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#### The spectre of the climate disaster functions as a new zone of investment in which humanity can legitimize itself as in a perfectly cohesive image. Reflecting a divine will to will, fossil fuel subsidy cuts reassert the unity of being in a reactionary attempt to ward off contingency, ultimately resulting in endless foddering and chatter by masses of indifference

Colebrook 14. Dr. Claire Colebrook, Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English, Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Letters, Doctor of Philosophy, *Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction Vol. 1*, Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor, 2014, p. 59-72

Questions, today, of climate and climate ethics—and even concerns regarding the sustainability and viability of this life of ours on earth— appear to present a new imaginary for political questions. One might say that it was only in the late twentieth century, with events such as the picturing of the earth from space, the possibility of nuclear annihilation of earthly life or the increasing speeds of new media allowing for the possibility of global audiences (such as the entire world viewing 9/11), that something like the problem of a global ethos would emerge. If there had always been a silent presupposed ‘we’1 in any ethical theory, then this virtual universalism would always struggle alongside moral valorizations of specified communities.2 How do we, from the particular world we inhabit, begin to think of life as such? It is the present sense of the planet as a whole, as a fragile bounded globe that might present us, finally, with the opportunity and imperative to think a genuine ethos. Now that we have a notion of climate that seems to break with the etymology of this specific inclination or latitude of the earth, and does so by gesturing to something like a sense of the earth as a region or inclination in itself, this might open a new imaginary of the globe. We might think of ethos as no longer bound to a territory within the planet; instead there might be the ethos of this globe of our own, that has no other region against which we might define ourselves or towards which we might direct our fantasies of another future. If there is something like climate change, perhaps it takes this form: not only a mutation of this climate (warming, depleting, becoming more volatile) but an alteration of what we take climate to be. One might want to suggest that as long as we think of climate in its traditional sense—as our specific milieu—we will perhaps lose sight of climate change, or the degree to which human life is now implicated in timelines and rhythms beyond that of its own borders. The figure of the globe appears to offer two ethical trajectories: on the one hand an attention to global interconnections and networks would expand responsibility and awareness beyond the figure of the isolated moral subject. Ethics may have to be considered beyond discursive, human and political modes (especially if one defines politics as the practice of a polity). On the other hand, the figure of the globe—considered as a figure—is intertwined with a tropology of interconnectedness, renewal, cyclic causality and organicism. This traditionally theological series of motifs, with the globe’s circularity reflecting a divine intentionality, is maintained today in many of the most profound and seemingly secular ecological theses, including the Gaia hypothesis and the global brain. It is the possibility of extinction or the end of human time that forces us to confront a new sense of the globe: far from being an unfortunate event that accidentally befalls the earth and humanity, the thought of the end of the anthropocene era is both at the heart of all the motifs of ecological ethics and the one idea that cannot be thought as long as the globe is considered in terms of its traditional and anthropocentric metaphors. The word ‘globalism’ along with the word ‘biopolitics’ suffers from a curious double valence. As a descriptive term globalism can refer to the lost autonomy and destroyed difference among worlds: the formation of global media, markets and communications eliminated what was once a panorama of difference. Once upon a time the globe enjoyed divergent timelines and worldviews. Even if it was central to the colonialist imagination to romanticize the extent to which ‘other’ worlds were exotically untranslatable, mystical and embedded in a non-linear time, there is nevertheless a very real sense in which globalism has created an earth of a single time, single market and single polity. Globalism would be a mode of homogenization, disenchantment or rendering quantifiable that one could lament as having displaced an earlier world of distinct places for the sake of one quantifiable space. This reduction of distinction has significant material consequences; today, any particular country’s environmental or wage policies will directly alter the day to day life of bodies elsewhere on the globe. But global inclusion and simultaneity also trigger a series of imaginary ramifications. In positive terms this has been described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in terms of a new multitude. Liberated from nation states and physical locales there can now be a humanity as such, a self-creating living labor that has no body other than that which it gives itself through its own immaterial productive powers (Hardt and Negri 2004). Thought less optimistically, one might say that the physical ability to occupy converging and synchronized worlds and times is coupled with a cognitive ~~paralysis~~ [inability] to think of any future that would not be one more chapter in a familiar collective narrative. This is evident in the terms that are used to describe the predicament of the globe. It is not only the case that events are materially and systemically linked, so that the volatile economies of even the smallest countries may precipitate global crises; it is also typical today to see all of financial history as similarly continuous and interconnected. This occurs both in short-term and long-term thinking; recent events have prompted the publication of a series of histories and genealogies, including the histories of debt, of money, of corporations, bonds and markets: all suggesting that the present is an expression and extension of a single history of something like ‘the’ globe (Ferguson 2008; Cashill 2010; Graeber 2011; Coggan 2012; Bakan 2005). Economic events are considered in relation to a past that we have been unable to think as anything other than differing by degree. Despite the new global conditions and linkages the 2008 cascade of economic crises were gauged to be either as bad as or worse than the great depression, while terms such as ‘recovery,’ ‘recession,’ ‘depression,’ and ‘crisis’ place the current state of play as a continuation of a past, a past that varies and recovers always in terms of one easily comprehended cycle. The lexicon deployed to assess and gauge the environment is similarly comforting in terms of its linear temporality and delimitation: Australia still refers to its condition as one of ‘drought,’ even when the period of insufficient rain and increasing desertification exceeds a decade; climate change policy refers to ‘mitigation,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘sustainability’ and ‘viability’—all of which enable one to think of management (however difficult) rather than cessation, rupture or incomprehension. One might say that the imaginary is, indeed, global. A literal globalism—the stark reality of there being no escape, no outside, nowhere else to flee now that the earth has been forced to yield ever more to the human desire for life—is coupled with an incompatible global figuration. Things will cycle back to recovery. The globe can be taken and assessed as an object and managed, saved, revived or given the respect and care that it deserves. If where we are is a globe, then it can be imagined as delimited, bounded, organically self-referring and unified. Perhaps—given the advent of globalism as a concrete event where there can now be no time, place or body that can live outside a certain destructive force field of events (such as the possibility of viral, political, economic and climactic terrors)—now is the time to think non-globally. The usual figures of the bounded earth, the ideally-self-balancing cosmos, the interconnectedness of this great organic home of ‘ours’ are modes of narrative self-enclosure that have shielded us from confronting the forces of the present. It is not surprising that ‘globalism’ is at once a term of mourning, signaling a world economy and politics that has taken every space and timeline into its calculative, cynical and rigid systematic maw at the same time as it signals a redemptive potential. We are, so various environmental and ecological imperatives remind us, always interconnected across and through this one living globe, this living world that environs us. The maxim, ‘act locally, think globally,’ should be reversed: there can be no encompassing global thought, for insofar as we think we are fragmented by various locales, figures, lexicons, disciplines and desire, but we nevertheless are caught up in a globe of action where no intent or prediction will be enough to secure or predict the outcome of any action. It was the great contribution of Lacanian psychoanalysis to point out that the visual figural unity of the human body—the bounded organism we see in the mirror—serves as a captivating lure that precludes us from confronting that ex-centric predicament of the speaking subject whose desire is never given in a living present but is articulated and dispersed in a time that is never that of a self-comprehending and self-affecting whole. Just as the spatial unity of the human body covers over the temporal dispersion of the speaking and desiring subject, so the delimited material object of the planet enables a misrecognition of the multiple systems, forces, timelines, planes and feedback loops that traverse what we imagine to be the single object of the globe. The advent of globalism— or the intensification of the world’s various modes of systemic interconnectedness and hyper-volatility—should, if anything, have prompted a destruction of the figure of the globe. And yet the opposite appears to be the case: even in the genre that is apparently most devoted to global catastrophe—the disaster movie—the globe is strangely reinforced and consolidated. A typical instance is Independence Day of 1996, in which an invasion of earth is initially viewed from the contained space of a US government control room, as though we will be able to have advance vision of ‘our’ end and limit from the point of view of a single screen and panel of experts. Perhaps today we might note that it is the physical image of the globe that serves as a reaction formation, precluding a thought of the consequences of globalism (if globalism remains the correct term for the increasingly evident and non-human complexities that are precluding any possibility of a global or comprehensive vision). If capitalism could once have been thought of as ‘a’ power imposed upon the globe then this is no longer the case. As the recent economic crises demonstrated capitalism is not a system, cannot be attributed to a body of interests, and is less a transcendent structure imposed upon organic life than it is just one of the many ways in which local, ill-considered, barely intentional forces of consumption and acquisition exceed the comprehension of any body (be that a physical, political, national or economic body). Marxist theory’s attempt to locate capitalism within history and within a theory of interests can be compared to a whole series of localizations and narrative therapies. Popular culture has for decades been giving a face and/or body to a series of diffuse and essentially ‘unglobable’ threats. Despite a series of calls for thinking in terms of distributed, de-centered and dispersed cognition, where we acknowledge that institutions, cultures and even organisms are not governed by a central organizing brain, the political imaginary remains wedded to organic figures. Popular culture has presented viral invasion more often than not in terms of an isolable and intruding body: conquering such threats can then be placed in a standard narrative of good and evil, self and other. Terrorism, too, is given a specific face in media culture (either the named Osama Bin Laden or an ethnically specified other). But it is not only popular culture that has been unable to confront a temporality and politics that is no longer that of contesting agents waging a war for the sake of a determined end. Lamenting the fall of modernity into a bio-politics that manages populations according to a general and quantifiable ‘life,’ Giorgio Agamben argues that it will be possible to arrive again at a genuine politics only by considering what Foucault failed to confront: the problem of sovereignty in modernity (Agamben 1998). That is, whereas Foucault was critical of the sovereign model of power, or power as an external and imposed body, Agamben’s critical concept of bio-politics wants to resist a modernity of diffused or capillary power, focusing again on how power establishes itself as a body. Agamben refuses the notion of the political and the polity as a universal or a given; the polity is constituted in and through human potentiality’s realization that it lacks any determined end. For Agamben, what needs to be recalled is the genesis or emergence of the political fold, the opening of something like a political space that then enables a distinction between that which is interior and that which is exterior to the polity. What counts as political is, for Agamben, itself not a political decision, and this is because ‘the polity’ or the opening of a space of what will become ‘our’ concern is an event, and one to which genuine thinking ought to (constantly) return. Today’s losses of commonality, or the absence of something like a global community, should prompt us to address that the global community or horizon is neither given nor guaranteed, but is nevertheless urgently required if we are not to lose sight altogether of our potentiality to be political, to open a political space. What bio-politics and its terrors force us to acknowledge is that our defining potentiality—for speaking together and opening up a political space— discloses itself most fully when it is not actualized. For bio-politics, too, bears the same double valence as globalism. It is precisely in the era of the bio-political, when all decisions regarding what we ought to do are grounded on maximizations of life that the passage from life to polity, and the political constitution of what counts as political life is forgotten. It is Auschwitz, modern hedonism, and the bio-political absence of a genuine political space of speech and decision that evidences the true nature of politics. Politics occurs not when bodies located in a world then decide to speak together, for politics is—through the event of speaking—the opening out of a world. Here, then, in this confrontation with a modern bio-politics that is criticized and lamented for being insufficiently political—insufficiently oriented to the opening and manifestation of a political space—Agamben gives the contemporary term ‘bio-politics’ a force that relates directly to the imaginary hyper-investment in the globe. Agamben, unlike the Foucault whom he criticizes for not confronting the relation between bare life and sovereignty, regards bio-politics in its various forms—both totalitarian managements of populations and democratic aims to increase a society’s happiness—as a loss of the political. As long as politics is focused on bare life, or the calculation of a living substance we will have retreated from the question of the potentiality of the political: man is not born as a political animal but becomes one, and he does so by creating a political space through speaking, opening up a world that is always his world. The Greek distinction between bios (or a life that is formed, bounded and oriented to what man might make of himself) and zoe (or mere bare life that, in modernity, becomes so much disposable waste and that increasingly becomes the subject of politics) is, for Agamben a difference that needs to be re-thought and re-inscribed. It is bios—created, formed, bounded, delimited life—that has been lost and that entails a loss of the political. How does this relate