**We can’t individually create or enforce rights, or solve other moral nuances, thus, individuals have to form a government.**

**Ripstein**, Arthur. *Force and Freedom*. E-book ed., London, England, Harvard UP, 2009.  ICWNW

Kant characterizes the state of nature as a system of private rights without public right. The apparatus of private rights applies to transactions in it, but subject to three defects that make that application merely provisional. Each of the defects reflects difficulties of unilateral action. **Objects of choice cannot be acquired without a public authorization of acquisition; private rights cannot be enforced without a public mechanism through which enforcement is authorized by public law; private rights are indeterminate in their application to particulars without a publicly authorized arbiter.** Even **the innate right of humanity is insecure in such a condition, both because no remedy is possible in case of a completed wrong against a person, and because even the protective right to defend your person against ongoing attack is indeterminate in its application. These problems can only be solved by a form of association capable of making law on behalf of everyone, and authorizing both enforcement and adjudication under law.**

**This applies to the global community, instead of being citizens of specific states the point of a government is best fulfilled if we are members of “humankind”.**

**Poulsen summarizing Cloots,** Frank Ejby. "Critique of Cosmopolitan Reason: Timing and Spacing the Concept of World Citizenship." *Academia*, 2014, [www.academia.edu/11673887/](http://www.academia.edu/11673887/) Anacharsis\_Cloots\_and\_the\_Birth\_of\_Modern\_Cosmopolitanism. Accessed 26 Oct. 2022.

Here two arguments are mixed. On the one hand, recent French history is constantly evoked by Cloots, against Montesquieu’s analysis of a separation of powers, to argue that no sub-national “corporation” should ever exist without having the possibility to gather sufficient power to create violent conflicts. And obviously, no multiple national powers should ever exist, as armies and wars are the only way they can solve conflicts. Only the “perfect fusion” of a “Confederation of individuals” can exist for Cloots. Cloots expressed his atheism previously on diverse occasions. All metaphysical discussion for him is vain. To the natural law theorists discussing if God is sovereign because he created man, or if it is man who ought to respect God’s power through reason, one could consider his answer to be what he writes about God: “The study of man makes us careful and lenient. Let us see nature as she is and not as we imagine it to be” (Cloots 1792, 257); “Does the chicken come before the egg or the egg before the chicken?” (p. 251); for “We belong to earth and not to the heavens” (p. 258). So if God is out of the equation, it is the people that represent the only possible source of power. he only truth comes from the people: “he people is my oracle; truth does not come down the heavens, but down the rostrum” (Cloots 1793, 475). Cloots is here even more explicit in replacing the sovereign God of natural law. “[…] the human race is God […]” (p. 476), or “[…] the human race, the supreme Being […]” (p. 476). In other words, the cosmos is complicated enough, without adding supposition about a possible theos. One should just examine nature, because humankind is subject to primitive laws just as animals are (Cloots 1793, 494). And this natural state is the same as the civil state. The human species is subjected to primitive laws, like the family of bees or beavers. Let us rise to animal instinct, let us subject ourselves to the invariable laws. Natural laws are not distinct from civil and political laws because the social state is as natural to man as it is to bees or aunts. (Cloots 1793, 497) And if nature is one, society is equally one. It is by consulting nature, claims Cloots (1793, 476), that he discovered his political system. he goal of a society is the conservation of natural rights (Cloots 1793, 497). What are natural rights? Natural rights are expressed in the 1789 Declaration. Cloots ascribed thereby a special status to this Declaration. It is the one and definitive expression of natural law. A curious position, when one considers the debates that surrounded the Declaration, its provisory character due to the compromises made, as well as its apparent division, at least implicitly, between civil and pre-civil (natural) rights. The Declaration states that **all men are born free and equal.** Cloots’s reasoning is twofold. **If all [people]** men **are free, then none can claim power over another. Anyone claiming sovereignty would be in contradiction with the “eternal principle” of the Declaration, on which Cloots bases his reflection. No individual or any group of individuals can claim sovereignty over a territory without being in contradiction with the eternal principle of freedom and equality. Only one community can exist in cohesion with human freedom: the whole of humankind.** Secondly, this **freedom does not mean anything if it is limited, if others represent a constant threat to it, if barriers are needed to contain this threat, if military expenses for safety drive society into financial crisis, if the borders are a limit to the freedom of movement of persons and freedom of trade, or if they conine industries within limited territories. This is why only the whole of humankind can hold sovereignty.** Moreover, **sovereignty is so despotic that no other power than humankind should hold it** (Cloots 1793, 495). In fact, Cloots would use French history, and the privileges and Machiavellian intrigues of the “corporations”, to illustrate his system. Thanks to its unification, France managed to crush the corporations, not only professional ones, but also provincial or local ones. Therefore, the same principle ought to apply to the whole globe. One more argument evokes the most fundamental principle of politics: that it ought to be founded on the general interest. The general will, as Cloots underlines, is the first principle of politics. In that, Cloots is faithful to Rousseau or Diderot. However, Cloots posits that **Rousseau was wrong in delimiting this general will to tiny republics. If Rousseau would have lived in Cloots’s own time, Cloots condescends, Rousseau would have agreed with him that the general will is in fact the universal will for all humankind.** Individuals are the foundation on which legitimate power is ascribed. heir rights are enshrined in the Declaration. Together they all form what Cloots calls a “confederation of individuals”. **Only collectively can individuals achieve something greater. Alone, they are pathetic creatures. United in a nation, like France, they are able to create great things. With a bit of imagination, Cloots argues that the whole nation of humankind could achieve even greater marvels.**

