# Daoism – Metafile

# 1NC – K

## 1NC – Shells

### Shell – Generic

#### Welcome to the age of acceleration. Crises of reification are tearing apart the way we experience and our present theories aren’t gonna save us. Only Daoism can defeat the cycle

Wenning, Mario (2011), "Daoism as Critical Theory", Comparative Philosophy, ,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy. Accessed on July 15, 2021. r0w@n

Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs, motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. In the process of increasingly understanding intersubjective-, self- and world-relationships primarily from the perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities, individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human beings.12 The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.13 Originally reification referred to the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a critique of the reification/distortion of communication,14 the reification of relationships of intersubjective recognition,15 the reification of gender roles16 or the 12 Karl Marx (1973, 108-111). 13 See for example Axel Honneth, (2005). 14 Jürgen Habermas (1984). 15 Axel Honneth (1996). 57 Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011) WENNING reification of conceptions of the self,17 what is being criticized are relationships primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice. Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective pathologies of communication and reification.18 People in late modern societies do not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘ (Entzauberung). In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and customs have lost their power in orienting lives. Finally, **the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration** (Beschleunigung) in which, as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during classical and high modernity, **late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational speed of change** in which **the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change within a lifetime.** In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.19 This acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of life, practices and sets of convictions. All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While the psychological impact of **reification leads to systematic forms** of forced inclusion or exclusion, **of being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities**, and the process of disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in, or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies. . However distinct these pathologies might appear, it is crucial to notice that there is a close linkage between these three briefly outlined pathological tendencies of modern societies. Not only are reification, disenchantment and acceleration historically connected, they also imply each other on a conceptual level. Reification consists in seeing the world primarily from the vantage point of being a means or a toolbox from which means can be utilized in order to bring about a desired end. In this objectifying process, the end justifies the variable means and is the only factor taken to be intrinsically valuable. This end, then, is understood as not presently realized but as a future possibility the reality of which depends on the implementation of one's plan of action. Bernard Williams, the eminent British moral philosopher, stresses this point by arguing that without projecting an aim into the future, life would become meaningless. He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful, but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is not futural anymore. By presupposing such a restricted conception of projective action as the reason for living, the present environment an actor navigates in is transformed into pure immanence in which prediction becomes possible to the point of resembling an analytic judgment: assuming that we know what we want, and if we can do what we want while nobody keeps us from doing it, what we want will become realized. Novelty is being reduced to the discovery of new implications of what has already been familiar. Effort is generated once we see the end of our action as external to our spontaneously generated attachments. It grows out of the attempt to realize the stipulated end in ever more innovative, efficient and predictable ways in which spontaneity is, at best, forced towards a goal. The goal at which effort is directed often drops out of focus during the acceleration process or it loses its appeal. It seems external to the actor who has been trapped in a means-ends apparatus. This rationalization process increasingly becomes independent from the specificity of ends pursued and impossible to get out of. With every rationalized act the actor moves deeper into the quicksand of a world of suppressed spontaneity. The consequence of this seemingly autonomous rationalization process famously described by Weber as an ―iron cage‖ is that the present is being downgraded as insignificant on its own terms when compared to the future gains one promises oneself as the payoff of one's actions. Processes of innovation become the norm and speed up because actors hope to do and achieve ever more goals in increasingly shorter segments of emptied time. Actors rush to a future, which can in principle never be actualized. Paul Virillio fittingly describes this blind acceleration process of chasing structurally elusive future goals in increasingly higher speeds of innovation adequately as a ―rushing standstill‖. From within the ―iron cage‖ of modernity true innovation, which would have to be different from mere acceleration or enhancement and would require deliberating about alternative present ends, seems increasingly impossible.21 The new is transfigured into the only variable that is to be expected. Instrumental action as the reified forgetfulness of the meaning resources of the present for the sake of the projected future thus seems without alternative. The consequence is what Hermann Lübbe refers to as a ‗Gegenwartsschrumpfung‘, a continuing shrinking of the present under the complimentary pressures of the tendencies of melancholic musealization of irretrievably lost pasts and forced innovation to run after structurally elusive futures.22 The dilemma with which critical theorists see themselves confronted is that whatever emancipatory tendencies – be they introduced as forms of resistance, mutual understanding, recognition etc. – are being proposed as means for a future end, instrumental action is reenacted under a normative guise and the domination of the future over the rest of time is thus further sedimented. As soon as instrumental actors propose or just point to emancipatory forms of action, they replicate and reenact the same temporal logic that it originally diagnosed as the problem of modernity, i.e., the belief that the future can be mastered through acts of projective planning. The problem of this projective planning mentality is not that things often turn out differently than planned, but that the actor sidesteps and thereby undermines the significance of the present and sees it simply as something to be used for future ends. In other words, by downgrading the present including its modes of action to being "for the sake of the future," critical theory denigrates the present to the status of a prefuture, a state of emptiness that is used as a resource rather than lived in. A theory exposing and explaining social pathologies is keen on pointing to the inescapable mechanisms preventing the emancipatory use of reason through action. Such an exclusive focus on the diagnosis and emergence of pathologies coincides with developing an ethics of melancholy that emphasizes the inescapable specter of instrumental reason. Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake of histories of catastrophes.23 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present - corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present - leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to justify themselves with respect to the past. This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First, however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as another critical theory. In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of the future.

#### The world is constantly changing, flowing, and becoming – action is only coherent in the specific circumstances of the present

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

We begin our argument for translating Daodejing as “Making This Life Signicant” from Daoist cosmology. Taking a closer look at the interpretation of both the title and the content of the Daodejing as “The Classic of This Focus (de ) and Its Field (dao ),” we might first ask what does the expression “this focus” mean? The Daoist correlative cosmology begins from the assumption that the endless stream of always novel yet still continuous situations we encounter are real, and hence, that there is ontological parity among the things and events that constitute our lives. As a parody on Parmenides, who claimed that “only Being is,” we might say that for the Daoist, “only beings are,” or taking one step further in underscoring the reality of the process of change itself, “only becomings are.” That is, the Daoist does not posit the existence of some permanent reality behind appearances, some unchanging substratum, some essential denying aspect behind the accidents of change. Rather, there is just the ceaseless and usually cadenced flow of experience. In fact, the absence of the “One behind the many” metaphysics makes our uncritical use of the philosophic term “cosmology” to characterize Daoism, at least in the familiar classical Greek sense of this word, highly problematic. In early Greek philosophy, the term “kosmos” connotes a clustered range of meanings, including arche (originative, material, and efficient cause/ultimate undemonstrable principle), logos (underlying organizational principle), theoria (contemplation), nomos (law), theios (divinity), nous (intelligibility). In combination, this cluster of terms conjures forth some notion of a single-ordered Divine3 universe governed by natural and moral laws that are ultimately intelligible to the human mind. This “kosmos” terminology is culturally specfiic, and if applied uncritically to discuss the classical Daoist worldview, introduces a cultural reductionism that elides and thus conceals truly significant differences. The Daoist understanding of “cosmos” as the “ten thousand things” means that, in effect, the Daoists have no concept of cosmos at all insofar as that notion entails a coherent, single-ordered world which is in any sense enclosed or denied. The Daoists are, therefore, primarily, “acosmotic” thinkers.

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#### The alternative is wu-wei- a deferential act of habit forming

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The compilers of the Daodejing seek rather explicitly to develop a contrast between the glimpses of insight this text strives to impart, and the substance of other philosophical doctrines. Many if not most doctrines evolve with their antecedents in an elaborate genealogy of values and ideas. These philosophical doctrines are often hierarchically structured by precepts and governing principles, and they may well require an extended course of study for their mastery and transmission. The precepts that inform these “doctrines” are professionalized by their learned “doctors,” and within their marble academies these erudites—for appropriate status and recompense— are only too glad to amaze the hoi poloi with the ashing dexterity of their philosophic thrusts and parries. What the Daodejing has to offer, on the other hand, is much simpler. It encourages the cultivation of a disposition that is captured in what we have chosen to call its wu-forms. The wu-forms free up the energy required to sustain the abstract cognitive and moral sensibilities of technical philosophy, allowing this energy, now unmediated by concepts, theories, and contrived moral precepts, to be expressed as those concrete feelings that inspire the ordinary business of the day. It is through these concrete feelings that one is able to know the world and to optimize the human experience. The abstraction of the concrete ethical dimension of such felt knowing into a formal moralist vocabulary is rehearsed in chapter 38 of the Daodejing: Thus, only when we have lost sight of way-making is there excellence, Only when we have lost sight of excellence is there authoritative conduct, Only when we have lost sight of authoritative conduct is there appropriateness, And only when we have lost sight of appropriateness is there ritual propriety. As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received 

### Shell – LARP (Medium)

#### Welcome to the age of acceleration – modernity’s obsession with constant innovation dominates the present with the future – our present lives matter little compared to the possibility for a new future – this leads to emotional and physical exhaustion and saps the value to our lives, but critical theory has failed modern movements. Only a new theory that can overcome these pathologies can create liberatory action

Wenning 11. Mario Wenning (Teaches and studies Social and Political Philosophy, Intercultural Philosophy, Aesthetics at the University of Macau, has a PHD from the New School), 2011, Comparative Philosophy vol. 2, <https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy> sean!

Finally, the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration (Beschleunigung) in which, as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during classical and high modernity, late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational speed of change in which the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change within a lifetime. 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He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful, but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is not futural anymore. 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Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake of histories of catastrophes.23 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present - corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present - leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to justify themselves with respect to the past. This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First, however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as another critical theory. In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of the future.

#### The world is constantly changing, flowing, and becoming – action is only coherent in the specific circumstances of the present

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

We begin our argument for translating Daodejing as “Making This Life Signicant” from Daoist cosmology. Taking a closer look at the interpretation of both the title and the content of the Daodejing as “The Classic of This Focus (de ) and Its Field (dao ),” we might first ask what does the expression “this focus” mean? The Daoist correlative cosmology begins from the assumption that the endless stream of always novel yet still continuous situations we encounter are real, and hence, that there is ontological parity among the things and events that constitute our lives. As a parody on Parmenides, who claimed that “only Being is,” we might say that for the Daoist, “only beings are,” or taking one step further in underscoring the reality of the process of change itself, “only becomings are.” That is, the Daoist does not posit the existence of some permanent reality behind appearances, some unchanging substratum, some essential denying aspect behind the accidents of change. Rather, there is just the ceaseless and usually cadenced flow of experience. In fact, the absence of the “One behind the many” metaphysics makes our uncritical use of the philosophic term “cosmology” to characterize Daoism, at least in the familiar classical Greek sense of this word, highly problematic. In early Greek philosophy, the term “kosmos” connotes a clustered range of meanings, including arche (originative, material, and efficient cause/ultimate undemonstrable principle), logos (underlying organizational principle), theoria (contemplation), nomos (law), theios (divinity), nous (intelligibility). In combination, this cluster of terms conjures forth some notion of a single-ordered Divine3 universe governed by natural and moral laws that are ultimately intelligible to the human mind. This “kosmos” terminology is culturally specfiic, and if applied uncritically to discuss the classical Daoist worldview, introduces a cultural reductionism that elides and thus conceals truly significant differences. The Daoist understanding of “cosmos” as the “ten thousand things” means that, in effect, the Daoists have no concept of cosmos at all insofar as that notion entails a coherent, single-ordered world which is in any sense enclosed or denied. The Daoists are, therefore, primarily, “acosmotic” thinkers.

#### The links:

#### The yuwei of the modern democratic state is mutually exclusive with the alternative

Stamatov 17. Aleksandar Stamatov (professor of humanities at Ming Chuan University), 4-1-2017, "The Laozi’s criticism of government and society and a daoist criticism of the modern state," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09552367.2017.1319782?journalCode=casp20 sean!

The Laozi expounds a severe criticism of the rulers and society of its time and this criticism is strongly supported by its metaphysical teachings. For the Laozi, the best rule is the one according to Dao which means that it follows the naturalness or the self-so of Dao. This is what is called governing through wuwei. Generally speaking, the problem with all existing states is that they have broken up the connection with Dao and lost the course of its natural function, so the rulers of these states can only use governing through youwei, which is the artificial and harmful way of governing and handling things. This kind of governing makes the rulers oppressive who in order to gain wealth and bring order in the state impose heavy taxation, harsh punishments and frequent warfare. The problem is, for the Laozi, that using oppressive measures for achieving order in the state actually contributes to the increasing of the state disorder. This kind of youwei government also incites people’s selfish desires which are artificial and different from the natural desires that are endowed by Dao. These desires make people strive to obtain treasures and objects; they make them yearn for the extremes, the extravagant and the excessive which brings competition between people and disorder. What the Laozi might say about the modern democratic state in general is that it is governed by youwei, and in particular that it is still oppressive by means of putting people into constant competition and need to satisfy their selfish desires. However, the questions whether the political philosophy of the Laozi as a whole bears some feasibility or not and is it possible that the concrete political teachings in it can substitute the modern democracy can be challenged, and are not considered here because it will surpass the scope and dimensions of this discussion, but they can still be suitably examined in another place. What is important here is that the Laozi’s criticism of government and society by itself may be directed to both Spring and Autumn/Warring States periods and the modern world

#### The 1AC’s constant run from death saps the ability to find meaning in life

Laozi, Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean! \*NOTE: I partially cite one of the original poems of the Daodejing here, written by Laozi. The translation and commentary is by Ames and Hall\*

Death is real and, wherever there is life, it is not far away. However, to separate death out from the life experience and inveigh against it as something to be avoided at all costs prevents us from appreciating the fragility and preciousness of life that is made possible by this same delicious temporality. Life is made meaningful by death. Death as natural closure punctuates a most particular event in the ongoing transformation of things. Properly understood, a healthy death can be lived well and can enhance the lives of all involved; misunderstood, a resentful death can sour life and become a focus of dread and loathing that robs everyone, especially those left to carry on, of their life energy. The Zhuangzi as a sustained reflection on the relationship between life and death provides many insightful anecdotes that take us beyond grief and suffering. For example: Not long thereafter, Ziyu fell ill, and Zisi went to ask after him. “Extraordinary!” said Ziyu. “The transformer of things continues to make me all gnarly and bent. He hunches me up so badly that my vital organs are above my head while my chin is buried in my belly button. My shoulders are higher than my crown, and my hunchback back points to the heavens. Something has really gone haywire with the yin and yang vapors!” ... “Do you resent this?” asked Zisi. “Indeed no,” replied Ziyu. “What’s to resent? If in the course of things it transforms my left arm into a cock, I’ll use it to tell the time of day. If it goes on to transform my right arm into a crossbow bolt, I’ll use it to shoot me an owl for roasting. If it then transforms my buttocks into wheels and my spirit into a horse, I will ride about on them without need of further transportation.... What’s to resent?”152 Zhuangzi’s conception of life and death is commonsensical. Empirically we know nothing of permanence and annihilation. In fact, all we know of experience is persistence within change. It is on this basis that the Zhuangzi concludes: “Once we take the heavens and earth to be a giant forge and transformation to be the great ironsmith, wherever I go is just fine. Relaxed I nod off and happily I awake.”153

#### States have to focus on even the smallest issues – they’ll inevitably spill up to catastrophe

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

All polarities are reconciled in the relationship between the particular focus and its field. To use singularity and plurality as a familiar polarity, a person is certainly a unique, nonsubstitutable individual, but as a radically contextualized matrix of relationships, this same person is also a manifold of selves all implicated within this individuality. Focus and field is thus another way of declaring the inseparability of the one and the many, of continuity and multiplicity, of uniqueness (aloneness) and commonality (sharedness). The reconciliation of polarities means that in any particular event, there is a continuity between the inconsequential and the important, between equilibrium and agitation. This being the case, the Daodejing insists that if small matters are not attended to, they can have cascading consequences in which equilibrium gives way to turmoil. In giving this apothegm a political application, the text evokes the image of a royal progress in which the ruler must be unrelentingly attentive to the basics—to the provisioning supply wagons upon which the well-being of not only the ruler, but all the travelers depends. Within the walls of the state itself, the ruler’s person is no different from all the other matters of concern to the court, and as such, must be given appropriate care. This chapter might well be read together with chapters 7 and 13. If rulers treat all things with equal seriousness and respect, their own persons will be taken care of as a matter of course. The way to be rid of such personal concerns is to be rid of the distinction between one’s person and the world in which we live. One both values one’s person and loses one’s person in a thoroughgoing integration into one’s field of experience. This is what the Zhuangzi calls “hiding the world in the world.”74 After all, “those who begrudge their persons as though they were the world can be put in charge of the world” (chapter 13).

#### Rationalism blinds us to specific circumstances, to the flow of the universe, to the people, to any policy options outside of the standard- Wu-Wei k2 eliminating the restraints

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), r0w@n

Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously upon the ways in which we relate to each other and the world. The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict by getting state-makers to meditate. Meditative disciplines are arduous, their results are uncertain, and modernist state-makers are particularly susceptible to practising the ‘un-Chinese habit of puzzling about ultimate reality . . . independent of sense perception and reason’ (Graham, 1989, p. 234). It might not be foolish to heed the advice provided by Taoists as a result 80 Ralph Pettman of their meditations, however. This is not advice about how to gain privileged access to an external reality. It is about the particular kinds of conclusions that become available when Taoists relinquish their mental grasp of ‘categories made habitual by naming’ (Graham, 1989, pp. 234–235), and seek meditative clarity for themselves (Needham, 1956, p. 33). If this sounds too general and self-serving, we might also recall that the Taoist classics conclude that war is never a preferred activity, and that when there is an alternative, we should take it. As the Tao te ching concludes: ‘Show me a man of violence that came to a good end, and I will take him for my teacher’ (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 31, 32, 45, 72, 77). In articulating their meditations, do Taoists contradict themselves? Creel thinks so, drawing attention to the difficulty of being both purposive and contemplative (meditative) at the same time (Creel, 1970, p. 45). Ames, on the other hand, repudiates attempts like Creel’s to cast Taoism in terms of a purposive/contemplative dichotomy, or in terms of any other reading that imputes to Taoism a (political) purpose: Since Taoist political theory is propounded as a microcosm of . . . [its] metaphysics in which the operation of the political state is seen as correlative to the functioning of the cosmos, it follows that the ideal ruler can only be ‘purposive’ if in fact there is some purpose in his cosmic counterpart, the tao. [And while t]he Taoism of the Lao Tzu does acknowledge a certain natural ‘so-ness’ which exists in all things and propels them toward their own realization . . . the political theory of the Lao Tzu is certainly not purposive in the sense of advocating a specific and artificially contrived political program which enables one to seize and exercise political control . . . (Ames, 1994, p. 218, fn. 23) Are Taoists also being impractical? The authors of the Huai Nan Tze (206 B.C.E.–8 C.E.) thought so, castigating Taoists for being naïve and primitive, and for seeming to provide a ‘total repudiation of human culture’ (Ames, 1994, p. 219, fn. 34). Why should an active form of pacifism be better than any other policy, they said? Why should a deliberate attempt to craft the world to human advantage be any less likely to accord with the way the universe works than a policy of active pacifism? It is at this point that Taoists are most likely to be misunderstood. When Taoists tell state-makers to be more actively pacifist, for example, they seem to be advising them to intervene less. This is not necessarily so, however. A Taoist does not necessarily advise either retreat or quiescence. A Taoist response might be more interventionist, or it might be less interventionist. The Taoist will decide from one moment to the next what is most appropriate. If he or she does advise intervention, then he or she is not likely to Taoism and the concept of global security 81 advise that this be done in a single-minded way. All of which might be scant comfort for the harassed policy adviser, though it might be a welcome breather for the policy-maker him- or herself. It might even be a moment he or she wants to prolong. 5 Conclusion The concept of global security is articulated today in terms of many different issue-areas. The more conventional of these issue-areas are those that involve the global military balance, though even these have less conventional components to them, like the issues raised by contemporary terrorism, or contemporary piracy. The less conventional issue-areas involve those like the global balance of productivity, which is now recognized as an important part of the concept of global security (hence the significance now afforded such issues as labour migration), and the global balance of identities (hence the importance now placed on the security issues that diasporas, refugees, and migrant populations represent). To talk about any of these issue-areas is to talk in one or more of the modernist analytical languages mapped at the beginning of this article. Indeed, it is not possible to describe or explain any global security issue-area without using an analytical language of some kind. These analytical languages are part of the modernist/rationalist project, a globalizing initiative that makes, in turn, for the kind of margins manifest in environmental concerns, or in the gender concerns that the global statistics to do with women’s well-being represent. Although the modernist/rationalist project is currently hegemonic, it encounters other thought-worlds that do not work on the same assumptions. These thought-worlds include Taoism, which is the thought-world discussed here. The epistemological divide between rationalism and Taoism is a radical one. It can be bridged, but not from the rationalist side. Once it is bridged we can bring across a range of Taoist concepts to compare with rationalist ones, including the Taoist concept of wu-wei. These concepts can then be used to understand global security better, in both its developmental (‘human’) and militarist (‘strategic’) forms. Taoists do not ‘see’ the concept of global security as being about ‘order’, ‘well-being’, or even ‘truth’. They do not ‘see’ the concept of global security in the way modernists/rationalists see this concept. This can be somewhat frustrating for those who want explicit policy alternatives to appraise, since Taoism does not provide fixed policy alternatives. What Taoism does do is transgress the limits rationalist thinking sets, however, and compensates for the distortions it creates. The rationalist will insist on scrutinizing what the 82 Ralph Pettman Taoist says, but his or her scrutiny will still be compromised by his or her own preconceptions. This is why we need to keep on recasting the rationalist concept of global security in a sacral context like the Taoist one.

#### The alternative is wu-wei- a deferential act of habit forming

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

The compilers of the Daodejing seek rather explicitly to develop a contrast between the glimpses of insight this text strives to impart, and the substance of other philosophical doctrines. Many if not most doctrines evolve with their antecedents in an elaborate genealogy of values and ideas. These philosophical doctrines are often hierarchically structured by precepts and governing principles, and they may well require an extended course of study for their mastery and transmission. The precepts that inform these “doctrines” are professionalized by their learned “doctors,” and within their marble academies these erudites—for appropriate status and recompense— are only too glad to amaze the hoi poloi with the ashing dexterity of their philosophic thrusts and parries. What the Daodejing has to offer, on the other hand, is much simpler. It encourages the cultivation of a disposition that is captured in what we have chosen to call its wu-forms. The wu-forms free up the energy required to sustain the abstract cognitive and moral sensibilities of technical philosophy, allowing this energy, now unmediated by concepts, theories, and contrived moral precepts, to be expressed as those concrete feelings that inspire the ordinary business of the day. It is through these concrete feelings that one is able to know the world and to optimize the human experience. The abstraction of the concrete ethical dimension of such felt knowing into a formal moralist vocabulary is rehearsed in chapter 38 of the Daodejing: Thus, only when we have lost sight of way-making is there excellence, Only when we have lost sight of excellence is there authoritative conduct, Only when we have lost sight of authoritative conduct is there appropriateness, And only when we have lost sight of appropriateness is there ritual propriety. As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received 

### Shell- K Affs

#### Welcome to the age of acceleration. Crises of reification are tearing apart the way we experience and our present theories aren’t gonna save us. Only Daoism can defeat the cycle

Wenning, Mario (2011), "Daoism as Critical Theory", Comparative Philosophy, ,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy. Accessed on July 15, 2021. r0w@n

Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs, motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. In the process of increasingly understanding intersubjective-, self- and world-relationships primarily from the perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities, individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human beings.12 The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.13 Originally reification referred to the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a critique of the reification/distortion of communication,14 the reification of relationships of intersubjective recognition,15 the reification of gender roles16 or the 12 Karl Marx (1973, 108-111). 13 See for example Axel Honneth, (2005). 14 Jürgen Habermas (1984). 15 Axel Honneth (1996). 57 Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011) WENNING reification of conceptions of the self,17 what is being criticized are relationships primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice. Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective pathologies of communication and reification.18 People in late modern societies do not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘ (Entzauberung). In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and customs have lost their power in orienting lives. Finally, **the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration** (Beschleunigung) in which, as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during classical and high modernity, **late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational speed of change** in which **the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change within a lifetime.** In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.19 This acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of life, practices and sets of convictions. All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While the psychological impact of **reification leads to systematic forms** of forced inclusion or exclusion, **of being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities**, and the process of disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in, or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies. . However distinct these pathologies might appear, it is crucial to notice that there is a close linkage between these three briefly outlined pathological tendencies of modern societies. Not only are reification, disenchantment and acceleration historically connected, they also imply each other on a conceptual level. Reification consists in seeing the world primarily from the vantage point of being a means or a toolbox from which means can be utilized in order to bring about a desired end. In this objectifying process, the end justifies the variable means and is the only factor taken to be intrinsically valuable. This end, then, is understood as not presently realized but as a future possibility the reality of which depends on the implementation of one's plan of action. Bernard Williams, the eminent British moral philosopher, stresses this point by arguing that without projecting an aim into the future, life would become meaningless. He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful, but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is not futural anymore. By presupposing such a restricted conception of projective action as the reason for living, the present environment an actor navigates in is transformed into pure immanence in which prediction becomes possible to the point of resembling an analytic judgment: assuming that we know what we want, and if we can do what we want while nobody keeps us from doing it, what we want will become realized. Novelty is being reduced to the discovery of new implications of what has already been familiar. Effort is generated once we see the end of our action as external to our spontaneously generated attachments. It grows out of the attempt to realize the stipulated end in ever more innovative, efficient and predictable ways in which spontaneity is, at best, forced towards a goal. The goal at which effort is directed often drops out of focus during the acceleration process or it loses its appeal. It seems external to the actor who has been trapped in a means-ends apparatus. This rationalization process increasingly becomes independent from the specificity of ends pursued and impossible to get out of. With every rationalized act the actor moves deeper into the quicksand of a world of suppressed spontaneity. The consequence of this seemingly autonomous rationalization process famously described by Weber as an ―iron cage‖ is that the present is being downgraded as insignificant on its own terms when compared to the future gains one promises oneself as the payoff of one's actions. Processes of innovation become the norm and speed up because actors hope to do and achieve ever more goals in increasingly shorter segments of emptied time. Actors rush to a future, which can in principle never be actualized. Paul Virillio fittingly describes this blind acceleration process of chasing structurally elusive future goals in increasingly higher speeds of innovation adequately as a ―rushing standstill‖. From within the ―iron cage‖ of modernity true innovation, which would have to be different from mere acceleration or enhancement and would require deliberating about alternative present ends, seems increasingly impossible.21 The new is transfigured into the only variable that is to be expected. Instrumental action as the reified forgetfulness of the meaning resources of the present for the sake of the projected future thus seems without alternative. The consequence is what Hermann Lübbe refers to as a ‗Gegenwartsschrumpfung‘, a continuing shrinking of the present under the complimentary pressures of the tendencies of melancholic musealization of irretrievably lost pasts and forced innovation to run after structurally elusive futures.22 The dilemma with which critical theorists see themselves confronted is that whatever emancipatory tendencies – be they introduced as forms of resistance, mutual understanding, recognition etc. – are being proposed as means for a future end, instrumental action is reenacted under a normative guise and the domination of the future over the rest of time is thus further sedimented. As soon as instrumental actors propose or just point to emancipatory forms of action, they replicate and reenact the same temporal logic that it originally diagnosed as the problem of modernity, i.e., the belief that the future can be mastered through acts of projective planning. The problem of this projective planning mentality is not that things often turn out differently than planned, but that the actor sidesteps and thereby undermines the significance of the present and sees it simply as something to be used for future ends. In other words, by downgrading the present including its modes of action to being "for the sake of the future," critical theory denigrates the present to the status of a prefuture, a state of emptiness that is used as a resource rather than lived in. A theory exposing and explaining social pathologies is keen on pointing to the inescapable mechanisms preventing the emancipatory use of reason through action. Such an exclusive focus on the diagnosis and emergence of pathologies coincides with developing an ethics of melancholy that emphasizes the inescapable specter of instrumental reason. Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake of histories of catastrophes.23 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present - corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present - leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to justify themselves with respect to the past. This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First, however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as another critical theory. In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of the future.

#### The world is constantly changing, flowing, and becoming – action is only coherent in the specific circumstances of the present

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

We begin our argument for translating Daodejing as “Making This Life Signicant” from Daoist cosmology. Taking a closer look at the interpretation of both the title and the content of the Daodejing as “The Classic of This Focus (de ) and Its Field (dao ),” we might first ask what does the expression “this focus” mean? The Daoist correlative cosmology begins from the assumption that the endless stream of always novel yet still continuous situations we encounter are real, and hence, that there is ontological parity among the things and events that constitute our lives. As a parody on Parmenides, who claimed that “only Being is,” we might say that for the Daoist, “only beings are,” or taking one step further in underscoring the reality of the process of change itself, “only becomings are.” That is, the Daoist does not posit the existence of some permanent reality behind appearances, some unchanging substratum, some essential denying aspect behind the accidents of change. Rather, there is just the ceaseless and usually cadenced flow of experience. In fact, the absence of the “One behind the many” metaphysics makes our uncritical use of the philosophic term “cosmology” to characterize Daoism, at least in the familiar classical Greek sense of this word, highly problematic. In early Greek philosophy, the term “kosmos” connotes a clustered range of meanings, including arche (originative, material, and efficient cause/ultimate undemonstrable principle), logos (underlying organizational principle), theoria (contemplation), nomos (law), theios (divinity), nous (intelligibility). In combination, this cluster of terms conjures forth some notion of a single-ordered Divine3 universe governed by natural and moral laws that are ultimately intelligible to the human mind. This “kosmos” terminology is culturally specfiic, and if applied uncritically to discuss the classical Daoist worldview, introduces a cultural reductionism that elides and thus conceals truly significant differences. The Daoist understanding of “cosmos” as the “ten thousand things” means that, in effect, the Daoists have no concept of cosmos at all insofar as that notion entails a coherent, single-ordered world which is in any sense enclosed or denied. The Daoists are, therefore, primarily, “acosmotic” thinkers.

#### The Links:

#### Fixed identity is a bad starting point – it restricts subjectivity away from the natural flow of becoming

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In the human experience we are radically contextualized, constituted by those roles and relationships that locate us within our social, natural, and cultural environments. “Proper way-making” is getting the most out of these relationships as we make our way in the world: It is making this life significant. And getting the most out of our experience depends upon achieving and sustaining optimally productive harmony. Such efficacy depends upon always knowing where to be, committing ourselves utterly in our relationships, being generous in our transactions, making good on what we say, being successful both in service and in governance, and seizing the moment. The greatest obstacle to optimizing relationships is coercion. If a healthy relationship is mutually accommodating, then the introduction of coercion, in which one party overwrites the importance of the other, entails a diminution in the creative possibilities of both. As Richard Rorty has observed, forced redefinition is humiliation. In a cosmology that begins from the uniqueness of the particular, strict identity and its corollary, strict equality, are not an option. Relationships are invariably hierarchical. But hierarchy is only pernicious when it is compromised by coercion. The family as an institution is hierarchical, but appropriate patterns of deference can allow members of the family to have both dignity and parity in their relationships.

#### Labels are bad – they abstract away individual foci and institutionalize un-natural structures

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The ongoing shaping of experience entails working with the as yet inchoate and thus seemingly insignificant phases of the process. Each step requires a quantum of imagination and inspiration that does not reference the world as it is, but flies ahead of what has already been articulated to forge a new way forward. The value of this novelty and the respect due it lies in its potential to reshape our world. Were those who have responsibility for order in the human world sufficiently deferential to this effort to maximize the available resources, the world would respond with natural plenty and the people would cooperate with fairness in the distribution of its bounty. In order to function effectively in managing our environment, we need distinctions. These distinctions in themselves are functional and enabling, but once established, can take on a life of their own. We quickly fall into the trap of turning names into things, so that these names identify some more real “I-know-not-what” that stands independent of the now “superficial” way in which we actually experience any particular event. We misinterpret the persistence within process as some underlying foundation of our experience. Rational structures become institutionalized and, given enough time, petrified. The regimen of values they carry with them, empowering some against others, become entrenched and uncompromising. What began as a convenience takes over, constraining the very experience it was created to facilitate, and in so doing, robs life of its creative vigor. Some commentators have balked at the analogy offered here, worried that way-making should in fact be the larger and more expansive rivers and seas, rather than their many tributaries. The point, however, is that dao as the ongoing process of experience is both in the world and is the world, is both the foci and their fields. In chapter 25 we invoked Tang Junyi’s characterization of this natural cosmology as “the inseparability of the one and the many, of continuity and its multiplicity (yiduo bufenguan)” to explain how the process is both one and many at the same time, depending on which is foregrounded. Way-making is not the One behind the many, but is rather the somewhat determinate many that constitute the somewhat indeterminate and ever continuous process.

#### Marxism and Neomarxism fail to account for the here and now and specific circumstances

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), r0w@n

Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature

#### The world exists as a set of experience- the 1ac’s abstract theorizing makes it impossible to succeed

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

The compilers of the Daodejing seek rather explicitly to develop a contrast between the glimpses of insight this text strives to impart, and the substance of other philosophical doctrines. Many if not most doctrines evolve with their antecedents in an elaborate genealogy of values and ideas. These philosophical doctrines are often hierarchically structured by precepts and governing principles, and they may well require an extended course of study for their mastery and transmission. The precepts that inform these “doctrines” are professionalized by their learned “doctors,” and within their marble academies these erudites—for appropriate status and recompense— are only too glad to amaze the hoi poloi with the ashing dexterity of their philosophic thrusts and parries. What the Daodejing has to offer, on the other hand, is much simpler. It encourages the cultivation of a disposition that is captured in what we have chosen to call its wu-forms. The wu-forms free up the energy required to sustain the abstract cognitive and moral sensibilities of technical philosophy, allowing this energy, now unmediated by concepts, theories, and contrived moral precepts, to be expressed as those concrete feelings that inspire the ordinary business of the day. It is through these concrete feelings that one is able to know the world and to optimize the human experience. The abstraction of the concrete ethical dimension of such felt knowing into a formal moralist vocabulary is rehearsed in chapter 38 of the Daodejing: Thus, only when we have lost sight of way-making is there excellence, Only when we have lost sight of excellence is there authoritative conduct, Only when we have lost sight of authoritative conduct is there appropriateness, And only when we have lost sight of appropriateness is there ritual propriety. As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing

#### The alternative is wu-wei- a deferential act of habit forming

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As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received

### Shell- WTO LARP

#### Welcome to the age of acceleration. Crises of reification are tearing apart the way we experience and our present theories aren’t gonna save us. Only Daoism can defeat the cycle

Wenning, Mario (2011), "Daoism as Critical Theory", Comparative Philosophy, ,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy. Accessed on July 15, 2021. r0w@n

Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs, motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. In the process of increasingly understanding intersubjective-, self- and world-relationships primarily from the perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities, individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human beings.12 The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.13 Originally reification referred to the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a critique of the reification/distortion of communication,14 the reification of relationships of intersubjective recognition,15 the reification of gender roles16 or the 12 Karl Marx (1973, 108-111). 13 See for example Axel Honneth, (2005). 14 Jürgen Habermas (1984). 15 Axel Honneth (1996). 57 Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011) WENNING reification of conceptions of the self,17 what is being criticized are relationships primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice. Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective pathologies of communication and reification.18 People in late modern societies do not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘ (Entzauberung). In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and customs have lost their power in orienting lives. Finally, **the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration** (Beschleunigung) in which, as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during classical and high modernity, **late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational speed of change** in which **the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change within a lifetime.** In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.19 This acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of life, practices and sets of convictions. All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While the psychological impact of **reification leads to systematic forms** of forced inclusion or exclusion, **of being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities**, and the process of disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in, or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies. . However distinct these pathologies might appear, it is crucial to notice that there is a close linkage between these three briefly outlined pathological tendencies of modern societies. Not only are reification, disenchantment and acceleration historically connected, they also imply each other on a conceptual level. Reification consists in seeing the world primarily from the vantage point of being a means or a toolbox from which means can be utilized in order to bring about a desired end. In this objectifying process, the end justifies the variable means and is the only factor taken to be intrinsically valuable. This end, then, is understood as not presently realized but as a future possibility the reality of which depends on the implementation of one's plan of action. Bernard Williams, the eminent British moral philosopher, stresses this point by arguing that without projecting an aim into the future, life would become meaningless. He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful, but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is not futural anymore. By presupposing such a restricted conception of projective action as the reason for living, the present environment an actor navigates in is transformed into pure immanence in which prediction becomes possible to the point of resembling an analytic judgment: assuming that we know what we want, and if we can do what we want while nobody keeps us from doing it, what we want will become realized. Novelty is being reduced to the discovery of new implications of what has already been familiar. Effort is generated once we see the end of our action as external to our spontaneously generated attachments. It grows out of the attempt to realize the stipulated end in ever more innovative, efficient and predictable ways in which spontaneity is, at best, forced towards a goal. The goal at which effort is directed often drops out of focus during the acceleration process or it loses its appeal. It seems external to the actor who has been trapped in a means-ends apparatus. This rationalization process increasingly becomes independent from the specificity of ends pursued and impossible to get out of. With every rationalized act the actor moves deeper into the quicksand of a world of suppressed spontaneity. The consequence of this seemingly autonomous rationalization process famously described by Weber as an ―iron cage‖ is that the present is being downgraded as insignificant on its own terms when compared to the future gains one promises oneself as the payoff of one's actions. Processes of innovation become the norm and speed up because actors hope to do and achieve ever more goals in increasingly shorter segments of emptied time. Actors rush to a future, which can in principle never be actualized. Paul Virillio fittingly describes this blind acceleration process of chasing structurally elusive future goals in increasingly higher speeds of innovation adequately as a ―rushing standstill‖. From within the ―iron cage‖ of modernity true innovation, which would have to be different from mere acceleration or enhancement and would require deliberating about alternative present ends, seems increasingly impossible.21 The new is transfigured into the only variable that is to be expected. Instrumental action as the reified forgetfulness of the meaning resources of the present for the sake of the projected future thus seems without alternative. The consequence is what Hermann Lübbe refers to as a ‗Gegenwartsschrumpfung‘, a continuing shrinking of the present under the complimentary pressures of the tendencies of melancholic musealization of irretrievably lost pasts and forced innovation to run after structurally elusive futures.22 The dilemma with which critical theorists see themselves confronted is that whatever emancipatory tendencies – be they introduced as forms of resistance, mutual understanding, recognition etc. – are being proposed as means for a future end, instrumental action is reenacted under a normative guise and the domination of the future over the rest of time is thus further sedimented. As soon as instrumental actors propose or just point to emancipatory forms of action, they replicate and reenact the same temporal logic that it originally diagnosed as the problem of modernity, i.e., the belief that the future can be mastered through acts of projective planning. The problem of this projective planning mentality is not that things often turn out differently than planned, but that the actor sidesteps and thereby undermines the significance of the present and sees it simply as something to be used for future ends. In other words, by downgrading the present including its modes of action to being "for the sake of the future," critical theory denigrates the present to the status of a prefuture, a state of emptiness that is used as a resource rather than lived in. A theory exposing and explaining social pathologies is keen on pointing to the inescapable mechanisms preventing the emancipatory use of reason through action. Such an exclusive focus on the diagnosis and emergence of pathologies coincides with developing an ethics of melancholy that emphasizes the inescapable specter of instrumental reason. Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake of histories of catastrophes.23 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present - corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present - leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to justify themselves with respect to the past. This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First, however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as another critical theory. In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of the future.

#### The world is constantly changing, flowing, and becoming – action is only coherent in the specific circumstances of the present

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

We begin our argument for translating Daodejing as “Making This Life Signicant” from Daoist cosmology. Taking a closer look at the interpretation of both the title and the content of the Daodejing as “The Classic of This Focus (de ) and Its Field (dao ),” we might first ask what does the expression “this focus” mean? The Daoist correlative cosmology begins from the assumption that the endless stream of always novel yet still continuous situations we encounter are real, and hence, that there is ontological parity among the things and events that constitute our lives. As a parody on Parmenides, who claimed that “only Being is,” we might say that for the Daoist, “only beings are,” or taking one step further in underscoring the reality of the process of change itself, “only becomings are.” That is, the Daoist does not posit the existence of some permanent reality behind appearances, some unchanging substratum, some essential denying aspect behind the accidents of change. Rather, there is just the ceaseless and usually cadenced flow of experience. In fact, the absence of the “One behind the many” metaphysics makes our uncritical use of the philosophic term “cosmology” to characterize Daoism, at least in the familiar classical Greek sense of this word, highly problematic. In early Greek philosophy, the term “kosmos” connotes a clustered range of meanings, including arche (originative, material, and efficient cause/ultimate undemonstrable principle), logos (underlying organizational principle), theoria (contemplation), nomos (law), theios (divinity), nous (intelligibility). In combination, this cluster of terms conjures forth some notion of a single-ordered Divine3 universe governed by natural and moral laws that are ultimately intelligible to the human mind. This “kosmos” terminology is culturally specfiic, and if applied uncritically to discuss the classical Daoist worldview, introduces a cultural reductionism that elides and thus conceals truly significant differences. The Daoist understanding of “cosmos” as the “ten thousand things” means that, in effect, the Daoists have no concept of cosmos at all insofar as that notion entails a coherent, single-ordered world which is in any sense enclosed or denied. The Daoists are, therefore, primarily, “acosmotic” thinkers.

#### The Links:

#### Rationalism blinds us to specific circumstances, to the flow of the universe, to the people, to any policy options outside of the standard- Wu-Wei k2 eliminating the restraints

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), r0w@n

Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. 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While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. 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The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict

#### Modernist IR lets problems get big before it addresses them, stimulates needless desire, and prohibits spontaneity through legislated morality

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), bracketed for gendered language, r0w@n

Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, [they are] not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, [they seek] to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. 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The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict by getting state-makers to meditate. Meditative disciplines are arduous, their results are uncertain, and modernist state-makers are particularly susceptible to practising the ‘un-Chinese habit of puzzling about ultimate reality . . . independent of sense perception and reason’ (Graham, 1989, p. 234). It might not be foolish to heed the advice provided by Taoists as a result 80 Ralph Pettman of their meditations, however. This is not advice about how to gain privileged access to an external reality. It is about the particular kinds of conclusions that become available when Taoists relinquish their mental grasp of ‘categories made habitual by naming’ (Graham, 1989, pp. 234–235), and seek meditative clarity for themselves (Needham, 1956, p. 33). If this sounds too general and self-serving, we might also recall that the Taoist classics conclude that war is never a preferred activity, and that when there is an alternative, we should take it. As the Tao te ching concludes: ‘Show me a man of violence that came to a good end, and I will take him for my teacher’ (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 31, 32, 45, 72, 77). In articulating their meditations, do Taoists contradict themselves? Creel thinks so, drawing attention to the difficulty of being both purposive and contemplative (meditative) at the same time (Creel, 1970, p. 45). Ames, on the other hand, repudiates attempts like Creel’s to cast Taoism in terms of a purposive/contemplative dichotomy, or in terms of any other reading that imputes to Taoism a (political) purpose: Since Taoist political theory is propounded as a microcosm of . . . [its] metaphysics in which the operation of the political state is seen as correlative to the functioning of the cosmos, it follows that the ideal ruler can only be ‘purposive’ if in fact there is some purpose in his cosmic counterpart, the tao. [And while t]he Taoism of the Lao Tzu does acknowledge a certain natural ‘so-ness’ which exists in all things and propels them toward their own realization . . . the political theory of the Lao Tzu is certainly not purposive in the sense of advocating a specific and artificially contrived political program which enables one to seize and exercise political control . . . (Ames, 1994, p. 218, fn. 23) Are Taoists also being impractical? The authors of the Huai Nan Tze (206 B.C.E.–8 C.E.) thought so, castigating Taoists for being naïve and primitive, and for seeming to provide a ‘total repudiation of human culture’ (Ames, 1994, p. 219, fn. 34). Why should an active form of pacifism be better than any other policy, they said? Why should a deliberate attempt to craft the world to human advantage be any less likely to accord with the way the universe works than a policy of active pacifism? It is at this point that Taoists are most likely to be misunderstood. When Taoists tell state-makers to be more actively pacifist, for example, they seem to be advising them to intervene less. This is not necessarily so, however. A Taoist does not necessarily advise either retreat or quiescence. A Taoist response might be more interventionist, or it might be less interventionist. The Taoist will decide from one moment to the next what is most appropriate. If he or she does advise intervention, then he or she is not likely to Taoism and the concept of global security 81 advise that this be done in a single-minded way. All of which might be scant comfort for the harassed policy adviser, though it might be a welcome breather for the policy-maker him- or herself. It might even be a moment he or she wants to prolong. 5 Conclusion The concept of global security is articulated today in terms of many different issue-areas. The more conventional of these issue-areas are those that involve the global military balance, though even these have less conventional components to them, like the issues raised by contemporary terrorism, or contemporary piracy. The less conventional issue-areas involve those like the global balance of productivity, which is now recognized as an important part of the concept of global security (hence the significance now afforded such issues as labour migration), and the global balance of identities (hence the importance now placed on the security issues that diasporas, refugees, and migrant populations represent). To talk about any of these issue-areas is to talk in one or more of the modernist analytical languages mapped at the beginning of this article. Indeed, it is not possible to describe or explain any global security issue-area without using an analytical language of some kind. These analytical languages are part of the modernist/rationalist project, a globalizing initiative that makes, in turn, for the kind of margins manifest in environmental concerns, or in the gender concerns that the global statistics to do with women’s well-being represent. Although the modernist/rationalist project is currently hegemonic, it encounters other thought-worlds that do not work on the same assumptions. These thought-worlds include Taoism, which is the thought-world discussed here. The epistemological divide between rationalism and Taoism is a radical one. It can be bridged, but not from the rationalist side. Once it is bridged we can bring across a range of Taoist concepts to compare with rationalist ones, including the Taoist concept of wu-wei. These concepts can then be used to understand global security better, in both its developmental (‘human’) and militarist (‘strategic’) forms. Taoists do not ‘see’ the concept of global security as being about ‘order’, ‘well-being’, or even ‘truth’. They do not ‘see’ the concept of global security in the way modernists/rationalists see this concept. This can be somewhat frustrating for those who want explicit policy alternatives to appraise, since Taoism does not provide fixed policy alternatives. What Taoism does do is transgress the limits rationalist thinking sets, however, and compensates for the distortions it creates. The rationalist will insist on scrutinizing what the 82 Ralph Pettman Taoist says, but his or her scrutiny will still be compromised by his or her own preconceptions. This is why we need to keep on recasting the rationalist concept of global security in a sacral context like the Taoist one.

#### International organizations restrict spontaneity

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), bracketed for gendered language, r0w@n

. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, [they are] not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, [they seek] to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously

#### Capitalism’s formations of desire are inherently against the flow of the universe

Pranav Dayanand, 21, Does Daoism sanction a political philosophy such as anarchical individualism?, Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies, 8-28-2021, DOA: 9-11-2021, https://utsynergyjournal.org/2020/11/29/does-daoism-sanction-a-political-philosophy-such-as-anarchical-individualism/, this card has quotes from Daoist texts, those were translated by the author not me, r0w@n

However, Laozi does not necessarily advocate doing nothing, but as Li indicates, Laozi strongly advocates acting in accordance with the Dao.[12] Therefore, wuwei advocates action that does not violate the Dao. While this is somewhat vague, one can politically contextualize this to refer to Deng’s hexie shehui or ‘social harmony’. “Things that are hard and rigid are the companions of death, things that are subtle and soft are the companions of life” [13] In this quote Laozi espouses a subtle approach to societal change, which was Deng’s philosophy on how to help China transition from its Maoist past. This policy of economic gradualism can be contrasted with the legalist approach taken in the aftermath of the USSR. While Deng sought to slowly move China into the wider free-market system without disrupting the social order, the post-USSR state sought to engage in an approach of ‘economic shock therapy’.[14] In other words, a gradual approach to transition under Deng seemed to be more in tune with the Daoist proposition that one must only act under the pretext that the Dao, or social harmony is protected. While I recognize that this is only one way to contextualize the Dao, it does paint an interesting picture of Daoist influences on modern China. However, even Daoism as an expression of capitalist individualism is not an inscrutable theory. Zhuangzi often espouses the idea that a proper follower of the Dao will lose himself in pursuit of the Dao.[15] In other words, this is a contradiction to the laissez-faire economics of capitalist philosophy that believes ‘to get rich is glorious’. The apparent contradiction in Daoist belief between self-cultivation and the pursuit of the Dao also manifests in different political ideologies. If one believes in the divine right of a ruler, would it not follow that the ruler’s subject would entrust the ruler to act in accordance with the Dao? Subsequently, the subject would then forgo his individual self-cultivation in favour of the pursuit of the Dao, which in the political sphere would involve forgoing individual freedom.[16] Our identities and our capitalist pursuits in the marketplace are based on a sense of self that has free will and self-determination. If we do not have a sense of self, and thus have no ideals of self-determination, then it might follow that we also have no profound right to govern as we so wish to. Ultimately, Daoism also does propagate against striving for anything, which is a slight issue when it is compared with capitalism. A subsequent thought that stands as an issue when thinking of Deng’s economic capitalism in accordance with Daoism is the subsequent environmental degradation that has been paramount across the Chinese economy. Daoist imagery often has its basis in streams, forests, and rivers that have been ravaged by the capitalist economic machine. Market capitalism is thought to put human ambition above the natural elements, which is not something Daoist thinkers would be inclined to support. To go along with the theme above, the state must act while simultaneously not violating the Dao. Oftentimes, it has been reported that the Chinese state model has been complicit in environmental degradation in order to maximize the success of state-owned enterprises in the free market. If the Dao is natural, then should one not maintain that the state should act against a collective human ambition that messes with the natural order of the environment? The ambition-driven individualist often finds himself at odds with the natural order of the Dao. In many ways, nefarious activities have given rise to a disruption in the natural order, leading to ecological calamities such as the melting of the polar ice caps and mass floods on a global scale. Considering Daoism warned against striving ambition when it contradicts the Dao, it appears as though it also warned against Deng’s economic model that led to these environmental outcomes.

#### Capitalism needs some good Daoist values

Schönfeld and Chen 19, Martin Schönfeld, and Xia Chen, Daoism and the Project of an Ecological Civilization or Shengtai Wenming 生态文明, religions, 9/20/19, DOA: 9/11/21, I have a pdf if u need it, r0w@n

There is a pattern of energy-flows, a way of how nature proceeds. The Daoist sage (shengren 聖 人) knows how to abide by this pattern and ‘go with the flow’. In the Daodejing 道德經, this idea is expressed in the demand “to be the stream of the universe” (c. 28), for “the universe is sacred; you cannot improve it” (c. 29).26 The reason is a pragmatic concern, motivated by self-interest: “what goes against the Dao comes to an early end” (c. 30).27 Seen in this way, the climate emergency is the outcome of not following the Dao. Instead of going with nature’s flow, humanity went against it and now risks coming to an early end in the hothouse fate. The sixth mass extinction is yet another consequence of going against the Dao, and it is also symptomatic of humanity dismissing Daoist values. Central to Daoist values is the rejection of destructiveness, domination, and competition. The Daodejing counsels, “Achieve results, but not through violence” (c. 30).28 The Daoist cherishes three core values or ‘treasures’ (san bao 三寶); they are mercy (ci 慈), frugality (jian 儉), and humility (hou 後; c. 67). The environmental crisis is the effect of disregarding these treasures: instead of mercy, civilization proceeds with a lack of empathy; instead of frugality, civilization embraces capitalism; and instead of humility, civilization indulges in hubris. Doing violence to nature shows a lack of wisdom. The Daodejing warns: “When humans lack a sense of awe, there will be disaster” (c. 72).29 Unlike religions whose practitioners indulge in climate skepticism, as the powerful Evangelical Protestant pluralities in USA, Australia, and Brazil, there is no place in Daoism for such indulgencies. Its teachings already contain explicit warnings of the new realities. Furthermore, its holy scriptures need no interpretive retrofit. Without need for exegetical modification, they can serve as spiritual framework for the challenges of the Anthropocene. Unlike Evangelicals, Daoists can simply say, we told you so. Next to the subordination of culture to nature and the precept of following the Dao, there is a third motif, which could be called ‘soft anthropocentrism’. As we have seen, the proper place of humanity is its harmonious integration in nature. Instead of dominating nature, civilization ought to aspire to a cultural paradigm of mercy, frugality, and humility. And yet, humans occupy a special place in the universe. The Classic of the Great Peace or Taipingjing 太平经, a collection of Daoist scriptures from the Han dynasty, has this to say about humans:

#### The alternative is wu-wei- a deferential act of habit forming

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

The compilers of the Daodejing seek rather explicitly to develop a contrast between the glimpses of insight this text strives to impart, and the substance of other philosophical doctrines. Many if not most doctrines evolve with their antecedents in an elaborate genealogy of values and ideas. These philosophical doctrines are often hierarchically structured by precepts and governing principles, and they may well require an extended course of study for their mastery and transmission. The precepts that inform these “doctrines” are professionalized by their learned “doctors,” and within their marble academies these erudites—for appropriate status and recompense— are only too glad to amaze the hoi poloi with the ashing dexterity of their philosophic thrusts and parries. What the Daodejing has to offer, on the other hand, is much simpler. It encourages the cultivation of a disposition that is captured in what we have chosen to call its wu-forms. The wu-forms free up the energy required to sustain the abstract cognitive and moral sensibilities of technical philosophy, allowing this energy, now unmediated by concepts, theories, and contrived moral precepts, to be expressed as those concrete feelings that inspire the ordinary business of the day. It is through these concrete feelings that one is able to know the world and to optimize the human experience. The abstraction of the concrete ethical dimension of such felt knowing into a formal moralist vocabulary is rehearsed in chapter 38 of the Daodejing: Thus, only when we have lost sight of way-making is there excellence, Only when we have lost sight of excellence is there authoritative conduct, Only when we have lost sight of authoritative conduct is there appropriateness, And only when we have lost sight of appropriateness is there ritual propriety. As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received 

### Shell- RTS LARP

#### Welcome to the age of acceleration. Crises of reification are tearing apart the way we experience and our present theories aren’t gonna save us. Only Daoism can defeat the cycle

Wenning, Mario (2011), "Daoism as Critical Theory", Comparative Philosophy, ,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy. Accessed on July 15, 2021. r0w@n

Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs, motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. In the process of increasingly understanding intersubjective-, self- and world-relationships primarily from the perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities, individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human beings.12 The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.13 Originally reification referred to the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a critique of the reification/distortion of communication,14 the reification of relationships of intersubjective recognition,15 the reification of gender roles16 or the 12 Karl Marx (1973, 108-111). 13 See for example Axel Honneth, (2005). 14 Jürgen Habermas (1984). 15 Axel Honneth (1996). 57 Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011) WENNING reification of conceptions of the self,17 what is being criticized are relationships primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice. Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective pathologies of communication and reification.18 People in late modern societies do not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘ (Entzauberung). In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and customs have lost their power in orienting lives. Finally, **the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration** (Beschleunigung) in which, as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during classical and high modernity, **late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational speed of change** in which **the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change within a lifetime.** In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.19 This acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of life, practices and sets of convictions. All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While the psychological impact of **reification leads to systematic forms** of forced inclusion or exclusion, **of being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities**, and the process of disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in, or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies. . However distinct these pathologies might appear, it is crucial to notice that there is a close linkage between these three briefly outlined pathological tendencies of modern societies. Not only are reification, disenchantment and acceleration historically connected, they also imply each other on a conceptual level. Reification consists in seeing the world primarily from the vantage point of being a means or a toolbox from which means can be utilized in order to bring about a desired end. In this objectifying process, the end justifies the variable means and is the only factor taken to be intrinsically valuable. This end, then, is understood as not presently realized but as a future possibility the reality of which depends on the implementation of one's plan of action. Bernard Williams, the eminent British moral philosopher, stresses this point by arguing that without projecting an aim into the future, life would become meaningless. He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful, but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is not futural anymore. By presupposing such a restricted conception of projective action as the reason for living, the present environment an actor navigates in is transformed into pure immanence in which prediction becomes possible to the point of resembling an analytic judgment: assuming that we know what we want, and if we can do what we want while nobody keeps us from doing it, what we want will become realized. Novelty is being reduced to the discovery of new implications of what has already been familiar. Effort is generated once we see the end of our action as external to our spontaneously generated attachments. It grows out of the attempt to realize the stipulated end in ever more innovative, efficient and predictable ways in which spontaneity is, at best, forced towards a goal. The goal at which effort is directed often drops out of focus during the acceleration process or it loses its appeal. It seems external to the actor who has been trapped in a means-ends apparatus. This rationalization process increasingly becomes independent from the specificity of ends pursued and impossible to get out of. With every rationalized act the actor moves deeper into the quicksand of a world of suppressed spontaneity. The consequence of this seemingly autonomous rationalization process famously described by Weber as an ―iron cage‖ is that the present is being downgraded as insignificant on its own terms when compared to the future gains one promises oneself as the payoff of one's actions. Processes of innovation become the norm and speed up because actors hope to do and achieve ever more goals in increasingly shorter segments of emptied time. Actors rush to a future, which can in principle never be actualized. Paul Virillio fittingly describes this blind acceleration process of chasing structurally elusive future goals in increasingly higher speeds of innovation adequately as a ―rushing standstill‖. From within the ―iron cage‖ of modernity true innovation, which would have to be different from mere acceleration or enhancement and would require deliberating about alternative present ends, seems increasingly impossible.21 The new is transfigured into the only variable that is to be expected. Instrumental action as the reified forgetfulness of the meaning resources of the present for the sake of the projected future thus seems without alternative. The consequence is what Hermann Lübbe refers to as a ‗Gegenwartsschrumpfung‘, a continuing shrinking of the present under the complimentary pressures of the tendencies of melancholic musealization of irretrievably lost pasts and forced innovation to run after structurally elusive futures.22 The dilemma with which critical theorists see themselves confronted is that whatever emancipatory tendencies – be they introduced as forms of resistance, mutual understanding, recognition etc. – are being proposed as means for a future end, instrumental action is reenacted under a normative guise and the domination of the future over the rest of time is thus further sedimented. As soon as instrumental actors propose or just point to emancipatory forms of action, they replicate and reenact the same temporal logic that it originally diagnosed as the problem of modernity, i.e., the belief that the future can be mastered through acts of projective planning. The problem of this projective planning mentality is not that things often turn out differently than planned, but that the actor sidesteps and thereby undermines the significance of the present and sees it simply as something to be used for future ends. In other words, by downgrading the present including its modes of action to being "for the sake of the future," critical theory denigrates the present to the status of a prefuture, a state of emptiness that is used as a resource rather than lived in. A theory exposing and explaining social pathologies is keen on pointing to the inescapable mechanisms preventing the emancipatory use of reason through action. Such an exclusive focus on the diagnosis and emergence of pathologies coincides with developing an ethics of melancholy that emphasizes the inescapable specter of instrumental reason. Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake of histories of catastrophes.23 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present - corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present - leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to justify themselves with respect to the past. This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First, however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as another critical theory. In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of the future.

#### The world is constantly changing, flowing, and becoming – action is only coherent in the specific circumstances of the present

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

We begin our argument for translating Daodejing as “Making This Life Signicant” from Daoist cosmology. Taking a closer look at the interpretation of both the title and the content of the Daodejing as “The Classic of This Focus (de ) and Its Field (dao ),” we might first ask what does the expression “this focus” mean? The Daoist correlative cosmology begins from the assumption that the endless stream of always novel yet still continuous situations we encounter are real, and hence, that there is ontological parity among the things and events that constitute our lives. As a parody on Parmenides, who claimed that “only Being is,” we might say that for the Daoist, “only beings are,” or taking one step further in underscoring the reality of the process of change itself, “only becomings are.” That is, the Daoist does not posit the existence of some permanent reality behind appearances, some unchanging substratum, some essential denying aspect behind the accidents of change. Rather, there is just the ceaseless and usually cadenced flow of experience. In fact, the absence of the “One behind the many” metaphysics makes our uncritical use of the philosophic term “cosmology” to characterize Daoism, at least in the familiar classical Greek sense of this word, highly problematic. In early Greek philosophy, the term “kosmos” connotes a clustered range of meanings, including arche (originative, material, and efficient cause/ultimate undemonstrable principle), logos (underlying organizational principle), theoria (contemplation), nomos (law), theios (divinity), nous (intelligibility). In combination, this cluster of terms conjures forth some notion of a single-ordered Divine3 universe governed by natural and moral laws that are ultimately intelligible to the human mind. This “kosmos” terminology is culturally specfiic, and if applied uncritically to discuss the classical Daoist worldview, introduces a cultural reductionism that elides and thus conceals truly significant differences. The Daoist understanding of “cosmos” as the “ten thousand things” means that, in effect, the Daoists have no concept of cosmos at all insofar as that notion entails a coherent, single-ordered world which is in any sense enclosed or denied. The Daoists are, therefore, primarily, “acosmotic” thinkers.