to globalism? Both Agamben’s critique of biopolitics and the reaction against globalism express a traditional and theological mourning for a loss of form. Globalism’s evils follow from its ravaging disrespect for limits and difference, its tendency to consume all previously distinct and specified nations and cultures into one vast calculative system without definition or limit. Not surprisingly the response to both globalism (seen as an inhuman, mindless and unbounded system) and to biopolitics (seen as a loss of the self-defining polity) has been the reaffirmation of the figure of the globe or bounded form. Agamben, for example, posits a series of positive manoeuvres that would ameliorate the biopolitical ravaging of the man of poiesis; these include a return to the active creation of man as a political living form as bios rather than zoe, as a being whose political nature has little or nothing to do with his mere life but requires creation. Not surprisingly, then, Agamben also wishes to retrieve a more authentic aesthetic encounter, where art is not passive spectatorship of an artist’s private invention but an opening out or disclosure of a created world. Here, art as poiesis or putting into distinct form would not be disengaged from collective praxis. Hardt and Negri, reacting more explicitly to a globalism that has precluded any active and intentional formation of a polity, call for the creation of a single, self-producing, self-aware and self-referring open whole of humanity: a single, continually re-productive body of man: In addition to envisioning revolution in ethical and political terms, we also conceive of it in terms of deep anthropological modification: of metissage and continuous hybridization of populations, of biopolitical metamorphosis. The first terrain of struggle is, from this point of view, the universal right to move, work and learn over the entire surface of the globe. Thus revolution, as we see it, is not only within Empire but also through Empire. It is not something which is fought against some implausible Winter Palace, but something which extends against all the central and peripheral structures of power, in order to empty them and subtract the capacity of production from capital. (Negri, Hardt and Zolo 27) We can pause here to note that what underpins Agamben’s call for a new politics and Hardt and Negri’s manifesto for a self-productive multitude is a figural globalism that is a variant of a traditional and theological organicism. That is, the figure of the globe—the ideally bounded sphere in which each point is in accord with the whole, and in which the whole is a dynamic and self-maintaining unity—harbours an axiology that privileges bios over zoe. What must be asserted as dominant and proper is a whole or bounded form that has no external or transcendent principle, no ordering that is given from without or that would elevate one point or term above another. Literal globalism, perceived as humanity’s alienation from itself and its earth through dead technical systems (such as the market, mechanization, computerization and speculation), is to be cured by figural globalism. Life as zoe, the mere life that lives on without a sense of itself, without a world and without form, is to be combated by life as bios: a properly political life of self-formation and speaking in common. Politics ought to be of, by and for the polity: thus, the call to immanence, whereby a body is not deflected by any power other than that of its own making is yet one more refusal to consider the predicament of a palpably non-sovereign power. Recall that for Agamben Foucault failed to consider the relationship between biopolitics and sovereign power, between power as instituted law that creates the border between law and non-law, or between governable life and the merely living. For Agamben the problem with biopolitics is that it is insufficiently directed towards bios: both totalitarian governments and democracies focus on well-being and happiness rather than confronting the problem that mere life does not proceed without some sort of gap or decision towards its proper world and end. If one were to recall the Greek attention to bios, or formed life, one might be able to retrieve something of the proper political potentiality that is covered over in modernity. Foucault, however, suggests an opposite path. The problem with biopolitics is not its inattention to bios or self-making but, rather, its maintenance of organic—or what I will refer to here as ‘global’—thinking. One could be misled by reading Foucault’s corpus backwards, concluding that his final thoughts on Greek and Hellenistic arts of the self would be the natural consequence of a theorization of biopolitics, leading to a retrieval of a poetics of the subject. But there are other possibilities indicated in his earliest criticisms of the concept of life. The problem with this concept, or more accurately this problem, is that its manner of folding an inside from an outside, or of producing a relation through which something like knowledge is possible, is—to use a Deleuzian term—its reactive reterritorializing quality. It is the concept of life as such, the life from which bounded beings emerge and against which they maintain themselves, that leads to a certain structure of ethics. Man becomes that being who is nothing more than a reflective structure, a being whose only law is that of giving a law to himself. The three concepts analyzed by Foucault that constitute the modern empirical-transcendental episteme are life, labour and language. It is because there is something in general called ‘life’ as a process of striving, self-production and self-maintenance that language and labor become the means through which man creates himself as an historical being. On the one hand Foucault suggests that this is in quite a specific sense the consequence of a refigured globe: the pre-modern space of knowledge had distributed beings in relations of analogy, such that the universal order of things was reflected in each living being. In classicism this book of nature, or experience of the earth as possessing its own sense that could be unfolded in various ways in each living form, gives way to an order that appears in representation and tabulation. Man, in classical thought, is not yet that being produced through the act of speech and labour that forms him in relation to a life in general that is only known after the event of its formation. In modernity the globe is no longer the book of nature or scene of readable order, becoming a site of ‘life’ that is now known as the enigmatic progression through which organisms and systems emerge: life is a process that can be read after the event of its ongoing acts of formation. Critically, then, this would suggest that with the politics of life itself something of the globe is lost or occluded. And this, indeed, is how ecological and anti-globalist theory understands both biopolitics and globalism more generally. What is lost is any sense of the earth as a living whole, as bearing a life and temporality of its own, within which human beings are located and towards which they ought to pay due respect and care. Yet despite the sense that globalism as a political event has erased all traditional and enchanted senses of the globe as a living whole that harbors its own order, the appeals to the figure and normativity of englobed life have become more intense than ever. If Agamben seeks to retrieve a sense of the world as that which man gives himself through speaking in common, and if Hardt and Negri aim to catalyze the self-expressing multitude, then they do so in thorough accord with a tradition and spirit of the self-evident beauty and worth of the organic globe. First, we can note the theological nature of this figure of the self-referring, self-creating living form that has no end or determination outside its own existence.3 Not only is this how the Christian God of monotheism was defined (as a potentiality that has no essence other being in pure act, never deflected from pure self-forming), it is also the case that theological poetics used the figure of the bounded sphere to express a divine intentionality of perfect accord, balance and (most importantly) self-reference. Such a form has its own temporality which is at once linear, organic and circular; it is a time of increasing creation and fruition, in which beings arrive at their proper form and in which the end concludes and discloses the reason of the whole. As an example we can think of Milton’s frequent references to the pendant world or balanced globe, contrasted with the boundless, formless and time-deprived chaos. The divine meets the human in John Donne’s frequent references to globes, circles, circumference and recovery, as though the earth’s form is that of the soul: Then, soul, to thy first pitch work up again; Know that all lines which circles do contain. For once that they the centre touch, do touch Twice the circumference, and be thou such (Donne 2000, 229). Second, this divine, organic and perfectly bounded form of immanent self reference can take the form of philosophy itself: that activity through which human reason refers back to, and redeems, itself by circling back and recognizing its own constitutive conditions. One could include here Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle, Hegel’s philosophy of absolute self-reference, and more recent and supposedly scientific claims for ‘human’ understanding, such as Robert Wright’s recent claim that the monotheistic figure of God will, organically, evolve to become nothing more than that of human nature understanding itself as the origin of all the figures to which it was once enslaved (2010). Third, and finally, when current ecological theorists continue to refer to the environment—as that which environs or encloses—or call for a due reverence to an earth that bears its own balance and self-ordering, it is once again a figure of bounded form or bios that is maintained against a life that would be a force without sense of itself, a time without disclosure of fruition. The problem with this anti-globalization global tropology is twofold. First, it is inefficacious when one considers the nature of modern power. The twenty-first century is marked by an intensification of diffuse and destructive forces. The cold war and its threat of nuclear annihilation had already troubled the motif of life as a war of interests among bodies, for it was clearly possible that the trajectory of man for survival and dominance was the same path that would lead to his disappearance. The subsequent wave of annihilation threats, from the AIDS awareness of the 1980s, followed by increasing anxieties about global warming, food shortages, viral panics (SARS, bird flu, swine flu), terrorist organizations that no longer concerned themselves with a worldly survival, and then economic crises that exposed an absence of any centered or commanding viewpoint: all these serve to show that the image of the globe, of an interconnected whole, is a lure and an alibi. We have perhaps always lived in a time of divergent, disrupted and diffuse systems of forces, in which the role of human decisions and perceptions is a contributing factor at best. Far from being resolved by returning to the figure of the bounded globe or subject of bios rather than zoe, all those features that one might wish to criticize in the bio-political global era can only be confronted by a nonglobal temporality and counter-ethics. Second, it follows that far from being an ecological figure that will save us from the ravages of globalism, subjectivism and bio-politics, it is the image of the globe that lies at the center of an anthropocentric imaginary that is intrinsically suicidal. Of course, extinction and annihilation lie at the heart of all life. But accelerated and self-witnessing extinction can only be achieved by a global animal, a ‘man’ whose desire for survival and mastery is so frenzied that he consumes his own milieu. And he does so because his milieu is a globe. If, as recent ‘returns’ to phenomenology insist, the thinking and living being always has a world, and if that world is always a world of meaning—defined in terms of potentialities and the organism’s timeline—then we are truly global. We are bounded by our own living form, with a world of our own folded around our sensory- motor apparatus (Thomson 2007). But does not the phenomenon of a violent, life-annihilating and globe-destroying globalism present us with another possibility? Perhaps what we need is a zoopolitics: not a lament for the ways in which politics has taken hold of human populations as mere life, but a critique of the ways in which political thinking remains human all too human—repressing the utter contingency of life by insisting on the meaning and form of bios. Rather than criticize biopolitical modernity for rendering mere life as formless, calculative, and void of meaning and mindful creativity, we should cast both bios and zoe on the side of figural lures, and strive to think beyond all forms of life. Neither the mere life of animality nor the formed life of political man, our attention would be better directed to a multiple and divergent network of times and matters. That is, bio-politics ought to be criticized not for seizing upon bare or mere life—not for forgetting the human forming power that enables politics, not for regarding man as bios rather than zoe. Rather, the biopolitics that is hysterically and morally regarded as destructive of well-bounded life would still be captured by bios, by the good form of self-producing man and would be better directed towards forces beyond the human, beyond the organism and beyond the globe. The globe or earth as the planet that was blessed with the contingency of life, including the human species whose global imagination has done so much to create destructive systems beyond its own power and comprehension, cannot be saved. Insofar as it is imagined as a globe or living whole with its own order and proper potentiality that might be restored, the earth will continue to be sacrificed to the ~~blindness~~ [ignorance] of an organic thinking that can only insist upon its own self-evident value. One final feature of globalism that needs to be noted, and that might suggest a new counter-global temporality is that of information. There is no public sphere, no bordered polis in which circulating data may be reflected upon, and incorporated; there is no transcendental and procedural ideal of consensus that would emerge as an aspect of an all encompassing life-world. According to Habermas, and other theorists of discourse theory, insofar as one speaks or even insofar as one claims to know, an intersubjective claim is presupposed (Habermas 1991, 378); it would be a performative contradiction to say something that one did not also claim to be true (Apel 2001, 47). Insofar as one speaks one is already with an ideal domain of recognition that is procedurally, if not actually, intersubjective and global. But the actual fact of globalism destroys global inclusion, consensus and recognition. There is a glut of speech and a deficit of both recognition and the demand for recognition. The more global citizens seek and demand inclusion the less attention and media space becomes available: every tweet, blog, Facebook post and text message places more and more pressure on the bloated domain of available consumable information. Individual speech acts are not fragments of one grand communicating globe; rather, the excess of production is utterly destructive of any possibility of (even ideal) reception. Indeed, it is the surfeit of information, especially information regarding the limits of the globe (such as data about global warming, resource depletion, new speeds of viral mutation, terrorist cells without traceable command centers) that requires a micro-politics (if that term could be freed from the notion of a polis) and demands some mode of schizo-analysis. The latter would refer to a tracking of splits in forces, of divergent systems and incongruous fields. One may never free oneself from the figure of the globe, or even the globe as the notion of figure—the notion that ‘we’ give a world to ourselves through our own recuperating imagination. But if the present has the capacity to teach us anything it may be this: only a shattering of the globe, with an attention to forces that resist recuperation, incorporation and comprehension—forces that operate beyond intentionality and synthesis— only this radical destruction can save us from ourselves.