**Thus, the standard is consistency with cosmopolitanism. This is the idea that actions should be consistent with a global community not an individual state.**

**Impact Calc:**

**My framework is not concerned with consequences, it cares about what's intrinsic to an action. E.g. bombing another country treats citizens of one country much differently than citizens of another, which is a violation of cosmopolitanism, even if that bombing helps the global economy, stops climate change, etc.**

**Prefer:**

**1. Equality: Where you are born or what country you’re a citizen of is an arbitrary, non-morally relevant characteristic because we can’t hold people culpable for things they have no control of. Thus, treating people morally differently by drawing arbitrary lines for how we can act is bad and the only solution is cosmopolitanism.**

**2. All humans exist on the same sphere and inevitably come into contact with each other. This creates a relation and community with those we interact with because we have to reconcile the fact that we both want to be in the same place. The only system that can solve this is cosmopolitanism.**

**Huber**, Jakob. "Kant's Cosmopolitanism as a Task Set to Humankind." *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, vol. 35, Jan. 20**18**, pp. 39-52, www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48563620. Accessed 27 Oct. 2022.

Yet, an additional fact of human existence with similar importance— besides our own embodiment—complicates the picture: the earth’s spherical surface. **The finitude of the globe,** Kant explains, **unites all places on its surface, for if its surface were an unbounded plane, people could be so dispersed on it that they would not come into any community with one another, and community would not then be a necessary result of their existence on the earth.** (DoR 6:262) **Humans do not act in empty space,** we are reminded here, **but on the earth’s limited surface. This,** in turn, **makes it impossible for them to get out of each other’s way** once and for all. **The earth’s spherical surface constitutes the unavoidable condition of (potential) interaction in the sense that where and how we pursue our ends necessarily impacts where and how others can do so—quite simply, because the space we take up at every particular point in time cannot be taken up by another person.** This gives us some idea of Kant’s motivation for introducing the idea of original common possession. While we cannot be blamed for the fact that we are present and act within time and space, this fact has normative implications: it implies that “the choice of one is unavoidably opposed by nature to that of another” (DoR 6:267). And we acknowledge these implications by thinking of the piece of land we are bound to acquire originally—and, thus, the earth as a whole—as possessed in common with all of humankind. Kant thus introduces the idea of original common possession in order to elucidate the way in which human beings stand, from the beginning, in a relation of “possible physical interaction” (DoR 6:352) with everyone else globally, given that, as physically embodied beings, they are constrained to occupy a portion of space on the earth (which cannot simultaneously be occupied by anyone else). **The idea is that the mere coexistence of a plurality of embodied agents on the spherical surface of the earth puts them into a particular kind of interdependence relation:** one of original common possession. Hence, I want to suggest that, in the Doctrine of Right, Kant’s **cosmopolitan agent is modeled on the idea of original common possession of the earth. The mere fact that embodied agents can affect and constrain one another with their choices unites them in a community with all those who jointly inhabit a bounded territory, the earth.** That the pertinent community is global in scope is confirmed explicitly a little later in the text when the notion of original common possession is, additionally, ascribed fundamental significance for the domain of “Cosmopolitan Right.” Echoing the earlier passage, Kant there argues that, in virtue of the fact that “nature has enclosed [us] all together within determinate limits (by the spherical shape of the place they live in, a globus terraquaeus),” we stand “originally in a community of land,” which is a “community of possible physical interaction” (DoR 6:352). 5. On the Idea of a Disjunctive Community In the last section, I introduced original common possession as that notion on which Kant’s global community is modeled. Before we go on, in the next section, to draw out how this reconceived cosmopolitanism collective reflects a wider shift in Kant’s political thought, I here set out to characterize the relevant community further. In particular, I want to highlight the spatiotemporally bounded nature of the original community of possession: rather than encompassing all humans in past, present, and future, it is constituted by a plurality of physical beings capable of thinking, acting, and affecting each other in real time and space—an empirical set of interacting participants who must learn to coexist simultaneously. Kant’s characterization of his global community as “disjunctive” (for example, Preparatory DoR AA23:321, 322, 323) will help us make good on this claim. What does it mean to characterize a community as “disjunctive”? The idea of disjunction is first introduced by Kant in a completely different context, namely, in the course of the first Critique’s argument that human beings’ knowledge of the world is mediated by a system of fundamental categories. Controversially, Kant thinks that he can develop these categories from nothing more than logical forms of judgment expressed in a systematic table (CPR A70/B95). One of these forms of judgment is the “disjunctive judgement,” the exclusionary “either . . . or” (CPR A69/ B94, A81/B106). In a disjunctive judgment, one divides a concept A into its mutually exclusive specifications B, C, and D. The assertion of any of these specifications of A is then considered a sufficient condition for negating the others (if A is B, it