#### Labor is unfulfilling and temporal- the only solution is Daoist deferential politics

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

“Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received  methods, stipulated concepts and categories, commandments, principles, laws of nature, conventions—all of these prejudices require us to intervene and “welcome things as they come and escort them as they go,” resulting in what Steve Goldberg has described as “a hardening of the categories.” Having stored past experience and organized it in terms of fixed standards or principles, we then recall, anticipate, and participate in a world patterned by these discriminations. Sages, however, mirror the world, and “neither see things off nor go out to meet them.” As such, they “respond to everything without storing anything up.” They mirror the world at each moment in a way that is undetermined by the shape of a world that has passed away, or by anticipations of a world yet to come. As the Daodejing asks in chapter 10: In scrubbing and cleansing your profound mirror Are you able to rid it of all imperfections? In loving the common people and breathing life into the state, Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? With nature’s gates swinging open and closed Are you able to remain the female? With your insight penetrating the four quarters Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? The Daoist project is neither passive nor quietistic. Water is the source of nourishment; the mirror is a source of light; the heart-and- mind is a source of transformative energy. To “know” as the mirror “knows” is not reduplicative, but is to cast the world in a certain light. Such performative “knowing” is for one to actively interpret and realize a world with healthy, productive effect. These metaphors for xin entail a presentation rather than a representation, a coordination rather than a correspondence. “Mirroring” then is best seen as synergistic and responsive, where all of the elements are in the stream and constitute a fluid interdependent continuity. Perhaps the best rendering of the term wuyu is “objectless desire.” Since neither noncoercive action nor unprincipled knowing can in the strict sense objectify a world or any element in it—that is, make discrete and independent objects out of one’s environing experience—the desiring associated with the Daoist sensibility is in the strictest sense “objectless.” The “enjoyments” associated with wuyu are possible without the need to dene, possess, or control the occasion of one’s enjoyment. Thus, wuyu, rather than involving the cessation and absence of desire, represents the achievement of deferential desire. Desire, based upon a noncoercive relationship (wuwei) with the world and a “mirroring” understanding (wuzhi) of it, is shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to consume, but by the desire simply to celebrate and to enjoy. It is deference. Desire is directed at those things desirable because they stand to be desired. But those things which stand to be desired must themselves be deferential, which means that they cannot demand to be desired. For to demand to be desired is to exercise a kind of mesmerizing control over the desirer. In a world of events and processes in which discriminations are recognized as conventional and transient, desire is predicated upon one’s ability at any given moment to “let go.” It is in this sense that wuyu is a nonconstruing, objectless, desire. The Daoist problem with desire does not concern what is desired, but rather the manner of the desiring. Enjoyment for the Daoist is realized not in spite of the fact that one might lose what is desired, but because of this fact. The world is a complex set of transformative processes, never at rest. Wuhua , the metamorphosis of things (and not to be confused with the wu- forms), means that we can never pretend that what we seek to hold on to has any permanent status. In Daoism, transient desire is the only desire that lets things be, that does not construe the world in a certain manner, that does not seek to apply the brakes on a world of changing things. The key to an understanding of wuyu—indeed of all these wu- forms that comprise the Daoist disposition—lies in the contrast between “objects” and “objectivity.” Using Western epistemological terms, the thoughts about the world expressed in both the Zhuangzi and the Daodejing represent what we might call a realist perspective.22 Beyond the mediating confusions introduced by language, and by layers of our own distorted perceptions and tendentious categorizations, there is nevertheless, with properly Daoist qualifications, an “objectively” real world. Our task is to experience that world as “objectively” as possible. From the Daoist perspective, the problem begins when we insist that the “objective world” is a world made up of objects—namely, concrete, unchangeable things that we encounter as over against and independent of us; things which announce themselves to us by asserting “I object!” For the Daoist, the objective world cannot be objective in this sense because it is a constantly transforming flow of events or processes that belie the sorts of discriminations that would permit a final inventory of the furniture of the world. Paradoxically, for the Daoist the objective world is objectless. Sages envision a world of changing events that they can, for whatever reason, choose to freeze momentarily into a distinct pattern of discrimination, but that they recognize, when they see clearly, as being beyond such distinctions. For the Daoist, the consequence of this transformed vision is that knowing, acting, and desiring in the world are no longer based upon construal. Feeling ourselves in tension with objectified others can lead us to act in an aggressive or defensive manner in order to effect our will. Principles and fixed standards can lead us to construe the object of our knowledge by recourse to such principles. In this way, an item becomes one of a kind (rather than one-of-a-kind) or an instrument for the achievement of an end (as opposed to an end in itself). Desire motivated by an object of desire leads us to seek possession of that which is desired, allowing it significance only insofar as it meets our needs. A self that is consumed by objects of desire narrows, truncates, and obfuscates the world as it is. On the other hand, noncoercive action, unprincipled knowing, and objectless desire have the following in common: To the extent that a disposition defined in these terms is eficacious, it enriches the world by allowing the process to unfold spontaneously on its own terms, while at the same time participating fully in it. We may say that the implementation of the wu-forms allows us to leave the world as it is. But we may make this claim only if we recognize that “world” in this context means a myriad of spontaneous transactions that are characterized by emerging patterns of deference to acknowledged excellences. In Daoism the self is forgotten to the extent that discriminated objects no longer constitute the environs of the self. These three wu-forms—wuwei, wuzhi, wuyu—all provide a way of entertaining, of deferring to, and of investing oneself in an objectless world. Thus, in their governing of the people the sages are concerned with embodying and promoting the sort of acting, knowing, and desiring that does not depend upon objects. In fact, when these wu-forms are understood as the optimum dispositions of the Daoist self, whether in the person of the sage or the people, they provide us with a way of interpreting passages in the Daodejing that are frequently construed unsympathetically as recommending imposition and control. Chapter 3 is an example: Not promoting those of superior character Will save the common people from becoming contentious. Not prizing property that is hard to come by Will save them from becoming thieves. Not making a show of what might be desired Will save them from becoming disgruntled. It is for this reason that in the proper governing by the sages: They empty the hearts-and-minds of the people and ll their stomachs, They weaken their aspirations and strengthen their bones, Ever teaching the common people to be unprincipled in their knowing And objectless in their desires. They keep the hawkers of knowledge at bay. It is simply in doing things noncoercively That everything is governed properly. But the wu-forms are not just wuwei,

#### The 1AC’s constant run from death saps the ability to find meaning in life

Laozi, Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean! \*NOTE: I partially cite one of the original poems of the Daodejing here, written by Laozi. The translation and commentary is by Ames and Hall\*

Death is real and, wherever there is life, it is not far away. However, to separate death out from the life experience and inveigh against it as something to be avoided at all costs prevents us from appreciating the fragility and preciousness of life that is made possible by this same delicious temporality. Life is made meaningful by death. Death as natural closure punctuates a most particular event in the ongoing transformation of things. Properly understood, a healthy death can be lived well and can enhance the lives of all involved; misunderstood, a resentful death can sour life and become a focus of dread and loathing that robs everyone, especially those left to carry on, of their life energy. The Zhuangzi as a sustained reflection on the relationship between life and death provides many insightful anecdotes that take us beyond grief and suffering. For example: Not long thereafter, Ziyu fell ill, and Zisi went to ask after him. “Extraordinary!” said Ziyu. “The transformer of things continues to make me all gnarly and bent. He hunches me up so badly that my vital organs are above my head while my chin is buried in my belly button. My shoulders are higher than my crown, and my hunchback back points to the heavens. Something has really gone haywire with the yin and yang vapors!” ... “Do you resent this?” asked Zisi. “Indeed no,” replied Ziyu. “What’s to resent? If in the course of things it transforms my left arm into a cock, I’ll use it to tell the time of day. If it goes on to transform my right arm into a crossbow bolt, I’ll use it to shoot me an owl for roasting. If it then transforms my buttocks into wheels and my spirit into a horse, I will ride about on them without need of further transportation.... What’s to resent?”152 Zhuangzi’s conception of life and death is commonsensical. Empirically we know nothing of permanence and annihilation. In fact, all we know of experience is persistence within change. It is on this basis that the Zhuangzi concludes: “Once we take the heavens and earth to be a giant forge and transformation to be the great ironsmith, wherever I go is just fine. Relaxed I nod off and happily I awake.”153

#### Rationalism blinds us to specific circumstances, to the flow of the universe, to the people, to any policy options outside of the standard- Wu-Wei k2 eliminating the restraints

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Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously upon the ways in which we relate to each other and the world. The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict

#### Socialism fails if we can’t change the fundamental disconnect between people- Daoism is the only system that does that-

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87

#### The alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, making the law integrative, contemplative, and reconsiderate of the Western paradigm

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. 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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91 When people live in balance, they accord with universal principles and experience physical, spiritual, and mental health. People will also recognize disease is a sign of imbalance and a call for adjusting a person’s consciousness. This natural health and individual responsibility will greatly reduce the need for tertiary social welfare norms. This basic change, of course, goes deeper than general legal norms. It calls for a reconsideration of the modern Western paradigm based on material separation (e.g., Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, Freudian psychology, and Weberian sociology). As already noted, Daoism shows that the explicit separation is only for an implicit connection and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. 92 At the same time, this change in consciousness calls for a return to a holistic sense, as America’s founders understood, of people and the world as inherently good (the divine essence itself). This lucidity will resolve many disputes within academic fields and between science and religious forums. It will bring the various strands of thinking back under a single roof. In this respect, Daoism is a complete account of reality. 93 91 See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 2, citing the 200 C.E. Huangdi Neijing. 92 Quantum physics certainly challenges the traditional order, and some notable physicists have already argued an approach similar to Daoism. See, e.g., DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980). See also, DAVID BOHM,ON CREATIVITY 104 (1996) (calling for a new mathematics that calls attention to a whole movement and to particular things only in some secondary function). 93 It’s not that this grand unified theory can be proven rationally, as Daoism holds, it can only be shown that it could be no other way. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 21 At some point, this change in consciousness is inevitable—as Daoism illustrates, the present situation is unsustainable. Conflict has served its purpose: disharmony is necessary for the experience of harmony and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. As described in Part III, however, the current economic conflict is dysfunctional, and the cultural and social welfare strife crippling.94 Throughout history, a conflicted society has always had to evolve or it would collapse;95 and, again, neither the law nor any other social norm could do anything about it. Many of America’s late 18th century constitutionalists understood that the conflict between liberalism and republicanism was inimical to democracy and a natural happiness. As Daoism also notes, this question is not a philosophical issue, it is a metaphysical point. Daoism demonstrates the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When the implicit connection and explicit separation come together in harmony, a person may experience Oneness and ultimately the Dao.96 This ancient wisdom is simple but profound. In the modern era, thinkers must work to understand its implications. 97 There is much to do within current fields like physics, health, and divinity. In typical 94 Externalities are much greater than most people recognize, and include things like routine pollution, war and cancer. 95 Feudalism, for example, either transitioned to a balanced homesteading (something akin to early America) or collapsed (like what happened in Russia). 96 Professor Wang also noted this point. See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 223 (describing how “[t]he whole emergent regularity is more than the sum of its parts”). 97 For the many nuances of just the Yin and Yang, see Professor Wang’s book. WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 22 Daoist fashion, this Eastern understanding calls for a Western pragmatism.98 In such a harmoniousstate may lie the solution to the world’s present challenges.

#### The alternative creates a balanced state that solves your aff and everything else

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### Shell- RTS LARP v2

#### Welcome to the age of acceleration. Crises of reification are tearing apart the way we experience and our present theories aren’t gonna save us. The role of the ballot is defeating these reifications

Wenning, Mario (2011), "Daoism as Critical Theory", Comparative Philosophy, ,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy. Accessed on July 15, 2021. r0w@n

Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs, motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. In the process of increasingly understanding intersubjective-, self- and world-relationships primarily from the perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities, individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human beings.12 The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.13 Originally reification referred to the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a critique of the reification/distortion of communication,14 the reification of relationships of intersubjective recognition,15 the reification of gender roles16 or the 12 Karl Marx (1973, 108-111). 13 See for example Axel Honneth, (2005). 14 Jürgen Habermas (1984). 15 Axel Honneth (1996). 57 Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011) WENNING reification of conceptions of the self,17 what is being criticized are relationships primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice. Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective pathologies of communication and reification.18 People in late modern societies do not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘ (Entzauberung). In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and customs have lost their power in orienting lives. Finally, **the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration** (Beschleunigung) in which, as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during classical and high modernity, **late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational speed of change** in which **the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change within a lifetime.** In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.19 This acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of life, practices and sets of convictions. All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While the psychological impact of **reification leads to systematic forms** of forced inclusion or exclusion, **of being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities**, and the process of disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in, or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies. . However distinct these pathologies might appear, it is crucial to notice that there is a close linkage between these three briefly outlined pathological tendencies of modern societies. Not only are reification, disenchantment and acceleration historically connected, they also imply each other on a conceptual level. Reification consists in seeing the world primarily from the vantage point of being a means or a toolbox from which means can be utilized in order to bring about a desired end. In this objectifying process, the end justifies the variable means and is the only factor taken to be intrinsically valuable. This end, then, is understood as not presently realized but as a future possibility the reality of which depends on the implementation of one's plan of action. Bernard Williams, the eminent British moral philosopher, stresses this point by arguing that without projecting an aim into the future, life would become meaningless. He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful, but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is not futural anymore. By presupposing such a restricted conception of projective action as the reason for living, the present environment an actor navigates in is transformed into pure immanence in which prediction becomes possible to the point of resembling an analytic judgment: assuming that we know what we want, and if we can do what we want while nobody keeps us from doing it, what we want will become realized. Novelty is being reduced to the discovery of new implications of what has already been familiar. Effort is generated once we see the end of our action as external to our spontaneously generated attachments. It grows out of the attempt to realize the stipulated end in ever more innovative, efficient and predictable ways in which spontaneity is, at best, forced towards a goal. The goal at which effort is directed often drops out of focus during the acceleration process or it loses its appeal. It seems external to the actor who has been trapped in a means-ends apparatus. This rationalization process increasingly becomes independent from the specificity of ends pursued and impossible to get out of. With every rationalized act the actor moves deeper into the quicksand of a world of suppressed spontaneity. The consequence of this seemingly autonomous rationalization process famously described by Weber as an ―iron cage‖ is that the present is being downgraded as insignificant on its own terms when compared to the future gains one promises oneself as the payoff of one's actions. Processes of innovation become the norm and speed up because actors hope to do and achieve ever more goals in increasingly shorter segments of emptied time. Actors rush to a future, which can in principle never be actualized. Paul Virillio fittingly describes this blind acceleration process of chasing structurally elusive future goals in increasingly higher speeds of innovation adequately as a ―rushing standstill‖. From within the ―iron cage‖ of modernity true innovation, which would have to be different from mere acceleration or enhancement and would require deliberating about alternative present ends, seems increasingly impossible.21 The new is transfigured into the only variable that is to be expected. Instrumental action as the reified forgetfulness of the meaning resources of the present for the sake of the projected future thus seems without alternative. The consequence is what Hermann Lübbe refers to as a ‗Gegenwartsschrumpfung‘, a continuing shrinking of the present under the complimentary pressures of the tendencies of melancholic musealization of irretrievably lost pasts and forced innovation to run after structurally elusive futures.22 The dilemma with which critical theorists see themselves confronted is that whatever emancipatory tendencies – be they introduced as forms of resistance, mutual understanding, recognition etc. – are being proposed as means for a future end, instrumental action is reenacted under a normative guise and the domination of the future over the rest of time is thus further sedimented. As soon as instrumental actors propose or just point to emancipatory forms of action, they replicate and reenact the same temporal logic that it originally diagnosed as the problem of modernity, i.e., the belief that the future can be mastered through acts of projective planning. The problem of this projective planning mentality is not that things often turn out differently than planned, but that the actor sidesteps and thereby undermines the significance of the present and sees it simply as something to be used for future ends. In other words, by downgrading the present including its modes of action to being "for the sake of the future," critical theory denigrates the present to the status of a prefuture, a state of emptiness that is used as a resource rather than lived in. A theory exposing and explaining social pathologies is keen on pointing to the inescapable mechanisms preventing the emancipatory use of reason through action. Such an exclusive focus on the diagnosis and emergence of pathologies coincides with developing an ethics of melancholy that emphasizes the inescapable specter of instrumental reason. Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake of histories of catastrophes.23 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present - corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present - leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to justify themselves with respect to the past. This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First, however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as another critical theory. In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of the future.

#### The 1AC is just another site of the temporal reification of labor- we keep working but never get any happier as our labor exists as a function of production where we never win

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

“Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received  methods, stipulated concepts and categories, commandments, principles, laws of nature, conventions—all of these prejudices require us to intervene and “welcome things as they come and escort them as they go,” resulting in what Steve Goldberg has described as “a hardening of the categories.” Having stored past experience and organized it in terms of fixed standards or principles, we then recall, anticipate, and participate in a world patterned by these discriminations. Sages, however, mirror the world, and “neither see things off nor go out to meet them.” As such, they “respond to everything without storing anything up.” They mirror the world at each moment in a way that is undetermined by the shape of a world that has passed away, or by anticipations of a world yet to come. As the Daodejing asks in chapter 10: In scrubbing and cleansing your profound mirror Are you able to rid it of all imperfections? In loving the common people and breathing life into the state, Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? With nature’s gates swinging open and closed Are you able to remain the female? With your insight penetrating the four quarters Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? The Daoist project is neither passive nor quietistic. Water is the source of nourishment; the mirror is a source of light; the heart-and- mind is a source of transformative energy. To “know” as the mirror “knows” is not reduplicative, but is to cast the world in a certain light. Such performative “knowing” is for one to actively interpret and realize a world with healthy, productive effect. These metaphors for xin entail a presentation rather than a representation, a coordination rather than a correspondence. “Mirroring” then is best seen as synergistic and responsive, where all of the elements are in the stream and constitute a fluid interdependent continuity. Perhaps the best rendering of the term wuyu is “objectless desire.” Since neither noncoercive action nor unprincipled knowing can in the strict sense objectify a world or any element in it—that is, make discrete and independent objects out of one’s environing experience—the desiring associated with the Daoist sensibility is in the strictest sense “objectless.” The “enjoyments” associated with wuyu are possible without the need to dene, possess, or control the occasion of one’s enjoyment. Thus, wuyu, rather than involving the cessation and absence of desire, represents the achievement of deferential desire. Desire, based upon a noncoercive relationship (wuwei) with the world and a “mirroring” understanding (wuzhi) of it, is shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to consume, but by the desire simply to celebrate and to enjoy. It is deference. Desire is directed at those things desirable because they stand to be desired. But those things which stand to be desired must themselves be deferential, which means that they cannot demand to be desired. For to demand to be desired is to exercise a kind of mesmerizing control over the desirer. In a world of events and processes in which discriminations are recognized as conventional and transient, desire is predicated upon one’s ability at any given moment to “let go.” It is in this sense that wuyu is a nonconstruing, objectless, desire. The Daoist problem with desire does not concern what is desired, but rather the manner of the desiring. Enjoyment for the Daoist is realized not in spite of the fact that one might lose what is desired, but because of this fact. The world is a complex set of transformative processes, never at rest. Wuhua , the metamorphosis of things (and not to be confused with the wu- forms), means that we can never pretend that what we seek to hold on to has any permanent status. In Daoism, transient desire is the only desire that lets things be, that does not construe the world in a certain manner, that does not seek to apply the brakes on a world of changing things. The key to an understanding of wuyu—indeed of all these wu- forms that comprise the Daoist disposition—lies in the contrast between “objects” and “objectivity.” Using Western epistemological terms, the thoughts about the world expressed in both the Zhuangzi and the Daodejing represent what we might call a realist perspective.22 Beyond the mediating confusions introduced by language, and by layers of our own distorted perceptions and tendentious categorizations, there is nevertheless, with properly Daoist qualifications, an “objectively” real world. Our task is to experience that world as “objectively” as possible. From the Daoist perspective, the problem begins when we insist that the “objective world” is a world made up of objects—namely, concrete, unchangeable things that we encounter as over against and independent of us; things which announce themselves to us by asserting “I object!” For the Daoist, the objective world cannot be objective in this sense because it is a constantly transforming flow of events or processes that belie the sorts of discriminations that would permit a final inventory of the furniture of the world. Paradoxically, for the Daoist the objective world is objectless. Sages envision a world of changing events that they can, for whatever reason, choose to freeze momentarily into a distinct pattern of discrimination, but that they recognize, when they see clearly, as being beyond such distinctions. For the Daoist, the consequence of this transformed vision is that knowing, acting, and desiring in the world are no longer based upon construal. Feeling ourselves in tension with objectified others can lead us to act in an aggressive or defensive manner in order to effect our will. Principles and fixed standards can lead us to construe the object of our knowledge by recourse to such principles. In this way, an item becomes one of a kind (rather than one-of-a-kind) or an instrument for the achievement of an end (as opposed to an end in itself). Desire motivated by an object of desire leads us to seek possession of that which is desired, allowing it significance only insofar as it meets our needs. A self that is consumed by objects of desire narrows, truncates, and obfuscates the world as it is. On the other hand, noncoercive action, unprincipled knowing, and objectless desire have the following in common: To the extent that a disposition defined in these terms is eficacious, it enriches the world by allowing the process to unfold spontaneously on its own terms, while at the same time participating fully in it. We may say that the implementation of the wu-forms allows us to leave the world as it is. But we may make this claim only if we recognize that “world” in this context means a myriad of spontaneous transactions that are characterized by emerging patterns of deference to acknowledged excellences. In Daoism the self is forgotten to the extent that discriminated objects no longer constitute the environs of the self. These three wu-forms—wuwei, wuzhi, wuyu—all provide a way of entertaining, of deferring to, and of investing oneself in an objectless world. Thus, in their governing of the people the sages are concerned with embodying and promoting the sort of acting, knowing, and desiring that does not depend upon objects. In fact, when these wu-forms are understood as the optimum dispositions of the Daoist self, whether in the person of the sage or the people, they provide us with a way of interpreting passages in the Daodejing that are frequently construed unsympathetically as recommending imposition and control. Chapter 3 is an example: Not promoting those of superior character Will save the common people from becoming contentious. Not prizing property that is hard to come by Will save them from becoming thieves. Not making a show of what might be desired Will save them from becoming disgruntled. It is for this reason that in the proper governing by the sages: They empty the hearts-and-minds of the people and ll their stomachs, They weaken their aspirations and strengthen their bones, Ever teaching the common people to be unprincipled in their knowing And objectless in their desires. They keep the hawkers of knowledge at bay. It is simply in doing things noncoercively That everything is governed properly. But the wu-forms are not just wuwei,

#### The 1AC’s constant run from death saps the ability to find meaning in life

Laozi, Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean! \*NOTE: I partially cite one of the original poems of the Daodejing here, written by Laozi. The translation and commentary is by Ames and Hall\*

Death is real and, wherever there is life, it is not far away. However, to separate death out from the life experience and inveigh against it as something to be avoided at all costs prevents us from appreciating the fragility and preciousness of life that is made possible by this same delicious temporality. Life is made meaningful by death. Death as natural closure punctuates a most particular event in the ongoing transformation of things. Properly understood, a healthy death can be lived well and can enhance the lives of all involved; misunderstood, a resentful death can sour life and become a focus of dread and loathing that robs everyone, especially those left to carry on, of their life energy. The Zhuangzi as a sustained reflection on the relationship between life and death provides many insightful anecdotes that take us beyond grief and suffering. For example: Not long thereafter, Ziyu fell ill, and Zisi went to ask after him. “Extraordinary!” said Ziyu. “The transformer of things continues to make me all gnarly and bent. He hunches me up so badly that my vital organs are above my head while my chin is buried in my belly button. My shoulders are higher than my crown, and my hunchback back points to the heavens. Something has really gone haywire with the yin and yang vapors!” ... “Do you resent this?” asked Zisi. “Indeed no,” replied Ziyu. “What’s to resent? If in the course of things it transforms my left arm into a cock, I’ll use it to tell the time of day. If it goes on to transform my right arm into a crossbow bolt, I’ll use it to shoot me an owl for roasting. If it then transforms my buttocks into wheels and my spirit into a horse, I will ride about on them without need of further transportation.... What’s to resent?”152 Zhuangzi’s conception of life and death is commonsensical. Empirically we know nothing of permanence and annihilation. In fact, all we know of experience is persistence within change. It is on this basis that the Zhuangzi concludes: “Once we take the heavens and earth to be a giant forge and transformation to be the great ironsmith, wherever I go is just fine. Relaxed I nod off and happily I awake.”153

#### Rationalism blinds us to specific circumstances, to the flow of the universe, to the people, to any policy options outside of the standard

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Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously upon the ways in which we relate to each other and the world. The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict

#### Socialism fails if we can’t change the fundamental disconnect between people

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. 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#### The alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, making the law integrative, contemplative, and reconsiderate of the Western paradigm

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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91 When people live in balance, they accord with universal principles and experience physical, spiritual, and mental health. People will also recognize disease is a sign of imbalance and a call for adjusting a person’s consciousness. This natural health and individual responsibility will greatly reduce the need for tertiary social welfare norms. This basic change, of course, goes deeper than general legal norms. It calls for a reconsideration of the modern Western paradigm based on material separation (e.g., Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, Freudian psychology, and Weberian sociology). As already noted, Daoism shows that the explicit separation is only for an implicit connection and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. 92 At the same time, this change in consciousness calls for a return to a holistic sense, as America’s founders understood, of people and the world as inherently good (the divine essence itself). This lucidity will resolve many disputes within academic fields and between science and religious forums. It will bring the various strands of thinking back under a single roof. In this respect, Daoism is a complete account of reality. 93 91 See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 2, citing the 200 C.E. Huangdi Neijing. 92 Quantum physics certainly challenges the traditional order, and some notable physicists have already argued an approach similar to Daoism. See, e.g., DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980). See also, DAVID BOHM,ON CREATIVITY 104 (1996) (calling for a new mathematics that calls attention to a whole movement and to particular things only in some secondary function). 93 It’s not that this grand unified theory can be proven rationally, as Daoism holds, it can only be shown that it could be no other way. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 21 At some point, this change in consciousness is inevitable—as Daoism illustrates, the present situation is unsustainable. Conflict has served its purpose: disharmony is necessary for the experience of harmony and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. As described in Part III, however, the current economic conflict is dysfunctional, and the cultural and social welfare strife crippling.94 Throughout history, a conflicted society has always had to evolve or it would collapse;95 and, again, neither the law nor any other social norm could do anything about it. Many of America’s late 18th century constitutionalists understood that the conflict between liberalism and republicanism was inimical to democracy and a natural happiness. As Daoism also notes, this question is not a philosophical issue, it is a metaphysical point. Daoism demonstrates the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When the implicit connection and explicit separation come together in harmony, a person may experience Oneness and ultimately the Dao.96 This ancient wisdom is simple but profound. In the modern era, thinkers must work to understand its implications. 97 There is much to do within current fields like physics, health, and divinity. In typical 94 Externalities are much greater than most people recognize, and include things like routine pollution, war and cancer. 95 Feudalism, for example, either transitioned to a balanced homesteading (something akin to early America) or collapsed (like what happened in Russia). 96 Professor Wang also noted this point. See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 223 (describing how “[t]he whole emergent regularity is more than the sum of its parts”). 97 For the many nuances of just the Yin and Yang, see Professor Wang’s book. WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 22 Daoist fashion, this Eastern understanding calls for a Western pragmatism.98 In such a harmoniousstate may lie the solution to the world’s present challenges.

#### The alternative creates a balanced state that solves your aff and everything else

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### Shell- RTS LARP v3

#### Welcome to the realm of desire. Society controls desires- forgetting these structures overwhelms the language barrier that makes all other reformation fail. Thus the role of the ballot is to overwhelm desire.

Hansen, Chad, 3, Daoism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 2-19-2003, DOA: 9-4-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/, r0w@n

With the importation of Indo-European Buddhism from India, wu-wei started to be interpreted via the Western conceptual apparatus contrasting desire or purpose and reason. This shaped the modern Chinese interpretation and probably undermined the ideal. It became the target of attack among “modern” Chinese who regarded Daoist “non-striving” or “purposelessness” as the source of Chinese passivity. The activist 19th century reformer, Kang You-wei (Kang have-wei) took the denial of the slogan as his scholarly name. 9.5 Pusimplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity) 樸 The Daoist “primitivist” ideal as expressed mainly in the Laozi. It metaphorically represents the result of forgetting mingnames and desires (See Wu-wei). Translations include simplicity, “raw” wood, and D. C. Lau’s more elaborate “uncarved block.” The detailed translation more sensitively expresses Laozi’s point in using the metaphor in the context of a view of names as “cutting” things into types and Laozi’s distinctive theory that such socially constructed distinctions (institutions) control us by controlling our desires. When societies adopt names or terms, it does so in order to instill and regulate desires for one of the pair created by the name-induced distinction. Thus Daoist forgetting requires forgetting names and distinctions, but in doing so, frees itself from the socially induced, unnatural desires that cause strife and unhappiness in society (e.g. status, rare objects, fame, authority). Hence: “The Nameless uncarved block thus amounts to freedom from desire.” (Daode Jing 37) 10. Texts and Textual History Questions of textual theory are the focus of the bulk of modern scholarship. They include these kinds of questions. Existence (did Laozi or Zhuangzi actually exist) Authorship (did they write the texts attributed to them?) Dating (when did they exist or write their texts?) Relations (did Laozi influence Zhuangzi?)

#### The aff’s conceptualization of the subject mentally distances us from the real world- this prevents them from acting with the confines of the environing particulars of the ten thousand things

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), r0w@n

Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously upon the ways in which we relate to each other and the world. The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict

#### The aff’s move towards justice lacks the re-evaluation of the relationality of desire and subjecthood that would enable real progress

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This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87

#### Thus the alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, making the law integrative, contemplative, and reconsiderate of the Western paradigm

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Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87 Opposite theories like formalism and realism as well as naturalism and positivism unite in a wise contemplation to restore the Dao. 88 Others have noted that a common vision of the “Good” reduces explicit laws and legal institutions. See, e.g., ROBERT MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 241-242 (1976). 89 The Daodejing stresses this natural way. See, e.g., TAO TE CHING, supra note 5, at 73 (ch. 17). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91 When people live in balance, they accord with universal principles and experience physical, spiritual, and mental health. People will also recognize disease is a sign of imbalance and a call for adjusting a person’s consciousness. This natural health and individual responsibility will greatly reduce the need for tertiary social welfare norms. This basic change, of course, goes deeper than general legal norms. It calls for a reconsideration of the modern Western paradigm based on material separation (e.g., Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, Freudian psychology, and Weberian sociology). As already noted, Daoism shows that the explicit separation is only for an implicit connection and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. 92 At the same time, this change in consciousness calls for a return to a holistic sense, as America’s founders understood, of people and the world as inherently good (the divine essence itself). This lucidity will resolve many disputes within academic fields and between science and religious forums. It will bring the various strands of thinking back under a single roof. In this respect, Daoism is a complete account of reality. 93 91 See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 2, citing the 200 C.E. Huangdi Neijing. 92 Quantum physics certainly challenges the traditional order, and some notable physicists have already argued an approach similar to Daoism. See, e.g., DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980). See also, DAVID BOHM,ON CREATIVITY 104 (1996) (calling for a new mathematics that calls attention to a whole movement and to particular things only in some secondary function). 93 It’s not that this grand unified theory can be proven rationally, as Daoism holds, it can only be shown that it could be no other way. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 21 At some point, this change in consciousness is inevitable—as Daoism illustrates, the present situation is unsustainable. Conflict has served its purpose: disharmony is necessary for the experience of harmony and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. As described in Part III, however, the current economic conflict is dysfunctional, and the cultural and social welfare strife crippling.94 Throughout history, a conflicted society has always had to evolve or it would collapse;95 and, again, neither the law nor any other social norm could do anything about it. Many of America’s late 18th century constitutionalists understood that the conflict between liberalism and republicanism was inimical to democracy and a natural happiness. As Daoism also notes, this question is not a philosophical issue, it is a metaphysical point. Daoism demonstrates the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When the implicit connection and explicit separation come together in harmony, a person may experience Oneness and ultimately the Dao.96 This ancient wisdom is simple but profound. In the modern era, thinkers must work to understand its implications. 97 There is much to do within current fields like physics, health, and divinity. In typical 94 Externalities are much greater than most people recognize, and include things like routine pollution, war and cancer. 95 Feudalism, for example, either transitioned to a balanced homesteading (something akin to early America) or collapsed (like what happened in Russia). 96 Professor Wang also noted this point. See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 223 (describing how “[t]he whole emergent regularity is more than the sum of its parts”). 97 For the many nuances of just the Yin and Yang, see Professor Wang’s book. WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 22 Daoist fashion, this Eastern understanding calls for a Western pragmatism.98 In such a harmoniousstate may lie the solution to the world’s present challenges.

### Shell- Space LARP

#### Welcome to the realm of desire. Society controls desires- forgetting these structures overwhelms the language barrier that makes all other reformation fail. Thus the role of the ballot is to overwhelm desire.

Hansen, Chad, 3, Daoism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 2-19-2003, DOA: 9-4-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/, r0w@n

With the importation of Indo-European Buddhism from India, wu-wei started to be interpreted via the Western conceptual apparatus contrasting desire or purpose and reason. This shaped the modern Chinese interpretation and probably undermined the ideal. It became the target of attack among “modern” Chinese who regarded Daoist “non-striving” or “purposelessness” as the source of Chinese passivity. The activist 19th century reformer, Kang You-wei (Kang have-wei) took the denial of the slogan as his scholarly name. 9.5 Pusimplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity) 樸 The Daoist “primitivist” ideal as expressed mainly in the Laozi. It metaphorically represents the result of forgetting mingnames and desires (See Wu-wei). Translations include simplicity, “raw” wood, and D. C. Lau’s more elaborate “uncarved block.” The detailed translation more sensitively expresses Laozi’s point in using the metaphor in the context of a view of names as “cutting” things into types and Laozi’s distinctive theory that such socially constructed distinctions (institutions) control us by controlling our desires. When societies adopt names or terms, it does so in order to instill and regulate desires for one of the pair created by the name-induced distinction. Thus Daoist forgetting requires forgetting names and distinctions, but in doing so, frees itself from the socially induced, unnatural desires that cause strife and unhappiness in society (e.g. status, rare objects, fame, authority). Hence: “The Nameless uncarved block thus amounts to freedom from desire.” (Daode Jing 37) 10. Texts and Textual History Questions of textual theory are the focus of the bulk of modern scholarship. They include these kinds of questions. Existence (did Laozi or Zhuangzi actually exist) Authorship (did they write the texts attributed to them?) Dating (when did they exist or write their texts?) Relations (did Laozi influence Zhuangzi?)

#### Space is just another victim of temporal staticizing reification-–outdated desire structures get replaced and the world keeps moving on– gotta change your argument or you’ll lose the uniqueness debate

Andrea Rinaldi, 16, Research in space: in search of meaning: Life science research aboard the International Space Station has come under scrutiny for its costs and apparent lack of returns, PubMed Central (PMC), 7/11/16, DOA: 12-14-2021, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4967952/, r0w@n

Humans have been going into space for a number of reasons: to “beat the other side” during the Cold War, out of curiosity, to make the first tentative steps into the great beyond or simply “because it's there”. Yet, to justify continued or even a permanent presence of humans in space now requires better arguments: the aggressive space programmes by China and India, for instance, serve to demonstrate their advanced financial, technological and organizational capacity and international prestige. Private companies are now exploring ways to get humans off the planet for commercial reasons and the military has always had a long‐standing interest in heaving material and humans into orbit. … scientific research was put forward as a major argument for establishing a permanent presence of humans in space… When the first components of the International Space Station (ISS) were launched into orbit in 1998, scientific research was put forward as a major argument for establishing a permanent presence of humans in space; the ISS was soon expanded with several laboratory modules to conduct a wide range of experiments in microgravity (Fig ​(Fig1).1). However, at a time of prolonged financial and political crisis, the future of science in space is uncertain. Intangibles such as “inspirational value” and “motivation for educational excellence” are no longer sufficient to spur significant investments if the results from the ISS laboratories are neither scientifically relevant nor applicable to use on Earth. The US administration has recently proposed to extend ISS operations until 2024, but given the current strained relations with Russia—which plays a vital role in transporting astronauts and materials to and from the ISS through its Soyuz capsules—even access is getting precarious. In the light of these and other problems, research in space needs to refocus its aims and rethink its role. Figure 1 International Space Station First launched in 1998, and continuously inhabited since November 2000, ISS is a joint project among five participating space agencies: NASA, ESA, Canadian Space Agency, Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) and Japan Aerospace eXploration Agency (JAXA). Credit: ESA.

#### Desire creates its image, look at the shiny rock that we got on the cheap– it’s an inevitable manifestation of our concentrations

Matt Weinzierl, 21, The Commercial Space Age Is Here, Harvard Business Review, 2-12-2021, DOA: 12-14-2021, https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-age-is-here, r0w@n

There’s no shortage of hype surrounding the commercial space industry. But while tech leaders promise us moon bases and settlements on Mars, the space economy has thus far remained distinctly local — at least in a cosmic sense. Last year, however, we crossed an important threshold: For the first time in human history, humans accessed space via a vehicle built and owned not by any government, but by a private corporation with its sights set on affordable space settlement. It was the first significant step towards building an economy both in space and for space. The implications — for business, policy, and society at large — are hard to overstate. In 2019, 95% of the estimated $366 billion in revenue earned in the space sector was from the space-for-earth economy: that is, goods or services produced in space for use on earth. The space-for-earth economy includes telecommunications and internet infrastructure, earth observation capabilities, national security satellites, and more. This economy is booming, and though research shows that it faces the challenges of overcrowding and monopolization that tend to arise whenever companies compete for a scarce natural resource, projections for its future are optimistic. Decreasing costs for launch and space hardware in general have enticed new entrants into this market, and companies in a variety of industries have already begun leveraging satellite technology and access to space to drive innovation and efficiency in their earthbound products and services. In contrast, the space-for-space economy — that is, goods and services produced in space for use in space, such as mining the Moon or asteroids for material with which to construct in-space habitats or supply refueling depots — has struggled to get off the ground. As far back as the 1970s, research commissioned by NASA predicted the rise of a space-based economy that would supply the demands of hundreds, thousands, even millions of humans living in space, dwarfing the space-for-earth economy (and, eventually, the entire terrestrial economy as well). The realization of such a vision would change how all of us do business, live our lives, and govern our societies — but to date, we’ve never even had more than 13 people in space at one time, leaving that dream as little more than science fiction. Today, however, there is reason to think that we may finally be reaching the first stages of a true space-for-space economy. SpaceX’s recent achievements (in cooperation with NASA), as well as upcoming efforts by Boeing, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic to put people in space sustainably and at scale, mark the opening of a new chapter of spaceflight led by private firms. These firms have both the intention and capability to bring private citizens to space as passengers, tourists, and — eventually — settlers, opening the door for businesses to start meeting the demand those people create over the next several decades with an array of space-for-space goods and services. Welcome to the (Commercial) Space Age In our recent research, we examined how the model of centralized, government-directed human space activity born in the 1960s has, over the last two decades, made way for a new model, in which public initiatives in space increasingly share the stage with private priorities. Centralized, government-led space programs will inevitably focus on space-for-earth activities that are in the public interest, such as national security, basic science, and national pride. This is only natural, as expenditures for these programs must be justified by demonstrating benefits for citizens — and the citizens these governments represent are (nearly) all on earth. In contrast to governments, the private sector is eager to put people in space to pursue their own personal interests, not the state’s — and then supply the demand they create. This is the vision driving SpaceX, which in its first twenty years has entirely upended the rocket launch industry, securing 60% of the global commercial launch market and building ever-larger spacecraft designed to ferry passengers not just to the International Space Station (ISS), but also to its own promised settlement on Mars. Today, the space-for-space market is limited to supplying the people who are already in space: that is, the handful of astronauts employed by NASA and other government programs. While SpaceX has grand visions of supporting large numbers of private space travelers, their current space-for-space activities have all been in response to demand from government customers (i.e., NASA). But as decreasing launch costs enable companies like SpaceX to leverage economies of scale and put more people into space, growing private sector demand (that is, tourists and settlers, rather than government employees) could turn these proof-of-concept initiatives into a sustainable, large-scale industry. This model — of selling to NASA with the hopes of eventually creating and expanding into a larger private market — is exemplified by SpaceX, but the company is by no means the only player taking this approach. For instance, while SpaceX is focused on space-for-space transportation, another key component of this burgeoning industry will be manufacturing. Made In Space, Inc. has been at the forefront of manufacturing “in space, for space” since 2014, when it 3D-printed a wrench onboard the ISS. Today, the company is exploring other products, such as high-quality fiber-optic cable, that terrestrial customers may be willing to pay to have manufactured in zero-gravity. But the company also recently received a $74 million contract to 3D-print large metal beams in space for use on NASA spacecraft, and future private sector spacecraft will certainly have similar manufacturing needs which Made In Space hopes to be well-positioned to fulfill. Just as SpaceX has begun by supplying NASA but hopes to eventually serve a much larger, private-sector market, Made In Space’s current work with NASA could be the first step along a path towards supporting a variety of private-sector manufacturing applications for which the costs of manufacturing on earth and transporting into space would be prohibitive. Another major area of space-for-space investment is in building and operating space infrastructure such as habitats, laboratories, and factories. Axiom Space, a current leader in this field, recently announced that it would be flying the “first fully private commercial mission to space” in 2022 onboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon Capsule. Axiom was also awarded a contract for exclusive access to a module of the ISS, facilitating its plans to develop modules for commercial activity on the station (and eventually, beyond it). This infrastructure is likely to spur investment in a wide array of complementary services to supply the demand of the people living and working within it. For example, in February 2020, Maxar Technologies was awarded a $142 million contract from NASA to develop a robotic construction tool that would be assembled in space for use on low-Earth orbit spacecraft. Private sector spacecraft or settlements will no doubt have need for a variety of similar construction and repair tools. And of course, the private sector isn’t just about industrial products. Creature comforts also promise to be an area of rapid growth, as companies endeavor to support the human side of life in the harsh environment of space. In 2015, for example, Argotec and Lavazza collaborated to build an espresso machine that could function in the zero-gravity environment of the ISS, delivering a bit of everyday luxury to the crew. To be sure, people have dreamt of using the vacuum and weightlessness of space to source or make things that cannot be made on earth for half a century, and time and again the business case has failed to pan out. Skepticism is natural. Those failures, however, have been in space-for-earth applications. For example, two startups of the 2010s, Planetary Resources, Inc. and Deep Space Industries, recognized the potential of space mining early on. For both companies, however, the lack of a space-for-space economy meant that their near-term survival depended on selling mined material — precious metals or rare elements — to earthbound customers. When it became clear that demand was insufficient to justify the high costs, funding dried up, and both companies pivoted to other ventures. These were failures of space-for-earth business models — but the demand for in-space mining of raw building material, metals, and water will be enormous once humans are living in space (and are therefore far cheaper to supply). In other words, when people are living and working in space, we are likely to look back on these early asteroid mining companies less as failures and more as simply ahead of their time.

#### It’s a global phenomenon– the desire overwhelms borders, cultures, law, and institutions alike– all hail to the almighty desire

Caroline Haskins, 18, Private space companies no longer have to follow the law, Outline, 5/8/18, DOA: 12-14-2021, https://theoutline.com/post/4469/outer-space-treaty-commerce-free-enterprise-bill-spacex-blue-origin-boeing-lockheed-martin, r0w@n

The Space Commerce Free Enterprise Bill, which passed the House of Representatives yesterday, works off the Outer Space Treaty, which the United States and dozens of other countries signed in 1967 and serves as a basic framework for keeping space safe and accessible for every country. Countries can’t own property on behalf of their own nation, and they’re liable for any private activity from their country. But the U.S.’s new bill won’t apply every part of the Outer Space Treaty to private companies. In other words, the U.S. doesn’t believe that it’s liable for activities of private space companies like SpaceX or Blue Origin. The bill also bundles almost all space mission approvals under one roof, the Office of Space Commerce, to try and encourage as many companies as possible to launch objects into space. The office would be in charge of everything from a theoretical asteroid mining industry to private space stations, which have been proposed as tourist attractions by companies like Blue Origin. So it’s likely that other countries, um, won’t exactly be thrilled about the U.S. disregarding the first major peacemaking treaty for activity in outer space. According to an email to The Outline, Mike Listner, the founder of the private space policy consulting firm Space Law & Policy Solutions, other countries may also be tempted to have a similar disregard for the rules. “The method used by the bill to permit private space activities could create some unfavorable interpretation of international law—and set a bad example for other nations who are enacting private space activities,” Listner said. It’s also not clear that the Office of Commercial Space would have strict guidelines in place for enforcing the Outer Space Treaty for private companies. The treaty also states that countries can’t launch or test “nuclear weapons” or “weapons of mass destruction.” Companies only need to say they don’t plan on bringing or using a nuclear weapon or weapon of mass destruction in space, and there are no guidelines in place for evaluating these claims. Military companies like Boeing are already looking to expand into space, and Trump has expressed interest in a “Space Force.” It seems less likely than ever that the U.S. respects the idea of space as a war-free commons. “The main criticism I have of the Bill is that [its regulation] is about as ‘light touch’ as you could possibly get, almost to the point of being ‘no touch,’” Brian Weeden, the Director of Program Planning for Secure World Foundation, told The Outline in an email. Weeden said that the State Department should probably be assessing whether a company really has peaceful intentions or not. Instead, the responsibility falls under the Office of Space Commerce, which is under the Department of Commerce—a government agency with a reputation for having a lax stance toward regulation. But Weeden said that the Office of Commercial Space is incredibly small: just 8 people work there. And although the Act proposes a big funding increase—from $2 million annually to $5 million—it’s unclear if the office will have the resources to keep up with the influx of applications that the Trump administration is explicitly encouraging. “[The bill] doesn't really address the resources that will be necessary for Commerce to properly do this new job,” Weeden said. Screengrab of a mockup of the Axiom Commercial Space Station. Axiom Space Still, private companies will probably love this bill. Weeden said that placing most approvals under one roof will make it easier for these companies to figure out how to get their missions approved. And theoretically, the success of private space companies could help the U.S. economy. According to Brendan Cunningham, an assistant professor of economics for Eastern Connecticut State University who has written about commercial space, it’s also important to consider that in order for the U.S. economy to actually benefit from commercial space activity, we’d have to use space efficiently. But Cunningham said in an email that the bill fails to consider efficiency at all. “Commons resources are susceptible to overuse and degradation—one example is overfishing,” Cunningham said in an email to The Outline. “Hazardous debris environment and the risk of [space trash collisions] indicate that space is succumbing to this pattern.” It’s not exactly surprising that the U.S. is moving toward deregulating outer space—a de facto arena for soft nationalistic power. Space offers a way to acquire information (like weather, GPS, or national security data) or practice ownership over some small slice of valuable space real estate. Basically, whether it’s military satellites or private space tourism, anything that the U.S. launches into space has value, and the country has made it clear that these corporate interests take priority over the idea that outer space should serve as a commons for all of humanity. And the U.S. is far from alone in this incentive. Australia just created its first space agency, whose explicit goal is to promote private companies. The UK is investing tremendous resources toward growing its domestic space program since the Brexit vote (with limited success). France, Japan, Russia, and China also want in.

#### The aff’s move towards justice lacks the re-evaluation of the relationality of desire and subjecthood that would enable real progress

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. 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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. 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#### Thus the alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, making the law integrative, contemplative, and reconsiderate of the Western paradigm

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This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87 Opposite theories like formalism and realism as well as naturalism and positivism unite in a wise contemplation to restore the Dao. 88 Others have noted that a common vision of the “Good” reduces explicit laws and legal institutions. See, e.g., ROBERT MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 241-242 (1976). 89 The Daodejing stresses this natural way. See, e.g., TAO TE CHING, supra note 5, at 73 (ch. 17). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91 When people live in balance, they accord with universal principles and experience physical, spiritual, and mental health. People will also recognize disease is a sign of imbalance and a call for adjusting a person’s consciousness. This natural health and individual responsibility will greatly reduce the need for tertiary social welfare norms. This basic change, of course, goes deeper than general legal norms. It calls for a reconsideration of the modern Western paradigm based on material separation (e.g., Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, Freudian psychology, and Weberian sociology). As already noted, Daoism shows that the explicit separation is only for an implicit connection and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. 92 At the same time, this change in consciousness calls for a return to a holistic sense, as America’s founders understood, of people and the world as inherently good (the divine essence itself). This lucidity will resolve many disputes within academic fields and between science and religious forums. It will bring the various strands of thinking back under a single roof. In this respect, Daoism is a complete account of reality. 93 91 See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 2, citing the 200 C.E. Huangdi Neijing. 92 Quantum physics certainly challenges the traditional order, and some notable physicists have already argued an approach similar to Daoism. See, e.g., DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980). See also, DAVID BOHM,ON CREATIVITY 104 (1996) (calling for a new mathematics that calls attention to a whole movement and to particular things only in some secondary function). 93 It’s not that this grand unified theory can be proven rationally, as Daoism holds, it can only be shown that it could be no other way. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 21 At some point, this change in consciousness is inevitable—as Daoism illustrates, the present situation is unsustainable. Conflict has served its purpose: disharmony is necessary for the experience of harmony and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. As described in Part III, however, the current economic conflict is dysfunctional, and the cultural and social welfare strife crippling.94 Throughout history, a conflicted society has always had to evolve or it would collapse;95 and, again, neither the law nor any other social norm could do anything about it. Many of America’s late 18th century constitutionalists understood that the conflict between liberalism and republicanism was inimical to democracy and a natural happiness. As Daoism also notes, this question is not a philosophical issue, it is a metaphysical point. Daoism demonstrates the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When the implicit connection and explicit separation come together in harmony, a person may experience Oneness and ultimately the Dao.96 This ancient wisdom is simple but profound. In the modern era, thinkers must work to understand its implications. 97 There is much to do within current fields like physics, health, and divinity. In typical 94 Externalities are much greater than most people recognize, and include things like routine pollution, war and cancer. 95 Feudalism, for example, either transitioned to a balanced homesteading (something akin to early America) or collapsed (like what happened in Russia). 96 Professor Wang also noted this point. See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 223 (describing how “[t]he whole emergent regularity is more than the sum of its parts”). 97 For the many nuances of just the Yin and Yang, see Professor Wang’s book. WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 22 Daoist fashion, this Eastern understanding calls for a Western pragmatism.98 In such a harmoniousstate may lie the solution to the world’s present challenges.

## 1NC – Toolbox – Thesis

### Thesis – Accelerationism

#### Welcome to the age of acceleration. Crises of reification are tearing apart the way we experience and our present theories aren’t gonna save us. Only Daoism can defeat the cycle

Wenning, Mario (2011), "Daoism as Critical Theory", Comparative Philosophy, ,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy. Accessed on July 15, 2021. r0w@n

Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs, motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. In the process of increasingly understanding intersubjective-, self- and world-relationships primarily from the perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities, individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human beings.12 The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.13 Originally reification referred to the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a critique of the reification/distortion of communication,14 the reification of relationships of intersubjective recognition,15 the reification of gender roles16 or the 12 Karl Marx (1973, 108-111). 13 See for example Axel Honneth, (2005). 14 Jürgen Habermas (1984). 15 Axel Honneth (1996). 57 Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011) WENNING reification of conceptions of the self,17 what is being criticized are relationships primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice. Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective pathologies of communication and reification.18 People in late modern societies do not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘ (Entzauberung). In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and customs have lost their power in orienting lives. Finally, **the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration** (Beschleunigung) in which, as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during classical and high modernity, **late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational speed of change** in which **the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change within a lifetime.** In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.19 This acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of life, practices and sets of convictions. All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While the psychological impact of **reification leads to systematic forms** of forced inclusion or exclusion, **of being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities**, and the process of disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in, or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies. . However distinct these pathologies might appear, it is crucial to notice that there is a close linkage between these three briefly outlined pathological tendencies of modern societies. Not only are reification, disenchantment and acceleration historically connected, they also imply each other on a conceptual level. Reification consists in seeing the world primarily from the vantage point of being a means or a toolbox from which means can be utilized in order to bring about a desired end. In this objectifying process, the end justifies the variable means and is the only factor taken to be intrinsically valuable. This end, then, is understood as not presently realized but as a future possibility the reality of which depends on the implementation of one's plan of action. Bernard Williams, the eminent British moral philosopher, stresses this point by arguing that without projecting an aim into the future, life would become meaningless. He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful, but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is not futural anymore. By presupposing such a restricted conception of projective action as the reason for living, the present environment an actor navigates in is transformed into pure immanence in which prediction becomes possible to the point of resembling an analytic judgment: assuming that we know what we want, and if we can do what we want while nobody keeps us from doing it, what we want will become realized. Novelty is being reduced to the discovery of new implications of what has already been familiar. Effort is generated once we see the end of our action as external to our spontaneously generated attachments. It grows out of the attempt to realize the stipulated end in ever more innovative, efficient and predictable ways in which spontaneity is, at best, forced towards a goal. The goal at which effort is directed often drops out of focus during the acceleration process or it loses its appeal. It seems external to the actor who has been trapped in a means-ends apparatus. This rationalization process increasingly becomes independent from the specificity of ends pursued and impossible to get out of. With every rationalized act the actor moves deeper into the quicksand of a world of suppressed spontaneity. The consequence of this seemingly autonomous rationalization process famously described by Weber as an ―iron cage‖ is that the present is being downgraded as insignificant on its own terms when compared to the future gains one promises oneself as the payoff of one's actions. Processes of innovation become the norm and speed up because actors hope to do and achieve ever more goals in increasingly shorter segments of emptied time. Actors rush to a future, which can in principle never be actualized. Paul Virillio fittingly describes this blind acceleration process of chasing structurally elusive future goals in increasingly higher speeds of innovation adequately as a ―rushing standstill‖. From within the ―iron cage‖ of modernity true innovation, which would have to be different from mere acceleration or enhancement and would require deliberating about alternative present ends, seems increasingly impossible.21 The new is transfigured into the only variable that is to be expected. Instrumental action as the reified forgetfulness of the meaning resources of the present for the sake of the projected future thus seems without alternative. The consequence is what Hermann Lübbe refers to as a ‗Gegenwartsschrumpfung‘, a continuing shrinking of the present under the complimentary pressures of the tendencies of melancholic musealization of irretrievably lost pasts and forced innovation to run after structurally elusive futures.22 The dilemma with which critical theorists see themselves confronted is that whatever emancipatory tendencies – be they introduced as forms of resistance, mutual understanding, recognition etc. – are being proposed as means for a future end, instrumental action is reenacted under a normative guise and the domination of the future over the rest of time is thus further sedimented. As soon as instrumental actors propose or just point to emancipatory forms of action, they replicate and reenact the same temporal logic that it originally diagnosed as the problem of modernity, i.e., the belief that the future can be mastered through acts of projective planning. The problem of this projective planning mentality is not that things often turn out differently than planned, but that the actor sidesteps and thereby undermines the significance of the present and sees it simply as something to be used for future ends. In other words, by downgrading the present including its modes of action to being "for the sake of the future," critical theory denigrates the present to the status of a prefuture, a state of emptiness that is used as a resource rather than lived in. A theory exposing and explaining social pathologies is keen on pointing to the inescapable mechanisms preventing the emancipatory use of reason through action. Such an exclusive focus on the diagnosis and emergence of pathologies coincides with developing an ethics of melancholy that emphasizes the inescapable specter of instrumental reason. Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake of histories of catastrophes.23 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present - corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present - leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to justify themselves with respect to the past. This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First, however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as another critical theory. In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of the future.

#### The world is constantly changing, flowing, and becoming – action is only coherent in the specific circumstances of the present

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

We begin our argument for translating Daodejing as “Making This Life Signicant” from Daoist cosmology. Taking a closer look at the interpretation of both the title and the content of the Daodejing as “The Classic of This Focus (de ) and Its Field (dao ),” we might first ask what does the expression “this focus” mean? The Daoist correlative cosmology begins from the assumption that the endless stream of always novel yet still continuous situations we encounter are real, and hence, that there is ontological parity among the things and events that constitute our lives. As a parody on Parmenides, who claimed that “only Being is,” we might say that for the Daoist, “only beings are,” or taking one step further in underscoring the reality of the process of change itself, “only becomings are.” That is, the Daoist does not posit the existence of some permanent reality behind appearances, some unchanging substratum, some essential denying aspect behind the accidents of change. Rather, there is just the ceaseless and usually cadenced flow of experience. In fact, the absence of the “One behind the many” metaphysics makes our uncritical use of the philosophic term “cosmology” to characterize Daoism, at least in the familiar classical Greek sense of this word, highly problematic. In early Greek philosophy, the term “kosmos” connotes a clustered range of meanings, including arche (originative, material, and efficient cause/ultimate undemonstrable principle), logos (underlying organizational principle), theoria (contemplation), nomos (law), theios (divinity), nous (intelligibility). In combination, this cluster of terms conjures forth some notion of a single-ordered Divine3 universe governed by natural and moral laws that are ultimately intelligible to the human mind. This “kosmos” terminology is culturally specfiic, and if applied uncritically to discuss the classical Daoist worldview, introduces a cultural reductionism that elides and thus conceals truly significant differences. The Daoist understanding of “cosmos” as the “ten thousand things” means that, in effect, the Daoists have no concept of cosmos at all insofar as that notion entails a coherent, single-ordered world which is in any sense enclosed or denied. The Daoists are, therefore, primarily, “acosmotic” thinkers.

### Thesis- Realm of Desire

#### Welcome to the realm of desire. Society controls desires- forgetting these structures overwhelms the language barrier that makes all other reformation fail

Hansen, Chad, 3, Daoism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 2-19-2003, DOA: 9-4-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/, r0w@n

With the importation of Indo-European Buddhism from India, wu-wei started to be interpreted via the Western conceptual apparatus contrasting desire or purpose and reason. This shaped the modern Chinese interpretation and probably undermined the ideal. It became the target of attack among “modern” Chinese who regarded Daoist “non-striving” or “purposelessness” as the source of Chinese passivity. The activist 19th century reformer, Kang You-wei (Kang have-wei) took the denial of the slogan as his scholarly name. 9.5 Pusimplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity) 樸 The Daoist “primitivist” ideal as expressed mainly in the Laozi. It metaphorically represents the result of forgetting mingnames and desires (See Wu-wei). Translations include simplicity, “raw” wood, and D. C. Lau’s more elaborate “uncarved block.” The detailed translation more sensitively expresses Laozi’s point in using the metaphor in the context of a view of names as “cutting” things into types and Laozi’s distinctive theory that such socially constructed distinctions (institutions) control us by controlling our desires. When societies adopt names or terms, it does so in order to instill and regulate desires for one of the pair created by the name-induced distinction. Thus Daoist forgetting requires forgetting names and distinctions, but in doing so, frees itself from the socially induced, unnatural desires that cause strife and unhappiness in society (e.g. status, rare objects, fame, authority). Hence: “The Nameless uncarved block thus amounts to freedom from desire.” (Daode Jing 37) 10. Texts and Textual History Questions of textual theory are the focus of the bulk of modern scholarship. They include these kinds of questions. Existence (did Laozi or Zhuangzi actually exist) Authorship (did they write the texts attributed to them?) Dating (when did they exist or write their texts?) Relations (did Laozi influence Zhuangzi?)

## 1NC – Toolbox – Links

### Link - Anthro

#### Anthropocentrism makes connecting to nature impossible

Laozi, Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean! \*NOTE: I partially cite one of the original poems of the Daodejing here, written by Laozi. The translation and commentary is by Ames and Hall\*

To contextualize this rather obscure chapter of the Daodejing, we remember that the Daoist tradition is generally critical of the Confucian willingness to limit its concerns to the human world alone. At the same time, as in this chapter, the Daodejing does not preclude such a focus. It does not reject the “extension” of oneself in the development of one’s humanity, but seeks to go further in extending oneself to all things by “acting authentically and without coercion (wuwei).” The Daoist texts, like their Confucian counterparts, see resistance to the emergence of a discrete and discriminating self as a precondition for integrative action and the extension of character (de) that follows from mutual accommodation. In one of the Zhuangzi parodies on Confucius, it describes this process: Yan Hui said, “I have made progress.” “How so?” inquired Confucius. “I have sat and forgotten.” Confucius, noticeably ustered, inquired: “What do you mean by ‘sitting and forgetting’?” “I have demolished my appendages and body, gotten rid of my keenness of sight and hearing, abandoned my physical form, and cast off knowledge, and in so doing, have joined with the Great Extender,” said Yan Hui. “This is what I call ‘sitting and forgetting.’” ... Confucius replied, “Please let me become your follower.”203 Perhaps the most helpful metaphor available in the Daoist texts to elucidate this notion of “extension” is that of the tally. Relationships are like tallies shared between persons, and those with character are able to make the most of them. In the Daoist tradition, the extension of one’s character is described in more pervasive terms than in the Confucian literature. As in the Confucian tradition, at times such a person becomes the embodiment and protector of the human order, a styler of new culture, and a source of new meaning. But the Daoists take it beyond this into the natural world. The zhenren, the Daoist version of the consummating person, embraces the character (de) of the natural as well as the human environment. By becoming coextensive with the de of the ox, for example, Cook Ding in butchering its carcass is able to penetrate and interpret its natural lineaments and interstices without distraction, and hence is able to become an efficacious butcher; by becoming coextensive with the de of the wood, Carpenter Qing is responsive to the quality and potential of his materials without distraction, and hence is able to become an efficacious craftsman.204 The absence of a “dis-integrating” discrete self makes these exemplars open to the ethos of their natural environments, so that the environment contributes to them, making them potent and productive, and they contribute to their environments, interpreting and maximizing the possibilities of those things that constitute their worlds

#### The Daoist paradigm places humans within nature- not outside of it

Schönfeld and Chen 19, Martin Schönfeld, and Xia Chen, Daoism and the Project of an Ecological Civilization or Shengtai Wenming 生态文明, religions, 9/20/19, DOA: 9/11/21, I have a pdf if u need it, r0w@n

There is a pattern of energy-flows, a way of how nature proceeds. The Daoist sage (shengren 聖 人) knows how to abide by this pattern and ‘go with the flow’. In the Daodejing 道德經, this idea is expressed in the demand “to be the stream of the universe” (c. 28), for “the universe is sacred; you cannot improve it” (c. 29).26 The reason is a pragmatic concern, motivated by self-interest: “what goes against the Dao comes to an early end” (c. 30).27 Seen in this way, the climate emergency is the outcome of not following the Dao. Instead of going with nature’s flow, humanity went against it and now risks coming to an early end in the hothouse fate. The sixth mass extinction is yet another consequence of going against the Dao, and it is also symptomatic of humanity dismissing Daoist values. Central to Daoist values is the rejection of destructiveness, domination, and competition. The Daodejing counsels, “Achieve results, but not through violence” (c. 30).28 The Daoist cherishes three core values or ‘treasures’ (san bao 三寶); they are mercy (ci 慈), frugality (jian 儉), and humility (hou 後; c. 67). The environmental crisis is the effect of disregarding these treasures: instead of mercy, civilization proceeds with a lack of empathy; instead of frugality, civilization embraces capitalism; and instead of humility, civilization indulges in hubris. Doing violence to nature shows a lack of wisdom. The Daodejing warns: “When humans lack a sense of awe, there will be disaster” (c. 72).29 Unlike religions whose practitioners indulge in climate skepticism, as the powerful Evangelical Protestant pluralities in USA, Australia, and Brazil, there is no place in Daoism for such indulgencies. Its teachings already contain explicit warnings of the new realities. Furthermore, its holy scriptures need no interpretive retrofit. Without need for exegetical modification, they can serve as spiritual framework for the challenges of the Anthropocene. Unlike Evangelicals, Daoists can simply say, we told you so. Next to the subordination of culture to nature and the precept of following the Dao, there is a third motif, which could be called ‘soft anthropocentrism’. As we have seen, the proper place of humanity is its harmonious integration in nature. Instead of dominating nature, civilization ought to aspire to a cultural paradigm of mercy, frugality, and humility. And yet, humans occupy a special place in the universe. The Classic of the Great Peace or Taipingjing 太平经, a collection of Daoist scriptures from the Han dynasty, has this to say about humans:

### Link – Fear of Death

#### Death is inevitable, but constantly running from it only makes it come faster

Laozi, Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean! \*NOTE: I partially cite one of the original poems of the Daodejing here, written by Laozi. The translation and commentary is by Ames and Hall\*

In the cycle of life and death, One third are the companions of life, One third are the companions of death,132 And one third again are people who, because of their preoccupation with staying alive, Move toward the execution ground with each and every step. Now why do they do this? Simply because of their preoccupation with staying alive. I have heard it said that those who are good at holding on to life Do not steer clear of rhinos and tigers when traveling in the hills, And do not hide behind armor133 and shields when entering the fray. For the rhino finds nowhere to gore, The tiger nothing to sink its claws into, And the soldier nothing into which he can lodge his blade. How can this be so? Because there is not a whiff of the execution ground about them. Commentary This is an important chapter in establishing a contrast between the presuppositions about life expectancy in the contemporary world, and those assumptions that attended life in classical China. Taken in their own context, the statistics offered here are probably quite accurate. Today there is an expectation that a full complement of life is some 75 or 80 years. If we turn the clock back a few generations, even in the relatively medically advanced environments of Western Europe and North America, childbirth was perilous for both infant and mother alike, not to mention the horror of plagues and pestilence that would occur at regular intervals. It is hard to say how this precariousness of life would affect human relationships. On the one hand, such high mortality rates must have been at least a caution in the natural affection that parents would be willing to invest in their newly born children. In traditional China, there was the custom of calling infants pejorative names as a way of warding off those forces that would claim them and take them away. On the other hand, such relentless temporality might well have made the fleeting relationship with a little life that much more precious. And when the perils of youth were successfully negotiated, a journey that reached longevity was certain to be much honored and celebrated. The Zhuangzi can serve as a gloss here: Those who understand way-making (dao) certainly have a penetrating familiarity with the overall pattern of things; those who understand this pattern certainly know how to deal with contingencies. And those who know how to deal with contingencies will not find themselves harmed by other things. For those of the very best character, fire cannot burn them, water cannot drown them, heat and cold cannot harm them, birds and beasts cannot hurt them. This is not to say they don’t pay any attention to such things, but rather that because they are alert to danger, secure amid changing fortunes, and careful in their undertakings, nothing is able to do them harm.

#### The 1AC’s constant run from death saps the ability to find meaning in life

Laozi, Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean! \*NOTE: I partially cite one of the original poems of the Daodejing here, written by Laozi. The translation and commentary is by Ames and Hall\*

Death is real and, wherever there is life, it is not far away. However, to separate death out from the life experience and inveigh against it as something to be avoided at all costs prevents us from appreciating the fragility and preciousness of life that is made possible by this same delicious temporality. Life is made meaningful by death. Death as natural closure punctuates a most particular event in the ongoing transformation of things. Properly understood, a healthy death can be lived well and can enhance the lives of all involved; misunderstood, a resentful death can sour life and become a focus of dread and loathing that robs everyone, especially those left to carry on, of their life energy. The Zhuangzi as a sustained reflection on the relationship between life and death provides many insightful anecdotes that take us beyond grief and suffering. For example: Not long thereafter, Ziyu fell ill, and Zisi went to ask after him. “Extraordinary!” said Ziyu. “The transformer of things continues to make me all gnarly and bent. He hunches me up so badly that my vital organs are above my head while my chin is buried in my belly button. My shoulders are higher than my crown, and my hunchback back points to the heavens. Something has really gone haywire with the yin and yang vapors!” ... “Do you resent this?” asked Zisi. “Indeed no,” replied Ziyu. “What’s to resent? If in the course of things it transforms my left arm into a cock, I’ll use it to tell the time of day. If it goes on to transform my right arm into a crossbow bolt, I’ll use it to shoot me an owl for roasting. If it then transforms my buttocks into wheels and my spirit into a horse, I will ride about on them without need of further transportation.... What’s to resent?”152 Zhuangzi’s conception of life and death is commonsensical. Empirically we know nothing of permanence and annihilation. In fact, all we know of experience is persistence within change. It is on this basis that the Zhuangzi concludes: “Once we take the heavens and earth to be a giant forge and transformation to be the great ironsmith, wherever I go is just fine. Relaxed I nod off and happily I awake.”153

### Link – Identity

#### Fixed identity is a bad starting point – it restricts subjectivity away from the natural flow of becoming

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

In the human experience we are radically contextualized, constituted by those roles and relationships that locate us within our social, natural, and cultural environments. “Proper way-making” is getting the most out of these relationships as we make our way in the world: It is making this life significant. And getting the most out of our experience depends upon achieving and sustaining optimally productive harmony. Such efficacy depends upon always knowing where to be, committing ourselves utterly in our relationships, being generous in our transactions, making good on what we say, being successful both in service and in governance, and seizing the moment. The greatest obstacle to optimizing relationships is coercion. If a healthy relationship is mutually accommodating, then the introduction of coercion, in which one party overwrites the importance of the other, entails a diminution in the creative possibilities of both. As Richard Rorty has observed, forced redefinition is humiliation. In a cosmology that begins from the uniqueness of the particular, strict identity and its corollary, strict equality, are not an option. Relationships are invariably hierarchical. But hierarchy is only pernicious when it is compromised by coercion. The family as an institution is hierarchical, but appropriate patterns of deference can allow members of the family to have both dignity and parity in their relationships.