#### Attaching political will to shaping the environment through fossil fuel subsidies only re-entrenches human mastery, violently trying to quell excess – this ensures the failure of any planetary project

Bauman 15. Whitney, Department of Religious Studies, Florida International University, Oxford JournalsArts & Humanities Jnl of the American Academy of Religion Volume 83, Issue 4Pp. 1005-1023. “Religion, Ecology, and the Planetary Other: Opening Spaces for Difference.” July 14, 2015.

PART II: MIMESIS AND EXCEPTIONALISM: THE WORLD AS SACRIFICIAL STANDING RESERVE. Generalized imitation has the power to create worlds that are perfectly disconnected from reality: at once orderly, stable, and totally illusory. (Dupuy 2011: 209) In order to navigate the creative and destructive mechanism of mimesis, I argue that it is first necessary to distinguish between mimetic projects that attempt to create new worlds regardless of the rest of the natural world and those that are grounded in planetary systems. Obviously, the opening quote of this section suggests that mimesis in our meaning-making practices has the capacity to create orderly but illusory worlds. This, I would argue, is the mimetic function of something like the truth regime of the global mobiles outlined above. Of course, such mimetic processes—ones that ignore the evolving planetary context—ultimately create a lot of violence toward the rest of the natural world because the world becomes standing reserve, separated out from moral concern as that which is used in the project to re-create the orderly world of contemporary globalized capitalism. One can also see this type of mimesis at work in (abstract) foundations of gender and sexuality roles that are defined as “normal” (usually as heteronormative), and into which our bodies are forced. These types of mimesis force life into specific channels. To some extent, religions have played a large role in this process as well. However, religion ought not to be seen only in a negative light. Religions and philosophies also reveal the mimetic structure of our very imaginings as grounded in evolutionary mimetic structures, and part of ecological healing is the re-cognition of such groundings. Refusal of our Mimetic Entanglement How did we begin to refuse our embeddedness in larger cosmic and evolutionary mimetic structures? When did humans begin to regard humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world? This is, of course, a question that obviously cannot be answered; but some wagers can be made. Rather than lay the blame of domination on sexism, racism, anthropocentrism, or any other isms as the critical theories that I am in debt to tend to do, I would lay it on an emergent transition resulting from the space of mimetic excess. My reasons for this are that if one travels down the rabbit hole of searching for the ultimate source of the logic of domination that leads to all isms, then one has already committed him/herself to the idea that humans are (at least from that point on) really separate from the rest of the natural world. Not to mention one is already then committed to laying blame for oppressions onto a scapegoat: patriarchy, heterosexism, speciesism, or racism. In order to re-read humans as always and already a part of the natural world, I follow an idea put forth by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment (2007). Bruce Martin sums up their insight well. He writes: Human reason ‘degenerated’ as it imitated the nature it came to dominate; in so doing it created a vicious, lifeless circle of domination perpetuated by a ‘rational’ society that has come to dominate the individual as much as ‘nature’ ever did. (Martin 2011: 116) In other words, we could attribute our forward looking and deliberating brains that emerged from the rest of the evolutionary process and more specifically out of lines of hominids, to the location of our eyes in front of our skulls, our ears on the side of our heads that give us honing abilities, and our upright posture that made it easier for our ancestors to hunt. Such features orient us toward critically examining the evidence and making decisions toward and about things that are not immediately present or in the distance. These features, along with our opposable thumbs, set us up eventually in a fairly dominant position vis-à-vis other animals and species on the planet. These moments of mimetic excess or spaces of creative emergence eventually lead to hominization. As Girard notes, “We can conceive of hominization as a series of steps that allow for the domestication of progressively increasing and intense mimetic effects, separated from one another by crises that would be catastrophes but also generative in that they would trigger the founding mechanism and at each step provide for more rigorous prohibition within the group, and for a more ritual canalization toward the outside” (1987: 96).6 In other words, at each emergent level, an inside/outside is created that marks sameness off from that which is other. The patterns of sameness that led to success would be mimicked—as any useful evolutionary adaptation is—and over time the genetic lines that survived would see differences in brain structures that lead to something like critical reflection. Far from being intentional, such a “dominating” position is an emergent phenomenon from the spaces of mimetic excess when our species began taking advantage of emergent possibilities (rather than necessarily falling into the same patterns of the past). Eventually, reason becomes the key in human success and in the domination over other humans and the rest of the natural world. The repetition of such narratives of dominations has led to the “isms” of our species rather than any sort of inherent capacities or tendencies, and it is this type of narrative that has led to the refusal of our mimetic embeddedness and to the type of human exceptionalism that we are so familiar with and critical of. This desire for control makes sense in an evolutionary context in which hominids and Homo sapiens have largely been at the whim of a nature “red in tooth and claw.” At a time before modern technologies, mastery of nature would be an essential component of survival. Humans would be the victims of a nature that was uncaring and unkind. Nature then becomes the ultimate victim and scapegoat that the logic of mastery then sacrifices. As Girard notes: The accusation makes the victim responsible for the disorder and catastrophe, in other words for the crisis, that afflicts the community. … [The mistreatment of the victim] is an aggressive reaction against a victim that would not be killed if it were not held responsible for the mimetic crisis. (1987: 38) One important point that helps to argue for something like nature as victim in the ways in which I am arguing here is the writings of Francis Bacon and other authors of the early scientific method and scientific revolution. There is no clear reason as to why natural science had to understand nature as dead matter, religion as somehow subjective opinion, and science as an objective adventure. Philosophical and other literary works such as Bacon's New Atlantis had to teach people that science would replace the church, that it was okay to experiment on other animals, and that this would lead to human progress (Merchant 1980). What some have termed “literary lynchings” and “literary sacrifices” had to prepare the euro-western imagination for treating nature as if it were merely standing reserve and for creating the human logic of domination.7 Though the contemporary logic of domination has long forgotten its founding myth, the religious, philosophical, and scientific attempts to make humans exceptional all participate in this story. This recognition can help us to argue for and re-inscribe our continuity with the rest of the natural world in ways that might open our meaning-making practices up toward planetary concerns. If we understand our whole thought process as dependent upon mimetic structures and processes found in the rest of the natural world, then we can begin to see even our meaning-making practices as emerging out of and addressing these types of structures. As Girard notes, “Order in human culture certainly does arise from an extreme of disorder, for such disorder is the disappearance of any and all contested objects in the midst of conflict, and it is at such a point that acquisitive mimesis is transformed into conflictual mimesis and tends toward the unification of conflict against an adversary” (1987: 28–29). Just as order seems to emerge out of chaos in other biological systems, so too in our cultural and religious systems; and, Girard argues, these moments of mimetic frenzy require some type of scapegoat, ritual, or expulsion of adversary if order is to be restored (1987: 30). However, there is in much of Girardian thought too much fear of chaos, hybridity, and disorder. Such a fear, or at least a desire to project order onto disorder where no real order exists, is actually part of the problem of a projective form of mimesis that leads to more and more disorder (or so I am arguing). In other words, perhaps mimetic identification with the rest of the natural world could provide an alternative way in which we can appreciate our difference and recognize our continuity without the need for continuing mass ecological destruction in the name of the enforced (dis)order of human exceptionalism. From this understanding, religions and philosophies have captured within their meaning-making structures certain truths expressed in the form of human thinking that can be found in other systems of the rest of the natural world: the balance between chaos and order, the sacrifice necessary for life to continue, and the inherent impossibility of any ultimate order or peace in the worlds that we currently inhabit. As Eric Schneider, Dorion Sagan, and other scientists that discuss non-equilibrium thermodynamics argue, equilibrium—or in this case ultimate order and peace—means death (Schneider and Sagan 2006). Perhaps this last insight is the reason that humans strive for some sort of transcendent resolution: every part of our being cries out against the seeming injustice of predator–prey, creative–destructive cycles, so our reason forces us to produce some sort of order that we just have not arrived at yet, in the case of religions, or imposes a logic of order on the entire planet, in the case of sciences. In any event, this type of understanding could help us understand our current planetary crises in a way that is in continuity with the ongoing creative–destructive processes of the planet. \*\*\*\*\*\*The Earth as Sacrificial Standing Reserve: The Logic of Domination One thing I find promising about the mechanism of mimesis as Girard understands it is that it has the potential to help re-write human thinking, including religious imaginings and scientific logic and reasoning, into the rest of the evolving planetary community, even if Girard himself did not imagine such a re-writing. If our human thinking operates according to mimetic structures, then they are in continuity with other repetitive cycles and systems in the cosmos and planet—as I argued above. In particular, I think that Girard's discussion of mimetic crisis has something to offer in terms of thinking about our current, global ecological problems. Girard argues that paroxysm is the result of certain points of conflictual mimesis within communities (1987: 26). At some points in human histories, the energy of mimetic excess must be released in moments of violence or breakdown. The repetitions of roles—defined in terms of gender, sex, sexuality, race, nationality, and even humanity—are always imperfect and lead to some type of remainder that is other from the repetitive role performances. This mimetic excess must be dealt with or the loss of all order and fall into chaos is risked (Girard 1987: 7). Religions, and I would argue the logic of domination found in reductive materialism, positivism, and scientism, all have ways of dealing with mimetic excess and releasing the violence that builds up. As Girard notes, “All modern ideologies are immense machines that justify and legitimate conflicts that in our time could put an end to humanity” (1987: 31). In other words, these systems must deal with mimetic excess, but they always risk violence. This is where the concept of the scapegoat comes in: as mimetic release. If, as I have argued, one of the dominant ideologies through which humans create meaning-making practices in the contemporary process of globalization relies on the logic of domination via science and technology, then perhaps the mimetic excess, the moment of paroxysm, can be understood as climate change and all the other environmental disasters we are faced with at this planetary moment. In the case of the effects of climate change especially, the human “community thinks of itself as entirely passive vis-à-vis its own victim, whereas” the rest of the natural world “appears by contrast, to be the only active and responsible agent in the matter” (Girard 1987: 27). We have now become victims of the excess of our own desire to impose order on the world. The logic of domination that imposes human desires and values upon the rest of the natural world and sets it up as standing reserve for humans returns in the form of climate change, huge storms, cancers, droughts, heat waves, and other acts of “nature” or “God” over which we poor humans have no control. In this case, the evolutionary fear of nature, leading to the imposition of order through repetition of the place of humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world, is creating terror, disorder, and chaos that are rising to a planetary frenzy.8 This mimetic excess, this abject remainder is the space of chaos and complexity, of creativity and destruction; but this excess demands some sort of recognition at threat of even greater destruction and chaos. Current rituals of scapegoating and release of this mimetic excess, in my opinion, only lead to projections of repressed mimesis. That is, “where the self as subject is projected onto the external world. The result is often fear of the other and subsequent attempts to master or dominate it” (Martin 2011: 120). In this case, “reversal of domination requires ‘mimetic identification’—that is internalization of the external that honors the particularity or individuality of the other” (Martin 2011: 120). We need new rituals and ways of thinking that help us to leave open spaces for mimetic excess, for the abject, and for creative emergence of possibilities toward planetary alternatives. I end this article with some ideas of what that might look like. Previous Section Next Section PART III: TRANSHUMANITY AND THE PLANETARY FUTURE: MIMETIC EXCESS, ABJECTION, AND SITES OF TRANSFORMATION Only the damming of mimetic forces by means of the prohibition and the diversion of these forces in the direction of ritual are capable of spreading and perpetuating the reconciliatory effect of the surrogate victim. … The Sacred is Violence. (Girard 1987: 32) The seemingly simple insight that Girard articulates here, that the sacred is violence, is a hard pill to swallow for many contemporary minds. The idea that the ground of being, that god or ultimate reality is somehow supposed to be peace, harmony, or some type of wholeness, may be the very idea that leads to much ecological and human violence today. We seek in our repetitions of actions and roles to enforce some type of order and balance upon the world that just does not exist. This desire to enforce equilibrium on the planet is actually wreaking havoc on humans and the rest of the planetary community. What if we begin our meaning-making practices from a space that suggests we are always already mixed up in a creative–destructive process of planetary becoming and that there is no ultimate explanation, end, or goal toward which all life can be conformed. This is what I have articulated elsewhere as a viable agnostic, planetary theology (Bauman 2009, 2014). Here I articulate three components of our meaning-making practices that might help us create points of mimetic identification with the abject: human thinking as “lines of flight,” thinking toward the trans-human, and planetary ethics of the “not yet.”

#### Vote aff for a restructuring of analysis away from the discourse of the anthropos in favor of the atomic explosion of the cosmic artisan

Colebrook 14. Dr. Claire Colebrook, Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English, Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Letters, Doctor of Philosophy, *Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction Vol. 1*, Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor, 2014, p. 110-115

