## Kant

kant confuses reason and practical rationality. Reasons are justifications for acting, but assertions of universal validity based in a priori reason doesn’t entail any interpretation of philosophical reason.

Reason stems independently of agents

The fact that moral agents confer value on things does not show their rational agency is intrinsically valuable. that one thing confers a property does not entail the first thing possesses it. e.g. [U]niversity presidents confer law degrees for u but that] doesn’t entail that these presidents themselves possess a PhD.

## Notes

### offense

#### Education is a spaces for democratic, communal deliberation but standardized tests incentivize teachers to discipline and ingrain unnatural habits, especially for students of color, Rury & Rice 17

John L. Rury, [John L. Rury is Professor of Education and (by courtesy) History and African & African American Studies at the University of Kansas. A past president of the History of Education Society and vice president of the American Educational Research Association, he has also served as an editor of the American Educational Research Journal.] Suzanna Rice [Associate Professor Suzanne Rice is the Deputy Director of the Assessment Research Centre. She has researched and published widely in the areas of testing policy and the impact of high-stakes testing programs. Her other research interests include teacher motivation and pathways, and career development provision in schools.]. “DEWEY ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TESTING, INTEREST, AND DISCIPLINE: DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION IN PERSPECTIVE” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, Volume 16, Issue 4 October 2017 , pp. 488-499. Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2017. Society for Historians of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000354> cw//az