cannot be C or D), and conversely the negation of all but one is a sufficient condition for asserting the remaining one. A disjunctive judgment, that is to say, relates subordinated concepts to a unified logical space within which they reciprocally delimit each other’s sphere and meaning. As already mentioned, the logical forms of judgment then ground categories or “pure concepts of the understanding.” The idea is that the same acts of mind that generate the forms of judgment also generate the synthesis of spatiotemporal manifolds under concepts. In our case, the disjunctive form of judgment yields the category of “community” as the third category of “relation,” alongside “substance” and “causality” (CPR A80/B106, B110–11). Kant’s basic ideas is that, just as in a disjunctive judgment, a concept is divided into its constituent components (bringing them into a relation of mutual determination and exclusion), so, in a material whole, things mutually determine one another in an object or body considered as a whole (CPR B112/3). In both, members are represented as reciprocally coordinated with one another as parts that come together to constitute a whole. Just as two logically opposing propositions exclude each other, so two objects cannot occupy the same spatial position (at the same time). And just as the constituents of a disjunctive judgment, taken together, include the entire sphere of knowledge in that particular domain, so substances, to be objects of experience, must stand in a unified space, a whole that is the product of its various constituents. Consequently, the pertinent category is called both “reciprocity” (with an emphasis on the relation of causal interaction) and “community” (with an emphasis on objects’ being part of one space). The argument is less obscure than is sounds: notice that Kant assumes that we have no given (absolute) framework within which we might locate events and states of affairs in space and time. Yet, he thinks, we always apprehend objects successively (we see one object first, then the other). Thus, we can only judge that two objects exist simultaneously in one spatial whole (instead of being two perceptions following on to each other) with the help of a category that, in Kant’s words, relates the perception of objects in time “prior to all experience, and indeed make[s] it possible” (CPR A177/B219). This entails that **simultaneously existing objects determine certain spatial features of each other: given that they mutually exclude one another,** each is, in some sense, responsible for the position of the other. And given that, conversely, only spatially separated objects are capable of coexisting simultaneously, spatial positions condition temporal positions. We can now return to the political context to illustrate how far Kant’s “disjunctive” original community of possession is spatiotemporally bounded. Concerning the spatial aspect, Kant invites us to understand his original community of possession as a system of mutual exclusion where persons stand in a relation of possible physical interaction by virtue of occupying different parts of the same space, the earth’s surface. The space they take up at every particular point in time cannot be taken up by another person. Just as a disjunctive judgment relates mutually exclusive concepts to a unified logical space, so does the idea of a disjunctive community elucidate how, **in virtue of sharing the earth in common, agents act, affect, and physically encounter each other in it.** Now, recall that, in the category of community, the spatial and the temporal are intricately intertwined: the thought was that a certain temporal judgement (two objects existing at the same time rather than just constituting consecutive sensible intuitions) requires a certain spatial judgement (that the objects are part of one and the same spatial whole), and the other way around.12 More specifically, we can only experience appearances as coexisting simultaneously by applying the concept of community, which is to suppose that the objects are in relations of mutual interaction—they “reciprocally contain the ground of the determination” of the other (CPR B258). Analogously, we can say that the idea of disjunctive original community grasps the essential simultaneity of our coexistence with one another on the earth’s limited surface (Milstein 2013, 126). In explicating the notion of original common possession, Kant thus clarifies that the relation among participants in the original community of possession is not “a relation to the land (as an external thing) but to other humans in so far as they are simultaneously on the same surface” (Preparatory DoR AA23:322; my emphasis). Our own corporeal nature and the earth’s surface are only normatively relevant in virtue of our concurrent existence. 6. A Political Task Set to Humankind **I have characterized the notion of humankind as disjunctive community as a spatiotemporally bounded collective consisting of a set of corporeal agents who, in virtue of sharing a limited space, interact with and affect one another. Our own physical nature on the one hand, and the limited space circumscribed by the spherical surface of the earth on the other hand, in conjunction constitute the empirical circumstances of our concurrent corporeal existence and thus the stage on which Kant’s (juridical) cosmopolitan project unfolds.** Kant’s transformed notion of humankind has a number of interesting implications worthy of further exploration. One aspect concerns the temporality of Kant’s cosmopolitanism: rather than conceptualizing a successive temporality of progress, **the notion of humankind is now employed to illustrate the (juridically!) problematic nature of the fact that a plurality agents each with the capacity for choice and action simultaneously coexist on the earth’s circumference.**13 **Another aspect pertains to the way individual agents relate to humankind as a collective of which they are a part:** in the Doctrine of Right, **individuals are not conceived of as means to the end of humankind’s moral perfection, but as constitutive components of a set of relations that together first constitute the relevant collective.