If the first feature of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the cosmos is that it is not cosmopolitical—for the cosmos can occur as the deterritorialization of non-human forces—the second is that (at least in this plateau) it bears a direct relation to music. But this is the case only if music is defined as the relations of qualities and differences, the power to form inflections and rhythms from which something like the human practice and culture of music emerged: The T factor, the territorializing factor, must be sought elsewhere: precisely in the becoming-expressive of rhythm or melody, in other words, in the emergence of proper qualities (color, odor, sound, silhouette…). Can this becoming, this emergence, be called Art? That would make the territory the result of art. The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark. Property, collective or individual, is derived from that even when it is in the service of war and oppression. … The expressive is primary in relation to the possessive; expressive qualities, or matters of expression, are necessarily appropriative and constitute a having more profound than being. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 316) There is a pre-human and pre-organic music that is generated from the differential relations among expressive qualities: the beating out of a rhythm establishes a pulse or band of time from which something like a meter might be organized. There is an articulation of sounds into tonal inflections that provides the condition for something like a scale or melody (or phonemes). Before there is something like a language— a repeatable and formalized set of relations—there must be the formation of qualities and the creation of differences. (One can think here of Freud’s example of his grandson establishing a pulsation of Fort-Da, opposing two sounds across space and time, securing a territory that then enables the forming of a body and its world.) And it is here that we can tie Deleuze and Guattari’s plateau on the refrain (where cosmos is conceptualized) with Deleuze’s idea of a differential mode of thinking. Deleuze and Guattari insist that there is an autonomy or differential power in expressive qualities. Relatively stable terms or beings are formed from pure predicates or qualities. One might say that ‘man’ as a rational animal who is defined through the speaking-seeing-eating figure of the face and voice has a political composition (for it determines relations among human bodies) but this occurs after the entering-into-relation of certain qualities. Man is an animal assembled through the speaking-seeing face (itself composed racially of skin colors), the commanding voice (again enabled through the composition of a phonematic spectrum) and the organized body (effected by bringing the hand-eye-brain complex into relation.) There is, in this respect, nothing political about the cosmos as long as we take politics to be the relations of the polity. On the contrary, the most important events are micro-political: how did this figure of political man (with the eye of judgment, voice of reason and body of labor) come to be composed from the forces of chaos? Such a determination would have been enabled by certain expressive qualities—the potentialities of sound in the voice, of light in the seeing eye, of conceptual configurations in the reasoning brain. Such qualities are synthesized and coordinated to produce the man of politics. To define the proper destiny of man to be that of a cosmo-political animal is to contain thinking within the already formed bounds of the organism. A differential politics, by contrast, approaches the cosmos as a radical deterritorialization, freeing expressive qualities from a human-all-too-human composition: For there is no imagination outside of technique. The modern figure is not the child or the lunatic, still less the artist, but the cosmic artisan: a homemade atomic bomb—it’s very simple really, it’s been proven, it’s been done. To be an artisan and no longer an artist, creator, or founder, is the only way to become cosmic, to leave the milieus and the earth behind. The invocation to the Cosmos does not at all operate as a metaphor; on the contrary, the operation is an effective one, from the moment the artist connects a material with forces of consistency or consolidation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 345) How might we think this meditation on the limits of cosmopolitanism in concrete terms? What would Deleuze and Guattari’s suggested cosmic release of matters mean, or—more accurately, since it is no longer a question of meaning or symbols—how might such deterritorialization work? Consider one of the problems of the twenty-first century: water. At once crucial to life, water is also one of the elements whose relations to human organisms and polities exposes crucial fragilities, including water borne infections, floods, drought, rising sea levels and melting ice caps. Water has, of course, been politicized. In the 2008 documentary Trouble the Water Hurricane Katrina was an event that could not simply be referred to as a natural disaster but exposed political distributions: the absence of decisions, intentions, attention and sympathy that affected a certain geographical region of America that was also, of course, a racial and sexual region. More broadly, and also in 2008, Flow: For Love of Water charted the various ways in which corporations sold, channeled, marketed, restricted and managed water sales and supplies—rendering this most basic of human elements into a key political weapon and structuring cause. Such cinematic events gesture towards a traditional cosmopolitanism, both in presenting the local plight of Katrina to a world audience as an indictment of America and in exposing certain globalizing markets (of water) to a population of general human concern. The response to such demonstrations of political mapping would be some form of cosmopolitical activism: such concerns would—as in twenty-first climate change rhetoric more generally—be those of viability, sustainability and the maintenance of humanity. How will we live on, into the future, if this most basic of elements becomes politicized, becomes a weapon or resource that is subject to plays of power among humans? Another politics of water is also possible, one that would be musical in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense (if music refers to the relations established among expressive qualities and their capacity to create forms, territories, identities and to open to the cosmos). We can begin by thinking about water’s elemental or musical qualities (its semi-autonomous power to enter into relations beyond human polities) through Roman Polanski’s Chinatown of 1974. Ostensibly a detective drama about the theft and re-channeling of water that is political in the most traditional of senses—to do with local contests and human interests—the film also allows water to become a visual quality. This is not when water is seen or made visible but when its absence or inhuman power takes over the screen: set in a heat-wave, the drama is shot through a heat haze in which the flows of human perspiration are matched with a barely discernible visual fluidity that takes the form of a slightly out of focus point of view. It is as though beyond the political plays of power something of the cosmic force of water—its resistance to human manipulation, its brutal and inhuman potentiality—threatens the person-to-person drama of the plot. Chinatown is at once about a cosmopolitics of water—about the ways in which corporate powers can take over local management and resources—at the same time as it is counter-political in its presentation of water as expressive or sensuous matter; water is not just represented as a human commodity but also takes over the formal elements of the screen, becoming an element from which the visual field is composed. A more specifically musical mode of cosmic deterritorialization occurs in the American composer Sebastian Currier’s Next Atlantis string quartet (Currier 2008).4 Here, sounds of water (which have been electronically synthesized, becoming almost melodic) are interspersed with sounds from the string quartet, which take on the quality of ‘becoming-water.’ At once the most formed and mannered of genres, the string quartet enters into relation not with the forces of the earth as territory (where water, say, is a humanized, nationalized quality) but with the cosmic force of water—its capacity to enter into variation and bear a sonic power beyond that of the polity. One might refer to such uses of the sounds of the cosmos as deterritorializing in a higher sense: the form of the work—its relations of varying sounds in dialogue—is also its matter, the work is the synthesis and forming—deforming of the elemental sound of water. Why would such an opening to the cosmos be worth anything today? Is not the urgency of twenty-first century climate change a condition of such intensity that one must manage, now, as efficiently and bureaucratically as possible the sustainability of human life? Perhaps climate change calls for the most cosmopolitical of responses: the taking hold of the world’s resources away from nation states and local polities for the sake of the viability of ongoing life. Such an imperative would, though, be in the name of the sustaining of human life, and of human life as it is already formed, already politicized and already organized. If we were to think otherwise, and if the crises of the twenty-first century were to prompt us to think at all it may be in a cosmic and inhuman mode, asking—at least beginning to ask—what the elements of this earth are, what force they bear, how we are composed in relation to those forces. If climate change politics has taught us anything to date—if it has, and if there is an ‘us’ or ‘we’ who might learn from, or be destroyed by, such events—it is that information and data directed to the maintenance of the polity has not yielded any affective response. Climate change skepticism is increasing, and this possibly because the cosmic force of destruction is now pushing beyond the political imagination, beyond our capacity to imagine ourselves and others like us in a future that will not be an extension of the present. Perhaps something other than a discursive politics among communicating individuals needs to open up to forces that are not our own, to consider the elemental and inhuman, so that it might be possible to think what life may be worthy of living on. Such an approach would require a thought of the cosmos—of life and its durations—that would be destructive of the polity, that would not return all elements and forces into what they mean for ‘us.’

#### Traditional forms of debate inculcate a demand for uniform rationality which is a violent technocratic eradication of the will that champions weakness and mediocrity creating a tragic ontology of ressentiment.

Ossewaarde 10. Marinus Ossewaarde, Associate Professor in Sociology at the University of Twente, “The Tragic Turn in The Re-Imagination of Publics: Resentment and Ressentiment,” Animus 14, 2010

For Nietzsche, the Heraclitean vision sees the truth about reality while tragedy subsequently transforms this unbearable absurdity of life into an aesthetic public, without masking the horror itself. The Socratic dialectic and its Apollonian publics intellectually involve people who are incited to search for the good in the realm of ideas, in spite of the phenomenological flux and absurdity of things. Dionysian publics do not try to check the becoming of reality, but instead, incite the participants to live it as art, by making them become part of the story itself. In Socratic dialogues, disputing friends critically question all established orders in their search for the rational or good order. Both the Dionysian and the Apollonian publics can disturb an established order and institutions. The urge to control drives bureaucracies, which, in order to effectively fix one type of reality, have to destroy all forms of publics that have the potential to upset order. In modern societies, bureaucracies impose an enlightenment model of rational order devoid of mythical content and uncertain self-knowledge, upon a reality that is thereby made fully intelligible, controllable and correctible. Nietzsche considers the European enlightenment as the modern successor to the Socratic myth-annihilation, which characterizes the Apollonian publics.8 The enlightenment movement’s confidence in the capacity of reason and its belief in the rational order of reality are Socratic in origin. However, Nietzsche suggests that the enlightenment goes steps further than Socrates in its annihilation of myth. Although Socrates ridicules and destroys the legendary tales of the tragedians, his dialogues are premised upon the myth of the Delphic oracle (which revealed that there was no one wiser than Socrates). And, although Socrates maintains that reason rather than myth is the foundation of European culture, reason, the nous, is itself a mythical entity (Nietzsche 2000: 72): the ‘voice of reason’ is the ‘divine voice’ of Socrates’ daimonion, which makes itself be heard in the dialogues (Nietzsche 2000: 75). In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, inspired by Nietzsche (c.f., Wellmer 1991: 3), maintain that the enlightenment movement postulates a vision of reason that is devoid of mythical content. Enlightenment reason, in its origin, seeks to make people think for themselves and to liberate them from their fears and superstitions, but, in the modernization process, it becomes an instrument that serves bureaucratic objectives, such as enforcing laws effectively, fixing a machine, or making a business run more efficiently.9 Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 57) emphasize that Nietzsche, like Hegel before him, had grasped this pathology of enlightenment reason that turns into a bureaucratic instrument. The reduction of the Socratic nous to an instrumental reason has far-reached political and cultural implications. Enlightenment reason provides the static concepts, mummified categories, classifications and catalogues that are required to construct bureaucratic limits and boundaries, which in turn rationally order reality (Honneth 2007: 70). Dialogical or democratic practices have no place in such a technical organization of reality. Bureaucracies, whose function is to implement the enlightenment or any other theoretical model of reality, have no need for the Socratic publics and consider dialogues and the need for intellectual justification rather troublesome and disorderly (Gouldner 1973: 76; Gardiner 2004: 35). The (potential) participants of Socratic dialogues are turned into bureaucratic subjects, like workers, consumers and clients, that is, into ‘spectators without influence’, whose lives are governed by the enlightened power elites and civil servants (Honneth 2007: 33). The identity of bureaucratic subjects is determined by typically large and powerful organizations, such as government agencies and enterprises (Mills 1956: 355). The Enlightenment movement is, in Nietzsche’s words (2000: 85), ‘the most illustrious opponent of the tragic world-view.’ Horkheimer and Adorno stress that the enlightenment movement, or perhaps more exactly, some kind of process deriving from it, eventually comes to substitute the plebeian entertainment of mass culture industries for the tragic art of the aesthetic publics. According to Nietzsche, bureaucratic subjects who live in a disenchanted world in which myths are annihilated by Apollonian reason cannot bear the horrific and absurd truth about their own existence.10 The subjects of the culture industries no longer have the opportunity to participate in enchanting tragic myths that cultivate powerful passions and the Dionysian will to live, which characterize Nietzsche’s ‘good European’. The entertainment provided by manufactured images and commodity forms, like music productions, films, television programmes and glossy magazines, ensures that the absurdity of life and the Dionysian abyss are forgotten (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007: 159).11 Being thoroughly rationalized, such subjects cannot develop the mythical imagination or a certain sensitivity that would have allowed them to ‘live the tragedy’ in and through the aesthetic publics. In a bureaucratic culture, subjects cannot experience, feel or live the tragic fate of the Dionysian hero, because, as Nietzsche (2000: 45) insists, shielded by bureaucracies, they are not ‘equipped for the most delicate and intense suffering.’ Bureaucracies expect and demand passive obedience from their subjects, which makes cultural movement nearly impossible. Such passive spectators or so-called ‘consumers of art’ (Shrum 1991: 349; 371), are, Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 155; 166) point out, deluded en masse, governed to take refuge in comfortable, boring and mindless bureaucratic forms of entertainment. Culture industries provide ready-made experiences to a passive public that is willing to buy them to fill the emptiness of a disenchanted world and appease the cowardly fear of living in the flux, which they explicitly experience in temporary relationships and the continuous flow of new products and changed consumption patterns. The experience of the flux can also be more implicit or unconscious, resulting in a sort of malaise, feeling of insecurity or restlessness. However, the escape from life into a manufactured dream-world of cultural productions does not really quench the thirst, as the Socratic dialogue and the Dionysian festival do, which, therefore, allows the culture industry to carry on with its provision of manufactured dream-worlds, to fill an emptiness that never decreases.

#### Status-quo notions of pluralism maintain the façade of agonistic respect, necessitating the violent imposition of respectability politics within deliberation – only delimitation of the agon can allow for deviance to exist

Oksala 12. Johanna, Academy of Finland Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies at the University of Helsinki, 2012 “Foucault, Politics, and Violence” p. 63-66

It is my contention that we do not have to accept Schmitt's distinction between friend and enemy to argue that democracy necessarily implies exclusion, Ma moment of closure." As Mouffe effectively argues through a post-structuralist framework, like- any other regime, modern pluralist democracy constitutes a system of relations of power. Consensus in a liberal-democratic society is—and always will be—the expression of hegemony and the crystallization of power relations. Consensus is the effect of physical violence, however, only when this hegemony is established through violent means. The frontier that establishes the distinction between inclusion/exclusion is always a political one, but is not necessarily the result of physical violence. The democratic-liberal society is a contingent and hegemonic articulation of the "people" through a particular political regime of inclusion-exclusion, but it is not founded on the ontological necessity to distinguish the enemy. As I argued in the previous chapter, the foundational violence of modern states is historical and contingent, not ontological. The conceptualization of necessary exclusion in terms of friend and enemy leads, moreover, to a problematic narrowing the political arena. The agonism that Mouffe advocates cannot be, understandably, violent confrontation between enemies. For Schmitt, the hostility inherent in the friend-enemy distinction ultimately leads to the transformation of the political into war because no amount of discussion, compromise, or exhortation can settle issues between enemies.20 To avoid this, Mouffe has to introduce the important distinction between "antagonism" and "agonism." Antagonism takes place between enemies, that is, persons who have no common symbolic space and who are therefore perceived as negating each other's identity. Agonism, on the other hand, involves a relation not between enemies but between "adversaries." Adversaries share a common symbolic space, but they want to organize this space in a different way."1 The aim of democratic politics is to transform antagonism into agonism by "providing channels through which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues which, while allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but as an adversary" (Monde 2000, 103). In other words, agonism does not result in violence because the democratic-liberal state and the possibilities it otters for legitimate opposition prevent antagonism from escalating into violent conflict. Mouffe defines an adversary in terms of two substantial features in addition to sharing a common symbolic space. The first one is normative: adversaries share an adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy—liberty and equality. They must agree on the importance of "liberty and equality for all" while disagreeing about their meaning and the way in which they should be implemented. The second one is formal: adversaries are recognized as having the right to defend their beliefs and ideas. They comprise the legitimate opponent whom we are not entitled to coerce, exclude, discipline, or punish. An adversary is somebody "whose ideas we combat, but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question" (Mouffe 2000, 102). Roth features raise important questions for political theory and practice. The unproblematic acceptance of liberty and equality as the pre-given ground of politics raises the question of whether the questioning of their ultimate value, through nonviolent means, necessarily makes one an enemy. Should we not also give a recognized political voice to the critics of these essentially Western political values instead of labeling them terrorists? Would an open political contest not strengthen and re- invigorate rather than weaken these values? The assumption that adversaries are already in the position of a legitimate opponent in the political field, on the other hand, compels us to ask whether political struggles are ever simply debates between existing interpretations of our under- lying values and principles, and not simultaneously struggles for one's voice to be heard and recognized as the voice of a legitimate partner. Should asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, prisoners, and nomads be excluded from the political debate because they have no legitimate position in it? Who has the right to be recognized and heard as an adversary in this political debate? Mouffe’s binary logic of enemy versus adversary ultimately becomes a limiting framework for conceptualizing political conflicts and struggles. The agonism she advocates is essentially embodied in the confrontation between the political left and right. She has repeatedly argued against "the illusion" that democratic politics could organize itself with- out them, in terms of some kind of "third way," for example." Instead of understanding agonism as characterizing the field of myriad conflicts over varied issues and identities—at times organized on clear platforms, bin also consisting of fragmented and vaguely formulated dissent, activ- ism, and lifestyle choices—politics is understood very traditionally as the party politics of citizens who are entitled to vote. Although Mouffe does not explicitly ground her problematic distinction between enemy and adversary on the question of violence, it is my contention that it is upheld by this "constant" of her political ontology—the hostility and violence inherent in politics. The category of the "adversary" becomes the key to envisaging the specificity of modern pluralist politics because it is the only means of removing the ever-present hostility and violence from the sphere of politics. The narrowing of the range of the political thus becomes the price we pay for having to keep the irreducible violence at bay. The category of adversary does not eliminate violence from modern democracies, however. It only shifts it to the margins, to corrective institutions and detention centers. While Foucault's thought effectively questions the idea of founda- tional physical violence on the level of the ontological, it exposes it on the level of the ontic. In chapters 5, (3, and 8 I go on to argue that he fundamentally challenges the idea that the liberal-democratic state only aims to positively channel primordial hostility into legitimate opposi- tion in the form of conflicts between adversaries. Instead, he claims that the state produces and sustains historically specific practices of violence through its monopoly on it. Violence in modern societies has largely been eradicated from open encounters between enemies, but it is practiced in the name of improvement in institutions of discipline, correction, and punishment. The reason why conflicts between adversaries do not escalate into violence in modern democracies is thus not because there are effective and legitimate channels through which they are de- fused—such as democratic political participation—but because the state has an insurmountable monopoly. A lot of conflicts are not defused, but in fact are produced, and then simply contained within prison walls. It is my contention that a consistently anti-essentialist approach to political thinking would mean understanding violence nominalistically, and not as a primordial, irreducible essence. Appropriating Foucault's thought, we should then also question "the repressive hypothesis"38 in connection with political violence: the idea that political order functions only to repress a primordial hostility. Instead, it effectively produces and sustains historically specific practices of violence.