Passed with bipartisan support, **NCLB** was arguably the most ambitious educational reform program in American history. It **stipulated** that public **schools be** held **accountable** **for** student **learning** as measured **by standardized tests** of achievement, as reflected in mastery of particular subjects. Individual schools would be expected to raise the achievement of all children to proficiency, even those from groups that had lagged in the past. **This** soon **placed** enormous **pressure** **on** teachers and administrators in **lower** **performing** **schools, especially** those **serving** children in unusually **poor communities**, who often were **threatened with** displacement and school **closure**. It was a school reform program focused directly on the classroom, and standardized achievement tests became the principal means for evaluating teachers. Unfortunately, NCLB did not produce a dramatic improvement in student achievement nationally, although there was a slight reduction in long-standing achievement gaps between different groups of students. 26 Given the prominent roles played by testing in the reforms following A Nation at Risk, and especially NCLB, it is not difficult to imagine how John Dewey would respond to these developments. In his own career **Dewey was notably critical of standardized testing**, which was just being developed at the time that D&E was published, although most of his skepticism was aimed at IQ tests rather than standards-based assessments of the sort widely used today. One of the most widely discussed concerns at present is that this practice unduly **drives** the **content of instruction. Teachers** are encouraged, implicitly or explicitly, to **devote** additional **time** and energy **to** the **subjects represented on** the **tests** (and to basic skills within those subjects) and in extreme cases to focus instruction on actual test items. A central criticism is that, as a result of such practices, **worthwhile content** that would **otherwise** be integrated **in**to **the** **curriculum is** given short shrift or is **excluded** altogether. As a consequence, **students miss** out on the **opportunity to learn valuable lessons from considering** such **questions.** 27 D&E points to a particular aspect of this problem that education reformers largely overlooked, namely, that teaching to the test leaves little room for teachers to accommodate students’ interests. Teaching to the test eventually became an issue for teachers and students, and for parents too, who called for modifications to the NCLB testing regime, or for waivers to be exempted from mandatory tests. This movement gained steam in the latter stages of NCLB, contributing to its eventual downfall, and a new federal policy that gave states considerably greater discretion in making schools accountable for improvement in instruction. Many called for greater attention to flexibility in how teachers tailored their instruction to meet the needs and interests of students. 28 This is a significant problem, Dewey argued, because **a failure to ground instruction in students’ interests is tantamount to closing the door on the schools’ democratic potential.** Why this is so can be better appreciated in light of Dewey's analysis of interest in D&E. To be interested is to be absorbed in, wrapped up in, carried away by, some object. To take an interest is to be on the alert, to care about, to be attentive. We say of an interested person both that he has lost himself in some affair and that he has found himself in it. Both terms express the engrossment of the self in an object. 29 As Dewey points out, etymologically, the word “interest” connotes something “between.” In this case it is bookended on one side by the student's “present powers,” intellectual, moral, and physical resources; and on the other side by an object (of interest). 30 **Interest** **is** thus **educationally** **significant** because **it** **attaches** a student's “**present** **powers**” **to** that more **remote** **object**. Learning occurs when the student encounters obstacles—and the means of overcoming them—as she pursues the object. Among the means of doing this are social relations among students and the knowledge and skills embedded in academic subjects. Prior to NCLB, Dewey's ideas were more likely to find expression in schools, especially at the elementary level, and in more affluent communities where pressure to attain higher achievement was not as pronounced. The short film Voyage of the Pilgrims ‘92, which features a group of public school fourth graders in Lexington, Massachusetts; their teacher, Steven Levy; and several classroom volunteers, provides an example of interest operating in a school setting, and, most significantly, illustrates the deep relation between “interest” with “democracy.” It is not clear whether this classroom was explicitly organized with Dewey in mind, but whether by intention or accident it clearly reflects Dewey's hope that schools would become embryonic democracies. 