seductively to induce conformity by way of modulation from within the subject who performs its own enterprising sense of self (by incurring debt, seeking motivation and conducting self-audits). Significantly for this study of plasticity and power, Deleuze attunes to how these strategies of power are to be distinguished by their tendency to either mold or modulate. He writes: “Confinements are moulds, different mouldings, while controls are a modulation like a self-transmuting moulding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh varies from one point to another” (1995: 178). Of key importance here is that rather than restricting change by confining and disciplining movements through moulds that hold for a set period of time (the school day, the tour of duty, etc.), control societies work immanently to change, by directing, inflecting and modulating it indefinitely—“In control societies you never finish anything,” Deleuze adds (1995: 178). The rise of the control society poses a whole new set of questions about political resistance that were absent from the discourse of political modernism. Neoliberalism has, at least in many “advanced capitalist” pockets, ceded to worker demands for more free time and less rigid work structures; feminist and queer demands for gender fluidity and non-heteronormative relationships; and postcolonial demands for minority recognition. But at the same time that many of the 20th century’s desires are seeing themselves fulfilled, and stifling old molds have given way to some more flexible identities, schedules and borders, power has not ceded any of its capacity to modulate modes of existence. This modulatory style of control is emblematic of what Mark Fisher calls “capitalist realism,” the idea that it may be easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. For Fisher, capitalist realism “entails subordinating oneself to a reality that is infinitely plastic, capable of reconfiguring itself at any moment. […] We are presented with what Jameson calls ‘a purely fungible present in which space and psyches alike can be processed and remade at will’ ” (199). In the control society, power entices never-ending adaption to a plastic reality in perpetual change and modulation, regardless of how unconducive to wellness or how unsustainable such economic imperatives have proven to be. Faced with this neoliberal reality political resistance cannot be content with only working towards the abolishment of confining structures and identities. Catherine Malabou and Marc Jeannerod address this predicament at the heart of the neuroplastic paradox in the most politicized passages of the book What Should We Do with Our Brain? In order to salvage the concept of plasticity, they propose a distinction between the neoliberal economy’s demands for infinite flexibility and the potentially therapeutic qualities of neuroplasticity. They warn: Let us not forget that plasticity is a mechanism for adapting, while flexibility is a mechanism for submitting. Adapting is not submitting, and, in this sense, plasticity ought not to serve as an alibi for submitting to the new world order being dreamed up by capitalism.… What flexibility lacks is the resource of giving form, the power to create, to invent or even to erase an impression, the power to style. Flexibility is plasticity minus its genius. (Jeannerod: xiv; Malabou: 12) The distinction that Malabou and Jeannerod set up between plasticity and flexibility posits plasticity’s creative capacity to challenge the neoliberal demand of interminable flexibility. According to their formulation, plasticity actively shapes the world, whereas flexibility submits to the shape that the world has already taken. For these thinkers, the act of giving form, creating, inventing, erasing and styling constitute the pragmatic and experimental basis for resistance. Conversely, flexibility would entail a subduing of this creative capacity in order to accept the form of the world as it is (in its becoming), and submit to its modulatory impositions, rather than contribute to its ongoing formation through acts of creation

### \*\*\*2NR - Szymanski ’17,

### \*\*\*1NC – Optimism

#### Politics that takes as it’s starting point a belief in this world ignore the nature of control societies as continually permissive of rebellion. Optimism relies on a

**Culp 16** “*Ending the World as We Know It,*” (<https://www.boundary2.org/2016/06/ending-the-world-as-we-know-it-an-interview-with-andrew-culp/>)

Andrew Culp: My opening is cribbed from a letter Gilles Deleuze wrote to philosopher and literary critic Arnaud Villani in the early 1980s. Deleuze suggests that any worthwhile book must have three things: a polemic against an error, a recovery of something forgotten, and an innovation. Proceeding along those three lines, I first argue against those who worship Deleuze as the patron saint of affirmation, second I rehabilitate the negative that already saturates his work, and third I propose something he himself was not capable of proposing, a “hatred for this world.” So in an odd twist of Marx on history, I begin with those who hold up Deleuze as an eternal optimist, yet not to stand on their shoulders but to topple the church of affirmation. The canon portion of “canon of joy” is not unimportant. Perhaps more than any other recent thinker, Deleuze queered philosophy’s line of succession. A large portion of his books were commentaries on outcast thinkers that he brought back from exile. Deleuze was unwilling to discard Nietzsche as a fascist, Bergson as a spiritualist, or Spinoza as a rationalist. Apparently this led to lots of teasing by fellow agrégation students at the Sorbonne in the late ’40s. Further showing his strange journey through the history of philosophy, his only published monograph for nearly a decade was an anti-transcendental reading of Hume at a time in France when phenomenology reigned. Such an itinerant path made it easy to take Deleuze at his word as a self-professed practitioner of “minor philosophy.” Yet look at Deleuze’s outcasts now! His initiation into the pantheon even bought admission for relatively forgotten figures such as sociologist Gabriel Tarde. Deleuze’s popularity thus raises a thorny question for us today: how do we continue the minor Deleuzian line when Deleuze has become a “major thinker”? For me, the first step is to separate Deleuze (and Guattari) from his commentators. I see two popular joyous interpretations of Deleuze in the canon: unreconstructed Deleuzians committed to liberating flows, and realists committed to belief in this world. The first position repeats the language of molecular revolution, becoming, schizos, transversality, and the like. Some even use the terms without transforming them! The resulting monotony seals Deleuze and Guattari’s fate as a wooden tongue used by people still living in the ’80s. Such calcification of their concepts is an especially grave injustice because Deleuze quite consciously shifted terminology from book to book to avoid this very outcome. Don’t get me wrong, I am deeply indebted to the early work on Deleuze! I take my insistence on the Marxo-Freudian core of Deleuze and Guattari from one of their earliest Anglophone commentators, Eugene Holland, who I sought out to direct my dissertation. But for me, the Tiqqun line “the revolution was molecular, and so was the counter-revolution” perfectly depicts the problem of advocating molecular politics. Why? Today’s techniques of control are now molecular. The result is that control societies have emptied the molecular thinker’s only bag of tricks (Bifo is a good test case here), which leaves us with a revolution that only goes one direction: backward. I am equally dissatisfied by realist Deleuzians who delve deep into the early strata of A Thousand Plateaus and away from the “infinite speed of thought” that motivates What is Philosophy? I’m thinking of the early incorporations of dynamical systems theory, the ’90s astonishment over everything serendipitously looking like a rhizome, the mid-00s emergence of Speculative Realism, and the ongoing “ontological” turn. Anyone who has read Manuel DeLanda will know this exact dilemma of materiality versus thought. He uses examples that slow down Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts to something easily graspable. In his first book, he narrates history as a “robot historian,” and in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, he literally traces the last thousand years of economics, biology, and language back to clearly identifiable technological inventions. Such accounts are dangerously compelling due to their lucidity, but they come at a steep cost: android realism dispenses with Deleuze and Guattari’s desiring subject, which is necessary for a theory of revolution by way of the psychoanalytic insistence on the human ability to overcome biological instincts (e.g. Freud’s Instincts and their Vicissitudes and Beyond the Pleasure Principle). Realist interpretations of Deleuze conceive of the subject as fully of this world. And with it, thought all but evaporates under the weight of this world. Deleuze’s Hume book is an early version of this criticism, but the realists have not taken heed. Whether emergent, entangled, or actant, strong realists ignore Deleuze and Guattari’s point in What is Philosophy? that thought always comes from the outside at a moment when we are confronted by something so intolerable that the only thing remaining is to think.

### 1NC – Habits of affirmation

#### Politics that takes as it’s starting point a belief in this world ignores the axiomatic nature of antiblackness as non-being which allows for the possibility of the future. Habits of affirmation especially in communicative spaces reveal themselves not as revolutionary actions but precisely constitutive of societies of control.