# Case

## Overview

### 1AR

#### The sublime has been inversed – in the era of climate change, we are presented with a new opportunity to affirm our dominance over the unending flux of nature through the positing of ourselves as the divine good to counter the evils of climate change and fossil fuel subsidies – this victory of rationality over the flux of the environment creates knee-jerk xenophobia as we block out all forms of deviance and recreates violence against the very nature it proclaims to protect.

#### Rather than take the epoch of climate change as a chance to reassert human will and rationality over nature, we take it as an opportunity for the humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage with the world – vote affirmative to recognize our inability to cohere humanity into one set movement, instead affirming intersections of desires in climate movements on an individual basis

### 1AR – Identity

#### They have conceded our thesis which is that the world is in a state a flux – in the era of climate change, we are presented with a new opportunity to either affirm dominance over the flux of nature through positing ourselves as the divine good or to make a humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage the world – by affirming rationality and total knowledge, we can create knee-jerk xenophobia as we block out all forms of deviance and recreate violence against nature and all beings marked as deviant and in static. Instead, you should vote affirmative to recognize our inability to cohere humanity one set movement, instead affirming the intersections of desires in the climate movement on an individual basis

### 2AR

In the era of climate change, we are presented with a crossroads – either we can affirm our dominance over the flux of nature by positing ourselves as the divine good that will counter climate change, corporations and fossil fuel subsidies through radical acts of imagination like fiat, championing rationality over the chaos of the world and thereby blocking out all forms of deviance in violent expulsions against the irrational and recreating climate change as we scientifically tinker with the environment for our own good, OR, we can reject that reassertion of rationality over nature and realize the ineptitude of rationality as a method of engagement through the world – by voting affirmative, you can affirm intersections of desires in climate movements on an individual basis, creating a pluralism of movements that engage populations without rallying around a perfect solution – that’s key to create a global ethos with momentum that can resolve climate change

## AT: Case

### AT: Presumption

#### Independently, vote aff to endorse the scholarship of the 1AC – if we win it’s a good method of understanding the world, endorsing it orients future pedagogy around it which is still good

#### Reject presumption –

#### a. Conservative – it pre-supposes the status quo is good and safe when the status quo is risky and staying in it is bad which is the system-justification the 1AC is critiques

#### b. Will to Sameness – the doctrine of presumption assumes you shouldn’t vote for the aff unless it’s proved itself to be useful – embrace the aff without the call upon things to demonstrate its value – that’s the 1AC

### AT: CTP

#### Pre-req to engagement with the political – our ethical subjectivities tinge engagement which was the overview

#### Inevitable – the right will always laugh at the left

#### Political is already ceded – despite if it is a democrat or republican in charge, the structure of liberalism will continue

### AT: State Engagement Good

#### Irrelevant – state engagement doesn’t have to be through fiat – we don’t preclude other forms of engagement

#### Engagement determined by our ethical status as subjects – if we win that status quo debate tinges political engagement with violence you vote aff

### AT: View from Nowhere

#### We have a diversity of authors in our 1AC which checks back any bias from any particular subject position – Colebrook is femme, etc

#### The premise of this argument relies on a retreat back to a calcified mode of subject formation that we critique – two DAs to that

#### A. Purity politics – the attempt to generate an exclusive ‘community of the dispossessed’ calcifies into violent practices of boundary drawing. For example the puritans were an oppressed population in England and their flee was one of fugitivity from the Church which ended in the most violent regime of dehumanization in history which testifies to the risk with practices of community formation

#### B. Identity is a paradox – any attempt at delineation between group identities will always be faced with the reality of the subject who falls between the cracks. The boundaries to race will never complete – if privilege, how much? If skin color, how dark? The inability of the negative to confront this leads to anti-queer lash-out against those bodies that do not conform to their movement

### AT: You Read Framework Last Round

#### Holding people to discourse outside of the round is infinitely regressive – everybody did something that they changed their mind about afterwards

#### Non-falsifiable

### AT: Being Exists/Imminence=Transcendent

#### Obviously being exists, our point is just that the general trend of the world is errs toward becoming and change which is not a rule but an observation about the world – and even if, our argument isn’t that all rules are bad but imposing additional rules onto others is harmful which still applies

### AT: Ressentiment Good

#### Ressentiment is bad –

#### Value – causes them to view life as what it could be rather than what it is which decimates valuing the present – even if it causes gains it changes how those gains are felt

#### Scapegoating – causes the search for others who prevent the fulfillment of fantasy

#### Action – we internal link turn their offense – in the context of debate ressentiment means they will always view themselves as not quite ready to go out and achieve change, just needing a few more skill points, inculcating infinite passivity

### ---AT: Solomon

#### Solomon is about resentment, not ressentiment – read it – doesn’t apply

### AT: Ressentiment Not Real

#### Yes – our evidence is based upon an inductive understanding of past examples observed by psychologists in the 1AC – and it’s specifically true in this instance which will be on framework – hold them to answering it in this space

### AT: Lundberg

#### Huge double-turn – we’ll explicitly concede this – their Lundberg ev is nothing but a critique of demands upon the law, which is their framework argument and proves there’s zero chance of any activism or change from their project because they become libidinally attached to the demand

#### Doesn’t link to the aff – we don’t attempt to be recognized as a political subject – rather the opposite

#### PURIFICATION DA – the universal psychoanalytic subject constructed by their evidence requires the elimination of anything outside that project i.e. queer desires that don’t quite conform to the project of psychoanalysis – that’s Colebrook

#### Linking to this is not a reason why we don’t solve

Berlant and Edelman 14. Lauren and Lee, Prof of English @ U Chicago and Prof of English @ Tufts U, Sex, or the Unbearable, Duke U Press 2014, p. 87-8 //LA

Though not every object of psychic investment constitutes a fetish, those that sustain a fantasy on which “living on” depends, those that operate by denying lack while expressing, through nega- tion, its threat, do function fetishistically and deserve to be read as such. I proposed earlier that “politics [is] the fantasy, when you break it down, of breaking down figures of fantasy.” In this we can see where politics and theory might usefully coincide: in their shared resistance to reification, their common identity as negative practices that dismantle the fantasy of identity. Despite my doubts about acknowledgment as a path to affective change, I do invest in the fantasy, both personally and pedagogically, of breaking fantasy down. Not because I believe that a life without fantasy is possible or desirable (how could it be desirable, after all, except by way of fan- tasy?) but rather because the reification of fantasy as reality, as what de Lauretis calls the “literality, or referentiality, [that] is a mainstay of political discourse” (de Lauretis 2011, 257), does violence both to those who reify themselves through attachment to it and to those made to figure the insistence of the Real that would rupture it from within. That rupture, for me, corresponds to the drive’s repetitive intrusion on fantasy but also to the imperative of politics as nega- tivity, as dissent from the world as given. As opposed to the politi- cal imaginary, with its fantasy (an indispensable fantasy) of consti- tuting community, it expresses the Real of politics as the breaking from and of what is. And in that I find “the task of politics and theory, as well as love.”

### AT: World Getting Better

#### 1. Irrelevant –

#### A. Some material conditions improving does not disprove our systemic analysis of value and specific acts of violence that can still be bad

#### B. In order for them to win that it is offense for them they have to draw a causal linkage from the specific value system that we critique and those changes – rather, people learn through experience and value systems change constantly

#### 2. Insidiousness DA – Violence does not disappear but rather renders itself illusive. Statistics of progress are a product of how the necropolitical regime continually breaks up and hides violence to make it harder to combat.

## AT: Theory

### 1AR – Value Theory

#### The idea that voting negative on rejoinder is value neutral is false – it presumes that we should preserve the current rules of debate which themselves are tautological – it’s impossible to escape

### 1AR – Structural Inherency

#### C/I – all the other types of inherency

#### The aff is structurally inherent – framework is a barrier which all the DAs on that flow will prove

#### Framework impact turns any reason why Structural Inherency is good or important

### 1AR – New Affs Bad

#### C/I – we don’t have to disclose new affirmatives

#### 1. New affs are good – they create a strategic incentive to research through the ability to not disclose new which pushes the community towards aff innovation and exploring new areas of literature.

#### 2. Coaching skews mean pre round prep is not an actionable standard – obviously small schools can never take advantage of preround disclosure when a team has 17 coaches cutting case negs and updates before the round

#### 3. No brightline – theory shouldn’t be about best out of round practices. That inevitably devolves to "you were a few minutes late, took too long with coaches before disclosure, etc. all of which are at the expense of substance.

#### Coward! Sad! Vote Aff!

Grimm 77. Ruediger Hermann, art historian and Goethe scholar, *Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge*, ed. M. Montinari, W. Miiller-Lauter & H. Wenzel, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pg. 30-33, Gender modified