#### Labels are bad – they abstract away individual foci and institutionalize un-natural structures

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

The ongoing shaping of experience entails working with the as yet inchoate and thus seemingly insignificant phases of the process. Each step requires a quantum of imagination and inspiration that does not reference the world as it is, but flies ahead of what has already been articulated to forge a new way forward. The value of this novelty and the respect due it lies in its potential to reshape our world. Were those who have responsibility for order in the human world sufficiently deferential to this effort to maximize the available resources, the world would respond with natural plenty and the people would cooperate with fairness in the distribution of its bounty. In order to function effectively in managing our environment, we need distinctions. These distinctions in themselves are functional and enabling, but once established, can take on a life of their own. We quickly fall into the trap of turning names into things, so that these names identify some more real “I-know-not-what” that stands independent of the now “superficial” way in which we actually experience any particular event. We misinterpret the persistence within process as some underlying foundation of our experience. Rational structures become institutionalized and, given enough time, petrified. The regimen of values they carry with them, empowering some against others, become entrenched and uncompromising. What began as a convenience takes over, constraining the very experience it was created to facilitate, and in so doing, robs life of its creative vigor. Some commentators have balked at the analogy offered here, worried that way-making should in fact be the larger and more expansive rivers and seas, rather than their many tributaries. The point, however, is that dao as the ongoing process of experience is both in the world and is the world, is both the foci and their fields. In chapter 25 we invoked Tang Junyi’s characterization of this natural cosmology as “the inseparability of the one and the many, of continuity and its multiplicity (yiduo bufenguan)” to explain how the process is both one and many at the same time, depending on which is foregrounded. Way-making is not the One behind the many, but is rather the somewhat determinate many that constitute the somewhat indeterminate and ever continuous process.

### Link – Kant

#### Western tradition is wrong – morality is not shaped by a struggle between passion and reason, but rather our resistance to the symbiotic flourishing of our heart-and-mind, or our drives for both passion AND reason

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

The optimum posture of the heart-and-mind (xin) is to achieve and sustain an emptiness and equilibrium that will enable it to take in the world as it is without imposing its own presuppositions upon it, and without allowing the world to cause it agitation. It is significant that xin—a stylized drawing of the aorta—precludes the assumption of distinctions between thinking and feeling, or idea and affect. Xin is frequently translated simply as “heart,” but since it is the seat of thinking and judgment, the notion of mind must be included in its characterization if the term is to be properly understood. Indeed, the functional equivalent of what we often think of as “purpose” or “intention” is also implicit in the notion of xin. Going back to Plato, the Western tradition has been accustomed to construe efforts aimed at moral perfection as involving an internal struggle between reason and passion, or, with Augustine, between what we know we ought to do, and an obstreperous will that frustrates our acting upon that knowledge. The interpenetration of idea, intention, and affect expressed in the notion of xin suggests that in the classical Chinese world the conflict associated with self-consummation is not turned inward as a struggle between the heart and the mind—that is, between the passions and reason, or between the will and judgment. If the dynamic of self-consummation does not entail the self divided against itself, what is the source and nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of an appropriate personal disposition is meant to overcome? If agitation is not referenced primarily within one’s soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the self in its interactions with external things. It is through a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their relations with us that we reach a disposition in which none among the myriad things is able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are best able to promote their flourishing.

#### Your framework’s focus on agency is wrong

Ames and Hall 2. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

The radical contextualization that is a pervasive feature of Daoist philosophy entails a priority of situation over agency. That is, agency is itself an abstraction from the complex web of constitutive relations that locates one within a specific, concrete situation. Thus, “to know” is to understand fully the reflexivity and mutually shaping relationship between self and context; “to conquer” is to be in full control of oneself within the shifting conditions of the life experience. As chapter 46 states, to be content is simply “knowing when enough is enough.” This satisfaction is neither a state of mind nor the acquisition of some absolute quantum of stuff, but rather the quality of reciprocal appreciation that gives character to a specific matrix of relationships. Appreciating one’s relationships requires a knowledge of oneself as well as others, and the adjustments necessary to remain self-possessed in one’s interactions. The dominant assumption in classical Chinese natural cosmology is that the energy of transformation is not invested in some external efficient principle that stands independent of its creature, but rather that this energy for change resides within the world itself. The world is autogenerative and “spontaneously so” without initial beginning and without presumptive end.

### Link – Language

#### The uncritical use of language to create change or describe the world is an instrument of social control that acts to order the flows of experience

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

Throughout the Daodejing there is a sustained suspicion of language. Chad Hansen has even characterized this text as being fundamentally “anti-language.” In describing the evolution of Daoism, Hansen suggests that “Since language is an instrument of social control, we should avoid it—and everything that goes with it.”60 One point that Hansen is making here is well taken: “Trained discriminations are not a constantly reliable guide to behavior. Culturally motivated preferences based on those distinctions are, on the whole, unreliable. And they control us in insidious, unnatural ways.”61 But it might be a case of throwing out the baby with the befouled bathwater to extrapolate from the entirely reasonable claim about Laozi’s Daoism that “as anarchy, it rebels not only against political authority, but all social authority” and then to infer that this means “the way to remove the authority of society totally from your life is to remove language.”62 While we might find a palpable irony in one of the world’s literary classics offering a critique of the language in which it is written, it is undeniably the case that a major theme of the Daodejing is that an uncritical use of language can lull us into a distorted understanding of the nature of the world in which we live. That said, language also has an important function for the Daoists who rely heavily upon oral transmission to pass on their ideas to subsequent generations. Broadly speaking, in the absence of the divorce between philosophy and rhetoric that occurred in classical Greece, there is an appreciation in the classical Chinese tradition of the performative and perlocutionary power of language that not only describes a world, but more important, commands a desired world into being. The Daodejing is not an exception to this sensibility. What then is the Daoist reticence in the use of language? The Daodejing is not a discursive, expository Aristotelian treatise that, in a linear and sequential way, sets out to explain the way the world is. Rather, it is a deliberately collated and edited collage of largely rhymed wisdom literature that was drifting about in the early Chinese tradition. Michael LaFargue offers an alternative reading strategy for the Daodejing in suggesting that, rather than anticipating some literal, univocal interpretation for each passage, we ought to search the text empathetically for the point that it is trying to make relative to concrete life situations.63 After all, even though empirically the claim that “a watched pot never boils” is demonstrably false, that does not diminish the saying’s psychological insight for those people who are given to watching pots. The philosophical problem that provokes the Daoist mistrust of language lies in the possibility that a misunderstanding of the nature of language has the potential to promote the worst misconceptions about the flux and flow of experience in which we live our lives. There is an obvious tension between the unrelenting processual nature of experience and the function of language to separate out, isolate, and arrest elements within it. To the extent that it is the nature of language to arrest the process of change and discipline it into a coherent, predictable order, there is the likelihood that an uncritical application of language might persuade us that our world is of a more stable and necessary character than it really is. The assumption, for example, that there is a literal language behind the metaphorical can introduce notions of permanence, necessity, and objectivity into our worldview that can have deleterious consequences. Corollary to such notions are dualistic categories, such as reality and appearance, right and wrong, good and evil, true and false, reason and rhetoric, that encourage a finality and thus a kind of dogmatism in our judgments about the world. Such assumptions in parsing our experience lead to the exclusionary prejudices familiar in foundational ways of thinking. Of course, the alternative to this “myth of the given” foundationalism is not its twin: a divisive and intolerant relativism that promises a different yet equally final judgment for each discrete person or community. In the Daoist processual worldview, there are not the gaps in experience that would permit either an exclusive foundationalism or an equally exclusive relativism. The ethos of the world is not a given, but an ecological achievement that is increased or diminished by human participation and behavior. Morality, then, is an ongoing negotiation in which some consensual and thus appropriate good can be produced by considering the needs and possible contributions of all things concerned.

### Link – Normative Ethics

#### Normative ethics are a dehumanizing arm of authoritarianism that saps the life of the community

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

In attempting to govern the people, acting assertively to promote particular value judgments over others can be divisive and self- defeating. Such conduct in favoring one thing over another encourages a contentiousness among the people that undermines rather than fosters community. Better to be broadly inclusive of different talents and contributions, and to strive to appreciate each thing on its own terms, with the single proviso that coercion in any form is impoverishing. Under the tutelage of sagacious rule, there is a tacit celebration of the bravery, patience, and kindliness of the ordinary person. There is a tolerance of difference and diversity that precludes any heavy- handed exercise of political constraints. In abjuring any appeal to political idealisms that are so often invoked by their advocates to justify the worst kinds of exclusion and coercion, those responsible for the flourishing of community simply allow it in all of its complexity to establish and sustain its own equilibrium. Rather than foisting an agenda on the community, effective administrators make sure that basic needs such as food and health are provided for, and then sit back to allow the character of the community to emerge synergistically out of the associated living of the people. The people, encouraged to be free from assumptions and inclusive of alternatives, develop a tolerance and accommodation that immunizes them from purveyors of malignant prejudices. It is only empathy and openness that can inspire the community to go beyond the mediocrity of unilaterally legislated values.

#### Morality is arbitrary and only makes everything worse

Ames and Hall 2. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

When the authentic way of being human is thriving in the world, the family-based natural morality of the community takes care of itself, enabling its members to flourish and prosper. It is only in a period of decadence and decline that philosophers arise to proclaim the obvious, and in so doing, ironically exacerbate the problem by institutionalizing an artificial alternative that suffocates natural unmediated sentiment. What was spontaneous natural feeling becomes external rules of conduct, where the invocation of moral rules as an alternative to the spontaneous expression of feeling is dehumanizing. Morality in a healthy community is nothing more than the uncaused emergence of patterns of deference and respect as one generation gives way to the next. Such a morality is alive and vibrant, with new experience occasioning an ongoing revision of old ways of doing things. The unfortunate breakdown of a world that allows the unadorned expression of honest feeling to become an alternative world in which educated morality and its vocabulary of right and wrong, good and evil, lead to the stifling of true affection.

### Link – State

#### The 1AC’s state centric heuristic is dominance over the natural flow of experience that’s key to making life significant

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

The world is constituted by a boundless sumptuousness of strange and wonderful things that often contradict each other in their life- patterns. This complex tension is not disciplined into order by some external controlling hand, imposing its considered design upon experience. And yet the oppositions that exist among things in nature resolve themselves into a self-adjusting balance and harmony. The spirituality we find pervasive in nature, far from being a gift bestowed by some external source, is rather the flowering of this thriving harmony. In fact, this harmony is not only autogenerative and self-sustaining, but persists only as long as it remains free from calculated manipulation, well-intended or otherwise. When the patterns of nature are taken as counsel for political order in the empire, they teach us that the human world too will flourish if left to its own internal impulses. Coercive interventions from “above,” while perhaps temporarily efficacious, are, in the long term and in the big picture, a source of destabilization and impoverishment. It is thus that sagacious rulers stay close to the center, and simply oversee a world that can be relied upon to order itself.

#### The yuwei of the modern democratic state is mutually exclusive with the alternative

Stamatov 17. Aleksandar Stamatov (professor of humanities at Ming Chuan University), 4-1-2017, "The Laozi’s criticism of government and society and a daoist criticism of the modern state," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09552367.2017.1319782?journalCode=casp20 sean!

The Laozi expounds a severe criticism of the rulers and society of its time and this criticism is strongly supported by its metaphysical teachings. For the Laozi, the best rule is the one according to Dao which means that it follows the naturalness or the self-so of Dao. This is what is called governing through wuwei. Generally speaking, the problem with all existing states is that they have broken up the connection with Dao and lost the course of its natural function, so the rulers of these states can only use governing through youwei, which is the artificial and harmful way of governing and handling things. This kind of governing makes the rulers oppressive who in order to gain wealth and bring order in the state impose heavy taxation, harsh punishments and frequent warfare. The problem is, for the Laozi, that using oppressive measures for achieving order in the state actually contributes to the increasing of the state disorder. This kind of youwei government also incites people’s selfish desires which are artificial and different from the natural desires that are endowed by Dao. These desires make people strive to obtain treasures and objects; they make them yearn for the extremes, the extravagant and the excessive which brings competition between people and disorder. What the Laozi might say about the modern democratic state in general is that it is governed by youwei, and in particular that it is still oppressive by means of putting people into constant competition and need to satisfy their selfish desires. However, the questions whether the political philosophy of the Laozi as a whole bears some feasibility or not and is it possible that the concrete political teachings in it can substitute the modern democracy can be challenged, and are not considered here because it will surpass the scope and dimensions of this discussion, but they can still be suitably examined in another place. What is important here is that the Laozi’s criticism of government and society by itself may be directed to both Spring and Autumn/Warring States periods and the modern world

### Link - Tech

#### Techno-managerial epistemology wrecks our relationship to nature and creates catastrophe

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

The most productive activities in the correlative world of classical Daoism are a function of optimally productive relations. And since coercion as either aggressor or victim diminishes the creative possibilities of a situation, optimally productive relations are the outcome of deferential dispositions in which all members of a social and natural nexus are able to express themselves fully in their relationships. It is under such conditions that a thriving community can accomplish the most, where “the most” is defined as the unique and productively diverse character of the community itself. At issue here are two different ways of knowing a world. Most courses of study involve an ever-expanding range of knowledge and experience. To “master” a subject means to be able to predict and control a situation within a certain domain of the human experience. Not only is the Daoist suspicious of this kind of authority as a basis for interacting with our environments, but further the Daoist is persuaded that such “knowledge” promotes attitudes of mind that frustrate its own intentions. The development of a really deferential disposition requires largely a letting go of those barriers to associative and synergistic living that prevent full participation and contribution. Perhaps one rather obvious example of these two approaches to functioning effectively in our world is our attempt over the last century to control water on the North American continent through the construction of dams and levies. Such construction feats certainly require a sophisticated level of engineering expertise, but to the extent that there is an insufficient respect for the way in which the processes of nature work, these projects have wreaked havoc on water supply, fish stocks, and natural reserves, and have precipitated human disaster where we have built our population centers on the floodplains. Is the Daoist a Luddite, then? The problem is not the technology but the technological mind. The familiar passage from Zhuangzi about the farmer’s response to the use of the well-sweep is a most appropriate gloss on this very question. On hearing about the well- sweep as a more efficient substitute for his pitcher for irrigating his fields, the old farmer is incensed, and draws a straight line between the use of such contrivances and a contriving heart-and-mind. For him, the cost is too great: If one has a contriving heart-and-mind lodged in his breast, he will be impure, and if he is impure, his spirit will be agitated, and the way (dao) will not carry someone whose spirit is agitated.

### Link – Util/EXT first

#### States have to focus on even the smallest issues – they’ll inevitably spill up to catastrophe

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

All polarities are reconciled in the relationship between the particular focus and its field. To use singularity and plurality as a familiar polarity, a person is certainly a unique, nonsubstitutable individual, but as a radically contextualized matrix of relationships, this same person is also a manifold of selves all implicated within this individuality. Focus and field is thus another way of declaring the inseparability of the one and the many, of continuity and multiplicity, of uniqueness (aloneness) and commonality (sharedness). The reconciliation of polarities means that in any particular event, there is a continuity between the inconsequential and the important, between equilibrium and agitation. This being the case, the Daodejing insists that if small matters are not attended to, they can have cascading consequences in which equilibrium gives way to turmoil. In giving this apothegm a political application, the text evokes the image of a royal progress in which the ruler must be unrelentingly attentive to the basics—to the provisioning supply wagons upon which the well-being of not only the ruler, but all the travelers depends. Within the walls of the state itself, the ruler’s person is no different from all the other matters of concern to the court, and as such, must be given appropriate care. This chapter might well be read together with chapters 7 and 13. If rulers treat all things with equal seriousness and respect, their own persons will be taken care of as a matter of course. The way to be rid of such personal concerns is to be rid of the distinction between one’s person and the world in which we live. One both values one’s person and loses one’s person in a thoroughgoing integration into one’s field of experience. This is what the Zhuangzi calls “hiding the world in the world.”74 After all, “those who begrudge their persons as though they were the world can be put in charge of the world” (chapter 13).

### Link – War/weapons

#### The 1AC’s glorification of the killing fields is the wrong starting point

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

Coercion is anathema to human flourishing, and perhaps nothing is a more poignant symbol of coercion than the instruments of war. Far from being celebrated as the trappings of the strong and mighty, weapons should be regarded for what they really are: a most unfortunate if perhaps sometimes necessary evil. This chapter sets out to demonstrate the tragic character of war. The full human life includes a broad spectrum of experiences, some of which are occasions for celebration and others for mourning. These two extremes are marked in Chinese custom by reversing the seat of honor. That is, in those ceremonies that punctuate the happy moments, the left is honored, and in those formalities that mark the moments of grief and heartache, the right is honored. The fact that whenever the military is involved, it is the right that is the seat of honor locates warfare and all of its horrors squarely and unmistakably on the side of life’s misfortunes. Warfare ought not to be glorified. It is always a losing proposition, and there are no victors. Although on occasion unavoidable, it is nothing better than methodical state-sanctioned killing. Even in the event of victory, triumph on the killing fields should never be confused with the proper seasons of celebration, but instead should be treated as what it is: a state funeral properly marked by grief and mourning.

### Link- Abstract Theorizing

#### The world exists as a set of experience- the 1ac’s abstract theorizing makes it impossible to succeed

Ames and Hall (02) Daodejing, Making this life significant, Ballatine Books

The compilers of the Daodejing seek rather explicitly to develop a contrast between the glimpses of insight this text strives to impart, and the substance of other philosophical doctrines. Many if not most doctrines evolve with their antecedents in an elaborate genealogy of values and ideas. These philosophical doctrines are often hierarchically structured by precepts and governing principles, and they may well require an extended course of study for their mastery and transmission. The precepts that inform these “doctrines” are professionalized by their learned “doctors,” and within their marble academies these erudites—for appropriate status and recompense— are only too glad to amaze the hoi poloi with the ashing dexterity of their philosophic thrusts and parries. What the Daodejing has to offer, on the other hand, is much simpler. It encourages the cultivation of a disposition that is captured in what we have chosen to call its wu-forms. The wu-forms free up the energy required to sustain the abstract cognitive and moral sensibilities of technical philosophy, allowing this energy, now unmediated by concepts, theories, and contrived moral precepts, to be expressed as those concrete feelings that inspire the ordinary business of the day. It is through these concrete feelings that one is able to know the world and to optimize the human experience. The abstraction of the concrete ethical dimension of such felt knowing into a formal moralist vocabulary is rehearsed in chapter 38 of the Daodejing: Thus, only when we have lost sight of way-making is there excellence, Only when we have lost sight of excellence is there authoritative conduct, Only when we have lost sight of authoritative conduct is there appropriateness, And only when we have lost sight of appropriateness is there ritual propriety. As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing

### Link- Racial Unity

#### Their conceptualization of racial unity reifies whiteness, only a Daoist reimagination of whiteness solves

Liu 17, Helena Liu, Undoing Whiteness: The Dao of Anti-racist Diversity Practice, Gender, Work and Organization, John Wiley and Sons Ltd, DOA: 9/3/21, 9/5/17, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/gwao.12142>, r0w@n

Daoism, and the doing of non-doing Praxis — the integration of philosophy and practice — is deeply embedded in Daoism. The Chinese character ‘道’ (Dao) is comprised of ‘首’ (head) and ‘⻌’ (walking feet), which together suggests reflective action (Sun, 2015). Dao itself signifies the way of nature and emphasizes balance and harmony. The familiar Daoist concept of yin-yang refers to the need for balance between polarities (Chen, 2008; Graham, 1989). What are typically seen as competing dyads in traditional Western thought, such as nature/self, contemplation/action and difference/oneness, are regarded as interconnected, complementary aspects that co-exist in harmony (Chen, 2008). The philosophical and religious tradition of Daoism emerged in China around the sixth Century BCE and is considered one of the most influential ancient philosophies that continues to shape contemporary Chinese thought, practice, literature and art (Chai, 2014; Chen, 2008; Cheung and Chan, 2005). Although Daoism is often credited to Laozi’s canonical Daodejing, over time, Daoism has been subject to countless reinterpretations and transformations, blending with other schools of thought including Confucianism and Buddhism (Clarke, 2002). The ongoing rewriting of Daoism is consistent with its principles that each subject position is unique and limited, and nature is marked by constant change (Chen, 2008; Lai, 2007; Seok, 2007; Sun, 2015). However, I have also sought to avoid the ‘dilettantism’ and cultural appropriation of much Western writings of Daoism (Stewart et al., 2008, p. 34), particularly its application in management and organization studies. Although my interpretations are limited by my reliance on English language scholars, I have attempted to ground my understanding through comparing multiple translations by specialists (Graham, 1989; Kohn and LaFargue, 1998). I thus offer my interpretation of a Daoist praxis of diversity in a spirit of creativity and continual transformation. Daoism is a quietist philosophy that advocates ziran (naturalness) (Chen, 2008). In the Daodejing, the value of naturalness is expressed through the metaphor of a ruler. The text describes the ideal ruler as one who is not reviled, feared or even loved, but one whom others ‘only know of their existence’ (Laozi, 2008, chap. 17). In other words, the best rulers are those who both follow the course of nature and do not assert their influence in ways that interrupt others’ natural activities (Kohn and LaFargue, 1998). The practice of ziran is wuwei, meaning non-action (but not no action) (Chen, 2008). With change as the constant, wuwei chooses flexibility and adjustment over coercive action. Non-action has often been equated to passivity in Western terms and thus quickly dismissed from managerial practice, which is constructed as the active influence of others and the environment (Brincat and Ling, 2014; Dinh et al., 2014). Daoists, however, would reject this binary opposition, seeing the world instead as characterized by dialectics where things can transform into their opposite (Cheung and Chan, 2005, 2008). According to the Daodejing, ‘the softest things in the world overcome the hardest’, such as how water, in one form gentle and soft, can become powerfully corrosive and penetrating (Laozi, 2008, chap. 78). Within these paradoxical poetics, a Daoist leads by following, adopting an orientation of self-effacement that allows others to develop on their own paths (Kohn and LaFargue, 1998). A Daoist lens prompts a rethinking of how whiteness in diversity discourses and practices can be interrogated. Daoism cautions that the pursuit of victory through conquest will often lead to loss (Laozi, 2008, chap. 73). This view suggests that the enforcement of ‘hard’ diversity policies such as mandatory quotas for ‘minorities’ can in some cases prompt resistance and lead to failure. That is, however, not to say that wuwei sanctions the preservation of the status quo. A Daoist view of racial equality would argue that the weak will triumph over the strong, but ideally by effortlessly following the course of nature (Laozi, 2008, chap. 36). Rather than forcing change, people can bring about a politics of anti-racist transformation through spontaneously finding opportunities to catalyse change 460 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd with minimal effort (Xing and Sims, 2011). As the Daodejing states, one ‘practices non-doing and yet there is nothing left undone’ (Lao Tzu, 2012, p. 101). Methods This article stems from a wider study exploring Chinese Australian leaders across business and government. The original study was concerned with how the social construction of race informed the participants’ leadership identities. Although diversity management was not the intended focus of the original study, 18 of the 21 participants indicated the impact of diversity management on their day-to-day lives as they were marked as subjects/objects of racial/ethnic/cultural difference. The analysis draws on 18 in-depth interviews conducted between April and December 2014 with the participants who specified and discussed their engagement with diversity practices. Participants were identified initially through the author’s network of contacts and expanded through snowball sampling. The participants were selected based on their self-identification as Chinese Australian and ranged from third-generation Chinese to recent migrants. All participants identified as cisgendered, with seven identifying as women and 11 identifying as men, and were between 33 and 62 years of age at the time of interview. By taking participants’ self-identifications as the starting point, the study aimed to make amends for the difficulties of identification, belonging and agency experienced by non-white people in Australia (Ang, 2014; Banerjee and Linstead, 2001; Hage, 1998). Due to the low representation of Chinese people in positions of leadership, sampling expanded across multiple sectors. Fourteen held middle to senior management positions in media, information technology (IT), finance, hospitality and arts, and four held positions in government, among whom two also founded their own companies. Each interview lasted between an hour and two hours with a total of 25 hours and 20 minutes of formal recorded time. The interviews began with a life history approach — ‘tell me about your background, your childhood, where you went to school and your memories growing up’ — and then proceeded in an informal, unstructured way, allowing the participant to choose on which aspects of their life and career they wished the interview to concentrate. It became apparent through the interviews that by virtue of their racial identity, the participants of the study were frequently expected to engage with diversity discourses and practices in their organizations and/or the wider community (Ahmed and Swan, 2006). Despite the fact that none of the participants held positions in human resources or were formally responsible for diversity management in any way, many of them embraced what they saw as a responsibility to advocate for and foster greater diversity in Australian organizations. For instance, one local councillor started her own diversity consultancy firm and became a prolific public speaker on issues of diversity, and a manager established an interdepartmental diversity council in his organization to encourage more racially diverse recruitment and promotion practices. As interviews were conducted with an interviewer who shared their identification as Chinese Australian, this might have created a relatively safe environment for the participants to speak openly about their experiences with diversity practices. In turn, it was integral to the study’s ethical commitment to anti-racism to challenge essentialist stereotypes of Chinese people in Western imaginations and engage with participants through non-hierarchal relations as much as possible in order to produce humanizing narratives of them. As the analyses were written up, I took care to de-identify excerpts relating to each participant by using pseudonyms for all but one participant, Jeff, who refused anonymity. Other more sensitive statements are left unattributed to any particular participant altogether. I met with Melinda, who articulated the most saliently a Daoist view of diversity, seven months after her initial interview as I began writing up this article to discuss and clarify my preliminary analysis. Once the interviews were transcribed, the transcripts were coded via grounded theory techniques and procedures (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The transcripts were closely examined for the participants’ concrete descriptions relating to diversity, iteratively moving between previously coded categories and emergent themes via constant comparative analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). An UNDOING WHITENESS 461 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 open coding scheme around core categories of racial difference and diversity management practices emerged through the continuous classification and reclassification of the data. Within these core categories, sub-categories were further developed. For example, under racial difference, sub-categories included the Asian Century, understanding and commonality. Under diversity management practices, sub-categories included strengthening whiteness, self-effacement and softness. In line with qualitative research traditions, contradictions among the participants were noted through the coding process to ensure that the analysis recognized the nuance and plurality of their voices. When the topic of diversity was raised in the interviews, I was frequently confronted by the ways some participants seemed to mask and re-centre whiteness through their discourses. Their approaches contravened my beliefs as a critical race scholar educated in Australia of the ways whiteness ought to be interrogated in organizations, where I tended to think in direct, combative terms of ‘fighting’ racism and ‘challenging’ white supremacy. I offer a Daoist philosophical practice not to suggest it is a superior method for interrogating whiteness or to intimate that people who identify as Chinese share a spiritual affinity, but to honour the voices of the participants of the study and recognize the unexpected and unassuming emancipatory potential of their practices. In this way, the study seeks to destabilize the view of diversity management as something white people and institutions do to passive minority subjects and highlight instead the ways in which minority subjects can be agents of diversity in their own right. The findings are organized around two sections that first detail how Chinese Australian managers and councillors view difference, diversity and harmony via a Daoist lens and then how this translates to their diversity practices. A Daoist view of diversity The participants expressed a view of the state of diversity in Australia as a complex admixture of understanding-ignorance and difference-oneness. Melinda, a public speaker and director of a cultural diversity consultancy firm, outlined the resistance others have had to her cause: So you’ve got people who are totally all for [workplace diversity] but are blinded by the fact that there are challenges, and then you’ve got the other side, who think ‘why would I want that?’. I’ve been talking to them about work, race and gender and they … might have experienced some racism and sexism in the past, sometimes by their colleagues, sometimes by clients, but they still believe it’s equal opportunity, and that racism happens in every country. Melinda then explained how she interprets inequality via the concept of yin-yang: Melinda: I came to understand what the Tai Chi [yin-yang] symbol meant. … There’s one whole, and then there are positives and negatives in the one. Dark does not mean that, but it could mean undercurrent; something you can’t reach; underneath the surface. There’s light in the dark and there’s dark in the light. So you’re never really pure white or pure black. … So my role and how I see the world is that nothing is black or white, nothing is all right and all wrong. There’s always an element of both. Like when people talk about stamping out crime and there’s zero tolerance, how can that work? You can reduce it but you can’t have the whole population do nothing wrong. Interviewer: Do you think within this view of yin-yang that the gender, racial, class and other injustices that occur in Australian society can never be stamped out? Melinda: I think it’s true that you can’t completely stamp it out. But I think for me it’s really trying to open people’s minds. It’s almost like, for me, it’s not stamping out injustice, it’s trying to get them thinking differently. My question here attempted to ground Melinda’s more abstract example of crime to our ongoing dialogue on sexism and racism, and probe for why she may be so invested in advocating for diversity if she believed inequality could not ultimately be abolished. Melinda casts inequality as a ‘natural’, inevitable aspect of society, but does not suggest it must be passively endured. By drawing on the symbol of yin-yang, Melinda sees inequality and injustice as things to engage with, rather than 462 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd directly combat and destroy. Her response offers a view of diversity as being about working with the ‘natural’ flow of an unequal society to gently and gradually uncover the understandings of harmonyin-diversity that lurk beneath the depths of ignorance and intolerance. Melinda’s orientation is characteristic of others in the study who reproached the reductionism of seeing race relations within binary oppositions; where racism is ‘done’ to weak ethnic minorities by a strong white majority and conversely ‘fought’ against the white majority by ethnic minorities. For example, Jeff, a sales executive at an IT company, describes how his beliefs about racial inequality have changed since his undergraduate years: One of my tickets when I first ran for Students’ Council was called ‘Smash Racism’. I’d have to say my political opinions changed as I grew up. I guess I was a little bit naïve, but I was no less passionate. I was a little bit simplistic in my approach. I think as the years go by, I realized things aren’t always what they seem; I now see in a lot of shades of grey. Within a non-dualistic view of oneness amid difference, participants emphasized the commonality of human experience we share with one another. Lynn, a marketing manager of a finance company, describes her experiences with ‘difference’ at university and after she arrived in Australia in 2002: Through my studies, I started meeting people from other areas [of China] and making friends from the south. And then I came to Australia and started meeting people from different cultures and different countries so that became really interesting. I often think are we really different or are we just human beings? We have so many commonalities, but we also have so many differences that we need to embrace. I think we need to respect the differences and the diversity. … Everywhere is different so you can’t generalize an area or a group based on that. Lynn demonstrates a flexible understanding of the social constructions of difference and oneness that has been developed through encountering the various cultural categories in China and Australia. The categorization of Chinese people as a group is a relatively new and ambiguous notion that was only known outside China until the foundation of the Republic of China in 1912 when the term zhongguoren (Chinese people) was used by Chinese nationals for the first time (Wang, 2009). For many Chinese people, their cultural identities are more likely to be defined by their association with certain villages, provinces, lineages, languages or trades and occupations than with the nation (Wang, 2009). Lynn disrupts the essentialist notion of racial identity categories often promoted in diversity research. Born in the north-eastern city of Harbin, Lynn grew up with notions of the considerable cultural difference between northern and southern China. As a consequence, she sees white Australian notions of a homogeneous Chineseness as arbitrary, overly simplistic and tenuous. Lynn, however, does not see diversity as divisive and embraces instead a Daoist understanding of the interrelation between difference and oneness (‘we have so many commonalities, but we also have so many differences’). Jeff also captures this paradox of difference-oneness as he recounts what he learnt through his experience leading the Students’ Council: I learned how to deal with people from all different cultures, understanding perspective, understanding the political compass where people sit and their attitudes, their values, where they’re from. And the fact that you can have different people with different beliefs that are incongruent, but at the same time they’re both right from different perspectives. Just being able to comprehend their polarity of belief is a big thing for me. It opened up my eyes. Participants of the study further questioned a unilateral view of white people’s domination over oppressed groups. Two participants in particular shared their beliefs on why we have yet to see diversity programmes result in radical change across organizations. Thomas, a former chief information officer of a resources company considers white Australians’ potential opposition to diversity: The fear of the unknown is what causes a lot of the problem, right? We say there are great Australians. Why do they have no understanding of what we are here for, what do we mean, what is our intention? Our intention is not to conquer Australia, but they are probably scared that if there UNDOING WHITENESS 463 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 are too many Chinese, we might take over, and that’s not the case. We make this our home, this is our home. So from my point of view, the more we do in terms of getting the Australians to understand the other side … they will be part of your friendship, they’ll understand that you’re not here to destroy the country. You’re here to create wealth for Australia, so what’s the difference? Andrea, a CEO of a media company, conceded that most company directors only want diversity in small doses at the senior levels of an organization: It’s baby steps. One of the biggest problems with boards is that the Chair often wants to bring somebody else on who is like them and of course the people who are like them are white, middle-class men and so bringing on a white middle-class woman is already a big step. You bring on a different race and a woman and it’s like, ‘Oh my god, that’s a huge step too much’. Thomas and Andrea draw attention to white ignorance and fear in a characteristically Daoist observation that the strong can be weak. From this perspective, interrogating whiteness is not a counterattack against a monolithic power. Instead, the participants of the study indicate a sensitivity to the fractures within white supremacy; the dark lurking beneath the surface of the light. A Daoist praxis of diversity With diversity marked on their bodies (Ahmed, 2009), the Chinese Australian participants of the study described navigating a delicate balance between being expected by their organizations and communities to stand for issues of diversity and multiculturalism (Ahmed and Swan, 2006), yet being regarded with suspicion on whose interests they represent. A former council mayor joked that the mainstream media repeatedly asks her to comment on multiculturalism in interviews: ‘The media just quotes me when there’s a multicultural issue because I’m Chinese. I have interest in other issues too. Can’t they ask me about my interests in education and healthcare? Why are they asking me about multiculturalism? [Laughs]’. The councillor suggested that by nature of her visible difference, she is confined to a narrow notion of Chineseness, where aspects of her full human condition are overlooked or denied. While her identity is restricted to a racialized woman representing racial issues, the councillor also underscored the ways she is met with continual suspicion about her motivations and interests: ‘Sometimes I feel that even if I help 10 [white] Australians and one Chinese person, some people will still complain that I only help Chinese people’. This perception is predicated on the assumption that whiteness exemplifies the human norm and thus only white people speak for the needs and interests of the whole of society (Dyer, 1997). It also reveals ongoing anxieties about multicultural Australia grounded in a persistent groupism that demarcates ethnic groups from white Australians, singling out the former as antagonistic and demanding their compliance with white regimes (Ahmed, 2008a; Ang, 2014; Bhabha, 1994). Another participant queried the lack of racial diversity in the organization with his human resources department and described how the white manager responded with, ‘Well, what do you want? Do you want a better job? Is that what it’s about?’. This common perception of minority subjects as self-interested when they raise issues of diversity relayed by the participants of the study highlights the challenges they face in their attempts to promote diversity via direct and explicit approaches. Underlying this perception is the assumption that ‘diversity management’ is something white people do to ethnic minorities and thus its practice by ethnic minorities must represent interests fundamentally at odds with white Australia. This distrust is further shaped by gender stereotypes so that participants identifying as women, such as the former mayor, are more often suspected of caring for Chinese people over white Australians, while participants identifying as men who promoted diversity tend to be accused of individual ambition. Diversity and its management needs to be protectively guarded by white Australians whose governance is the only way to ensure it is exercised for the ‘greater good’ (Banerjee and Linstead, 2001; Hage, 1998; Stratton and Ang, 2013). 464 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd As the review of the literature discussed, existing studies have shown how conflict strategies in diversity management are often met with organizational opposition (Tatli and Özbilgin, 2009). Rather, diversity practitioners frequently need to employ business case discourses to promote wider commitment (Tomlinson and Schwabenland, 2010) and draw on discourses of inclusion to secure allies (Lawrence, 2000). Chinese Australians in this study developed alternative methods of engaging with discourses of diversity by co-opting wider discourses produced by Australian political leaders. They exhibited a tendency towards ziran (naturalness) by flowing along the discursive current of the ‘Asian Century’. They encouraged the government’s argument for Australia to engage with its Asian neighbours, framing it as the ‘wise’ thing to do. In the words of Wen, a senior executive in a financial services firm: I think there are a lot of action plans and initiatives for change coming from the Federal Government. That they have this Asian Century, that is all very good; to be more aware, to encourage Australians to invest in educating their children to speak Mandarin, understand culture. I think that is really fantastic. … Geographically we are so well positioned; it would be unwise for Australia not to take advantage of this economic power and influence in this region. And what better way to invest in generations to come than to empower them to have this understanding. David, a general manager of a telecommunications company similarly co-opted the discourses of the Asian Century: [Our] Board’s got a very, very key direction of going through Asia since the last year. But do you know who in this organization is ‘Asia ready’? … That’s how we used to tell the company what we can bring to the party, what we can bring to a company, the customer benefits, understanding the culture and dealing with the customs. In the Daodejing, a passage on the dialectics of weakness-strength states: ‘If you want to weaken something, you must definitely strengthen it. If you want to abolish something, you must definitely elevate it’ (Laozi, 2008, chap. 36). Laozi’s methodology involves doing the opposite to achieve a purpose and taking a soft and weak approach in order to overcome the hard and strong (Kohn and LaFargue, 1998). Turning conventional understandings of interrogating whiteness around, the findings suggest that the participants sought to bring about a vision for diversity in Australia through strengthening whiteness. Specifically, the participants saw their roles as being about supporting the dominant white Australians who hold formal positions of leadership in organizations and society in developing deeper understandings of diversity. Participants predominantly conceptualized developing this understanding by gently raising awareness and cultivating white Australians’ genuine interest in diversity. Jeff successfully assembled a diversity council within his company and worked to mainstream its agenda through a high-profile launch for the council sponsored and sanctioned by senior managers. He utilized the film, The Matrix, as an analogy to capture this relationship: [As] advocates of cultural competence, we are the Morpheus of this world; we are free from the rules that are bound to us by the Matrix. The leadership of this country is Neo. They’re the ones with the power. They’re the designated ones to change the public discourse, the public debates, the public sentiment of this nation. So that’d be politicians, that’d be the media, that’d be academics, that’d be public policy advisers, you name it. These are the people with the influence to change the discourse of this country’s mind. They’re the ones we have to convince. But first of all, we’ve got to wake them up to the fact that they are actually in the Matrix. Jeff, along with many of the participants, elevated white people to protagonists of a heroic narrative in which Australia rises to meet the opportunities of the Asian Century. Like Thomas and Andrea, Jeff acknowledged white people’s fear and weakness and the challenges they face in recognizing, let alone resisting, white supremacy. In order to promote the need for diversity, he appealed to normalized assumptions of white people’s destiny to lead: UNDOING WHITENESS 465 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 So how do you tell someone that they’re actually in the Matrix? And that’s the challenge. … The people who form the leadership of this nation — the prevailing culture that has put them into leadership is the very culture that they have to change in order for it to survive or do well in the next century. It actually takes a lot of courage … and it might mean that a lot of them will become defensive and not want to change because of a threat in their authority. But I’m confident and I’m appealing to the fact that they’ll understand. They’ll see the bigger picture that they themselves, the leadership of this nation, are going to be better off because of it. Because they are not going to lose their relevance in the age and century. In fact they’re going to become a pivotal player. Australia has the opportunity to become the link between East and West. While the concept of ‘Asia ready’ (Australian Industry Group, 2012, p. 1) remains vague in public discourses, participants influenced its framing as the undoing of the dominant Australian whiteness. In line with the whiteness literature, the participants did not seek to challenge white people, but rather to reshape a multidimensional whiteness that represents structural advantage, perceptions of self and others, and cultural practices (Frankenberg, 1993). This whiteness touts a superficial multiculturalism that ultimately leaves white supremacy intact when diversity and its management remain the claim of white people. Hage (1998) articulates this critical distinction at the heart of Australian white supremacy, where ethno-cultural diversity is not what we are, but something that (white) Australia has. Indeed, when read from a Daoist lens, Australia’s overt state-sanctioned multicultural agenda can be understood to weaken diversity. In strengthening diversity, we may paradoxically reproduce its commodification as something to be controlled and managed.1 Instead, Wen and David suggested a new, emancipatory practice of whiteness that requires its fundamental transformation so that Australian whiteness becomes inherently multicultural (e.g., understanding other cultures and educating white children to speak Mandarin). Moreover, participants constructed this radical anti-racist whiteness as a requisite for Australia’s survival and success in the Asian Century. China’s rise as an economic power and trade partner to Australia has indeed provided an impetus for increasing Chinese language and cultural education (Manicom and O’Neil, 2010). Yet fuelled by historical fears of an ‘Asian invasion’, Australia remains ambivalent towards China with public opinion polls in recent years suggesting increasingly negative views and declining trust in China (Manicom and O’Neil, 2010). It remains to be seen how China’s growing influence over Australia may shape Australia’s national identity. While the discourses that underscored white Australians’ benevolence and authoritative legitimacy seemingly reflected a degree of internalized racism, my extended dialogue with the participants of the study tended to reveal an awareness of the ways white supremacy pervades organizational and societal structures, suggesting that the discourses participants employed were often carefully crafted within oppositional and hostile environments. When I further questioned Jeff’s self-effacing view of his own role an hour into our interview, he articulated a Daoist notion of the importance of overcoming a preoccupation with the self towards a holistic view of harmony (Chen, 2008): Interviewer: What I’m hearing underneath a lot of what you’re saying is that you’re not saying that you see yourself as the future Prime Minister of Australia. You don’t see yourself as ‘The One’ who will make that change. It’s almost like you see yourselfJeff: As a catalyst. I’ll tell you what, I actually don’t see myself as part of the equation. I see a mission, and that’s it. I’m doing what any person in their right minds would do, and that’s to articulate as well as I can. One of my favourite quotes of all time is from Harry Truman. He says basically, ‘It’s amazing what you can accomplish when you do not care who gets the credit’. And that’s my attitude to this problem. I think the mission is above any of us. We all have a role to play, but it’s above any of us. It’s not about whether I ever become CEO, Prime Minister, or whatever. It’s got nothing to do with that. The fact is, to get diversity right, Australia will be a heck of a lot better off. In the face of white normalization where ethnic minorities are often perceived as, and criticized for, only representing the interests of their ethnic group, it was to an extent necessary for Jeff to 466 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd de-individualize racial equality. He resolutely maintained emphasis on the ‘mission’ of diversity supported with nationalistic Asian Century discourses of Australian survival and success. In critically reflecting on a more holistic view of harmony, some participants stressed the need to distinguish equality from popular discourses of diversity management. The former is described as demanding a more self-reflexive awareness of how focusing on issues such as leadership representation can overlook or reinforce class inequality (Scully and Blake-Beard, 2005). Vivian, a general manager at a telecommunications company, most saliently expressed this commitment to equality: Let’s face it. The race issues in this country are not at the top end. They’re the asylum seekers, the Cronulla riots.2 If you want to talk about race, you go to those more fundamental issues. If I had half an hour with [then Prime Minister] Tony Abbott, I wouldn’t be thinking about race, I wouldn’t be speaking about promotions, I’d be speaking about changing the language for the border Australians at that level, at the community level. It doesn’t surprise me that there’s been little focus from the top end because the people there are truly well-to-do.

### Link- Diversity

#### Their conceptualization of diversity gives all the power to satus quo whiteness

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In strengthening diversity, we may paradoxically reproduce its commodification as something to be controlled and managed.1 Instead, Wen and David suggested a new, emancipatory practice of whiteness that requires its fundamental transformation so that Australian whiteness becomes inherently multicultural (e.g., understanding other cultures and educating white children to speak Mandarin). Moreover, participants constructed this radical anti-racist whiteness as a requisite for Australia’s survival and success in the Asian Century. China’s rise as an economic power and trade partner to Australia has indeed provided an impetus for increasing Chinese language and cultural education (Manicom and O’Neil, 2010). Yet fuelled by historical fears of an ‘Asian invasion’, Australia remains ambivalent towards China with public opinion polls in recent years suggesting increasingly negative views and declining trust in China (Manicom and O’Neil, 2010). It remains to be seen how China’s growing influence over Australia may shape Australia’s national identity. While the discourses that underscored white Australians’ benevolence and authoritative legitimacy seemingly reflected a degree of internalized racism, my extended dialogue with the participants of the study tended to reveal an awareness of the ways white supremacy pervades organizational and societal structures, suggesting that the discourses participants employed were often carefully crafted within oppositional and hostile environments. When I further questioned Jeff’s self-effacing view of his own role an hour into our interview, he articulated a Daoist notion of the importance of overcoming a preoccupation with the self towards a holistic view of harmony (Chen, 2008): Interviewer: What I’m hearing underneath a lot of what you’re saying is that you’re not saying that you see yourself as the future Prime Minister of Australia. You don’t see yourself as ‘The One’ who will make that change. It’s almost like you see yourselfJeff: As a catalyst. I’ll tell you what, I actually don’t see myself as part of the equation. I see a mission, and that’s it. I’m doing what any person in their right minds would do, and that’s to articulate as well as I can. One of my favourite quotes of all time is from Harry Truman. He says basically, ‘It’s amazing what you can accomplish when you do not care who gets the credit’. And that’s my attitude to this problem. I think the mission is above any of us. We all have a role to play, but it’s above any of us. It’s not about whether I ever become CEO, Prime Minister, or whatever. It’s got nothing to do with that. The fact is, to get diversity right, Australia will be a heck of a lot better off. In the face of white normalization where ethnic minorities are often perceived as, and criticized for, only representing the interests of their ethnic group, it was to an extent necessary for Jeff to 466 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd de-individualize racial equality. He resolutely maintained emphasis on the ‘mission’ of diversity supported with nationalistic Asian Century discourses of Australian survival and success. In critically reflecting on a more holistic view of harmony, some participants stressed the need to distinguish equality from popular discourses of diversity management. The former is described as demanding a more self-reflexive awareness of how focusing on issues such as leadership representation can overlook or reinforce class inequality (Scully and Blake-Beard, 2005). Vivian, a general manager at a telecommunications company, most saliently expressed this commitment to equality: Let’s face it. The race issues in this country are not at the top end. They’re the asylum seekers, the Cronulla riots.2 If you want to talk about race, you go to those more fundamental issues. If I had half an hour with [then Prime Minister] Tony Abbott, I wouldn’t be thinking about race, I wouldn’t be speaking about promotions, I’d be speaking about changing the language for the border Australians at that level, at the community level. It doesn’t surprise me that there’s been little focus from the top end because the people there are truly well-to-do.

### Link- Rejecting Masculinity

#### Yin Yang means feminity and masculinity are inseparable- rejecting one means rejecting everything

Miller 17, Dessie Miller, Celebrating the Feminine: Daoist Connections to Contemporary Feminism in China, Master's Projects and Capstones. 613, DOA: 9/3/21, 5/19/17, <https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1607&context=capstone>, r0w@n

Ying-Yang Polarity In Chinese philosophy, the concept of yin (陰) and yang (陽) illustrates how these two elements are complementary, interdependent, and dualistic in the natural world and how they give rise to the other. Their duality is an indivisible whole and the fusion of these two elements brings the physical, phenomenal world into being. Yin and yang depict the discernment between Ames and Hall, 44. 11 Ames and Hall, 134. 12 Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 180 & 185. 13 10 right and wrong, morning and night, or male and female. As the Daodejing states, “…as soon as everyone in the world knows that the beautiful is beautiful, there is ugliness…as soon as everyone knows the able, there is ineptness…” One could not be understood nor appreciated 14 fully without the other and by understanding these elements, then one is able to understand the natural patterns and balance of nature. To take the meaning further, let’s take a look at the deconstruction and analysis of each character. For example, the radical for 陰 (yin) is 阝(fu)—左⽿ or “the left side” since this radical could be placed on the right side of the character and the meaning would be different— literally means “mound” and 侌 (yin) means “overcast,” “cloudy,” “shady,” “the moon,” and “month” (it is an old variant of 陰). The character represents the feminine or negative principle in nature, but it can also mean, for example, “shady,” “dark,” “the moon,” “female,” “implicit,” and “female genitalia.” The radical for 陽 (yang) is the same as the previous character, 阝(fu), and 易 (yi) means “easy,” “amicable,” or “to change/exchange” (it is the same character used for the I Ching 易經, or Book of Changes). This represents the masculine or positive principle in nature, but other meanings include “sunny,” “bright,” “the sun,” “male,” “explicit,” and “male genitalia.” The original meaning of yin and yang was used to describe the “shady” and “sunny” sides of the mountain respectively, but this concept evolved and became more nuanced over the centuries.15 Ames and Hall, 80. 14 For more information on Yin-Yang, see: Robin R. Wang. YINYANG: The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese 15 Thought and Culture. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 11 Furthermore, the symbolism of these two elements shows how men and women are, in fact, equal to one another and that one would not exist nor survive without the other. In many societies, yang and its development have been seen to be more valuable than the cultivation of yin since this element has been as the weaker, more inferior element; however, the women could be considered soft power and teacher to a new generation. For example, women in China were once allowed little to no education, voice, and freedom. They had to go through with arranged marriages and in order to achieve beauty—and a higher status—women from wealthy families and women from families who could afford the cost had to suffer the horrendous process of footbinding. The only way women could gain status and to be considered attractive and marriageable was by obtaining perfect-sized bound feet, or “golden lilies,” and also by giving birth to sons.16 If a woman gave birth to a daughter, she lost status and “worth” in her husband's household. A woman’s main function in society was to be a virtuous, obedient, and caring daughter, wife, mother, and possibly a widow later in life. Mothers taught their daughters how to cook, clean, and embroidery amongst other tasks that were given to women at the time. The mothers also passed on oral histories, folklore, songs, and a secret women’s script—known as nüshu (⼥書)— which was exclusively used amongst the women in Jiangyong County, Hunan. This script not only preserved songs, poems, stories, and histories of women, but it gave them a way to stay in For more information on foot-binding and its history, see: Wang Ping. Aching for Beauty: Footbinding in China. 16 New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2002. and Dorothy Ko. Cinderella’s Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. 12 touch with their female relatives and friends, as well. This gave them a voice, however soft in their patriarchal society. This is what was meant by the teaching and passing on a culture.17 Feminine Imagery in the Daodejing The Daodejing, as stated earlier, contains the concept of “proto-feminism” within its pages through the clever, poetic use of language, symbolism, and metaphors. The philosophy emphasizes non-assertive behavior, advocates for gender equality, and it celebrates the feminine, the resilient female, and the nurturing mother. This section will give examples of some of the feminine imagery and it will analyze the use of language in the canonical text. Chapters 1, 20, and 25 uses the imagery of an ineffable and dualistic nurturing mother to explain that instead of “…finding their nourishment at the marble temple of learning, the Daoists remain contented at the mother’s breast, suckled on rich milk of immediate experience and unmediated feeling.” Chapter 1 describes the ineffability and duality of the Dao, “…[t]he 18 nameless (wuming) is the fetal beginnings of everything that is happening (wanwu), [w]hile that which is named their mother.” Towards the end of Chapter 20 (“…I alone differ from others, 19 and value being nourished by the mother.” ) and the beginning of Chapter 25 (“…[o]ne can 20 regard it as the mother of heaven and earth. I do not know its proper name; I have given it the style ‘the Way [Dao].’” ) the Dao is depicted as the mother of heaven and earth who has 21 For further information, see: 宮哲兵。“⼥書：世界唯⼀⼥性⽂字。Her Story: 她們的故事 (Nüshu: The 17 World’s Only Women’s Script. Her Story: Their Stories)。” 台北：婦⼥新知基⾦會出版部，中華民國國⼋⼗年 ⼀⽉ (January 1992)。 Ames and Hall, 106-107. 18 Ames and Hall, 77 & 205. 19 Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden. Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. 2nd ed (Indianapolis 20 Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2005), 172. Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 175. 21 13 nourished all and has allowed those to have an infant-like mind; which means that the mind welcomes a vast sea of experience and unmediated feeling or judgment. Chapters 6 and 28 has more illustrative feminine imagery, such as the correlation between female reproductive organs and the reproductive nature of Dao. According to Roger Ames and David Hall states in their book, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (1998), the main metaphors that are used as to define feminine traits and characteristics—softness, weakness, darkness, tranquility, and receptivity—are “water,” “the infant,” “the valley,” “the mother,” and “the source.”22 Chapter 6, for example, states “[t]he spirit of the valley never dies; She is called the ‘Enigmatic Female.’ The portal of the Enigmatic Female is called the root of Heaven and Earth. An unbroken, gossamer thread it seems to be there. But use will not unsettle it.” Like other 23 passages, this one celebrates the reproductive abilities, the mysteriousness of the female, and her accommodatingly dark emptiness, or vacant interior, which “the valley” alludes to.24 Chapter 28 uses the metaphors, “the canyon,” “the infant,” and “the valley,” much like the aforementioned chapter. This passage also makes a reference to the symbolism of yin-yang, “[k]now the male but preserve the female…[k]now the white but preserve the black…” As 25 stated in the “Yin-Yang Polarity” section, both elements are to be fully understood and one could not exist or survive without the other. The continuity between the polarities has been a prevalent theme throughout the Daodejing. Additionally, like Chapters 6, 32, 39, and 61, Chapter 28 used Roger Ames and David Hall. Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western 22 Culture. (New York: SUNY, 1998), 91. Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 165-166. 23 Ames and Hall. Thinking from the Han, 91. 24 Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 176. 25 14 the metaphors, “the canyon” and “the valley,” to express the inexhaustible fecundity of the Dao since it is the creator and preserver all things. All things originate and eventually return to this cosmic force. Lastly, the most effective way to cultivate the world is to invariably rely on the power of inclusivity, both yin and yang elements need to be present. Again, the two, three, or 26 more become one and complete a full circle by intermixing and by being interdependent. As mentioned so far, the Daodejing is one of the few ways in which “proto-feminism” took root within Chinese culture and this concept, “proto-feminism,” has evolved over the centuries. It is argued that feminism is a relatively new phenomenon in China since it does not have a long history like feminism in Western countries; however, if Daoism was added into the discourse, then one could see that the tradition was the precursor to and how it helped shape feminism into what it is today in China. So far, we have looked at the use of language and examples of feminine imagery in the Daodejing, deconstructed and analyzed the characters of some key Daoist concepts, and we have compared Confucianism and Daoism to provide more context. Now, let’s look at contemporary feminism to see how exactly Daoism has influenced and helped shape feminism in China today. Overview of Contemporary Feminism in China Feminism has been gaining momentum as early as the late 1800’s. It has been linked to socialism—encouraging women to actively participate in their country’s society and economy in order to advance the nation and successfully build up the economy—and class ties, or equality, such as granting women equal rights and freedoms. During this time, the traditional female The tantric aspect of Daoism delves deeper into the reproductive natures on the Dao and yin-yang elements, which 26 emphasizes their complementariness and interdependency. For further reading, see: Bruce Frantzis. Taoist Sexual Meditation: Connecting Love, Energy, and Spirit. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2012. 15 image was being challenged and femininity was redefined by forbidding the practice of footbinding. However, many male reformers, who advocated for a loyal, virtuous wife and a strong, 27 healthy mother, were opposed to fully bestowing equal rights onto their female counterparts.28 Women and feminists were not satisfied with this narrow view of women and there have been several prominent Chinese feminists who helped shaped and are continuing to mold feminism and what it means in China today, such as Li Ruzhen, Qiu Jin, and five women known as the “Beijing Five.”29 Li Ruzhen’s (formerly romanized as Li Ju-Chen) novel, Flowers in the Mirror (鏡花緣 jinghuayuan), written during the Qing Dynasty (1827), used quite a number of Daoist concepts and themes throughout his novel and it did contribute to contemporary feminist thought. His book is a satiric novel that also contains romance and allegorical symbolism. History, fantasy, and satire are interwoven together. The title is also symbolic, according to the translator and editor, Lin Taiyi, of the 1965 translation. On page 9 in the introduction, it is stated that “…the word ‘mirror’ [is] meant to convey the idea that life is just an illusion.” For example, the reality 30 was that Confucianism was considered the norm in China and as the character, Old Tuo, said in The practice began during the Song Dynasty and it was officially banned in 1911, but foot-binding continued in 27 the rural areas until around 1939 (Lucy Crossley. “Pictured: The Last Living Chinese Women with Bound Feet More Than 100 Years After the Centuries-old Symbol of Beauty and Status Was Banned ” Daily Mail. 8 June 2014. http:// www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2652228/PICTURED-The-living-Chinese-women-bound-feet-100-yearscenturies-old-symbol-beauty-status-banned.html). Fan Hong and J.A. Managan. “A Martyr for Modernity: Qiu Jin, Feminist, Warrior, and Revolutionary.” The 28 International Journal of the History of Sport 18, no. 1 (2008), 28. Other people who contributed to contemporary feminism in China include Liang QiChao, reformist, scholar, 29 journalist, and philosopher, (1873-1929) and He-Yin Zhen, an anarchist-feminist, (ca. 1884-1920). For more information, see: Rebecca Karl. “Feminism in Modern China.” Journal of Modern Chinese History 6, no. 2 (2012): 235-255. DOI: 10.11080/17535654.2012.738873. Li Ju-Chen. Flowers in the Mirror. Translated and edited by Lin Tai-yi. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 30 1965), 9. 16 the beginning of Chapter 13, “The Country of Women,” “[w]hatever one is accustomed to always seems natural.” This chapter entertains the possibility of a society where the women are 31 portrayed as dominant and masculine, a Confucian society in reverse. In the chapter, “The Country of Women,” the gender roles are reversed and the society is a matriarchal one. The men are portrayed as the submissive sex and they have to raise the children and maintain a clean, orderly home. In addition, the men have to take painstaking measures to appear attractive to their female counterparts; such as undergoing the excruciating process of foot-binding in order to obtain dainty “golden lilies,” plucking their eyebrows in the shape of a new moon, and spending hours on their hair, clothes, makeup, and jewelry. The women could wear trousers, hats, and manage the affairs outside the home. They are given the masculine pronouns and the men have the feminine ones. The book was quite radical for its time, especially this chapter since it completely reversed and contradicted the Confucian norms. The understanding of Daoism in this novel stems from the religious aspect; however, in both Confucianism and Daoism, the religious and philosophical aspects overlap and it can be quite difficult to discern where philosophy ends and where religion begins, and vice versa, since they are neatly interwoven together. When I say that this novel emphasizes the religious aspect, I mean that the Daoist pantheon is one of the key elements in the novel and, like Lin Tai-yi said, Li Ju-Chen, 107. 31 17 “…when the character Tang Ao speaks of ‘acquiring the [D]ao,’ it is shown that he must first do many ‘acts of charity.’”32 Qiu Jin came from a respectable family that paid careful to and allowed equal education to the education of their sons and daughters. According to Hong and Managan, her marriage was a seemingly happy one by traditional standards; however, she eventually grew bored and by 1902 she became influenced by the movements taking place in Hunan, the center of China’s reforms.33 She eventually left her family to pursue the lifestyle of a revolutionary. Qiu Jin became a stingwilled feminist who stepped out of her traditional role as a “proper” Chinese woman by seeking “…to project a masculine image in order to acquire independence, equality, and power by transference.” She rejected what was considered to be feminine by practicing military drills and 34 occasionally dressing in men’s clothes. She stated, “[m]y aim is to dress like a man!…In China men are strong, and women are oppressed because they are supposed to be weak. I want somehow to have the mind of a man. If I first take on the appearance of a man then I believe my mind too will eventually become like that of a man.” She was a woman who believed “…that 35 through heroic deeds she might wash away the shame of her former subservience, demonstrate her patriotic [fervor] and illustrate her moral courage.” Qui Jin believed wholeheartedly that in 36 Li Ju-Chen, 13. According to Russell Kirkland in his article, “Huang Ling-wei: A Taoist Priestess in 32 T’ang” (1991), Huang Ling-wei, also known as “the Flower Maid,” (ca. 640-721 CE) was one of the few Taoist priestesses who achieved significant recognition for her charitable deeds that were carried out with a compassionate heart (“acquiring the Dao”); however, she was neglected by historians during this time period since she was not considered historically significant at the time (pg. 73). On the other hand, according to Catherine Despeaux and Livia Kohn (Women in Daoism 2003) the priestess “…attained magical powers and succeeded in ascending bodily to the immortals (pg. 124).” Hong and Managan, 32 & 34. 33 Hong and Managan, 27. 34 Hong and Managan, 38. 35 Hong and Managan, 41. 36 18 order to become independent, women must fight for their rights to education and freedom. She practiced what she preached and in 1907 she started a journal called Chinese Women’s Journal (中國⼥報 zhongguo nübao), in which she expressed her feminists ideals to enlighten women on how they have long been oppressed (foot-binding, polygamy, being confined to the inner chambers of the house, and exclusion from sports and education) and that they need not be subservient any longer. The women had to unwrap the bindings on their feet, literally and 37 figuratively, and challenge the gender roles in their Confucian culture. Qiu Jin wanted the women to understand this and she criticized the men for oppressing women and she criticized women because they accepted subjugation. In order to become more independent and empowered, women had to imagine a different social order and fight to make that a reality. This 38 was quite radical during this time and it was a defining moment for modern China, women, and feminists. Qiu Jin later became a national heroine in China and she has been a symbol of women’s rights and empowerment after her execution in 1907—where she dressed in women’s clothes since she was dying for women’s rights—due to a failed uprising against the Qing dynastic rulers. She staunchly believed in her morals and she was willing to risk her life for them. She left a strong imprint on contemporary feminism and a path for future generations. She has been portrayed in various forms of media, such as the documentary film “Autumn Gem: The True Hong and Managan, 42. 37 “If we want women to be free from men’s oppression we must be independent. To be independent we must have 38 education and learn to make a living…If women can support themselves, they will be equal to men. The whole country would not have a wasted person. The country would be strong again. Women’s education is very popular in Japan. If any of you want to come here I will help you.” [Hong and Managan, 38, and 秋瑾。“秋瑾集 (Qiu Jin’s Collected Works)。” (北京：中華書局, 1960), 32]” 19 Story of China's First Feminist” (2009) and the Chinese/Hong Kong biographical film “The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake” (2011). She is part of modern Chinese culture, discourse, and 39 political iconography; however, her poetry and essays are often overlooked. Her exceptional educational background and revolutionary ideas are reflected in them.40 Another event that sparked debate about the discrimination of women in China was the arrest of five activists for women’s rights, known as the “Beijing Five.” These five women—Wei Tingting, Wang Man, Zheng Churan, Wu Rongrong, and Li Tingting—were imprisoned for thirty-seven days due to alleged charges of picking quarrels and provoking trouble. However, 41 the activists were planning to distribute stickers on buses in order to raise awareness of sexual harassment on public transportation on May 8 (International Women’s Day), and they were arrested before they were able to begin staging their protest. Their arrest sparked heated debates around the world and it was condemned by renowned organizations and politicians, such as Amnesty International and Hilary Clinton. Other protests staged by the “Beijing Five” were Occupy Men’s Toilets in 2012 to bring focus on the unfair ratio of women’s public toilets to men’s and Bloody Brides in 2013 where the women dressed in wedding dresses with red paint smears resembling blood-stains to raise awareness on domestic violence, which has been a longstanding issue in China.42 Qiu Jin’s sobriquet, or pen name, was Jianhu Nüxia (鑑湖⼥俠), which translated to “Woman Knight of Mirror 39 Lake.” For more information, see: 鲍家麟和刘晓艺。“侠⼥愁城:秋瑾的⽣平与诗词 (Life Experience and Poems of 40 Qiu Jin)。” 第1版。南京：南京⼤学出版社，2016。and 郭延礼和郭蓁。“中国⽂库·⽂学类:秋瑾诗⽂选注 (China’s Library of Literature: Selected Works of Qiu Jin)。“ 第1版。北京：⼈民⽂学出版社，2011。 Ren Yuan. “Chinese Feminist: ‘If I Talk About Women’s Rights in China, People will Think I’m Sick.” The 41 Telegraph. 15 April 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11535311/Chinese-female-activistWomens-rights-are-seen-as-a-sickness-here.html Yuan. 42 20 The recent protests against gender inequality have become a relatively new phenomenon in China. More and more women have become aware of the gender inequality and discrimination that is still quite prominent throughout the various layers of their society. Even though it can be tricky waters to navigate, women and feminists have been coming together to voice these underlying issues. Additionally, feminists have been called derogatory names, cast in a negative light, and they have faced harassment, intimidation, and they have been subjected to pressure. Rather than quashing these protests, it has been fueling feminists in China to make sure that their voices could be heard. However, feminists may have to devise other ways in which to protest and bring awareness to these issues because the government has been cracking down hard on protestors. In a BBC News article written in 2015 by Martin Patience, “China’s Detained ‘Guerrilla Feminists,’” it was stated that “[s]ince coming to power two years ago, President Xi Jinping's government has locked up journalists, lawyers, NGO workers and activists of all stripes. He has warned against what he sees as Western ideas infiltrating China and threatening the ruling Communist Party's grip on power.”43 Feminism has long been under pressure and the recipient of negative backlash in China, especially in recent times, but it has also been gaining momentum. Even though it has been gaining momentum, women are still discriminated against throughout the various sectors of their society, such as teachers paying more attention to their male students because they are believed to be more competent than girls, universities openly excluding girls from certain majors (i.e., any engineering majors because women could not lift or operate heavy machinery and should not be away from home for too long) and national defense since, again, women are still viewed as the Martin Patience. “China’s Detained ‘Guerrilla Feminists.’” BBC News. 3 April 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/ 43 world-asia-china-32166443 21 weaker sex. Additionally, many job ads have openly excluded women or specified that they want a tall, slim, young, attractive woman working for them. For example, plane stewardesses in China should have all of these physical characteristics because they have to serve as the face of the airline. Once they become older and are no longer considered attractive by the standards of the airline, the women are given more menial tasks at the airport. Conclusion It is argued that feminism is a relatively new phenomenon in China; however, there are “proto-feminist” concepts found within the Daodejing. The idea of feminism has been evolving over the centuries and all of the aforementioned elements play an integral part in how Daoism helped shape what feminism is today in China. The Daodejing has celebrated the femininity, fecundity, resiliency, and mysteriousness of the Dao and the text has illustrated that the yin element is as equally strong and as important as its yang counterpart. Daoism has long been challenging the patriarchal, Confucian society and providing an alternate way of living and thinking. For example, women such as Huang Ling-wei and Cao Wenyi were able to step out of their traditional role as women and have more freedoms, like being religious founders and leaders. Secondly, the yin-yang elements are an intrinsic part of the reproductive nature of both the Dao and beings. These elements become one and complete a full circle through their interdependency and intermixing. There is masculinity in femininity and there is femininity in masculinity; however, the masculine has been portrayed as being more developed and competent. Daoism promotes a feminine consciousness and that the yin should be cultivated and understood. The feminine element and one’s own femininity is not a weakness. People like Li 22 Ruzhen, Qiu Jin, He-Yin-Zhen, and activists like the “Beijing Five” have understood this. Both women and feminists alike have been voicing their opinions on these underlying issues, and these types of protests have been gaining momentum as early as the late 1800’s in China. Lastly, women and feminists today will have to come up with different strategies in which to protest and raise awareness of gender inequality and women’s rights. One way they could go about this is to bring in Daoism to show China’s citizens and government that there are “proto-feminists” concepts found within one of the oldest and most influential books compiled in ancient China, the Daodejing. This would probably spark a heated debate, but it would also raise feminine consciousness, or get people to start thinking in a different way, and provide the activists a more solid counterargument

### Link- Capitalism

#### Capitalism’s formations of desire are inherently against the flow of the universe

Pranav Dayanand, 21, Does Daoism sanction a political philosophy such as anarchical individualism?, Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies, 8-28-2021, DOA: 9-11-2021, https://utsynergyjournal.org/2020/11/29/does-daoism-sanction-a-political-philosophy-such-as-anarchical-individualism/, this card has quotes from Daoist texts, those were translated by the author not me, r0w@n

However, Laozi does not necessarily advocate doing nothing, but as Li indicates, Laozi strongly advocates acting in accordance with the Dao.[12] Therefore, wuwei advocates action that does not violate the Dao. While this is somewhat vague, one can politically contextualize this to refer to Deng’s hexie shehui or ‘social harmony’. “Things that are hard and rigid are the companions of death, things that are subtle and soft are the companions of life” [13] In this quote Laozi espouses a subtle approach to societal change, which was Deng’s philosophy on how to help China transition from its Maoist past. This policy of economic gradualism can be contrasted with the legalist approach taken in the aftermath of the USSR. While Deng sought to slowly move China into the wider free-market system without disrupting the social order, the post-USSR state sought to engage in an approach of ‘economic shock therapy’.[14] In other words, a gradual approach to transition under Deng seemed to be more in tune with the Daoist proposition that one must only act under the pretext that the Dao, or social harmony is protected. While I recognize that this is only one way to contextualize the Dao, it does paint an interesting picture of Daoist influences on modern China. However, even Daoism as an expression of capitalist individualism is not an inscrutable theory. Zhuangzi often espouses the idea that a proper follower of the Dao will lose himself in pursuit of the Dao.[15] In other words, this is a contradiction to the laissez-faire economics of capitalist philosophy that believes ‘to get rich is glorious’. The apparent contradiction in Daoist belief between self-cultivation and the pursuit of the Dao also manifests in different political ideologies. If one believes in the divine right of a ruler, would it not follow that the ruler’s subject would entrust the ruler to act in accordance with the Dao? Subsequently, the subject would then forgo [their] individual self-cultivation in favour of the pursuit of the Dao, which in the political sphere would involve forgoing individual freedom.[16] Our identities and our capitalist pursuits in the marketplace are based on a sense of self that has free will and self-determination. If we do not have a sense of self, and thus have no ideals of self-determination, then it might follow that we also have no profound right to govern as we so wish to. Ultimately, Daoism also does propagate against striving for anything, which is a slight issue when it is compared with capitalism. A subsequent thought that stands as an issue when thinking of Deng’s economic capitalism in accordance with Daoism is the subsequent environmental degradation that has been paramount across the Chinese economy. Daoist imagery often has its basis in streams, forests, and rivers that have been ravaged by the capitalist economic machine. Market capitalism is thought to put human ambition above the natural elements, which is not something Daoist thinkers would be inclined to support. To go along with the theme above, the state must act while simultaneously not violating the Dao. Oftentimes, it has been reported that the Chinese state model has been complicit in environmental degradation in order to maximize the success of state-owned enterprises in the free market. If the Dao is natural, then should one not maintain that the state should act against a collective human ambition that messes with the natural order of the environment? The ambition-driven individualist often finds [themselves] at odds with the natural order of the Dao. In many ways, nefarious activities have given rise to a disruption in the natural order, leading to ecological calamities such as the melting of the polar ice caps and mass floods on a global scale. Considering Daoism warned against striving ambition when it contradicts the Dao, it appears as though it also warned against Deng’s economic model that led to these environmental outcomes.