**Barber ’16**, *The Creation of Non-Being,* (<http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/pdf/barber.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

[3] Deleuze's philosophy has come to be associated with habits of affirmation, where "habits" indicate the practices or operations by which reality is experientially and experimentally enacted.[4] This association could be attributed to Deleuze's invocation of concepts such as the rhizome, which appears to advocate teeming, emergent, multiplicitous movement in excess of all boundaries. In such a landscape of fluidity and flux, Deleuze's notion of creation then becomes associated with the affirmation of alternative possibilities. This association may also be attributed to Deleuze's rigorous refusal of the being of negativity. He contends that negative being plays no role in the determination of reality, that it is in fact an illusion that conceals the force of differential immanence. Given the centrality of this contention, any association of Deleuze's thought with habits of affirmation would have to depend on the following claim: the refusal of negative being entails the refusal of habits of negativity, in favor of habits of affirmation.[5] [4] Yet it is fundamentally mistaken to conflate the refusal of negative being with the refusal of negative habits. The call for habits of affirmation is theoretically illegitimate: if all habits are real, and if reality has no negative being, then all habits—precisely because they are real—do not involve negative being; the reality that is habituated—regardless of whether this habituation is characterized as affirmative or negative—has no negative being. If the call for habits of affirmation is therefore not entailed by Deleuze's refusal of negative being, then from where does this call arise? If habits of affirmation are imperative, then from where does this imperativity draw its mandate? To begin to answer these questions, one must address the ways in which habits of affirmation are logically consistent—and ultimately politically complicit—with the contemporary conjuncture of capitalism. [5] This conjuncture, which has been variously described in terms of "late capitalism," "postfordism," or "communicative capitalism," is marked by an affirmation of mobility, innovation, fluidity, possibility, and creativity. Deleuze analyzed this conjuncture in terms of control societies, which he distinguished from disciplinary societies. Control establishes domination not by setting up in advance strict boundaries, but rather by a kind of unending encouragement, or motivated permissiveness: control establishes and expands itself by establishing and expanding possibilities of communication. Domination "no longer operate[s] by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication" (Deleuze 1997: 174). Whereas discipline names the prohibition of excessive mobility and innovation, control names the "modulation" of the possibilities implied in such mobility and innovation (Deleuze 1997: 179). [6] [6] With control, domination remains not despite, nor in opposition to, but precisely as possibility, which is modulated through a communicability that is ever more fluid and receptive in its listening in order to be ever more innovative in its surveilling.[7] Following Deleuze's analysis of control, habits of affirmation—of multiplicitous possibilities, or of the possibility of being-otherwise—are not resistant to, but actually constitutive of, control's modulation. Control is marked by "endless postponement" (Deleuze 1997: 179), meaning that the future—as that which breaks with the present—never takes place. The present is extended into the future, and so the future becomes a modulation of the present; an essential incommensurability between present and future remains unthinkable.[8] Given Deleuze's analysis, it is not by accident that he increasingly experimented with habits of negativity. In his last book, What is Philosophy? – co-written with Félix Guattari, and published one year after his analysis of control—one can observe, for instance, his attentiveness to "shame" (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 107), which was motivated by his reading of Primo Levi, or his indication of agreement with the negative dialectic of Theodor Adorno.[9] [7] One finds, in the same book, a polemic against communication and a concomitant positioning of creation as distinct from and incommensurable with the communicative.[10] Simply put, Deleuze's increased attention to control, or communication, directly corresponds to his increased attention to the negative—not as being but as experience and experiment, as habit. Thus it is not only that Deleuze's refusal of negative being cannot be conflated with habits of affirmation, it is also that Deleuze, when attending to control, attempts to articulate habits of negativity. What is Philosophy? concludes with an articulation of the No of chaos, the non of thought that enables creation: philosophy must attain "an essential relationship with the No that concerns it"; philosophy does "not need the No as beginning, or as the end in which [it] would be called upon to disappear by being realized, but at every moment of [its] becoming or [its] development" (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 218). [8] The creation named by Deleuze's philosophy is thus in immanence with the No, and it is this Nocreation immanence that begins to articulate antagonism toward communication: "Creating has always been something different from communicating" (Deleuze 1997: 175). This divergence between communication and the No of creation is utter, essential, and irredeemable. There is no possibility of emancipating communication, nor is there any affirmative basis for creation—for the base is communication. There is nothing to affirm, and so creation is immanent with the negativity of the non: "The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication" (Deleuze 1997: 175). The Reality of Non-Being [9] My argument, drawing on Deleuze, is that the logic of possibility actually serves to modulatively reproduce the anti-black grammar of the world. Creation, defined as a break with the presently given world, is not a possibility. It is rather immanent with an axiomatic No to such possibility, with habits of negativity. [10] This thesis concerns a key problematic that stems from the Afro-Pessimist analysis of anti-blackness: if blackness stands both within the habitus of modernity, as an organizing principle, and without this habitus, as a perpetually banished subjectivity, then the very articulation of blackness would seem to depend on and reproduce such a habitus. In other words, both being-within and being-without are possibilities governed by modernity's dominative positioning of blackness. The articulation of blackness is in fact bound by this problematic insofar as one remains within the ambit of habits of affirmation. In other words, the presumption of affirmation is co-extensive with the reproduction of the habitus of modernity: that which is presently available for affirmation is already governed by modernity and its articulation of blackness, and so habits of affirmation inevitably participate in and reproduce the doublebind in which modernity positions blackness.

### 2NR – Barber 16

#### Habits of affirmation are an act of creation whereby we attempt to create and modulate the future within the present. Control societies no longer act by limiting our acts of imagination and creation but rather by modulating them through a motivated permissiveness.

#### Think here about places like the UT campus which has constructed specific sights for students to protest. We are allowed to protest but only in terms of the dominant grammar which makes discussion and communication possible in the first place.

#### Habits of affirmation happen not in opposition to but in immanence with their negation. This creates a double bind where blackness is necessary for the coherence of the world but blackness also must inhabit the state of nonbeing. This reveals the affirmative as an endless postponement where this double-bind is pushed across eternity never to be destroyed.

## Impactonk

### \*Notices your depression\*

#### UwU “what’s this??”

**Culp 16** (Andrew Culp (2016) Confronting connectivity: feminist challenges to the metropolis, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 13:2, 166-183, DOI: 10.1080/14791420.2015.1108449. Pg. 7-9. Accessed: 7/8/18// EW)