Western logic and metaphysics have been traditionally founded upon a handful of principles which were regarded as being self-evidently true, and therefore neither requiring nor admitting of any further proof40• One of these principles we have already dealt with at some length, the notion that truth must be unchanging. Rather than further belabor the whole question of truth, we shall now turn to Nietzsche's analysis of why it is that truth should be regarded as necessarily unchanging in the first place. Nietzsche's view of reality (the will to power) is such that all that exists is an ever-changing chaos of power-quanta, continually struggling with one another for hegemony. Nothing remains the same from one instant to the next. Consequently there are no stable objects, no "identical cases," no facts, and no order. Whatever order we see in the world, we ourselves have projected into it. By itself, the world has no order : there is no intrinsically stable "world order," no "nature." Yet metaphysics, logic, and language indeed, our whole conceptual scheme is grounded in the assumption that there is such a stable order. Why? . • . die Annahme des seienden ist nothig, um denken und schliessen zu konnen : die Logik handhabt our Formeln fiir Gleichbleibendes deshalb ware diese Annahme noch ohne Beweiskraft fiir die Reali tat : ,,das Seiende" gehort zu unserer Optik48• This can perhaps be best clarified by anticipating our discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Even if reality is a chaos of power-quanta, about which any statement is already an interpretation and "falsification," we nevertheless must assume some sort of order and continuity in order to function at all. But the assumption of order and continuity even if it is a necessary assumption is certainly not any sort of proof. We ourselves, as will to power, gain control over our environment by "interpreting" it, by simplifying and adapting it to our requirements. Life itself is an ongoing process of interpretation, a process of imposing a superficial order upon a chaotic reality. In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr iiber etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozess setzt fortwahrendes /nterpretieren voraus42• Thus we create for ourselves a world in which we can live and function and further enhance and increase our will to power. Even our perceptual apparatus is not geared to gleaning "truth" from the objects of our experience. Rather, it arranges, structures, and interprets these objects so that we can gain control over them and utilize them for our own ends. The "truth" about things is something we ourselves have projected onto them purely for the purpose of furthering our own power. Thus Nietzsche can say Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrthum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben konnte. Der Werth fiir das Leben entscheidet zuletzt43. Thus the "truth" about reality is simply a variety of error, a convenient fiction which is nevertheless necessary for our maintenance. In the last analysis it is not a question of "truth" at all, but rather, a matter of which "fiction," which interpretation of reality best enables me to survive and increase my power. In an absolute sense, the traditional standard of unchanging truth is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. But on the basis of Nietzsche's criterion for truth we can make a vital distinction. All statements about the truth or falsity of our experiential world are functions of the will to power, and in this sense, all equally true (or false). The difference lies in the degree to which any particular interpretation increases or decreases our power. The notion that truth is unchanging is the interpretation of a comparatively weak will to power, which demands that the world be simple, reliable, predictable, i. e. "true." Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory the unknown is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is : the more predictable and reliable the world is, the less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasantly surprised. However, " darin driickt sich eine gedriickte Seele aus, voller MIBtrauen und schlimmer Erfahrung . . . 44." The demand that reality and truth be stable, reliable, predictable, and conveniently at our disposal is a symptom of weakness. The glossing over of the chaotic, contradictory, changing aspect of reality is the sign of a will to power which must reduce the conflict and competition in the world to a minimum. Yet resistance and competition are the very factors which enable any particular power-constellation to express itself and grow in power. As we saw earlier, the will to power can only express itself by meeting resistance, and any interpretation of reality which attempts to minimize these factors is profoundly anti-life (since life is will to power). Furthermore, a person embodying a strong and vigorous will to power will "interpret" the "threatening" aspect of the world the chaos, ambiguity, contradiction, danger, etc. as stimuli, which continually offer [them] a high degree of resistance which [they] must meet and overcome if [they are] to survive and grow. Rather than negate change and make the world predictable, a "strong" person would, according to Nietzsche, welcome the threat and challenge of a constantly changing world. Referring to those who require a world as changeless as possible in order to survive, Nietzsche says . . . (eine umgekehrte Art Mensch wiirde diesen Wechsel zum Reiz rechnen) Eine mit Kraft iiberladene und spielende Art W esen wiirde gerade die Aff ekte, die Unvernunft und den Wechsel in eudamonistischem Sinne gutheissen, sammt ihren Consequenzen, Gefahr, Contrast, Zu-Grunde-gehn usw-45. A large part of the intellectual energy of the West has been spent in trying to discover "facts," "laws of nature," etc., all of which are conceived to be "truths" and which, therefore, do not change. For Nietzsche, this conceptualization of our experience is tantamount to a "mummification" : when an experience is conceptualized, it is wrenched from the everchanging stream of becoming which is the world. By turning our experiences into facts, concepts, truths, statistics, etc. we "kill" them, rob them of their immediacy and vitality and embalm them, thus transforming them into the convenient bits of knowledge which furnish our comfortable, predictable, smug existences46• Der Mensch sucht ,,die Wahrheit" : eine Welt, die nicht sich widerspricht, nicht tiiuscht, nicht wechselt, eine wahre Welt, eine Welt, in der man nicht leidet : Widerspruch, Tauschung, Wechsel Ursachen des Leidens l47 For Nietzsche, this whole tendency to negate change which is so intimately connected with the presupposition that "truth" always means "unchanging, eternal truth," is a symptom of decadence, a symptom of the weakening and disruption of the will to power. This outlook says, in effect, "This far shall you go, and this much shall you learn, but no more than this . . . . " In the absence of any fixed and ultimate standard for truth, of course, this outlook is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. Yet it is not a question here of rightness or wrongness, but a question of power. More specifically, it is a matter of vital power. "Der Werth fur das Leben entscheidet zuletzt48." Nietzsche's conclusion is that this static world interpretation has a negative, depressing effect on a person's vital energies (will to power). It constricts growth, it sets limits and hampers the self-assertion of the will to power. The strong individual, whom Nietzsche so much admires, flourishes only in an environment of change, ambiguity, contradiction, and danger. The chaotic and threatening aspect of the world is a stimulus for such individuals, demanding that they constantly grow and increase their power, or perish49• It demands that they constantly exceed their previous limits, realize their creative potential and surpass it, become more than they were. In the absence of any stability in the world, the strong individual who can flourish in such an environment is radically free from any constraint, radically free to create. It need scarcely be said that this world-interpretation is immeasurably more conducive to the growth and enhancement of the will to power than the static worldview. And the increase of will to power is Nietzsche's only criterion : Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Gradund Kraftverhaltnissen, als ein Kampf . . .0 0

## AT: Cap Good

### 1AR – Top

#### No link – we’re SPECIFIC TO DEBATE and analysis here does not scale – they must win advantages to capitalist subjectivities in the context of debate – prefer this model of competition: it’s the only tangible and transformative education we can garner – extrapolating us to other situations for the sake of clash is the same will to equitable debate we critique which means case is a DA – that’s not severance – the desires analyzed in the 1AC don’t scale to the analysis of a political body which is exactly the argument we’ll make on framework

#### Err aff on evidence – capitalism creates epistemic blindspots that are used to hide its structural contradictions

### AT: Transition Wars

#### The 1AC creates new possibilities not currently imaginable which means you should hold their analysis to this context – their transition wars analysis anticipates prior methods of rejecting capitalism

#### The 1AC is specific to our speech acts and their implications which means any transition wars impact at best amounts to the PRL 2.0 which failed anyway

#### They’re myths

Kassiola 3. Dean at San Francisco State, Joel Jay, “Questions to Ponder in Understanding the Modern Predicament”, Explorations in Environmental Political Theory, ed. Kassiola, M.E. Sharpe

As we reflect upon the causes of the potentially lethal modern predicament, we face the central question of how modern societal trans­formation will occur. This raises the concomitant, apparently insur­mountable, obstacle of the current elite’s opposition to such change in values and social institutions: How will the rich accept the lower material levels necessitated by environmental limits, and create a more just world order through a redistribution of wealth and power? The unhappy experience and knowledge of increasing environmental degradation with threats to all planetary life should move the industrial rich to recognize the self-defeating and unsatisfactory nature of modern values and social practices. They may come to accept the necessity of a new, postmodern social order, one not so characterized by the ideolo­gies of capitalism, industrialism, and Hobbesianism. In this new order citizens—including the rich—can have more leisure time to experience and contemplate the nonmaterial and more fulfilling aspects of the hu­man condition, like nature.

### AT: Democracy

#### Stats go aff

Gilens and Page 14. Martin, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and Benjamin, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making at Northwestern University, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, American Political Science Association, Perspectives on Politics, September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3, p. 575-577

Each of our four theoretical traditions (Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, Majoritarian Interest-Group Pluralism, and Biased Pluralism) emphasizes different sets of actors as critical in determining U.S. policy outcomes, and each tradition has engendered a large empirical literature that seems to show a particular set of actors to be highly influential. Yet nearly all the empirical evidence has been essentially bivariate. Until very recently it has not been possible to test these theories against each other in a systematic, quantitative fashion. By directly pitting the predictions of ideal-type theories against each other within a single statistical model (using a unique data set that includes imperfect but useful measures of the key independent variables for nearly two thousand policy issues), we have been able to produce some striking findings. One is the nearly total failure of “median voter” and other Majoritarian Electoral Democracy theories. When the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy. The failure of theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy is all the more striking because it goes against the likely effects of the limitations of our data. The preferences of ordinary citizens were measured more directly than our other independent variables, yet they are estimated to have the least effect. Nor do organized interest groups substitute for direct citizen influence, by embodying citizens’ will and ensuring that their wishes prevail in the fashion postulated by theories of Majoritarian Pluralism. Interest groups do have substantial independent impacts on policy, and a few groups (particularly labor unions) represent average citizens’ views reasonably well. But the interest-group system as a whole does not. Overall, net interest-group alignments are not significantly related to the preferences of average citizens. The net alignments of the most influential, business-oriented groups are negatively related to the average citizen’s wishes. So existing interest groups do not serve effectively as transmission belts for the wishes of the populace as a whole. “Potential groups” do not take up the slack, either, since average citizens’ preferences have little or no independent impact on policy after existing groups’ stands are controlled for. Furthermore, the preferences of economic elites (as measured by our proxy, the preferences of “affluent” citizens) have far more independent impact upon policy change than the preferences of average citizens do. To be sure, this does not mean that ordinary citizens always lose out; they fairly often get the policies they favor, but only because those policies happen also to be preferred by the economically-elite citizens who wield the actual influence. Of course our findings speak most directly to the “first face” of power: the ability of actors to shape policy outcomes on contested issues. But they also reflect—to some degree, at least—the “second face” of power: the ability to shape the agenda of issues that policy makers consider. The set of policy alternatives that we analyze is considerably broader than the set discussed seriously by policy makers or brought to a vote in Congress, and our alternatives are (on average) more popular among the general public than among interest groups. Thus the fate of these policies can reflect policy makers’ refusing to consider them rather than considering but rejecting them. (From our data we cannot distinguish between the two.) Our results speak less clearly to the “third face” of power: the ability of elites to shape the public’s preferences.49 We know that interest groups and policy makers themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping opinion. If they are successful, this might help explain the high correlation we find between elite and mass preferences. But it cannot have greatly inflated our estimate of average citizens’ influence on policy making, which is near zero. What do our findings say about democracy in America? They certainly constitute troubling news for advocates of “populistic” democracy, who want governments to respond primarily or exclusively to the policy preferences of their citizens. In the United States, our findings indicate, the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes. When a majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover, because of the strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it. A possible objection to populistic democracy is that average citizens are inattentive to politics and ignorant about public policy; why should we worry if their poorly informed preferences do not influence policy making? Perhaps economic elites and interest-group leaders enjoy greater policy expertise than the average citizen does. Perhaps they know better which policies will benefit everyone, and perhaps they seek the common good, rather than selfish ends, when deciding which policies to support. But we tend to doubt it. We believe instead that— collectively—ordinary citizens generally know their own values and interests pretty well, and that their expressed policy preferences are worthy of respect.50 Moreover, we are not so sure about the informational advantages of elites. Yes, detailed policy knowledge tends to rise with income and status. Surely wealthy Americans and corporate executives tend to know a lot about tax and regulatory policies that directly affect them. But how much do they know about the human impact of Social Security, Medicare, food stamps, or unemployment insurance, none of which is likely to be crucial to their own well-being? Most important, we see no reason to think that informational expertise is always accompanied by an inclination to transcend one’s own interests or a determination to work for the common good. All in all, we believe that the public is likely to be a more certain guardian of its own interests than any feasible alternative. Leaving aside the difficult issue of divergent interests and motives, we would urge that the superior wisdom of economic elites or organized interest groups should not simply be assumed. It should be put to empirical test. New empirical research will be needed to pin down precisely who knows how much, and what, about which public policies. Our findings also point toward the need to learn more about exactly which economic elites (the “merely affluent”? the top 1 percent? the top one-tenth of 1 percent?) have how much impact upon public policy, and to what ends they wield their influence. Similar questions arise about the precise extent of influence of particular sets of organized interest groups. And we need to know more about the policy preferences and the political influence of various actors not considered here, including political party activists, government officials, and other noneconomic elites. We hope that our work will encourage further exploration of these issues. Despite the seemingly strong empirical support in previous studies for theories of majoritarian democracy, our analyses suggest that majorities of the American public actually have little influence over the policies our government adopts. Americans do enjoy many features central to democratic governance, such as regular elections, freedom of speech and association, and a widespread (if still contested) franchise. But we believe that if policymaking is dominated by powerful business organizations and a small number of affluent Americans, then America’s claims to being a democratic society are seriously threatened. Clearly, when one holds constant net interest-group alignments and the preferences of affluent Americans, it makes very little difference what the general public thinks. The probability of policy change is nearly the same (around 0.3) whether a tiny minority or a large majority of average citizens favor a proposed policy change (refer to the top panel of figure 1).

### AT: Disease

#### 1. Capitalism encourages ineffective responses to disease crises – Ebola proves.

Wood 14. Preston, 10-8-2014, "The Ebola crisis and capitalism," Liberation News, https://www.liberationnews.org/diagnosis-of-shame-the-ebola-crisis-in-the-capitalist-world/

While the World Bank, the United States and Europeans are now promising to build hospitals and clinics, it is unlikely that many such projects will come to fruition. The United States has explicitly stated that U.S. personnel would not staff the centers. Clearly, the U.S. medical system once again has shown itself to be unable and unwilling to prepare to cope with a major epidemic, where, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, 1.4 million people will be infected by the year 2015. Under capitalism, reserve cadres of trained health care workers are not available to be mobilized to combat an outbreak of such a disease, whether it is due to the spread of a virus or the aftermath of a natural disaster such as a hurricane or earthquake. There’s no profit in treating people in need. While vast sums of money flow into the U.S. war machine, where endless billions are spent on weapons of mass destruction aimed at civilian populations around the world, the inequalities of the society come into stark view when a large medical crisis occurs. Racism, denial of access to poor people to health care without adequate insurance, uneven levels of care, inadequate staffing and training of health care workers, all come into play. Surrounding the recent surge of Ebola infections, people in Africa and people living overseas from Africa are being blamed, scapegoated and demonized across the span of television, radio and social media. In the capitalist world, science, reason, compassion and care are submerged while hysteria, bigotry, fear and panic flourish. Instead of mobilizing the scientific and health care community to find organizational pathways to control the spread of the virus, instead of supporting those infected, and instead of educating and mobilizing public opinion towards a collective effort to combat and stop the epidemic, chaos rules and suffering flourishes. Quarantine, a necessary means of controlling a highly contagious pathogen, becomes a brutal lock-down. In Dallas, the family of the deceased was locked in their tiny apartment, unable to leave.