31 As shown in the film, at the start of the school year Levy challenged students to “create their own classroom.” Following much discussion among themselves and consultation with Mr. Levy, the students decided that they wanted, above all, to make their own desks: this was their main interest. From the start, they encountered many questions that they had to answer in order to advance their project: How would Pilgrims make furniture? What tools did they have? What desk design should they adopt? How much wood and stain will be needed? How will they finance the project? The children came up against numerous obstacles along the way, but persevered, often choosing to continue working through recess and before and after regular school hours. Most of the time, these students were not working individually, but in teams and small groups with shifting membership. Of necessity, they had to consult with one another, smooth over disagreements, find compromises when consensus could not be reached, and coordinate the different parts of this multifaceted project. Because realizing their shared interest in the form of functional desks required the contributions of all the students, they encouraged one another's learning. The interest in building desks soon expanded to include an interest in one's classmates. Students’ interest in making the desks provided the needed motivation for learning considerable academic content as well. Reading, history, writing, and math were all taught in the context of the project as students undertook such tasks as learning about the lives and times of the Pilgrims, writing letters to area businesses asking for funding and then keeping them informed about of the project's development, computing area in order to buy wood and stain, and keeping accounts of expenses. All of this learning was organically connected with the students’ central and genuinely held interest. 32 Dewey valued the knowledge encapsulated in school subjects and he appreciated the fact that reading and math (areas most widely tested in connection with NCLB) have a special place in students’ learning. **By helping students to pursue their interests, teachers are** also, as a general rule, **helping** **them** to become better readers and mathematicians. Depending on the students and interests involved, they could **become more competent in** the sciences, arts, **history**, and other areas. But accommodating students’ interests was important to Dewey not only as a means of helping students to learn academic content. He also theorized a connection between interest and the development of self-discipline, which in itself is an important educational goal. While many teachers agreed with the goal of raising achievement, they also worried that NCLB's focus on testing foreclosed the possibility of engaging students in lessons that sparked curiosity and attention. 33 **When interest is lacking, teachers** have little choice but to **use** what Dewey called “artificial inducements”: promises of **reward or** threats of **punishment**, in order to motivate students to attend to the lessons at hand. This has become somewhat commonplace during the NCLB era, and some schools have even experimented with the idea of offering monetary rewards for improvement on tests. 34 **When** such **inducements** **are** **ineffective**, direct, **teacher**-imposed **discipline** often **follows**, and students are denied privileges or given low grades for failing to meet externally imposed standards. **These** and other negative sanctions **demean students**, but from Dewey's perspective, that is only part of the problem: **when teachers routinely exercise control, it is more difficult for students to develop** control over themselves, or **self**-**disciplin**e. And as Dewey noted, such self-discipline is positively enabling: A person who is trained to **consider** his **actions**, to undertake them **deliberately**, is in so far disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen course **in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty**, and you have the essence of discipline. Discipline means power at command; mastery of the resources available for carrying through the action undertaken. … Discipline is positive. 35 The connection between interest and discipline is illustrated in the example above when the students persevere in the face of differences of opinion and difficult math problems, as well as when they willingly forego recess in order to work on their project. These students’ mental and physical powers are harnessed to a particular interest, but they are in the process of learning a more general “lesson” about what it means to be disciplined and the rewards of such discipline. For Dewey, students learn to be disciplined by being self-disciplined. Many educators associate “learning by doing” with the acquisition of skills, but, in Dewey's account, **habits and** traits of **character are** also **acquired in this manner**. As he often pointed out, **such learning is essential for** accomplishing any significant goal and, more broadly, for **purposefully living life rather being led through it** by others or, indirectly, by unexamined conventions and customs. While interest and discipline have many important implications for education, Dewey argues that their connection with democracy is of the greatest educational significance. A characteristic of **a democratic society** is that its **members have** common **interests** that can be **advanced** only **through** the **contributions of many, requiring** that **each** member **consider** **and execute** her **activities with others in mind**. As Dewey recognized, such a society requires certain educational arrangements: “[A democratic] society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and habits of mind which secure social change without introducing disorder.” 36 From a Deweyan perspective, one of the most serious shortcomings of **NCLB** is that it appears to **contradict** certain key **educational needs of democracy**. These **deficiencies come** into view **once** it is **realized** the extent to which **tests, rather than students’** interests, will **drive instruction.** Because it is the rare child who takes a direct interest in the skills tested, NCLB encourages teacher-imposed discipline, rather than self-discipline. Sacrificed are opportunities for students to work together with teachers to identify projects of interest that provide not only subject matter content, but also lessons in joint problem-solving and cooperation. Given this, it is little wonder that NCLB produced such modest improvements in student achievement, despite all of the time and resources devoted to its implementation as a reform program.