The Metropolis advances connectivity’s liberal principles of communication, language, and cooperation as their capitalist appropriation is becoming “the life of the city itself.”64 Behind these disembodied abstractions hides sexual exploitation. Although the Metropolis is networked and informatized on the computational layer, it operates through the “pharmaco-pornographic” soft technologies that initiate cycles of excitation- frustration at the intersection of technologies of the body (biotechnologies, surgery, pharmaceuticals) and representation (film, television, new media).65 These technologies commodify labor through a contract of service that gives a sexual double meaning to the liberal ideals of access, free expression, and transparency—the pharmacopornographic regime also offers access to bodies, puts a pricetag on sensual expression, and guarantees ever-more-penetrating forms of exposure. Beyond the postmodernization of production, Hardt and Negri characterize the Metropolis in two additional ways, the first of which is that the Metropolis organizes a space of encounter by providing a shared structure for the interaction and communion of people and perceptions.66 These encounters are spaces of contingency, and regardless of how space is used to structure these encounters, their emergent effects remain unpredictable and surprising. As Manfredo Tafuri argues, because power “speaks many dialects,” then it is “the construction of physical spaces” that is “certainly the site of ‘battle,’” as it is accessed through the “borders, remains, residues” it leaves after the “collision” of the encounter.67 Also striking about these encounters is that they organize “brief metropolitan contacts” rather than “frequent and prolonged association.”68 However aleatory and brief, encounters contribute to the third dimension of the Metropolis: material histories, which pathologically prevent good encounters through their hierarchies, divisions, and polarizations that “bombards you” with negative encounters.69 These hierarchies and divisions are the marks of colonial relations, racism, patriarchy, and other exploitation that flow through the veins of the Metropolis and pour out onto its streets, and the pathology often runs so deep that Hardt and Negri declare: “the Metropolis is a jungle, and the form of the common and encounter it presents are ones you should run from!”70 What if the Metropolis is not a jungle, however, but a storm “that does not confront us like a subject, facing us, but like an environment that is hostile to us?”71 The pornographic transparency of connectivity denudes subjects by exposing them to the dangerous forces of the outside. Imagining the Metropolis as a storm matches the reality of its harshly gendered landscape of fear and violence, one that restricts women’s access to resources, inhibits their ability to find dignified work, and delivers the daily assaults of catcalls and other violences.72 The term risks naturalizing the oppression that women face, a concern reflected in the adage, “everybody complains about the weather, but nobody does anything about it!” 73 Yet the traditional depiction of crime as the occasional result of bad actors is not sufficient. The metaphor of the storm powerfully signals the structural conditions of ongoing urban hostility as a space of bad encounters and fraught material histories. The ecological dimension of the metaphor thus strengthens the links between the city and earlier feminist methods for studying structural violence not isolated to a single individual.74 Innumerable feminist collectives have used the city as an object of inquiry, many taking cues from Italian feminism and the feminist social center movement, such as Madridbased Precarias a la Deriva, which “wanders” the city to find the “fragmented, informal, invisible work that we do,”75 Pittsburgh’s SubRosa, which uses “site-u-ational” art that “centers on the uses and implications of biotechnology as it applies to sexual difference, race, and transnational labor conditions,”76 and Feel Tank Chicago, which works to “depathologize negative affects so that they can be seen as a possible resource for political action.”77 What these feminist media projects reveal is the unavoidable commonality between women who weather the daily assault of patriarchy like a bad storm, which is a consequence of the gendered way in which the Metropolis is embodied and experienced. Such negative encounters stick to bodies as frustrations and feelings and is later channeled into grief, outrage, or simply suffered in seclusion.78 Most sober-minded critics find the uglier of our shared feelings unfit for something as noble as liberation, which may be why so few political projects outwardly declare that they draw their strength from envy, irritation, paranoia, and anxiety. Sianne Ngai argues that although these negative affects are weaker than “grander passions” and thus lack an orientation powerful enough to form clear political motivations, the unsuitability of weakly intentional feelings “amplifies their power to diagnose situations,” and those “situations marked by blocked or thwarted actions in particular.”79 From this perspective, ugly feelings provide epistemological access to the bad encounters organized by the Metropolis— especially those that are cruel replacements meant to inspire only enough optimism to discourage the search for a better alternative.80 Ugly feelings may be not just the result of bad encounters, then, but a form of resistance enfolded by the body that can be used as a public resource.

### \*\*\*2NR – Culp ‘16

### Stock

#### The impact is massive violence and extinction – the brink is now.

Robinson 16 (William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis>)

In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to turn poverty and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has broken free from the constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is not enough. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. A global rebellion against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is popular, grassroots and leftist struggle, and the rise of new cultures of resistance: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global capitalism must strive to influence, from this vantage point, the discourse and practice of movements for a more just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may depend on it.

### \*\*\*2NR – Robinson 16

### 1NC – Gratuitous violence

#### The incapability of Blackness to inherit debt allows for the emergence of a captive society which encourages gratuitous violence against blackness

**Barber ’16**, *The Creation of Non-Being,* (<http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/pdf/barber.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

 [50] Given this adumbration of the logic of inheritance, non-being may be recapitulated—in a sense irreducible to Deleuze's strictly conceptual articulation, and in accordance with Afro-Pessimism's analysis of the forceful negativity of blackness—as that which is without the *kinship of being* or the *being of kinship*.[[30]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-30) One consequence of this approach is the reformulation of control societies in terms of George Jackson's analysis of "captive society" (Jackson 1994: 4), the elaboration of which draws upon the indications of Michelle Koerner's "Line of Escape."[[31]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-31) Conceiving control according to captivity has the analytic advantage of foregrounding anti-blackness in a way that control does not: a slave society is also a captive society, and so to speak of control according to captivity is to speak of the perdurance of anti-blackness in the contemporaneity of control. Whereas control may be reduced to debt, and thus to the supposed universality of the indebted man, the insistence on captivity breaks this universality through a position bound not to debt—the we of anti-black social life—but to gratuitous violence. [51] If contemporary social life is constituted through what Jackson calls "neo-slavery,"[[32]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-32) then any public space for mediating conflicts, much less any *state* as a space for mediating the representation of (conflictual) people, is inadequate to social antagonism. As Koerner puts it, "Jackson asserts that, despite the theatrics of representational democracy, the function of the state in 'captive society' is not exactly a political function but a *policing* one. The state here emerges not as the site of political power but as a *weapon*" (Koerner 2011: 167). Police violence, as the weapon constitutive of captive society, thus indicates a violence logically prior to any public. The gratuity of such violence can be analyzed only insofar as it is connected to the violence of a slavery that – contrary to the progressive aspirations of a public—has not ended. [52] To observe this point is to redouble the refusal of any secular frame that purports to be distinct from Christian theological violence.[[33]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-33) This is because the inadequacy of the public sphere or the state is fundamentally an inadequacy of the secular. After all, both the public sphere and the state are imagined by or as the secular, which presents itself as a space of neutrality (at least in principle) for the mediation of conflicts. The secular claims this capacity for mediation insofar as it defines itself as fundamentally distinct from religion, which in turn is defined as the cause of the violence that sabotages the neutrality of secular space. As I have argued, however, secular capitalism should be understood as undivided from Christianity. This means that the secular, while correct in its claim that religion—specified as Christian damnation—is an index of violence, uses this very claim to disavow its own perpetuation and qualitative intensification of such gratuitous violence via anti-blackness. [53] Against the world's gratuitous violence, there is no means of mediation, no space of reasons. As Koerner remarks, "Power, in the terms of Jackson's analysis, is *essentially predatory*. And it is for this reason that Jackson conceptualizes the forces of resistance in 'captive society' in terms of escape and, above all, running" (Koerner 2011: 168).

## Alternatonk

### Offensive Opacity

#### The affirmative can never be anything more than a temporary zone of autonomous resistance until the police shut them down. In light of the futility of the 1AC we recreate this space as an offensive zone of opacity which reorients plasticity towards a permanent refusal of neoliberal structures.

**Culp 16,** *Dark Deleuze,* p22-24, (<https://track5.mixtape.moe/frhirn.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist **[BRACKETS IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT]**