#### Capitalism is the antithesis of Daoist Values

Schönfeld and Chen 19, Martin Schönfeld, and Xia Chen, Daoism and the Project of an Ecological Civilization or Shengtai Wenming 生态文明, religions, 9/20/19, DOA: 9/11/21, I have a pdf if u need it, r0w@n

There is a pattern of energy-flows, a way of how nature proceeds. The Daoist sage (shengren 聖 人) knows how to abide by this pattern and ‘go with the flow’. In the Daodejing 道德經, this idea is expressed in the demand “to be the stream of the universe” (c. 28), for “the universe is sacred; you cannot improve it” (c. 29).26 The reason is a pragmatic concern, motivated by self-interest: “what goes against the Dao comes to an early end” (c. 30).27 Seen in this way, the climate emergency is the outcome of not following the Dao. Instead of going with nature’s flow, humanity went against it and now risks coming to an early end in the hothouse fate. The sixth mass extinction is yet another consequence of going against the Dao, and it is also symptomatic of humanity dismissing Daoist values. Central to Daoist values is the rejection of destructiveness, domination, and competition. The Daodejing counsels, “Achieve results, but not through violence” (c. 30).28 The Daoist cherishes three core values or ‘treasures’ (san bao 三寶); they are mercy (ci 慈), frugality (jian 儉), and humility (hou 後; c. 67). The environmental crisis is the effect of disregarding these treasures: instead of mercy, civilization proceeds with a lack of empathy; instead of frugality, civilization embraces capitalism; and instead of humility, civilization indulges in hubris. Doing violence to nature shows a lack of wisdom. The Daodejing warns: “When humans lack a sense of awe, there will be disaster” (c. 72).29 Unlike religions whose practitioners indulge in climate skepticism, as the powerful Evangelical Protestant pluralities in USA, Australia, and Brazil, there is no place in Daoism for such indulgencies. Its teachings already contain explicit warnings of the new realities. Furthermore, its holy scriptures need no interpretive retrofit. Without need for exegetical modification, they can serve as spiritual framework for the challenges of the Anthropocene. Unlike Evangelicals, Daoists can simply say, we told you so. Next to the subordination of culture to nature and the precept of following the Dao, there is a third motif, which could be called ‘soft anthropocentrism’. As we have seen, the proper place of humanity is its harmonious integration in nature. Instead of dominating nature, civilization ought to aspire to a cultural paradigm of mercy, frugality, and humility. And yet, humans occupy a special place in the universe. The Classic of the Great Peace or Taipingjing 太平经, a collection of Daoist scriptures from the Han dynasty, has this to say about humans:

### Link- Anarchism

#### Anarchism pulls the state out of the dao, it should coexist with the individual- AND their transition method should be smooth, to do otherwise invites suffering and failure

Pranav Dayanand, 21, Does Daoism sanction a political philosophy such as anarchical individualism?, Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies, 8-28-2021, DOA: 9-11-2021, https://utsynergyjournal.org/2020/11/29/does-daoism-sanction-a-political-philosophy-such-as-anarchical-individualism/, this card has quotes from Daoist texts, those were translated by the author not me, r0w@n

The argument in favour of anarchical individualism is predicated firstly on an etymological pretext. The Ancient Greek root behind anarchy comes from ‘an arkei’[1], which translates to no power. The etymology of wuwei reveals something similar. Since ‘wei’’ refers to action while ‘wu’ refers to ‘lack of’, Ames makes the argument that this is similar to the etymology of anarchy.[2] Subsequently, Chapter 75 of Laozi’s Daodejing contrasts wuwei with youwei, which means ‘to do many things”. In this chapter, Laozi deplores rulers who engage in youwei and in fact says that it difficult for the ruler to rule.[3] Throughout the texts, you can find examples which praise this point of view, mainly revolving around the ruler ignoring his own personal inclinations in favour of the beliefs of his people. Therefore, the argument could be made from these conceptual texts that Daoism seems to espouse a government that primarily serves the interests of its people and allows its citizens to live freely. The issue with some of this textual evidence is that it is often selective with its quotation of the Daodejing. For example, Laozi also states that ‘ruling a big country is like cooking a small fish.’[4] In many ways this is contrary to the anarchist ideas many of these theorists would espouse but is similarly a central theme in Daoist texts. Many of the ideas that espouse Daoism as an anarchist text do so through a Western lens and fail to see that Chinese philosophy does not see the cultivation of the self in opposition to state power.[5] Elite Daoist leadership has been common throughout Chinese history. The Chinese conceive the idea of personhood differently than Western anarchists and see it as something that exists within a larger cosmological contrast[6]. On the other hand, Western anarchists view the self as something in direct contrast to the collective will. In Daoism, collective will and individual liberty are not in tension but in fact, complement each other.[7] This line of thinking would apply to Daoist conceptions of the state as well. While Daoism does focus on the ziran and the importance of self-cultivation, it does not espouse a society that is distrustful of state power. At most, one could say that the citizens and the state should be one and the same and that the ruler should not have to compel its citizens by virtue of his leadership. This Western-influenced anarchist belief is also reinforced by a false reading of historical contexts. Namely, most historians point to the preponderance of Huang-Lao Daoist thought in the aftermath of a brutal and oppressive Qin dynasty that sought to use legalist philosophy to rule with an iron fist. In its aftermath, one may say that it is possible that the Qin dynasty had led to a strong distrust of authority resulting in an individualistic Han dynastical era. Unfortunately, this is not entirely accurate given the fact that while the peasantry could self-cultivate their land without stringent tax restrictions, there was still an organized state system that emphasized cooperation. Self-cultivation was practiced as something that is part and parcel with the success of the wider state. Sima Qian, the primary historian of the Han dynastical era, appeared to espouse a system of governance like post-1978 China, wherein a laissez-faire economic system was the best way to allow the citizens to cooperate with the state.[8] In other words, the state must allow its citizens to self-cultivate themselves and their communities with minimal state intervention to optimize both the trust of its citizens and the subsequent success of the nation state. In Daoist terms: 為無為 … 無為而無不為 “To the point that one does everything non-coercively, one does things non-coercively and nothing gets undone” [9] This focuses the discussion of Daoism around the ideas of individualism in the realm of economics. As Wang and Cheng indicate, Laozi disparages any interference of governments in the market because market competition acts as the mechanism of production.[10] They base this on chapter 2 of the Laozi, which emphasizes the principle of non-interference in state governance. Within this context, one can view the reforms in Deng Xiaopeng’s post-1978 China as a return to Daoist ideology. In fact, the specific nature of the transition China has undergone can be compared to Daoism in both its structure and the way it occurred. It is a very naturalistic approach to governing a population. Deng’s belief that ‘to get rich is glorious’ seemed to propagate the capitalist system that would follow and set China on the path it leads to this day. The comparisons with Daoism are based on the idea that Daoism is a naturalistic philosophy, rather than profoundly idealist or utopian as was Maoism. According to Laozi, nature is dynamic and cannot be finitely fixed or set.[11] This contradicts the historical materialism one had seen in the first few decades of post-1949 China and set forth a belief that to control nature leads to failure. In political terms, it would be incorrect to control the natural ziran of self-cultivating nature of the human experience that seeks to protect the individual self. The belief that Daoism finds allies in Deng-style governance seems to resonate more than those who believe it to be anarchical. The Dao is often confused with what is natural by virtue of its imagery of the ‘easy flowing stream’ and its characterization as ‘indefinite and vague’. Consequently, people view wuwei through a similar light that advocates letting nature run its course. However, Laozi does not necessarily advocate doing nothing, but as Li indicates, Laozi strongly advocates acting in accordance with the Dao.[12] Therefore, wuwei advocates action that does not violate the Dao. While this is somewhat vague, one can politically contextualize this to refer to Deng’s hexie shehui or ‘social harmony’. “Things that are hard and rigid are the companions of death, things that are subtle and soft are the companions of life” [13] In this quote Laozi espouses a subtle approach to societal change, which was Deng’s philosophy on how to help China transition from its Maoist past. This policy of economic gradualism can be contrasted with the legalist approach taken in the aftermath of the USSR. While Deng sought to slowly move China into the wider free-market system without disrupting the social order, the post-USSR state sought to engage in an approach of ‘economic shock therapy’.[14] In other words, a gradual approach to transition under Deng seemed to be more in tune with the Daoist proposition that one must only act under the pretext that the Dao, or social harmony is protected. While I recognize that this is only one way to contextualize the Dao, it does paint an interesting picture of Daoist influences on modern China. However, even Daoism as an expression of capitalist individualism is not an inscrutable theory. Zhuangzi often espouses the idea that a proper follower of the Dao will lose himself in pursuit of the Dao.[15] In other words, this is a contradiction to the laissez-faire economics of capitalist philosophy that believes ‘to get rich is glorious’. The apparent

### Link- Rationalism/Util

#### Rationalism blinds us to specific circumstances, to the flow of the universe, to the people, to any policy options outside of the standard- Wu-Wei k2 eliminating the restraints

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Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously upon the ways in which we relate to each other and the world. The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict

### Link- Modernist IR

#### Modernist IR lets problems get big before it addresses them, stimulates needless desire, and prohibits spontaneity through legislated morality

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), bracketed for gendered language, r0w@n

Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, [they are] not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, [they seek] to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. 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The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict by getting state-makers to meditate. Meditative disciplines are arduous, their results are uncertain, and modernist state-makers are particularly susceptible to practising the ‘un-Chinese habit of puzzling about ultimate reality . . . independent of sense perception and reason’ (Graham, 1989, p. 234). It might not be foolish to heed the advice provided by Taoists as a result 80 Ralph Pettman of their meditations, however. This is not advice about how to gain privileged access to an external reality. It is about the particular kinds of conclusions that become available when Taoists relinquish their mental grasp of ‘categories made habitual by naming’ (Graham, 1989, pp. 234–235), and seek meditative clarity for themselves (Needham, 1956, p. 33). If this sounds too general and self-serving, we might also recall that the Taoist classics conclude that war is never a preferred activity, and that when there is an alternative, we should take it. As the Tao te ching concludes: ‘Show me a man of violence that came to a good end, and I will take him for my teacher’ (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 31, 32, 45, 72, 77). In articulating their meditations, do Taoists contradict themselves? Creel thinks so, drawing attention to the difficulty of being both purposive and contemplative (meditative) at the same time (Creel, 1970, p. 45). Ames, on the other hand, repudiates attempts like Creel’s to cast Taoism in terms of a purposive/contemplative dichotomy, or in terms of any other reading that imputes to Taoism a (political) purpose: Since Taoist political theory is propounded as a microcosm of . . . [its] metaphysics in which the operation of the political state is seen as correlative to the functioning of the cosmos, it follows that the ideal ruler can only be ‘purposive’ if in fact there is some purpose in his cosmic counterpart, the tao. [And while t]he Taoism of the Lao Tzu does acknowledge a certain natural ‘so-ness’ which exists in all things and propels them toward their own realization . . . the political theory of the Lao Tzu is certainly not purposive in the sense of advocating a specific and artificially contrived political program which enables one to seize and exercise political control . . . (Ames, 1994, p. 218, fn. 23) Are Taoists also being impractical? The authors of the Huai Nan Tze (206 B.C.E.–8 C.E.) thought so, castigating Taoists for being naïve and primitive, and for seeming to provide a ‘total repudiation of human culture’ (Ames, 1994, p. 219, fn. 34). Why should an active form of pacifism be better than any other policy, they said? Why should a deliberate attempt to craft the world to human advantage be any less likely to accord with the way the universe works than a policy of active pacifism? It is at this point that Taoists are most likely to be misunderstood. When Taoists tell state-makers to be more actively pacifist, for example, they seem to be advising them to intervene less. This is not necessarily so, however. A Taoist does not necessarily advise either retreat or quiescence. A Taoist response might be more interventionist, or it might be less interventionist. The Taoist will decide from one moment to the next what is most appropriate. If he or she does advise intervention, then he or she is not likely to Taoism and the concept of global security 81 advise that this be done in a single-minded way. All of which might be scant comfort for the harassed policy adviser, though it might be a welcome breather for the policy-maker him- or herself. It might even be a moment he or she wants to prolong. 5 Conclusion The concept of global security is articulated today in terms of many different issue-areas. The more conventional of these issue-areas are those that involve the global military balance, though even these have less conventional components to them, like the issues raised by contemporary terrorism, or contemporary piracy. The less conventional issue-areas involve those like the global balance of productivity, which is now recognized as an important part of the concept of global security (hence the significance now afforded such issues as labour migration), and the global balance of identities (hence the importance now placed on the security issues that diasporas, refugees, and migrant populations represent). To talk about any of these issue-areas is to talk in one or more of the modernist analytical languages mapped at the beginning of this article. Indeed, it is not possible to describe or explain any global security issue-area without using an analytical language of some kind. These analytical languages are part of the modernist/rationalist project, a globalizing initiative that makes, in turn, for the kind of margins manifest in environmental concerns, or in the gender concerns that the global statistics to do with women’s well-being represent. Although the modernist/rationalist project is currently hegemonic, it encounters other thought-worlds that do not work on the same assumptions. These thought-worlds include Taoism, which is the thought-world discussed here. The epistemological divide between rationalism and Taoism is a radical one. It can be bridged, but not from the rationalist side. Once it is bridged we can bring across a range of Taoist concepts to compare with rationalist ones, including the Taoist concept of wu-wei. These concepts can then be used to understand global security better, in both its developmental (‘human’) and militarist (‘strategic’) forms. Taoists do not ‘see’ the concept of global security as being about ‘order’, ‘well-being’, or even ‘truth’. They do not ‘see’ the concept of global security in the way modernists/rationalists see this concept. This can be somewhat frustrating for those who want explicit policy alternatives to appraise, since Taoism does not provide fixed policy alternatives. What Taoism does do is transgress the limits rationalist thinking sets, however, and compensates for the distortions it creates. The rationalist will insist on scrutinizing what the 82 Ralph Pettman Taoist says, but his or her scrutiny will still be compromised by his or her own preconceptions. This is why we need to keep on recasting the rationalist concept of global security in a sacral context like the Taoist one.

### Link- Communism

#### Marxism and Neomarxism fail to account for the here and now and specific circumstances

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), r0w@n

Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature

#### Socialism fails if we can’t change the fundamental disconnect between people- Daoism is the only system that does that-

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87

### Link- International Organizations

#### International organizations restrict spontaneity

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), bracketed for gendered language, r0w@n

. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, [they are] not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, [they seek] to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. 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It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. 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On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously

### Link- Labor

#### Their approach to labor comes from the wrong angle- we should be optimizing happiness not economic returns- that comes from a different understanding of labor and possession that the aff can never have

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

“Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received  methods, stipulated concepts and categories, commandments, principles, laws of nature, conventions—all of these prejudices require us to intervene and “welcome things as they come and escort them as they go,” resulting in what Steve Goldberg has described as “a hardening of the categories.” Having stored past experience and organized it in terms of fixed standards or principles, we then recall, anticipate, and participate in a world patterned by these discriminations. Sages, however, mirror the world, and “neither see things off nor go out to meet them.” As such, they “respond to everything without storing anything up.” They mirror the world at each moment in a way that is undetermined by the shape of a world that has passed away, or by anticipations of a world yet to come. As the Daodejing asks in chapter 10: In scrubbing and cleansing your profound mirror Are you able to rid it of all imperfections? In loving the common people and breathing life into the state, Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? With nature’s gates swinging open and closed Are you able to remain the female? With your insight penetrating the four quarters Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? The Daoist project is neither passive nor quietistic. Water is the source of nourishment; the mirror is a source of light; the heart-and- mind is a source of transformative energy. To “know” as the mirror “knows” is not reduplicative, but is to cast the world in a certain light. Such performative “knowing” is for one to actively interpret and realize a world with healthy, productive effect. These metaphors for xin entail a presentation rather than a representation, a coordination rather than a correspondence. “Mirroring” then is best seen as synergistic and responsive, where all of the elements are in the stream and constitute a fluid interdependent continuity. Perhaps the best rendering of the term wuyu is “objectless desire.” Since neither noncoercive action nor unprincipled knowing can in the strict sense objectify a world or any element in it—that is, make discrete and independent objects out of one’s environing experience—the desiring associated with the Daoist sensibility is in the strictest sense “objectless.” The “enjoyments” associated with wuyu are possible without the need to dene, possess, or control the occasion of one’s enjoyment. Thus, wuyu, rather than involving the cessation and absence of desire, represents the achievement of deferential desire. Desire, based upon a noncoercive relationship (wuwei) with the world and a “mirroring” understanding (wuzhi) of it, is shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to consume, but by the desire simply to celebrate and to enjoy. It is deference. Desire is directed at those things desirable because they stand to be desired. But those things which stand to be desired must themselves be deferential, which means that they cannot demand to be desired. For to demand to be desired is to exercise a kind of mesmerizing control over the desirer. In a world of events and processes in which discriminations are recognized as conventional and transient, desire is predicated upon one’s ability at any given moment to “let go.” It is in this sense that wuyu is a nonconstruing, objectless, desire. The Daoist problem with desire does not concern what is desired, but rather the manner of the desiring. Enjoyment for the Daoist is realized not in spite of the fact that one might lose what is desired, but because of this fact. The world is a complex set of transformative processes, never at rest. Wuhua , the metamorphosis of things (and not to be confused with the wu- forms), means that we can never pretend that what we seek to hold on to has any permanent status. In Daoism, transient desire is the only desire that lets things be, that does not construe the world in a certain manner, that does not seek to apply the brakes on a world of changing things. The key to an understanding of wuyu—indeed of all these wu- forms that comprise the Daoist disposition—lies in the contrast between “objects” and “objectivity.” Using Western epistemological terms, the thoughts about the world expressed in both the Zhuangzi and the Daodejing represent what we might call a realist perspective.22 Beyond the mediating confusions introduced by language, and by layers of our own distorted perceptions and tendentious categorizations, there is nevertheless, with properly Daoist qualifications, an “objectively” real world. Our task is to experience that world as “objectively” as possible. From the Daoist perspective, the problem begins when we insist that the “objective world” is a world made up of objects—namely, concrete, unchangeable things that we encounter as over against and independent of us; things which announce themselves to us by asserting “I object!” For the Daoist, the objective world cannot be objective in this sense because it is a constantly transforming flow of events or processes that belie the sorts of discriminations that would permit a final inventory of the furniture of the world. Paradoxically, for the Daoist the objective world is objectless. Sages envision a world of changing events that they can, for whatever reason, choose to freeze momentarily into a distinct pattern of discrimination, but that they recognize, when they see clearly, as being beyond such distinctions. For the Daoist, the consequence of this transformed vision is that knowing, acting, and desiring in the world are no longer based upon construal. Feeling ourselves in tension with objectified others can lead us to act in an aggressive or defensive manner in order to effect our will. Principles and fixed standards can lead us to construe the object of our knowledge by recourse to such principles. In this way, an item becomes one of a kind (rather than one-of-a-kind) or an instrument for the achievement of an end (as opposed to an end in itself). Desire motivated by an object of desire leads us to seek possession of that which is desired, allowing it significance only insofar as it meets our needs. A self that is consumed by objects of desire narrows, truncates, and obfuscates the world as it is. On the other hand, noncoercive action, unprincipled knowing, and objectless desire have the following in common: To the extent that a disposition defined in these terms is eficacious, it enriches the world by allowing the process to unfold spontaneously on its own terms, while at the same time participating fully in it. We may say that the implementation of the wu-forms allows us to leave the world as it is. But we may make this claim only if we recognize that “world” in this context means a myriad of spontaneous transactions that are characterized by emerging patterns of deference to acknowledged excellences. In Daoism the self is forgotten to the extent that discriminated objects no longer constitute the environs of the self. These three wu-forms—wuwei, wuzhi, wuyu—all provide a way of entertaining, of deferring to, and of investing oneself in an objectless world. Thus, in their governing of the people the sages are concerned with embodying and promoting the sort of acting, knowing, and desiring that does not depend upon objects. In fact, when these wu-forms are understood as the optimum dispositions of the Daoist self, whether in the person of the sage or the people, they provide us with a way of interpreting passages in the Daodejing that are frequently construed unsympathetically as recommending imposition and control. Chapter 3 is an example: Not promoting those of superior character Will save the common people from becoming contentious. Not prizing property that is hard to come by Will save them from becoming thieves. Not making a show of what might be desired Will save them from becoming disgruntled. It is for this reason that in the proper governing by the sages: They empty the hearts-and-minds of the people and ll their stomachs, They weaken their aspirations and strengthen their bones, Ever teaching the common people to be unprincipled in their knowing And objectless in their desires. They keep the hawkers of knowledge at bay. It is simply in doing things noncoercively That everything is governed properly. But the wu-forms are not just wuwei.

## 1NC – Toolbox – Alts

### Alt – Wu-Wei

#### The alternative is wu-wei, or effortless non-calculative responsiveness – rather than the instrumental action of Western critical theory, only wu-wei can disrupt the future oriented temporality of strenuous action

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In the earlier analysis of the logic of instrumental action we have seen that by way of trying to master the present for the sake of a future project, the openness of the present is closed and the present shrinks. Constant innovation becomes a means in order to desperately try to gather more experiences and rush after fugitive goals in every shorter time spans. Critical theory has been incapable of addressing the pathology of acceleration in theoretically plausible and practically promising ways by failing to see through the temporal structure underlying instrumental, purposive action. This becomes particularly obvious when we turn to the third dimension of a critical social theory, that of opening up or at least pointing to transformative dimensions. In order to distance itself from the norms prevalent in the society, critical theory in a Daoist spirit has to point to something that is not only significantly different, but also significantly better. Only when it is possible to disclose possibilities that promise to overcome or at least significantly ameliorate the diagnosed pathologies as forms of social injury are we dealing with a progressive rather than reactionary force. The emancipatory dimension distinguishes mere cultural critique from critical theory. In what way, then, does a reconstruction of Daoist conception of the relationship between optimal action and time point towards a transformative potential in the present? A charitable reconstruction of the concept of wu-wei would, without doubt, have to abandon certain metaphysical background assumptions common to ancient Daoism. In particular it is necessary to dismiss the cosmological conception of a basic harmony of the cosmos as well as the possibility of retreating from societies, including the norms governing these societies. It is not plausible to assume that the moderns have simply lost the right path or dao, because this would presuppose that there once was or always is a right path one could be led astray from. Rather, we might say metaphorically that the dao itself has become astray to express that social structures take on pathological forms. In other words, many of the pathologies of late modern societies are not directly to be attributed to the decisions of individual actors but are structural dimensions governing all spheres of society as much as theses spheres are only reproduced through human action. Actors cannot simply leave behind an unhealthy for a healthy dao, but have to uncover dimensions within dao, dimensions pointing to forms of actions, which allow for flourishing and transformation from within. Given these ramifications, a charitable interpretation of wu-wei could provide valuable insights for contemporary action theory in the context of critical social theory. I have suggested that wu-wei, understood as pertaining to the form of an action performed in an effortless way, provides a radically different conception of optimal action from that of purposive, instrumental activity. As a key normative concept, wu-wei could perhaps be better translated as, following Ames and Hall, ―non-coercive action‖ or, following Eric Sean Nelson, ―effortless non-calculative responsiveness‖28 to avoid the passive and quietist implications associated with the literal translation ―non-action‖ or ―non-doing‖.29 Since the term appears in many different contexts and different texts, it can at best serve as an umbrella concept covering a potentially unlimited set of practices, which have some things in common and diverge in other dimensions. It is fair to say that due to its high valuation in classical Chinese texts, activities or forms of responsiveness referred to as displaying the structure of wu-wei present an achievement. They are optimal forms of comportment. While they can be cultivated, they don't follow the same means-end rationality which reduces the means to be only instrumentally useful and has a tendency to wear subjects out in accelerating processes of a forgetfulness of the present. It has been argued by Chris Fraser, among others, that it is misleading to conceive of wu-wei as a form of effortless action and that it would be better to interpret it as non-intentional action instead.30 To understand why it is nevertheless justified to understand wu-wei as involving effortless dimensions rather than focusing on nonintentionality it is essential to distinguish two different senses of effort. This will allow us to avoid the misunderstanding that wu-wei would be an irrational, nonpurposive state of simply letting oneself go without conscious focus. Wu-wei interrupts a certain form of effortful striving. When referring to effort, we often conflate objective effort with subjectively experienced effort. While the former includes the exercise of physiological processes (physical effort) as well as thought processes (mental effort), the latter refers to the subjective feeling of exertion and exhaustion.31 When translating wu-wei as a form of ―effortless non-calculative responsiveness‖ (rather than nonintentional action), what is meant is not the absence of objective effort, but a decreasing amount of subjectively experienced strenuousness. Such forms of performing an action without exhausting oneself coincide with the deliberate and often skilled performance of a practice. Often effortless actions tend to coincide precisely with an increased form of identification with highly complex forms of skilled action ranging from playing chess and juggling to speaking a natural language fluently. These actions are intentional in the sense that when being asked why an actor engages in them, he could provide a reason for his action as an answer.32 However, when wu-wei-like actions are conducted well, the consciousness of these reasons and especially the conscious fixation on future goals, which needs to be actualized through significant degrees of subjectively felt exhaustion, drops out of the field of experience of the actor. One classic example to illustrate the structure of wu-wei-like actions is the story of cook Ding mentioned in Zhuang-Zi. The cook perfected the skill of cutting up oxen by learning how to use a knife with the greatest subtlety, avoiding any unnecessary friction. Ding did so by "using his cultivated intuition rather than his eyes" to cut up the ox according to his joints, avoiding all unnecessary resistance and thereby transforming an instrumental skill into an effective and context-sensitive art, an ars contextualis. 33 He perfected the art of butchery to the point of not having to blindly follow rules in a subjectively as well as objectively (with regard to the sharpness of the blade of the knife) exhausting way. This does not mean that cutting up the ox does not confront the butcher with challenges. Otherwise he would not even need a knife and would not be a master of his art. It also does not mean that Ding could not provide reasons for what he is doing. After all, he explains his philosophy of intuitive mastery to Lord Wen-Hui. However, when challenges arise, Ding stops for a moment to size up the difficulties‖ and focuses on the activity in the present in a slow and calm manner rather than wasting his energies in forms of overly strenuous and hasty acts of applying a context-independent method. The story does not simply illustrate the benefits of wu-wei-like action, but offers a normative model, which "goes beyond skill" and, in Lord Wen-Hui‘s words, illustrates ―the secret of caring for life‖.34 This secret, we may infer, is that the mastery of practices does not rest on analyzing or reasoning from principles, but in spontaneously attending to a situation intuitively and with a high degree of effortless concentration and dedication. What is significant for our context is the specific temporality of engaging in wuwei. What the concept wu-wei designates is a perfection in the moment of present action rather than a perfection the goal of which is being projected into the future. The vital organ of decision making processes is the heart-mind xin (心) rather than the disembodied intellect. ―For the ancient Chinese,‖ A.C. Graham remarks, ―the heart, not the brain, is the organ of thought. Most men use it to plan ahead, but the sage uses it only to reflect the situation as it objectively is, before [they] he responds. Like a mirror, it reflects only the present; it is not stuffed with past information which it ‗retains‘ (ts'ang [cang 藏] ‗stores, hoards‘) at the cost of being trapped in obsolete attitudes. The sage perceives and responds to every situation as new.‖35 Seen from a temporal perspective, wu-wei is intended to free the future-creating presence as it discloses itself from the perspective of an actor who is pursuing [their] task in a skillful and whole-hearted fashion in the ever new and newly experienced present. The actor is fully absorbed into performing an action well to the point of forgetting [themselves], the passage of time, as well as extrinsic goals of the action. It is easy to see that an action carried out in this way is also self-rewarding while being indirectly efficacious. The actor forgets the passage of time and is not being inhibited by the anxiety connected to goal fixation while he might nevertheless indirectly realize goals which are important to him. Being in a state of fully absorbed, meaningful and skilled action includes a heightened responsiveness to the constantly changing potential of the context surrounding the action. Rather than acting only locally by detaching a certain task, instrument or goal from its context, the actor mirrors the situation in its entirety. By freeing the attention for the demands of the present moment from the weight of a recollected past and the demands of a not yet present future, it allows an action to be spontaneous rather than being guided by a fixed plan the goal of which is projected beyond the here and now. The actor is not wearing [themselves] out in the process of being plagued by a deadline attached to his project, but exercises his energies efficiently in the mastery of the art of perfecting action. Based on the concept of wu-wei, a critique of the temporal logic underlying instrumental action that is lacking in critical theory becomes possible. In contrast to the inactivity of an apathetic person, the actor practicing wu-wei engages the present in non-instrumental ways. Rather than limiting non-instrumental action to the aesthetic realm as has been common in the European tradition from Schiller until Adorno or that of intersubjectivity as in the tradition from Kant to Habermas and Honneth, the domains in which actions can be practiced in a wu-wei-like manner is virtually unlimited. Drawing on insights arising from analytic philosophy of mind and action, Chris Fraser has shown that wu-wei can be understood as what John Searle refers to as ―the Background‖. 36 The Background is a term of art referring to the various tacit capacities, abilities and know-how an actor always already draws on whenever performing an action. These unthematized background conditions allow for an action to be successful while facing real time challenges that could not be solved through slow acts of premeditation. Classic examples would be the intuitive operation of a car's transmission or speaking a language fluently. These actions are being performed without having to calculate which gear is appropriate for which speed or consciously having to apply the rules of grammar. Fraser ultimately criticizes wu-wei-based normative accounts of action since they proclaim to do away with the kind of higher-level deliberation that he rightly considers fundamental to engaging in moral reasoning and other practices. I agree with Fraser that it is necessary to account for these forms of intentional deliberation while I disagree with him in excluding higher order intentional deliberation from the realm of potentially wu-wei forms of activities. What Fraser's reductivist analysis of wu-wei understood as nonintentional action fails to see is that reasoning is an action as well, a thought-action.37 Thought actions also always presuppose a background of tacit assumptions, including normative assumptions, meanings and associations of concepts, etc. A contemporary reconstruction of the concept of wu-wei understood as effortless non-calculative responsiveness (rather than nonintentional action) can thus also be applied to cognitive thought-acts. In the mentioned story of butcher Ding as well as other stories, Zhuang Zi emphasizes that the person who knows what he is doing often engages in thinking before he makes his moves. However, such thinking does not decide between alternative courses of action by applying rules in judgment (bian 辩). Rather, as A.C. Graham points out, such a form of attentive thinking is an intuitive sorting out (lun 論).38 Accordingly, artificial forms of deliberation, which are nonspontaneous, strenuous and fixated on following predetermined principles and future goals, are then to be distinguished from those kinds of genuine thought-actions which are conducted in a skillful, responsive and spontaneous manner with a heightened attention for and awareness of the specific needs of the evolving present. Daoism would espouse the latter while dismissing the former practices. Free intentional deliberation consists in an open encounter with intentional contents. Searle's assertion that ―intentionality reaches down to the bottom level of the voluntary actions‖39 thus needs to be extended by adding that spontaneity and effortlessness receptivity also reaches all the way up to the level of intentionality.40 Only by acknowledging that wu-wei potentially applies to all actions, including thought-acts, do we get an insight into the scope and impact of Daoist naturalism. Once we acknowledge that many of our thought contents, as Galan Strawson's puts it, ―just happen‖,41 the question becomes whether we can make any general claims about how to relate to them responsively. Actors are not simply confronted with neutral, occurring episodes entering and leaving their field of attention, but stand to their streams of consciousness in a relationship that Harry Frankfurt aptly characterizes as one of caring.42 In the process of wu-wei-like action, the actor does not distinguish between an instrumental value of intermediary goals and an absolute value of the future, final goal. Rather, as Graham shows, the only imperative of the Daoist critic of imperatives is ―respond with awareness of what is objectively so.‖43 If an action is performed in a wu-wei-like manner, the actor does not only, and not even primarily care for the realization of the goals of his action, but also cares about how well, in the sense of how attentive, the action leading to such a realization is being performed. Daoists agree that if an action is carried out well, the actor responds to streams of inherently interconnected mental and physical events in a focused and contextsensitive manner. He is in a state of acquiescence to the specificity of the task performed and the context in which it is performed. In other words, he stops to see these events as unacceptable intruders that need to be sorted out anxiously according to given rules and reified plans, but as providing occasions or invitations for actions, actions which are responsive, sensitive and focused. The implications of conceiving of optimal intentional action as not being one of an overtaxing, future-directed effort, but one that effortlessly focuses on the demands of the present, are far reaching. An action, which is not based on the logic of striving for future goals but on performing a practice well in the here and now, is the most efficacious form of practice since it does not waste its energy in fruitless confrontation. This is not to say that wu-wei-like actions could not be executed quickly. Wu-wei concerns the form rather than the speed in which an action is carried out. Whether an action is being performed quickly or slowly does not determine whether it is performed in an absorbed and responsive way. Sitting still, for example in the context of meditation, can be non-wu-wei-like in involving a lot of effort when the person meditating forces himself to sit still for ulterior goals. The skilled mastery of the juggler over his cascades or the engagement in a lively conversation, on the other hand, might be performed quasi-automatically even if involving quick and spontaneous responses. Conscious deceleration, be it through eating in a slower pace or turning to meditation, might further perpetuate the temporal logic of the instrumental calculus as long as it is performed with too much effort and connected to a focus on an extrinsic concern. The efficacy of effortless action is not one measured by calculating future gains against present costs, but one that takes into account how far the acting individual is in fact in tune with the rhythm of his or her environment by responding to challenges of that environment as they arise in ever readjusting forms. Such a process of being ―in tune‖ combines mastery and responsiveness, engagement and receptivity, order and spontaneity, purpose and disinterestedness. Effortless action is thus not subject to following a universal set of norms as the Confucians (or Kantians) would have it. Rather, a person performing actions well generates singular norms that arise from, and do justice to, the concrete situation (auto-nomous). The state of mind that a person is in while exercising noncalculative and responsive action has been compared to what psychologists have described as ―flow experience‖. Flowing action provides an antidote to the accelerating, reifying and disenchanting logic that drives instrumental action. It comes as no surprise that Zhuang Zi‘s story concerning cook Ding's perfected carving of an ox serves as a prominent example in Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's classic Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience in which ‗yu‘ (御) is being translated as ‗flow‘. 44 Flow comes about when human actors are absorbed in the present tasks at hand. The present tasks at hand are seen as providing living potentials rather than dead means for ulterior ends. When actors in flow states are confronted by a challenging task, the completion of this task lets the actor forget the past and the future. Interrupting ordinary strenuous comportment, an actor undergoing flow experiences also overcomes a reified sense of self, thereby ―dereifying‖ or liquifying, reenchanting, and decelerating his relationship to the objects [they] produces, [themselves], the act of production and his fellow human beings. Flow arises out of a balancing act that is in constant danger of collapsing either into becoming a rote routine or an overtaxing effort. The overtaxing effort brings forth unnecessary forms of reactions, while the rote routine lacks the sense of freedom and potential. The art of wu-wei thus consists in successfully striking and sustaining a balance between extreme effort and passive rule-following. If an actor is capable of sustaining such a balance, there is a harmony between his desires and will. In this sense wu-wei-kind of actions are free actions as they are characterized by Frankfurt: ―a free act is one that a person performs simply because he wants to perform it. Enjoying freedom of action consists in maintaining this harmonious accord between what we do and what we want to do.‖45 As different as the underlying temporality is, the guiding ideal of effortless, attentive actions provides a surprising overlap with the guiding Western ideal of positive freedom.

#### The alternative is wu-wei- a deferential act of habit forming

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

The compilers of the Daodejing seek rather explicitly to develop a contrast between the glimpses of insight this text strives to impart, and the substance of other philosophical doctrines. Many if not most doctrines evolve with their antecedents in an elaborate genealogy of values and ideas. These philosophical doctrines are often hierarchically structured by precepts and governing principles, and they may well require an extended course of study for their mastery and transmission. The precepts that inform these “doctrines” are professionalized by their learned “doctors,” and within their marble academies these erudites—for appropriate status and recompense— are only too glad to amaze the hoi poloi with the ashing dexterity of their philosophic thrusts and parries. What the Daodejing has to offer, on the other hand, is much simpler. It encourages the cultivation of a disposition that is captured in what we have chosen to call its wu-forms. The wu-forms free up the energy required to sustain the abstract cognitive and moral sensibilities of technical philosophy, allowing this energy, now unmediated by concepts, theories, and contrived moral precepts, to be expressed as those concrete feelings that inspire the ordinary business of the day. It is through these concrete feelings that one is able to know the world and to optimize the human experience. The abstraction of the concrete ethical dimension of such felt knowing into a formal moralist vocabulary is rehearsed in chapter 38 of the Daodejing: Thus, only when we have lost sight of way-making is there excellence, Only when we have lost sight of excellence is there authoritative conduct, Only when we have lost sight of authoritative conduct is there appropriateness, And only when we have lost sight of appropriateness is there ritual propriety. As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received 

### Alt – Wu Forms

#### The alternative is to embody the wu forms

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

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Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received methods, stipulated concepts and categories, commandments, principles, laws of nature, conventions—all of these prejudices require us to intervene and “welcome things as they come and escort them as they go,” resulting in what Steve Goldberg has described as “a hardening of the categories.” Having stored past experience and organized it in terms of fixed standards or principles, we then recall, anticipate, and participate in a world patterned by these discriminations. Sages, however, mirror the world, and “neither see things off nor go out to meet them.” As such, they “respond to everything without storing anything up.” They mirror the world at each moment in a way that is undetermined by the shape of a world that has passed away, or by anticipations of a world yet to come. As the Daodejing asks in chapter 10: In scrubbing and cleansing your profound mirror Are you able to rid it of all imperfections? In loving the common people and breathing life into the state, Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? With nature’s gates swinging open and closed Are you able to remain the female? With your insight penetrating the four quarters Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? The Daoist project is neither passive nor quietistic. Water is the source of nourishment; the mirror is a source of light; the heart-and- mind is a source of transformative energy. To “know” as the mirror “knows” is not reduplicative, but is to cast the world in a certain light. Such performative “knowing” is for one to actively interpret and realize a world with healthy, productive effect. These metaphors for xin entail a presentation rather than a representation, a coordination rather than a correspondence. “Mirroring” then is best seen as synergistic and responsive, where all of the elements are in the stream and constitute a fluid interdependent continuity. Perhaps the best rendering of the term wuyu is “objectless desire.” Since neither noncoercive action nor unprincipled knowing can in the strict sense objectify a world or any element in it—that is, make discrete and independent objects out of one’s environing experience—the desiring associated with the Daoist sensibility is in the strictest sense “objectless.” The “enjoyments” associated with wuyu are possible without the need to define, possess, or control the occasion of one’s enjoyment. Thus, wuyu, rather than involving the cessation and absence of desire, represents the achievement of deferential desire. Desire, based upon a noncoercive relationship (wuwei) with the world and a “mirroring” understanding (wuzhi) of it, is shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to consume, but by the desire simply to celebrate and to enjoy. It is deference. Desire is directed at those things desirable because they stand to be desired. But those things which stand to be desired must themselves be deferential, which means that they cannot demand to be desired. For to demand to be desired is to exercise a kind of mesmerizing control over the desirer. In a world of events and processes in which discriminations are recognized as conventional and transient, desire is predicated upon one’s ability at any given moment to “let go.” It is in this sense that wuyu is a nonconstruing, objectless, desire. The Daoist problem with desire does not concern what is desired, but rather the manner of the desiring. Enjoyment for the Daoist is realized not in spite of the fact that one might lose what is desired, but because of this fact. The world is a complex set of transformative processes, never at rest. Wuhua , the metamorphosis of things (and not to be confused with the wu- forms), means that we can never pretend that what we seek to hold on to has any permanent status. In Daoism, transient desire is the only desire that lets things be, that does not construe the world in a certain manner, that does not seek to apply the brakes on a world of changing things. The key to an understanding of wuyu—indeed of all these wu- forms that comprise the Daoist disposition—lies in the contrast between “objects” and “objectivity.” Using Western epistemological terms, the thoughts about the world expressed in both the Zhuangzi and the Daodejing represent what we might call a realist perspective.22 Beyond the mediating confusions introduced by language, and by layers of our own distorted perceptions and tendentious categorizations, there is nevertheless, with properly Daoist qualifications, an “objectively” real world. Our task is to experience that world as “objectively” as possible. From the Daoist perspective, the problem begins when we insist that the “objective world” is a world made up of objects—namely, concrete, unchangeable things that we encounter as over against and independent of us; things which announce themselves to us by asserting “I object!” For the Daoist, the objective world cannot be objective in this sense because it is a constantly transforming ow of events or processes that belie the sorts of discriminations that would permit a final inventory of the furniture of the world. Paradoxically, for the Daoist the objective world is objectless. Sages envision a world of changing events that they can, for whatever reason, choose to freeze momentarily into a distinct pattern of discrimination, but that they recognize, when they see clearly, as being beyond such distinctions. For the Daoist, the consequence of this transformed vision is that knowing, acting, and desiring in the world are no longer based upon construal. Feeling ourselves in tension with objectified others can lead us to act in an aggressive or defensive manner in order to effect our will. Principles and fixed standards can lead us to construe the object of our knowledge by recourse to such principles. In this way, an item becomes one of a kind (rather than one-of-a-kind) or an instrument for the achievement of an end (as opposed to an end in itself). Desire motivated by an object of desire leads us to seek possession of that which is desired, allowing it significance only insofar as it meets our needs. A self that is consumed by objects of desire narrows, truncates, and obfuscates the world as it is. On the other hand, noncoercive action, unprincipled knowing, and objectless desire have the following in common: To the extent that a disposition defined in these terms is efficacious, it enriches the world by allowing the process to unfold spontaneously on its own terms, while at the same time participating fully in it. We may say that the implementation of the wu-forms allows us to leave the world as it is. But we may make this claim only if we recognize that “world” in this context means a myriad of spontaneous transactions that are characterized by emerging patterns of deference to acknowledged excellences. In Daoism the self is forgotten to the extent that discriminated objects no longer constitute the environs of the self. These three wu-forms—wuwei, wuzhi, wuyu—all provide a way of entertaining, of deferring to, and of investing oneself in an objectless world. Thus, in their governing of the people the sages are concerned with embodying and promoting the sort of acting, knowing, and desiring that does not depend upon objects. In fact, when these wu-forms are understood as the optimum dispositions of the Daoist self, whether in the person of the sage or the people, they provide us with a way of interpreting passages in the Daodejing that are frequently construed unsympathetically as recommending imposition and control.

#### The alternative is to vibe with the wu forms

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

The compilers of the Daodejing seek rather explicitly to develop a contrast between the glimpses of insight this text strives to impart, and the substance of other philosophical doctrines. Many if not most doctrines evolve with their antecedents in an elaborate genealogy of values and ideas. These philosophical doctrines are often hierarchically structured by precepts and governing principles, and they may well require an extended course of study for their mastery and transmission. The precepts that inform these “doctrines” are professionalized by their learned “doctors,” and within their marble academies these erudites—for appropriate status and recompense— are only too glad to amaze the hoi poloi with the ashing dexterity of their philosophic thrusts and parries. What the Daodejing has to offer, on the other hand, is much simpler. It encourages the cultivation of a disposition that is captured in what we have chosen to call its wu-forms. The wu-forms free up the energy required to sustain the abstract cognitive and moral sensibilities of technical philosophy, allowing this energy, now unmediated by concepts, theories, and contrived moral precepts, to be expressed as those concrete feelings that inspire the ordinary business of the day. It is through these concrete feelings that one is able to know the world and to optimize the human experience. The abstraction of the concrete ethical dimension of such felt knowing into a formal moralist vocabulary is rehearsed in chapter 38 of the Daodejing: Thus, only when we have lost sight of way-making is there excellence, Only when we have lost sight of excellence is there authoritative conduct, Only when we have lost sight of authoritative conduct is there appropriateness, And only when we have lost sight of appropriateness is there ritual propriety. As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. 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Feeling ourselves in tension with objectified others can lead us to act in an aggressive or defensive manner in order to effect our will. Principles and fixed standards can lead us to construe the object of our knowledge by recourse to such principles. In this way, an item becomes one of a kind (rather than one-of-a-kind) or an instrument for the achievement of an end (as opposed to an end in itself). Desire motivated by an object of desire leads us to seek possession of that which is desired, allowing it significance only insofar as it meets our needs. A self that is consumed by objects of desire narrows, truncates, and obfuscates the world as it is. On the other hand, noncoercive action, unprincipled knowing, and objectless desire have the following in common: To the extent that a disposition defined in these terms is eficacious, it enriches the world by allowing the process to unfold spontaneously on its own terms, while at the same time participating fully in it. 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In fact, when these wu-forms are understood as the optimum dispositions of the Daoist self, whether in the person of the sage or the people, they provide us with a way of interpreting passages in the Daodejing that are frequently construed unsympathetically as recommending imposition and control. Chapter 3 is an example: Not promoting those of superior character Will save the common people from becoming contentious. Not prizing property that is hard to come by Will save them from becoming thieves. Not making a show of what might be desired Will save them from becoming disgruntled. It is for this reason that in the proper governing by the sages: They empty the hearts-and-minds of the people and ll their stomachs, They weaken their aspirations and strengthen their bones, Ever teaching the common people to be unprincipled in their knowing And objectless in their desires. They keep the hawkers of knowledge at bay. It is simply in doing things noncoercively That everything is governed properly. But the wu-forms are not just wuwei, wuzhi, and wuyu. In fact, wu- forms are pervasive in the Daodejing. One additional wu-form, for example, is wuming : translated as “the nameless,” but actually suggesting a kind of naming that does not assign fixed reference to things. In order to function effectively in negotiating our environment, we need to rely upon our ability to make distinctions. These distinctions in themselves are certainly functional and enabling, but can distort the way in which we understand our world. We can easily fall into the fallacy of what Whitehead describes as “misplaced concreteness,” reifying what is abstract and treating these hypostatized “things” as more real than the changing events of our experience. We can easily and at real expense overdetermine the continuity within the life process as some underlying and unchanging foundation. Such linguistic habits can institutionalize and enforce an overly static vision of the world, and in so doing, deprive both language and life of their creative possibilities. The referential use of language as someone’s technical morality— expressing the way the world ought to be—can too easily lay claim to the power and control that would make it so. Naming as power undermines the importantly creative aspect in the effective use of names. In a processual world—a world ever under construction—to be able to name something is to be able to trace out its concrete relation to you and the world, and on that basis, respond to it productively. While naming can be understood as an abstractive and isolating gesture, Daoist naming personalizes a relationship and, abjuring any temptation to x what is referenced, instead understands the name as a shared ground of growing intimacy. Such naming is presentational rather than just representational, normative rather than just descriptive, perlocutionary rather than just locutionary, a doing and a knowing rather than just a saying. Naming as knowing must have the provisionality to accommodate engaged relationships as in their “doing and undergoing” they deepen and become increasingly robust. Such knowing is dependent upon an awareness of the indeterminate aspects of things. The ongoing shaping of experience requires a degree of imagination and creative projection that does not reference the world as it is, but anticipates what it might become. In the Classic of Mountain and Seas, an ancient “gazetteer” that takes its reader on a field seminar through unfamiliar lands, the calls of the curious animals and birds that are encountered are in fact their own names. They (like most things) cry out what they would be. And having access to the “name” of something is not only a claim to knowing it in a cognitive sense, but more importantly, to knowing how to deal with it. Naming is most importantly the responsiveness that attends familiarity. Hence such knowing is a feeling and a doing: it is value-added. It is naming without the kind of fixed reference that allows one to “master” something, a naming that does not arrest or control. It is a discriminating naming that in fact appreciates rather than depreciates a situation. Another important wu-form is wuxin , literally “no heart-and- mind,” that might best be interpreted as “unmediated thinking and feeling.” As the Daodejing observes in chapter 49: Sages really think and feel immediately (wuxin). They take the thoughts and feelings of the common people as their own. The sages do not compose the score for social and political order. The music is the natural expression of the common people. The role of the sages is to listen carefully to the songs of the common people and to orchestrate their thoughts and feelings into consummate harmony. Since the people themselves are the immediate source of communal order, they are in this respect the emerging content of the hearts-and-minds of the sages. The heart-and-mind is the product rather than the source of the flourishing community. The people do not speak to one another because they have hearts-and- minds; rather, they have become whole-hearted members of the community through full participation in the communicating community. An obscure passage in the Zhuangzi becomes less so when we read it and its key notion wuqing as a wu-form—not “no-feeling,” but rather “unmediated feeling.” This understanding of wuqing can provide us with a useful gloss on this chapter 49 of the Daodejing. Hui Shi said to Zhuangzi, “Can someone be a person without feelings?” “Not a problem,” replied Zhuangzi. “But how can someone be called a person,” asked Hui Shi, “if they don’t have feelings?” Zhuangzi said, “Their context provides them with the appearance and the shape of a person—why wouldn’t we call them such?” “Since we are already calling them persons,” asked Hui Shi, “how could it be that they are lacking feelings?” “This is not what I mean by feelings,” replied Zhuangzi. “What I mean when I say that they are ‘wuqing’ (lit. ‘without feelings’) is that they do not injure their own persons with likes and dislikes, and are always responsive to what is natural without trying to increase life.”23 Persons such William James’s “Jack and Jill” reside in their immediate affective relationships. For such persons to lose sight of these important relations by buying into a regimen of contrived values distances them from their concrete circumstances and makes them less human than they were. Another wu-form that we find repeated in the Daodejing is wushi , interpreted as “no-business.” As a wu-form it means “to be non- interfering in going about your business.” In chapter 57, it has a specifically political application that explains itself: The more prohibitions and taboos there are in the world, The poorer the people will be. The more sharp instruments in the hands of the common people, The darker the days for the state, The more wisdom hawked among the people, The more that perverse things will proliferate. The more prominently the laws and statutes are displayed, The more widespread will be the brigands and thieves. Hence in the words of the sages: We do things noncoercively And the common people develop along their own lines; We cherish equilibrium And the common people order themselves; We are non-interfering in our governance And the common people prosper themselves; We are objectless in our desires And the common people are of themselves like unworked wood. One of the most pervasive ideas in the Daodejing that is captured in the wu-form wuzheng is “striving without contentiousness.” Chapter 66 concludes with a consideration of the conduct of the sages: “Is it not because they strive without contentiousness that no one in the world is able to contend with them?” The wu-forms that we find throughout the text all advocate a personal disposition that seeks to optimize relationships through collaborative actions that, in the absence of coercion, enable one to make the most of any situation. It is the uniqueness of each situation that requires any generalization about this optimal disposition to be stated in negative terms. A voice coach can describe the constraints that students in general might have to overcome in achieving the fullness of their talent, but all of the students must sing their own unique songs.

### Alt- Pu

#### The alternative is Pu

Hansen, Chad, 3, Daoism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 2-19-2003, DOA: 9-4-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/, r0w@n

With the importation of Indo-European Buddhism from India, wu-wei started to be interpreted via the Western conceptual apparatus contrasting desire or purpose and reason. This shaped the modern Chinese interpretation and probably undermined the ideal. It became the target of attack among “modern” Chinese who regarded Daoist “non-striving” or “purposelessness” as the source of Chinese passivity. The activist 19th century reformer, Kang You-wei (Kang have-wei) took the denial of the slogan as his scholarly name. 9.5 Pusimplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity) 樸 The Daoist “primitivist” ideal as expressed mainly in the Laozi. It metaphorically represents the result of forgetting mingnames and desires (See Wu-wei). Translations include simplicity, “raw” wood, and D. C. Lau’s more elaborate “uncarved block.” The detailed translation more sensitively expresses Laozi’s point in using the metaphor in the context of a view of names as “cutting” things into types and Laozi’s distinctive theory that such socially constructed distinctions (institutions) control us by controlling our desires. When societies adopt names or terms, it does so in order to instill and regulate desires for one of the pair created by the name-induced distinction. Thus Daoist forgetting requires forgetting names and distinctions, but in doing so, frees itself from the socially induced, unnatural desires that cause strife and unhappiness in society (e.g. status, rare objects, fame, authority). Hence: “The Nameless uncarved block thus amounts to freedom from desire.” (Daode Jing 37) 10. Texts and Textual History Questions of textual theory are the focus of the bulk of modern scholarship. They include these kinds of questions. Existence (did Laozi or Zhuangzi actually exist) Authorship (did they write the texts attributed to them?) Dating (when did they exist or write their texts?) Relations (did Laozi influence Zhuangzi?)

### Alt- Wuyu

#### The alternative is Wuyu- a refusal of unproductive desire that forces us to live in the present

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

“Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received  methods, stipulated concepts and categories, commandments, principles, laws of nature, conventions—all of these prejudices require us to intervene and “welcome things as they come and escort them as they go,” resulting in what Steve Goldberg has described as “a hardening of the categories.” Having stored past experience and organized it in terms of fixed standards or principles, we then recall, anticipate, and participate in a world patterned by these discriminations. Sages, however, mirror the world, and “neither see things off nor go out to meet them.” As such, they “respond to everything without storing anything up.” They mirror the world at each moment in a way that is undetermined by the shape of a world that has passed away, or by anticipations of a world yet to come. As the Daodejing asks in chapter 10: In scrubbing and cleansing your profound mirror Are you able to rid it of all imperfections? In loving the common people and breathing life into the state, Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? With nature’s gates swinging open and closed Are you able to remain the female? With your insight penetrating the four quarters Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? The Daoist project is neither passive nor quietistic. Water is the source of nourishment; the mirror is a source of light; the heart-and- mind is a source of transformative energy. To “know” as the mirror “knows” is not reduplicative, but is to cast the world in a certain light. Such performative “knowing” is for one to actively interpret and realize a world with healthy, productive effect. These metaphors for xin entail a presentation rather than a representation, a coordination rather than a correspondence. “Mirroring” then is best seen as synergistic and responsive, where all of the elements are in the stream and constitute a fluid interdependent continuity. Perhaps the best rendering of the term wuyu is “objectless desire.” Since neither noncoercive action nor unprincipled knowing can in the strict sense objectify a world or any element in it—that is, make discrete and independent objects out of one’s environing experience—the desiring associated with the Daoist sensibility is in the strictest sense “objectless.” The “enjoyments” associated with wuyu are possible without the need to dene, possess, or control the occasion of one’s enjoyment. Thus, wuyu, rather than involving the cessation and absence of desire, represents the achievement of deferential desire. Desire, based upon a noncoercive relationship (wuwei) with the world and a “mirroring” understanding (wuzhi) of it, is shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to consume, but by the desire simply to celebrate and to enjoy. It is deference. Desire is directed at those things desirable because they stand to be desired. But those things which stand to be desired must themselves be deferential, which means that they cannot demand to be desired. For to demand to be desired is to exercise a kind of mesmerizing control over the desirer. In a world of events and processes in which discriminations are recognized as conventional and transient, desire is predicated upon one’s ability at any given moment to “let go.” It is in this sense that wuyu is a nonconstruing, objectless, desire. The Daoist problem with desire does not concern what is desired, but rather the manner of the desiring. Enjoyment for the Daoist is realized not in spite of the fact that one might lose what is desired, but because of this fact. The world is a complex set of transformative processes, never at rest. Wuhua , the metamorphosis of things (and not to be confused with the wu- forms), means that we can never pretend that what we seek to hold on to has any permanent status. In Daoism, transient desire is the only desire that lets things be, that does not construe the world in a certain manner, that does not seek to apply the brakes on a world of changing things. The key to an understanding of wuyu—indeed of all these wu- forms that comprise the Daoist disposition—lies in the contrast between “objects” and “objectivity.” Using Western epistemological terms, the thoughts about the world expressed in both the Zhuangzi and the Daodejing represent what we might call a realist perspective.22 Beyond the mediating confusions introduced by language, and by layers of our own distorted perceptions and tendentious categorizations, there is nevertheless, with properly Daoist qualifications, an “objectively” real world. Our task is to experience that world as “objectively” as possible. From the Daoist perspective, the problem begins when we insist that the “objective world” is a world made up of objects—namely, concrete, unchangeable things that we encounter as over against and independent of us; things which announce themselves to us by asserting “I object!” For the Daoist, the objective world cannot be objective in this sense because it is a constantly transforming flow of events or processes that belie the sorts of discriminations that would permit a final inventory of the furniture of the world. Paradoxically, for the Daoist the objective world is objectless. Sages envision a world of changing events that they can, for whatever reason, choose to freeze momentarily into a distinct pattern of discrimination, but that they recognize, when they see clearly, as being beyond such distinctions. For the Daoist, the consequence of this transformed vision is that knowing, acting, and desiring in the world are no longer based upon construal. Feeling ourselves in tension with objectified others can lead us to act in an aggressive or defensive manner in order to effect our will. Principles and fixed standards can lead us to construe the object of our knowledge by recourse to such principles. In this way, an item becomes one of a kind (rather than one-of-a-kind) or an instrument for the achievement of an end (as opposed to an end in itself). Desire motivated by an object of desire leads us to seek possession of that which is desired, allowing it significance only insofar as it meets our needs. A self that is consumed by objects of desire narrows, truncates, and obfuscates the world as it is. On the other hand, noncoercive action, unprincipled knowing, and objectless desire have the following in common: To the extent that a disposition defined in these terms is eficacious, it enriches the world by allowing the process to unfold spontaneously on its own terms, while at the same time participating fully in it. 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It is simply in doing things noncoercively That everything is governed properly. But the wu-forms are not just wuwei,

### Alt- Wuzhu

#### The alternative is to vibe with the wu forms

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The abstraction of the concrete ethical dimension of such felt knowing into a formal moralist vocabulary is rehearsed in chapter 38 of the Daodejing: Thus, only when we have lost sight of way-making is there excellence, Only when we have lost sight of excellence is there authoritative conduct, Only when we have lost sight of authoritative conduct is there appropriateness, And only when we have lost sight of appropriateness is there ritual propriety. As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). 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Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received  methods, stipulated concepts and categories, commandments, principles, laws of nature, conventions—all of these prejudices require us to intervene and “welcome things as they come and escort them as they go,” resulting in what Steve Goldberg has described as “a hardening of the categories.” Having stored past experience and organized it in terms of fixed standards or principles, we then recall, anticipate, and participate in a world patterned by these discriminations. Sages, however, mirror the world, and “neither see things off nor go out to meet them.” As such, they “respond to everything without storing anything up.” They mirror the world at each moment in a way that is undetermined by the shape of a world that has passed away, or by anticipations of a world yet to come. As the Daodejing asks in chapter 10: In scrubbing and cleansing your profound mirror Are you able to rid it of all imperfections? In loving the common people and breathing life into the state, Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? With nature’s gates swinging open and closed Are you able to remain the female? With your insight penetrating the four quarters Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? The Daoist project is neither passive nor quietistic. Water is the source of nourishment; the mirror is a source of light; the heart-and- mind is a source of transformative energy. To “know” as the mirror “knows” is not reduplicative, but is to cast the world in a certain light. Such performative “knowing” is for one to actively interpret and realize a world with healthy, productive effect. These metaphors for xin entail a presentation rather than a representation, a coordination rather than a correspondence. “Mirroring” then is best seen as synergistic and responsive, where all of the elements are in the stream and constitute a fluid interdependent continuity. Perhaps the best rendering of the term wuyu

### Alt- Harmonious Consciousness

#### The alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, making the law integrative, contemplative, and reconsiderate of the Western paradigm

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87 Opposite theories like formalism and realism as well as naturalism and positivism unite in a wise contemplation to restore the Dao. 88 Others have noted that a common vision of the “Good” reduces explicit laws and legal institutions. See, e.g., ROBERT MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 241-242 (1976). 89 The Daodejing stresses this natural way. See, e.g., TAO TE CHING, supra note 5, at 73 (ch. 17). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91 When people live in balance, they accord with universal principles and experience physical, spiritual, and mental health. People will also recognize disease is a sign of imbalance and a call for adjusting a person’s consciousness. This natural health and individual responsibility will greatly reduce the need for tertiary social welfare norms. This basic change, of course, goes deeper than general legal norms. It calls for a reconsideration of the modern Western paradigm based on material separation (e.g., Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, Freudian psychology, and Weberian sociology). As already noted, Daoism shows that the explicit separation is only for an implicit connection and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. 92 At the same time, this change in consciousness calls for a return to a holistic sense, as America’s founders understood, of people and the world as inherently good (the divine essence itself). This lucidity will resolve many disputes within academic fields and between science and religious forums. It will bring the various strands of thinking back under a single roof. In this respect, Daoism is a complete account of reality. 93 91 See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 2, citing the 200 C.E. Huangdi Neijing. 92 Quantum physics certainly challenges the traditional order, and some notable physicists have already argued an approach similar to Daoism. See, e.g., DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980). See also, DAVID BOHM,ON CREATIVITY 104 (1996) (calling for a new mathematics that calls attention to a whole movement and to particular things only in some secondary function). 93 It’s not that this grand unified theory can be proven rationally, as Daoism holds, it can only be shown that it could be no other way. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 21 At some point, this change in consciousness is inevitable—as Daoism illustrates, the present situation is unsustainable. Conflict has served its purpose: disharmony is necessary for the experience of harmony and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. As described in Part III, however, the current economic conflict is dysfunctional, and the cultural and social welfare strife crippling.94 Throughout history, a conflicted society has always had to evolve or it would collapse;95 and, again, neither the law nor any other social norm could do anything about it. Many of America’s late 18th century constitutionalists understood that the conflict between liberalism and republicanism was inimical to democracy and a natural happiness. As Daoism also notes, this question is not a philosophical issue, it is a metaphysical point. Daoism demonstrates the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When the implicit connection and explicit separation come together in harmony, a person may experience Oneness and ultimately the Dao.96 This ancient wisdom is simple but profound. In the modern era, thinkers must work to understand its implications. 97 There is much to do within current fields like physics, health, and divinity. In typical 94 Externalities are much greater than most people recognize, and include things like routine pollution, war and cancer. 95 Feudalism, for example, either transitioned to a balanced homesteading (something akin to early America) or collapsed (like what happened in Russia). 96 Professor Wang also noted this point. See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 223 (describing how “[t]he whole emergent regularity is more than the sum of its parts”). 97 For the many nuances of just the Yin and Yang, see Professor Wang’s book. WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 22 Daoist fashion, this Eastern understanding calls for a Western pragmatism.98 In such a harmoniousstate may lie the solution to the world’s present challenges.