** Rather than pursuing either of these ideas further, in this section I shall focus on showing how **Kant’s conception of humankind as disjunctive community reflects a modified cosmopolitan project—in other words, what it means to think of the creation of the pertinent state of affairs as a task set to humankind.** Recall the main insight underlying the idea of disjunctive community: **by virtue of sharing the earth in common, there is a sense in which individuals’ fates are inevitably bound up with one another. The task set to participants in the original community of possession is, thus, to come to terms with the fact that, as embodied agents, they exist, together with a plurality of other such agents, within limited space.** They are not each bound to become more virtuous, thus contributing over time to the moral perfection of humankind at large. Rather, their task pertains to the way in which they immediately relate to one another through their respective capacities for choice and action. Arthur Ripstein has articulated this contrast in terms of the incompatibility relations pertinent to right as opposed to ethics (Ripstein 2009, 355–88): instead of being concerned (as the domain of ethics) with incompatibility relations internal to an agent’s will—that is, with the logical consistency of maxims for action—right pertains to the way in which the choices of multiple agents confront and relate to one other in time and space. This problem—the reciprocal relation of choices of embodied agents interacting under circumstances of spatial constraint—concerns the moral domain of right, as developed systematically in Kant’s mature political philosophy. In the Doctrine of Right’s introduction, Kant lays out this irreducibly relational normativity: whether an action is right cannot be determined except through its relation to those of other agents—according to the universal law of right, “any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” (DoR 6:230). Kant illustrates this point by likening the coordinated actions of a plurality of externally free agents to the law-governed interaction of constitutive elements within a system of physical objects, held together by the Newtonian law of equality of action and reaction (DoR 6:232). The crucial insight is that, on Kant’s view, **the problem thus conceived has distinctly political implications.** The core line of argument throughout the Doctrine of Right seeks to establish that **the reciprocal relation of individual choices that is constitutive for this moral domain requires a shift to a distinctly public standpoint.** Only principles (that is to say, laws) issued by a public, “omnilateral will” (DoR 6:263) allow a plurality of agents to coexist and justly coordinate their interactions. Only they have the required authority to bind all of them equally while acknowledging their equal moral status. Coercive political institutions limit the capacity for choice and action of each to the condition of its compossibility with everyone else’s equal claim. **In turning the disjunctively related choices of each agent into a consistent set of rightful relations, they “determine with mathematical exactitude” what “rightfully belongs to everyone” (DoR 6:232–33). This fundamentally changes the way in which we think of the creation of a cosmopolitan order as a task set to humankind.** Most importantly, the final end of this project is not a world of fully virtuous agents that consistently act from the moral law—a moral whole or cosmopolitan kingdom of ends. Rather, it consists in the creation of a political order, a legal state of affairs in which a set of juridical norms regulates external relations between persons. This order is not in the service of or subordinate to a further value, state of affairs, or kind of community that it would be ideally conducive to. Rather, a just legal regime is itself constitutive of a distinct kind of moral (juridical) relation. **The task set to humankind in Kant’s mature political philosophy thus consists in nothing more or less than the creation of a juridical condition, which is consequently characterized as “the entire final end” (DoR 6:355) of the moral domain of right. In creating such a condition, we transform the disjunctive “community of thoroughgoing interaction” into a rightful community of juridical subjects.** Such an institutional order does not require perfectly virtuous individuals who always act from the right incentive. For, in instantiating a distinctly external and interpersonal kind of morality, **right focuses entirely on the way in which a plurality of persons relate to one another through their choices: it is a matter of action, rather than motivation.** The pertinent principles abstract from intrapersonal good willing (the maxims or right reasons for action) and can be externally enforced. This leads us to the wider interpretive context. Recall my claim that the shift in Kant’s construal of humankind as the relevant cosmopolitan agent reflects a wider transformation of the nature and final end of his cosmopolitan project. Now, it is vital to understand this transformation in the context and against the background of Kant’s attempt, in the 1790s, to distinguish the domains of right and ethics as two separate domains of moral agency. We saw how, in Kant’s essays on history and politics, ethical and political ends are still enmeshed—the political, to be more precise, is in the service of the ethical final end. Only as Kant develops the sphere of right as a distinct domain of moral agency is he able to separate conceptually the political goal of a just global order from the ethical goal of the moral improvement of humankind. In its final form, **Kant’s cosmopolitanism is concerned with the creation of a set of institutions that establish rightful relations among individuals globally**. This is a task in its own right, rather than being in the service of the final end of history from an ethical perspective, which consists in the complete development of humans’ predispositions for the use of reason.