#### Education should focus on the process of learning, not content; it instills reflexive, life-long habits that contextualize reductionist views and enable them to process the information thrown their way. Standardized testing in social studies kills that by prioritizing rote memorization of the dominant viewpoint which is epistemically disingenuous

Journell ‘7 (Wayne Journell. “Dewey and Standardization: A Philosophical Look at The Implications For Social Studies.” Social Studies Research and Practice, 2(3), 301-315. 2007) CVHS AB

The era of NCLB has turned the goal of public education from how to think to what to think. While the difference may seem like simple semantics, Dewey (1910) believes otherwise: If our schools turn out their pupils in that attitude of mind which is conducive to good judgment in any department of affairs in which pupils are placed they have done more than if they sent out their pupils merely possessed of vast stores of information. (p. 101) The Virginia SOLs are very conscious of making sure that all grade levels throughout the Commonwealth are learning the same types of information, but there is no congruency about the method in which the information is taught. The standards list content from specific time periods in history but offer few ways to connect specific facts to larger themes. This creates curriculum that either functions by tedious routine or sporadic covering of content, neither of which is conducive to learning (Dewey, 1910). As Dewey (1910) argues, when teachers are given standards and the responsibility to ensure successful performance of those standards, then developing useful habits of the mind is a secondary goal. In other words, if teachers are teaching to the test, they are not developing life skills of analytical and critical thinking for their students (Anagnostopoulos, 2005; Vogler & Virtue, 2007). The high-stakes testing component used to quantify NCLB is not necessarily changing what students are learning but the way in which they are learning the material. There is little in the Virginia SOLs for U.S. History that would surprise the average citizen, but the amount of information needed to be covered by the end of the school year forces teachers to change their methods for analyzing historical actions, as evidenced in the studies by van Hover and Pierce (2006) and Yeager and van Hover (2006). For example, most adults remember studying Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan to end World War II. By using primary sources and discussing the reasoning behind the decision—dropping the bomb actually saved both American and Japanese lives—students could appreciate that a decision of such magnitude is not merely a means to an end that one finds in a history textbook. Students today are not consistently exposed to such arguments and debates due to the time constraints placed on teachers by standardized tests (Parker, 2006; Vogler & Virtue, 2007). This creates an injustice much deeper than simply a poor appreciation of history. Instead, American students are not being taught to think critically about problems and are, therefore, avoiding higher levels of Bloom’s taxonomy (Pattiz, 2004). Wright (2002) defines critical thinking as “criteria [of] accuracy, clarity, plausibility, relevance, having a weight of evidence for a claim, and logic” (p. 258). For that reason, many educators scoff at the notion of having high school courses specifically designed for teaching critical thinking. This separates analytical thinking from common applications; in short, it does not create the habit of critical thinking necessary for life situations (Wright, 2002). Analytical thinking needs to be repeatedly used as a tool to solve problems in school, which will allow students to critically view social issues later in life. Dewey (1938) calls the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies the notion that “a person learns only the particular thing he is studying at the time” (p. 48). Instead, students not only learn facts or solutions to problems, but they also learn the methods and techniques used to understand such data. Segregation of historical facts apart from the historical process created by standardization forces students into developing a skewed perception of history. According to Dewey (1938), separating content from the process of discovery creates experiences that “[are] not available under the actual conditions of life” (p. 48). Lee (2004) concurs, claiming that students must become familiar with the historical process in order to understand that history is open to interpretation. Multiple versions of history exist; however, teachers often only expose their students to the master narrative presented in textbooks and standards. Standardization narrows the social studies curriculum, forcing teachers to implement tedious memorization techniques that only allow for the teaching of specific content (Savage, 2003). Evaluations of student knowledge have also become more simplistic. Multiple-choice and true or false assessments have taken the place of essays and projects, in part because teachers want to model what their students will see on end-of-course tests. In other words, NCLB has turned education into a right or-wrong, black-or-white experience (Pattiz, 2004). This is especially disconcerting to social studies where human emotions and conditions are studied, creating gray areas in all aspects of history (Lee, 