“A truly dark path undoes everything that makes up this world. Deleuze and Guattari’s proposal to “accelerate the process” follows from R. D. Laing’s clinical prescription for more madness in our “veritable age of Darkness” (AO, 131). He supports the mad in turning “the destruction wrecked on them” into a force of dissolution against the “alienated starting point” of normality. This is a method made for breaking with the inside, which “turns in on itself” when “pierced by a hole, a lake, a flame, a tornado, an explosion,” so that the outside comes flooding in (132). Such a break can go one of two ways: it can be a breakdown or a breakthrough (239, 132). The best “breakthrough” is “making a break for it.” Deleuze is fond of repeating Black Panther George Jackson, who writes from prison that “yes, I can very well escape, but during my escape, I’m looking for a weapon” (DI, 277). The phrase applies to far more than Jackson’s literal imprisonment in San Quentin—what he really wanted was liberation from the American capitalist system of racial oppression, which is truly what killed him during his final escape attempt (eleven years into his one-year-to-life indefinite sentence for robbing a gas station for $70). The necessity of weapons should be clear. Even the most terrifying nomadic war machine is overshadowed by the state, which calls its operations “keeping the peace” (as documented by Foucault in his “Society Must Be Defended” lectures and beyond). Such violence has renewed meaning in 2015 as I write in the wake of a white supremacist massacre and as an outcry about racist police violence has finally started to generalize. Jackson stands as a reminder that a revolutionary line of flight must remain active; revolution is not a system-effect, though capitalism as a “system leaking all over the place” establishes the terrain for “revolutionary escape” (such as a propaganda system that can be infiltrated to attract outside conspirators or a legal system that provides lawyers who can smuggle subversive objects into controlled spaces) (DI, 270). The brilliant guerilla Che wrote the steps for one such dance, the minuet: the guerrillas begin by encircling an advancing column and splitting into a number of “points,” each with enough distance to avoid themselves being encircled; a couple pairs off and begins their dance as one of the guerrilla points attacks and draws out the enemy, after which they fall back and a different point attacks—the goal is not annihilation but to immobilize to the point of fatigue (Guevara, Guerilla Warfare, 58–59). Escapism is the great betrayer of escape. The former is simply “withdrawing from the social,” whereas the latter learns to “eat away at [the social] and penetrate it,” everywhere setting up “charges that will explode what will explore, make fall what must fall, make escape what must escape” as a “revolutionary force” (AO, 341). The same distinction also holds between two models of autonomy: temporary autonomous zones and zones of offensive opacity. Temporary autonomous zones are momentary bursts of carnivalesque energy that proponent Hakim Bey says “vanish, leaving behind it an empty husk” when the forces of definition arrive (Temporary Autonomous Zone, 100). Deleuze and Guattari suggest, contrary to orthodox Marxists, that societies are defined by how they manage their paths of escape (rather than their modes of production) (TP, 435). As such, “psychotopological” distance established by temporary autonomous zones does not create a significant enough rupture to open into anything else and thus collapses escape into escape-ism. Tiqqun’s zones of offensive opacity are an improvement, as they oppose a wider web of cybernetic governance without packing maximum intensity into a single moment (Anonymous, “De l’Hypothèse Cybernétique,” 334–38). Opacity is its first principle, something they learn from the long tradition of autonomists and anarchists whose most militant factions would refuse all engagement with parliamentary politics, labor and unions, and news media. Offensive orientation is its second principle, though tempered by the famous line from The Internationale, “la crosse en l’air,” with the butts of our guns held high in the air: knowing we can take the fight to the trenches, or even take power, but refuse it anyway. Tiqqun is well aware of the difficult history behind the state assassinations of the Black Panther Party and the Red Army Faction, so they know to resist militarization lest they become an army or be liquidated. The advantage of this “strategic withdrawal” is autonomy, especially as communism becomes its qualitative guide. Posing communism as oppositional self-determination, it takes the whole social apparatus of capture as its contrary—against any temptation to engage the social, for whatever resources offered, arises a demand to be met by a parallel space of communism. Flows: Interruption, Not Production The schizo is dead! Long live the schizo! Schizo culture appealed to a society seized by postwar consumer boredom. “Can’t we produce something other than toasters and cars? How about free speech, free school, free love, free verse!” It is no exaggeration to say that the events of May 19were sparked by a Situationist intolerance for boredom (“boredom is always counter-revolutionary,” says Guy Debord; “Bad Old Days Will End,” 36). In the time since the 1972 publication of Anti-Oedipus, capitalism has embraced its schizophrenia through neoliberalism. The schizo has become the paraphilic obsession of Nietzsche’s last man. Its flood of more and more objects has subjects able to muster less and less desire, as seen in the Japanese Lost Decade of stagflation, when a torrent of perversions coincided with a suicide epidemic. The dominant feelings today are probably anxiety or depression (Plan C, “We Are All Very Anxious”).

#### The alternative opens up a space for cognition to create and destroy new flows of power previously closed off by neoliberal structures. Eating away at machines like the affirmative is key to a larger dispersed project of escape.

### \*\*\*2NR – Culp 16

### 1NC – End of the world

#### The alternative is to make a call for the end of this world which marks all notions of the future and creation as insufficient and intolerable. An offensive orientation combined with an affective withdrawal refuses the ability of control and captive societies to modulate our investments into neoliberal and anti-black structures.

**Culp 16,** *Dark Deleuze,* p22-24, (<https://track5.mixtape.moe/frhirn.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

My basic argument is that a new untimeliness in a time not Deleuze’s own requires a negative project that his work introduces but does not sustain: the Death of this World. The end of this world is the third in a succession of deaths—the Death of God, the Death of Man, and now the Death of this World. This is not a call to physically destroy the world. The Death of God did not call for the assault of priests or the burning of churches, and the Death of Man did not propose genocide or the extinction of our species. Each death denounces a concept as insufficient, critiques those who still believe in it, and demands its removal as an object of thought. In the Death of Man, we learned that the human sciences were impotent in the face of the systemic injustices of this world. Rather, Foucault shows how expert inquiry makes exploitation, sexism, racism, poverty, violence, and war into the constitutive elements of how humanity defends itself. He shows that attempts to save this humanity created a biopower that “makes live and lets die,” which paradoxically administers life through “a power to expose a whole population to death” that tends toward wars of all-out destruction (Foucault, History of Sexuality, 135–37). Elaborating on this condition, subsequent theorists say that we have already been killed but have not yet died, making us an “already dead” that makes us already ready to adopt a revolutionary orientation that sacrifices our current time and space for a new, not-yet-realized future (Cazdyn, Already Dead, 9). Seen from this perspective, runaway climate change, the Sixth Extinction, and many other impending catastrophes are all essential parts of this world. The Death of this World admits the insufficiency of previous attempts to save it and instead poses a revolutionary gamble: only by destroying this world will we release ourselves of its problems. This does not mean moving to the moon, but that we give up on all the reasons given for saving the world. In my own announcement of the death of this world, I propose critiques of connectivity and positivity, a theory of contraries, the exercise of intolerance, and the conspiracy of communism. Contemporary Deleuze scholarship tends to be connectivist and productivist. Connectivism is the world-building integration into an expanding web of things. As an organizational logic, it is the promiscuous inclusion of seemingly unrelated elements into a single body to expand its capacities. Academics are not alone in endorsing connectivism—I argue that connectivism drives Google’s geopolitical strategy of global influence, which proceeds through a techno-affirmationist desire to annex everything. Commentators use different names for their webs of connections, such as rhizomes, assemblages, networks, material systems, or dispositifs. I simply call them “this world” and plot for its destruction. Productivism links up with the autonomous, ceaseless autoproduction of the real. The most naive productivists sentimentally cherish creation and novelty for their own sake, whether as dewy-eyed admiration for the complexity of nature or a staunch Voltairine defense of all types of diversity. The productivists worthy of criticism are those who, in the name of “finding something about this world to believe in,” affirm what is given as if this wretched world already included all materials for a better one. I find that in relinquishing the power of destruction, they can only capitalize on production through the logics of accumulation and reproduction. So in founding a new world on the terms of the old, its horizon expands barely beyond what already exists. The alternative I propose is finding reasons to destroy this world. The greatest crime of joyousness is tolerance. While mentioning tolerance may have marked one as a radical in Deleuze’s time, Wendy Brown argues in Regulating Aversion that liberal tolerance is now essential to the grammar of empire’s “domestic discourse of ethnic, racial, and sexual regulation, on the one hand, and as an international discourse of Western supremacy and imperialism on the other” (1, 7). Today’s tolerant are to blame for a “liberal Deleuze,” such as William Connolly, who names Deleuze as an antirevolutionary who inspires his belief that “transformation is neither needed nor in the cards today; what is needed is creative modes of intervention posed at several strategic sites in the service of reducing economic inequality, foster intra- and inter-state pluralism, and promoting ecological sanity” in his book on pluralism (Pluralism, 159). Deleuze criticized a similar position many decades ago when denouncing the media-hungry form of the Nouveaux Philosophes, who had “inscribed themselves perfectly well on the electoral grid . . . from which everything fades away” (“On the New Philosophers,” 40–41). Liberal Deleuzians can be criticized accordingly—for endorsing the usual abstractions of the Law and the State that hide the workings of power; for denouncing Marxism “not so much because real struggles would have made new enemies, new problems and new means arise, but because THE revolution must be declared impossible”; and for reviving the subject as part of a general martyrology. What stands between liberalism and revolution is intolerance, but in a peculiar way. Intolerance arises out of this world as “something intolerable in the world” to prove that there is “something unthinkable in thought” (C2, 169). Which is to say, it is when we find it all unbearable that we realize “it can no longer think a world or think itself” (170). This is where the Dark Deleuze parts ways with the joyful by inviting the death of this world. There are many fellow travelers of revolutionary intolerance, including Wendy Brown and Herbert Marcuse. Newton argues in his autobiography Revolutionary Suicide that the revolutionary task is to risk one’s life for the chance of “changing intolerable conditions” (5). In his essay on “repressive tolerance,” Marcuse extends tolerance only to the left, subversion, and revolutionary violence and proposes a militant intolerance of the right, this world, and “benevolent neutrality.” Together, they express the dark truth of the intolerable as the lived present of being trapped by something so unbearable, so impossible, that it must be destroyed. To be completely clear: the point is not to grow obstinate but to find new ways to end our suffocating perpetual present. Darkness advances the secret as an alternative to the liberal obsession with transparency. Foucault smartly identifies transparency’s role in the “science of the police,” which is used in the task of maintaining order through the collusion between the state and capital from liberalism’s beginnings in the German notion of the police state through to contemporary biopolitics (Security, Territory, Population).