**3. In case the NC questions this, rights exist and are morally relevant.**

**Ripstein 2**, Arthur. *Force and Freedom*. E-book ed., London, England, Harvard UP, 20**09**. [Bracketed for Gendered Language] ICWNW

Your sovereignty, which Kant also characterizes as **your quality of being your “own master** (sui juris),” **has as its starting point your right to your own person,** which Kant characterizes as innate. As innate, this right contrasts with any further acquired rights you might have, because innate right does not require any affirmative act to establish it; **as a right, it is a constraint on the conduct of others, rather than a way of protecting some nonrelational aspect of you. It is a precondition of any acquired rights because those capable of acquiring them through their actions already have the moral capacity to act in ways that have consequences for rights, that is, for the conduct of others.** That any system of rights presupposes some basic moral capacities that do not depend on antecedent acts on the part of the person exercising them does not yet say what the rights in question are, or how many such rights there might be. Kant writes that there is “only one innate right.” Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every human being by virtue of his humanity.10 The innate right is the individualization of the Universal Principle of Right, applied to the case in which only persons are considered. The Universal Principle of Right demands that each person exercise his or her choice in ways that are consistent with the freedom of all others to exercise their choice; the innate right to freedom is then each person’s entitlement to exercise his or her freedom, restricted only by the rights of all others to do the same under universal law. No issues of right would arise for someone who succeeded in “shunning all society,”11 and if there were only one person in the world, no issues of independence or rightful obligation would arise.12 Kant offers different formulations of innate right, each of which elaborates an aspect of the idea that **one person must not be subject to the choice**13 **of another,** which Kant glosses in terms of one person being a mere means for another. This familiar Kantian theme is explained in terms of the classic distinction, from Roman law, between persons and things. **A person is a being capable of setting its own purposes. A thing is something that can be used in the pursuit of whatever purposes the person who has it might have. The classic example of a person being treated as a mere thing is the slave, for a slave is entirely at the disposal of his or her master.** The slave’s problem is that he is subject to the master’s choice: the master gets to decide what to do with the slave and what the slave will do. **The slave does not set his own ends, but is merely a means for ends set by someone else.** To call it “the” problem is not too strong: if the other problems a slave has—low welfare, limited options, and so on—were addressed by a benevolent master, the relationship of slavery would perhaps be less bad, but it would not thereby be any less wrong. **The right to be your own master is neither a right to have things go well for you nor a right to have a wide range of options. Instead, it is explicitly contrastive and interpersonal: to be your own master is to have no other master.** It is not a claim about your relation to yourself, only about your relation to others. The right to equal freedom, then, is just the right that no person be the master of another. The idea of being your own master is also equivalent to an idea of equality, since none has, simply by birth, either the right to command others or the duty to obey them. So the right to equality does not, on its own, require that people be treated in the same way in some respect, such as welfare or resources, but only that no person is the master of another. **Another person is not entitled to decide for you even if [t]he[y] know**s **better than you what would make your life go well, or has a pressing need that only you can satisfy.** The same right to be your own master within a system of equal freedom also generates what Kant calls an “internal duty” of rightful honor, which “consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others, a duty expressed by the saying do not make yourself into a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.”14 Kant says that this duty can be “explained . . . as obligation from the right of humanity in our own person.”