## 1NC – Toolbox – Solves Case

### 1NC – Solves Fem

#### The alternative is the best way to empower femininity

Lee 14. Kyoo Lee (Kyoo Lee, "Q," a transdisciplinary traveler, thinker, reader, writer, and the author of Reading Descartes Otherwise (Fordham UP) and Writing Entanglish (Belladonna\*), teaches Philosophy, Gender Studies, and Justice Studies at the City University of New York), 2014, "On the Transformative Potential of the “Dark Female Animal” in Daodejing," De Gruyter, published by Columbia University, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7312/mcwe16624-004/html sean!

In fact, however, it is this metaphysically abstracted and sophisticated Daoism that paves a way for the nonmainstream empowerment and diversifi cation of Daoism, including the feminist rendering of it. It is the very series or process of transferral transvaluation—the figurative codification, codified neutralization, neutralized play and playful reevaluation including reversal—of Dao as female/maternal/ feminine and as watery, flowy, billowy, that enables and allows inner revolutions and metamorphoses. Typically, dual textual or intertextual movements within Daoist discourse take place that way. Robin Wang’s succinct account of xuanpin represents such a standard move: From the perspective of the Daodejing , women are not excluded, shunned, frozen out, disadvantaged, rejected, unwanted, abandoned, dislocated, or otherwise marginalized. Instead, their basic identity, as complementary and necessary to men, is recognized as embodying the Secret of Life. Yin (female) and yang (male) embrace each other and blend into a state of harmonious balance. If any name can be given to the Dao in all things, it is “Mother.” The “Door of the Mystic Female” ( Xuanpinzimen ) is “the root of Heaven and Earth.” Just as “the softest substance of the world goes through the hardest” and “that-which-is-without-form penetrates thatwhich-has-no-crevice,” so “the Female overcomes the Male by quietude and achieves the lowly position by quietude.” Success in human affairs depends upon taking no action ( wuwei ), as in the lowly position. (WANG 2003, 67) With Wang above, one would readily recognize why and how women in Daodejing, otherwise situated “in the lowly position,” receive comparatively better treatments; imagine Aristotle trying to read Daodejing !—let alone Confucius. I also agree that xuanpin as a figure of Dao can also be mobilized rhetorically, politically, ideologically, ontologico-philo-poetically even, as I am trying to do, with and against the Confucian patriarch. That is, xuanpin demonstrates inscriptively and performatively the categorical priority or primordiality, and even, in a sense, superiority, of femaleness and femininity—as the norm, albeit invisible and inaudible.

### 1NC – Solves Gender (trans)

#### The Daoist tradition is the best way to subvert gender essentialisms

Burton-Rose 12. Daniel Burton-Rose (Daniel Burton-Rose is a Lecturer in Chinese, Asian, and World History in the History Department at Northern Arizona University. He obtained his doctorate from the Department of East Asian Studies at Princeton University in 2016 and his M.A in the Asian Languages and Civilizations Department of the University of Colorado, Boulder), 2012, "Gendered Androgyny: Transcendent Ideals and Profane Realities in Buddhism, Classicism, and Daoism," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057%2F9781137082503\_3 sean!

The most striking gender-bending imagery in Daoism contrasts starkly with female Buddhist devotees fervently praying to be reborn as men. In the male pregnancy motif, the adept is enjoined to visualize a child within his or her body. The first reference to an inner embryo occurs in the Xiang’er commentary to the Laozi 相爾老子注 (Dunhuang Stein 6852), which most modern scholars accept as an early production of the Celestial Masters.69 The Xiang’er commentary condones visualizations of body gods, but objects to visualization of the Dao itself as having a constant form and location. Those who say “nurturing the [transcendent] embryo and refining the physical form should be like making clay into pottery” 培胎練形當如土為瓦時 are teaching “false arts” and sowing “false deceptions” that “should not be adopted” as “to act upon them is the height of delusion.”70 We know from this that there were communities in the Latter Han dynasty that implemented a reading of the Laozi as a guide for physiospiritual transformation, and that concentration on an incipient body within their own played a major part in their practices. The transcendent embryo thus predates not only the advent of Inner Alchemy, which likely is not named as such until the Song,71 but the Highest Purity (Shangqing 上清) revelations of AD 364–370 in which it plays such an important part in iconography,72 often depicted suspended on a cloud above a meditating adept. The first appearance as a body god of what would become the Infant (ying’er 嬰兒) of Inner Alchemy is testified quite early in the Daoist religious tradition. The Infant appears in The Central Scripture of the Most High Lord Lao (Taishang Laojun zhongjing 太上老君 中經), also called the Central Scripture of Laozi (Laozi zhongjing 老子 中經) and the Jade Calendar of the Pearly Palace (Zhugong yuli 珠宮 玉曆 DZ 1168), which according to Kristofer Schipper “may well be the most ancient treatise of Daoist lore of the universe which has come down to us in a complete form.”73 Possibly of Latter Han dynasty provenance,74 the teachings of this text are “entirely centered around the vision of the Infant.”75 In the text, an “Infant” (chizi 赤子: literally, “ruddy baby”) is the hierogonic progeny of the Yellow Old (Man) of the Central Pole (Zhongji Huanglao 中極黃老76 or the Perfected Central Yellow [Zhong huang zhenren 中黃真人]) and his spouse the Jade Woman of Mysterious Radiance of Great Yin (Taiyin xuanguang yu nü 太陰玄光 玉女 or the Pure Woman [Su nü 素女]). The importance of this child is evident in the fact of it being the only body deity to be named in the older, Outer portion of the Most High Vistas of the Yellow Court Jade Scripture (Taishang huangting waijing yu jing 太上黃庭景外玉經 DZ 332),77 where he is identified as the Perfected Child-Cinnabar (Zi dan zhenren 子丹真人). He is nourished, in the Central Scripture, by the adept’s circulation of qi through the viscera. The relevant portion of the scripture reads: I am the child of the Tao. The human being has me too, but it is not the individual “I”. I am right there, at the canal of the stomach, facing south, sitting on a bed of jade and pearls, under a canopy of yellow clouds . . . My mother at my right; she carries me in her arms and feeds me; my father stands at my left to teach and protect me. . . . [I] Zidan of Primal Yang am nine-tenths of an inch high. When you think of me, then make me become on equal height with your body.78 In the Central Scripture, this new body created by the adept is indestructible: “Your body is of equal height with Heaven and Earth. The ten-thousand things of Heaven and Earth cannot attack you without all the gods from Heaven and Earth knowing it. Thus your body with its four limbs cannot be hurt. If it hurts or itches, the gods know it too.”79 The transcendent body that male and female devotees could produce within themselves made possible a self-promotion into the celestial realm. Like female Buddhist adepts wishing to become Buddhas, this meditation technique promised autodivinization. In section 20 of the Inner portion of the Yellow Court Scripture, we first see instructions on the creation of the “embryo transcendent”80 (taixian 胎仙, section 1) along lines common in Inner Alchemy: that is, a “transformation body” for “long-life” achieved in part by the cessation of seminal emission: By coagulating the essence and fostering the womb, you will generate a body by transformation; by detaining the embryo and causing the essence to stop, you will live a long life.81 節精育胞化生身 留胎止精可長生 In these texts, the Crimson Child is housed in the Cinnabar Field (lower and middle in the Central Scripture, upper in the Yellow Court Scripture). These would be conflated in Inner Alchemy, so that the Infant became synonymous with the Golden Elixir refined in this location in the adept’s body. Visualization practices centered on imagining a child in devotees’ bodies are remarkably consistent over the nearly two millennia of the Daoist creed. In mythology the deity Laozi himself is the product of autogenesis. As an informant in Taiwan explained to Schipper in the 1970s: 84 In the matrix, he [Laozi] sang sacred texts for eighty-one years. Thereupon he was born out of the left armpit of mother Li. At birth he had white hair which is why he was called the “old child.” . . . As to his reincarnation in the womb of mother Li, one must know that it was he himself who transformed his body from nothingness into the shape of mother Li, so was to return into his own matrix; there was never any other mother Li. People today are not aware of this fact and say that the Old Lord came [from the outside] to place himself in mother Li’s womb. In fact, it was not at all like that!82 As Schipper summarizes: “Laojun is the body of the Dao before birth; Laozi is the Old Child and the Old Master of this world.”83 In this schema there is an explicit move to coopt female generative powers for male practitioners, a strategy that expands the gendered possibilities of men while undermining the biological prerogatives and associated essentialized qualities of women.

### 1NC- Solves Util

#### Daoism is ultimately utilitarian

Hansen, Chad, 14, Zhuangzi (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 12-17-2014, DOA: 9-1-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zhuangzi/, r0w@n

Confucian dàos were broadly humanist. The earliest version (Confucius 551–479 BC) traced normativity to earlier human invention. Metaphorical trails are left by past human walkings, i.e. social practices. Language was an example of such an invented social practice which intertwined with routine activities (rituals) to yield the correct, sage-king inspired way of life—the social 道 dàopath. A later version (Mencius 372–239 BC) focused on natural human psychology. The correct path is that to which our natural moral psychology inclines us. Humans have a 心 xīnheart-mind that is naturally shangood-at normative choice and practice. Mencius may have been reacting to Mohism. Mozi (470–391 BC) had earlier initiated a shift in focus to more natural and objective, less culturally relative way of grounding normative judgment. His claim that 天 tiānnature:sky exhibited a tendency to a course leading to human utility or well-being. So humans should use that natural norm, the 辯 biàndistinction between 利害 lì-hài benefit-harm in constructing our social dào, including the norms of language. Correctly using terms is using them to mark the path of cooperative behaviors that lead to general human benefit—a social 道 dàopath utilitarianism, rather than a law or rule version. Nature intends us to follow its natural structures in ways that lead to universal human 利 lì benefit. Ethical questions thus have a single correct answer in an ideally engineered and shared normative linguistic practice. Mohist utilitarian metaethics pointed to natural realism. Daoist primitivism (symbolized by the mythical Laozi and the anonymous text known as the Dàodé Jing) was, as noted above, a further trend toward a broader ethical naturalism with anti-language absolutist implications. We should forget or ignore all social norms and practices, including linguistic ones. Utility (perhaps egoistic utility) does motivate our behavior as naturally as water follows the paths created by natural contours of earth. Language should not interfere in any way with this natural guiding interaction between us and the course(es) of nature. 4.2 The Conceptual Foci of Chinese Daoist Normative Theorizing Understanding the Zhuangzi is made more difficult by the huge differences not only in the philosophical context, but in the pervasive metaphors that structure and focus discussions of norms of behavior in the Chinese vs Indo-European classical traditions. His positions invite comparisons with modern metaethical naturalism but he does not focus them with concepts linked to grammatical sentences such as “laws” or “rules” (sentences in all form) or “facts” (sentence-sized chunks of reality) or “properties (realities corresponding to sentence predicates).” Zhuangzi used the traditional 道 dàopath metaphor together with the technical terminology developed in Mohism of shì-fēithis-not that, biàndistinction and kěpermissible.

### 1NC- Ontology Claims

#### The phenomenon of Mutual Entailing means forever forward energy- it’s all about posturing and letting the wave take you

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

In the Book of Changes, experience itself is defined simply as a succession of yin and yang phases: . This description is an abstract way of making the empirical observation that all predicates give way to their opposites: order and disorder succeed each other, and so on. This characteristic of experience is ascribed to the natural cyclical movement of qi rather than some supernatural force, and is captured and made explicit in the metaphorical language of yinyang and the ve phases cosmology. As chapter 40 of the Daodejing observes, the mutual entailing of opposites means that whatever “goes out” and becomes consummately distinct, also “returns”: “Returning” is how way-making moves, And “weakening” is how it functions. The events of the world arise from the determinate, And the determinate arises from the indeterminate. The most basic meaning of “returning” restates what has been said above. As Tang Junyi reports, cosmology is not simply a linear zerosum victory of order over chaos driven by some external cause, but rather is the endless alternation between rising and falling, emerging and collapsing, moving and attaining equilibrium that is occasioned by its own internal energy of transformation.16 This cosmic unfolding is not “cyclical” in the sense of reversibility and replication, but is rather a continuing spiral that is always coming back upon itself and yet is ever new. It is the disposition of all things that their present condition entails its opposite. The Daodejing observes in chapter 58: It is upon misfortune that good fortune leans, It is within good fortune itself that misfortune crouches in ambush, And where does it all end? This insight into the mutuality of opposites has several implications. Perhaps most obviously, young is “young-becoming-old”; dark is “dark-becoming-light”; soft is “soft-becoming-hard.” In the fullness of time, any and all of the qualities that define each event will yield themselves up to their opposites. Those who are born into the world and live to grow old will eventually die. Anything that embarks upon this journey toward fruition has in its first few steps set o on the long road home. And it is at the moment of setting out as a newborn infant that a person has maximum potency. Thus, the journey can fairly be characterized both as a returning and a gradual weakening of one’s initial promise. And it is by effectively husbanding this potency over one’s career that one is able to make the most of one’s experience. By anticipating the changes in your conditions, and by remaining focused despite the unavoidable vicissitudes that are visited upon you as you move along the continuum from beginning to end, you are able to optimize the possibilities at each moment and thus enjoy joy the ride to its fullest. Cultivating a proper disposition and being prepared for the seasons through which you pass from birth to death will enable you to consistently get the most out of your circumstances. It is your resolution—the intensity found at the center—that will keep your life experience in focus, establish you as an object of deference, and enable you to enjoy both a productive life and a healthy death. Said another way, to lose focus and stray off course along the way while on this journey will precipitate reversion. Squandered energy while young will age you prematurely. As it says in chapter 55: For something to be old while in its prime. Is called a departure from the way of things. And whatever departs from the way of things will come to an untimely end. Aggression directed at others will, like Monsieur Guillotine’s guillotine, come back to shorten your own life. Again, as in chapter 74: To stand in for the executioner in killing people Is to stand in for the master carpenter in cutting his lumber. Of those who would thus stand in for the master carpenter, Few get away without injuring their own hands. The world around us is always an interface between persistent form and novelty, the familiar honeycombed by the unexpected. The new emerges within the context and the security of the ordinary, and in due course, what was new overtakes and supplants the ordinary, and what was ordinary becomes an increasingly fragile memory for those who can still remember. In time, the new becomes the newly ordinary, and the ordinary returns whence it came

### 1NC- Solves everything

#### The alternative creates a balanced state that solves your aff and everything else

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87 Opposite theories like formalism and realism as well as naturalism and positivism unite in a wise contemplation to restore the Dao. 88 Others have noted that a common vision of the “Good” reduces explicit laws and legal institutions. See, e.g., ROBERT MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 241-242 (1976). 89 The Daodejing stresses this natural way. See, e.g., TAO TE CHING, supra note 5, at 73 (ch. 17). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91

### 1NC- Productivity

#### Daoism solves- higher effectivity, better organization, communal mindset

Helena Viera, 17, How Daoism can make a difference in business, LSE Business Review, 4-27-2017, DOA: 10-29-2021, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2017/04/27/how-daoism-can-make-a-difference-in-business/, joined PPG in March 2015 to help set up the blog. She has lived and worked in four continents as a journalist and communications consultant. Her experience includes the roles of reporter and editor for international media organizations such as Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal, and Brazil’s Globo group. She holds an M.A. in International Development from American University in Washington, D.C. and an M.Sc. in Strategic Communications from Columbia University in New York. r0w@n

Second, with this long-term perspective in mind we need to be serious about what we are doing and the potential consequences thereof. Understanding the impact of reversion and circularity on our life is vital here: things and situations are only temporary since our environment is in constant change and whatever is there can turn into its opposite. Consequentially, realising that our level of energy is essential to lead a good life makes us try to maintain it through self-cultivation. This in turn leads to a more peaceful and harmonious life, where we can take care of others by being kind, generous and supportive. Now, how can Daoist self-cultivation make a difference in business? Here are four suggestions regarding how Daoism can improve not only our personal well being but also positively influence our working environment: 1. More balance – better focus Physical as well as mental self-cultivation potentially yields more effectiveness. We are more balanced, less anxious, angry or concerned, which makes it easier to stay focused and productive. Realising that circumstances are only temporary gives us a different outlook and perception. Instead of being too concerned about present circumstances and getting lost in too many details, we can better concentrate on essential things, the bigger picture. 2. More awareness – better self-organisation Understanding the ‘logic’ of reversion and circularity makes us more aware of the consequences and interrelatedness of our actions and fosters a more serious attitude. This increased awareness promotes a better self-organisation and makes us realise the importance and relevance of even small tasks, since everything is interrelated. 3. More kindness – better cooperation A cooperative and supportive attitude, like being kind and more caring towards our colleagues helps to promote their success too, creates a better working atmosphere and hence increases overall well-being. 4. More modesty – less egoism Certain modesty prevents us from putting ourselves first or boasting too much with our achievements. It further prevents us from egoistically pursuing our own interests and yields less unethical behaviour, since we are no longer too concerned about potential financial and material gains. In brief, individual self-cultivation leads to a more positive, healthier corporate culture and hence a better working environment for all within a company through an attitude of mutual support and kindness. A better working environment in turn leads to a higher level of productiveness and effectiveness through increased identification with our job role as well as loyalty towards our employer.

# 2NR – K

## Overview

### General

Here’s the argument- tech innovation getting faster and faster- ppl not living the same lives

That means we need new theories- none of the squo ones work at solving big problems

Ie labor- strikes fail always

That’s why you endorse the alternative- reconfiguration of the way we do law making it consider social consciousness.

The alt is mutually exclusive with the plan

Extend links

The impact is huge- having harmoniousness consciousness done through the state solves back for every instance of violence they mention and way more- pratt 14 evidence is amazing

Welcome to the age of acceleration. Crises of reification are tearing apart the way we experience and our present theories aren’t gonna save us. Only Daoism can defeat the cycle

The 1AC is just another site of the temporal reification of labor- we keep working but never get any happier as our labor exists as a function of production where we never win

The 1AC’s constant run from death saps the ability to find meaning in life

Rationalism blinds us to specific circumstances, to the flow of the universe, to the people, to any policy options outside of the standard

Institutional hope fails if we can’t change the fundamental disconnect between people

Their understandings of progress are bad because they circle back to institutional demand

This means we need to make better understandings between people- something that happens through the alt

The alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, making the law integrative, contemplative, and reconsiderate of the Western paradigm- it’s about being aware of the kind of things their aff ignores- that’s what lets us create the harmonious consciousness

The alternative creates a balanced state that solves your aff and everything else- communal mindset comes first

### Space Larp

#### Desires are socially induced as a means of controlling the masses by the ruling elite. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best overwhelms desires by embracing *wuyu*- that’s Chad

#### *Wuyu* outweighs

#### Desire systems prevent any improvement- internal link to the aff

#### Outweighs on scope since the k is the internal link to all conflicts

#### The Alternative is creating a harmonious consciousness, instituting legal reforms while being mindful of desire systems that will try to corrupt them- that forces us to reconsider every element of the western paradigm.

#### Their concept of the subject isolates them from understanding these desire systems- it pretends like they and the state they role-play is above those systems.

#### Their attempt to move to socialism without changing desire systems is them acting against the flow of the universe and absent the alternative will always fail.

#### Their engagement with space while refusing to consider the way desire operates on it is a link- it proves they haven’t had the right epistemic orientation.

### Floating PIK

#### I’m going for the k as a floating pik- there were no floating piks bad warrants in the 1ar and

#### Don’t eval new 2ar responses, I don’t get a 3nr to answer them which would make debate impossible

#### Extend the theory of power

#### Desires are socially induced as a means of controlling the masses by the ruling elite. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best overwhelms desires by embracing *wuyu*- that’s Chad

#### *Wuyu* outweighs

#### Desire systems prevent any improvement- internal link to the aff

#### Outweighs on scope since the k is the internal link to all conflicts

#### If I win the theory of power and that they don’t link to it from the plan they have zero links to offense in the round- that means any risk of the alt being good is sufficient to negate

### Framing Questions

#### The Framing question for you this round is ‘how does the aff resolve desire structures?’

#### This question means two things

#### If they don’t resolve desire structures they do not win a single impact- the chad evidence is very explicit that only changing desire structures can function to create realistic change since it’s how the system is constructed

#### The world is structurally different post-alt since desire systems are reformed, this means none of their perms or disads to the alt link since they assume current desire systems

## 2NR– Frontlines–Theory

### Get to weigh case over k

CI- debaters don’t get to weigh their case impacts over daoism

1. I just outframed you- daoism’s a metaphysical epistemological question- that comes before any impacts since it critiques how you got to your impacts in the first place

A2 TJFS

Standards based on the logic of the round come first- you need logic to have debates and make decisions in the first place

## 2NR – Frontlines – LARP

#### Overview- this debate is a question of epistemological orientation- how does the affirmative look at the resolution? How do they think the world that they’re trying to help works?

#### This question necessarily comes first

#### your epistemology determines what impacts you have- if they lose the epistemology debate it means they shouldn’t have considered the advantages in the first place

#### if

### Extinction outweighs

1. Desires are controlled by the system- without an affirmation of forgetting those desires- the aff- the neg falls prey to them

That means you

1. doubt their policy evidence! It’s created by thought-systems that control your desire as a judge to vote for their squo-mainintaining stuff.
2. The aff is key since without a daoist reformation desire systems destroy any attempt they’ll make at a perm
3. The chad evidence indicates that the root cause of unnatural desires, strife, and unhappiness is non-adherence with daoism
4. Means they can’t solve their impacts since only changing desire systems will resolve suffering
5. The alt is a prereq to the aff

## 2NR – Frontlines – Generics

### A2 Anarchy DA

#### We’re not anarchist - we’re just not coercive

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

While certainly advocating a kind of political anarchism, the Daodejing still assumes the need for a hierarchical political structure, with rulers above and the common people below. What is distinctively anarchistic about the Daoist political order is the absence of coercion. The most efficacious regime is one in which those who rule carry out their administrative responsibilities so lightly and unobtrusively that the people are able to go about their business confidently without detecting any kind of manipulation. The people are never given reason to question the credibility of this unadvertised and always distant source of political orchestration, and it would not even occur to them that this good life is of anyone’s making save their own. The expectation that social order emerges from the bottom up is a strong theme in this traditionally agrarian culture in which most adjustments are the informal business of the extended family. The grand analogy that is at work here is that in its activities the human world does well to model its cosmic context. Just as the boundless field of experience in which the human life is lived unfolds according to its own internal equilibrium without being secured by anything beyond it, so the human social and political order should proceed according to its own internal rhythms without relying upon some top-down source to discipline it. The ruler’s occupation is wuwei: that is, to bring together the concerted efforts of the people and to be the coordinate around which these contributions are synchronized to maximum benefit.

### A2 Primitivism DA

#### You misread Daoism – it’s not that we shouldn’t have technology, but rather that we shouldn’t need to use it

Wenning 11. Mario Wenning (Teaches and studies Social and Political Philosophy, Intercultural Philosophy, Aesthetics at the University of Macau, has a PHD from the New School), 2011, Comparative Philosophy vol. 2, <https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy> sean!

Following this line of critique, two specific strains of objections against Daoism's emancipatory potential and enlightenment deficit thus need to be addressed up front before discussing in what sense Daoism can be interpreted as a critical theory. One line of critique is addressed at Daoism's primitivist naturalism while the other set of objections focuses on the proposed technique of emulation. The first group of critics conceives of Daoism as a reactionary movement propagating a return to nature. Such movements claim that the present is fallen when compared to an allegedly earlier, blissful state in need of being restored once again. The emulation of a constantly changing yet static environment envisioned by Daoists is criticized as a form of imitation of, or a call for a return to, a primary state of nature. The natural world is being romanticized, critics contend, as idyllic and ethically superior. This line of critique, clearly mirroring Christian conceptions of a myth of the primal fall as one finds them in Western romanticism, hardly does justice to the gist of the normative ideals we find in the oldest Daoist texts. Rather than advocating a return to a simplicity that allegedly existed in some prior historical period, Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi draw on what they describe as "natural" processes in order to delineate structures of present flourishing in the midst of "historical" crises. Nature is not what happened prior to the fall from paradise to civilization, but the spontaneity which is ever again threatened to be covered up by webs of social domination and misguided authority. That the pervasive reference to nature in Daoist texts is not the kind of naturalism the first group of critics take it to be becomes clear if we turn to the first readers of the classical Daoists who stressed that emulation is not to be misunderstood as imitation. Guo Xiang already emphasized in his commentary on the Zhuang-Zi (莊子) that blind imitation of an allegedly natural condition is useless, fruitless and harmful. 53 Imitation is useless because the world is in constant flux and different times require different responses. Imitation is also fruitless since the very act of imitation presupposes a conscious effort, which stands in the way of achieving the naturalness that is being attributed to what is being imitated. And, finally, imitation is said to be harmful in that it manifests a constant striving to overcome one's limits. This overcoming rather than acknowledging stands in the way of optimal, we could also say, non-reified practices of self- other- and world-relationships.4 The term ‗zi-ran‘ (自然), which is translated as ‗natural‘, offers itself as a denominator for such processes of spontaneous flourishing. Just as optimal forms of action seem to be performed as if by themselves and without an ulterior end, nature also is not equipped with a fixed trajectory while revealing a sense of flourishing and fittingness. The reference to naturalness serves as a critique against artificial forms of ―second nature‖ in the form of reified conceptions of morality and straining activism. In the case of an occasional reference to an allegedly better past, for example to the utopian village in chapter 80 of the Dao-De-Jing, what is depicted is not a historical past of perfected human beings who live in harmony with nature. Rather, the images serve as mythic or utopian evocations of a mode of being and power-execution which is significantly different and more sophisticated than that found in societies which use up all resources in acts of instrumental activism.5 In the case of the utopian village, what is depicted is not a primitive community before the fall. The city possesses tools such as ships and carts, armor and weapons, but they ―have no reason to deploy them.‖6 This city consists a group of people, which is technologically highly advanced while preserving the freedom to not use the technology at its disposal, to live a decelerated life in the present while leaving the technological choices at their disposal unused whenever their application is not absolutely necessary. They live in relatively small communities in order not to be governed by a distant government they do not have an obvious connection to. The imagination is used here as a laboratory to provide impulses in order to enrich conceptions of chosen, communal and sophisticated passivity in the present rather than primitive innocence or unreflective activism directed at the future.

### A2 Quietism DA

#### No – Daoism empowers bodies to respond to oppressive structures in innovative ways

Wenning 11. Mario Wenning (Teaches and studies Social and Political Philosophy, Intercultural Philosophy, Aesthetics at the University of Macau, has a PHD from the New School), 2011, Comparative Philosophy vol. 2, <https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy> sean!

Apart from the charge of primitive naturalism, a second, perhaps more forceful strain of objections against Daoism's critical potential concerns what is seen as the opportunistic strategy or set of techniques arising out of the ethics of emulation. While the first group of critics object to Daoism's alleged primitivism, the second group object to the proposed forms of emulation. This second strain of objections contends that Daoism essentially reconciles actors to the pathological structures of their age rather than empowering them to understand, oppose and, ultimately, transform or abolish these structures. This critique reflects a long tradition of accusing Daoism of promoting a problematic form of quietism. Rather than resisting problematic processes of change, they are said to accept these phenomena as unchangeable. The best one can do, Daoists seem to suggest, is to use what is problematic but here to stay to one's advantage. The enfent terrible of contemporary philosophy Slavoi Zizek puts it as follows: The recourse to Taoism or Buddhism offers a way out of this predicament which definitely work better than the desperate escape into old traditions: instead of trying to cope with the accelerating rhythm of the technological progress and social changes, one should rather renounce the very endeavor to retain control over what goes on, rejecting it as the expression of the modern logic of domination - one should, instead, ―let oneself go,‖ drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference towards the mad dance of the accelerated process, a distance based on the insight that all this social and technological upheaval is ultimately just a non-substantial proliferation of semblances which do not really concern the innermost kernel of our being... One is almost tempted to resuscitate here the old infamous Marxist cliché of religion as the ―opium of the people,‖ as the imaginary supplement of the terrestrial misery: the ―Western Buddhist‖ meditative stance is arguably the most efficient way, for us, to fully participate in the capitalist dynamics, while retaining the appearance of mental sanity. If Max Weber were to live today, he would definitely write a second, supplementary, volume to his Protestant Ethic, entitled The Taoist Ethic and the Spirit of the Global Capitalism. Just as the charge against Daoism‘s alleged primitivism, Zizek's interpretation seems mistaken to me. It might be a legitimate response to certain ―Eurodaoist‖8 forms of lifestyle philosophies and new age wisdom literature propagating that a spiritual change will automatically lead to a transformation of the environing system parameters. What the objection fails to acknowledge and do justice to, though, is the emancipatory impulse behind Daoism. Rather than opposing one's changing environment with outdated images of bliss, by emulating this environment in constantly readjusting ways like a river adjusts its course, actors reclaim naturalness in their action and become empowered. Such an empowerment does not proceed by mastering the world through one's purposive efforts, but emancipates itself by responding to the environment in the form of adjusting to dynamic processes in refined and often subversive ways.

### A2 Situationality means endorses bad shit

### A2 No Universal Philosophy

### A2 Authoritarianism DA

### A2

# Card Dump

#### Awareness matters

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

The Daodejing encourages a comprehensive, processual view of experience that requires a full understanding of the larger picture and the ability to locate and appreciate the particular event within it. This broad view of the field of experience allows one to contextualize particular events, and it provides the peripheral vision needed to stay focused at the center while at the same time anticipating future turns. What does it mean to achieve resolution in one’s disposition by “keeping to the center” and “remaining focused”? By appealing to what Tang Junyi has captured in the expression yiduo bufenguan — —translatable as “the inseparability of one and many, of continuity and multiplicity, of dao and the myriad of insistent particulars (de)”—we can identify two mutually reinforcing levels of awareness advocated in the Daodejing: what we might call focal awareness and field awareness. In order to influence and anticipate the general flow of circumstances, we must have a focused awareness of each of the particular events that constitute our experience. We must be aware of the one as it is implicated in and influences the many. This kind of awareness is to see the world focally in terms of the insistent particulars (de) that constitute it. And in order to best understand any one of these events and bring it fully into focus, we must be aware of the field of conditions that conspire to sponsor and sustain it. We must be aware of the many conditions as they are implicated in and are continuous with the one event. This kind of awareness is to see the insistent particular more broadly in terms of the continuous flow of experience (dao). The field can only be entered through the particular focus, and the complexity of the focus can only be appreciated by extending the field. Thus, a focal awareness and a field awareness presuppose each other. One insight governing field awareness is that it requires a full cognizance of the mutual entailment of opposites, allowing one to track one’s collaboration in any particular situation through its inevitable process of reversion. It foregrounds the relational character of the elements within the matrix of events, and the symbiotic continuities that obtain among them. This kind of insight —the capacity to see where a situation has come from and to anticipate where it is going—discourages any proclivity one might have to isolate things, and to make exclusive judgments about them on the basis of any particular phase in their continuing narrative. A student of the martial arts may become discouraged because his or her initial attempts at reproducing the proper form of a roundhouse kick are slow and embarrassingly unsuccessful, while at the same time other more supple students may gain immediate proficiency. A field awareness would anticipate that this student’s initial lack of suppleness will, in the course of training, be transformed into the tension that, like a taut spring, produces the power of the properly executed technique. A weakness becomes a strength when what is inflexible becomes more supple. Focal awareness, on the other hand, is the full appreciation of the particular foci that constitute any particular field as the concrete medium through which field awareness is sustained. A subtle understanding of the uniqueness of each event and the attention to the minutia that affect it enables one to anticipate the evolving order, and to encourage or discourage fluctuations at an incipient phase before they have evolved into the full-blown weight of circumstances. All major events are modest in their beginnings, and minor alterations introduced at an early stage of an ongoing event can have cascading consequences for the outcome. Several defining aspects of focal order condition our awareness of it. The first of these conditions is the temporal immediacy of the continuing present: order is always located in the “very now.” The second condition is spatial immediacy: order starts here and goes there. Third, focal order is always collaborative: all relations, while they are intrinsic and thus constitutive, are also projective and recursive. And finally, equilibrium in one’s disposition allows one to contextualize events on their own terms and to achieve an optimally productive harmony. The “art” in any martial art lies in tailoring it to the strengths and weaknesses, both psychological and physical, of the particular student. The fullest degree of competence comes as a function of optimizing this uniqueness. A great deal of care must be taken at the most elementary stages of training to establish “habits of mind and body,” again both psychological and physical, that lead to a maximizing of the developing skill and allow for the emergence of one’s particularity. Training is a combination of awareness and feeling. And one must remain resolutely focused in one’s entire person through the changing seasons of one’s practice. Success in the martial arts, as in all experience, lies ultimately in the satisfaction students gain in knowing that they have made the most of their experience in all of its changing phases. A full appreciation of particularity requires that we understand and be responsive to the complex patterns of relatedness implicated in any event. These patterns are endlessly manifold and diverse, and their ever-changing novelty makes them constantly unique and distinctive. But again this novelty is always ab initio and in situ, occurring within an already familiar context. Indeterminacy and the possibility for spontaneity are real, and there are gaps in the sequence of events that preclude absolute predictability and precise causal analysis. But there is also a fluid continuity that is captured in expressions such as “passing” and “returning.” It is in appreciating both this continuity and the emergent novelty of experience that we are able to deal with events in terms of the mutual implication of opposites. The Daodejing enjoins us to cultivate those habits of awareness that allow us to plumb and appreciate the magic of the ordinary and the everyday. Indeed, it is by enchanting the routine that we are on the way to making this life truly significant.

#### What is waymaking? It requires intimate connection to the constantly changing foci of experience

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, sean!

Way-making is participatory, and is thus influenced by the character of those who would act to extend it. While fluid and processual, it contains within it the eventful phenomena we identify as those “things” and “images” that make up our lives, including of course ourselves. This emerging field of experience is autogenerative, with the energy of transformation residing within it. The seminal concentrations of qi are fecund, giving birth to the myriad things around us, transforming as one thing becomes another. The under- determinacy of these unique constituents makes their boundaries ever porous, but even more so at the beginning of their ascendancy and in their decline. Way-making as the unfolding field of experience is the unsummed totality of things and events. It is unsummed because it is unbounded, and can only be known from one perspective or another. There is no single-ordered whole, no perspective outside of it. Each of the foci that in total constitute experience is holographic in construing its own field of dynamic, transforming relationships. There is a recurrent kind of expression in the Daodejing that ends several chapters, including this one: “By this (yici).” The answer to the question, “How do we know that this is so?” is “By this.” This question, rephrased, is “What is your perspective on this?” Hence, the question “How?” also means “Whence?” The emphasis in this Daoist epistemology of feeling, then, is neither the external environs as an object of knowledge nor the solitary knower as subject, but upon the site at which the act of knowing takes place, and the range and quality of relationships that constitute this site. Given the qualitative dimension of knowing, implicit in this question, “How?” is “How well?” That is, how productive is the knowing of the world in this way? The Zhuangzi contains a passage in which this notion of “locus” or “place” is presented as being integral to what it means to know: Zhuangzi and Hui Shi were strolling across the bridge over the Hao river. Zhuangzi observed, “The minnows swim out and about as they please—this is the way they enjoy themselves.” Huizi replied, “You are not a fish—how do you know what they enjoy?” Zhuangzi returned, “You are not me—how do you know that I don’t know what is enjoyable for the fish?” Huizi said, “I am not you, so I certainly don’t know what you know; but it follows that, since you are certainly not the fish, you don’t know what is enjoyment for the fish either.” Zhuangzi said, “Let’s get back to your basic question. When you asked ‘From where do you know what the fish enjoy?’ you already knew that I know what the fish enjoy, or you wouldn’t have asked me. I know it from here above the Hao river.”52 Angus Graham, in interpreting this passage, observes that the expression anzhi can mean both “how do you know...” and “from where do you know...” But Zhuangzi is not just depending upon this linguistic ambiguity in order to win a sophistical argument. He has a more philosophic point to make: He wants to deny the “objectivity” of knowledge in the sense of the independence of the world known, from the knower. For Zhuangzi, knowledge is performative and a function of fruitful correlations. It is a “realizing” of a world in the sense of “making it real.” And the knower and the known are inseparable aspects of this same event. Agency cannot be isolated from action. As the Zhuangzi says elsewhere, “There can only be genuine understanding when there is a genuine person.”53 One and one’s posture or perspective is thus integral to what is known. Knowledge entails proximity. Zhuangzi’s experience with the fishes makes his world continuous with the world of the fishes, and as such, his claim to knowledge is a claim to having been there. Being continuous with the fishes and collaborating with them in the experience does not deny the fishes their difference. In fact, it is only through Zhuangzi’s deference to their difference—allowing them to be what they are—that the experience can be optimally fruitful, and he can really come to know these particular fishes. The expression “sire of the many (zhongfu)” balances the familiar metaphor for way-making “mother of everything that is (wanwu zhi mu)” and “the mother of the heavens and earth (tianxia mu),” underscoring the androgyny of the process. It should be noted that mother is the impregnated female, and father is the siring male. Each of them entails the other.

#### We love root cause analysis

Wenning, Mario (2011), "Daoism as Critical Theory", Comparative Philosophy, ,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1017&context=comparativephilosophy. Accessed on July 15, 2021.

Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs, motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. **In the process of** increasingly **understandin**g intersubjective-, self- and world-**relationships primarily from the perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities, individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human beings**.12 The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.13 Originally reification referred to the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a critique of the reification/distortion of communication,14 the reification of relationships of intersubjective recognition,15 the reification of gender roles16 or the 12 Karl Marx (1973, 108-111). 13 See for example Axel Honneth, (2005). 14 Jürgen Habermas (1984). 15 Axel Honneth (1996). 57 Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011) WENNING reification of conceptions of the self,17 what is being criticized are relationships primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice. Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective pathologies of communication and reification.18 People in late modern societies do not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘ (Entzauberung). **In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and customs have lost their power in orienting lives**. Finally, **the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration** (Beschleunigung) in which, as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. **We witness a progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social change** since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during classical and high modernity, **late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational speed of change** in which **the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change within a lifetime.** In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.19 This acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of life, practices and sets of convictions. All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While **the psychological impact of reification leads to systematic forms of forced inclusion or exclusion, of being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities, and the process of disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in, or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies.**

#### Their rhetoric reflects western assumptions about Daoist philosophy

Ames and Hall (02) Daodejing, Making this life significant, Ballatine Books

Given this marginalization of other philosophical traditions, philosophy as a discipline has an unfullled responsibility to our academy. An essential occupation of philosophers is to identify and describe the generic traits of the human experience in order to locate problems within the broadest possible context. And these dening generic characteristics are importantly dierent as we move from one cultural and epochal site to another. Philosophers have the responsibility to seek out and to understand the uncommon assumptions that distinguish cultures as a preventative against cultural reductionism and the misconceptions such ethnocentrism entails. Thus, the absence of philosophers in the interpretation of Chinese philosophy has come at a cost. It has become a commonplace to acknowledge that, **in the process of Western humanists attempting to make sense of** the classical **Chinese philosophical literature,** many **Western assumptions have** inadvertently **been insinuated into the understanding of these texts,** and have colored the vocabulary through which this understanding has been articulated. Chinese **philosophy has been made familiar to Western readers by** rst **“Christianizing” it**, and **then more recently** by locating it **within a poetical-mystical-occult worldview.** To the extent that Chinese philosophy has become the subject of Western philosophical interest at all, it has usually been analyzed within the framework of categories and philosophical problems not its own.

#### Daoism not passive

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Brecht's adaptation of Daoism seems all the more perplexing given the conception of Chinese philosophy in the West. **One common critique** leveled against Chinese philosophical traditions goes something like this. Rather than providing another alternative foundation for Enlightenment reason, **Confucianism and Daoism are** essentially **incompatible** with individual autonomy and equality, **the pillars of** the **Enlightenment** project. The alleged deficit is then attributed to a difference in philosophical outlook. The age of critique, announced in a tone of philosophical audacity from the Neo-Copernican Kant, claims philosophical singularity and superiority with regard to his East Asian contenders. **While Western philosophical traditions in the Enlightenment tradition call into question established webs of authority, the emphasis on cosmic harmony in** Confucianism and **Daoism is said to rest on an acceptance of unquestioned relationships of power.** In other words, harmony is emphasized at the expense of a capacity for individual resistance and critique. If autonomy and equality are the pillars of enlightenment reason, the capacity to resist is its muscle. If **Daoism** just gives in to established authorities, it **does not possess the capacity of resistance**, thus making it unsuitable for emancipation emphasized in the wake of the Enlightenment. Following this line of critique, two specific strains of objections against Daoism's emancipatory potential and enlightenment deficit thus need to be addressed up front before discussing in what sense Daoism can be interpreted as a critical theory. One line of critique is addressed at Daoism's primitivist naturalism while the other set of objections focuses on the proposed technique of emulation. **The first group of critics conceives of Daoism as a reactionary movement propagating a return to nature.** Such movements claim that the present is fallen when compared to an allegedly earlier, blissful state in need of being restored once again. The emulation of a constantly changing yet static environment envisioned by Daoists is criticized as a form of imitation of, or a call for a return to, a primary state of nature. The natural world is being romanticized, critics contend, as idyllic and ethically superior. This line of critique, clearly mirroring Christian conceptions of a myth of the primal fall as one finds them in Western romanticism, hardly does justice to the gist of the normative ideals we find in the oldest Daoist texts. **Rather than advocating a return to a simplicity that allegedly existed in some prior historical period, Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi draw on what they describe as "natural" processes in order to delineate structures of present flourishing in the midst of "historical" crises. Nature is not what happened prior to the fall from paradise to civilization, but the spontaneity which is ever again threatened to be covered up by webs of social domination and misguided authority. That the pervasive reference to nature in Daoist texts is not the kind of naturalism the first group of critics take it to be becomes clear if we turn to the first readers of the classical Daoists who stressed that emulation is not to be misunderstood as imitation.** Guo Xiang already emphasized in his commentary on the Zhuang-Zi (莊子) that blind imitation of an allegedly natural condition is useless, fruitless and harmful. 53 Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011) WENNING **Imitation is useless because the world is in constant flux and different times require different responses. Imitation is also fruitless since the very act of imitation presupposes a conscious effort, which stands in the way of achieving the naturalness that is being attributed to what is being imitated. And, finally, imitation is said to be harmful in that it manifests a constant striving to overcome one's limits.** This overcoming rather than acknowledging stands in the way of optimal, we could also say, non-reified practices of self- other- and world-relationships.4 **The term ‗zi-ran‘ (自然), which is translated as ‗natural‘, offers itself as a denominator for such processes of spontaneous flourishing. Just as optimal forms of action seem to be performed as if by themselves and without an ulterior end, nature also is not equipped with a fixed trajectory while revealing a sense of flourishing and fittingness. The reference to naturalness serves as a critique against artificial forms of ―second nature‖ in the form of reified conceptions of morality and straining activism**. In the case of an occasional reference to an allegedly better past, **for example to the utopian village in chapter 80 of the Dao-De-Jing, what is depicted is not a historical past of perfected human beings who live in harmony with nature. Rather, the images serve as mythic or utopian evocations of a mode of being and powerexecution which is significantly different and more sophisticated than that found in societies which use up all resources in acts of instrumental activism**.5 In the case of the utopian village, w**hat is depicted is not a primitive community before the fall. The city possesses tools such as ships and carts, armor and weapons, but they ―have no reason to deploy them.‖6 This city consists a group of people, which is technologically highly advanced while preserving the freedom to not use the technology at its disposal, to live a decelerated life in the present while leaving the technological choices at their disposal unused whenever their application is not absolutely necessary**. They live in relatively small communities in order not to be governed by a distant government they do not have an obvious connection to. **The imagination is used here as a laboratory to provide impulses in order to enrich conceptions of chosen, communal and sophisticated passivity in the present rather than primitive innocence or unreflective activism directed at the future.**

#### Their rhetoric reflects western assumptions about Daoist philosophy

Ames and Hall (02) Daodejing, Making this life significant, Ballatine Books

In fact, **the absence of the “One behind the many” metaphysics makes** our **uncritical use of the philosophic term “cosmology” to characterize Daoism,** at least in the familiar classical Greek sense of this word, **highly problematic**. In early Greek philosophy, the term “kosmos” connotes a clustered range of meanings, including arche (originative, material, and ecient cause/ultimate undemonstrable principle), logos (underlying organizational principle), theoria (contemplation), nomos (law), theios (divinity), nous (intelligibility). In combination, this cluster of terms conjures forth some notion of a single-ordered Divine3 universe governed by natural and moral laws that are ultimately intelligible to the human mind. This “**kosmos” terminology is culturally specific, and** if **applied uncritically to discuss the** classical **Daoist worldview, introduces** a **cultural reductionism** that elides and thus conceals truly signicant dierences. The Daoist understanding of “cosmos” as the “ten thousand things” means that, in eect, the **Daoists have no concept of** cosmos at all insofar as that notion entails **a coherent, single-ordered world which is in any sense enclosed or denied**. The Daoists are, therefore, primarily, “acosmotic” thinkers.4 One implication of this distinction between a “cosmotic” and an “acosmotic” worldview is that, in the absence of some overarching arche or “beginning” as an explanation of the creative process, and under conditions which are thus “an-archic” in the philosophic sense of this term, although the “nature” of something might indeed refer to “kinds,” such “natural kinds” would be no more than generalizations made by analogizing among similar phenomena. That is, dierence is prior to identiable similarities.

#### Wu-Wei explained with metaphysics :D

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#### Creativity Disad to Judeo-Christian tradition

Ames and Hall (02) Daodejing, Making this life significant, Ballatine Books

In our introduction to Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong, we introduce a distinction between power and creativity, and follow A. N. Whitehead in questioning the appropriateness of using “creativity” in the familiar creatio ex nihilo model that we associate with Judeo- Christian cosmogony. Whitehead argues that **any robust sense of creativity requires that creativity itself is more primordial than God. In the received Judeo-Christian tradition, the all-powerful God determines things, makes things.** God, as Omnipotent Other Who commands the world into being, is Maker of the world, not its Creator. In the presence of the perfection that is God, nothing can be added or taken away. There can be no novelty or spontaneity. Thus, all subsequent acts of “creativity” are in fact secondary and derivative exercises of power. Creativity can make sense only in a processual world that admits of ontological parity among its constitutive events and of the spontaneous emergence of novelty. Power is to be construed as the production of intended effects determined by external causation. Real creativity, on the other hand, entails the spontaneous production of novelty, irreducible through causal analysis**.** Power is exercised with respect to and over others. Creativity is always reflexive and is exercised over and with respect to “self.” And since self in a processive world is always communal, creativity is contextual, transactional, and multidimensional. Thus creativity is both self-creativity and co- creativity. Either everything shares in creativity, or there is no creativity. Indeed, it is this transactional, co-creative character of all creative processes that precludes the project of self-cultivation and self-creation from being egoistic.One further point can be made with respect to the creativity that the spontaneous emergence of novelty makes possible. The radical sense of creativity that we associate with “bringing into being” in a creatio ex nihilo sensibility is too isolated and extreme for this idea within the Daoist tradition. The term dao, like the terms “building,” “learning,” and “work,” entails both the process and the created product. It is the locus and the time frame within which the always contextualized creativity takes place. When the Zhuangzi observes that “we are one with all things ,” this insight is a recognition that each and every unique phenomenon is continuous with every other phenomenon within one’s eld of experience. But is this an exhaustive claim: are we talking about all phenomena in the continuing present? Because the world is processional and because its creativity is ab initio rather than ex nihilo—a contextual creativity expressed across the careers of its constitutive phenomena—any answer to this question would have to be provisional. Phenomena are never either atomistically discrete or complete. The Zhuangzi recounts

#### Individuality and Mutuality within Daoist Metaphysics

Ames and Hall (02) Daodejing, Making this life significant, Ballatine Books

A third assumption in the Daoist “cosmology” is that life broadly construed is entertained through and only through these same phenomena that constitute our experience. The eld of experience is always construed from one perspective or another. There is no view from nowhere, no external perspective, no decontextualized vantage point. We are all in the soup**.** The intrinsic, constitutive relations that obtain among things make them reflexive and mutually implicating, residing together within the flux and flow. This mutuality does notin any way negate the uniqueness of the particular perspective. Although any and all members of a family have implicated within them and thus present (rather than represent) the entire family, all members constitute and experience the family from their own particular point of view. And members in making the family their own quite appropriately have a distinctive proper name. A corollary to this radical perspectivism is that each particular element in our experience is holographic in the sense that it has implicated within it the entire field of experience. This single flower has leaves and roots that take their nourishment from the environing soil and air. And the soil contains the distilled nutrients of past growth and decay that constitute the living ecological system in which all of its participants are organically interdependent**.** The sun enables the ower to process these nutrients, while the atmosphere that caresses the ower also nourishes and protects it. By the time we have “cashed out” the complex of conditions that conspire to produce and conserve this particular flower, one ripple after another in an ever-extending series of radial circles, we have implicated the entire cosmos within it without remainder. For the Daoist, there is an intoxicating bottomlessness to any particular event in our experience. The entire cosmos resides happily in the smile on the dirty face of this one little child. If the insistent particular (de ) is holographic, how does differentiation occur among particular things? In the human community, for example, what does it mean for a person to become distinguished and an object of deference? First, this holographic sensibility is not simply Daoist, but a shared commitment of classical Chinese natural cosmology. The Confucian Mencius, for example, is also articulating this classical Chinese common sense when he interprets the eld of qi in terms of moral energy and oers his advice on the attainment of human excellence. He speaks of his ability to nourish his “ood-like qi (haoran zhi qi   ,” describing this qi as that which is “most vast (zhida   )” and “most rm (zhigang   ).”6 Restated in the language of focus and eld, Mencius is saying that his “oodlike qi” has the greatest “extensive” and “intensive” magnitudes. This language of extensive eld and intensive focus suggests that one nourishes one’s qi most successfully by making of oneself the most integral focus of the most extensive eld of qi. In this manner, one gains greatest virtue (excellence, potency) in relation to the most far-reaching elements of one’s environs. As we read in the Mencius: Everything is here in me. There is no joy greater than to discover creativity (cheng   ) in one’s person and nothing easier in striving to be authoritative in one’s conduct (ren ) than committing oneself to treating others as one would oneself be treated.7 Our argument for translating cheng   as “creativity” in this Mencius passage is that its more familiar translations as “sincerity” and “integrity” in fact reference a creative process. “Sincerity” as aective tone is the ground of growth in mutual relationships, and “integrity” is the “becoming one” that occurs as we become intimate. The deepening of these relationships that in sum constitute us as a person is a profoundly co-creative process of “doing and undergoing,” of shaping and being shaped. The Daoist variation on the efficacy of one’s “flood-like qi” is the way in which the intensive focus of one’s insistent particularity(de    ) provides the most extensive range of influence or potency in shaping one’s world. Said simply, persons who “have their stuff together” change the world around them. In chapter 54 of the Daodejing,the cultivation of personal excellence is described as the starting point in world-making and in enhancing the ethos of the cosmos: Cultivate it in your person, And the character you develop will be genuine; Cultivate it in your family, And its character will be abundant; Cultivate it in your village, And its character will be enduring; Cultivate it in the state, And its character will ourish; Cultivate it in the world, And its character will be all-pervading. This relationship between intensive resolution and extensive inuence is also captured in chapter 23: Thus, those who are committed to way-making in what they do Are on their way. Those who are committed to character in what they do Achieve this character While those who lose it Are themselves lost. Way-making is moreover enhanced by those who express character, Just as it is diminished by those who themselves have lost it. Optimizing experience by getting the most out of it requires a kind of “husbanding” of one’s resources, where “husbanding” is understood as a combination of cultivation and frugality. High resolution in one’s character elevates one as a focal presence and as an enduring inuence on the extended community through the patterns of deference that have come to dene one’s person. This achieved character provides the world with a resource for resolving its problems as they arise. Such is the import of chapter 59: For bringing proper order to the people and in serving tian, Nothing is as good as husbandry. It is only through husbandry that you come early to accept the way, And coming early to accept the way is what is called redoubling your accumulation of character. If you redouble your accumulation of character, all obstacles can be overcome, And if all obstacles can be overcome, none can discern your limit. Where none can discern your limit, You can preside over the realm. In presiding over the mother of the realm You can be long-enduring. In this processual Daoist cosmology, continuity is prior to individuality, and the particular character or disposition of each event is thus an ongoing distinctive achievement. That is, each event distinguishes itself by developing its own uniqueness within the totality. And freedom is neither the absence of constraint nor some isolatable originality, but the full contribution of this achieved uniqueness to a shared community.

#### Change is inherent to living- means no need for God/Science

Ames and Hall (02) Daodejing, Making this life significant, Ballatine Books

A fourth presupposition of Daoist cosmology is that we are not passive participants in our experience. The energy of transformation lies within the world itself as an integral characteristic of the events that constitute it. There is no appeal to some external efficient cause: no Creator God or primordial determinative principle. In the absence of any preordained design associated with such an external cause,this energy of transformation is evidenced in the mutual accommodation and co-creativity that is expressed in the relations that obtain among things. When turned to proper effect, this energy can make the most of the creative possibilities of any given situation. This kind of responsive participation we have characterized elsewhere as ars contextualis: the art of contextualizing.8 Ars contextualis is a way of living and relating to a world that quite simply seeks to get the most out of the diversity of experience.

#### The Family and Spontaneity

Ames and Hall (02) Daodejing, Making this life significant, Ballatine Books

Ambrose King makes the argument that relationships within the classical Chinese cosmology are construed broadly in familial terms.10 We have gone further in suggesting that family is a more adequate metaphor than Joseph Needham’s notion of “organism” for thinking about Chinese cosmology, and that arguably all relationships within this world are familial.11 This metaphorcertainlyhas application to the Daodejing, where rulership as an institution is naturalized on the model of the family, and explicit images of human procreativity—mother and infant—are projected onto the cosmos.In fact, the sustained Grand Analogy that pervades the Daodejing is: dao is to the world as ruler ought to be to the people. Dao—the discernible rhythm and regularity of the world as it unfolds around and through us—is nonimpositional: “Way-making (dao) really does things noncoercively.”12 This attitude is carried over into the human world. In governing effectively, coercion is perceived as impoverishing and dehumanizing. So the consummate political model in Daoism, corresponding to the consummate experience itself, is described as wuwei(“noncoercive activity”)and ziran(“self- so-ing,” or “what is spontaneously so”). As stated in chapter 17,under the sway of nonimpositional rulership, the people are able to be spontaneous.With the most excellent rulers, their subjects only know that they are there, The next best are the rulers they love and praise, Next are the rulers they hold in awe, And the worst are the rulers they disparage.... With all things accomplished and the work complete The common people say, “We are spontaneously like this.” Spontaneity must be clearly distinguished from randomness and impetuosity. In fact, far from being “uncaused,” it is the novelty made possible by a cultivated disposition.Spontaneity is the punctuated flow and pressure of the calligrapher’s brush; it is the singing dexterity of Cook Ding’s cleaver. Spontaneous action is a mirroring response. As such, it is action that accommodates the “other” to whom one is responding. It takes the other on its own terms. Such spontaneity involves recognizing the continuity between oneself and the other, and responding in such a way that one’s own actions promote the interests and well- being both of oneself and of the other. This does not lead to reductive imitation but to complementarity and coordination. Handshakes and embraces are actions that presuppose a recognition of the relational stance of the other, and that complete that stance. In the dancehall of the cosmos, when the music for the next dance starts to play and partners open their arms to each other, the dance proceeds as a dyadic harmony of nonassertive actions.

#### Relationships/Co-creativity spillover

Ames and Hall (02) Daodejing, Making this life significant, Ballatine Books

What is particularly instructive about this excerpt from James is his claim that the site of knowing the truth about Jill is Jack’s heart. Both the magical importance of Jill as someone valued and the absolute truth about Jill as a matter of fact are realized concretely in these immediate feelings. Persons are constituted by their relationships, and these relations are valorized and made real in the process of persons bringing their fields of experience into focus. And it is Jack who focuses Jill with optimum resolution. The unmediated acknowledgment of Jill as one of the wonders of creation resides in the affective relationships that give her context, particularly, her Jack. This is only to say that the creative transactions—the doings and undergoings among persons—are a disclosure of their feelings for one another. Thus, affective tone and the subjective form of feeling are always entailed in the uniquely perspectival locus of the co-creative process. We feel our way forward into novel experience. When we turn to the Chinese language in which this Daoist worldview is sedimented, James’s insight into the inseparability of fact and value—the cognitive and the affective, thinking and feeling —is revealed in its own way. The character xin , often translated rather awkwardly as “heart-and-mind,” is itself an argument for the assumed indivisibility of knowing and feeling within this antique tradition. Xin is a stylized pictograph of the aorta, associating it quite immediately with the “heart” and the emotional connotations that attend it. The fact that the character qing that we translate as “emotions” or “feelings” is a combination of this xin and a phonetic element, qing , justies this understanding.14 Indeed, many if not most of the characters that entail some dimension of “emotions” and “feelings” have xin as a component element. However, the fact that xin has as often been rendered as “mind” should also alert us to the possible inadequacy of simply translating it as “heart.” Many if not most of the Chinese characters that refer to dierent modalities of “thinking” are also constructed with xin as a component. Indeed, there are many passages in these classical texts that would not make sense in English unless the xin “thinks.” The point is that in this classical Chinese worldview broadly conceived, the mind cannot be divorced from the heart. There are no altogether rational thoughts devoid of feeling, nor any raw feelings altogether lacking in cognitive content. Having said this, the prejudice to which Daoism is resolutely resistant is the dichotomy between the cognitive and the affective that would privilege knowing as some separate cognitive activity. A. N. Whitehead expresses this same concern when he observes that: “... mothers can ponder many things in their hearts that words cannot express.”15 Concrete feelings, the real site of knowing, become selectively abstracted and impoverished when they are resolved into the rational currency of names, concepts, and theories without adequate deference to the affective ground of this cognitive superstructure. In this early Chinese natural cosmology in which process and change have priority over form and stasis, it is frequently observed that, with respect to the common sense understanding of the human body, physiology has priority over anatomy, and function takes precedence over site. In this resolutely nondualistic worldview, the xin, then, is primarily a dynamic system that is metonymically associated with but in no way exhausted by, its dense center, the anatomical heart-and-mind. This being the case, it might well be argued that xin means primarily “thinking and feeling,” and then derivatively and metaphorically, the organs with which these experiences are allied. In the passage cited above, James allows that every Jack is “enchanted” by the charms and perfections of his own particular Jill. The enchantment in the “thoughtful” feelings of Jack and Jill emerges in their mutual and reciprocated sensitivity and awareness. This kind of shared appreciation means several things. Certainly, they recognize better than most the quality, significance, and magnitude of each other, and in so doing, admire each other greatly. But this burgeoning capacity for mutual appreciation goes well beyond simply a personal enjoyment of each other that begins and ends in their relationship. Indeed this appreciation spills over to become “value-added”—quite literally raising the value of the cosmos in which they occur. Their shared cosmos is much appreciated, becoming a more magnicent time and place because of the profound feelings Jack and Jill have for each other. It is this capacity of the human experience to enchant the cosmos, then, that is the more important meaning of “appreciating the particular.”

#### Mutual Entailing means forever forward energy- it’s all about posturing and letting the wave take you

Ames and Hall (02) Daodejing, Making this life significant, Ballatine Books

In the Book of Changes, experience itself is defined simply as a succession of yin and yang phases: . This description is an abstract way of making the empirical observation that all predicates give way to their opposites: order and disorder succeed each other, and so on. This characteristic of experience is ascribed to the natural cyclical movement of qi rather than some supernatural force, and is captured and made explicit in the metaphorical language of yinyang and the ve phases cosmology. As chapter 40 of the Daodejing observes, the mutual entailing of opposites means that whatever “goes out” and becomes consummately distinct, also “returns”: “Returning” is how way-making moves, And “weakening” is how it functions. The events of the world arise from the determinate, And the determinate arises from the indeterminate. The most basic meaning of “returning” restates what has been said above. As Tang Junyi reports, cosmology is not simply a linear zerosum victory of order over chaos driven by some external cause, but rather is the endless alternation between rising and falling, emerging and collapsing, moving and attaining equilibrium that is occasioned by its own internal energy of transformation.16 This cosmic unfolding is not “cyclical” in the sense of reversibility and replication, but is rather a continuing spiral that is always coming back upon itself and yet is ever new. It is the disposition of all things that their present condition entails its opposite. The Daodejing observes in chapter 58: It is upon misfortune that good fortune leans, It is within good fortune itself that misfortune crouches in ambush, And where does it all end? This insight into the mutuality of opposites has several implications. Perhaps most obviously, young is “young-becoming-old”; dark is “dark-becoming-light”; soft is “soft-becoming-hard.” In the fullness of time, any and all of the qualities that define each event will yield themselves up to their opposites. Those who are born into the world and live to grow old will eventually die. Anything that embarks upon this journey toward fruition has in its first few steps set o on the long road home. And it is at the moment of setting out as a newborn infant that a person has maximum potency. Thus, the journey can fairly be characterized both as a returning and a gradual weakening of one’s initial promise. And it is by effectively husbanding this potency over one’s career that one is able to make the most of one’s experience. By anticipating the changes in your conditions, and by remaining focused despite the unavoidable vicissitudes that are visited upon you as you move along the continuum from beginning to end, you are able to optimize the possibilities at each moment and thus enjoy joy the ride to its fullest. Cultivating a proper disposition and being prepared for the seasons through which you pass from birth to death will enable you to consistently get the most out of your circumstances. It is your resolution—the intensity found at the center—that will keep your life experience in focus, establish you as an object of deference, and enable you to enjoy both a productive life and a healthy death. Said another way, to lose focus and stray off course along the way while on this journey will precipitate reversion. Squandered energy while young will age you prematurely. As it says in chapter 55: For something to be old while in its prime. Is called a departure from the way of things. And whatever departs from the way of things will come to an untimely end. Aggression directed at others will, like Monsieur Guillotine’s guillotine, come back to shorten your own life. Again, as in chapter 74: To stand in for the executioner in killing people Is to stand in for the master carpenter in cutting his lumber. Of those who would thus stand in for the master carpenter, Few get away without injuring their own hands. The world around us is always an interface between persistent form and novelty, the familiar honeycombed by the unexpected. The new emerges within the context and the security of the ordinary, and in due course, what was new overtakes and supplants the ordinary, and what was ordinary becomes an increasingly fragile memory for those who can still remember. In time, the new becomes the newly ordinary, and the ordinary returns whence it came.