### 2NR – Culp 16

### 1NC – Habits of negativity

**Barber ’16**, *The Creation of Non-Being,* (<http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/pdf/barber.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

[11] Against such reproduction, it is essential to insist on habits of negativity. Such insistence is total: since it is affirmation as such that entails participation in the being here indexed by modernity, even a modicum of affirmation mitigates the force enacted by negativity. The power of creation therefore resides entirely and essentially on the side of negativity—and not at all on the side of affirmation. Concomitantly, to invoke such power actually entails an unmitigated refusal of habits of affirmation; affirmation does not name or support, but on the contrary denies, the power of creation. Given the double-bind in which modernity positions blackness, this is to say that the negativity of the non, in virtue of its immanence with a force of creation, indexes blackness as a power of non-being, as that which is without need of—and in fact opposed to—reliance on the affirmative. [12] It remains necessary to outline the articulation of this immanence of creation and non-being—that is, to theoretically express how an unmitigated insistence on habits of negativity can be both a refusal of affirmation and an enactment of power. This warrants a return to Deleuze's thought by way of some questions: How can habits of negativity, articulated via Deleuze's insistence on the non, gain theoretical consistency with his conceptual refusal of negative being? If negative being is refused, then in what sense can there be insistence on the non? [13] Deleuze argues that "being is difference itself. Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the negative . . . non-being is Difference" (Deleuze 1994: 76-77). This makes clear that negative being is refused in virtue of difference; what is essential is difference in itself. Hence difference is articulated not as the affirmation of affirmative being, nor even as the affirmation of being as such. On the contrary, difference is articulated as "non-being": negative being is refused, but it is refused in favor of non-being. Difference antecedes both positive being and negative being, thereby displacing their dialectical or conflictual relation. In other words, difference is not between opposed beings but in itself, autonomous from and antecedent to every being or thing; difference is real, but precisely as a matter of non-being. Its reality is not the being of a thing, it is no-thing. [14] Such theorization enables the delinking of creation (as force of non-being, or no-thing) from affirmation (as possibility of being). Difference, or non-being, marks a real force of creation that is without, and incommensurable with, being. In virtue of this unanalogizability of non-being with being, creation is articulated as a force stemming from negativity, and not at all from affirmation: affirmation is said of being and its possibilization, whereas creation is said of non-being. Habits of negativity, which antagonize every (positively or negatively described) being, or being as such, are thus coeval with an insistence on the real force of non-being. [15] This argument can be used to negotiate a tension between the Afro-Pessimist emphasis on irresolvable negativity and the concern of Black Optimism to emphasize a power named by blackness: while the former's emphasis on negativity extends to habits of affirmation as such, this negativity immanently involves—and thus does not abandon—an insistence on the power of creation. Consequently, the Black Op concern to speak of the power of blackness may be satisfied entirely within the space of negativity, or social death, on which Afro-Pessimism insists. Such satisfaction does not then require recourse to qualifications that would mitigate the negativity of this space, On the contrary, power is immanent to a redoubled negativity, or a negativity toward both being and the affirmation of the possibility of being-otherwise. [16] Yet even as Deleuze's philosophical efforts may be deployed by and for the articulation of AfroPessimist claims, these claims vertiginously intensify Deleuze's theorization of non-being: Deleuze theorizes non-being in terms of a "vertigo" of immanence (Deleuze and Guattari 1996: 48), yet blackness is the historical, material experience of such vertigo. Drawing on a distinction made by Wilderson, this is to say that for Deleuze non-being is a "subjective vertigo," or a vertigo into which Deleuze's thought makes an entrance, while blackness is experienced as "objective vertigo," meaning that vertigo is— historically or materially—always already there (Wilderson 2011: 3). Immanence, or the vertigo of nonbeing, remains an object for the thought of Deleuze; blackness is historically or materially the objective reality of non-being—the very reality of the vertigo of immanence. Consequently, to think non-being according to blackness entails the reading of Deleuze's theoretical articulation in terms of the operations by which historical, material power is enacted

### \*\*\*2NR – Barber 16

## Framonk

### Subject formation

#### Subject formation should be the first and last question of this round. Therefore the ROB is to vote for the debater that best challenges neoliberalism’s hold over cognition. Anything else dooms the plastic nature of consciousness to endless reproduce destructive structures without question or self-awareness.

**Szymanski ’17**, *The Neuroplastic paradox,* (<http://www.inflexions.org/exhaustion/PDFs/06_Szymanski.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

One of neoliberal power’s most enduring strategies for maintaining its dominance amidst the deterritorializing effects of a plastic reality that incessantly expresses, creates and modulates is to reterritorialize onto the site of the individual. If there is a historical through-line linking the disciplinary society to the control society, which should be taken as evidence that one type of society does not replace the other but that it emerges over and on top of the other, like an archaeological site or palimpsest, it is the enduring and unwavering presence of the individual. This individualized subject is not a natural given, though neoliberal ideology often presents it as such. It is the result of a highly abstract form of subjectivity production that parses the individual from the machinic assemblages in which it is immersed as a component part. Nevertheless, this parsing of the individual from the “dividual” is a fundamental aspect of the capitalist production of subjectivity that Maurizio Lazzarato calls “social subjection.” Found in regimes of power based both on disciplinarity and control, the apparatus of social subjection assigns “subjectivity, an identity, sex, profession, nationality, and so forth” to produce “an ‘individuated subject’ whose paradigmatic form in neoliberalism has been that of ‘human capital’ and the ‘entrepreneur of the self’ “ (2014: 24). Though really inseparable from the creativity and novelty of the dynamic plastic assemblages in which it takes part, power parses an individual who is made “guilty and responsible for his fate” (24). In an undulatory reality of endless modulations, characterized as “infinitely plastic,” the individual and its lingering mould incessantly returns as a dominant refrain, confirming power’s vested interest in an ontology that separates self from world and makes the former unduly responsible for all that happens in the latter. **If the individual is the product of power, and if power subjects the individual in such a way as to encourage its performance as modulatory “human” capital, then there is no reason to believe that the individual’s ability to creatively shape the plastics of its world would somehow mark power’s undoing.** Nor is there reason to believe that therapeutic methods which encourage brain plasticity to move more in sync with the economic demands of life under neoliberalism would somehow lead to wellness or flourishing, even if they may lead to being “symptom-free.” Plasticity, as much as flexibility, can constitute a total submission to the status quo, without us even being cognizant of it—hence the plastic paradox. After all, there is nothing unusual about desiring “the very thing that dominates and exploits us,” and thus producing its (and by extension, our) very existence. Given neoliberal power’s immanence to neuroplasticity as well as its immanence to the dominant therapeutic methods which justify themselves with recourse to the concept, the lofty hopes that have been invested in neuroplasticity beg to be critically tempered. Yet I would like to conclude on a pragmatic note, which also happens to be a positive one, and suggest that by reintroducing the question of subjectivity—of how the brain becomes subject—into the plastic dynamics of the event, we may ride the quantum of potential that neuroplasticity does offer: the potential for transversal social practices constitutive of therapeutic activism to usher in novel subjectivities whose processual composition amounts to nothing less than well-becoming—a collectively animated well-being whose therapeutic and political value lies in the how of its making

### \*\*\*2NR - Szymanski ’17

# 2NR

## “You can’t read that”

### General

#### If the fundamental thesis of the critique is true then you need to ask what the role of white people should be

#### Insofar as they haven’t shown what the correct role for white people is then you should assume the only alternative they can provide to white people actively fighting racism is white people staying silent and being complicit in racism which is a net worse.

#### We are not orthodox Afro-Pess, Barber explicitly states their theory negotiates tensions between pessimism and optimism.