2004). Movements such as fascism in Germany or chattel slavery in antebellum America cannot adequately be explained as “wrong” without looking at the events and eras that led to the creation of these situations. Students are not oblivious to this change as well. Kanevsky and Keighley (2003), in an attempt to understand academic discouragement, conducted a study of middle and high school students who were labeled as gifted and talented in elementary school but were academically underachieving in their secondary years. The students surveyed targeted their boredom at the techniques of their teachers, specifically “copying, memorizing, regurgitating, repetition [and] waiting.” (p. 21). One student reported, “I remember always thinking I want to learn something and we’re not learning anything and we did the same things over and over again.” (p. 20). Another telling response was, “The only thing you do at school is memorize . . . They don’t expect you to understand.” (p. 24). Chiodo and Byford (2004) performed a similar study solely for the field of social studies, using eighth and eleventh grade history students. The authors found negative attitudes towards social studies with students referring to their history courses as “dull, boring, and irrelevant,” due to instruction based on lecture and worksheets (p. 16). The eighth-grade students preferred their social studies courses to involve more “group projects, group work, debates, and simulations,” activities which are often stifled by standardization (p. 20). As any educator knows, when the enjoyment is taken out of learning, students will find other ways to focus their motivation. More importantly, even though the students in both studies did not use Deweyan terminology, they saw the habits being forced upon them as detrimental to their education. They knew that the superficial techniques of their teachers were hiding a deeper understanding of the subject. As a former high school teacher in Virginia, I had a perfect student pass rate on the Virginia SOL tests for U.S. History and World History Part II during the 2004-2005 school year. While my school principal and district supervisors were thrilled with my results, I felt that my history students did not receive as beneficial an education as my Advanced Placement Government students, who were free from an end-of-course SOL testing requirement. In the government course, I had the freedom to cover material without the restraints of time or pressure. My students engaged in advanced levels of thinking such as student-lead classroom discussions and oral debates on controversial issues. The course was demanding, but at the end of the year, nearly half of my students told me that government was the most rewarding course they had taken in high school, because they learned about themselves, both personally and politically, and that the class had forced them to perform a variety of tasks that they had never before attempted. The course instilled new habits in those students, such as formulating arguments and public speaking, both of which will remain useful to them in their academic and professional careers. Unfortunately for my history students, their educational experience was limited due to the constant pressure to cover the required standards before the end-of-course test, similar to the aforementioned studies by van Hover and Pierce (2006), Vogler (2005), and Yeager and van Hover (2006). Their courses were dominated by worksheets, lectures, and repetition of facts—a true Machiavellian method where the ends justified the means. Dewey (1910) warns against using such techniques in the teaching of history: The danger in those studies where the main emphasis is upon acquisition of skill is just the reverse. The tendency is to take the shortest cuts possible to gain the required end. This makes the subjects mechanical and thus restrictive of intellectual power. (p. 51) One could argue that my history and government students will likely forget most of the content of their respective courses as they reach adulthood, but my government students may remember those habits of formulating arguments and effective public speaking. As Dewey (1938) states, “Collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and often is much more important than the spelling lesson or lesson in geography or history that is learned” (p. 48). Consider a sports analogy: A baseball player with any remote skill can face a hard-throwing pitching machine and eventually learn to hit the ball consistently, because the motion of the machine and the speed and location of the pitches will remain constant. All the hitter has to do is adjust his timing. Of course, replace the machine with a hard-throwing pitcher and suddenly the batter flails hopelessly. While the speed is similar to that of the machine, the movement of the ball and the release point of the pitcher are going to vary with each pitch. Therefore, having a player learn to hit exclusively off of a pitching machine is ineffective, because it creates poor habits and the hitter is unable to adjust when minor variances are implemented. Instead, a more effective technique would be to equip the hitter with basic habits of hitting such as keeping one’s eye on the ball, maintaining a solid base, and using a level swing. The same philosophy holds true for students: Teach them the tools necessary to learn and they will be able to learn in a multitude of environments.