**I affirm the whole resolution, I’ll specify anything further in cross ex.**

**Contention 1)**

**Contorno**, Lauren. "The Influence of Cosmopolitan Values on Environmental Attitudes: An International Comparison." *Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research*, vol. 17, no. 1, July 20**12 (Summarizing Cosmopolitans)**, digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1194&context=respublica. Accessed 30 Oct. 2022.

While egalitarian and postmaterialist values are logical choices to explore in explaining eco-consciousness, cosmopolitanism is an ideology that warrants more analysis concerning its possible influence on environmental attitudes. **Because externalities of environmental degradation, e.g. air pollution, often cannot be internalized, environmental problems are global issues which require a global consciousness and multilateral effort in order to eradicate.** Therefore, some scholars argue that a global conception of citizenship is required in order to foster a sense of obligation to environmental issues. “A framework of citizenship based on an evolution of rights (civil to political to social) within a national context provides a categorization and typology that are too limited for contemporary realities.”15 As Gabrielson notes, “**The transnational character of environmental degradation, globalization, the logic of neo-liberalism, and widespread migration are some of the most prominent factors altering the contexts of contemporary citizenship.”**16 According to this logic, it seems likely that **those individuals who already see themselves as global citizens and favor intensity of need over proximity (cosmopolitans) will show greater concern for environmental issues than those whose primary allegiance is to national issues** (patriots). To elaborate, the argument in favor of a cosmopolitan conception of citizenship as a means to environmentalism is as follows: **citizens who view themselves as “citizens of the world” rather than only citizens of their own nation-state are more likely to show concern for the environment, for not only do they feel an obligation to preserve the integrity of their own local environment, but also to preserve the integrity of ecosystems around the world for their fellow global citizens.** While patriots are primarily concerned about citizens of their own nation, cosmopolitans have equally as strong moral obligations to citizens around the world. **Therefore, while a cosmopolitan’s own immediate environment may not be suffering the consequences of climate change and environmental degradation, a cosmopolitan will feel obligated to take steps to prevent environmental damage due to its current detrimental effects in other regions around the world. For example, although there may not be a severe shortage of freshwater in the United States, cosmopolitan U.S. citizens may take steps to conserve water because they know that freshwater depletion is an environmental issue affecting citizens in other nations.** Patriots may not have this same consciousness, for they are primarily concerned about issues affecting their own nation. While there is a growing body of literature promoting the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship as a means to gain support for the global environmental movement, there have been very few studies that have attempted to empirically establish a correlation between cosmopolitan values and environmental concern. Andrew Dobson advocates for a “post-cosmopolitan” conception of citizenship in his book Citizenship and the Environment (2003). Post-cosmopolitan citizenship entails a transnational conception of citizenship in which political obligation stems from “the material production and reproduction of daily life in an unequal and asymmetrically globalizing world.”17 This non-contractual theory of obligation is based upon the grounds that harm reaches “beyond national boundaries and both backwards and forwards in time,” creating a duty which extends beyond the nation-state. 18 Dobson advocates for post-cosmopolitan citizenship due to the nature of climate change and its global consequences. **“Some people contribute more to this phenomenon than others, and…some people suffer more from the unpredictability this brings in its train than others.”19 From a cosmopolitan worldview, this situation is a violation of justice and elicits a sense of moral duty to fellow citizens around the globe who are suffering as a result of environmental degradation.**20 “To the extent that people in developed nations draw more than their fair share of the Earth’s biological productivity, they owe a duty of equity to individuals across the globe whose share of the planet’s productivity is diminished. To the extent that people in developed nations do not bear the external costs of their consumption practices, they owe a duty of compensation to individuals across the globe on whom those costs are imposed.”21 Similarly, **Aaron Maltais recognizes environmental degradation as an international collective action problem and argues that the current political conception of justice has cosmopolitan implications. Maltais advocates for new global institutional arrangements to address anthropogenic climate change.** 22

**This impacts back to my framework because prioritization of the environment is required by cosmopolitanism. Additionally, economic growth is not a necessity of cosmopolitanism because it doesn’t have the same circumstances, i.e. it’s everyone’s climate versus China’s economy.**

**Contention 2) China fulfilling its pledges and emissions targets is constitutive of global climate cooperation.**

**Froggatt**, Antony, **and** Daniel **Quiggin**. "China, EU, and US Cooperation on Climate and Energy." *Chatham House*, Mar. 20**21**, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/2021-03-26-china-eu-us-cooperation-froggatt.pdf. Accessed 30 Oct. 2022.