#### A call for the end of the world necessarily involves a praxis of self abolition which seeks to undo identities created by whiteness. The alt is a rejection of any appeal to innocence or return to a equilibrium defined by anti-black control societies.

Aarons 16 (Kieran Aarons, PhD candidate in Philosophy at DePaul University, MA in Theory and Criticism from the University of Western Ontario, 2-29-16, “No Selves to Abolish: Afro-Pessimism, Anti-Politics, and the End of the World,” http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/no-selves-to-abolish-afropessimism-anti-politics-and-end-world, footnotes 12, 18, 21, and 23 included in curly braces, modified) gz

[We live in a period in which] the struggle to defend one’s condition tends to merge with the struggle against one’s condition. [8] I take it to be a libertarian axiom of our times that, where it is desired, autonomous organisation around one’s own characteristic grammar of suffering is a non-negotiable condition of struggle. [9] What interests me is how groups can orient themselves in their struggles around the specificity of the suffering they experience, without attempting to lay claim to a positivity for themselves on the basis of transindividual objects unavailable to Black flesh, thereby crowding out a linkage between these other struggles and Blackness. How can non-Black persons who are struggling against the miserable lives they are offered do so in ways that do not, as Wilderson puts it, ‘fortify and extend the interlocutory life’ of the anti-Black existential commons? A few preliminary theses can be outlined from outset, which take the form of rhetorical and practical strategies that must be avoided across the board. 1. We must reject any appeal to the register of ‘innocence’. To claim that someone deserves freedom or protection because of an absence of transgression – that one is experiencing ‘undeserved’ oppression – implicitly distances oneself from the a priori or gratuitous nature of the violence that the Black body magnetises, the tautological absence of any pretence that occasions it. This would be a baseline: stop defending one’s ‘innocence’. [10] 2. Should a chain of local revolts spread and intensify to the point where it manages to destitute the constituted power structures enveloping us, collapsing their symbolic hold over the hearts and minds of its subjects and exposing the coup de force that always underpins them, we must attack any effort to replace it with a newly signifying ‘constituent power’. As some friends stated recently, The legitimacy of ‘the people’, ‘the oppressed’, the ‘99%’ is the Trojan horse by which the constituent is smuggled back into insurrectionary destitution. This is the surest method for undoing an insurrection – one that doesn’t even require defeating it in the streets. To make the destitution irreversible, therefore, we must begin by abandoning *our own legitimacy*. We have to give up the idea that one makes the revolution in the name of something, that there’s a fundamentally just and innocent entity which the revolutionary forces would have the task of representing. One doesn’t bring power down to earth in order to raise oneself above the heavens. [11] 3. In other words, the revolutionary process must not be understood as the constitution of a new law or constituent social body, but should rather be measured by our capacity to destitute the governmental and economic mechanisms of labour, and of the capture of life more broadly. Beyond the simple destruction of power lies its deactivation. [12] {[12] To destitute an order of relations is first of all to deprive it of any relevance, to strip it of any significance. However, far from a strictly negative project, destitution is inseparable from the positive elaboration of a new evaluation of the important and the interesting, the alluring and the repugnant, the tolerable and the intolerable. Although such a process must inevitably originate in the frontal negation of an insurrectional sequence deposing the forces of order and immobilising the infrastructure of the economy, it can ultimately be ‘fulfilled’ only through the elaboration of a divergent mode of living itself, one shot through with an anomic [i.e. law-less] idea of happiness. On anomic fulfilment, see Giorgio Agamben, The Use of Bodies (forthcoming in English).} 4. We must call into question the entire framework of expropriation in the widest sense of the term: the expropriation of once-possessed land, of culture, of relational capacity and of labour from the hands of the State and the capitalist, patriarchal class. We must no longer envision the remedy for suffering as entailing the *recovery* of a lost wholeness, entitlement or plenitude of which one is presently deprived. This is undoubtedly a more difficult conversation (particularly in the case of indigenous struggles), but one which I think is worth having. In the past 15 years of radical feminist, anarchist, queer and left-communist theory, we can see a widespread tendency to gravitate in the direction of thoughts such as these. What cuts across these tendencies and links them to one another beyond their otherwise significant differences is the way people have begun to wrestle seriously with a fundamental tension that will animate any future revolutionary or insurrectional practice to come, namely, the tension between autonomy and self-abolition. Though with very different emphases, this tension between autonomist organisation and identity abolitionism can be found in Tiqqun, in US insurrectionary queer anarchism of the late 2000’s (e.g. the informal Bash Back! network), recent currents in materialist and nihilist feminism, as well as in communisation theory (journals like Théorie Communiste, Troploin, Meeting, Riff Raff, Endnotes, Blaumachen, Sic, etc.). A few quotes might serve to illustrate this tension: Autonomy is a means by which we develop shared affinities as a basis for abolishing the relations of domination that make that self-organization necessary. And yet, even as we do this, we want to be freed of the social relations that make us into women, queers, women of colour, trans\*, et cetera. We want to be liberated from these categories themselves, but experience teaches us that the only way out is through. LIES: A Journal of Materialist Feminism [13] Identity Politics are fundamentally reformist and seek to find a more favourable relationship between different subject positions rather than to abolish the structures that produce those positions from the beginning. Identity politicians oppose ‘classism’ while being content to leave class society intact. Any resistance to society must foreground the destruction of the subjectifying processes that reproduce society daily, and must destroy the institutions and practices that racialise and engender bodies within the social order. […] With the revolution complete and the black flag burned, the category of queer must too be destroyed. […] [Bash Back] isn’t about sustaining identities, it’s about destroying them. Queer Ultraviolence: A Bash Back! Anthology [14] [I]t is no longer possible to imagine a transition to communism on the basis of a prior victory of the working class as working class. […] There is nothing to affirm in the capitalist class relation; no autonomy, no alternative, no outside, no secession. […] [I]n any actual supersession of the capitalist class relation we ourselves must be overcome; ‘we’ have no ‘position’ apart from the capitalist class relation…[I]t is a rupture with the reproduction of what we are that will necessarily form the horizon of our struggles. Endnotes [15] Despite tremendous and certainly irreconcilable differences between these groups, what these theoretical camps share is the assumption that an overcoming of the existing conditions of suffering and exploitation will ultimately require not a valorisation, empowerment, or even autonomisation of presently existing oppressed subject positions, but rather the simultaneous abolition of the conditions of oppression and the social relations and the identities they produce: the liquidation rather than the consolidation and empowerment of identity. This emphasis on the liquidation of present forms of desire, self-identification, and subjectification is arguably something relatively ‘new’. For example, it very clearly runs counter to classical anarchism’s emphasis on individual self-expression, freedom and the like. As some friends recently pointed out, For more than a century, the figure of the anarchist indicate[d] the most extreme point of western civilization. The anarchist is the point where the most hard-lined affirmation of all western fictions – the individual, freedom, free will, justice, the death of god – coincides with the most declamatory negation. The anarchist is a western negation of the west. [16] We might do well to ask whether, from an afropessimist point of view, insurrectional anarchism, queer theory and communisation theory remain ‘humanist negations of the Human’? If so, is this necessarily so? My hypothesis is this: to the extent that they can escape this, it is in the direction of a thought of self-abolition. That is, to the extent that struggles actively refuse to validate, affirm, or strengthen the forms of subjectivity presently produced under capitalism, white supremacy and cis-sexist patriarchy, these struggles can be *potentially* aligned with – or at least, *less likely to stomp all over* – the Black struggle against its own objecthood. [17] Self-abolition therefore constitutes the *only* possible horizon for a non-Black struggle that does not reinforce anti-Blackness. This leads to what might be characterised as a *negative identity politics*. [18] {[18] As should by now be clear, it would seem to be an unavoidable conclusion of afropessimist theory that this bar on positive identity politics apply to Black bodies as much as anyone else. However, this is so less as a strategic constraint (as with other Subjects) than as a historically a priori impossibility for bodies positioned as killable objects. It is black objecthood that creates a situation wherein every positive Black identity politics struggling to secure visibility within the political (or the space of civil society) must be purchased through a gesture of structural self-adjustment to a non-Black grammar of suffering. Hence the tendency (which forms the program of the Black bourgeoisie) toward what Fanon described as ‘hallucinatory whitening’ On the latter concept, see Wilderson, Red White And Black, 74-76.