#### 2. It’s not like science goes away after the affirmative and disease prevention can still occur – it’s ridiculous to assume the opposite

### AT: Human Nature

#### Even if we are biologically predisposed to favor the in-group over the out-group that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t reject manifestations of it like racism and xenophobia

### AT: Environment

#### Capitalism guarantees environmental destruction—eco-reforms are coopted by corporate interests who place their goals before societies guaranteeing continued eco-destruction

Smith 5. Richard, *The Engine of Eco Collapse*, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism Vol 16 Iss 4, Proquest

In the last part of the book, Diamond turns to our current crisis and lists a dozen critical environmental problems that, he says, will doom our own society unless we solve them. We all know what these problems are: global warming, fossil fuel consumption, natural habitat destruction, species extinction, fresh water consumption, industrial pollution, etc. And we also all know, at least in broad terms, what we must do to solve these problems: urgently wean ourselves off fossil fuels, stop deforestation, find alternative energy sources, stop overfishing and hunting species to extinction, stop dumping toxics in the environment, and so on. So if we all know what needs to be done and have the advantage of hindsight, w**hy aren't we doing it?** Why aren't we "choosing to succeed?" The short answer is that under capitalism, the choices we need to make are not up to "society," while the ruling classes are incapable of making sustainable choices. In Chapter 9, Diamond relates some success stories-mostly those of small Pacific Island societies-where economic and environmental decisions were up to "society." Unlike Easter Island or Mayan society, these were small tribal village democracies where there were no distinctions of rank or class and no elite/mass conflict. Diamond's favorite example is the highland society of New Guinea. Over thousands of years they built a mini-Switzerland of interrelated villages, terraced farms and tree plantations. The society was, and still is today, chiefless. Within each village diere are just individuals and so-called "big-men" with no special privileges, who by force of personality, intelligence and experience were more influential than other individuals but still lived in a hut and tilled a garden like everyone else's. "Decisions were (and often still are today) reached by means of everybody in the village sitting down together and talking, and talking, and talking. The big-men couldn't give orders, and they might or might not succeed in persuading others to adopt their proposals." Diamond remarks that "To outsiders today (including not just me but often New Guinea government officials themselves), that bottom-up approach to decision-making can be frustrating, because you can't get a quick answer to your request; you have to have the patience to endure talk-talk-talk for hours or days with every villager who has some opinion to offer." (pp. 284-85). But it works. By getting everyone's input and approval, New Guinea societies successfully ensured consensus, rationally managed their economy, society, and environment-and survived sustainably for more than 40,000 years. **But ours is not a "bottom-up" democratic society.** In our capitalist society, ownership and control of the economy are largely in the hands of private corporations who pursue their own ends and don't answer to society. And that's the problem. So it seems curious, even perverse, that when Diamond turns to address our contemporary environmental crisis, he inexplicably forgets his own lesson and presents no comparable exploration of contradictory (class) interests and (class) conflict in modern capitalist society. This is unfortunate because Diamond's reluctance to discard his own pro-market "core values" prevents him from applying the same critical analysis to our own society that he so effectively deploys to analyze pre-modern societies. The fact that he fails to do so makes his book weakest in its concluding "What-do-we-do-now?" chapters on big business and the environment. For after stressing the need for urgent radical change to avert collapse, Diamond then ignores the systemic problems of capitalism that stand in the way of that needed radical change and instead, falls back on the standard tried-and-failed strategy of lobbying, consumer boycotts, eco labeling, green marketing, asking corporations to adopt benign "best practices," and so on-the stock-in-trade strategy of the environmental lobbying industry that has proven so impotent to date against the global capitalist juggernaut of eco-destruction. Of course this is not at all to demean reforms. Lots of problems can be and have been significantly ameliorated and even solved without overturning the economic system. **But despite significant victories here and there**, the big problems-global warming, deforestation, overfishing, pollution, resource exhaustion, species extinction, and environmentally caused human health problems-are not getting better. They are getting worse. And they are getting worse because **environmental reforms are always and everywhere subordinated to profit and growth.**

### AT: War

#### War is not down but rather IMPLOSIVE and INSIDIOUS – while the United States has technically not declared war since the 70s, we have still seen the instantiation of dictators in Iran and South America, and the violence in Iraq and worldwide – this proves that these wars are not counted as traditional but are violent nonetheless.

## AT: Heg Good

### 1AR – Top

#### Top level – you should have a high threshold when comparing this to 1AC ev – our authors assume theirs but their authors definitely aren’t assuming ours

#### We don’t link – our ethic of radical responsibility doesn’t preclude interventions, it just means they should stay defensive, peaceful and consensual

#### Heg is unsustainable

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Barack Obama re-embraced multilateralism with logic and fervor. The United States needed to prove that it was once again a good global citizen, not only to uphold and strengthen a rules-based order at a time when rising and returning powers were increasingly challenging those rules, but also to leverage and extend America’s declining resources as much as possible. Rushing to fix every crisis, with diplomacy, sanctions, or the threat or use of force, raised expectations the United States could not, and should not, try to meet. The Security Council, meanwhile, returned to its Cold War habits, meaning that multilateralism is once again a prescription for inaction. By Obama’s lights, he has played an honorable game; he also made a virtue of necessity, recommitting to the global order to reduce imperial overstretch. The next four to eight years may well see the end of the United Nations as a serious forum for global decisionmaking about peace and security. That may sound melodramatic, but consider Frederic Hof’s characterization of “the West” in the Washington Post as a “hollow, demoralized, leaderless coalition of the frightened and unwilling.” Hof warns of the consequences of standing by and watching as the Syrian government and its allies systematically killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and destroyed the country to “save” it. “Having protected no Syrians from mass murder; having given Russia, the regime, and Iran a green light to do as they wished by chanting endlessly about there being no ‘military solution’ to the problem of Syria; having watched the Kremlin draw lessons from Syria to apply in Europe—where does it now end?” Now ask yourself what a Trump presidency will do to change any of that. He and his generals will be highly willing to fight the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and any other terrorist groups that could strike America. They will be completely unwilling to use force to stop a government’s treatment of its own people, no matter how savage, and inclined to cut deals with other great powers that allow the big players to have spheres of interest, in the best nineteenth-century style. After all, what is most important is to make the world safe for business. Based on the extrapolation of current trends (a foolhardy thing to do, but often the only alternative), I see the following dangers shaking and perhaps toppling the current world order. A Transactional America. Obama expressed one of the fundamental precepts of his foreign policy in the 2010 National Security Strategy: “America has not succeeded by stepping outside the currents of international cooperation. We have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice.” His was an institutional America, committed to alliances and organizations that the victors of World War II created and developed to safeguard, however imperfectly, global peace and prosperity. Trump’s will be a transactional America, looking for the best deal it can get to advance its interests wherever, whenever, and with whomever. UN approval will become a nice-to-have rather than a need-to-have. A Preoccupied Europe. Even the cloudiest crystal ball yields this prediction. Although I am a euro-optimist over the long term, meaning that I believe that European integration will survive and will prove to be a powerful precedent for other regions over a century or so, the European Union has no bandwidth for anything other than its own internal challenges. EU countries may be able to pull together on issues like refugees and direct threats to regional security, but European leaders will step back from global leadership for the foreseeable future. The strongest traditional partner for the United States, Great Britain, is contending with the same war-weariness and public mistrust of government-led foreign misadventures as the U.S. government is. Chinese and Russian Cynicism. Both China and Russia have a major stake in preserving the current UN-based order because both are permanent members of the Security Council with the right to veto resolutions that contravene their national interests. Both nations talk a good game with developing countries, periodically presenting themselves as BRICS—emerging or at least returning powers. But when it comes to the world order, they are deeply status quo. They show much less interest in actually using the Security Council to authorize actual action (as opposed to resolutions “deploring” or “regretting” action taken by other nations) to bolster global peace and security. Both are willing to authorize almost any kind of action taken in the name of fighting global terrorism, because their governments are genuinely afraid of terrorism and because labeling their domestic opponents “terrorists” has proved handy. Overall, however, a United Nations used as a prestige platform by Russia and China and a hand-writing forum by everyone else will become steadily more irrelevant to anything but global humanitarian issues. Value-Free Foreign Policy. In 1945, the most important article in the UN Charter was 2(4), by which all UN members pledge not to use force against the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of any state. The goal was to avoid a repeat of the two great world wars that humanity had endured over thirty years. The Security Council was supposed to act whenever a state broke this pledge, deploying the resources of all states against the aggressor, in furtherance of the opening line of the preamble, to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Over time, however, the second clause of the preamble has become more and more salient, promising “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” That provision gave rise to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, and a host of human rights treaties and resolutions commanding the assent—at least on paper—of almost all nations. Even the sovereignty guardians (many of them with the bitter experience of imperialist interventions behind them) have steadily recognized that unless the international community cares about what happens to citizens and not just states, chaos, terrorism, lawlessness, disease, and mass migration result. But although these values will continue to adorn the “whereas clauses” of UN resolutions, they will be merely a screen for the classic pursuit of great-power interests. Rising Regional Institutions. In the absence of meaningful action by global institutions, regional organizations will have no choice but to fill the vacuum. NATO is an experienced practitioner of this game, although NATO members much prefer to act with UN authorization whenever possible. The African Union has also played a valuable security role with UN authorization over the past several decades and the Organization of American States may now be reinvigorated with the United States finally able to talk to Cuba again. The coming disintegration of Venezuela will test OAS resolve and offer a harbinger of either continued inertia or more active things to come. ASEAN has also stepped up its level of activity in recent years, which was made easier by the thaw between the United States and Myanmar. But we will also see more activity from newer regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other new regional and particularly sub-regional organizations, that can usefully serve the interests of the biggest power in the neighborhood, just as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States authorized the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. The United States will be getting a taste of its own medicine, as it did with Warsaw Pact authorizations of Soviet incursions during the Cold War. But with a growing number of powers using these tactics, the world will be a more chaotic place.

####

### 1AR – In Round Only

#### No link – we’re SPECIFIC TO DEBATE and analysis here does not scale – they must win advantages to capitalist subjectivities in the context of debate – prefer this model of competition: it’s the only tangible and transformative education we can garner – extrapolating us to other situations for the sake of clash is the same will to equitable debate we critique which means case is a DA – that’s not severance – the desires analyzed in the 1AC don’t scale to the analysis of a political body which is exactly the argument we’ll make on framework

# Framework

### 1AR – Top

#### We meet – the affirmative is a normative rejection of fossil fuel subsidies

#### Counterinterp – affirmatives must reject the rationalization of status quo environmental policy

#### Vote aff –

#### First is XENOPHOBIA – any project of coherency demands a fear of irrationality, instilling a xenophobia within the psyche – as the vanguard with the goal of a perfect rational politic, they will stop at nothing to reach their goal, inevitably purging populations marked as deviant in liberal wars

#### Think of the Cultural Revolution with the goal of creating only perfectly rational scholarship – they will always exclude any moment of irrationality, any vestige of traditional knowledge that could threaten their goal – that’s Colebrook

#### Independently, this positing of defense of the resolution as the locus of subject formation separates self-worth from individual desire, homogenizing all forms of desire-seeking under to the one true way, framed as divine – this by definition eradicates the potential for value creation as we no longer can literally do what we subjectively value, rendering all debates lifeless alienated husks – [this impact turns their skills offense]

#### Second is RESPECTABILITY – demand for an agonistic model of debate where both sides accept the same ethico-political principles causes a demonization of all outside that model creating respectability politics manifesting itself as debaters striking black judges because they aren’t conducive to a “good policy debate” – that’s Osalka

#### Third is MICROFASCISM – governed to take refuge in the mindless oversimplication of fiat, debaters run from the complexities of the real world as we realize that it’s hard to pass bills and we can’t always get what we want – the project of technomanagerially ordering the world causes a demonization of irrationality that is wholly life negating because we can no longer live life in the flux – that’s Ossewaarde

### Defense – Top

#### Some defense –

#### Deterrence is a myth – voting for them empirically causes teams to end up moving farther to the left to garner better impact turns to T – means your politics are strictly a reactionary penalization of difference

#### [if they get to fiat a model of debate then we do too and COUNTERINTERP THEIR INTERP PLUS OUR AFF solves]

#### Framework checks framework – a debate about the resolution is always predictable

#### Questioning the structure of the activity is good – it’s a systemic inversion of how education works

### AT: Education

#### There’s a REACTIVE PROLIFERATION disad that turns this – the more information they put out, the more decentralized anonymous sources put out papers to disprove them which gives deniers something to latch on to – think youtube “debunkings” endlessly cited as competing evidence by climate denialists

### AT: Fairness

#### Fairness presumes playing the game is good – they are tautological because they say that we ought to preserve the game because it’s a game and games are good which isn’t a reason why the game itself or fairness matters

### AT: Skills

#### The entire aff is impact defense to their skills argument – attempting to facilitate a governmental end to climate just recreates the logic of human mastery where we see ourselves as able to shape the environment and control all forms of difference – by toying with this sort of divine power, the same structures of climate change are recreated – that’s 1AC Bauman

### AT: TT

#### The endless positivistic analyses and reproduction of molar formations onto molecular impulses culminates in a war on difference.

#### Impossible – conceded thesis claim of the aff – there is no capital-T truth because all of existence is predicated on fluidity

#### Case debate proves you could truth test

#### Even if you couldn’t, we still have a good form of education

# K

## Generic

### Yes Permutations

#### The aff gets permutations:

#### a. Clash—method debates are only productive if we use them to hone in the benefits of different methods—providing a stable advocacy and requiring the negative to say “should not” is the only way to test the advantages.

#### b. Coherence – any model without the permutation justifies arbitrary pics and plan plus counterplans that make being affirmative impossible

## Afropess

### CX

What are the parts of social death?

How can you tell someone’s race? How \_\_\_\_ do they have to be?