The collective outcome of several high-level events in 2021 will be crucial for meeting global climate change objectives, as well as national climate and energy targets. Even under ordinary circumstances this would be an important time, as China sets its next five-year plan, President Biden likely implements progressive campaign pledges – including re-joining the Paris Agreement and setting a 2050 net zero target – and the EU introduces the next structural funds programme. However, the importance of 2021 is even greater as countries submit their revised five-year pledges to the UNFCCC and negotiate at the COP26 in order to put global mitigation plans back on track to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Two additional factors make the next 12 months particularly important. First, the COVID-19 impacts on energy supply, demand and emissions; the extent of associated recovery packages; and the acceleration or slowing of the energy transition. Second, **climate diplomacy between China, the EU and the US is in greater flux than ever before,** with an emerging shift towards competitive climate action mechanisms with import taxes on the carbon content of goods. It is still too early to determine the precise impacts of COVID-19 on the speed of decarbonization and the energy transition. Emissions slowed in 2020, but the initial substantial reduction due to lockdowns shows signs of abating and emissions are returning to near pre-pandemic levels. **This only underscores the importance of countries’ revised NDC pledges demonstrating significantly increased ambition. This will be aided by the EU’s announcement of a 55 per cent emission reduction target by 2030 and President Xi stating that China’s goal is to reach carbon neutrality by 2060.** Consequently, there is today significantly more optimism over the politics of international climate change than there was just six months ago and the likelihood of an ambitious outcome of COP26 has increased significantly. The stimulus packages in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are a once-in-ageneration opportunity to accelerate public-sector low-carbon expenditure. **China, the EU and the US will need to ensure these have climate action front and centre.** The EU has made firm pledges in this regard, dedicating at least 30 per cent of its recovery plan and multi-year budget to meeting climate pledges, and there will be considerable global scrutiny of President Biden on the implementation of his Build Back Better pledges. **China, the EU and the US have been the most important parties to the UNFCCC, not only due to their historical and current emissions, but also to their geopolitical power, which has enabled them to encourage or discourage greater mitigation ambition. Therefore, a united front from these major players and demonstrable examples of cooperation will be fundamental to the success of meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement.** They may prioritize different approaches including using the market, subsidies, green stimulus packages, and legislation or regulation to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon society. However, even with a new US administration it is likely that a trend towards less international cooperation and more competition will continue. The clearest sign of this shift is the proposed introduction of import taxes on the carbon content of goods entering the EU. This will test the level of political support within the EU and opposition from other countries, as well as the EUs ability to overcome the challenges to the implementation of CBAMs, principally regarding WTO rules. President Biden is considering similar carbon import taxes for the US. New mechanisms that impact global trade are notoriously difficult to introduce and are highly politically sensitive; therefore the chances of their effective implementation are probably low. Nevertheless, just seriously considering carbon import taxes could stimulate trading partners to further their cooperative international pledges and domestic climate action. Thus, a simple dichotomy between cooperation and competition is too reductionist. The delay in holding COP26, due to COVID-19, gives countries time to take into account the change in administration in the US before submitting their revised NDCs. Moreover, COP26 is being hosted jointly by Italy and the UK, the respective presidents of the G20 and G7 in 2021, which is likely to increase the profile of climate initiatives. Policies to reduce GHG emissions tend to be long-term, requiring consistency and stability. The EU has achieved this, across successive European Commissions, resulting in more ambitious mitigation targets and global leadership in the deployment of low-carbon technologies. Likewise, **China, through its five-year planning cycle has consistently addressed environmental and climate-change issues. But, while this has created policy stability, addressing climate change has often been subordinate to other social and economic priorities of the Chinese government.** In the US, climate change remains a partisan issue, with Democratic administrations pushing forward climate policies, only for these to be slowed down or reversed by Republicans. This stop-start approach to climate mitigation and adaption reduces the effectiveness of domestic policies and diminishes the effectiveness of the US in the international process.

**This impacts back to my framework because global cooperation is intrinsic to a cosmopolitan world order. To clarify, the offense is not that consequentially there is less cooperation which is bad, it is that prioritizing individual goals to international cooperation is a violation of cosmopolitanism.**

**Contention 3) International law requires China to take massive steps on climate change.**

**Liu**, Hongqiao, **and** Xiaoying **You**. "Q&A: What Does China's New Paris Agreement Pledge Mean for Climate Change." *Carbon Brief*, 16 Dec. 20**21**, www.carbonbrief.org/qa-what-does-chinas-new-paris-agreement-pledge-mean-for-climate-change/#:~:text=The%20submission%20means%20China%20has,net%2Dzero%20emissions%20before%202060. Accessed 30 Oct. 2022.