} Put differently, when read through an afropessimist logic (as I understand it), what is vital in the queer, anarchist or communist tendencies toward self-abolition is generally not their theorisation of race, which often remains unsatisfactory, [19] but their tendency to locate the means and aims of revolutionary struggle in the immediate self-abolition of and by their respectively oppressed group per se. Though this may take its point of departure from a grammar of suffering marked by the exploitation of variable capital, or the marginalisation of one’s queer identity, both of which constitute ‘Human grammars’ on Wilderson’s reading, by refusing to regard the plenitude of existing subjectivity (labour power, or the marginalised subjectivity of queers, etc.) [20] as in need of affirmation, they at least *potentially* avoid recomposing the human community around this same grammar and community, thereby opening up the possibility for an overlap with the struggle against White supremacy from other directions. Since it draws its affective coordinates *not* from Black suffering (analogy) but from a disidentification with the human community emerging *from* the position in which it occupies, self-abolition remains a regulative idea rather than an actionable maxim. The role of it as an idea is to confer a sort of negative coherency on empirical acts. Again, that this must be ideational rather than empirically empathic is necessitated by the ‘ruse of analogy’, i.e. the fact that Black suffering cannot appear phenomenally to non-Black bodies except on condition of being ‘structurally adjusted’ to non-Black grammars. Hence there is only an indirect or ideational liaison between these paradigms, i.e. between the self-abolitionism of non-Black life and the anti-political program of the slave that Wilderson (drawing from Césaire) distils into the phrase: ‘the end of the world’. As distinct ideas, self-abolition and the end of the world are not synthetic or integral. Instead, they are perhaps best conceived of as parallel vectors, parallel precisely insofar as their potential crossing constitutes a presently unthinkable vanishing point in socio-historical conjuncture. Despite this paradigmatic distance, the past year has witnessed moments that defy this schema, moments in which, under the aleatory impetus of an event, the social hostility configuring each line leads them to converge. This is what happened during the seventeen-day revolt in the San Francisco Bay Area following the Darren Wilson non-guilty verdict in December of 2014, in which diverse groups of people were led to collectively block freeways, rail lines, roads and ports, to frontally attack the police, as well as to paralyze [pacify] the quotidian functioning of the metropolis through the widespread looting and destruction of commercial spaces. Such intensely conflictual ruptures enact a kind of larval, potential, and fugitive convergence between paradigmatic lines, yet whose miserable separation must resume as soon as order is restored on the ground, and the situation becomes once again governable. \*\* I will close with some tentative theses: 1. That we find ourselves fighting a common enemy does not mean that we have a common *experience* of that enemy, nor does it preclude the possibility that we may actually ~~stand~~ [remain] in antagonistic relations to one another at another level. We must therefore reject any model of solidarity premised on reciprocal recognition, on empathy, sympathy or charity, or on the assumption of common interests. 2. The only consistent and honest fight is one we engage in for our own reasons, oriented immanently around our own idea of happiness. By the latter is meant not an individual psychological state, but rather the affective complicity and feeling of increased power that arises between people who, based on a shared perception of the lines of force surrounding them, act together to polarise situational conflicts in pursuit of ungovernable forms of life, in whatever experimental forms this might take in the present. 3. If we [21] fight because our own lives compel us to, and it is our own idea of happiness that orients us in these struggles, what is left of ‘anti-racist solidarity’? While the notion of a ‘solidarity’ with Black suffering cannot be stripped of a certain paradigmatic incoherence, if it means anything at all it must be premised not on an attempt to identify, recognise, or render visible Black suffering, but on a *disidentification with ourselves*. That self-abolition is a regulative Idea means that it is inexistent in the present. If my struggles can be said to align themselves with Black struggle, this is not in the moment I declare my ‘support’ for it, or my willingness to be ‘authorised’ by whatever initiative the nearest Black person is calling for. [22] Rather, it is when we collectively clear the path for an assault on the conditions that enforce those identities which paradigmatically constitute a ‘self’ that we contribute to making things easier for others. {[21] This ‘we’ aims to take seriously the paradigmatic differences positioning us, and yet at the same time wishes to be cautious about implying any unnecessary exclusiveness that would not in fact reflect the situation on the ground, in the streets, and our lives. It may be that this tension does not lend itself to any easy resolution.} 4. At what Wilderson refers to as the ‘paradigmatic’ level, the geometry of self-abolitionist solidarity is therefore one of parallel rather than convergent lines. My own struggles and those of the friends I’m closest to proceed as if along a parallel line with the Black body’s struggle against objecthood or enslavedness, a struggle which we must make every effort to avoid obstructing as we continue to dismantle the conditions reproducing our own identities. Perhaps we can put things this way: the meeting point between Blackness’s war on enslavedness and those who might envision themselves as its ‘allies’ is not in a paradigmatic commonality to affirm between us; it lies, rather, in what we wish to negate in ourselves that might free the way for us all to find something more powerful than the selves presently available to us and denied to them. [23] [23] Taking up Wilderson and Sexton’s insights regarding the absence of black subjectivity or ‘standpoint’, Fred Moten concedes that if the ‘nothingness’ of blackness consists in its ‘(negative) relation to the substance of subjectivity-as-nonblackness (enacted in antiblackness)’, then there is indeed no emancipation conceivable in the form of an affirmative black subjectivity. However, for Moten this is an insight that remains to be fulfilled: what is needful is not the recovery of, but practical and theoretical ‘refusal of standpoint’, refusal that clears the way for the elaboration of an ‘existence without standing’, a thinking ‘outside the desire for a standpoint’. Blacks, he argues, ‘must free [themselves] from ontological expectation’, cease being entranced by the denial of their own subjectivity, and refuse the allure of Blackness as a ‘property that belongs to Blacks’. What is necessary is to ‘find the self, and kill it’, by which he means ‘the self that [blacks] cannot have and cannot be, but against which [they] are posed as the occupant of no position’. It is in abandoning the desire for legible subjectivity that we open the possibility of elaboration of an undercommons, whose modern day ‘maroons’ wage a ‘war of apposition’ grounded on an ethics of ‘dispossessive intimacy’. See Fred Moten, ‘Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)’, in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 112:4, Fall 2013, and Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, *The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study* (New York: Autonomedia, 2013). Moten’s work will form the basis of a forthcoming follow-up article. 5. This nonlinear thought of self-abolition is not a re-centring of white or non-Black identity, but rather decentring and multiplication of the fronts from which the material and symbolic apparatus of Humanity can be destituted.