#### Standardization limits freedom by reinforcing dogmatism – this is oppressive and kills love of learning.

Journell ‘7 (Wayne Journell. “Dewey and Standardization: A Philosophical Look at The Implications For Social Studies.” Social Studies Research and Practice, 2(3), 301-315. 2007) CVHS AB

* Turns Kant because critical thinking is a prerequisite to accessing rationality
* Turns Deleuze because critical thinking opens up lines of flight
* Probably turns like every other framework there is

Garrison (2004) asserts that the “ultimate goal [of education] is to become a lover of wisdom” where “wisdom . . . is beyond knowledge alone though knowledge is a means to its attainment” (p. 147). Such a phrase is rich with Dewey, who believes that the most important habit that educators can impress upon youth is the love of learning. Dewey (1922/1988) views habits as arts that that lead to the betterment of individuals and society. It is here that one finds the crux of Dewey’s feelings about habits, that they “are so intimately a part of ourselves” (p. 21). No other aspect of who we are as individuals is as directly related to our environment as the habits that we form. As Dewey acknowledges, some habits can be damaging and virtually irremovable, but that is due to the intense bond that we have with those habits. People fall victim to oppressive habits such as drinking and smoking, and a cunning marketer will understand that a great amount of money is available in the treatment and cures of such addictions because those habits become fundamental to the identity of an individual. A positive habit will have the opposite outcome. Someone who gains the habits of critical thinking and intrinsic love of knowledge will experience riches that never cease. Dewey (1910) calls this phenomenon abstract thinking or “interest in intellectual matters for their own sake, a delight in thinking for the sake of thinking” (p. 141). Standardization has created an outcome-based society that starts at the ground level. Every assignment a student attempts to complete requires value, a score or an evaluation that signifies accomplishment or successful completion. Even among more motivated, college-bound students remains a desire to learn for the purposes of a reward. In my Advanced Placement course, I assigned weekly readings of a philosophical nature on the structure and efficiency of the American political system and occasionally gave remedial pop quizzes to assess both the effort and comprehension of my students. At one point, I overheard something I had never expected: an admonished student griping about not being quizzed because they had actually read the assigned material. Where was the elation that accompanies learning new knowledge or the excitement of opening new possibilities that had previously ceased to exist? When people learn for the sake of others, they lose focus of the individual for whom learning is truly designed. Learning does offer retribution as long as the value is intrinsically motivated. True learning is the key that unlocks doors and opens hidden passageways to the unexplored. Dewey (1910) believes that “thought affords the sole method of escape from purely impulsive or purely routine action” (p. 14). When education becomes standardized and states dictate both the knowledge presented and the method of thought that accompanies that knowledge, then states limit students’ ability to escape, not only from the monotony of the classroom, but also from the boundaries impressed upon them by societal customs. Dewey (1910, 1916), using Plato’s definition of slavery, would [think] ~~view~~ such forced habits as a form of oppression. Shackles of iron are simply replaced by stocks of routine, repetition, and irrelevance. Similar to the way slave narratives tell of African Americans using education as a way to escape from bondage, students need the habits of critical thinking and intrinsic learning to break away from the darkness of unimaginative, simplistic thought. In essence, the argument against standardization is a plea for freedom.