**The headline targets in China’s updated NDC are pledges to reach a peak in CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieve “carbon neutrality” before 2060.** The document – which is titled, “China’s achievements, new goals and new measures for nationally determined contributions” – was published on 28 October 2021, just days before COP26. In terms of quantitative targets for 2030, **it pledges to cut CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by more than 65% from 2005 levels, increase the share of non-fossil energy to around 25% and raise forest stock volumes by 6bn cubic metres from 2005 levels, as well as bringing the installed capacity of wind and solar to more than 1,200 gigawatts** (GW). The first three quantitative targets are enhancements to goals that were included in China’s first NDC, submitted in 2016 at the same time as it ratified the Paris Agreement. The fourth target for renewable capacity is a new addition. In addition to the strengthened quantitative goals, China has now pledged to peak emissions “before 2030”, whereas its first NDC had aimed to do this “around 2030” and to “mak[e] best efforts to peak early”. Furthermore, China has officially added its goal of “achieve[ing] carbon neutrality before 2060” into the latest document. The following table, compiled by Carbon Brief, shows that all of the numerical targets set in China’s first NDC have been enhanced in the revised submission. The table also shows China’s progress to date, based on public information disclosed by the Chinese government and Carbon Brief’s interview with Prof Zou Ji – chief executive and president of the NGO Energy Foundation China – in March 2021. Notably, the target for wind and solar means that China has committed to more than doubling its installed capacity – already the world’s largest – during the 2020s. (Hu Min, executive director of the Innovative Green Development Program, [iGDP], a Beijing-based thinktank, tells Carbon Brief the renewable goal is likely to be “massively overachieved”. The International Energy Agency [IEA] says it will be met four years early.) Along with its updated NDC, China published its “mid-century long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategy” (LTS) on 28 October. Countries were invited to submit such strategies by 2020, as part of the COP21 decision in 2015 that adopted the Paris Agreement. The LTS sets out what China describes as “strategic visions” for 2060 and covers a wide range of social, economic and governance areas. It also includes emerging policy priorities, such as nature-based solutions and blue carbon. However, there is only one quantitative goal for 2060 in the LTS, targeting an 80% share of energy from non-fossil fuels – an increase from 25% by 2030, as set in the revised NDC. Apart from that, it presents several quantitative targets for 2025 and 2030 in key areas such as buildings, transport and forestry, which are not detailed in the revised NDC. **Among other goals, the LTS stipulates that, by 2025, all new buildings in cities and towns would implement China’s “green building” standards and half of the rooftops of new public buildings and factories should “strive to” be covered with solar panels. It also specifies that “about 40%” of new vehicles sold in 2030 would be powered by “new energy” or clean energy** – effectively meaning electric, hybrid and hydrogen vehicles. All of these near-term targets have been enhanced compared to the previous objectives set in domestic policies. For example, the target for new and clean energy-fuelled vehicles would mean doubling the rate of market uptake over five years, from the 20% target set for 2025 just a year ago. **The language on peaking oil consumption is also worth noting. The strategy states that oil consumption “shall reach a peak plateau“ during the 15th five-year plan period, from 2026 to 2030. Within that total, it says that land transport, which accounts for around three-fifths of China’s oil use overall, will “strive to peak” by 2030.** At the same time, the LTS provides no clear indication about the financial support China intends to give for the realisation of its climate goals. Guo Hongyu, deputy program director of Beijing-based Greenovation Hub – ​​a local environmental “think-do organisation” – tells Carbon Brief that **the LTS lacks a clear timetable for phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, for example. Nor does it specify how China plans to finance its short- and long-term transition,** Guo adds. According to the Green Finance Committee of China Society for Finance and Banking – a Beijing-based organisation aiming at promoting green finance – **a cumulative 487tn yuan (around US$76tn) of investment is required for carrying out green and low-carbon projects in China over the next three decades. In addition, the country will need “transition finance” to decarbonise hard-to-abate sectors, such as the “dual high” industries, agriculture, shipping and aviation.**

**This impacts back to my framework because international law stems from a cosmopolitan form of government which means following it is key to cosmopolitanism. If China fails to fulfill its promises by prioritizing economic growth and not paying for climate change reduction it violates international law and lies to other countries which also violates cosmopolitanism.**