### 1AR – Frontline

#### The 1NC has made two top level misinterpretations of the 1AC which act as terminal link defense to all their claims:

#### 1. Our argument is not that all essentialism should be disregarded but rather is a fight against the barriers that prevent the affirmation of deviance which is contextually different than the colorblind becoming they critique

#### 2. Colebrook does not define queerness to refer solely to sexual deviancy, but rather all difference from the idealized subject which means blackness is already queerness and validates the perm

#### Permutation – do both – that combines the political and social recognition of the structural antagonisms of the alt with the affirmation of one’s own identity in the aff which offers the only source of true value to life

#### VALUE DOUBLE BIND – either the alternative mandates absolute focus on social death all the time, which clearly precludes value, or it simply requires the recognition of social death to allow for moments of value which means that the permutation’s recognition shields the link

### 1AR – Alt/Social Death

#### The alt – their theory is not explanatory – 3 large problems:

#### A. Violence – cross-x proves that anti-deviant violence did not change before and after the middle passage – rather, the construction of identity around xenophobic subject positions existed long before that – Leviticus 18:22 within Christianity disproves their claims about the unique nature of black positionality

#### Their accumulation and gratuitous violence claims did not arise post-slavery – a litany of empirics disprove – Genghis Khan took three thousand Chinese soldiers, put them in a hole, poured water over them, waited for it to freeze and then had his army eat lunch on top of them

#### B - Purity Politics – the attempt to staticize and define ontological imperatives of antiblackness just leads to violent imposition of arbitrary metrics like the blood quantum restriction – that creates violence because their attempt to generate an exclusive ‘community of the dispossessed’ calcifies dehumanization – the boundaries to race will never complete –If it is skin color, how dark? If it is ethnicity, what percentage of your ethnicity? The inability of the negative to confront this leads to lash-out against those bodies that do not conform to their movement and independently disproves their theory

#### C. Social death – their claims about its unique nature is overly reductive and empirically denied:

#### Gratuitous violence – the killing of Lauryn Paige and the descration and repeated stabbing testifies to the nature of queer overkill

#### General dishonorment – 2AC overview explains the specific ways in which queerness is demonized and queer literature specifically is marked as not useful

#### Understanding natal disenfranchisement as an act of alienation – as a separation from the truth of the subject – naturalizes the grid of the familial bindings and forever suppresses the echo of queerness

Richardson 13. Matt, PhD in English, “The Queer Limit of Black Memory: Black Lesbian Literature and Irresolution” <https://ohiostatepress.org/Books/Book%20PDFs/Richardson%20Queer.pdf>, 2013

The museum’s permanent collection is a set of exhibits that puts African dispersal into a global context. It sets the tone for the museum itself, situating its priorities in relation to remembering the story of slavery and colonialism from the perspective of four themes: origins, movement, adaptation, and transformation. The front wall of the building is a glass window that allows one to see outside from the staircase, which leads to all the floors of the museum. Next to the staircase is a three-story photograph of the face of Africa, or more precisely, the face of a little African girl. This photograph is the literal face of the museum; because of the glass wall, it is visible from the street and transforms the front of the building into an impressive tableau. The original photograph was taken by Chester Higgins Jr. and incorporated into a photomosaic titled “Photographs from the African Diaspora,” a composite of over two thousand individual photographs. The mosaic is a significant archive of Black memory and is a permanent part of the museum. 2 The pictures line the staircases between the museum floors. They are beautiful; they move me with their sheer force of evidence in numbers. Each one touches an affective punctum that is temporally situated through the setting, listening to the archives clothes, hairstyles, and other visual aspects of the subjects. Each photograph tells a story—mothers and daughters, men in military uniform, weddings, funerals, spiritual ceremonies, Black men with children, men and women dancing, children at play, men and women at work. They tell me a story that I already know, one of pride and joy, resistance and endurance, family and love. The photographs also talk back to the ever-present narrative of the broken Black family, which is challenged and reconstituted in many forms on the museum wall. There is a phonic materiality to the visual. I think of Fred Moten’s insistence on the photograph that screams as part of a mournful/political practice. 4 I am reminded that the purpose of the project is to provide what Hirsch and Spitzer call “points of memory” or “points of intersection between past and present, memory and postmemory, personal memory and cultural recall.” 5 They are included in the infrastructure of the museum in order to make an argument or a point about Black memory. 6 The photographs argue for closure on the enduring questions regarding the inherent pathology of the Black family; they yell that the accusations are untrue, that Black families do exist. Representation of a normative resolution to the question of Black familial pathology requires the suppression of any echo of queerness. In this context queerness would be unmelodic, improvisational, unpredictable, and irresolute. On the second floor, there are several sections that make up the permanent exhibit at MoAD. There are more objects in the permanent collection that speak to me, to all the visitors, about the normative Black subject. At the top of the steps, leading into the second floor, is an installation on adornment. It has three figures: a man, a child, and a woman. The placards next to the figures describe the role of adornment in culture, but to me the story they tell is about gender. In the installation, the faces of the figures separate from the torsos and morph into different ones. The torsos also change every few seconds, mixing the traditional with the contemporary, the urban with the rural. This fragmented Black body is put back together in gender appropriate terms. Difference, multiculturalism, and diversity are celebrated in the facial morphing. Asian, African, and white European faces join those of African descent, celebrating a mixed-racial heritage, clearly eschewing racial purity. However, there is no male face with lipstick, for example, or faces that challenge gender binaries at all. Apparently, there is no place for gender variance in this diasporic social imagining. There is a queer limit to how we understand our history and ourselves. In MoAD the photographs and the figures together tell a narrative that binds the body to normative genders and to heterosexuality. The heterosexual matrix, as Judith Butler has explained, is the logic that links biology to gender presentation/expression and sexual object choice. The expectation is that these qualities—anatomy, gender, and sexuality—predict each other through a linear progression. 7 The visitor experiences this logic first by way of the images on display in the photomosaic. Then, figures at the top of the stairs remind us of the proscribed biological basis of the familial and communal representations and again offer us a resolution to the accusations of Black familial pathology and gender aberrance in the biologically based nuclear family.

#### All sentient beings have agency – their argument is the worst form of negativity

Robinson 4. Reginald Leamon, prof law @ Howard U, researcher on the relation between race and academic thought “Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity, and White Structural Oppression: An Analysis of Critical Race Practive/Praxis” American University Law Review 53, no.6 (August 2004): 1361-1419

Under Praxis, Yamamoto argues that left scholars must serve ordinary people’s practical needs.25 Right now, these scholars do not relate to political lawyers and community activists. By existing in separate worlds, neither group has helped to co-create26 “racial justice.” As such, theoretical writings and traditional civil rights strategies move institutions not toward racial justice, but toward liberal solutions.27 So long as this gap continues, law will retreat from racial justice. In surmounting this gap, Yamamoto requires scholars, lawyers, and activists to work together (e.g., consortium). Under Practice or Praxis, Williams and Yamamoto intend to pursue a justice concept, in which antisubordination becomes the singular end.28 This end promises to give to ordinary people, especially those engaged in interracial conflict, the human agency (or empowerment) that they lack. For example, Yamamoto advocates for a “racial group agency,” one oddly standing on racial identity and personal responsibility.29 Unfortunately, Practice and Praxis cannot achieve this end. Relying on classical CRT methodology, Williams and Yamamoto assume that ordinary people like blacks lack human agency and personal responsibility. They presume that white structural oppression buries ordinary people alive under the weight of liberal legalisms like Equal Protection, rendering them subtextual victims.30 I disagree. Pure consciousness is always prior, and all sentient beings have agency. Despite the sheer weight of the legal violence, slaves never forgot their innate right to be free; they retained a pure consciousness that never itself was enslaved.31 Moreover, slaves acted purposefully when they picked cotton and when they fought to be free. Slaves planned revolts, killed masters, overseers, and each other, ran away, picked cotton, and betrayed other co-conspirators; all examples of human agency. Today, despite danger and violence, ordinary people co-create lives of joy, peace, and happiness. Antebellum slaves co-created spaces in which they knew joy, peace, and happiness. In the modern era, ordinary people like blacks have pure consciousness and human agency too. Despite daily examples of human agency, Williams and Yamamoto posit that ordinary people lack real, practical control over their lives.32 By taking this position, they reproduce a major premise in CRT: slavery, Jim Crow, racism, and racial discrimination have subordinated the lives of ordinary people.33 Put succinctly, white structural oppression (e.g., supremacy) impacts the micropractices of ordinary people. By implication, it negates their racial identity, social values, and personal responsibility. If so, then criminal courts mock ordinary people like blacks when the state punishes them for committing crimes.34 If so, the New York Times unfairly punished Jayson Blair, and he was correct to fault it for encouraging plagiarism and for rewarding his unprofessional behavior.35 Failing to address these implications, Williams and Yamamoto direct us to white structural oppression and divert us from the real, practical control that ordinary people exercise when they go to work or commit a crime. In this way, Williams and Yamamoto can only empower ordinary people if they eradicate white racism, for only then will ordinary people have human agency. Practice and Praxis fail because they ignore how ordinary people use mind constructs. A mind construct means any artificial, causal, or interdependent arrangement of facts, factors, elements, or ideas that flows from our inner awareness.36 Representing core beliefs,37 a mind construct allows us to make sense of our personal experiences and social reality. A mind construct is not reality, but ordinary people believe that it is.38 Practice and Praxis also fail because they refuse to deconstruct mind constructs of ordinary people. Intending to adhere to CRT’s methodology, Williams and Yamamoto believe that these mind constructs cannot cocreate experiences, and thus white structural oppression must be an external, objective reality. By refusing to interrogate these mind constructs, they tell us that the proper locus of white structural oppression must be white mindsets. By and large, while white mindsets co-create racial oppression, other mind constructs cannot. Whites have power; others do not. Whites victimize blacks; ordinary people cannot co-create their own oppression experience.39 Working within CRT methodology, Williams and Yamamoto cannot re-imagine ordinary people as bearers of human agency, the power to act purposefully that includes how we use our mind constructs to co-create and to understand experiences and realities. By failing to see ordinary people as powerful agents, Williams and Yamamoto have tied personal liberty not only to liberal legalism and white appreciation, but also to CRT’s liberal agenda.40

### 1AR – More DAs

#### RATIONALISM DA – Ossewarde – traditional policy debate operates through a lens of rationalism that disavows anything deemed irrational and purges it which is the basis for depicting women as hysterical and bad judges and undergirds the violence they critique – acts as link defense

#### FORM DA – even if they win every other argument on the criticism you still vote aff because we have won a critique of the form of debate which comes first because it is how content is filtered. Absent reorienting debate away from communicative productivity, people will continue to drive to make debate into an perfect educational activity, manifesting in debaters striking all black judges because they aren’t conducive to a “good policy debate.”

## Cap

### 1AR – Top

#### We have a competitive thesis claim as to the nature of capitalism and revolution – only the creation of hierarchical identity categories assigned to populations can explain contemporary violence that creates the impacts they isolate as there is no bright line for the creation of capitalism as they recognize it. This is offense – only the molecular revolution of the aff avoids creating the same categories they critique which is a REIFICATION DA to the alt

#### The aff solves the K – affirmative becoming is a gesture toward the Imaginary Party of May 77, rejecting not only capital’s physical domination but the very roles assigned

#### Stasis DA – situating capitalism as a monolithic system fails – our intersectional approach is key to prevent pessimism and stasis

#### We control the root cause – elimation of the potential for becoming of the laborer is what drives modern capitalism – only an affirmation of deviance from that model allows new possibilities

#### Permutation do XYZ

### AT: Political Engagement Link

#### Huge link turn - we’re the opposite of abandoning politics - modern education conceived notions such as the market economy as intrinsically useful and valuable, disavowing the political nature of those values of capitalism - that allows students to be commodified and exported into the labor force, brainwashed to think that it’s the best and only possible way the world can work - only our opening of education to include and cultivate multiple understandings of becoming in the world can ALLOW for engagement with the political

#### it's a link of omission – just because we don’t engage with the political doesn’t mean we can’t – the 1ac obviously isn’t refusal of politics – means perm do both shields it

## Setcol

### 1AR – Double Turns Bad

#### This is a huge double turn with framework – [explain]. That proves the inauthenticity of the criticism and poisons any kind of subject formation that they can engender as they only mechanize the bodies they talk about for competitive gain which dooms the alternative to failure

### 1AR – Frontline

#### Turn – Our argument is not that all essentialism should be disregarded but rather is a fight against the barriers that prevent the affirmation of deviance which is contextually different than the colorblind becoming they critique

#### Permutation – do both – the affirmative enabling of moments of non-normative expression within debate can obviously be combined with a pessimism about political institutions

#### Value Double Bind – either the alternative mandates absolute focus on social death all the time, which clearly precludes value, or it simply requires the recognition of social death to allow for moments of value which means that the permutation’s recognition shields the link

#### There are a few net benefits to the permutation that are also independent DAs to the alt:

#### Purity Politics DA – the attempt to staticize and define ontological imperatives of antiblackness just leads to violent imposition of arbitrary metrics like the blood quantum restriction – that creates violence because their attempt to generate an exclusive ‘community of the dispossessed’ calcifies dehumanization – the boundaries to race will never complete –If it is skin color, how dark? If it is ethnicity, what percentage of your ethnicity? The inability of the negative to confront this leads to lash-out against those bodies that do not conform to their movement and independently disproves their theory

#### Reflexivity DA – their demand that party formation can only occur around race inevitably reproduces other hierarchies absent the recognition of the stratification of bodies with respect to supposed value – sexism in the black panther party that arose from absolute focus in a certain direction

#### Museumification DA – their appeal to an authentic Indian paves over the hyper-simulation of manifest manners that in fact aids in the eradication of native peoples and tribal differences – the dialectic nature of their critique offers a bizarre essentialism that confirms the hyper-simulation of the Indian as an object of research