#### Standardized tests fail Dewey’s test for learned experience by teaching ahistorical, static truths.

 Vinson et al ‘1 (Kevin D. Vinson, Rich Gibson, E. Wayne Ross. “High-Stakes Testing and Standardization: The Threat to Authenticity.” *Progressive Perspectives,* Vol. 3 No. 2, Winter 2001. <http://www.uvm.edu/~dewey/monographs/ProPer3n2.html>) CVHS AB \*\*brackets in original

The current expansion of standardized testing fails pedagogically on a number of levels, including, perhaps most importantly, on several criteria initially proposed by Dewey himself. In The Child and the Curriculum, for example, Dewey (1902/1956) argued that education and educators must “get rid of the prejudicial notion that there is some gap in kind… between the child's experience and the various forms of subject-matter that make up the course of study” (p. 11). This, for Dewey, was the “problem” with traditional and dominant viewpoints. Moreover, it was a problem defined by two principal “sides”: From the side of the child, it [was] a question of seeing how his [or her] experience already contains within itself elements—facts and truths—of just the same sort as those entering into the formulated study; and, what is more important, of how it contains within itself the attitudes, the motives, and the interests which have operated in developing and organizing the subject-matter to the plane which it now occupies. From the side of the studies, it is a question of interpreting them as outgrowths of forces operating in the child's life, and of discovering the steps that intervene between the child's present experience and their richer maturity. (p. 11) As he continued: Abandon the notion of subject-matter as something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside the child's experience; cease thinking of the child's experience as also something hard and fast; see it as something fluent, embryonic, vital; and we realize that the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process [italics added]. Just as two points define a straight line, so the present standpoint of the child and the facts and truths of studies define instruction. It is continuous reconstruction, moving from the child's present experience out into that represented by the organized bodies of truth that we call studies. (p. 11) In terms of standardized testing, what Dewey's understanding implies are at least three significant points. First, it suggests an instructional state of affairs in which all important knowledge—even so-called “academic” or “disciplinary” knowledge—grows out of the multiple and experienced lives of the learners themselves. Second, it indicates an instruction that is fluid and dynamic, one in which neither the perceived and actualized experiences of the child nor the subject matter itself is constant or set in stone, that is “fixed and ready-made.” Third, it maintains and asserts a certain and clear connectedness, one inherent in the act of instruction, that represents the motion and instability of the learner’s association with a given mode of content. In sum, it challenges the extent to which content can be predetermined, objectified, established as permanent, legitimately cut-off from experience, and measured or moderated externally. And yet, these indeed are the conditions that at least partially describe the present commitment to standardized and high-stakes testing. Accordingly, “It is the failure to keep in mind the double aspect of subject-matter which causes the curriculum and child to be set over against each other…” (Dewey, 1902/1956, p. 23), such that “[t]he [instructional] material is not translated into life-terms, but is directly offered as a substitute [italics added] for, or an external annex to, the child's present life” (p. 24). In fact, because of this failure, “[t]hree typical evils result: In the first place, the lack of any organic connection with what the child has already seen and felt and loved makes the material purely formal and symbolic” (p. 24). The material becomes, in effect, “not a reality, but just the sign of a reality which might be experienced if certain conditions were fulfilled…” (p. 25). The “realities” of classroom life, therefore, get replaced by the “symbols” of standardization. The fact that a school or school district has a system for delivering mandated tests and reporting their scores, and that it has in place therefore a means by which to control and dictate content and teaching method in a publicly visible way, replaces the realities of classroom life, substituting in their place an “image” or “mere representation” by which to judge and presume—to imagine or create—the supposed “(in)effectiveness” of teachers and schools. “The second evil in this external presentation is lack of motivation. There are not only no facts or truths which have been previously felt as such with which to appropriate and assimilate the new, but there is no craving, no need, no demand” (Dewey, 1902/1956, p. 25). Content, within a technology of standardized testing, that inevitably leads to standardized curriculum and instruction, disconnects schooling from the child's innate curiosity; it turns the learner off, so that classroom life becomes phony, senseless, and trivial within the bigger life picture. Speculatively, one cause for what those who support standardization see as a lack of knowledge on the part of today's young people might be simply that through schooling children are taught not to enjoy, long for, or value learning for its own inherent consequences. Instead, students (e.g. children) learn because they are made to, and are scared into achieving vis-à-vis the perils of the threatened and threatening alternative consequences. Subsequently, they develop a viewpoint toward schooling as something negative and of little internal or substantive value, as something one does purely to pass and to succeed within the system: Preparing for tests becomes equated with “real” work: Passing tests becomes the indicator of success and the only legitimate definition of learning. As one Chicago sixth grader recently stated, “Normally I wouldn't pay much attention because I’d know I could pass without doing much work…. It's not like that now. I know I've got to study harder and learn so that I can go on to the seventh grade—and life” (Steinberg, 1999, p. A25). (Note, though, that some Chicago students—the Organized Students of Chicago [OSC-- have indeed had some success in challenging Chicago's Tests of Academic Proficiency [TAP] [see Fair Test, 1999b].) As Dewey (1902/1956) noted, even “Unpleasant, because meaningless, activities may get agreeable if long enough persisted in. It is possible for the mind to develop interest in a routine or mechanical procedure if conditions are continually supplied which demand that mode of operation and preclude any other sort[italics added]” (p. 28). “The third evil is that even the most scientific matter, arranged in most logical fashion, loses this quality, when presented in external, ready-made fashion, by the time it gets to the child” (Dewey, 1902/1956, p. 6). That is: It has to undergo some modification in order to shut out some phases too hard to grasp, and to reduce some of the attendant difficulties. What happens? Those things which are most significant to the scientific man [sic], and most valuable in the logic of actual inquiry and classification, drop out. The really thought-provoking character is obscured, and the organizing function disappears….[content] is presented as stuff only for “memory.” This is the contradiction: the child gets the advantage neither of the adult logical formulation, nor of his [or her] own native competencies of apprehension and response. (p. 26) In effect, subject matter, in order to meet such demands as those presented by standardized testing—for example, “efficiency,” “effectiveness,” “objectivity,” “validity,” “reliability”—becomes hypersimplified. Subject matter becomes denatured to the point that it exists only as a collection of mere facts or rote ideas useful only for mechanized storage and retrieval. It becomes information that remains unproblematic and unproblematized, unassailable and unassailed; it becomes virtual data set to portray and symbolize an absolute Truth.

