# ND22 Kant NC

## 1NC – OFF

#### The meta-ethic is constitutivism.

#### First, value theory – the existence of extrinsic goodness requires unconditional human worth.

Korsgaard (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) OS \*bracketed for gen lang\* //rct st

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, he or she [they] supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Second, regress – we can always ask why we should follow a theory, so they aren’t binding because they don’t have a starting point. Practical reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself, so it’s the only thing we can follow

#### Practical reason means we all have a unified perspective – What can be justified to me can be justified to everyone who is a practical reasoner. If I can conclude that 2+2 is 4, then I understand not only that I know 2+2 is 4, but that everyone around me can arrive at the same conclusion. That means that principles that apply inconsistently to agents are bad – I cannot logically will that I should be able to murder someone if I will that they cannot murder me because that would create a contradiction.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with external and internal freedom.

#### Negate –

#### Property rights are necessary to have freedom, otherwise your own freedom would restrict itself as you could set no ends. Property is an extension of yourself – when you mix your labor with something, it becomes part of your end.

Exdell 1 (John Exdell, John Exdell is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Kansas State University. He teaches courses in Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Race, and Philosophy of Law., 1977, accessed on 11-20-2022, Ethics - UChicago, "Distributive Justice: Nozick on Property Rights | Ethics: Vol 87, No 2", https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/292025) [brackets for gen lang] //phs st

Nozick proposes two such principles. The first—called the "principle of acquisition"—identifies the way in which an individual obtains the moral right to holdings previously "unheld" by others. Nozick finds this principle in Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government, where it is explained how individuals may acquire property in "the fruits of the earth" as they are found in their natural state. According to Locke, an individual comes to own such things when [they] has mixed [their] labor with them: "Every man has a property in his own 'person.' This nobody has any right to but [them]self. The 'labor' of his body and the 'work' of his hands, we may say, are properly his. . . . For his 'labor' being the unquestionable proper¬ty of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others.'

Philosophers have long puzzled over this passage. How exactly do I join my labor to the acorns I gather from beneath the oak? And why, mysteriously, does the joining make the acorns mine? Nozick's explanation is by far the most plausi¬ble yet of fered.6 He notes that having a property right in something means having the right to decide what shall be done with it. Then he suggests: "This notion of property helps us understand why earlier theorists spoke of people as having property in themselves and their labor. They viewed each person as having a right to decide what would become of [them]self and what [they] would do, and as having a right to reap the benefits of what he did."7

Taken in this way, Locke's reference to having property in oneself represents his acceptance of the Kantian imperative: persons have a right to pursue their own ends; they may not be forced to act, to labor, for the benefit of others. This granted, the right to keep the fruits of one's labor follows as a simple corollary. If someone steals the vegetables you have raised in your garden, he has acted on the maxim that your of forts may be used, without your consent, to serve his own ends. He has, in effect, treated you like a slave.

#### Environmental protection at the cost of econ growth restricts what people can do with their territory, which violates the principle of just transfers.

Exdell 2 (John Exdell, John Exdell is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Kansas State University. He teaches courses in Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Race, and Philosophy of Law., 1977, accessed on 11-20-2022, Ethics - UChicago, "Distributive Justice: Nozick on Property Rights | Ethics: Vol 87, No 2", https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/292025) [brackets for gen lang] //phs st

Nozick's second principle the "principle of transfer"—explains how indi-viduals may acquire holdings previously "held" by others. The right not to be used as means to the purposes of others entails that we may do what we want with our skills, our labor, and the products thereof. We can give them away, trade them, or keep them for ourselves. Hence we might say: "From each as he chooses." The principle of transfer—"to each as he is chosen"—is simply the other side of the coin. Things rightfully held by others become yours when others have freely transferred them to you in the exercise of their right to liberty!'

The principles of acquisition and transfer together constitute the criterion of a just distribution of wealth and income. A just distribution results when everyone has obtained his possessions by the means prescribed in these principles. There is only one exception: when the prevailing distribution, even though produced by legitimate means, is influenced by previous distributions that were not. In that case the historical inequities require adjustment of some kind in accordance with spe¬cial "principles of rectification."

This qualification aside, the political implications of Nozick's theory are clear. Taking from someone what [they] has acquired by his labor, or by transfer, violates a fundamental right not to be treated as a means to the purposes of others. Redistributive policies aimed to correct inequalities produced by a free market economy are therefore illegitimate—even when the ownership of land and natural resources is in private hands.