#### Wu Wei + Narrowness vs Width

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At this point we would like to introduce a few technical terms of aesthetic analysis that might be applied in explaining the particularly Daoist mode of attaining and sustaining harmony. This vocabulary is drawn from the work of A.N. Whitehead’s Process and Reality, a philosophical work that is grounded in an aesthetic sense of order.17 According to Whitehead, there are four fundamental variables that contribute to the achievement of that harmony deriving from a balance of simplicity and complexity. These variables are triviality, vagueness, narrowness, and width. Triviality involves an excess of differentiation. It is complexity without contrast. An order is trivial when it is characterized by an excess of differentiation among its elements, all of which are entertained equally and are given equal importance. Systems theory would call triviality an excess of information leading to the production of dissonance: it is mere “noise.” It is chaos. There is no organizing strategy, no hierarchy, no differential importance. This is sheer multiplicity without focus or discretion. Vagueness, as Whitehead uses the term, is an excess of identication. In a vague order, the differences among items are irrelevant factors in constituting the order. It is simplicity without contrast. The vague order displays an undierentiated commonality of character. Vagueness is a bland field without particular focus; it is the facile and unconsidered use of generalizations. Narrowness is an emphasis upon certain components in an order at the expense of others. It is simplicity in search of intense contrast. An order dominated by narrowness has an intensity of focus that backgrounds all other strongly differentiated factors. Matter-of-fact gives way to importance. Finally, width involves the coordination of differentiated elements, each with its own unique contribution to the order. It is complexity that sacrifices some contrast for depth and scope. The kind of discussion one would hope to have in an interdisciplinary university seminar would likely contribute to an order characterized by width. Width involves the balancing of narrowness and vagueness. A productive order has all four characteristics in various forms of background/foreground combinations. Vagueness, and the mild identication it entails, when focused by the narrow, produces the contrasts appropriate to the production of harmony. Contrast involves the interweaving of triviality and vagueness through a shifting foreground/background gestalt, while the depth of contrast in an order is a function of its degree of complexity. The Daodejing centers its discussion on cultivating the most productive relationship between the vagueness of the continuous eld of experience and the narrowness of the insistent particulars. One pervasive theme of the text is that coercive, contentious activity diminishes the balance between focus and field. On the other hand, noncoercive relatedness encourages width, and the alternation between vagueness and triviality provides contrast. The abstractness of the Daodejing and the absence of any concrete, illustrative examples trades potential complexity and intensity that would be provided by these specific cases for an accommodating width, thus allowing it to be broad in its relevance and application. The role of the reader, then, is to supply the narrowness needed to create the intensity and deepen the degree of contrast. This language of aesthetic analysis can be regarded as germane to the dispute between the naturalistic Daoists and the more narrowly human-centered Confucians that we find both in the Daodejing and the Analects of Confucius, and in the tradition more broadly conceived. From a Confucian point of view, the vagueness of human relatedness is brought into focus through the performance of hierarchical roles and formal practices (li ). Through these ritualizing institutions all human beings are able to take a stand, and to find their place by establishing a value that is relative to the value of other members of their community. Ritualized living is an instrument for personalizing institutions and registering the narrowness and intensity of each human perspective, while allowing for enough width to promote effective tolerance. The Confucian argument would insist that the narrowness of human concerns provides the necessary intensity, while the Daoist’s exaggerated inclusiveness would move humanity beyond productive “width” in the direction of a nonproductive vagueness. Thus, the central complaint of the Confucian about the Daoist vision of things is in the vagueness of the latter. In fact, the Confucian accuses the Daoist explicitly of sacricing the intensity that comes with a narrow focus for an inclusiveness that is too thin and diuse.18 In response, the Daoist, as a student of the arts of the Chaos clan, would insist that the Confucian claim to narrowness is bogus. Indeed, the insistent particularity (de) of human beings and the possible intensity of their natural feelings is trivialized by recourse to contrived rules and articifial relationships that are dehumanizing, and by strategies for social regulation that privilege an ordered uniformity over spontaneity. Further, the absence of concern about the natural environment transforms Confucian narrowness into a kind of intolerance and exclusiveness that jeopardizes the depth of contrast and the intensity of one’s experience provided by appropriate width. Confucian narrowness, the Daoist might well argue, leads socially to nepotism, parochialism, and jingoism, and within the natural environment, to anthropocentrism, speciesism, and the pathetic fallacy.19 For the Daoist, the only guarantee of a viable narrowness would be to allow for the nontrivialized expression of each perspective in the environment to be registered and accounted for, human and otherwise. Indeed, li and its perceived intolerance of the world beyond the human community leads to a thinness of experience, and with it, a diminution of imagination and creativity. The Daoist’s guarantee against vagueness lies in an achieved disposition that is made manifest in the appropriate exercise of the wu-forms: , or noncoercive actions in deference to the de (“particular focus”) of things; wuzhi , or knowing that does not have recourse to rules or principles; and wuyu , or desiring that does not seek to possess or control its object. The deference implicit in these wu-forms facilitates width as an appropriate combination of triviality and vagueness, while maintaining the narrowness and the focus of insistent particularity. The point of this technical aside is a simple enough one: The interfusion of the variables leading to a balanced complexity of experience involves recourse to distinctly nonlogical criteria. There is no means of establishing the superiority of triviality, or vagueness, or narrowness, or width, one over the other because these are all presuppositions of a realized order. Nor is there any final science that could advise one as to the correct intermixing of these aspects of order. Similarly, consistent with the Daoist resistance to asserting any certitude or final vocabulary, there is no way of saying that Confucianism or Daoism is ultimately superior to the other by virtue of an appeal to univocal criteria. Nor is there any means of separating the two movements into distinctive schools on the basis of orthodoxies of belief or practice. There is no final truth either about the nature of things, or about the means whereby that nature is sought. The achievement of order and harmony in nature and society—that is to say, the achievement of effective way-making or dao—is a multifaceted effort that is dependent less upon uncovering true principles or right forms of conduct than on the exercise of imagination and creativity within the most deferential of contexts. In fact, the broadest context—the one leading to the richest resources for Chinese “way-makers”—has been built from the contributions of both the Confucian and the Daoist sensibilities.

#### Focal and Field Awareness as a method for Wu-Wei + Continuity and fluidity Metaphysics as an applicable method

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The Daodejing encourages a comprehensive, processual view of experience that requires a full understanding of the larger picture and the ability to locate and appreciate the particular event within it. This broad view of the field of experience allows one to contextualize particular events, and it provides the peripheral vision needed to stay focused at the center while at the same time anticipating future turns. What does it mean to achieve resolution in one’s disposition by “keeping to the center” and “remaining focused”? By appealing to what Tang Junyi has captured in the expression yiduo bufenguan — —translatable as “the inseparability of one and many, of continuity and multiplicity, of dao and the myriad of insistent particulars (de)”—we can identify two mutually reinforcing levels of awareness advocated in the Daodejing: what we might call focal awareness and eld awareness. In order to influence and anticipate the general flow of circumstances, we must have a focused awareness of each of the particular events that constitute our experience. We must be aware of the one as it is implicated in and influences the many. This kind of awareness is to see the world focally in terms of the insistent particulars (de) that constitute it. And in order to best understand any one of these events and bring it fully into focus, we must be aware of the field of conditions that conspire to sponsor and sustain it. We must be aware of the many conditions as they are implicated in and are continuous with the one event. This kind of awareness is to see the insistent particular more broadly in terms of the continuous flow of experience (dao). The field can only be entered through the particular focus, and the complexity of the focus can only be appreciated by extending the field. Thus, a focal awareness and a field awareness presuppose each other. One insight governing field awareness is that it requires a full cognizance of the mutual entailment of opposites, allowing one to track one’s collaboration in any particular situation through its inevitable process of reversion. It foregrounds the relational character of the elements within the matrix of events, and the symbiotic continuities that obtain among them. This kind of insight —the capacity to see where a situation has come from and to anticipate where it is going—discourages any proclivity one might have to isolate things, and to make exclusive judgments about them on the basis of any particular phase in their continuing narrative. A student of the martial arts may become discouraged because his or her initial attempts at reproducing the proper form of a roundhouse kick are slow and embarrassingly unsuccessful, while at the same time other more supple students may gain immediate prociency. A field awareness would anticipate that this student’s initial lack of suppleness will, in the course of training, be transformed into the tension that, like a taut spring, produces the power of the properly executed technique. A weakness becomes a strength when what is inflexible becomes more supple. Focal awareness, on the other hand, is the full appreciation of the particular foci that constitute any particular field as the concrete medium through which field awareness is sustained. A subtle understanding of the uniqueness of each event and the attention to the minutia that affect it enables one to anticipate the evolving order, and to encourage or discourage fluctuations at an incipient phase before they have evolved into the full-blown weight of circumstances. All major events are modest in their beginnings, and minor alterations introduced at an early stage of an ongoing event can have cascading consequences for the outcome. Several defining aspects of focal order condition our awareness of it. The first of these conditions is the temporal immediacy of the continuing present: order is always located in the “very now.” The second condition is spatial immediacy: order starts here and goes there. Third, focal order is always collaborative: all relations, while they are intrinsic and thus constitutive, are also projective and recursive. And finally, equilibrium in one’s disposition allows one to contextualize events on their own terms and to achieve an optimally productive harmony. The “art” in any martial art lies in tailoring it to the strengths and weaknesses, both psychological and physical, of the particular student. The fullest degree of competence comes as a function of optimizing this uniqueness. A great deal of care must be taken at the most elementary stages of training to establish “habits of mind and body,” again both psychological and physical, that lead to a maximizing of the developing skill and allow for the emergence of one’s particularity. Training is a combination of awareness and feeling. And one must remain resolutely focused in one’s entire person through the changing seasons of one’s practice. Success in the martial arts, as in all experience, lies ultimately in the satisfaction students gain in knowing that they have made the most of their experience in all of its changing phases. A full appreciation of particularity requires that we understand and be responsive to the complex patterns of relatedness implicated in any event. These patterns are endlessly manifold and diverse, and their ever-changing novelty makes them constantly unique and distinctive. But again this novelty is always ab initio and in situ, occurring within an already familiar context. Indeterminacy and the possibility for spontaneity are real, and there are gaps in the sequence of events that preclude absolute predictability and precise causal analysis. But there is also a fluid continuity that is captured in expressions such as “passing” and “returning.” It is in appreciating both this continuity and the emergent novelty of experience that we are able to deal with events in terms of the mutual implication of opposites. The Daodejing enjoins us to cultivate those habits of awareness that allow us to plumb and appreciate the magic of the ordinary and the everyday. Indeed, it is by enchanting the routine that we are on the way to making this life truly significant.

#### Wu Forms Alt + Passivity Frontlines

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The compilers of the Daodejing seek rather explicitly to develop a contrast between the glimpses of insight this text strives to impart, and the substance of other philosophical doctrines. Many if not most doctrines evolve with their antecedents in an elaborate genealogy of values and ideas. These philosophical doctrines are often hierarchically structured by precepts and governing principles, and they may well require an extended course of study for their mastery and transmission. The precepts that inform these “doctrines” are professionalized by their learned “doctors,” and within their marble academies these erudites—for appropriate status and recompense— are only too glad to amaze the hoi poloi with the ashing dexterity of their philosophic thrusts and parries. What the Daodejing has to offer, on the other hand, is much simpler. It encourages the cultivation of a disposition that is captured in what we have chosen to call its wu-forms. The wu-forms free up the energy required to sustain the abstract cognitive and moral sensibilities of technical philosophy, allowing this energy, now unmediated by concepts, theories, and contrived moral precepts, to be expressed as those concrete feelings that inspire the ordinary business of the day. It is through these concrete feelings that one is able to know the world and to optimize the human experience. The abstraction of the concrete ethical dimension of such felt knowing into a formal moralist vocabulary is rehearsed in chapter 38 of the Daodejing: Thus, only when we have lost sight of way-making is there excellence, Only when we have lost sight of excellence is there authoritative conduct, Only when we have lost sight of authoritative conduct is there appropriateness, And only when we have lost sight of appropriateness is there ritual propriety. As for ritual propriety, it is the thinnest veneer of doing one’s best and making good on one’s word, And it is the first sign of trouble. “Foreknowledge” is tinsel decorating the way, And is the first sign of ignorance. It is for this reason that persons of consequence: Set store by the substance rather than the veneer And by the fruit rather than the flower. Hence, eschewing one they take the other. The moral precepts described in the first two stanzas emerge as objects of reverence, but as hallowed as they might become, they are anemic when compared to the love and life of concrete, spontaneous feelings. It is the “substance” and the “fruit”—the passionate experience of life itself—rather than a catechism of bloodless ethical principles, that is the real site of knowing. Such felt knowing is an ongoing process of focal and field awareness—of way-making—that can only be sustained with indefatigable resolution. Indeed, it is not an easy business to stay focused. Even though the Daodejing’s teachings on how to cultivate the most effective disposition for making one’s way in the world could not be put in more straightforward terms, still “when the very best scholars learn of way-making they are just barely able to keep to its center” (chapter 41). Were we to search for something like a central insight that defines the Daoist sensibility, we might discover that a “single thread” pervades the text. The central focus of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of deference in the establishment and preservation of relationships. As we have said above, integrity in a processual worldview is not being one, but becoming one in the consummatory relationships that one is able to achieve within a context of environing particulars. Deference involves a yielding (and being yielded to) grounded in an acknowledgment of the shared excellence of particular foci (de) in the process of one’s own self- cultivation. Deferential acts require that one put oneself literally in the place of the other, and in so doing, incorporate what was the object of deference into what is one’s own developing disposition. And one’s own disposition thus fortified becomes available as a locus of deference for others. In Confucianism, self is determined by sustained effort (zbong ) in deferential transactions (shu ) guided by ritually structured roles and relations (li ) that project one’s person outward into society and into culture. Such a person becomes a focus of the community’s deference (junzi ) and a source of its spirituality (shen ). Daoism, on the other hand, expresses its deferential activity through what we are calling the wu-forms. The three most familiar articulations of this pervasive sensibility are: wuwei , wuzhi , and wuyu . These are, respectively, noncoercive actions in accordance with the de (“particular focus”) of things; a sort of knowing without resort to rules or principles; and desiring which does not seek to possess or control its “object.” In each of these instances, as in the case of Confucian shu, it is necessary to put oneself in the place of what is to be acted in accordance with, what is to be known, or what is to be desired, and thus incorporate this perspective into one’s own disposition. Our chief aim here is to demonstrate how this explicitly Daoist understanding of deferential activity presupposes a focus-field model of self. Given our discussion of the inseparability of feeling and thinking —the affective and the cognitive—in the Daoist heart-and-mind (xin), the conflict associated with the self that the Daoist sage must overcome cannot be a struggle among some compartmentalized rational, appetitive, and emotional faculties. Indeed, given the relational and unpartitioned model of the self characterized by xin, it is dicult to imagine how there could be anything like an internal dynamics that would be a source of agitation. It is unlikely that we would nd Hamlets or St. Pauls prominent among the Daoists. If the problematic of unrealized selfhood does not entail a self divided against itself, what is the source and the nature of the disturbance that the cultivation of the Daoist disposition is meant to overcome? If it is not referenced primarily within an individuating soul, it can only be a disturbance in the relationships that constitute the context of self-consummation. Said another way, if a person is  not in fact constituted by some essential, partitioned “soul,” but is rather seen as dynamic pattern of personal, social, and natural relationships, agitation must arise as a consequence of poor management of these constitutive roles and relationships. Hence, agitation in the heart-and-mind is not narrowly “psychological,” but is more accurately conceived of as of broad ethical concern: How should we act and what should we do? To summarize the three most prominent examples of the wu-forms that we have discussed in more detail elsewhere,20 wuwei , often translated (unfortunately) as “no action” or “non-action,” really involves the absence of any course of action that interferes with the particular focus (de ) of those things contained within one’s field of influence. Actions uncompromised by stored knowledge or ingrained habits are relatively unmediated: they are accommodating and spontaneous. As such, these actions are the result of deferential responses to the item or the event in accordance with which, or in relation to which, one is acting. These actions are ziran , “spontaneous” and “self-so-ing,” and as such, are nonassertive actions. It is not through an internal struggle of reason against the passions but through “acuity (ming )”—a mirroring of the things of the world as they are in their interdependent relations with us—that we reach a state in which nothing among all of the myriad of “the goings on” in the world will be able to agitate our hearts-and-minds, and we are able to promote the flourishing of our world. In other words, we defer in attaining integrity with those things that contextualize us, establishing a frictionless equilibrium with them. And it is this state of achieved equilibrium that is precisely the relationship most conducive to symbiotic growth and productivity. The Daoist sages in Zhuangzi are described in such terms: The stillness of the sages is not simply a matter of their saying: “Stillness is good!” and hence they are still. Rather, they are still because none of the myriad things are able to agitate their hearts-and-mind. When water is still, it illuminates one’s whiskers and eyebrows, and in its placidity, it provides a standard so that skilled artisans can take their measure from it. If the stillness of water provides illumination, how much more so one’s spirit. The stillness of the heart-and-mind of the sage makes it mirror to the whole world and the looking glass for all of the myriad things.21 The notion of jing —stillness, tranquillity—that is often used to characterize this posture, far from being simple passivity, is an ongoing, dynamic achievement of equilibrium that requires constant monitoring and adjustment. It is important to remember that all correlative pairs entail their opposites in the sense that jing is “tranquillity-becoming-agitated.” Thus, tranquillity (jing) stands in a dominant relationship in its partnership with agitation (dong ); it does not negate or exclude its opposite. The same qualification has to be brought to bear on other familiar pairs that might otherwise mislead us: for example, emptiness (xu ) and fullness (shi ), and clarity (qing ) and turbidity (zhuo ). Wuzhi , often translated as “no-knowledge,” actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves “acosmotic” thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered (“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, therefore, unprincipled knowing. Such knowing does not appeal to rules or principles determining the existence, the meaning, or the activity of a phenomenon. Wuzhi provides one with a sense of the de of a thing— its particular uniqueness and focus— rather than yielding an understanding of that thing in relation to some concept or natural kind or universal. Ultimately, wuzhi is a grasp of the daode relationship of each encountered item that permits an understanding of this particular focus (de) and the eld that it construes. Knowledge, as unprincipled knowing, is the acceptance of the world on its own terms without recourse to rules of discrimination that separate one sort of thing from another. Rules of thumb, habits of mind and action, established customs, fixed standards, received  methods, stipulated concepts and categories, commandments, principles, laws of nature, conventions—all of these prejudices require us to intervene and “welcome things as they come and escort them as they go,” resulting in what Steve Goldberg has described as “a hardening of the categories.” Having stored past experience and organized it in terms of fixed standards or principles, we then recall, anticipate, and participate in a world patterned by these discriminations. Sages, however, mirror the world, and “neither see things off nor go out to meet them.” As such, they “respond to everything without storing anything up.” They mirror the world at each moment in a way that is undetermined by the shape of a world that has passed away, or by anticipations of a world yet to come. As the Daodejing asks in chapter 10: In scrubbing and cleansing your profound mirror Are you able to rid it of all imperfections? In loving the common people and breathing life into the state, Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? With nature’s gates swinging open and closed Are you able to remain the female? With your insight penetrating the four quarters Are you able to do it without recourse to wisdom? The Daoist project is neither passive nor quietistic. Water is the source of nourishment; the mirror is a source of light; the heart-and- mind is a source of transformative energy. To “know” as the mirror “knows” is not reduplicative, but is to cast the world in a certain light. Such performative “knowing” is for one to actively interpret and realize a world with healthy, productive effect. These metaphors for xin entail a presentation rather than a representation, a coordination rather than a correspondence. “Mirroring” then is best seen as synergistic and responsive, where all of the elements are in the stream and constitute a fluid interdependent continuity. Perhaps the best rendering of the term wuyu is “objectless desire.” Since neither noncoercive action nor unprincipled knowing can in the strict sense objectify a world or any element in it—that is, make discrete and independent objects out of one’s environing experience—the desiring associated with the Daoist sensibility is in the strictest sense “objectless.” The “enjoyments” associated with wuyu are possible without the need to dene, possess, or control the occasion of one’s enjoyment. Thus, wuyu, rather than involving the cessation and absence of desire, represents the achievement of deferential desire. Desire, based upon a noncoercive relationship (wuwei) with the world and a “mirroring” understanding (wuzhi) of it, is shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to consume, but by the desire simply to celebrate and to enjoy. It is deference. Desire is directed at those things desirable because they stand to be desired. But those things which stand to be desired must themselves be deferential, which means that they cannot demand to be desired. For to demand to be desired is to exercise a kind of mesmerizing control over the desirer. In a world of events and processes in which discriminations are recognized as conventional and transient, desire is predicated upon one’s ability at any given moment to “let go.” It is in this sense that wuyu is a nonconstruing, objectless, desire. The Daoist problem with desire does not concern what is desired, but rather the manner of the desiring. Enjoyment for the Daoist is realized not in spite of the fact that one might lose what is desired, but because of this fact. The world is a complex set of transformative processes, never at rest. Wuhua , the metamorphosis of things (and not to be confused with the wu- forms), means that we can never pretend that what we seek to hold on to has any permanent status. In Daoism, transient desire is the only desire that lets things be, that does not construe the world in a certain manner, that does not seek to apply the brakes on a world of changing things. The key to an understanding of wuyu—indeed of all these wu- forms that comprise the Daoist disposition—lies in the contrast between “objects” and “objectivity.” Using Western epistemological terms, the thoughts about the world expressed in both the Zhuangzi and the Daodejing represent what we might call a realist perspective.22 Beyond the mediating confusions introduced by language, and by layers of our own distorted perceptions and tendentious categorizations, there is nevertheless, with properly Daoist qualifications, an “objectively” real world. Our task is to experience that world as “objectively” as possible. From the Daoist perspective, the problem begins when we insist that the “objective world” is a world made up of objects—namely, concrete, unchangeable things that we encounter as over against and independent of us; things which announce themselves to us by asserting “I object!” For the Daoist, the objective world cannot be objective in this sense because it is a constantly transforming flow of events or processes that belie the sorts of discriminations that would permit a final inventory of the furniture of the world. Paradoxically, for the Daoist the objective world is objectless. Sages envision a world of changing events that they can, for whatever reason, choose to freeze momentarily into a distinct pattern of discrimination, but that they recognize, when they see clearly, as being beyond such distinctions. For the Daoist, the consequence of this transformed vision is that knowing, acting, and desiring in the world are no longer based upon construal. Feeling ourselves in tension with objectified others can lead us to act in an aggressive or defensive manner in order to effect our will. Principles and fixed standards can lead us to construe the object of our knowledge by recourse to such principles. In this way, an item becomes one of a kind (rather than one-of-a-kind) or an instrument for the achievement of an end (as opposed to an end in itself). Desire motivated by an object of desire leads us to seek possession of that which is desired, allowing it significance only insofar as it meets our needs. A self that is consumed by objects of desire narrows, truncates, and obfuscates the world as it is. On the other hand, noncoercive action, unprincipled knowing, and objectless desire have the following in common: To the extent that a disposition defined in these terms is eficacious, it enriches the world by allowing the process to unfold spontaneously on its own terms, while at the same time participating fully in it. We may say that the implementation of the wu-forms allows us to leave the world as it is. But we may make this claim only if we recognize that “world” in this context means a myriad of spontaneous transactions that are characterized by emerging patterns of deference to acknowledged excellences. In Daoism the self is forgotten to the extent that discriminated objects no longer constitute the environs of the self. These three wu-forms—wuwei, wuzhi, wuyu—all provide a way of entertaining, of deferring to, and of investing oneself in an objectless world. Thus, in their governing of the people the sages are concerned with embodying and promoting the sort of acting, knowing, and desiring that does not depend upon objects. In fact, when these wu-forms are understood as the optimum dispositions of the Daoist self, whether in the person of the sage or the people, they provide us with a way of interpreting passages in the Daodejing that are frequently construed unsympathetically as recommending imposition and control. Chapter 3 is an example: Not promoting those of superior character Will save the common people from becoming contentious. Not prizing property that is hard to come by Will save them from becoming thieves. Not making a show of what might be desired Will save them from becoming disgruntled. It is for this reason that in the proper governing by the sages: They empty the hearts-and-minds of the people and ll their stomachs, They weaken their aspirations and strengthen their bones, Ever teaching the common people to be unprincipled in their knowing And objectless in their desires. They keep the hawkers of knowledge at bay. It is simply in doing things noncoercively That everything is governed properly. But the wu-forms are not just wuwei, wuzhi, and wuyu. In fact, wu- forms are pervasive in the Daodejing. One additional wu-form, for example, is wuming : translated as “the nameless,” but actually suggesting a kind of naming that does not assign fixed reference to things. In order to function effectively in negotiating our environment, we need to rely upon our ability to make distinctions. These distinctions in themselves are certainly functional and enabling, but can distort the way in which we understand our world. We can easily fall into the fallacy of what Whitehead describes as “misplaced concreteness,” reifying what is abstract and treating these hypostatized “things” as more real than the changing events of our experience. We can easily and at real expense overdetermine the continuity within the life process as some underlying and unchanging foundation. Such linguistic habits can institutionalize and enforce an overly static vision of the world, and in so doing, deprive both language and life of their creative possibilities. The referential use of language as someone’s technical morality— expressing the way the world ought to be—can too easily lay claim to the power and control that would make it so. Naming as power undermines the importantly creative aspect in the effective use of names. In a processual world—a world ever under construction—to be able to name something is to be able to trace out its concrete relation to you and the world, and on that basis, respond to it productively. While naming can be understood as an abstractive and isolating gesture, Daoist naming personalizes a relationship and, abjuring any temptation to x what is referenced, instead understands the name as a shared ground of growing intimacy. Such naming is presentational rather than just representational, normative rather than just descriptive, perlocutionary rather than just locutionary, a doing and a knowing rather than just a saying. Naming as knowing must have the provisionality to accommodate engaged relationships as in their “doing and undergoing” they deepen and become increasingly robust. Such knowing is dependent upon an awareness of the indeterminate aspects of things. The ongoing shaping of experience requires a degree of imagination and creative projection that does not reference the world as it is, but anticipates what it might become. In the Classic of Mountain and Seas, an ancient “gazetteer” that takes its reader on a field seminar through unfamiliar lands, the calls of the curious animals and birds that are encountered are in fact their own names. They (like most things) cry out what they would be. And having access to the “name” of something is not only a claim to knowing it in a cognitive sense, but more importantly, to knowing how to deal with it. Naming is most importantly the responsiveness that attends familiarity. Hence such knowing is a feeling and a doing: it is value-added. It is naming without the kind of fixed reference that allows one to “master” something, a naming that does not arrest or control. It is a discriminating naming that in fact appreciates rather than depreciates a situation. Another important wu-form is wuxin , literally “no heart-and- mind,” that might best be interpreted as “unmediated thinking and feeling.” As the Daodejing observes in chapter 49: Sages really think and feel immediately (wuxin). They take the thoughts and feelings of the common people as their own. The sages do not compose the score for social and political order. The music is the natural expression of the common people. The role of the sages is to listen carefully to the songs of the common people and to orchestrate their thoughts and feelings into consummate harmony. Since the people themselves are the immediate source of communal order, they are in this respect the emerging content of the hearts-and-minds of the sages. The heart-and-mind is the product rather than the source of the flourishing community. The people do not speak to one another because they have hearts-and- minds; rather, they have become whole-hearted members of the community through full participation in the communicating community. An obscure passage in the Zhuangzi becomes less so when we read it and its key notion wuqing as a wu-form—not “no-feeling,” but rather “unmediated feeling.” This understanding of wuqing can provide us with a useful gloss on this chapter 49 of the Daodejing. Hui Shi said to Zhuangzi, “Can someone be a person without feelings?” “Not a problem,” replied Zhuangzi. “But how can someone be called a person,” asked Hui Shi, “if they don’t have feelings?” Zhuangzi said, “Their context provides them with the appearance and the shape of a person—why wouldn’t we call them such?” “Since we are already calling them persons,” asked Hui Shi, “how could it be that they are lacking feelings?” “This is not what I mean by feelings,” replied Zhuangzi. “What I mean when I say that they are ‘wuqing’ (lit. ‘without feelings’) is that they do not injure their own persons with likes and dislikes, and are always responsive to what is natural without trying to increase life.”23 Persons such William James’s “Jack and Jill” reside in their immediate affective relationships. For such persons to lose sight of these important relations by buying into a regimen of contrived values distances them from their concrete circumstances and makes them less human than they were. Another wu-form that we find repeated in the Daodejing is wushi , interpreted as “no-business.” As a wu-form it means “to be non- interfering in going about your business.” In chapter 57, it has a specically political application that explains itself: The more prohibitions and taboos there are in the world, The poorer the people will be. The more sharp instruments in the hands of the common people, The darker the days for the state, The more wisdom hawked among the people, The more that perverse things will proliferate. The more prominently the laws and statutes are displayed, The more widespread will be the brigands and thieves. Hence in the words of the sages: We do things noncoercively And the common people develop along their own lines; We cherish equilibrium And the common people order themselves; We are non-interfering in our governance And the common people prosper themselves; We are objectless in our desires And the common people are of themselves like unworked wood. One of the most pervasive ideas in the Daodejing that is captured in the wu-form wuzheng is “striving without contentiousness.” Chapter 66 concludes with a consideration of the conduct of the sages: “Is it not because they strive without contentiousness that no one in the world is able to contend with them?” The wu-forms that we find throughout the text all advocate a personal disposition that seeks to optimize relationships through collaborative actions that, in the absence of coercion, enable one to make the most of any situation. It is the uniqueness of each situation that requires any generalization about this optimal disposition to be stated in negative terms. A voice coach can describe the constraints that students in general might have to overcome in achieving the fullness of their talent, but all of the students must sing their own unique songs.

. . . but, no matter how he may seem to others, especially to those fooled by appearances, Pooh, the Uncarved Block, is able to accomplish what he does because he is simpleminded. As any old Taoist walking out of the woods can tell you, simpleminded does not necessarily mean stupid. It's rather significant that the Taoist ideal is that of the still, calm, reflecting "mirror-mind" of the Uncarved Block, and it's rather significant that Pooh, rather than the thinkers Rabbit, Owl, or Eeyore, is the true hero of Winnie-the-Pooh and The House at Pooh Corner: "The fact is," said Rabbit, "we've missed our way somehow." They were having a rest in a small sand-pit on the top of the Forest. Pooh was getting rather tired of that sand-pit, and suspected it of following them about, because whichever direction they started in, they always ended up at it, and each time, as it came through the mist at them, Rabbit said trium- The Tao of Who? 13 "Try," said Piglet suddenly. "We'll wait here for you." phantly, "Now I know where we are!" and Pooh said sadly, "So do I," and Piglet said nothing. He had tried to think of something to say, but the only thing he could think of was, "Help, help!" and it seemed silly to say that, when he had Pooh and Rabbit with him. "Well," said Rabbit, after a long silence in which nobody thanked him for the nice walk they were having, "we'd better get on, I suppose. Which way shall we try?" "How would it be," said Pooh slowly, "if, as soon as we're out of sight of this Pit, we try to find it again?" "What's the good of that?" said Rabbit. "Well," said Pooh, "we keep looking for Home and not finding it, so I thought that if we looked for this Pit, we'd be sure not to find it, which would be a Good Thing, because then we might find something that we weren't looking for, which might be just what we were looking for, really." "I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit . . . . "If I walked away from this Pit, and then walked back to it, of course I should find it." "Well, I thought perhaps you wouldn't," said Pooh. "I just thought." The Tao of Pooh Rabbit gave a laugh to show how silly Piglet was, and walked into the mist. After he had gone a hundred yards, he turned and walked back again .. . and after Pooh and Piglet had waited twenty minutes for him, Pooh got up. "I just thought," said Pooh. "Now then, Piglet, let's go home." "But, Pooh," cried Piglet, all excited, "do you know the way?" "No, " said Pooh. "But there are twelve pots of honey in my cupboard, and they've been calling to me for hours. I couldn't hear them properly before, because Rabbit would talk, but if nobody says anything except those twelve pots, I think. Piglet, I shall know where they're calling from. Come on." They walked off together; and for a long time Piglet said nothing, so as not to interrupt the pots; and then suddenly he made a squeaky noise .. . and an oo-noise .. . because now he began to know where he was; but he still didn't dare to say so out loud, in case he wasn't. And just when he was getting so sure of himself that it didn't matter whether the pots went on calling or not, there was a shout in front of them, and out of the mist came Christopher Robin. After all, if it were Cleverness that counted most, Rabbit would be Number One, instead of that Bear. But that's not the way things work.

#### Daoism, Diversity, and Whiteness

Liu 17, Helena Liu, Undoing Whiteness: The Dao of Anti-racist Diversity Practice, Gender, Work and Organization, John Wiley and Sons Ltd, DOA: 9/3/21, 9/5/17, <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/gwao.12142>, r0w@n

Daoism, and the doing of non-doing Praxis — the integration of philosophy and practice — is deeply embedded in Daoism. The Chinese character ‘道’ (Dao) is comprised of ‘首’ (head) and ‘⻌’ (walking feet), which together suggests reflective action (Sun, 2015). Dao itself signifies the way of nature and emphasizes balance and harmony. The familiar Daoist concept of yin-yang refers to the need for balance between polarities (Chen, 2008; Graham, 1989). What are typically seen as competing dyads in traditional Western thought, such as nature/self, contemplation/action and difference/oneness, are regarded as interconnected, complementary aspects that co-exist in harmony (Chen, 2008). The philosophical and religious tradition of Daoism emerged in China around the sixth Century BCE and is considered one of the most influential ancient philosophies that continues to shape contemporary Chinese thought, practice, literature and art (Chai, 2014; Chen, 2008; Cheung and Chan, 2005). Although Daoism is often credited to Laozi’s canonical Daodejing, over time, Daoism has been subject to countless reinterpretations and transformations, blending with other schools of thought including Confucianism and Buddhism (Clarke, 2002). The ongoing rewriting of Daoism is consistent with its principles that each subject position is unique and limited, and nature is marked by constant change (Chen, 2008; Lai, 2007; Seok, 2007; Sun, 2015). However, I have also sought to avoid the ‘dilettantism’ and cultural appropriation of much Western writings of Daoism (Stewart et al., 2008, p. 34), particularly its application in management and organization studies. Although my interpretations are limited by my reliance on English language scholars, I have attempted to ground my understanding through comparing multiple translations by specialists (Graham, 1989; Kohn and LaFargue, 1998). I thus offer my interpretation of a Daoist praxis of diversity in a spirit of creativity and continual transformation. Daoism is a quietist philosophy that advocates ziran (naturalness) (Chen, 2008). In the Daodejing, the value of naturalness is expressed through the metaphor of a ruler. The text describes the ideal ruler as one who is not reviled, feared or even loved, but one whom others ‘only know of their existence’ (Laozi, 2008, chap. 17). In other words, the best rulers are those who both follow the course of nature and do not assert their influence in ways that interrupt others’ natural activities (Kohn and LaFargue, 1998). The practice of ziran is wuwei, meaning non-action (but not no action) (Chen, 2008). With change as the constant, wuwei chooses flexibility and adjustment over coercive action. Non-action has often been equated to passivity in Western terms and thus quickly dismissed from managerial practice, which is constructed as the active influence of others and the environment (Brincat and Ling, 2014; Dinh et al., 2014). Daoists, however, would reject this binary opposition, seeing the world instead as characterized by dialectics where things can transform into their opposite (Cheung and Chan, 2005, 2008). According to the Daodejing, ‘the softest things in the world overcome the hardest’, such as how water, in one form gentle and soft, can become powerfully corrosive and penetrating (Laozi, 2008, chap. 78). Within these paradoxical poetics, a Daoist leads by following, adopting an orientation of self-effacement that allows others to develop on their own paths (Kohn and LaFargue, 1998). A Daoist lens prompts a rethinking of how whiteness in diversity discourses and practices can be interrogated. Daoism cautions that the pursuit of victory through conquest will often lead to loss (Laozi, 2008, chap. 73). This view suggests that the enforcement of ‘hard’ diversity policies such as mandatory quotas for ‘minorities’ can in some cases prompt resistance and lead to failure. That is, however, not to say that wuwei sanctions the preservation of the status quo. A Daoist view of racial equality would argue that the weak will triumph over the strong, but ideally by effortlessly following the course of nature (Laozi, 2008, chap. 36). Rather than forcing change, people can bring about a politics of anti-racist transformation through spontaneously finding opportunities to catalyse change 460 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd with minimal effort (Xing and Sims, 2011). As the Daodejing states, one ‘practices non-doing and yet there is nothing left undone’ (Lao Tzu, 2012, p. 101). Methods This article stems from a wider study exploring Chinese Australian leaders across business and government. The original study was concerned with how the social construction of race informed the participants’ leadership identities. Although diversity management was not the intended focus of the original study, 18 of the 21 participants indicated the impact of diversity management on their day-to-day lives as they were marked as subjects/objects of racial/ethnic/cultural difference. The analysis draws on 18 in-depth interviews conducted between April and December 2014 with the participants who specified and discussed their engagement with diversity practices. Participants were identified initially through the author’s network of contacts and expanded through snowball sampling. The participants were selected based on their self-identification as Chinese Australian and ranged from third-generation Chinese to recent migrants. All participants identified as cisgendered, with seven identifying as women and 11 identifying as men, and were between 33 and 62 years of age at the time of interview. By taking participants’ self-identifications as the starting point, the study aimed to make amends for the difficulties of identification, belonging and agency experienced by non-white people in Australia (Ang, 2014; Banerjee and Linstead, 2001; Hage, 1998). Due to the low representation of Chinese people in positions of leadership, sampling expanded across multiple sectors. Fourteen held middle to senior management positions in media, information technology (IT), finance, hospitality and arts, and four held positions in government, among whom two also founded their own companies. Each interview lasted between an hour and two hours with a total of 25 hours and 20 minutes of formal recorded time. The interviews began with a life history approach — ‘tell me about your background, your childhood, where you went to school and your memories growing up’ — and then proceeded in an informal, unstructured way, allowing the participant to choose on which aspects of their life and career they wished the interview to concentrate. It became apparent through the interviews that by virtue of their racial identity, the participants of the study were frequently expected to engage with diversity discourses and practices in their organizations and/or the wider community (Ahmed and Swan, 2006). Despite the fact that none of the participants held positions in human resources or were formally responsible for diversity management in any way, many of them embraced what they saw as a responsibility to advocate for and foster greater diversity in Australian organizations. For instance, one local councillor started her own diversity consultancy firm and became a prolific public speaker on issues of diversity, and a manager established an interdepartmental diversity council in his organization to encourage more racially diverse recruitment and promotion practices. As interviews were conducted with an interviewer who shared their identification as Chinese Australian, this might have created a relatively safe environment for the participants to speak openly about their experiences with diversity practices. In turn, it was integral to the study’s ethical commitment to anti-racism to challenge essentialist stereotypes of Chinese people in Western imaginations and engage with participants through non-hierarchal relations as much as possible in order to produce humanizing narratives of them. As the analyses were written up, I took care to de-identify excerpts relating to each participant by using pseudonyms for all but one participant, Jeff, who refused anonymity. Other more sensitive statements are left unattributed to any particular participant altogether. I met with Melinda, who articulated the most saliently a Daoist view of diversity, seven months after her initial interview as I began writing up this article to discuss and clarify my preliminary analysis. Once the interviews were transcribed, the transcripts were coded via grounded theory techniques and procedures (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The transcripts were closely examined for the participants’ concrete descriptions relating to diversity, iteratively moving between previously coded categories and emergent themes via constant comparative analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). An UNDOING WHITENESS 461 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 open coding scheme around core categories of racial difference and diversity management practices emerged through the continuous classification and reclassification of the data. Within these core categories, sub-categories were further developed. For example, under racial difference, sub-categories included the Asian Century, understanding and commonality. Under diversity management practices, sub-categories included strengthening whiteness, self-effacement and softness. In line with qualitative research traditions, contradictions among the participants were noted through the coding process to ensure that the analysis recognized the nuance and plurality of their voices. When the topic of diversity was raised in the interviews, I was frequently confronted by the ways some participants seemed to mask and re-centre whiteness through their discourses. Their approaches contravened my beliefs as a critical race scholar educated in Australia of the ways whiteness ought to be interrogated in organizations, where I tended to think in direct, combative terms of ‘fighting’ racism and ‘challenging’ white supremacy. I offer a Daoist philosophical practice not to suggest it is a superior method for interrogating whiteness or to intimate that people who identify as Chinese share a spiritual affinity, but to honour the voices of the participants of the study and recognize the unexpected and unassuming emancipatory potential of their practices. In this way, the study seeks to destabilize the view of diversity management as something white people and institutions do to passive minority subjects and highlight instead the ways in which minority subjects can be agents of diversity in their own right. The findings are organized around two sections that first detail how Chinese Australian managers and councillors view difference, diversity and harmony via a Daoist lens and then how this translates to their diversity practices. A Daoist view of diversity The participants expressed a view of the state of diversity in Australia as a complex admixture of understanding-ignorance and difference-oneness. Melinda, a public speaker and director of a cultural diversity consultancy firm, outlined the resistance others have had to her cause: So you’ve got people who are totally all for [workplace diversity] but are blinded by the fact that there are challenges, and then you’ve got the other side, who think ‘why would I want that?’. I’ve been talking to them about work, race and gender and they … might have experienced some racism and sexism in the past, sometimes by their colleagues, sometimes by clients, but they still believe it’s equal opportunity, and that racism happens in every country. Melinda then explained how she interprets inequality via the concept of yin-yang: Melinda: I came to understand what the Tai Chi [yin-yang] symbol meant. … There’s one whole, and then there are positives and negatives in the one. Dark does not mean that, but it could mean undercurrent; something you can’t reach; underneath the surface. There’s light in the dark and there’s dark in the light. So you’re never really pure white or pure black. … So my role and how I see the world is that nothing is black or white, nothing is all right and all wrong. There’s always an element of both. Like when people talk about stamping out crime and there’s zero tolerance, how can that work? You can reduce it but you can’t have the whole population do nothing wrong. Interviewer: Do you think within this view of yin-yang that the gender, racial, class and other injustices that occur in Australian society can never be stamped out? Melinda: I think it’s true that you can’t completely stamp it out. But I think for me it’s really trying to open people’s minds. It’s almost like, for me, it’s not stamping out injustice, it’s trying to get them thinking differently. My question here attempted to ground Melinda’s more abstract example of crime to our ongoing dialogue on sexism and racism, and probe for why she may be so invested in advocating for diversity if she believed inequality could not ultimately be abolished. Melinda casts inequality as a ‘natural’, inevitable aspect of society, but does not suggest it must be passively endured. By drawing on the symbol of yin-yang, Melinda sees inequality and injustice as things to engage with, rather than 462 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd directly combat and destroy. Her response offers a view of diversity as being about working with the ‘natural’ flow of an unequal society to gently and gradually uncover the understandings of harmonyin-diversity that lurk beneath the depths of ignorance and intolerance. Melinda’s orientation is characteristic of others in the study who reproached the reductionism of seeing race relations within binary oppositions; where racism is ‘done’ to weak ethnic minorities by a strong white majority and conversely ‘fought’ against the white majority by ethnic minorities. For example, Jeff, a sales executive at an IT company, describes how his beliefs about racial inequality have changed since his undergraduate years: One of my tickets when I first ran for Students’ Council was called ‘Smash Racism’. I’d have to say my political opinions changed as I grew up. I guess I was a little bit naïve, but I was no less passionate. I was a little bit simplistic in my approach. I think as the years go by, I realized things aren’t always what they seem; I now see in a lot of shades of grey. Within a non-dualistic view of oneness amid difference, participants emphasized the commonality of human experience we share with one another. Lynn, a marketing manager of a finance company, describes her experiences with ‘difference’ at university and after she arrived in Australia in 2002: Through my studies, I started meeting people from other areas [of China] and making friends from the south. And then I came to Australia and started meeting people from different cultures and different countries so that became really interesting. I often think are we really different or are we just human beings? We have so many commonalities, but we also have so many differences that we need to embrace. I think we need to respect the differences and the diversity. … Everywhere is different so you can’t generalize an area or a group based on that. Lynn demonstrates a flexible understanding of the social constructions of difference and oneness that has been developed through encountering the various cultural categories in China and Australia. The categorization of Chinese people as a group is a relatively new and ambiguous notion that was only known outside China until the foundation of the Republic of China in 1912 when the term zhongguoren (Chinese people) was used by Chinese nationals for the first time (Wang, 2009). For many Chinese people, their cultural identities are more likely to be defined by their association with certain villages, provinces, lineages, languages or trades and occupations than with the nation (Wang, 2009). Lynn disrupts the essentialist notion of racial identity categories often promoted in diversity research. Born in the north-eastern city of Harbin, Lynn grew up with notions of the considerable cultural difference between northern and southern China. As a consequence, she sees white Australian notions of a homogeneous Chineseness as arbitrary, overly simplistic and tenuous. Lynn, however, does not see diversity as divisive and embraces instead a Daoist understanding of the interrelation between difference and oneness (‘we have so many commonalities, but we also have so many differences’). Jeff also captures this paradox of difference-oneness as he recounts what he learnt through his experience leading the Students’ Council: I learned how to deal with people from all different cultures, understanding perspective, understanding the political compass where people sit and their attitudes, their values, where they’re from. And the fact that you can have different people with different beliefs that are incongruent, but at the same time they’re both right from different perspectives. Just being able to comprehend their polarity of belief is a big thing for me. It opened up my eyes. Participants of the study further questioned a unilateral view of white people’s domination over oppressed groups. Two participants in particular shared their beliefs on why we have yet to see diversity programmes result in radical change across organizations. Thomas, a former chief information officer of a resources company considers white Australians’ potential opposition to diversity: The fear of the unknown is what causes a lot of the problem, right? We say there are great Australians. Why do they have no understanding of what we are here for, what do we mean, what is our intention? Our intention is not to conquer Australia, but they are probably scared that if there UNDOING WHITENESS 463 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 are too many Chinese, we might take over, and that’s not the case. We make this our home, this is our home. So from my point of view, the more we do in terms of getting the Australians to understand the other side … they will be part of your friendship, they’ll understand that you’re not here to destroy the country. You’re here to create wealth for Australia, so what’s the difference? Andrea, a CEO of a media company, conceded that most company directors only want diversity in small doses at the senior levels of an organization: It’s baby steps. One of the biggest problems with boards is that the Chair often wants to bring somebody else on who is like them and of course the people who are like them are white, middle-class men and so bringing on a white middle-class woman is already a big step. You bring on a different race and a woman and it’s like, ‘Oh my god, that’s a huge step too much’. Thomas and Andrea draw attention to white ignorance and fear in a characteristically Daoist observation that the strong can be weak. From this perspective, interrogating whiteness is not a counterattack against a monolithic power. Instead, the participants of the study indicate a sensitivity to the fractures within white supremacy; the dark lurking beneath the surface of the light. A Daoist praxis of diversity With diversity marked on their bodies (Ahmed, 2009), the Chinese Australian participants of the study described navigating a delicate balance between being expected by their organizations and communities to stand for issues of diversity and multiculturalism (Ahmed and Swan, 2006), yet being regarded with suspicion on whose interests they represent. A former council mayor joked that the mainstream media repeatedly asks her to comment on multiculturalism in interviews: ‘The media just quotes me when there’s a multicultural issue because I’m Chinese. I have interest in other issues too. Can’t they ask me about my interests in education and healthcare? Why are they asking me about multiculturalism? [Laughs]’. The councillor suggested that by nature of her visible difference, she is confined to a narrow notion of Chineseness, where aspects of her full human condition are overlooked or denied. While her identity is restricted to a racialized woman representing racial issues, the councillor also underscored the ways she is met with continual suspicion about her motivations and interests: ‘Sometimes I feel that even if I help 10 [white] Australians and one Chinese person, some people will still complain that I only help Chinese people’. This perception is predicated on the assumption that whiteness exemplifies the human norm and thus only white people speak for the needs and interests of the whole of society (Dyer, 1997). It also reveals ongoing anxieties about multicultural Australia grounded in a persistent groupism that demarcates ethnic groups from white Australians, singling out the former as antagonistic and demanding their compliance with white regimes (Ahmed, 2008a; Ang, 2014; Bhabha, 1994). Another participant queried the lack of racial diversity in the organization with his human resources department and described how the white manager responded with, ‘Well, what do you want? Do you want a better job? Is that what it’s about?’. This common perception of minority subjects as self-interested when they raise issues of diversity relayed by the participants of the study highlights the challenges they face in their attempts to promote diversity via direct and explicit approaches. Underlying this perception is the assumption that ‘diversity management’ is something white people do to ethnic minorities and thus its practice by ethnic minorities must represent interests fundamentally at odds with white Australia. This distrust is further shaped by gender stereotypes so that participants identifying as women, such as the former mayor, are more often suspected of caring for Chinese people over white Australians, while participants identifying as men who promoted diversity tend to be accused of individual ambition. Diversity and its management needs to be protectively guarded by white Australians whose governance is the only way to ensure it is exercised for the ‘greater good’ (Banerjee and Linstead, 2001; Hage, 1998; Stratton and Ang, 2013). 464 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd As the review of the literature discussed, existing studies have shown how conflict strategies in diversity management are often met with organizational opposition (Tatli and Özbilgin, 2009). Rather, diversity practitioners frequently need to employ business case discourses to promote wider commitment (Tomlinson and Schwabenland, 2010) and draw on discourses of inclusion to secure allies (Lawrence, 2000). Chinese Australians in this study developed alternative methods of engaging with discourses of diversity by co-opting wider discourses produced by Australian political leaders. They exhibited a tendency towards ziran (naturalness) by flowing along the discursive current of the ‘Asian Century’. They encouraged the government’s argument for Australia to engage with its Asian neighbours, framing it as the ‘wise’ thing to do. In the words of Wen, a senior executive in a financial services firm: I think there are a lot of action plans and initiatives for change coming from the Federal Government. That they have this Asian Century, that is all very good; to be more aware, to encourage Australians to invest in educating their children to speak Mandarin, understand culture. I think that is really fantastic. … Geographically we are so well positioned; it would be unwise for Australia not to take advantage of this economic power and influence in this region. And what better way to invest in generations to come than to empower them to have this understanding. David, a general manager of a telecommunications company similarly co-opted the discourses of the Asian Century: [Our] Board’s got a very, very key direction of going through Asia since the last year. But do you know who in this organization is ‘Asia ready’? … That’s how we used to tell the company what we can bring to the party, what we can bring to a company, the customer benefits, understanding the culture and dealing with the customs. In the Daodejing, a passage on the dialectics of weakness-strength states: ‘If you want to weaken something, you must definitely strengthen it. If you want to abolish something, you must definitely elevate it’ (Laozi, 2008, chap. 36). Laozi’s methodology involves doing the opposite to achieve a purpose and taking a soft and weak approach in order to overcome the hard and strong (Kohn and LaFargue, 1998). Turning conventional understandings of interrogating whiteness around, the findings suggest that the participants sought to bring about a vision for diversity in Australia through strengthening whiteness. Specifically, the participants saw their roles as being about supporting the dominant white Australians who hold formal positions of leadership in organizations and society in developing deeper understandings of diversity. Participants predominantly conceptualized developing this understanding by gently raising awareness and cultivating white Australians’ genuine interest in diversity. Jeff successfully assembled a diversity council within his company and worked to mainstream its agenda through a high-profile launch for the council sponsored and sanctioned by senior managers. He utilized the film, The Matrix, as an analogy to capture this relationship: [As] advocates of cultural competence, we are the Morpheus of this world; we are free from the rules that are bound to us by the Matrix. The leadership of this country is Neo. They’re the ones with the power. They’re the designated ones to change the public discourse, the public debates, the public sentiment of this nation. So that’d be politicians, that’d be the media, that’d be academics, that’d be public policy advisers, you name it. These are the people with the influence to change the discourse of this country’s mind. They’re the ones we have to convince. But first of all, we’ve got to wake them up to the fact that they are actually in the Matrix. Jeff, along with many of the participants, elevated white people to protagonists of a heroic narrative in which Australia rises to meet the opportunities of the Asian Century. Like Thomas and Andrea, Jeff acknowledged white people’s fear and weakness and the challenges they face in recognizing, let alone resisting, white supremacy. In order to promote the need for diversity, he appealed to normalized assumptions of white people’s destiny to lead: UNDOING WHITENESS 465 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 So how do you tell someone that they’re actually in the Matrix? And that’s the challenge. … The people who form the leadership of this nation — the prevailing culture that has put them into leadership is the very culture that they have to change in order for it to survive or do well in the next century. It actually takes a lot of courage … and it might mean that a lot of them will become defensive and not want to change because of a threat in their authority. But I’m confident and I’m appealing to the fact that they’ll understand. They’ll see the bigger picture that they themselves, the leadership of this nation, are going to be better off because of it. Because they are not going to lose their relevance in the age and century. In fact they’re going to become a pivotal player. Australia has the opportunity to become the link between East and West. While the concept of ‘Asia ready’ (Australian Industry Group, 2012, p. 1) remains vague in public discourses, participants influenced its framing as the undoing of the dominant Australian whiteness. In line with the whiteness literature, the participants did not seek to challenge white people, but rather to reshape a multidimensional whiteness that represents structural advantage, perceptions of self and others, and cultural practices (Frankenberg, 1993). This whiteness touts a superficial multiculturalism that ultimately leaves white supremacy intact when diversity and its management remain the claim of white people. Hage (1998) articulates this critical distinction at the heart of Australian white supremacy, where ethno-cultural diversity is not what we are, but something that (white) Australia has. Indeed, when read from a Daoist lens, Australia’s overt state-sanctioned multicultural agenda can be understood to weaken diversity. In strengthening diversity, we may paradoxically reproduce its commodification as something to be controlled and managed.1 Instead, Wen and David suggested a new, emancipatory practice of whiteness that requires its fundamental transformation so that Australian whiteness becomes inherently multicultural (e.g., understanding other cultures and educating white children to speak Mandarin). Moreover, participants constructed this radical anti-racist whiteness as a requisite for Australia’s survival and success in the Asian Century. China’s rise as an economic power and trade partner to Australia has indeed provided an impetus for increasing Chinese language and cultural education (Manicom and O’Neil, 2010). Yet fuelled by historical fears of an ‘Asian invasion’, Australia remains ambivalent towards China with public opinion polls in recent years suggesting increasingly negative views and declining trust in China (Manicom and O’Neil, 2010). It remains to be seen how China’s growing influence over Australia may shape Australia’s national identity. While the discourses that underscored white Australians’ benevolence and authoritative legitimacy seemingly reflected a degree of internalized racism, my extended dialogue with the participants of the study tended to reveal an awareness of the ways white supremacy pervades organizational and societal structures, suggesting that the discourses participants employed were often carefully crafted within oppositional and hostile environments. When I further questioned Jeff’s self-effacing view of his own role an hour into our interview, he articulated a Daoist notion of the importance of overcoming a preoccupation with the self towards a holistic view of harmony (Chen, 2008): Interviewer: What I’m hearing underneath a lot of what you’re saying is that you’re not saying that you see yourself as the future Prime Minister of Australia. You don’t see yourself as ‘The One’ who will make that change. It’s almost like you see yourselfJeff: As a catalyst. I’ll tell you what, I actually don’t see myself as part of the equation. I see a mission, and that’s it. I’m doing what any person in their right minds would do, and that’s to articulate as well as I can. One of my favourite quotes of all time is from Harry Truman. He says basically, ‘It’s amazing what you can accomplish when you do not care who gets the credit’. And that’s my attitude to this problem. I think the mission is above any of us. We all have a role to play, but it’s above any of us. It’s not about whether I ever become CEO, Prime Minister, or whatever. It’s got nothing to do with that. The fact is, to get diversity right, Australia will be a heck of a lot better off. In the face of white normalization where ethnic minorities are often perceived as, and criticized for, only representing the interests of their ethnic group, it was to an extent necessary for Jeff to 466 GENDER, WORK AND ORGANIZATION Volume 24 Number 5 September 2017 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd de-individualize racial equality. He resolutely maintained emphasis on the ‘mission’ of diversity supported with nationalistic Asian Century discourses of Australian survival and success. In critically reflecting on a more holistic view of harmony, some participants stressed the need to distinguish equality from popular discourses of diversity management. The former is described as demanding a more self-reflexive awareness of how focusing on issues such as leadership representation can overlook or reinforce class inequality (Scully and Blake-Beard, 2005). Vivian, a general manager at a telecommunications company, most saliently expressed this commitment to equality: Let’s face it. The race issues in this country are not at the top end. They’re the asylum seekers, the Cronulla riots.2 If you want to talk about race, you go to those more fundamental issues. If I had half an hour with [then Prime Minister] Tony Abbott, I wouldn’t be thinking about race, I wouldn’t be speaking about promotions, I’d be speaking about changing the language for the border Australians at that level, at the community level. It doesn’t surprise me that there’s been little focus from the top end because the people there are truly well-to-do.