### Evans

#### Our only options are for white people to have a theoretical understanding of gratuitous violence or no understanding of gratuitous violence. Having no understanding is probably a net worse as means white people will be complicit in it without ever knowing theres a problem.

### Culp is too white.

#### Culp’s failure to credit Black Scholarship can’t be carried over to us insofar as I acknowledge the influence Afro-Pessimists had on this K. Authors like Barber prove abandoning works like Dark Deleuze is not productive and takes away valuable tools for dismantling society

# Method

### Zannotti

#### Szymanski proves our brain and therefore our subjectivity is not a preexisting entity but is created through eviroments and actions. Heuristic notions of the state literally program us to only operate within statist modes of thought and removes any possibility of resistance. Until they have neuroscience on their side you should discount this argument.

#### The State-form is more than just an institution – it’s a series of relations that re-direct desire to conform to the political subject that it idealizes. Only by abolishing established organs of power can we hope to think of a new political future.

Newman 09 [Saul, Professor of Political Theory at the University of London at Goldsmiths. 02/18/2009. “War on the State: Stirner and Deleuze’s Anarchism.” <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saul-newman-war-on-the-state-stirner-and-deleuze-s-anarchism>] Lifeguard-PF

Deleuze also unmasks forms and structures of thought that affirm State power. Like Stirner, Deleuze believes that thought has complicity in State domination, providing it with a legitimate ground and consensus: “Only thought is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that it is universal by right, of elevating the State to de jure universality” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:375). Rationality is an example of State thought. Deleuze goes one step further than Stirner: rather than seeing certain forms of thought as simply lending rational and moral authority to the State, he contends that rational and moral discourses actually form part of the assemblage of the State. The State is not only a series of political institutions and practices, but also comprises a multiplicity of norms, technologies, discourses, practices, forms of thought, and linguistic structures. It is not just that these discourses provide a justification for the State — they are themselves manifestations of the State form in thought. The State is immanent in thought, giving it ground, logos — providing it with a model that defines its “goal, paths, conduits, channels, organs...” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:434). The State has penetrated and coded thought, in particular rational thought. It both depends on rational discourses for its legitimisation and functioning while in turn making these discourses possible. Rational thought is State philosophy: “Common sense, the unity of all the faculties at the centre of the Cogito, is the State consensus raised to the absolute” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:376). It is only by freeing thought from this moral and rational authoritarianism that we can free ourselves from the State (Deleuze 1987:23). For Deleuze the model of State thought is what he calls aborescent logic (Deleuze 1987:25). Aborescent logic is a conceptual model or “image” of which predetermines thought on a rational basis. It is based on the root and tree system: there is a central unity, truth or essence — like Rationality — which is the root, and which determines the growth of its “branches”. Deleuze says: ...trees are not a metaphor at all but an image of thought, a functioning, a whole apparatus that is planted in thought to make it go in a straight line and produce famous correct ideas. There are all kinds of characteristics in the tree: there is a point of origin, seed or centre; it is a binary machine or principle of dichotomy, which is perpetually divided and reproduced branchings, its points of aborescence;’ (Deleuze 1987:25) Thought is trapped in binary identities such as black/white, male/female, hetero/homosexual. Thought must always unfold according to a dialectical logic and is thus trapped within binary divisions that deny difference and plurality (Deleuze 1987:128). For Deleuze this model of thought is also the model for political power — the authoritarianism of one is inextricably linked with the authoritarianism of the other: “Power is always arborescent” (Deleuze 1987:25). So instead of this authoritarian model of thought, Deleuze proposes a rhizomatic model which eschews essences, unities and binary logic, and seeks out multiplicities, pluralities and becomings. The rhizome is an alternate, non-authoritarian ‘image’ of thought, based on the metaphor of grass, which grows haphazardly and imperceptibly, as opposed to the orderly growth of the aborescent tree system. The purpose of the rhizome is to allow thought “to shake off its model, make its grass grow — even locally at the margins” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:24). The rhizome, in this sense, defies the very idea of a model: it is an endless, haphazard multiplicity of connections, which is not dominated by a single centre or place, but is decentralised and plural. It embraces four characteristics: connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and rupture (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:7). It rejects binary divisions and hierarchies, and is not governed by an unfolding, dialectical logic. It thus interrogates the abstractions that govern thought, which form the basis of various discourses of knowledge and rationality. In other words, rhizomatic thought is thought which defies Power, refusing to be limited by it — rhizomatics “would not leave it to anyone, to any Power, to ‘pose’ questions or to ‘set’ problems” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:24). One could argue here that Stirner’s attack on abstractions, essences and fixed ideas, is an example of rhizomatic thought. Like Deleuze, Stirner looks for multiplicities and individual differences, rather than abstractions and unities. Abstractions, like truth, rationality, human essence, are images which, for these thinkers, deny plurality and deform difference into sameness. Koch comments on Stirner’s disdain for transcendental fixed ideas. However I would argue that Stirner here invents a new form of thought which emphasises multiplicity, plurality and individuality over universalism and transcendentalism. This anti-essentialist, anti-universal thinking anticipates Deleuze’s approach. Moreover this anti-essentialist, anti-foundationalist style of thinking has radical implications for political philosophy. The political arena can no longer be drawn up according to the old battle lines of the State and the autonomous, rational subject that resists it. This is because a revolution is capable of forming multiple connections, including connections with the very power it is presumed to oppose: ‘These lines tie back to one another. That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the rudimentary form of the good and the bad’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:9).’ So according to their critique of rational and moral discourses, both Stirner and Deleuze would see political theories based on a rational critique of the State, to be forms of thinking which actually reaffirm, rather than resist, State power. Such theories, because they do not question the essentialist distinction between rationality and irrationality, and because they see the State as fundamentally irrational, neglect the fact that the State has already captured rational discourse itself. In other words, to question the rational basis of the State, to say that State power is “irrational” or “immoral”, is not necessarily a subversion of the State, but may instead be an affirmation of its power. It leaves State power intact by subjecting revolutionary action to rational and moral injunctions that channel it into State forms. If the State is to be overcome one must invent new forms of politics which do not allow themselves to be captured by rationality: “politics is active experimentation since we do not know in advance which way a line is going to turn” (Deleuze 1987:137). I shall address this question of resistance later.

### Bryant

#### *Whoops!* Bryant is a Deleuzian (check out their blog it’s great) which means they obviously wouldn’t consider the K “abstract reasoning”

#### No Brightline – Even if they come back with that god awful example about ditingusing colors that still doesn’t explain how to engage with borderline cases if there weren’t a specific set of criteria for what counts as abstract in the 1AC don’t buy this argument

#### If we win our Szymanski that means we’re the most material as we control the starting point for politics outside of this round. Until they win affective investments into the state within communicative spaces is good they can’t outweigh under Bryant.

### Pappas

#### Every card we read is a reason why the K is true in the particular-instance of the affirmative. The need to win that the K is untrue before this argument plays any role in the debate.

#### Oppression manifests materially but justifies itself symbolically – hyper focus on individual instances fails to see how those events are influenced by larger structures.

### Methodological pluralism

#### Absorption DA – Control societies rely on their ability to absorb modes of criticism, the aff + the alt is just the aff with a “coexist” bumper sticker on it which robs the alt of its power.

**Culp 16** “*Ending the World as We Know It,*” (<https://www.boundary2.org/2016/06/ending-the-world-as-we-know-it-an-interview-with-andrew-culp/>)

I see two popular joyous interpretations of Deleuze in the canon: unreconstructed Deleuzians committed to liberating flows, and realists committed to belief in this world. The first position repeats the language of molecular revolution, becoming, schizos, transversality, and the like. Some even use the terms without transforming them! The resulting monotony seals Deleuze and Guattari’s fate as a wooden tongue used by people still living in the ’80s. Such calcification of their concepts is an especially grave injustice because Deleuze quite consciously shifted terminology from book to book to avoid this very outcome. Don’t get me wrong, I am deeply indebted to the early work on Deleuze! I take my insistence on the Marxo-Freudian core of Deleuze and Guattari from one of their earliest Anglophone commentators, Eugene Holland, who I sought out to direct my dissertation. But for me, the Tiqqun line “the revolution was molecular, and so was the counter-revolution” perfectly depicts the problem of advocating molecular politics. Why? Today’s techniques of control are now molecular. The result is that control societies have emptied the molecular thinker’s only bag of tricks (Bifo is a good test case here), which leaves us with a revolution that only goes one direction: backward. I am equally dissatisfied by realist Deleuzians who delve deep into the early strata of A Thousand Plateaus and away from the “infinite speed of thought” that motivates What is Philosophy? I’m thinking of the early incorporations of dynamical systems theory, the ’90s astonishment over everything serendipitously looking like a rhizome, the mid-00s emergence of Speculative Realism, and the ongoing “ontological” turn. Anyone who has read Manuel DeLanda will know this exact dilemma of materiality versus thought. He uses examples that slow down Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts to something easily graspable. In his first book, he narrates history as a “robot historian,” and in A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, he literally traces the last thousand years of economics, biology, and language back to clearly identifiable technological inventions. Such accounts are dangerously compelling due to their lucidity, but they come at a steep cost: android realism dispenses with Deleuze and Guattari’s desiring subject, which is necessary for a theory of revolution by way of the psychoanalytic insistence on the human ability to overcome biological instincts (e.g. Freud’s Instincts and their Vicissitudes and Beyond the Pleasure Principle). Realist interpretations of Deleuze conceive of the subject as fully of this world. And with it, thought all but evaporates under the weight of this world. Deleuze’s Hume book is an early version of this criticism, but the realists have not taken heed. Whether emergent, entangled, or actant, strong realists ignore Deleuze and Guattari’s point in What is Philosophy? that thought always comes from the outside at a moment when we are confronted by something so intolerable that the only thing remaining is to think.