#### Yin Yang and Feminism

Miller 17, Dessie Miller, Celebrating the Feminine: Daoist Connections to Contemporary Feminism in China, Master's Projects and Capstones. 613, DOA: 9/3/21, 5/19/17, <https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1607&context=capstone>, r0w@n

Ying-Yang Polarity In Chinese philosophy, the concept of yin (陰) and yang (陽) illustrates how these two elements are complementary, interdependent, and dualistic in the natural world and how they give rise to the other. Their duality is an indivisible whole and the fusion of these two elements brings the physical, phenomenal world into being. Yin and yang depict the discernment between Ames and Hall, 44. 11 Ames and Hall, 134. 12 Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 180 & 185. 13 10 right and wrong, morning and night, or male and female. As the Daodejing states, “…as soon as everyone in the world knows that the beautiful is beautiful, there is ugliness…as soon as everyone knows the able, there is ineptness…” One could not be understood nor appreciated 14 fully without the other and by understanding these elements, then one is able to understand the natural patterns and balance of nature. To take the meaning further, let’s take a look at the deconstruction and analysis of each character. For example, the radical for 陰 (yin) is 阝(fu)—左⽿ or “the left side” since this radical could be placed on the right side of the character and the meaning would be different— literally means “mound” and 侌 (yin) means “overcast,” “cloudy,” “shady,” “the moon,” and “month” (it is an old variant of 陰). The character represents the feminine or negative principle in nature, but it can also mean, for example, “shady,” “dark,” “the moon,” “female,” “implicit,” and “female genitalia.” The radical for 陽 (yang) is the same as the previous character, 阝(fu), and 易 (yi) means “easy,” “amicable,” or “to change/exchange” (it is the same character used for the I Ching 易經, or Book of Changes). This represents the masculine or positive principle in nature, but other meanings include “sunny,” “bright,” “the sun,” “male,” “explicit,” and “male genitalia.” The original meaning of yin and yang was used to describe the “shady” and “sunny” sides of the mountain respectively, but this concept evolved and became more nuanced over the centuries.15 Ames and Hall, 80. 14 For more information on Yin-Yang, see: Robin R. Wang. YINYANG: The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese 15 Thought and Culture. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 11 Furthermore, the symbolism of these two elements shows how men and women are, in fact, equal to one another and that one would not exist nor survive without the other. In many societies, yang and its development have been seen to be more valuable than the cultivation of yin since this element has been as the weaker, more inferior element; however, the women could be considered soft power and teacher to a new generation. For example, women in China were once allowed little to no education, voice, and freedom. They had to go through with arranged marriages and in order to achieve beauty—and a higher status—women from wealthy families and women from families who could afford the cost had to suffer the horrendous process of footbinding. The only way women could gain status and to be considered attractive and marriageable was by obtaining perfect-sized bound feet, or “golden lilies,” and also by giving birth to sons.16 If a woman gave birth to a daughter, she lost status and “worth” in her husband's household. A woman’s main function in society was to be a virtuous, obedient, and caring daughter, wife, mother, and possibly a widow later in life. Mothers taught their daughters how to cook, clean, and embroidery amongst other tasks that were given to women at the time. The mothers also passed on oral histories, folklore, songs, and a secret women’s script—known as nüshu (⼥書)— which was exclusively used amongst the women in Jiangyong County, Hunan. This script not only preserved songs, poems, stories, and histories of women, but it gave them a way to stay in For more information on foot-binding and its history, see: Wang Ping. Aching for Beauty: Footbinding in China. 16 New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2002. and Dorothy Ko. Cinderella’s Sisters: A Revisionist History of Footbinding. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. 12 touch with their female relatives and friends, as well. This gave them a voice, however soft in their patriarchal society. This is what was meant by the teaching and passing on a culture.17 Feminine Imagery in the Daodejing The Daodejing, as stated earlier, contains the concept of “proto-feminism” within its pages through the clever, poetic use of language, symbolism, and metaphors. The philosophy emphasizes non-assertive behavior, advocates for gender equality, and it celebrates the feminine, the resilient female, and the nurturing mother. This section will give examples of some of the feminine imagery and it will analyze the use of language in the canonical text. Chapters 1, 20, and 25 uses the imagery of an ineffable and dualistic nurturing mother to explain that instead of “…finding their nourishment at the marble temple of learning, the Daoists remain contented at the mother’s breast, suckled on rich milk of immediate experience and unmediated feeling.” Chapter 1 describes the ineffability and duality of the Dao, “…[t]he 18 nameless (wuming) is the fetal beginnings of everything that is happening (wanwu), [w]hile that which is named their mother.” Towards the end of Chapter 20 (“…I alone differ from others, 19 and value being nourished by the mother.” ) and the beginning of Chapter 25 (“…[o]ne can 20 regard it as the mother of heaven and earth. I do not know its proper name; I have given it the style ‘the Way [Dao].’” ) the Dao is depicted as the mother of heaven and earth who has 21 For further information, see: 宮哲兵。“⼥書：世界唯⼀⼥性⽂字。Her Story: 她們的故事 (Nüshu: The 17 World’s Only Women’s Script. Her Story: Their Stories)。” 台北：婦⼥新知基⾦會出版部，中華民國國⼋⼗年 ⼀⽉ (January 1992)。 Ames and Hall, 106-107. 18 Ames and Hall, 77 & 205. 19 Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden. Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. 2nd ed (Indianapolis 20 Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2005), 172. Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 175. 21 13 nourished all and has allowed those to have an infant-like mind; which means that the mind welcomes a vast sea of experience and unmediated feeling or judgment. Chapters 6 and 28 has more illustrative feminine imagery, such as the correlation between female reproductive organs and the reproductive nature of Dao. According to Roger Ames and David Hall states in their book, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (1998), the main metaphors that are used as to define feminine traits and characteristics—softness, weakness, darkness, tranquility, and receptivity—are “water,” “the infant,” “the valley,” “the mother,” and “the source.”22 Chapter 6, for example, states “[t]he spirit of the valley never dies; She is called the ‘Enigmatic Female.’ The portal of the Enigmatic Female is called the root of Heaven and Earth. An unbroken, gossamer thread it seems to be there. But use will not unsettle it.” Like other 23 passages, this one celebrates the reproductive abilities, the mysteriousness of the female, and her accommodatingly dark emptiness, or vacant interior, which “the valley” alludes to.24 Chapter 28 uses the metaphors, “the canyon,” “the infant,” and “the valley,” much like the aforementioned chapter. This passage also makes a reference to the symbolism of yin-yang, “[k]now the male but preserve the female…[k]now the white but preserve the black…” As 25 stated in the “Yin-Yang Polarity” section, both elements are to be fully understood and one could not exist or survive without the other. The continuity between the polarities has been a prevalent theme throughout the Daodejing. Additionally, like Chapters 6, 32, 39, and 61, Chapter 28 used Roger Ames and David Hall. Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western 22 Culture. (New York: SUNY, 1998), 91. Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 165-166. 23 Ames and Hall. Thinking from the Han, 91. 24 Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 176. 25 14 the metaphors, “the canyon” and “the valley,” to express the inexhaustible fecundity of the Dao since it is the creator and preserver all things. All things originate and eventually return to this cosmic force. Lastly, the most effective way to cultivate the world is to invariably rely on the power of inclusivity, both yin and yang elements need to be present. Again, the two, three, or 26 more become one and complete a full circle by intermixing and by being interdependent. As mentioned so far, the Daodejing is one of the few ways in which “proto-feminism” took root within Chinese culture and this concept, “proto-feminism,” has evolved over the centuries. It is argued that feminism is a relatively new phenomenon in China since it does not have a long history like feminism in Western countries; however, if Daoism was added into the discourse, then one could see that the tradition was the precursor to and how it helped shape feminism into what it is today in China. So far, we have looked at the use of language and examples of feminine imagery in the Daodejing, deconstructed and analyzed the characters of some key Daoist concepts, and we have compared Confucianism and Daoism to provide more context. Now, let’s look at contemporary feminism to see how exactly Daoism has influenced and helped shape feminism in China today. Overview of Contemporary Feminism in China Feminism has been gaining momentum as early as the late 1800’s. It has been linked to socialism—encouraging women to actively participate in their country’s society and economy in order to advance the nation and successfully build up the economy—and class ties, or equality, such as granting women equal rights and freedoms. During this time, the traditional female The tantric aspect of Daoism delves deeper into the reproductive natures on the Dao and yin-yang elements, which 26 emphasizes their complementariness and interdependency. For further reading, see: Bruce Frantzis. Taoist Sexual Meditation: Connecting Love, Energy, and Spirit. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2012. 15 image was being challenged and femininity was redefined by forbidding the practice of footbinding. However, many male reformers, who advocated for a loyal, virtuous wife and a strong, 27 healthy mother, were opposed to fully bestowing equal rights onto their female counterparts.28 Women and feminists were not satisfied with this narrow view of women and there have been several prominent Chinese feminists who helped shaped and are continuing to mold feminism and what it means in China today, such as Li Ruzhen, Qiu Jin, and five women known as the “Beijing Five.”29 Li Ruzhen’s (formerly romanized as Li Ju-Chen) novel, Flowers in the Mirror (鏡花緣 jinghuayuan), written during the Qing Dynasty (1827), used quite a number of Daoist concepts and themes throughout his novel and it did contribute to contemporary feminist thought. His book is a satiric novel that also contains romance and allegorical symbolism. History, fantasy, and satire are interwoven together. The title is also symbolic, according to the translator and editor, Lin Taiyi, of the 1965 translation. On page 9 in the introduction, it is stated that “…the word ‘mirror’ [is] meant to convey the idea that life is just an illusion.” For example, the reality 30 was that Confucianism was considered the norm in China and as the character, Old Tuo, said in The practice began during the Song Dynasty and it was officially banned in 1911, but foot-binding continued in 27 the rural areas until around 1939 (Lucy Crossley. “Pictured: The Last Living Chinese Women with Bound Feet More Than 100 Years After the Centuries-old Symbol of Beauty and Status Was Banned ” Daily Mail. 8 June 2014. http:// www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2652228/PICTURED-The-living-Chinese-women-bound-feet-100-yearscenturies-old-symbol-beauty-status-banned.html). Fan Hong and J.A. Managan. “A Martyr for Modernity: Qiu Jin, Feminist, Warrior, and Revolutionary.” The 28 International Journal of the History of Sport 18, no. 1 (2008), 28. Other people who contributed to contemporary feminism in China include Liang QiChao, reformist, scholar, 29 journalist, and philosopher, (1873-1929) and He-Yin Zhen, an anarchist-feminist, (ca. 1884-1920). For more information, see: Rebecca Karl. “Feminism in Modern China.” Journal of Modern Chinese History 6, no. 2 (2012): 235-255. DOI: 10.11080/17535654.2012.738873. Li Ju-Chen. Flowers in the Mirror. Translated and edited by Lin Tai-yi. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 30 1965), 9. 16 the beginning of Chapter 13, “The Country of Women,” “[w]hatever one is accustomed to always seems natural.” This chapter entertains the possibility of a society where the women are 31 portrayed as dominant and masculine, a Confucian society in reverse. In the chapter, “The Country of Women,” the gender roles are reversed and the society is a matriarchal one. The men are portrayed as the submissive sex and they have to raise the children and maintain a clean, orderly home. In addition, the men have to take painstaking measures to appear attractive to their female counterparts; such as undergoing the excruciating process of foot-binding in order to obtain dainty “golden lilies,” plucking their eyebrows in the shape of a new moon, and spending hours on their hair, clothes, makeup, and jewelry. The women could wear trousers, hats, and manage the affairs outside the home. They are given the masculine pronouns and the men have the feminine ones. The book was quite radical for its time, especially this chapter since it completely reversed and contradicted the Confucian norms. The understanding of Daoism in this novel stems from the religious aspect; however, in both Confucianism and Daoism, the religious and philosophical aspects overlap and it can be quite difficult to discern where philosophy ends and where religion begins, and vice versa, since they are neatly interwoven together. When I say that this novel emphasizes the religious aspect, I mean that the Daoist pantheon is one of the key elements in the novel and, like Lin Tai-yi said, Li Ju-Chen, 107. 31 17 “…when the character Tang Ao speaks of ‘acquiring the [D]ao,’ it is shown that he must first do many ‘acts of charity.’”32 Qiu Jin came from a respectable family that paid careful to and allowed equal education to the education of their sons and daughters. According to Hong and Managan, her marriage was a seemingly happy one by traditional standards; however, she eventually grew bored and by 1902 she became influenced by the movements taking place in Hunan, the center of China’s reforms.33 She eventually left her family to pursue the lifestyle of a revolutionary. Qiu Jin became a stingwilled feminist who stepped out of her traditional role as a “proper” Chinese woman by seeking “…to project a masculine image in order to acquire independence, equality, and power by transference.” She rejected what was considered to be feminine by practicing military drills and 34 occasionally dressing in men’s clothes. She stated, “[m]y aim is to dress like a man!…In China men are strong, and women are oppressed because they are supposed to be weak. I want somehow to have the mind of a man. If I first take on the appearance of a man then I believe my mind too will eventually become like that of a man.” She was a woman who believed “…that 35 through heroic deeds she might wash away the shame of her former subservience, demonstrate her patriotic [fervor] and illustrate her moral courage.” Qui Jin believed wholeheartedly that in 36 Li Ju-Chen, 13. According to Russell Kirkland in his article, “Huang Ling-wei: A Taoist Priestess in 32 T’ang” (1991), Huang Ling-wei, also known as “the Flower Maid,” (ca. 640-721 CE) was one of the few Taoist priestesses who achieved significant recognition for her charitable deeds that were carried out with a compassionate heart (“acquiring the Dao”); however, she was neglected by historians during this time period since she was not considered historically significant at the time (pg. 73). On the other hand, according to Catherine Despeaux and Livia Kohn (Women in Daoism 2003) the priestess “…attained magical powers and succeeded in ascending bodily to the immortals (pg. 124).” Hong and Managan, 32 & 34. 33 Hong and Managan, 27. 34 Hong and Managan, 38. 35 Hong and Managan, 41. 36 18 order to become independent, women must fight for their rights to education and freedom. She practiced what she preached and in 1907 she started a journal called Chinese Women’s Journal (中國⼥報 zhongguo nübao), in which she expressed her feminists ideals to enlighten women on how they have long been oppressed (foot-binding, polygamy, being confined to the inner chambers of the house, and exclusion from sports and education) and that they need not be subservient any longer. The women had to unwrap the bindings on their feet, literally and 37 figuratively, and challenge the gender roles in their Confucian culture. Qiu Jin wanted the women to understand this and she criticized the men for oppressing women and she criticized women because they accepted subjugation. In order to become more independent and empowered, women had to imagine a different social order and fight to make that a reality. This 38 was quite radical during this time and it was a defining moment for modern China, women, and feminists. Qiu Jin later became a national heroine in China and she has been a symbol of women’s rights and empowerment after her execution in 1907—where she dressed in women’s clothes since she was dying for women’s rights—due to a failed uprising against the Qing dynastic rulers. She staunchly believed in her morals and she was willing to risk her life for them. She left a strong imprint on contemporary feminism and a path for future generations. She has been portrayed in various forms of media, such as the documentary film “Autumn Gem: The True Hong and Managan, 42. 37 “If we want women to be free from men’s oppression we must be independent. To be independent we must have 38 education and learn to make a living…If women can support themselves, they will be equal to men. The whole country would not have a wasted person. The country would be strong again. Women’s education is very popular in Japan. If any of you want to come here I will help you.” [Hong and Managan, 38, and 秋瑾。“秋瑾集 (Qiu Jin’s Collected Works)。” (北京：中華書局, 1960), 32]” 19 Story of China's First Feminist” (2009) and the Chinese/Hong Kong biographical film “The Woman Knight of Mirror Lake” (2011). She is part of modern Chinese culture, discourse, and 39 political iconography; however, her poetry and essays are often overlooked. Her exceptional educational background and revolutionary ideas are reflected in them.40 Another event that sparked debate about the discrimination of women in China was the arrest of five activists for women’s rights, known as the “Beijing Five.” These five women—Wei Tingting, Wang Man, Zheng Churan, Wu Rongrong, and Li Tingting—were imprisoned for thirty-seven days due to alleged charges of picking quarrels and provoking trouble. However, 41 the activists were planning to distribute stickers on buses in order to raise awareness of sexual harassment on public transportation on May 8 (International Women’s Day), and they were arrested before they were able to begin staging their protest. Their arrest sparked heated debates around the world and it was condemned by renowned organizations and politicians, such as Amnesty International and Hilary Clinton. Other protests staged by the “Beijing Five” were Occupy Men’s Toilets in 2012 to bring focus on the unfair ratio of women’s public toilets to men’s and Bloody Brides in 2013 where the women dressed in wedding dresses with red paint smears resembling blood-stains to raise awareness on domestic violence, which has been a longstanding issue in China.42 Qiu Jin’s sobriquet, or pen name, was Jianhu Nüxia (鑑湖⼥俠), which translated to “Woman Knight of Mirror 39 Lake.” For more information, see: 鲍家麟和刘晓艺。“侠⼥愁城:秋瑾的⽣平与诗词 (Life Experience and Poems of 40 Qiu Jin)。” 第1版。南京：南京⼤学出版社，2016。and 郭延礼和郭蓁。“中国⽂库·⽂学类:秋瑾诗⽂选注 (China’s Library of Literature: Selected Works of Qiu Jin)。“ 第1版。北京：⼈民⽂学出版社，2011。 Ren Yuan. “Chinese Feminist: ‘If I Talk About Women’s Rights in China, People will Think I’m Sick.” The 41 Telegraph. 15 April 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/11535311/Chinese-female-activistWomens-rights-are-seen-as-a-sickness-here.html Yuan. 42 20 The recent protests against gender inequality have become a relatively new phenomenon in China. More and more women have become aware of the gender inequality and discrimination that is still quite prominent throughout the various layers of their society. Even though it can be tricky waters to navigate, women and feminists have been coming together to voice these underlying issues. Additionally, feminists have been called derogatory names, cast in a negative light, and they have faced harassment, intimidation, and they have been subjected to pressure. Rather than quashing these protests, it has been fueling feminists in China to make sure that their voices could be heard. However, feminists may have to devise other ways in which to protest and bring awareness to these issues because the government has been cracking down hard on protestors. In a BBC News article written in 2015 by Martin Patience, “China’s Detained ‘Guerrilla Feminists,’” it was stated that “[s]ince coming to power two years ago, President Xi Jinping's government has locked up journalists, lawyers, NGO workers and activists of all stripes. He has warned against what he sees as Western ideas infiltrating China and threatening the ruling Communist Party's grip on power.”43 Feminism has long been under pressure and the recipient of negative backlash in China, especially in recent times, but it has also been gaining momentum. Even though it has been gaining momentum, women are still discriminated against throughout the various sectors of their society, such as teachers paying more attention to their male students because they are believed to be more competent than girls, universities openly excluding girls from certain majors (i.e., any engineering majors because women could not lift or operate heavy machinery and should not be away from home for too long) and national defense since, again, women are still viewed as the Martin Patience. “China’s Detained ‘Guerrilla Feminists.’” BBC News. 3 April 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/ 43 world-asia-china-32166443 21 weaker sex. Additionally, many job ads have openly excluded women or specified that they want a tall, slim, young, attractive woman working for them. For example, plane stewardesses in China should have all of these physical characteristics because they have to serve as the face of the airline. Once they become older and are no longer considered attractive by the standards of the airline, the women are given more menial tasks at the airport. Conclusion It is argued that feminism is a relatively new phenomenon in China; however, there are “proto-feminist” concepts found within the Daodejing. The idea of feminism has been evolving over the centuries and all of the aforementioned elements play an integral part in how Daoism helped shape what feminism is today in China. The Daodejing has celebrated the femininity, fecundity, resiliency, and mysteriousness of the Dao and the text has illustrated that the yin element is as equally strong and as important as its yang counterpart. Daoism has long been challenging the patriarchal, Confucian society and providing an alternate way of living and thinking. For example, women such as Huang Ling-wei and Cao Wenyi were able to step out of their traditional role as women and have more freedoms, like being religious founders and leaders. Secondly, the yin-yang elements are an intrinsic part of the reproductive nature of both the Dao and beings. These elements become one and complete a full circle through their interdependency and intermixing. There is masculinity in femininity and there is femininity in masculinity; however, the masculine has been portrayed as being more developed and competent. Daoism promotes a feminine consciousness and that the yin should be cultivated and understood. The feminine element and one’s own femininity is not a weakness. People like Li 22 Ruzhen, Qiu Jin, He-Yin-Zhen, and activists like the “Beijing Five” have understood this. Both women and feminists alike have been voicing their opinions on these underlying issues, and these types of protests have been gaining momentum as early as the late 1800’s in China. Lastly, women and feminists today will have to come up with different strategies in which to protest and raise awareness of gender inequality and women’s rights. One way they could go about this is to bring in Daoism to show China’s citizens and government that there are “proto-feminists” concepts found within one of the oldest and most influential books compiled in ancient China, the Daodejing. This would probably spark a heated debate, but it would also raise feminine consciousness, or get people to start thinking in a different way, and provide the activists a more solid counterargument

#### Yinyang and Queerness

Brilmyer, Trentin, and Xiang 19, THE ONTOLOGY OF THE COUPLE or, What Queer Theory Knows about Numbers

The ontocouple first appears to us in a reading of the cosmological couple yinyang through Dao. The yinyang has often been understood to institute a gender binary, and with it, the logic of hierarchical hetero-complementarity; however, as we shall contend, even if one is to interpret yinyang as having something to do with “masculine” and “feminine” principles, the two that one finds there operates according to a logic other than that of sexual difference, at least as it has been conceived in the West.18 This is because, in presenting nonbeing as primary—indeed, in insisting that nonbeing is more than a fantasy projected onto others—what we refer to as the ontocouple of the yinyang does not depend on the expulsion of the zero but is founded on the very assumption that it is shared by all beings. As such, the yinyang can be seen to harbor a one and a zero that relate to each other differently than the logic of the count, which, as Wittig showed us in section 1, introduces a hierarchy of terms in its privileging the positivity of the first term (those linked with being and “one”), projecting nonbeing (“zero”) onto those terms defined always negatively, and secondarily against the first (as “two”). In the Dao Dejing, the central text of Daoism, yinyang names the perpetual interbecoming of being (有 you) and nonbeing (無 wu). Here, the yinyang is deeply entangled with Dao, the unnamable universal origin, cosmic order and “the way” (another meaning of Dao) in which all of reality partakes. In the Book of Changes (otherwise known as the I Ching) an open line \_ \_ is used to connote yin, a full line \_\_\_ to connote yang, a lexical rendering allows for a numerological translation of yin as 0 and yang as 1. As we stress, however, this zero and one are a zero and one that do not and can never combine to produce One, as yin and yang—never synthesized—remain always together separately. The Confucian commentary on the Book of Changes, “Commentary on the Appended Phrases” (繫辭), articulates the relationship between yinyang and Dao as follows: “One yin and one yang, this is called Dao” (Wang 2011). Does this mean that one yin and one yang added together equals Dao? Or does it mean that yin and yang unite to form Dao? The answers to both questions are firmly no. Yin and yang neither sublate into the one of Dao nor synthesize into a third one that is Dao: 1 + 1(0) ≠ 1. The first reason for this is that yin and yang must be simultaneously present in their difference in order 242 GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES to be Dao. The second reason is that both yin and yang are themselves Dao, which in turn ensures their differentiating sameness. Indeed, yin and yang’s strangeness lies in the way in which they are “either different and the same” (Xiang 2018b: 428). They are constantly becoming each other as the shifting sides of the same mountain (etymologically speaking19) as well as being and nonbeing that interbecome as the same Dao (philosophically speaking). As such, they operate together according to a relation that is not dualistic but “transdualistic” as “both discernibly different and porously one” (ibid.: 436). The two conjured in the ontocouple of the yinyang, in other words, connotes an intimate togetherness between being and nonbeing, or rather (if we follow the lexical order implied by the yinyang in which yin always comes first) between nonbeing (0) and being (1). In the Daoist conception of the yinyang, we discover a model for the couple that stays with the zero, rather than positivizes its threatening negativity. Here the nondialectical and nongendered two of the primordial, cosmo-philosophical couple—yin (and) yang—is not predicated on the exclusion of, but rather guaranteed, queerly, by the fundamental zero of Dao. Indeed, primacy of yin (0) over yang (1) is inscribed not only lexically but cosmologically within Daoist philosophy. The Dao Dejing offers a well-known numerology to illustrate its cosmology: “Dao generates one, one generates two, two generates three, three generates ten thousand things.” Notice how the phrase “Dao generates one” implies that there is something before one: Dao, a not-one that is primary.20 In the general cosmology of the Dao Dejing, moreover, as chapter 40 explains, “All things under heaven are generated from being, and being is generated from nonbeing (天下萬物生於有, 有生於 無).”21 While these lines might appear to suggest that what one witnesses in the cosmology of Dao Dejing is a kind of creatio ex nihilo through which something is created out of nothing, what we think of as Daoist creativity (rather than creation) consists not in the sudden appearance of the one out of the void but in simultaneity of yin (and) yang guaranteed by the generative “zero” of the Dao—that which the Dao Dejing figures as a dark hole/whole (xuanpin, 玄牝).22 In a powerful reading of the Dao’s figuration in the Dao Dejing as xuanpin (玄牝)—a kind of dark/mysterious (xuan) womb/female animal (pin)—Kyoo Lee (2014: 69) reads the Dao as a hole that is also a whole, a site of universal emptiness and potentiality simultaneously. Building on Lee’s reading of the Dao, we interpret Dao as both zero and one and therefore also two (“one yin and one yang”), and we stress the implications of this simultaneity for our envisioning of a couple that would not expel the zero (a zero that, although shared by all, is often projected onto one term of the equation).23 Distancing the notion of xuanpin from any biological notion of femininity, Lee (2014: 69–70) proposes that while THE ONTOLOGY OF THE COUPLE 243 the notion of xuanpin is “gyno-oriented,” it is not “gyno-centric”; as she explains, “xuanpin is freely transsexual, gender-bending: female and not female at once.” One might here approach the hole/whole of xuanpin and the Dao that it figures as a much more universalizable hole/whole, which in closing we link to the anus—a bodily site whose threatening negativity, when negated, produces us as (sexually and racially) differentiated subjects. We thus double back to weave the Daoist cosmology we have just outlined together with the Western European psychoanalytic conceptions of sexuality that we have been tarrying with throughout the piece in order to further sketch our notion of the ontocouple. In another foundational text of Daoism, Zhuangzi, a Daoist philosopher, is asked where Dao is to be found: “It is in the piss and shit!” he responds, to the great surprise of his interlocutor. Following Zhuangzi, we close by transitioning from the cosmical to the corporeal in order to explore the dialectical mechanism through which early twentieth-century psychoanalysis understood the gendered sexual subject to emerge: the repression of a fundamental zero—the anus, a hole that, disturbingly not nothing, must be negated in order to produce the very ontological difference figured in 1 + 1(0) = 1. Before we do so, however, let us remark that in no way do we want to nor could we romanticize a “Daoist queer theory” that would disrupt, in its alleged ancient purity, modern, colonial, and/or Western conceptions of gender and sexuality: one need only consider the fact that in China a “yinyang person” (yinyang ren, 陰陽人) is a pathologizing medical euphemism for intersex person, as well as a derogatory term for queers and especially for effeminate men, to see how the coexistence of yinyang posits as much a threat to the heteronormative Chinese society as to a Western one. If the yinyang can in any way be said to be “queer,” then, this is because of the frightening way it bodies forth the zero, the way that “yinyang ren” indexes a sameness indifferent to heterosexual difference. Similarly, in turning to the anus as a site of corporeal sameness, we are not interested in endorsing anal sexuality as ethically or politically more valuable than genital sex (thus turning a zero into a one); rather, we are interested in tracing the mechanisms through which difference emerges through the negation, albeit unsuccessful and incomplete, of a primal “zero” that is in fact shared by all bodies that enter the one-tological machine

#### Daoist medicine, essence and spirit, mind-body health

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Daoist medicine takes the 《Dao De Jing’s》Central Dao and 《The Yellow Emperor’s Internal Classic》as foundational principles and applies the Yin-Yang Five Elemental phases theory for differentiation. The Daoist Medicine was called a divergent of the Yellow Dao. Traditional Chinese Medicine in ancient times was called “a divergent of the Yellow Arts”, thus one can witness the relationship of Traditional Chinese medicine and Daoist Medicine in regards to their source of transmission and their differences in rank and level. One should attempt to establish the “Dao” in order to explore Chinese pharmacology. For the time being, it is referred to as “Daoist Medicine”, the whereas the common Traditional Chinese Medicine is simply called “Chinese Medicine” as a means of differentiation. Daoist Medicine’s earliest ancestor is the “shaman” of the remote ages. Later on, wizards were known by the name of “Heavenly Doctors”. Daoist Medicine’s concepts and notions deploy Lao Zi’s “Dao” of the《Dao De Jing》as their fundamental principle, as the core of their content. Furthermore Daoist Medicine utilizes form and spirit simultaneously for treatment in order to develop newly-emerging methods and strategies. Daoist Medicine can be defined as a Daoist follower in the process of passing on the Dao through medical activities, pursuing long life and cultivating immortality. Through increasing one’s knowledge and understanding of the universe, life, time, time-space, health and disease,one is capable of shaping a set of tools endowed with mystical characteristics. These tools embody the cultural qualities of the body-mind medical system that originated from the birthplace of Chinese culture, China’s Central Plains. The art of healing pertaining to Daoist philosophies and later to Daoist sects gave birth to the common world’s Chinese Medicine, but it is at the same time distinct from it. Daoist Medicine places an even stronger emphasis on the principles of Jing [essence] Qi and Shen [spirit], as well as stressing the doctrines of the Generating and Controlling Cycles of the Five Elemental-Phases. Both Chinese Medicine and Daoist Medicine value holistic differentiation methods of the inter-relationship between humans and the natural world. Differentiation must search for root causes, internal causes and external causes. Providing treatment must also correspond to the holistic regulation and removal of root causes, internal causes and external causes. Qi is the source of Daoist Medicine’s numerous skills varying as ways in which it is applied. If one does not cultivate realization, in that case it is hard to grasp and physically experience its higher mastery and use. Anyone desiring Great Medicine ought to know well 《The Simple Questions》, 《The Zhou Yi》, 《The Yellow Emperor’s Acupuncture Classic》, The Palace of Brightness, Stems and Branches Point Selection, the twelve meridians, the three positions and nine indicators, five Zang-organs and six Fu-viscera, interior-exterior acupuncture points, the 《Materia Medica》, Zhang Zhong Jing, Bian Que, Hua Tuo, and many other forms of remedies and formulae. One also must have an excellent understanding of peoples’ yin and yang fortune through life, each home’s physiognomy, and the “Shining Turtle’s Five Omens”. One must be equally proficient in the divination method of the “Six Ren” of the《 Zhou Yi》, then one is able to obtain the Great Medicine. Next, one must be well versed in all prescriptions, formulae and methods and ponder deeply about their wondrous principles. One must be mindful and scrutinize intensively. Consequently one is able of calling oneself a Daoist healer. One must also read curiously into a wide variety of books. Which ones? If one does not read the five classics, one is unaware of the existence of the Dao of benevolence and righteousness. If one does not read the “Three Histories”, one has no idea of the existence of the matters of past and present. If one does not read 《The Inner Classic》, then one is ignorant of compassion and fondness of giving alms. If one does not read 《Lao》and《Zhuang》, one cannot go beyond the mundane body and cannot give free reign to the true body’s movements, thus good and bad fortune will be restrained by fears and taboos. When one comes into contact with the path of confusion that means one is alive. There is a physical body, there’s growth, health and death. One should go as far as delving into the secrets of the fall and rise of the five elemental-phases and the “Seven Illuminations of the Heavenly Bodies” [the astronomy of the 28 constellations]. One must equally explore the mysterious abstruseness. If one is capable of completely finishing this study, then there is no obstruction to the “Way of Medicine”, extremely benevolent, extremely beautiful.

#### Hella links

Pettman 05, Ralf Pettman, Taoism and The Concept of Global Security, International Relations of the Asian-Pacific, 2005, [https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103](https://sci-hub.se/https%3A//doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci103), r0w@n

Specific comparisons of Taoist and non-Taoist approaches to global security Having briefly tried to define Taoism and the Tao, and having indicated some of the problems that arise in trying to doing so, I shall now move to the nub of the matter, which is to compare Taoism and rationalism in epistemological terms. I will then compare Taoist thinking with more rationalist thinking about global security in ‘human’ terms, and then with rationalist thinking about global security in more conventional terms. 4.1 Comparing Taoist and rationalist epistemologies The profundity of the concept of the Tao seems to preclude us from using Taoism to describe its meaning in logical, empirical, analytical terms. As a consequence we are typically invited to talk in analogical and metaphorical terms instead. But this is to jeopardize at once the sympathy of most contemporary social scientists, who as a group are likely to require something much more publicly verifiable before considering it reliable. Rationalists are not about to content themselves with accounts of an aptitude for living 6 The story is that of the drunk who returns home at night and loses his key while trying to open the front door to his home. He is subsequently found by a neighbour looking under a lamplight some distance away. After asking what the drunk is doing, and where he lost his key, the neighbour then asks why the drunk is not looking outside his front door. The drunk replies to the effect that the light is brighter under the lamp. Taoism and the concept of global security 71 expressed in ‘stories, verses, maxims’ and the like (Graham, 1989, pp. 199– 200; Giles, 1961 [1889]) If historically or philosophically minded, they will want to be more systematic. If positivists, they will want to use the hypothetico-deductive method. So let us be clear. Rationalism, which is the doctrine within which most thinking and practice about the concept of global security is currently done, prioritizes reason as an end in itself. Taoism, which is the doctrine I am trying to bring to bear upon the rationalist construction of this concept, is a way of thinking and practice that does not. It prioritizes sacral (and in this instance, Taoist) insights instead. These two are seemingly incommensurable. They would seem to represent an unbridgeable epistemological divide. Their protagonists not only talk different analytical languages, they talk past each other as well, which is just what I want to prevent, not just because I do not like dialogues of the deaf, but more importantly, because I think it is to capitulate to rationalism. From the rationalist perspective, Taoism looks anti-rational. As such, it is at best interesting. It is not reliable knowledge. From the Taoist perspective, however, rationalism is what one does with the rational part of one’s mind. It is only part of what Taoists do, nor need it be the larger part, since it includes the injunction to live in a state of sacral spontaneity. I noted above that rationalism is compromised at its root by the kind of self that is required if rationalism is to succeed. I argued that the individuated self – at one mind’s remove from the community – is objectifying. This self is created in turn by learning to be mentally distanced from the communalist context into which ‘one’ was born. Rationalism valorizes this individuated self, typically turning it into a primary normative purpose. Because this bias is built into rationalism itself, and because it limits and distorts so thoroughly what rationalism can do, we have to go outside rationalism to compensate for it. Otherwise, whenever we use rationalism, we will get the world right, but we will also get the world wrong. The most straightforward compensation procedure I know is one that enjoins us to get close to listen, and to take part, that is, to actively eschew the objectifying mind-gaze to participate in what one wants to understand. Anthropologists do this when they immerse themselves in a society not their own. The compensation bid need not stop there, however. It can be carried over from the social ground to the sacral one (and in this case the Taoist one), thus providing the kind of insight not otherwise available to rationalists because of how they choose to know. Those rationalists who get this far will no doubt want to follow their Taoist insights up by considering them rationally, but at least they will have Taoist insights to follow up. At least, having accepted immersion in the ‘shal- 72 Ralph Pettman low’ or meditative end of the experiential pool,7 or even beyond, they may have learned what otherwise they would not have been able to. The rationalist may even want to follow this up with further attempts to take part, and further rationalist reappraisals. By which point we will have constructed a cycle of knowing that is already rolling rationalism forward across the epistemological divide. We are still faced with fundamental uncertainty about the ground on which we stand (though most natural scientists will remain oblivious, and many social scientists likewise.) By eternally returning to both rationalism and Taoism, however, we no longer have to set the one up in opposition to the other. We do not have to abandon our regard for rigour, or our preference for specified indices of comparison, or for reassessing sacral insights in non-sacral ways. But nor do we have to abandon the idea that Taoism has something meaningful to say about the concept of global security. The two are no longer placed in contention, since to place them thus is to cleave to the rationalist line as the surest way to know what is true, and to ignore the way the ontological character of rationalism compromises any such surety. While we are used to having sacral illusion dispelled by analytic clarity, we are not so used to having analytic illusion dispelled by sacral clarity. That is the task before us, however, and it is a task with normative implications considerably more extensive than those rationalists would valorize. How does moving onto Taoist ground, and immersing ourselves in Taoist experience, play out in practice? Our section on mapping the concept of global security began by highlighting the making of modernity. If we start with this general project, and cast it in the light of the general Taoist knack for sacral spontaneity, we see at once how little this knack has to do with the rationalist way of thinking or being. Where the modernist/rationalist talks of empirical logic and scientific representation, the sacralist/Taoist talks (in Graham’s terms, at least) of the rejection of empirical logic, and an ‘infinite regress, testing by tests which in the end are themselves untested’ (Graham, 7 Arriving at Taoist precepts requires the use of what Waley calls ‘quietism’, or the ‘gradual inward-turning of . . . thought’ (Waley, 1934, pp. 43, 45). This involves the use of the mind in non-rationalist, indeed anti-rationalist ways, that allow it to become less distracted and more aware. For rationalists, meditation as a research methodology is too subjective. Why should we accept the results of Taoist quietism, they say, as a way to plan global security, for example, when we can use rationalist bargaining strategies and mediation practices instead? Why, for that matter, should we treat exploitation or global destitution or environmental neglect with meditative detachment, rather than with objective plans for changing the world for the better? Why should we use non-rational illumination to help rulers order the inter-state system when we have publically replicable ways of thinking that allow us to do so scientifically (Graham, 1989, p. 234)? Taoists respond by comparing their accounts of the world with modernist ones. They point out how modernist state-makers are taught to understand world affairs by objectifying. They point out how knowing of this sort is circumscribed by the nature of the primary experience that makes untrammelled reasoning possible (individuation). And they see themselves as eschewing these limits by inviting a different kind of primary experience. Taoism and the concept of global security 73 1981, pp. 10, 11). Where the rationalist talks of the hypothetico-deductive method, the Taoist talks (again in Graham’s terms) of an understanding of the ‘mysterious order which runs through all things’, and the universal motion of chi energy (Graham, 1981, pp. 12, 19–20). Where the rationalist talks of a detached and individuated intellectual vantage-point, separate from society, where reason can be given free reign to cogitate and communicate, the Taoist talks (in Hansen’s terms this time) of ‘heart-minds’ (Hansen, 1992, pp. 53, 85–86). Taoists respond to the situation they are in by unfocusing, that is, by allowing themselves to act with the ‘immediacy of an echo’, rather than the self-consciousness of someone who applies general principles. (Graham, 1981, pp. 6, 12, 14). They invite, in other words, the kind of recognition the ‘heart’ gives ‘when the mind is silent’ (Krishnamurti, 1972, p. 34). This is metaphorical language, but we are not, after all, trying to ascertain what is scientifically true. We are trying to locate scientific truth-finding within its sacral context.8 Faced with global security planning, Taoists highlight the way rationalist attempts to anticipate a particular foreign policy can only reach so far. Taoists highlight how those who really know what they are doing tend to eschew conscious thought to attend instead to the ‘total situation’. This ‘knack’, like a feel for the way a bacterium works, or for how to play a musical instrument, is not one that can be ultimately explained (Graham, 1983, p. 7). Taoists also compare the way they face the future with the way it is faced by those who promote the national interest, for example, or the relevant capitalist/corporate, politico-social, bourgeois, or masculinist interest. The rationalist entertains options A, B, and C, and plays out each one in advance, in a bid to anticipate what will turn out the best. Except that it is not possible to anticipate what will turn out the best. In choosing one policy option, the others cease to exist. Once, for example, option B is chosen, options A and C have no chance of happening. Option A might have been better, or might have been worse. Likewise option C. With the B policy chosen, these alternatives are no longer alternatives. Which is why contemplating such alternatives was futile in the first place, and making decisions on the basis of such contemplations makes no sense at all. It is not possible, that is, to know rationally what is in the national interest. To rely on rationalism is, therefore, to overplay rationalism, which is to underplay Taoism in turn, and to underplay sacral spontaneity (Graham, 1981, p. 14). 8 This is why Taoists see intellectual detachment in terms of a ‘returning’ to the ‘‘root’ or ‘trunk’ or ‘seed’ . . . [or] ‘gate’ . . . [or] ‘axis’ . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21), and tend not to posit a reality behind appearances, as modernists/rationalists do. Taoist thought is figured against a very different metaphysical ground. As Graham says: ‘In so far as we can co-ordinate the Chinese concepts with our own, it seems that the physical world has more being and reality than the Way. However it is only by grasping the Way that we mirror the physical world clearly . . .’ (Graham, 1981, p. 21). 74 Ralph Pettman Modernist proponents of global security demur. Enough people in the world live as if modernist conceptions of global security ought to prevail, they note, for most of these conceptions to prevail in practice. Enough people behave as if world order is made up of sovereign states, for example, for this way of ordering world affairs to be a tangible, global reality. The same applies to liberal marketeering, global modes of making civil identity, the global formation of capitalist classes, the global advent of social movements, and the global advent of gender-specific practices. There is a self-fulfilling quality to the modernist project, and we must deal with its global consequences, they argue, whether the Taoist critique of the rationalist cause is valid or not. This is not to say that the people of the world live in the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps there is a preferred alternative, though perhaps (and this is the Taoist thought) there is no ‘preferred alternative’ either, at least of a rationally accessible sort. Perhaps it is a matter of standing back to look at this cosmos that we are all in, then standing close to listen, then feeling as best we can for how it moves, before standing back to look once more. Perhaps we might even learn something in taking ourselves through such a process, something we might need to know if we are to understand global security. 4.2 Comparing Taoist concerns with human security ones Speaking of the people of the world, I will now move to consider the concept of global security in terms of human security. The concept of human security still tends to be used to describe everything that the statist/militarist forms of security thinking are not (Paris, 2001). I think this is a mistake since I think it is more useful to see strategic security thinking as one aspect of human security thinking. I shall heed the conventional distinction here, however, as a way of comparing Taoist ideas and non-strategic security ones. The Taoist is likely to turn first to the pre- and post-modernist margins that modernist/rationalists create as they seek to extend their hegemonic grasp. Modernists consign to the margins those not deemed rationalistic enough, like women, and those who do not accept modernity as being necessarily beneficial, like many environmentalists. While feminists highlight the male-made character of global security, most feminists are also modernists, however. As such they are not in much of an epistemological mood to listen to Taoists, who they tend to think of as representing a pre-modernist way of thinking. Environmentalists, meanwhile, highlight the impact modernist humankind is having upon the planet’s ecosystems. The modernists among them tend to dismiss Taoist thinking likewise. The Taoist might turn next to those who speak the different analytic lan- Taoism and the concept of global security 75 guages mapped in the first section of this article with regard to the different assumptions analysts make about human nature and nurturing practices. Since those who speak these languages are all rationalists, however, the Taoist is likely to meet with the epistemological incomprehension already discussed. Perhaps the Taoist should apply a more specific Taoist technique, therefore. Perhaps a more particular expression of the Taoist perspective will be able to gain better purchase on the rationalist position. In this section I shall look at human security in the light of the Taoist preference for wu-wei, that is, active pacifism, or ‘no unnatural action’, or, as Graham calls it, ‘Doing Nothing’ (Graham, 1981, p. 288; 1989, pp. 232–233). To Needham, wu-wei means not using force when ‘subtler methods of persuasion, or simply letting things alone to take their own course’ promises a good outcome (Needham, 1956, pp. 37, 68). To Merton it means ‘perfect action – because . . . carried out . . . in perfect harmony with the whole . . . [and] not “conditioned” or “limited” by our own individual needs . . . desires . . . theories and ideas’ (Merton, 1965, p. 28). To Hansen it means action that avoids ‘artificially induced or learned purposes or desires . . . [since g]etting rid of wei . . . [means] freeing us from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures . . .’ (Hansen, 1992, p. 214). Clearly, we are going to encounter here the same translation troubles we did earlier. A general reading of the Taoist literature seems to suggest that the Taoist sees wu-wei as a demonstrably caring, humble, frugal, yielding, and wise way to respond, however. It is the kind of (re)action that spares lives as much as it can, while leaving people as much as possible to themselves. It is the kind of (re)action that deals with large matters while they are still small, and fosters ‘being content’. It is the kind of counsel state-makers heed when they keep their ‘sharpest weapons where none can see them’, and regard all weapons as not ‘lovely’. It opposes conquest by force of arms, knows ‘the male’ and yet cleaves to that which is ‘female’, seeks the welfare of ordinary people, and endeavours to see and hear as ordinary people do. It tries not to stimulate the desire for products that are hard to get, and it tries not to legislate kindness or morality, exalt fame or riches, or rely upon either the ritual or overt use of power. In short, it tries to foster gentle friendships, true words, good government, due regulation, and effective deeds (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 11, 29, 31, 32, 37, 49, 75, 77, 81). Despite all the in-built universals (what constitutes wisdom or compassion? what is a true word? what is good government? what is an effective deed?), this concept is not a vague one. If it still seems so, it is given a graphic account in the practise of Taoist-inspired martial arts like that of tai 76 Ralph Pettman chi chuan, or judo, or aikido. In tai chi chuan the force of the opponent is returned or redirected, making it possible to prevail by yielding rather than by retaliating. This has important implications for conflict management and conflict resolution, even though it may well be one thing to redirect a punch to the person, and quite another to topple the global edifice of gender discrimination or capitalist exploitation, or to fight a guerrilla war. In Japanese judo, which is derived from the Chinese martial arts, weaker people learn to overcome stronger ones by moving in ways that do not offer resistance (Creel, 1970, p. 67). The same principle is manifest in aikido, a Taoist-style meditation in martial movement, where the purpose is to bring the self into accord ‘with the universe itself ’. This requires the practitioner to prevail over the ‘mind of discord’ in itself. In practice, this does not mean retreat. Nor does it mean retaliation. It means completing the task we all purportedly have, that is ‘to reconcile the world and make human beings one family’ (Uyeshiba, 1963, pp. 177, 178; Pettman, 1993). Returning to the analytic map of the concept of global security provided at the start, we can now compare the thinking of those who speak as liberal analysts of the inter-state system or society, for example, with their optimistic assumptions about the capacity for tit-for-tat behaviour, and Taoist thinking, which makes no such assumptions, and is not constrained by the rationalist context in which such assumptions are articulated. Wu-wei decrees no need to return tit-for-tat in promoting global security. It may mean practising reciprocity. It may not. There is no conceptual obligation either way, since ‘no unnatural action’ is not a contractual practice. The Tao te ching espouses a sense of the human whole instead. Since the Taoist also eschews legislated forms of morality, he or she is not bound to the kind of agreements that make international alliances and organizations possible. In dealing with global security matters, he or she seeks to employ sacral spontaneity rather than analytic deliberation, artlessness rather than purposefulness, and to engage in action not planned in the more premeditated way. This sounds to rationalist ears like a recipe for disaster, since it appears to lack all the certainty they are used to in securing global affairs. There are no agreed rules, or agreed habits of international practice where rules cannot be established, or established ways of using force where co-operative means fail. They are likely to point to the Hitlers of this world, who revel in Taoist-style spontaneity, and who take millions of innocent people down with them. And they are right to do so. Taoists are not racist fascists, however. This kind of spontaneity is not Taoist, even when it gets couched in sacral terms. The key Taoist works read nothing like the ideological writings of a Hitler or one of his ilk. Indeed, they speak from a perspective that shows these writings to be human Taoism and the concept of global security 77 atavisms. They repudiate them comprehensively. Moreover, Hitler was the product of rationalism gone awry. Reaching for the mind-view that made for his rise in the first place is not what we necessarily want to do next. If we turn to the rationalist proponents of world government, we find those who are more optimistic than the liberals about the possibility of global governance, and we find that Taoists do not make this kind of assumption either. Nor do they accept the conceptual constraints involved. Taoists do not see people as being calculating or altruistic. In practise ‘no unnatural action’ makes for a mirror-like appraisal of the moment. It may mean promoting world governance or government. It may not. Given the sacral spontaneity that wu-wei represents, any policy choice may be preferred (Graham, 1981, p. 91). It will depend on what lets most people live out their lives relatively unharassed. In terms of the politico-economic (market-making) dimension to world affairs, the practice of wu-wei may or may not stand in stark contrast to the dog-eat-dog thinking of contemporary economic protectionists, the tit-for-tat thinking of global marketeers, and the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of international socialists. While protectionists always see a need to defend their country against the predatory behaviour of trading and investing ‘others’, Taoists may or may not feel obliged to respond with economic nationalism of this sort. Likewise with the free trading and investing practices that those who see human beings as basically calculating espouse (though the Tao te ching does eschew the stimulation of a desire for products that are hard to get). Nor do Taoists necessarily espouse the planned production and distribution policies that altruistic socialists find most congenial either (though the Tao te ching does recommend distributing a country’s wealth evenly, without legislating kindness). If we focus upon issues to do with global economic development and human want, we can see that Taoists are not constrained to the rationalist languages currently used here to do their thinking with. The concept of wu-wei frees us from the constraints these languages impose. This does not mean that wu-wei prescribes set developmental policies of some other kind, or has a solution it can bring to bear upon a specific famine (though Taoism does enjoin us to be frugal and content, foster the welfare of ordinary people, and not exalt riches). It does mean that wu-wei will always see economic well-being as part of the security equation, however, which is still not an acknowledged part of the rationalist approach to global security. It will always argue that people should not want, as well, which is not yet the basic position in the rationalist world either. In terms of the politico-social dimension to world affairs, we can see how the practice of wu-wei may or may not entail the dog-eat-dog thinking of 78 Ralph Pettman contemporary nationalists, the tit-for-tat thinking of modernist proponents of human rights and democracy, or the hail-fellow-well-met thinking of modernist proponents of social movements. Taoism is not constrained to any particular policy or policies. Indeed, it enjoins us not to get caught up in the conventional thinking that these rationalist ways of talking about the self-in-world-society represent. This does not make it a panacea (though the humane and caring character of Taoism would make it the basis for one, as would its sense of cosmic respect). It does invite us to move beyond the rationalist way of thinking, though, to entertain the Taoist level of experience, before deciding what to do. Which brings us to that part of the analytic map sketched at the beginning that accounts for those who emphasize the importance of human nurturing practices, not human nature. Classical marxists emphasize the materialist nature of the nurturing environment, articulating an analytic language that describes and explains the concept of global security in terms of the capitalist mode of production, capitalist exploitation, and the relevant class struggle. Neo-marxists add a mentalist note to this story to account for the hegemonic power of the ruling class, and its capacity to craft a concept of global security that serves its particular interests. Taoist spontaneity is radically different in that it does not portend any particular alternative to the analytic certainties (neo)marxist doctrines represent. Nor does it preclude the policies they prescribe or proscribe. Wu-wei practice seeks responses that are more immediate, instead, and more appropriate to the global security situation, as read as a whole, and from one moment to the next. It seeks a sense of the whole security situation, before affirming that sense in such a way as to nurture as many concerned as possible. Of the analytic languages that articulate preconceptions about human nurturing practices, constructivism is the one most like Taoism. This analytic language highlights the mentalist aspect of the nurturing environment. It does not recommend any particular policy response, since it merely highlights the mentally-made component to them all. Taoism can look very similar, particularly when we find the Tao te ching recommending that we should think as ordinary people think, which is just what the so-called ‘commonsense’ version of constructivism does (Pettman, 2000). While constructivism does not prescribe a particular way of thinking about the concept of global security, it is still rationalist, however, and it still constrains us to a mentalist rather than a materialist consideration of the concept. Taoism does not. It is non-rationalist and sacralist. And while most rationalists are likely to find this a recipe for epistemological anarchy, some may find that it is an opportunity to explore and assess productive ways of thinking that rationalism precludes. Taoism and the concept of global security 79 4.3 Comparing Taoist concerns with conventional strategic ones The dominant (though not necessarily the most important) language spoken about contemporary world affairs is the (neo)realist one. It articulates all of our dog-eat-dog notions about an anarchic world system, and global and regional balances of power. Compare the concept of wu-wei. This would seem to have nothing to do with the whole politico-strategic spectrum (Pettman, 1998, p. 176). On the one hand we have the classical realist dialect of alliance-hopping, and the neo-realist dialect of structural reasons for self-help. We have prescriptions for the pursuit of the national self-interest, and for the proscription of intervention in other states’ affairs. We have state-centricity, and pessimistic assumptions about human nature. On the other hand we have the Taoist determination to make no such assumptions and accept no such constraints. We have clear but not dogmatic opposition to conquest by force of arms. We have the decision to be as flexible as possible about what foreign policies to adopt, and how to implement them. We have the determination to act or react with profound, indeed sacral spontaneity. Rationalists aptly point out that anything less than sacral spontaneity is likely to fall flat on its face. While we wrestle with whether we are profound enough, however, we can always, as the Tao te ching recommends, keep the state’s biggest guns out of sight, treat them as unattractive (no parades or fly-pasts), use overt force extremely reluctantly, ensure that collateral human damage is kept to an absolute minimum if we do have to use force, and treat any success as a tragedy not a triumph. The ultimate issue in the politico-strategic realm is war. How does wu-wei apply here? Human warring is regularly analysed rationally in terms of a range of causes, kinds and consequences. The results of these analyses are used to plan appropriate politico-strategic practices, whether of an offensive, defensive, or pre-emptive kind. Human warring can also be analysed by meditating, however – that is, by not cogitating so self-consciously upon the ways in which we relate to each other and the world. The results of these meditations can then be used to practice neither offence, defence, or preemption, but a kind of watchfulness, a kind of non-anticipation, a way of being in the world-moment that is equaniminous, open, and aware. The latter is the one that wu-wei exemplifies. It would be worthy but fruitless to try and deal with world conflict by getting state-makers to meditate. Meditative disciplines are arduous, their results are uncertain, and modernist state-makers are particularly susceptible to practising the ‘un-Chinese habit of puzzling about ultimate reality . . . independent of sense perception and reason’ (Graham, 1989, p. 234). It might not be foolish to heed the advice provided by Taoists as a result 80 Ralph Pettman of their meditations, however. This is not advice about how to gain privileged access to an external reality. It is about the particular kinds of conclusions that become available when Taoists relinquish their mental grasp of ‘categories made habitual by naming’ (Graham, 1989, pp. 234–235), and seek meditative clarity for themselves (Needham, 1956, p. 33). If this sounds too general and self-serving, we might also recall that the Taoist classics conclude that war is never a preferred activity, and that when there is an alternative, we should take it. As the Tao te ching concludes: ‘Show me a man of violence that came to a good end, and I will take him for my teacher’ (Lao Tzu, 1997, pp. 31, 32, 45, 72, 77). In articulating their meditations, do Taoists contradict themselves? Creel thinks so, drawing attention to the difficulty of being both purposive and contemplative (meditative) at the same time (Creel, 1970, p. 45). Ames, on the other hand, repudiates attempts like Creel’s to cast Taoism in terms of a purposive/contemplative dichotomy, or in terms of any other reading that imputes to Taoism a (political) purpose: Since Taoist political theory is propounded as a microcosm of . . . [its] metaphysics in which the operation of the political state is seen as correlative to the functioning of the cosmos, it follows that the ideal ruler can only be ‘purposive’ if in fact there is some purpose in his cosmic counterpart, the tao. [And while t]he Taoism of the Lao Tzu does acknowledge a certain natural ‘so-ness’ which exists in all things and propels them toward their own realization . . . the political theory of the Lao Tzu is certainly not purposive in the sense of advocating a specific and artificially contrived political program which enables one to seize and exercise political control . . . (Ames, 1994, p. 218, fn. 23) Are Taoists also being impractical? The authors of the Huai Nan Tze (206 B.C.E.–8 C.E.) thought so, castigating Taoists for being naïve and primitive, and for seeming to provide a ‘total repudiation of human culture’ (Ames, 1994, p. 219, fn. 34). Why should an active form of pacifism be better than any other policy, they said? Why should a deliberate attempt to craft the world to human advantage be any less likely to accord with the way the universe works than a policy of active pacifism? It is at this point that Taoists are most likely to be misunderstood. When Taoists tell state-makers to be more actively pacifist, for example, they seem to be advising them to intervene less. This is not necessarily so, however. A Taoist does not necessarily advise either retreat or quiescence. A Taoist response might be more interventionist, or it might be less interventionist. The Taoist will decide from one moment to the next what is most appropriate. If he or she does advise intervention, then he or she is not likely to Taoism and the concept of global security 81 advise that this be done in a single-minded way. All of which might be scant comfort for the harassed policy adviser, though it might be a welcome breather for the policy-maker him- or herself. It might even be a moment he or she wants to prolong. 5 Conclusion The concept of global security is articulated today in terms of many different issue-areas. The more conventional of these issue-areas are those that involve the global military balance, though even these have less conventional components to them, like the issues raised by contemporary terrorism, or contemporary piracy. The less conventional issue-areas involve those like the global balance of productivity, which is now recognized as an important part of the concept of global security (hence the significance now afforded such issues as labour migration), and the global balance of identities (hence the importance now placed on the security issues that diasporas, refugees, and migrant populations represent). To talk about any of these issue-areas is to talk in one or more of the modernist analytical languages mapped at the beginning of this article. Indeed, it is not possible to describe or explain any global security issue-area without using an analytical language of some kind. These analytical languages are part of the modernist/rationalist project, a globalizing initiative that makes, in turn, for the kind of margins manifest in environmental concerns, or in the gender concerns that the global statistics to do with women’s well-being represent. Although the modernist/rationalist project is currently hegemonic, it encounters other thought-worlds that do not work on the same assumptions. These thought-worlds include Taoism, which is the thought-world discussed here. The epistemological divide between rationalism and Taoism is a radical one. It can be bridged, but not from the rationalist side. Once it is bridged we can bring across a range of Taoist concepts to compare with rationalist ones, including the Taoist concept of wu-wei. These concepts can then be used to understand global security better, in both its developmental (‘human’) and militarist (‘strategic’) forms. Taoists do not ‘see’ the concept of global security as being about ‘order’, ‘well-being’, or even ‘truth’. They do not ‘see’ the concept of global security in the way modernists/rationalists see this concept. This can be somewhat frustrating for those who want explicit policy alternatives to appraise, since Taoism does not provide fixed policy alternatives. What Taoism does do is transgress the limits rationalist thinking sets, however, and compensates for the distortions it creates. The rationalist will insist on scrutinizing what the 82 Ralph Pettman Taoist says, but his or her scrutiny will still be compromised by his or her own preconceptions. This is why we need to keep on recasting the rationalist concept of global security in a sacral context like the Taoist one.

#### Lots of shit

Pranav Dayanand, 21, Does Daoism sanction a political philosophy such as anarchical individualism?, Synergy: The Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies, 8-28-2021, DOA: 9-11-2021, https://utsynergyjournal.org/2020/11/29/does-daoism-sanction-a-political-philosophy-such-as-anarchical-individualism/, this card has quotes from Daoist texts, those were translated by the author not me, r0w@n

The argument in favour of anarchical individualism is predicated firstly on an etymological pretext. The Ancient Greek root behind anarchy comes from ‘an arkei’[1], which translates to no power. The etymology of wuwei reveals something similar. Since ‘wei’’ refers to action while ‘wu’ refers to ‘lack of’, Ames makes the argument that this is similar to the etymology of anarchy.[2] Subsequently, Chapter 75 of Laozi’s Daodejing contrasts wuwei with youwei, which means ‘to do many things”. In this chapter, Laozi deplores rulers who engage in youwei and in fact says that it difficult for the ruler to rule.[3] Throughout the texts, you can find examples which praise this point of view, mainly revolving around the ruler ignoring his own personal inclinations in favour of the beliefs of his people. Therefore, the argument could be made from these conceptual texts that Daoism seems to espouse a government that primarily serves the interests of its people and allows its citizens to live freely. The issue with some of this textual evidence is that it is often selective with its quotation of the Daodejing. For example, Laozi also states that ‘ruling a big country is like cooking a small fish.’[4] In many ways this is contrary to the anarchist ideas many of these theorists would espouse but is similarly a central theme in Daoist texts. Many of the ideas that espouse Daoism as an anarchist text do so through a Western lens and fail to see that Chinese philosophy does not see the cultivation of the self in opposition to state power.[5] Elite Daoist leadership has been common throughout Chinese history. The Chinese conceive the idea of personhood differently than Western anarchists and see it as something that exists within a larger cosmological contrast[6]. On the other hand, Western anarchists view the self as something in direct contrast to the collective will. In Daoism, collective will and individual liberty are not in tension but in fact, complement each other.[7] This line of thinking would apply to Daoist conceptions of the state as well. While Daoism does focus on the ziran and the importance of self-cultivation, it does not espouse a society that is distrustful of state power. At most, one could say that the citizens and the state should be one and the same and that the ruler should not have to compel its citizens by virtue of his leadership. This Western-influenced anarchist belief is also reinforced by a false reading of historical contexts. Namely, most historians point to the preponderance of Huang-Lao Daoist thought in the aftermath of a brutal and oppressive Qin dynasty that sought to use legalist philosophy to rule with an iron fist. In its aftermath, one may say that it is possible that the Qin dynasty had led to a strong distrust of authority resulting in an individualistic Han dynastical era. Unfortunately, this is not entirely accurate given the fact that while the peasantry could self-cultivate their land without stringent tax restrictions, there was still an organized state system that emphasized cooperation. Self-cultivation was practiced as something that is part and parcel with the success of the wider state. Sima Qian, the primary historian of the Han dynastical era, appeared to espouse a system of governance like post-1978 China, wherein a laissez-faire economic system was the best way to allow the citizens to cooperate with the state.[8] In other words, the state must allow its citizens to self-cultivate themselves and their communities with minimal state intervention to optimize both the trust of its citizens and the subsequent success of the nation state. In Daoist terms: 為無為 … 無為而無不為 “To the point that one does everything non-coercively, one does things non-coercively and nothing gets undone” [9] This focuses the discussion of Daoism around the ideas of individualism in the realm of economics. As Wang and Cheng indicate, Laozi disparages any interference of governments in the market because market competition acts as the mechanism of production.[10] They base this on chapter 2 of the Laozi, which emphasizes the principle of non-interference in state governance. Within this context, one can view the reforms in Deng Xiaopeng’s post-1978 China as a return to Daoist ideology. In fact, the specific nature of the transition China has undergone can be compared to Daoism in both its structure and the way it occurred. It is a very naturalistic approach to governing a population. Deng’s belief that ‘to get rich is glorious’ seemed to propagate the capitalist system that would follow and set China on the path it leads to this day. The comparisons with Daoism are based on the idea that Daoism is a naturalistic philosophy, rather than profoundly idealist or utopian as was Maoism. According to Laozi, nature is dynamic and cannot be finitely fixed or set.[11] This contradicts the historical materialism one had seen in the first few decades of post-1949 China and set forth a belief that to control nature leads to failure. In political terms, it would be incorrect to control the natural ziran of self-cultivating nature of the human experience that seeks to protect the individual self. The belief that Daoism finds allies in Deng-style governance seems to resonate more than those who believe it to be anarchical. The Dao is often confused with what is natural by virtue of its imagery of the ‘easy flowing stream’ and its characterization as ‘indefinite and vague’. Consequently, people view wuwei through a similar light that advocates letting nature run its course. However, Laozi does not necessarily advocate doing nothing, but as Li indicates, Laozi strongly advocates acting in accordance with the Dao.[12] Therefore, wuwei advocates action that does not violate the Dao. While this is somewhat vague, one can politically contextualize this to refer to Deng’s hexie shehui or ‘social harmony’. “Things that are hard and rigid are the companions of death, things that are subtle and soft are the companions of life” [13] In this quote Laozi espouses a subtle approach to societal change, which was Deng’s philosophy on how to help China transition from its Maoist past. This policy of economic gradualism can be contrasted with the legalist approach taken in the aftermath of the USSR. While Deng sought to slowly move China into the wider free-market system without disrupting the social order, the post-USSR state sought to engage in an approach of ‘economic shock therapy’.[14] In other words, a gradual approach to transition under Deng seemed to be more in tune with the Daoist proposition that one must only act under the pretext that the Dao, or social harmony is protected. While I recognize that this is only one way to contextualize the Dao, it does paint an interesting picture of Daoist influences on modern China. However, even Daoism as an expression of capitalist individualism is not an inscrutable theory. Zhuangzi often espouses the idea that a proper follower of the Dao will lose himself in pursuit of the Dao.[15] In other words, this is a contradiction to the laissez-faire economics of capitalist philosophy that believes ‘to get rich is glorious’. The apparent contradiction in Daoist belief between self-cultivation and the pursuit of the Dao also manifests in different political ideologies. If one believes in the divine right of a ruler, would it not follow that the ruler’s subject would entrust the ruler to act in accordance with the Dao? Subsequently, the subject would then forgo his individual self-cultivation in favour of the pursuit of the Dao, which in the political sphere would involve forgoing individual freedom.[16] Our identities and our capitalist pursuits in the marketplace are based on a sense of self that has free will and self-determination. If we do not have a sense of self, and thus have no ideals of self-determination, then it might follow that we also have no profound right to govern as we so wish to. Ultimately, Daoism also does propagate against striving for anything, which is a slight issue when it is compared with capitalism. A subsequent thought that stands as an issue when thinking of Deng’s economic capitalism in accordance with Daoism is the subsequent environmental degradation that has been paramount across the Chinese economy. Daoist imagery often has its basis in streams, forests, and rivers that have been ravaged by the capitalist economic machine. Market capitalism is thought to put human ambition above the natural elements, which is not something Daoist thinkers would be inclined to support. To go along with the theme above, the state must act while simultaneously not violating the Dao. Oftentimes, it has been reported that the Chinese state model has been complicit in environmental degradation in order to maximize the success of state-owned enterprises in the free market. If the Dao is natural, then should one not maintain that the state should act against a collective human ambition that messes with the natural order of the environment? The ambition-driven individualist often finds himself at odds with the natural order of the Dao. In many ways, nefarious activities have given rise to a disruption in the natural order, leading to ecological calamities such as the melting of the polar ice caps and mass floods on a global scale. Considering Daoism warned against striving ambition when it contradicts the Dao, it appears as though it also warned against Deng’s economic model that led to these environmental outcomes.

#### Names create meaning

Hansen, Chad, 3, Daoism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 2-19-2003, DOA: 9-4-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/, r0w@n

The character mingnames really includes all words. Grammatically, Chinese common nouns share more features with proper names and one-place predicates (transitive verbs and adjectives) than do familiar Indo-European nouns. Chinese common nouns lack case and gender markings and Chinese grammar requires no grammatical noun-verb agreement. Like mass nouns, Chinese common nouns do not undergo pluralization and can stand alone as noun phrases. For related reasons, Chinese analysis postulated no substance-attribute structure to adjective-noun relations. So the translation ‘name’ is not inept nor is the ancient Chinese theory assumption that all words name the part of reality which the word “picks out”—roughly “naming” what we think of as its denotation or scope. Thus ‘white’ is a name and ‘horse’ is a name. Each names a region or part of the world. The most familiar statement of a widely shared implicit theory of names in ancient China is expressed beautifully in the Daode Jing. Call it the “contrast theory” of names. It treats all words (norms or values) as “coming with” a complement, converse or opposite. To learn and understand a word is to know what is and what is not picked out by it. In the Daode Jing, the theory lends itself to a linguistic idealist interpretation. Names literally “create” things. This line of interpretation informs the “chaos” interpretation of Daoist metaphysics in which reality is an undifferentiated stuff which humans divide into “things” by the use of mingnames. An interesting near homonym is mingcommand-fate which was routinely used as a verbal form of mingnames. The familiar practice is to translate it as either ‘command’ (reminding us of the Chinese view that the role of language and names is guiding and coordinating behavior) or as ‘fate’. Another meaning-related near homonym is mingdiscerning:clear.

#### Pu Alt Maybe?

Hansen, Chad, 3, Daoism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), No Publication, 2-19-2003, DOA: 9-4-2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/daoism/, r0w@n

With the importation of Indo-European Buddhism from India, wu-wei started to be interpreted via the Western conceptual apparatus contrasting desire or purpose and reason. This shaped the modern Chinese interpretation and probably undermined the ideal. It became the target of attack among “modern” Chinese who regarded Daoist “non-striving” or “purposelessness” as the source of Chinese passivity. The activist 19th century reformer, Kang You-wei (Kang have-wei) took the denial of the slogan as his scholarly name. 9.5 Pusimplicity (Pre-linguistic Purity) 樸 The Daoist “primitivist” ideal as expressed mainly in the Laozi. It metaphorically represents the result of forgetting mingnames and desires (See Wu-wei). Translations include simplicity, “raw” wood, and D. C. Lau’s more elaborate “uncarved block.” The detailed translation more sensitively expresses Laozi’s point in using the metaphor in the context of a view of names as “cutting” things into types and Laozi’s distinctive theory that such socially constructed distinctions (institutions) control us by controlling our desires. When societies adopt names or terms, it does so in order to instill and regulate desires for one of the pair created by the name-induced distinction. Thus Daoist forgetting requires forgetting names and distinctions, but in doing so, frees itself from the socially induced, unnatural desires that cause strife and unhappiness in society (e.g. status, rare objects, fame, authority). Hence: “The Nameless uncarved block thus amounts to freedom from desire.” (Daode Jing 37) 10. Texts and Textual History Questions of textual theory are the focus of the bulk of modern scholarship. They include these kinds of questions. Existence (did Laozi or Zhuangzi actually exist) Authorship (did they write the texts attributed to them?) Dating (when did they exist or write their texts?) Relations (did Laozi influence Zhuangzi?)

#### Capitalism/Anthro links

Schönfeld and Chen 19, Martin Schönfeld, and Xia Chen, Daoism and the Project of an Ecological Civilization or Shengtai Wenming 生态文明, religions, 9/20/19, DOA: 9/11/21, I have a pdf if u need it, r0w@n

There is a pattern of energy-flows, a way of how nature proceeds. The Daoist sage (shengren 聖 人) knows how to abide by this pattern and ‘go with the flow’. In the Daodejing 道德經, this idea is expressed in the demand “to be the stream of the universe” (c. 28), for “the universe is sacred; you cannot improve it” (c. 29).26 The reason is a pragmatic concern, motivated by self-interest: “what goes against the Dao comes to an early end” (c. 30).27 Seen in this way, the climate emergency is the outcome of not following the Dao. Instead of going with nature’s flow, humanity went against it and now risks coming to an early end in the hothouse fate. The sixth mass extinction is yet another consequence of going against the Dao, and it is also symptomatic of humanity dismissing Daoist values. Central to Daoist values is the rejection of destructiveness, domination, and competition. The Daodejing counsels, “Achieve results, but not through violence” (c. 30).28 The Daoist cherishes three core values or ‘treasures’ (san bao 三寶); they are mercy (ci 慈), frugality (jian 儉), and humility (hou 後; c. 67). The environmental crisis is the effect of disregarding these treasures: instead of mercy, civilization proceeds with a lack of empathy; instead of frugality, civilization embraces capitalism; and instead of humility, civilization indulges in hubris. Doing violence to nature shows a lack of wisdom. The Daodejing warns: “When humans lack a sense of awe, there will be disaster” (c. 72).29 Unlike religions whose practitioners indulge in climate skepticism, as the powerful Evangelical Protestant pluralities in USA, Australia, and Brazil, there is no place in Daoism for such indulgencies. Its teachings already contain explicit warnings of the new realities. Furthermore, its holy scriptures need no interpretive retrofit. Without need for exegetical modification, they can serve as spiritual framework for the challenges of the Anthropocene. Unlike Evangelicals, Daoists can simply say, we told you so. Next to the subordination of culture to nature and the precept of following the Dao, there is a third motif, which could be called ‘soft anthropocentrism’. As we have seen, the proper place of humanity is its harmonious integration in nature. Instead of dominating nature, civilization ought to aspire to a cultural paradigm of mercy, frugality, and humility. And yet, humans occupy a special place in the universe. The Classic of the Great Peace or Taipingjing 太平经, a collection of Daoist scriptures from the Han dynasty, has this to say about humans:

#### The deferential disposition crafts habit forming

Ames and Hall 10. Roger Ames and David Hall (Ames is a Canadian philosopher at the University of Peking. Hall was a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas), 2010, “Daodejing: Making this Life Significant,” Ballantine Books, I have a pdf, r0w@n

If we look for a more concrete way to express the cultivation of the wu-form disposition advocated by the Daodejing, we might think of “life as art.” The developed customs and habits of mind of the Daoist are a resource that conditions, influences, and attempts to optimize the range of creative possibilities without in fact causally determining the crafting of novel experiences. Such aggregated habits are irreducibly social, and are the unannounced social propensity out of which individual hearts-and-minds express themselves as overt actions. For example, the insistent particularity associated with the uniqueness of a particular person must be understood both relationally and as a dynamic process within the context of a given natural, social, and cultural world. Particular character is an inter- penetration of habits that has organized and made meaningful the more primary but not more important natural impulses. Considered synchronically, persons are irreducibly relational, entailing what they do for this specific community as well as the personal enrichment they derive from participating in its communal life- forms and culture. Viewed diachronically, each particular personality must also be understood as an ongoing and unrelenting awareness that attends every gesture and thought, and that is expressed as a rened disposition in all of its activities. For the classical Confucian, this ritualized awareness (li )—the living of one’s life within the roles and relationships of family and community—focuses one’s aggregated habits as they are expressed in the events of the day. We have reected on this Confucian notion of disposition at some length in our Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong, and attempt to locate the Daoist sensibility within this discussion here. To begin with, for the Daoist, this focused awareness is extended beyond the immediate human community to encompass the other environments as well. The habit-informed interactions between person and environments occur within custom and culture broadly construed. This ecological sensibility is what gives Daoist philosophy its profoundly cosmic dimension. To use the word “habits” to characterize either the Confucian li or the Daoist ecological sensibility might seem, initially, somewhat disenchanting, reducing the intense and elegantly productive human experience, whether human-centered or more broadly construed, to the ordinary and routine. But the claim at issue is that it is precisely in the elevation of the routine and ordinary business of the day, rather than in some ephemeral and transitory “momentous” events, that the profound meanings of a life are to be realized. And, properly understood, “habit” is essential to this process of enchanting the everyday. We are accustomed to think of habit in a negative manner as mere routine, or as compulsively repetitive behavior that we would alter if only we had the willpower. That is, we are inclined to place habit squarely within the sphere of determined behavior. Indeed, habit as acquired disposition is of no great significance if one understands the order of the world to be the result of a transcendent Creator, or as the mechanical instancing of transcendent Laws of Nature. For in such cases, habitual actions merely replicate the necessities of things; they are the involuntary expression of our given instincts and needs. It is only if the world is truly processive and changing in character that acquired dispositions may become a constitutive ground of the way things are. Understanding the Daoist-refined ecological consciousness as habitual behavior will be of benet only if we rethink our own accepted senses of habit. Hexis was used initially by Aristotle as a neologism. The Greek hexus means “having” or “being in possession of.” Early on, hexis also had the suggestion of both “condition” and the “state” of something. It was thus used dispositionally to mean the natural or conditioned “tendencies” of things—as the “habit” of a vine. Aristotle himself sometimes uses hexis to refer to the natural or innate behavior of creatures. If we combine the senses of “habit” as that which is had—as a state or condition that something takes on, and as its consequent tendency—we arrive at the sense of the term that is found most prominently in the American pragmatic tradition. John Dewey contrasts habit with essentialized notions of human nature and reason that are the backdrop of deterministic instinct theory, insisting that “the meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired.”24 We are our habits, and they possess us rather than we them. So for Dewey, “the real opposition is not between reason and habit but between routine, unintelligent habit, and intelligent habit or art.”25 Habit is an acquired and cultivated disposition to act in one way as opposed to another. It is the significant form that bursts of energy take as they are channeled through existing patterns of associated living, dependent upon anticipated response as much as novel impulse. It is certainly not counterintuitive to understand habit in this creative sense. Most individuals would recognize the peculiar contribution of technique to artistic endeavor. Without the ability to mentally parse and physically play musical notes and chords in a stylized fashion, neither composition nor performance would be possible. Technique, as pre-reflective and dispositional, frees the artist to perform and to create. This same relationship to spontaneity is realized throughout one’s experience

#### The Death of Wonton.

**The emperor of the Southern Seas was Lickety, the emperor of the Northern Sea was Split, and the emperor of the Center was Wonton. Lickety and Split often met each other in the land of Wonton, and Wonton treated them very well. Wanting to repay Wonton's kindness, Lickety and Split said, "All people have seven holes for seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing. Wonton alone lacks them. Let's try boring some holes for him." So every day they bored one hole [in him], and on the seventh day Wonton died**.

#### Human value judgments are the root cause of all suffering—rejecting conventional notions of good and bad

Watson 2013. Burton, American sinologist, translator, and writer known for his numerous translations of Chinese and Japanese literature into English. “Introduction,” THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ZHUANGZI. New York, Columbia City Press, 2013. Accessed 9/13/20 2:00 PM PST. <https://terebess.hu/english/tao/Zhuangzi-Burton-Watson.pdf>. CH.

It is this baggage of conventional values that man must first of all discard before he can be free. Zhuangzi saw the same human sufferings that Confucius, Mozi, and Mencius saw. He saw the man-made ills of war, poverty, and injustice. He saw the natural ills of disease and death. But he believed that they were ills only because man recognized them as such. If man would once forsake his habit of labeling things good or bad, desirable or undesirable, then the man-made ills, which are the product of man’s purposeful and value-ridden actions, would disappear, and the natural ills that remain would no longer be seen as ills but as an inevitable part of the course of life. Thus in Zhuangzi’s eyes, man is the author of his own suffering and bondage, and all his fears spring from the web of values created by himself alone. Zhuangzi sums up this whole diseased, fear-struck condition of mankind in the macabre metaphor of the leper woman who “when she gives birth to a child in the deep of the night, rushes to fetch a torch and examine it, trembling with terror lest it look like herself” (sec. 12).

But how is one to persuade the leper woman that disease and ugliness are mere labels that have no real validity? It is no easy task, and for this reason the philosophy of Zhuangzi, like most mystical philosophies, has seldom been fully understood and embraced in its pure form by more than a small minority. Most of the philosophies of ancient China are addressed to the political or intellectual elite; Zhuangzi’s is addressed to the spiritual elite.

**Cut off sagehood! Cast out wisdom! The people will benefit a hundredfold. Cut off ren! Cast out right! The people will return to filiality and parental kindness. Cut off cleverness! Cast out profit! Brigands and thieves will nowhere be found. As patterns, these three are insufficient and only make the people seek to add to them. Exhibit the plainness of undyed cloth; embrace the uncarved block. Be little self-regarding and make your** **desires few.[[1]](#footnote-1)**

Eno 2010 Robert, American sinologist. “Introduction,” *Dao De Jing*. Robert Eno, 2010, pp 6.

Value relativity. If we were able to escape the beliefs we live by and see human life from the perspective of the Dao, we would understand that we normally view the world through a lens of value judgments -- we see things as good or bad, desirable or detestable. The cosmos itself possesses none of these characteristics of value. All values are only human conventions that we project onto the world. Good and bad are non-natural distinctions that we need to discard if we are to see the world as it really is.

#### Value judgments and planning cloud our minds. Nature has no value, no plan text. We must return to our true state of nature (wuwei)

Eno 2010 Robert, American sinologist. “Introduction,” *Dao De Jing*. Robert Eno, 2010, pp 6.

Nature and spontaneity. The marks of human experience are value judgments and planned action. The marks of the Dao are freedom from judgment and spontaneity. The processes of the Dao may be most clearly seen in the action of the non-human world, Nature. Trees and flowers, birds and beasts do not follow a code of ethics and act spontaneously from instinctual responses. The order of Nature is an image of the action of the Dao. To grasp the perspective of the Dao, human beings need to discard judgment and act on their spontaneous impulses. The Dao de jing celebrates spontaneous action with two complementary terms, “self-so” and “non-striving” (ziran and wuwei, see Glossary). The inhabitants of the Natural world are “self-so,” they simply are as they are, without any intention to be so. Human beings live by purposive action, planning and striving. To become Dao-like, we need to return to an animal-like responsiveness to simple instincts, and act without plans or effort. This “wuwei” style of behavior is the most central imperative Daoist texts recommend for us.

#### Do not honor the worthy. This will keep the people from contention. Do not prize rare things. This will keep the people from becoming thieves. Do not display the desirable. The hearts of the people will not be turbulent.

#### Hence the governance of the sage: Empty their minds and fill their bellies, Weaken their wills and strengthen their bones. Always render the people free of knowledge and desire. Ensure that the clever do not dare to act.

#### Engage in non-action (wuwei) and nothing will go unruled.[[2]](#footnote-2)

#### The alt is wuwei, purposeful inaction, which is where we discard human institutions and align ourselves with the way of the cosmos. Discard value judgements and negate any attempt at change

Eno 2010 Robert, American sinologist. “Introduction,” *Dao De Jing*. Robert Eno, 2010, pp 7-8.

\*\*\*edited for gendered language. Edits are struck through and in brackets\*\*\*

The political outcome. As the Daoist sage comes effortlessly to subdue the world, ~~he~~ [they] will necessarily be treated as its king. The rule of such a king will be to discard all human institutions and social patterns that are the product of human intellectual effort and value judgments. The people will be returned to a simple and primitive state close to animal society, and this social environment will itself nurture in the population a stance of wuwei. Ultimately, the world will return to the bliss of ignorance and fulfillment in a stable life of food gathering, food consumption, and procreation, all governed by the seasonal rhythms of Nature and the Dao.

#### The judge must align themselves with the Dao. Cast aside your preconceived notions of value and vote on the truth which aligns with the Way of the cosmos

Eno 2019 Robert, American sinologist. “Zhuangzi: The Inner Chapters.” Robert Eno, 2019. pp. 23-24

\*\*\*edited for gendered language. Edits are struck through and in brackets\*\*\*

2.14: Escaping the infinite regress of adjudication\*

Now let’s say that you and I debate. If you prevail over me and I do not prevail over you, does that mean that what you say is so and what I say is not? If I prevail over you and you do not prevail over me, does that mean that what I say is so and what you say is not? Or is it that one of us is right and one of us wrong? Or are both of us right or both of us wrong? If you and I are both unable to know, then others will become muddled as we are.

Whom shall we call upon to put it right? Shall we call upon one who agrees with you? But if ~~he~~ [they] agrees with you, how can ~~he~~ [they] put it right? Shall we call upon one who agrees with me? But if he [they] agrees with me, how can he [they] put it right? Shall we call upon one who differs with both you and me? But if ~~he~~ [they] differs with both you and me, how can ~~he~~ [they] put it right? Shall we call upon one who agrees with both you and me? But if he [they] agrees with both you and me, how can he [they] put it right? Thus you and I and these others all cannot know – shall we await yet another? Harmonize all of these by the horizon of heaven. Relying on it to stretch forward is the way to live out your full lifespan; forgetting the years, forgetting all judgments, stirring within the boundless. What do I mean by the horizon of heaven? It is to say, assert what is not true; affirm what is not so. Were what is true so different from what is false, there would be no arguments; were what is so that different from what is not, there would be no arguments. The mutual dependence of shifting voices is the same as if they were not mutually dependent.

Therefore lodge all this in the boundless

#### The false distinction between human and nature is the root cause of climate change and only an understanding of how we fit into nature solves

Chakrabarty 2009. Dipesh, Lawrence A. Kimpton Distinguished Service Professor of History and South Asian Studies at the University of Chicago and a professorial fellow at the Research School of Humanities at the Australian National University. “The Climate of History: Four Theses.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 35, no. 2, 2009, pp. 197–222. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/596640. Accessed 18 Sept. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/596640.%20Accessed%2018%20Sept.%202020). CH.

When Wilson then recommends in the interest of our collective future that we achieve self-understanding as a species, the statement does not correspond to any historical way of understanding and connecting pasts with futures through the assumption of there being an element of continuity to human experience. (See Gadamer’s point mentioned above.) Who is the we? We humans never experience ourselves as a species. We can only intellectually comprehend or infer the existence of the human species but never experience it as such. There could be no phenomenology of us as a species. Even if we were to emotionally identify with a word like mankind, we would not know what being a species is, for, in species history, humans are only an instance of the concept species as indeed would be any other life form. But one never experiences being a concept.

The discussion about the crisis of climate change can thus produce affect and knowledge about collective human pasts and futures that work at the limits of historical understanding. We experience specific effects of the crisis but not the whole phenomenon. Do we then say, with Geyer and Bright, that “humanity no longer comes into being through ‘thought’” (“WH,” p. 1060) or say with Foucault that “the human being no longer has any history”?59 Geyer and Bright go on to write in a Foucaultian spirit: “Its [world history’s] task is to make transparent the lineaments of power, underpinned by information, that compress humanity into a single humankind” (“WH,” p. 1060).

This critique that sees humanity as an effect of power is, of course, valuable for all the hermeneutics of suspicion that it has taught postcolonial scholarship. It is an effective critical tool in dealing with national and global formations of domination. But I do not find it adequate in dealing with the crisis of global warming. First, inchoate figures of us all and other imaginings of humanity invariably haunt our sense of the current crisis. How else would one understand the title of Weisman’s book, The World without Us, or the appeal of his brilliant though impossible attempt to depict the experience of New York after we are gone!60 Second, the wall between human and natural history has been breached. We may not experience ourselves as a geological agent, but we appear to have become one at the level of the species. And without that knowledge that defies historical understanding there is no making sense of the current crisis that affects us all. Climate change, refracted through global capital, will no doubt accentuate the logic of inequality that runs through the rule of capital; some people will no doubt gain temporarily at the expense of others. But the whole crisis cannot be reduced to a story of capitalism. Unlike in the crises of capitalism, there are no lifeboats here for the rich and the privileged (witness the drought in Australia or recent fires in the wealthy neighborhoods of California). The anxiety global warming gives rise to is reminiscent of the days when many feared a global nuclear war. But there is a very important difference. A nuclear war would have been a conscious decision on the part of the powers that be. Climate change is an unintended consequence of human actions and shows, only through scientific analysis, the effects of our actions as a species. Species may indeed be the name of a placeholder for an emergent, new universal history of humans that flashes up in the moment of the danger that is climate change. But we can never understand this universal. It is not a Hegelian universal arising dialectically out of the movement of history, or a universal of capital brought forth by the present crisis. Geyer and Bright are right to reject those two varieties of the universal. Yet climate change poses for us a question of a human collectivity, an us, pointing to a figure of the universal that escapes our capacity to experience the world. It is more like a universal that arises from a shared sense of a catastrophe. It calls for a global approach to politics without the myth of a global identity, for, unlike a Hegelian universal, it cannot subsume particularities. We may provisionally call it a “negative universal history.”61

#### Jackpottttt

Joseph Pratt 14, A Daoist Take on American Legal Theory, No Publication, 5-26-2014, DOA: 10-26-2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2441773, r0w@n

This consciousness is a sense of the world’s inherent goodness, and that a balance between the other and oneself is necessary to experience that beauty. 83 It is an awareness that separation is only for the experience of community and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. It also follows, as some people in early America understood, only when the common weal and individual pursuits are in harmony can people enjoy true equality and liberty and thus the freedom to pursue that happiness the world provides. This enlightened sense brings together Immanuel Kant’s individualism and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism in a way that achieves much more than either could do separately. 84 81 PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, Article XIV (noting “[t]hat a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free”). 82 For an early case law comment on this point, see Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. 315 (Va. 1809) (noting that a legislature could not limit a subsequent legislature’s actions on a particular matter, but only admonish that any change would violate a natural principle). 83 Professor Gabel calls for realizing an “unalienated relatedness,” while Professor Kennedy might refer to this consciousness as an “intersubjective zap.” See Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36, at 1-14 (1984). Gabel also noted that union and otherness represent a false duality. Id. at 21. 84 Bentham’s utilitarianism would be considered a communalism to the extent it is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In harmony with individualism, this communalism achieves the greatest good for everyone. In other words, there are no losers. Similarly, with respect to Kant’s individualism, people are not considered a means to an end. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 17 The problem is not liberalism per se.85 A strict republicanism, as in state Communism, was as dysfunctional as the Lochner era’s liberalism—both lasted less than 50 years. Whereas capitalism overemphasized the individual, Communism overplayed the communal. Without a genuine connection among people, the forced equality saps the work spirit and the society crumbles. Nor is the solution a capitalistic-socialism, as in modern China—in contrast with the socialisticcapitalism found in America. Emphasizing socialist principles without a deeper connection among the people also only perpetuates a wayward system. The two sets of social norms may differ, but the underlying problem is the same. To foster or preserve this consciousness, the law needs to structure social institutions and decide legal disputes in ways that facilitate this consciousness. In this respect, as in early America, the law must promote a harmonious balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, and discourage purely private material aims, recognizing they are neither productive nor fulfilling as they may seem. In this role, the law must be integrative—it must contemplate various personal and social factors, including the psychological, sociological, political, and economic. 86 At the level of legal theory, the opposing sides like Formalism and 85 This point, and critique of CLS, was noted early on. See Mark Hager, Book Review, Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, by Mark Kelman, 37 AM. L. REV. 1051, 1057-59 (1988). 86 Professor Gabel has suggested that such a legal system will stress restorative justice, mediation movements, holistic lawyers and integrated legal education. See Gabel, Spiritual Practice, supra note 33, at 530-531. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 18 Realism as well as naturalism and positivism also must come back together—again as in early America—to constitute a simple holistic wisdom.87 Attaining a harmonious consciousness, at the same time, will reduce the need for law and legal theory. 88 Daoism stresses that in a balanced state, people believe the goodness has occurred naturally.89 Rather than a stratified society, which many early Americans also sought to avoid, people will seek arrangements where they can live and work in harmony with each other. There thus will be less overt economic conflict. Even in contractual matters, people will seek solutions that benefit all— recognizing that to injure another is to injure the group and ultimately oneself. In torts, similarly, the grounded consciousness will make people reasonable in their daily interactions and reduce negligence. When an accident occurs, the focus will also be on restoring the group’s balance—a solution where all may win. Some may question whether such a consciousness and way of life is possible or even preferable to today’s economic circumstances? At the end of feudalism, many also questioned America’s experiment with democracy, and it worked well in some portions of the country for several decades. The eventual widespread loss of this consciousness and balance between the common weal and individual pursuits, moreover, was not due to economic necessity. Rather, it stemmed from a pride in 87 Opposite theories like formalism and realism as well as naturalism and positivism unite in a wise contemplation to restore the Dao. 88 Others have noted that a common vision of the “Good” reduces explicit laws and legal institutions. See, e.g., ROBERT MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 241-242 (1976). 89 The Daodejing stresses this natural way. See, e.g., TAO TE CHING, supra note 5, at 73 (ch. 17). Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 19 purely material gain—a sense that the individual self could outstrip the whole. It was a wrong step in a right direction. With a holistic consciousness, people again will be free to create and invent new ways of doing things. These new ways, moreover, will accord with the underlying natural order and thus be more productive than the former methods. In the present, post-capitalistic-industrial era, this harmonious approach will open up new metaphysical-physical possibilities, which have few, if any, of the negative side effects, such as pollution, cancer and war, of the discordant system. Just as America’s early homesteading outstripped feudalistic agricultural systems, a holistic approach to manufacturing will surpass the capitalistic-industrial order’s methods. In connection with a harmonious economy, this consciousness, by creating a stable community of secure individuals, will free people from the alienation and thus errant desire and displacement activity of modern societies. In the balanced state, people will be free to experience the world on a deeper and fuller basis. 90 Each person will have the opportunity to realize his or her unique contribution to the whole and thereby attain the happiness that ordinary existence promises. The social norms that previously channeled and controlled displacement activity will become redundant. When it comes to any such displacement conflict, the law will seek integrative ways to restore individual and societal balance. Finally, this consciousness, by showing individual health is related to universal principles of balance and harmony, will encourage people to lead healthy lives and 90 CLS scholars seeking to transcend ill-liberal tendencies have noted this relationship. See, e.g., Gabel and Kennedy, Roll Over, supra note 36. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 20 take responsibility for their illnesses. Daoist metaphysics demonstrates that harmony between the Yin and Yang applies all the way down to the cellular level (and farther). 91 When people live in balance, they accord with universal principles and experience physical, spiritual, and mental health. People will also recognize disease is a sign of imbalance and a call for adjusting a person’s consciousness. This natural health and individual responsibility will greatly reduce the need for tertiary social welfare norms. This basic change, of course, goes deeper than general legal norms. It calls for a reconsideration of the modern Western paradigm based on material separation (e.g., Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology, Freudian psychology, and Weberian sociology). As already noted, Daoism shows that the explicit separation is only for an implicit connection and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. 92 At the same time, this change in consciousness calls for a return to a holistic sense, as America’s founders understood, of people and the world as inherently good (the divine essence itself). This lucidity will resolve many disputes within academic fields and between science and religious forums. It will bring the various strands of thinking back under a single roof. In this respect, Daoism is a complete account of reality. 93 91 See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 2, citing the 200 C.E. Huangdi Neijing. 92 Quantum physics certainly challenges the traditional order, and some notable physicists have already argued an approach similar to Daoism. See, e.g., DAVID BOHM, WHOLENESS AND THE IMPLICATE ORDER (1980). See also, DAVID BOHM,ON CREATIVITY 104 (1996) (calling for a new mathematics that calls attention to a whole movement and to particular things only in some secondary function). 93 It’s not that this grand unified theory can be proven rationally, as Daoism holds, it can only be shown that it could be no other way. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 21 At some point, this change in consciousness is inevitable—as Daoism illustrates, the present situation is unsustainable. Conflict has served its purpose: disharmony is necessary for the experience of harmony and ultimately Oneness and the Dao. As described in Part III, however, the current economic conflict is dysfunctional, and the cultural and social welfare strife crippling.94 Throughout history, a conflicted society has always had to evolve or it would collapse;95 and, again, neither the law nor any other social norm could do anything about it. Many of America’s late 18th century constitutionalists understood that the conflict between liberalism and republicanism was inimical to democracy and a natural happiness. As Daoism also notes, this question is not a philosophical issue, it is a metaphysical point. Daoism demonstrates the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When the implicit connection and explicit separation come together in harmony, a person may experience Oneness and ultimately the Dao.96 This ancient wisdom is simple but profound. In the modern era, thinkers must work to understand its implications. 97 There is much to do within current fields like physics, health, and divinity. In typical 94 Externalities are much greater than most people recognize, and include things like routine pollution, war and cancer. 95 Feudalism, for example, either transitioned to a balanced homesteading (something akin to early America) or collapsed (like what happened in Russia). 96 Professor Wang also noted this point. See WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6, at 223 (describing how “[t]he whole emergent regularity is more than the sum of its parts”). 97 For the many nuances of just the Yin and Yang, see Professor Wang’s book. WANG, YINYANG, supra note 6. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2441773 22 Daoist fashion, this Eastern understanding calls for a Western pragmatism.98 In such a harmoniousstate may lie the solution to the world’s present challenges.

#### A right to strike does not prevent permanent replacement of striking workers, nor the criminalization of coercive strikes tactics for being too “violent!” Let’s stop repeating the mistakes of the last 40 years of labor politics and instead imagine alternative political horizons for liberation.

**White 2018** (Ahmed White, Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike, Wisconsin Law Review,2018 Wis. L. Rev. 1065 (2018), 1127-1131)//NotJacob

One of the outstanding ironies in a story rich with many is that the very things which made the prospect of an effective right to strike seem for a time **so viable—the unlawful, illiberal, and altogether intolerable coerciveness of sit-down strike and mass picketing, especially—are also what made this concept impossible to ever realize.** As we have seen, **effective strikes could build the labor movement, validate the Wagner Act, secure the New Deal, and in many ways change America. But they could not make themselves legitimate.** So it is **that workers have found themselves with a right to strike that equals little more than a right to quit work**—and maybe lose their jobs or their houses and savings in the balance. **They have a right to strike,** as Steinbeck’s character, Mac, complained**, but they “can’t picket”—at least, not in a way that is really apt to change anything.** And **so they do not strike—in fact, under these circumstances they usually should not strike.** The proof of this is readily evident, not only in the dramatic decrease in strikes since the 1970s, but in the sad regularity with which even the most vibrant strikes have ended in defeat for workers. **Phelps Dodge (1983**), **Greyhound (1983 and 1990**), **Hormel (1985-1986**), **Caterpillar (1992, 1993, and 1994-1995**), **Detroit Daily News/Daily Free Press (1995-1997)**—th**ese are but the most notable of a litany of vibrant strikes since the 1970s that ended in failure.**306 They are, in fact, the definitive labor struggles of this period, overshadowing a much smaller number of comparable disputes, like the strikes at United Parcel Service in 1997 and Verizon in 2016 that—often shaped by uniquely favorable labor dynamics—ended in something resembling victory for the union.**307 Each of these big and unsuccessful strikes was motived by very modest, in fact anti-concessionary, goals and well-supported by workers and the larger public alike.** **And each featured mass picketing and other attempts at militancy. But these tactics were met with injunctions, civil suits, mass arrests, and criminal prosecutions, which ended the protests and left the employers free to exert their vast advantages in material wealth and political power, end the disputes on their terms, and leave thousands of strikers unemployed.308 It is true that the last year or so has witnessed what many people have declared to be a miniature strike wave, that has been widely celebrated by unionists and their allies as a welcome departure from past trends and portent, many hope, of a sustained resurgence of labor activism.**309 Headlined by statewide teachers strikes in West Virginia, Oklahoma, and Arizona, all in the first part of 2018, the strikes commanded a great deal of media coverage, at least compared to what labor disputes usually receive nowadays.310 However, closer inspection suggests that this wave is mainly an artifact of wishful thinking exacerbated by the novelty for many people nowadays of seeing these strikes reported in the media. For in fact, the number of strikes over the last couple of years has remained close to the level that has prevailed for several decades now.311 Perhaps more significant in putting these strikes in proper context is a reflection on their character. **None have been organizing strikes.** All of these strikes have been over contracts and working conditions, with many driven by workers’ opposition to concessions and ended with less than spectacular gains by the strikers.312 Moreover, the strikes which comprise this supposed wave have been disproportionately mounted by government workers—teachers, mainly—who are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act. For this reason, several of the strikes have been unlawful, as state law typically denies such workers the right to strike anyway. But at the same time—and this may be the most crucial point—**none of these strikes has unfolded in an especially militant way, at least by historical standards. There have been no big sit-down strikes, no threatening episodes of mass picketing, no routing of “scabs,” no destruction of property.** Which is all to say that the kinds of strikes that built the labor movement eighty or more years ago remain thoroughly in check. **There is little hope within the prevailing political and juridical order that things could ever be any different.** Perhaps the right to strike could be made effective if it were fundamentally reconfigured in illiberal, corporatist terms. The right could conceivably be reconfigured such that the government might intervene more aggressively and make the workers protests effective—for example, stepping in to decide by adjudication, mediation, or arbitration which side should win a strike. Elements of this approach, which was vigorously opposed by IWW and AFL unionists alike in the early twentieth century, can be found internationally, in industry-specific statutes like the Railway Labor Act, and in labor statutes that apply to government workers, although most often when the law goes down this path it all but dispenses with the right to strike anyway, treating it as a redundancy, a tool without a purpose. As Senator Wagner himself perceived, alignment between the excessive reliance on the authority of the state to manage labor relations and the denigration of the right to strike was both dysfunctional and dangerous. As he put it back in the summer of 1937, defending the recently-passed statute that bore his name and the right that he placed at the center of it, [t]he outlawry of the right to strike is a natural concomitant of authoritarian governments. It occurs only when a government is willing to assume definitive responsibility for prescribing every element in the industrial relationship—the length of the day, the size of the wage, the terms and conditions of work.**313 Clearly no such regime will be instituted in any event, not least because, as interest in such schemes in the twentieth century makes clear, support for this kind of corporatist intervention in labor disputes has itself been an elite reaction against strike militancy that currently does not exist. Where does this leave workers and unions, possessed of a right they cannot afford to surrender but cannot rely on as a means of advancing their interests and standing in society?** Are they bound like Steinbeck’s strikers to meet defeat, albeit in a more peaceful way? Maybe. In one of his many commentaries on the sit-down strikes as they raged across the country in the spring of 1937, Walter Lippmann took time to analyze one of the speeches in which James Landis had argued that the tactic might well become a new right, in the same way that the right to strike in general had been created through its persistent assertion in the face of opposition and incredulity. No revolutionary, Lippmann nonetheless understood what Landis apparently did not: that the right Landis spoke of was revolutionary in its conception, and therefore not just an impracticality but a contradiction. “Never in the history of the law has rebellion been made lawful. Only the rights demanded by the rebels have been legalized,” said Lippman.314 **As the labor scholars who call for the restoration of an effective right to strike have all understood, the tactics that made such strikes possible were tolerated only so long as there was not a functional system of labor rights in place, one that could stand alone in courts and hearing rooms.** **Once this was the case—once the rebel unionists’ aims, or at least those imputed to them, were realized—the sit-down strikes were predictably banned, and then so were mass picketing, secondary boycotts, and so forth**. Thus it is that in cases like Fansteel and the debates on Taft-Hartley, sit-down strikers, mass picketers, and the like were presented as enemies of the labor law. **Even more recent attacks on the right to strike, such as complaints in the 1980s about union violence going uncensored and the modest moves by the NLRB to rein in this, too, have been inevitably justified not in terms of overthrowing the system of labor rights but managing it, reconciling its virtues with the normative and juridical mandates of liberal society. And so it is that the right to strike—the right to an effective strike—has been sacrificed not in the name of capitalist hegemony but on liberalism’s altar of labor peace. Unfortunately, so far as the interests of workers go, these are the same thing.**

#### When I say Daoist philosophies I’m talking about these three texts- I obviously never pretended to talk about every form of Daoism

Coutinho 14, Steve. “An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies.”, 2014, Columbia University Press, Dr. Coutinho is a specialist in early Chinese philosophy with an emphasis on early Daoist texts. He studied at University College London, where he did his B.A. in analytical philosophy, and M.Phil in the phenomenology of Husserl. At the University of Hawai'i, he completed his Ph.D. in Chinese and Comparative Philosophy under the supervision of Roger Ames, and studied classical Chinese with David McCraw.He has taught at the University of London, the University of Hawai'i, and Towson University. He came to Muhlenberg College in 2005, where he teaches courses in Philosophies of China, Philosophies of India, Daoist Philosophies, Logic, and Philosophy of Language, DOA- 11/20/21, I have an apple books file, r0w@n

“The term “Daoism” is highly amorphous, as there is no unitary phenomenon to which it unambiguously refers. It may refer to the philosophical ideas advocated in early texts such as the Laozi and the Zhuangzi; to the syncretistic metapolitical thought of the Han dynasty; to systems of spiritual and meditative cultivation; to practices of alchemy and longevity; and to a number of institutional religious systems that have developed over the course of the last two millennia. This book does not pretend to be about all these forms of Daoism. Rather, it focuses specifically on the variety of philosophical ideas and viewpoints that are raised in three early Daoist texts. Two texts in particular, the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, came to dominate the discourse and acquired the status of classics, at least in part because of the richness of their philosophical content. They are by no means the only early texts representative of Daoist philosophical thought. The Huainanzi and the Lüshi Chunqiu, for example, contain some material that resonates with Daoist sensibility. Roger Ames and D. C. Lau have produced a study and translation of “Yuan Dao,” an essay from the Huainanzi that explicitly draws ideas from both the Laozi[…]”“Harold Roth has recently produced a study of the “Nei Ye” chapter of the Guanzi and its possible relationship to early Daoist thought and practice. In this book, I have expanded the usual repertoire of the Laozi and the Zhuangzi with a study of the Liezi. Though it dates from a slightly later period, it is very similar to the Zhuangzi in style, spirit, and content, sharing and developing many concerns found in the earlier two texts. Without denying the individuality of and distinctive differences among the three texts, or the plurality of voices and perspectives within each of them, they can be seen as sharing a distinctive philosophical sensibility that differentiates them from competing views of the time. Even if the authors, contributors, and commentators did not think of themselves as proponents of a single doctrine or as belonging to the same school, they are not unreasonably regarded as belonging to related traditions of thought. Broadly speaking, they each articulate a worldview that promotes a shift in emphasis from the human to the cosmic, or from the artificial to the natural. They also advocate ways of life in which we cultivate natural capacities, and modes of yielding, nurturing[…]”“time to come. But since it has multiple manifestations, I shall use the plural form, “Daoist philosophies.” This book provides a thorough scholarly introduction to the fundamental concepts of the various branches of Daoist thought represented in these three texts. It is written for two types of readers: those interested in philosophy who want to expand their range to include Daoism; and those interested in ancient China who wish to deepen their understanding of the philosophical issues raised by these texts.”

#### Daoism isn’t humanist, that’s just your western assumption of it- enlightenment philosophe/libertarian link- daoism isn’t libertarian- logic card

Goodfield 11, Eric Goodfield, Wu Wei East and West: Humanism and Anti-Humanism in Daoist and Enlightenment Political Thought, Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, March 2011, 12-8-2021,​​​ Eric Lee Goodfield is an Assistant Professor with AUB’s Civilization Studies Program and the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration. His recent book Hegel and the Metaphysical Frontiers of Political Theory came out with Routledge in 2014. His research interests include non-Western/comparative political thought, the history of philosophy, and modern and contemporary political philosophy.  A former Fulbright Fellow, Eric has previously taught in Korea, Thailand, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, and Germany. r0w@n

In Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and West-ern Thought (1997) J.J. Clarke makes a common juxtaposition regard-ing the intimacy of Daoist and Enlightenment political thought.Clarke writes: ‘The wise ruler knows that, at a certain level of oper-ating, the best policy is in a sense to do nothing, a policy summed up in the central philosophical concept of wu-wei which is translated into French as laissez-faire’ (1997: 50). Like Clarke, some contem-porary authors have witnessed the flourishing of the Sinophilia of the early Enlightenment and the direct impact of Daoist and Chinese Thought on the ideas of Spinoza,1 Leibniz, Voltaire, Quesnay, the philosophes, and have proceeded to make overt connections between the Daoist notion of ‘non-action’ or Wu wei ((無爲) and Enlighten-ment laissez-faire doctrines as a sign of meaningful overlap.2 This Trend has recently been updated and made more severe by scholarsTheoria, March 2011 doi:10.3167/th.2011.571260303-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 56 and economists such as Ken McCormick who has made claims of ‘the independent advo cacy of a policy of laissez-faire by both ancientTaoist philosophers and Classical econo mists’ (1999: 331) and JamesA. Dorn who, in the name of ‘Market Daoism’ and ‘the Tao of AdamSmith’, claims that ‘the notion that a laissez-faire system will be har-monious if government safeguards persons and property… [is] inher-ent in the ancient Chinese Taoist vision of a self-regulating order’(2003: 140). In contrast to such sweeping approaches, I will here argue that these sorts of **common conceptual comparisons have often been inappropriate where touchstone humanist notions devoid of theDao de Jing’s** (hereafter referred to as the DDJ) **fundamental meta-physical commitments** are brought forward as evidence of interconnection.3 That is, the DDJ provides us with one specific and seminal case from within the Daoist canon that undermines the economist's case. I find that it is precisely **by taking seriously the metaphysical underpinnings of these conceptual traditions that we find avenues for constructive dialogue** and exchange that cohere with Zhang Longzi’s1992 call in The Dao and the Logos to ‘find a common ground on which Chinese and western literatures can be understood as com-mensurable, even though their cultural and historical contexts are dif-ferent’(1992: xiv). I assume that the DDJ’s unique metaphysics calls for this sort of philosophical hermeneutic and that, by coming to terms with them, space for comparative reflection on its political the-oretic dimensions is opened up as well. This is not to suggest that his-torical or cultural comparatives are futile in the case of the DDJ but,rather, that **taking the primacy of the great Dao as a presuppositional and foundational construct that is intentionally antecedent to its polit-ical theorisations permits a conceptual comparative to take priority.**This of course runs counter to those authors who would see the DDJas a primarily military or political guidebook. In order to accomplish my task I present a close reading of severalkey passages in the DDJ. These will illuminate the important ways inwhich normative statements regarding Wu wei/non-action rely on pro-nounced metaphysical assumptions that make Enlightenment con-cepts of laissez-faire conceptually incommensurable. The translationsand interpretations below are from the well accepted, if somewhatstaid, Waley translation and are presented in comparison with MossRoberts’s recent and ‘indigenous’ oriented treatment. Of the two translations, the former is written in a Western intellectual frame of reference whereas the latter presents a sinologist’s sensitivity to the discursive nuances and specificities of China’s own intellectual his-Wu Wei East and West 5703-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 57 tory and language.4The tension between these two approaches provides a fruitful basis for a comparative between Chinese and Euro-centric traditions of thought that I hope will permit some discrimina-tion between that which is, and is not, conceptually appropriable to the West in assessing its importations and mobilisations of the Daoist conception of Wu wei.IIThe  DDJ’s opening statements inform us that **‘only those that rid themselves forever of desire can see the Secret Essences**’ (Waley1934: §1) entailing that, in limiting desire we may gain access to the immanent presence of the Dao standing behind the appearances of sensual reality. The Roberts translation makes an important correction to Waley’s Platonism conversion, and there is no mention of ‘secret essences’ here: clearly the Dao is present in both appearance and essence, and the distinction itself likely escapes Daoist thought in the first place.5 Common to both English renderings, however, is **a recog-nition of the sage’s distance on the sensual disclosure of the originary truth of Dao which otherwise remains inaccessible to those whose experience is limited to the sensual and the finite**. The DDJ here seems conservative in its notion that little in the world can actually be changed as a result of the fundamental and original ‘nature’ that expresses itself through particular being; the immanence of the Day Expresses the underlying and inevitable nature of nature that calls for human attunement rather than wilful agency. Like a big bang setting in motion a great universal trajectory, this nature has its own creative path to take and is essentially set forth by a primordial unity that binds the sensual and the intellectual, the object and its concept.Roberts renders this totality as ‘everlasting, constant, common to the ten thousand’ (Laozi 2001: 28. It is now as it ever has been, with nodularity in itself, no historical aspect, and no ancestor or descendant rendering it relatable to Western notions of an unconditioned absolute causa sui. **This metaphysical view of the Dao as the unconditioned totality of nature** is reinforced in Wang Bi’s commentaries on the Laozi which held to a transcendentalist interpretation. The position is further sustained in contemporary philosophical readings of the DDJsuch as those of Arthur Waley, (1934), Roger T. Ames, (1981),Thomas Michael (2005) and Xiogan Liu. (1998). Michael frames theDDJ’s metaphysical coherence in terms of a marked ‘Daoist dis-58 Eric Goodfield03-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 58 course’. For Michael, this discourse ‘clearly participated in the gen-eral movement of religious and philosophical thought and belief in early China’(2005: 2)  which dealt with the central domains of cos-mogony, cosmology and ontology in addressing ‘the three central questions of metaphysics’ (2005: 6).6 Xiaogan takes these pronouncements further to suggest that **the Dao manifests itself in the higher order concept of naturalness** (tzu-jan) which ‘is thus **the cardi-nal value in the system of Lao-tzu’s philosophy, and its significance is embodied by the Tao, the final metaphysical reality in the Tao-te-ching**’ (1998: 431.7Tzu-jan itself is none other than the ideal to whichWu-Wei strives in its conformity with the flow of the Dao and avoid-ance of unnatural action.Of course, the original unconditioned unity and metaphysical substance through which nature itself subsists is the great Dao. TheDaoist ruler’s withdrawal from nature mentioned in the opening stan-zas of the DDJ is partially an attitude shared by thinkers of theEnlightenment who held that truth, albeit of the non-metaphysical kind, could be secured through rigorous interrogation of material phe-nomena. While Daoists in general may be said to be made conserva-tive out of allegiance to the primacy of an original nature,**Enlightenment thinkers gave priority to a principle of dynamic change in nature that could be realized through a humanist programme of its mastery.** Where Enlightenment thinkers were often willing to consign nature to mechanistic rubrics, pace **Hobbes, New-ton, Locke, the philosophes and others**, the same did not always hold true of the socio-historical worlds of freedom, purpose and will for these same thinkers. **For early Daoism** in general and the DDJ in par-ticular, however, t**here could be no such distinction between natural and historical spheres and all that is is both the constant and becom-ing Dao** (Roberts). **The humanistic inclinations of modern thought are rejected and a singular and all-encompassing crucible is recognized in the Dao as the only real foundation for human experience.** This is upheld in the following line of the first stanza: ‘Desire ever-present:Behold their every finite course / Forth together come the two / Alone and the same But differ in name’ (Roberts 2001: 27). **The world of concepts is not divorced or superior to the world of things and there is no appearance and reality distinction upheld. The desireless meditations of the sage (shengren) upon the undivided unity of theDao becomes the discipline of leadership required to recognise and nurture the sublime underlying unity that holds together the natural world with the social commons.**Wu Wei East and West 5903-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 59 **In contrast to Enlightenment naturalism the ‘science’ of the Dao is** precisely **found in attenuation of the self to nature to the end of an har-monistic and all-encompassing spiritual liberation. By means of with-drawal from the finite cycle of banal existence, the Daoist sage, ‘who alone embodies the effective ability to transform the world’** (Michael2005: 41), **opens up the possibility for the salvation of others as well**.Out of the retreat from the senses and passions, **the Daoist’s relin-quishing of desire results in an ethic of effective non-action or Wuwei: by standing back the sage ‘acts’ to encourage the self-fulfilling nature that is inherent in all things, animate and inanimate.** By means of direct experience the sage witnesses the self-same ‘chang' of Daowh which is present in all particularity such that Dao is present in both the change and permanence, becoming and being that is found in bothDaoist withdrawal and immersive experience. It is this **dual disclosure of the Dao in thing and idea that separates it from the main trend ofEnlightenment thought in denying absolutes and embracing only tran-sient phenomenal instancing**.9The implications of this principle of non-action have direct impli-cations for Daoist political thought. The means of accomplishing this political turn, however, are in clear opposition to modern notions of agency which imagine an autonomous will operating beyond the het-erogeneous boundaries of nature as its other. To highlight the contrast with core Enlightenment orientations, we have only to recall Kant's Call to the autonomy of rational judgment vis-à-vis the arbitrary sounds of nature, class and superstition. As this makes clear, **theDaoist political imagination dispenses with humanistic notions of freedom of will and instead situates the criteria for political judge-ment as immanent in, rather than independent of, nature. The Daoistconception of non-action has from this point of view been misun-derstood in its basic contempt for forms of social and political judge-ment which would conceive of action and agency in terms of laissez-faire utility.**In stanza Two of the DDJ, we see that the justification of non-action as a casuistic ideal is a reflection of the DDJ‘s dialectical conception of opposition. The DDJ here tells us that ‘Being and not-being grow out of one another / Difficult and the easy complement one another’(Waley 1934: §2).10 In so doing **it rejects binary logics that would assert a law of noncontradiction exclusively so that A is both A and not A simultaneously.11 From the perspective of the particular concept it is only A, from the perspective of the Dao A and not-A, that share ina deeper unity which embraces both such that their discrete identities**60 Eric Goodfield03-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 60 **do not escape a relational unity.** Both truths exist in the Daoist land-scape; one is recognised as the experience of sensual life and desire and the other the wisdom of the sage who has penetrated to a more sublime foundation underlying apparent reality: the valleys and the misty mountain peaks of classical Daoist aesthetics. This wisdom is recognised as the result of a limiting of desire. Though the DDJ lays down no explicit programme for such progress, this ethic is present in non-active acting (wei wu-wei): ‘This is why the man of wisdom /Concerns himself with under-acting / And applies the lesson / Of the word unspoken’ (Roberts 2001: 30). Having attained this level, thesage, recognised as the most fit ruler who ‘stands in direct contrast with the thoroughly unimportant role played by the King’(Michael2005: 44) does more by doing less in an ethic of non-action which guides without interfering or laying claim from beyond the bounds of the political realm. **The DDJ‘s programme presents us with a minimalist political theory in the extreme; recognising the naturalistic basis of diversity it maximally seeks to allow these differentials to express themselves.** The Dao authorizes these differences in what it refers to as the ‘10,000 things’ or the multifarious plurality of phenomena which fill the canvas of the world. Naturalistic **laissez-faire doctrines of the early Enlightenment** which rose up to challenge the economic pater-nalism of mercantilism cohere with this approach at their margins, but**in no way do they recognise it as an inherently organic process unrav-elling itself.** With the possible exception of specific Western rational-istic visions of a ‘logos’ anteceding nature,12 **there is little** else **in the repertoire of Western thought that remotely coheres with the Dao as the ‘othering’ predecessor to the historical and natural realms.** It is the world of human interactions as seen through the Dao’s paradoxical unity which presents us with unique political implications. **Wu weihere becomes a recognition of a larger logic, an alternate ‘logos’ tohuman historical will which furnishes the ends of the natural world and those of the human as well. As such, private and public action is best to emulate and attenuate to this underlying and eternal presence.Advancing human political and economic interests out of a laissez-faire approach here misses out on the point that human ends infected by merely political and economic interests will always fall short of their true aim. The laissez-faire orientations in the DDJ are inclined towards release rather than gain, and surrender rather than acquisition. Inshort, the spiritual nature of the Dao and the potentialities of human beings presents a political economy that is difficult to hold up toEnlightenment notions of non-interference for comparison.**Wu Wei East and West 6103-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 61 Wu wei is not merely an isolated ideal fit for kings and poets either; **the notion of leadership is to set up an example of non-action that would infect the kingdom with an anti-humanist orientation. This ethic takes human action as a medium through which nature expresses itself as opposed to a calculus which would seek to narrate human experience and choice through the prism of self-interest**. Perhaps the young Jean Jacques Rousseau echoes this ethos in his notion of amour de soi-meme as a kind of passive recognition of the vital incli-nation at the heart of human nature prior to its egoistic socializationand, for both Rousseau and the DDJ, corruption where a ‘superflux of wealth and goods / Is the piper’s tune for thieves, The negation of theWay’ (Roberts 2001: 138). This simplicity in both cases imagines an agency that rises and falls with its nature and seeks nothing beyond itself out of anxiety, avarice or vainglory. While Rousseau in the sec-ond treatise imagines humans as biological organisms bound by their environment, the DDJ imagines no such limit in nature itself; nature is always emergent, and the unity it forms by binding its inherent ten-sions into a singular reality represents the unfathomable mystery and complexity of the universe and the dynamic concord of change and changelessness. This impenetrable mystery at the heart of the DDJ presents itself as a heavenly paradigm which the Daoist sage king seeks to reproduce in the kingdom. Quite clearly, however, Wu wei is no economistic social doctrine and this is quite in line with the anti-political politics which issue from the DDJ. My thesis of the essen-tially anti-political nature of the DDJ is supported by Thomas Michael who witnesses the primacy of the sage, as opposed to the occupant of the political throne, as the prime mediator between heaven and earth. Where the crown is wrongly made the focal subject in the DDJ, Michael argues that the Laozi ‘proffers a distinctly polit-ical philosophy, but in doing so … [we] overlook the specifically reli-gious dimension of early Daoist cosmology’ (2005: 42) and the primary role the sage plays in the continuity of nature and society. Inmoving beyond interest oriented agency, the shengren sage ‘Concerns Himself with under-acting. … / That all ten thousand may come forth.… / Without his possession’ (Roberts 2001: 30). Having estab-lished the kingdom of Wu wei an ethic of contentment in the nature of being overcomes the need for accumulation and wilful appropriation where ‘No omen more dire than desire gained / Truly with few wants content’ (Roberts 2001: 125). On these terms no politics is best, andthe Dao asserts a complete abandonment of material and class interest to the ends of a vastly different form of good which accrues to the62 Eric Goodfield03-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 62 social. **The kingdom of Wu wei realizes the natural regime’s virtues of parsimony, simplicity and organic flourishing. These come about with the release and resignation of humanistic forms of agency** that are associated with the Enlightenment values of property, power and accumulation residing behind the non-interferential ideological doc-trine of laissez-faire.In line with its general ideal of enlightened absolutism, Stanza 45of the DDJ outlines a form of leadership which is understood as the exclusive vocation of the sage; only the few can accomplish the detachment from earthly and bodily want that permits progress on the deeper matters of natural wisdom. Where overt politics are conceived of as an essential aspect of social existence the DDJ sees disharmony and dissonance. Where power is hidden and sublimated in the task of harmonisation, the people are best able to express and fulfill their natures. In this sense power and politics are pedagogical and stand below the social realm in a foundational capacity. They should remain unseen and unheard. Politics for the DDJ ought to be the practice of profound and remarkable restraint and withdrawal. Thus, the DDJstates in Stanza 25 :Thus just as Dao has ‘this greatness’ and as earth has it and as heaven hasit, so may the ruler also have it. The ways of men are conditioned by those of earth. The ways of earth, by those of heaven. The ways of heaven by those of Dao, and the ways of Dao by the Self-so (Waley).The Daoist ruler stands between the becoming of earth and the ‘self-so’ (Ziran) of the Dao. The self-so, rendered by Roberts as becom-ing13 founds all subsequent particularity and is a kind of self-standing and unchanging totality. As Roberts brings out, the use of the term ruler’ in Line 16 is replaced by the term ‘man’ in the Guodian andMawangdui manuscripts (Roberts 2001: 203). He attributes this topossible Confucian influences. Regardless, common to both transla-tions is a recognition that alongside transient phenomenal experience there resides the permanence of heaven that is changing. Attunement With this ultimate strata of reality means a withdrawal from the phe-nomenal as such and a recognition of a basic foundation for judge-ment. The king’s greatness is derivative of this ultimate foundation,standing on the great circuit of being as a median between heaven and earth. While no Platonic monism and hard distinction between real reality and apparent reality is implied here, the sage seeks the way itself through an understanding of ‘heaven’s rule’ that is immanent inWu Wei East and West 6303-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 63 nature. The political hierarchy also reflects an ‘epistemological’ one in the sense that the sage’s understanding of the lower human and earthly planes is dependent upon the superior frames of heaven and,ultimately, the self-sustaining absolute that is Dao. What is clear is that the passage ‘radically undercuts the value of the position held by the King as the representative of the realm of the Human, asserted from the political vantage of the common sense point of view’(Michael 2005: 46).Yet, and unlike many of its Western counterparts, the DDJ leaves this whole unfathomable, a paradoxical construct. It is precisely this logical quandary which is embraced in the DDJ and allows it to break through the static and hyper-logical limitations of Par-menidean and later platonic thought which were so caught up in the web of metaphysical implications which emerge from monism: theDao is subject to no such nomothetic insistence upon logical consis-tency. It is this embrace of the paradoxical that also takes the DDJbeyond the utilitarian borders of a laissez-faire deference to the larger harmonizing will of nature or an invisible hand. **Of spiritual proportions, the uniqueness of this Daoist foundation is its accep-tance of a cosmological dynamic in its raw and unresolved form, recognition that ‘being and becoming, to lift a phrase from an alien intellectual lexicon, are borne out of a unified whole which is not logically accessible. This calm in the face of the storm at the heart of the dialectic of being sets Daoist political thought outside the philo-sophical approaches which are witnessed in liberal and pragmatic conceptions of humanist political action.** While not a personal god,spirit or will, the Dao is a  universal dynamic force that is immanent in nature and human experience. **This continuity between natural and historical forces is the fulcrum upon which political judgment by the sage is exercised**.In keeping with this anti-humanist trend, Stanza 40 asserts the paradox of being and knowing as follows: ‘In Dao the only emotion is returning / The only useful quality, weakness / For though all crea-tures under heaven are the products of Being, / Being itself is the product of Not-being’(Waley 1934: §40).14 **This rejection of monism is upheld in the dualism of being and not-being. The DDJ tells us that being gives birth to the many particular phenomena of the senses,however non-being gives birth to being**. It is this dynamic that Laozi Calls the ‘bellows of heaven and earth, an inexhaustible and energetic relation of form and formlessness where nothingness is resolved into being. While recognising a primordial unity of all things behind the64 Eric Goodfield03-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 64 appearance of the senses, the DDJ does not lay down an epistemology suggesting that all things of the senses are merely transient appear-ances. Rather **all things reflect the paradoxical unity of form and formlessness that is the creative essence of the Dao itself. The Daoist totality accordingly is thus a fluid whole whose definition defines the scientific naturalism of the Enlightenment which instrumentalise nature to the ends of human interests or seeks to reduce natural phe-nomena to the limiting concepts and abstractions of empiricism and physical dynamics.** By contrast **Western ‘Classical and Neoclassical Economics implicitly presuppose a kind of substance ontology, which defines the many as independent, mutually exclusive substances or entities’** (Graupe 2007: 4) in a way **which does not cohere with the integrated fluidity of Daoist transformation**.15The political implications of this mysticism, when looked at from a modern empirical point of view, are difficult to systematize and pre-sent a seemingly ineffable metaphysical foundationalism. In short,both its observations and its conclusions seem plural, multi-sided and opaque. Actual application of the principles of the Dao however seem to boil down to **four main political ideals: non-interference; tolerance;detached esotericism; and value neutrality.** When combined, these principles orient a Daoist ‘political theory’ towards a benevolent paternalism rooted in supra-humane ideals. For these reasons recon-ciliation with Enlightenment notions of nature which would encour-age productive comparative study seems difficult. **Where one embraces the moral essence of human experience as an end in itself,the other seeks wholly to displace such a perspective to the ends of an historical transcendence.** **Daoist thought on politics and nature dis-places the humanistic orientations of Enlightenment thought and seek instead a form of understanding that borders on intuitive discipline,meditation and aesthetic insight.** The transformation of the political here provides for the revision of **human prejudices** which **the DDJholds to be at the root of failed political judgment. Human problems and conflicts emerged out of egoistic and sensual misunderstanding which cannot be rectified on the same grounds.** While the denial of self is not called for as a means of resolution, the DDJ does recognise that the historical recycling of human misfortune requires a transfor-mation of the moral and intellectual on the basis of categories which themselves diminish moral and intellectual agency: Dao, Te and Wuwei. Dao present us with the metaphysical aspect, Te with its fluid presence in experience and Wu wei with the sage’s discipline of non-action in the face of the prior two forces.Wu Wei East and West 6503-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 65 In addition to this divergence from its Enlightenment other, theDDJ appears to be a staunchly anti-progressive document as well:there is simply no mastery to be won for humanistic purposes. Inaccord with its anti-humanist approach, notions of progress are under-stood as retrogressive. Going ahead means upsetting what ‘is’ such that we are taken further away from where being is situated: the here and now in its fullness. The quiescent passivity of the observant rulerin Wu wei backing away from the natural course of things sees to it that all ‘are’. Without laws imposed by the greatest power of the state,and opting for the minimal set there is no need for a system of civil laws in order to regulate everyday grievances. The ever-present rule of heaven's is the ultimate source of political legitimacy and the state andsage maximally retreat from the intermediation between it and the people. The wealth of being and flourishing that emerges from this political eclipse’ is simply neither calculable nor captured by liberalnotions of laissez-faire policy strategies specifically taken up to amplify material interests socially understood. In Graupe’s terms even **humans are considered as “events'' rather than “things'' or“beings’’’** (2007: 4) **in the on-going processual life of the great Dao.**Herein, **liberalism’s methodological individualism**16 **falls to the ground and is supplanted by a radically different vision of social belonging and action**: laissez-faire notions of a marketplace har-monised by a hidden hand of self-interest are supplanted by a vision of attunement with a pre-established harmonic which invests ‘the many of society with the fundamental and pre-established ‘capital of the Dao: contentment. Stanza 20 points to the abyss standing between the sage and the everyday world of want and desire:The crowd has more than it needs;I am left untended.The crowd has its ways and its means;I am set in my ways and despised.Alone and apart from all others,I honor the life-giving mother. (Roberts 2001)As this makes clear, Wu wei does not only endorse a giving up of the whirl of desire that governs individuals, it also encourages a rejection of social values seen as a private or personal normative compass. Thisfundamental differential distinguishes ‘liberal’ appropriations ofDaoist thought from those which witness its embrace of paradox and the autonomy of plural phenomena in the unfolding of the one Dao asan end in itself. 66 Eric Goodfield03-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 66 This mismatching is made more visible when looked at in terms of real world applicability, implementation and policy. As a policy plat-form, the state’s laissez-faire retreat from economic intervention is simply incommensurable with the larger Daoist programme. The Appeal to Adam Smith’s recognition of ‘latent’ forces working towards prosperity and perfection’ and that, subsequently, ‘All one needs to do is allow them to operate, to not get in their way’ (McCormick1999: 336) is incrementally coherent with the Dao. The economist reduction, however, of the Dao to a strategic balancing of the mater-ial interests at play in society is insufficient to the intended analogy,and remains a major shortfall in McCormick’s and Dorn’s arguments for the essential coherence of Daoism with laissez-faire ideology. This Inadequacy is heightened by Dorn’s and McCormick’s capitalist ref-erences. As Dorn argues, quoting Smith ‘people get rich by serving others and respecting their property rights’ (1998: 491). And, as such,the government is tasked with ‘the duty of protecting … every mem-ber of society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it’ (2003: 491).  **While, however, the Laozi does speak to social flourishing and the prosperity necessary to it, the institutionalisation of private property seems an utterly alien superimposition. This con-version and importation of the Dao to such alien purposes reduces WuWei to a hackneyed ‘orientalist’ crutch for the historically and insti-tutionally specific imperatives of market capitalism and the concomi-tant liberal politics of possessive individualism**.The practical implications of the comparative with liberal notion of laissez-faire stretch further yet. The DDJ seems to suggest that where the state power acts as a sublime force for human affairs, the chances of lesser powers springing up and assailing one another is diminished. Without a leviathan harassing the many interests of soci-ety, there is to be less factionalism in society and no exemplar of exploitative power. In this context the DDJ tells us: ‘The more cun-ning craftsmen there are, The more pernicious contrivances will be invented. The more laws are promulgated, The more thieves and ban-dits there will be’ (Waley 1934).17 Thus governance guides and regu-lates progress that would otherwise lead to unnecessary want and seeks to resolve issues emerging from differentials of status, property and access. The majority of civil society, in its most general sense, are unencumbered by an interventionist state in the DDJ and are guided by the higher wisdom that commends an ethic of simplicity, trans-parency and utility to the lives of its citizens. This qualified approach to progress and development puts brakes on an EnlightenmentWu Wei East and West 6703-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 67 humanism that would otherwise see the common good and its plural-istic realization as the sole end. **Humanist teleologies are** thus **direct affronts to the basic ethic of the DDJ which holds origins as definitive of the historical as well as natural trajectories that shape the lives of private and public persons and rulers and citizens.** Ultimately, a Daoist vision of ‘progress’ and the profits of contentment yielded byit are understood in coherence with the primordiality of the Dao suchthat the ‘ruled' enrich themselves … the ruled keep their simple ways’(Roberts 200: 145), ‘Owning little, craving less’ (Roberts 2001: 70).**In opposition to the political norms of the Enlightenment, the DDJ advances a spiritual interest in the attenuation of social and political life to the sublime processes of natural development.** The social, polit-ical and economic dictates of Enlightenment conceptions of human nature and their interests are herein rejected as merely one-sided and empirical facets of a deeper nature rooted in the universal continuity of the Dao. This continuity is presented in the DDJ as intuitively as well as intellectually knowable, not on the basis of axiomatic or logi-cal principles but rather in the absence of the absolutes that would be required to resolve the basic problems which human experience and living presents for science and philosophy. I hold that this amounts to foundationalism in the DDJ and I take its meandering philosophical meditations as a meaningful form of reflection in itself. This dynamic has at times been held up as a mysticism but I argue that it actually presents a profound dialectic of thought and didactic approach to the questions of being and becoming where the primacy of the question is held up as operative for the understanding of the absolute Dao as a unity underlying nature and society which must be recognised and respected if not finally grasped.III: ConclusionI believe the general trend of my discussion has made my position on the association of Enlightenment notions of laissez-faire with Wu wei clear: the anti-humanist metaphysical perspective which gives rise toWu wei in the DDJ makes the association superficial and problem-attic. The well-known religious comparativist Paul Carus argued that,according to Laozi, ‘Rulers should not interfere with the natural development of their people, but practice non-acting, non-meddling,non-interference, or, as the French call it, laissez faire…. The less the welfare of the people is forced by artificial methods, the greater will68 Eric Goodfield03-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 68 be their wealth and prosperity’ (Reid 1925: 293). I believe that such statements misunderstand the sense in which Wu wei is apolitical and has little to do with the social amplification of wealth and prosperity.As argued above, the utility served to liberal notions of negative lib-erty which are furthered by the invocation of laissez-faire doctrines is part and parcel of the problem which conventional and pragmatic pol-itics presents from the DDJ’s point of view. That is, **humanist visions of political practice impair our ability to see beyond a human horizon of interest to the disinterested plateau of the Dao and inevitably results in disappointment and suffering.** In this context, Wu wei has far more to do with allowing a supra-historical fate embedded innature to fulfill itself in recognition of the ultimate harmony it alone can yield in whatever form. Rather, it is as Hans Georg Moeller put it in his Philosophy of the Daodejing; politics in the DDJ is a politics of paradox where no politics is best. What is certain here is that readers who see the DDJ as a politically and economically pragmatic text will not be satisfied with my empha-sis on those aspects of the text which render it as a somewhat ahistor-ical rejection of political life to the ends of spiritual attunement and reconciliation: Wu wei understood in its contemplative rather than purposive sense.18 This is not to say that Logan's vision of the DDJas a treatise first and foremost concerned with considering the virtue of naturalness (tzu-jan) for human society does not contribute to our understanding of its theoretical purposes. Despite the ambivalences of our readings of the DDJ’s overall purposes, however, Gerlach, whotraces Wu wei into early Eighteenth century European notions of lais-sez-faire through the pens of Quesnay and others, openly admits that he is tracing the transmission of Confucian readings which have ren-dered it the wu-wei er zhi of enlightened despotism (2005: 4-5).Michael frames this influence as a ‘Confucian-inspired interpretative overlay [that] has been decisive in allowing modern scholars to claim that the Laozi is a work of political philosophy’ (2005: 55). Thus, and from this point of view, to attribute the Wu Wei of the economists to the DDJ and early Daoism is simply misplaced appropriation insearch of ancient legitimation for a young ideological hypothesis.This coheres with Ames’s assertion that the pronounced anarchist ten-dencies presented in the DDJ had less to do with formulating a posi-tive political theory – let alone a version of laissez faire – than with providing political relief to those who suffered under the yolk of extreme authoritarianism during the pre-Qin Warring States Period(475 BCE-221 BCE) which witnessed epic strife and conflict. AsWu Wei East and West 6903-Good:Layout 1  1/26/11  2:24 PM  Page 69 such, he renders the DDJ’s positive political purposes of secondary concern where its rendering of Wu-wei ‘defies any possibility of prac-tical implementation’ (1981: 197).

#### Perm do both- meta-ethical anthropocentrism is distinct from ethical anthropocentrism and the perm outweighs the alt- we represent a livable future for everyone

**Shapiro 11,** (Kenneth Shapiro, (ed., Animals and Society Institute), “Anthropocentrism,” Human-Animal Study, Volume 12 2011. FT+r0w@n)

Anthropocentrism has had a contested history vis-a-vis this meta-ethical debate. The suggestion that moral value is even partially affected, let alone constructed, by differential human capacities or perspectives has been typically associated in contemporary meta-ethics with relativism; such that proponents of relativism embrace anthropocentrism, whereas proponents of realism eschew it. Investigating the pre-modern history of anthropocentrism, however, yields remarkably different associations. By exploring the antagonism toward meta-ethical anthropocentrism that developed in early-modern thought, we can unearth different understandings of the concept that can be used to articulate defensible alternatives to the realism- relativism debate today. Furthermore, focusing on anthropocentrism as a meta-ethical position helpfully disentangles it from other extensions of the concept. Meta-ethical anthropocentrism can be defined as the view that conceptions of morality are constrained by human perspectives and sensibilities (it is this dependence that has led to the common association of metaethical anthropocentrism with relativism). Ethical anthropocentrism, however, says nothing about the foundations or conceptions of morality, but instead refers to the more commonplace view that moral consideration is only properly granted to humans. In this way, ethical anthropocentrism represents what we may call a 'first-order' moral judgment: it is a claim about what is moral. Meta-ethical anthropocentrism, by contrast, is a 'second-order' moral judgment (i.e. a judgment about moral judgment): it is a claim about what morality is. It is quite possible to be anthropocentric in one, but not both of these senses. Indeed, as discussed in section two below, Western philosophy has tended to affirm ethical anthropocentrism despite a pronounced rejection of metaethical anthropocentrism. My own view is an inversion of this trend: in section three, I defend a form of metaethical anthropocentrism that does not entail anthropocentrism of the first-order, ethical variety. The thesis is that moral values may be realist without thereby sacrificing the ineliminable role that human sensibility and experience play in their consitutiton; and that this form of metaethical anthropocentrism rejects the pernicious moral myopia toward non-human animals that is bred by first-order anthropocentrism. Finally, in section four, I look to philosophical Daoism as an actual, liveable embodiment of this position.

1. Dao De Jing, Chapter 19. http://www.fang.ece.ufl.edu/daodejing.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Dao De Jing, Chapter 3. <http://www.fang.ece.ufl.edu/daodejing.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)