#### The aff enables colleges to innovate absent pressure of rankings; conversations shift to the best fit for the student rather than reducing them to a number, Lash 15

Lash 2015, Jonathan Lash (Past president, Hampshire College, sixth on forbes’ list of most entrepreneurial college. Jonathan Lash, President of Hampshire College, is also a Director of World Resources Institute, a DC-based environmental think tank, where he previously served as president. Jonathan is a widely recognized environmental leader who chaired President Bill Clinton's Council on Sustainable Development and was the State of Vermont’s Environmental Secretary and Commissioner. He holds a law degree and master’s degree in education from Catholic University of America and a bachelor’s from Harvard College.), "Results of Removing Standardized Test Scores from College Admissions." Hampshire College, September 21, 2015 https://www.hampshire.edu/news/2015/09/21/results-of-removing-standardized-test-scores-from-college-admissions cw//az

We completely **drop**ped **standardized tests** from our application as part of our new mission-driven admissions strategy, **distinct from** the “**test-optional” policy** that hundreds of colleges now follow. If we reduce education to the outcomes of a test, the only incentive for schools and students to innovate is in the form of improving test-taking and scores. Teaching to a test becomes stifling for teachers and students, far from the inspiring, adaptive education which most benefits students. Our greatly accelerating world needs graduates who are trained to address tough situations with innovation, ingenuity, entrepreneurship, and a capacity for mobilizing collaboration and cooperation. We weighed other factors in our decision: Standardized test scores do not predict a student’s success at our college SATs/ACTs are strongly biased against low-income students and students of color, at a time when diversity is critical to our mission We surveyed our students and learned not one of them had considered rankings when choosing to apply to colleges; instead they most cared about a college’s mission Some good students are bad test takers, particularly under stress, such as when a test may grant or deny college entry; Multiple-choice tests don't reveal much about a student We’ve developed much better, fairer ways to assess students who will thrive at our college. In our admissions, we review an applicant’s whole academic and lived experience. We consider an applicant’s ability to present themselves in essays and interviews, review their recommendations from mentors, and assess factors such as their community engagement and entrepreneurism. And yes, we look closely at high school academic records, though in an unconventional manner. We look for an overarching narrative that shows motivation, discipline, and the capacity for self-reflection. We look at grade point average (GPA) as a measure of performance over a range of courses and time, distinct from a one-test-on-one-day SAT/ACT score. A student’s consistent "A" grades may be coupled with evidence of curiosity and learning across disciplines, as well as leadership in civic or social causes. Another student may have overcome obstacles through determination, demonstrating promise of success in a demanding program. Strong high school graduates demonstrate purpose, a passion for authenticity, and commitment to positive change. We’re seeing remarkable admissions results **since disregarding standardized test scores**: Our **yield**, the percentage of students who accepted our invitation to enroll, **rose in a single year from 18% to 26**%, an amazing turnaround The quantity of applications went down but the **quality went up,** likely **because we made it harder to apply**, asking for more essays; Our **applicants** collectively **were more motivated,** mature, disciplined and consistent in their high school years than past applicants **Class diversity increased to 31%** students of color, the most diverse in our history, up **from 21% two years ago** The percentage of students who are the **first-gen**eration from their family to attend college **rose from 12% to 18%** in this year’s class. Our “No SAT/ACT policy” has also changed us in ways deeper than data and demographics: **Not once did we** sit in an Admissions committee meeting and "**wish we had a test score**." Without the scores, every **other detail of** the student’s **application became more vivid.** Their academic record over four years, letters of recommendation, essays, in-person interviews, and the optional creative supplements gave us a more complete portrait **than** we had seen **before**. Applicants gave more attention to their applications including the optional components, putting us in a much better position to predict their likelihood of success here. This move away from test scores and disqualification from the U.S. News rankings has allowed us to innovate in ways we could not before. In other words, we are free to innovate rather than compromise our mission to satisfy rankings criteria: **We no longer chase volumes** of **applications to superficially inflate** our "**selectivity" and game** the U.S. News **rankings**. We no longer have to worry that any applicant will "lower our average SAT/ACT scores" and thus lower our U.S. News ranking. Instead we choose quality over quantity and focus attention and resources on each applicant and their full portfolio. **At** college fairs and **info**rmation **sessions, we don’t** spend time answering high school families’ questions about our ranking and test score "cut-offs." Instead **we have conversations about** the things that matter: What does our unique **academic program** look like and what qualities does a student need to be successful at it? An unexpected benefit: this shift has **sav[ing]**~~ed~~ us **significant** time and operational **expense**. Having a smaller but more targeted, engaged, passionate, and robust applicant pool, we are able to streamline our resources. How can **U.S. News rankings** reliably measure college quality when their data-points **focus** primarily **on** the **high school performance** of the incoming class **in** such terms as GPA, **SAT/ACT**, class rank, and selectivity? **These** measures **have nothing to do with** the **college's** **results**, except perhaps in the college's aptitude for marketing and recruiting. **Tests** and rankings **incentivize schools to conform to** test performance and rankings **criteria, at the expense of** mission and **innovation**. Our shift to a mission-driven approach to admissions is right for Hampshire College and the right thing to do. We fail students if we reduce them to a standardized test number tied more to their financial status than achievement. We fail students by perpetuating the myth that high standardized test scores signal "better" students. We are in the top one percent of colleges nationwide in the percentage of our undergraduate alumni who (-To on to earn advanced degrees—this on the strength of an education where we assess their capabilities narratively, and where we never, not once, subject them to a numerical or letter grade on a test or course. At Hampshire College, we face the same financial challenges as many colleges. But these challenges provide an opportunity to think about who we are and what matters to us. We can not lose sight of our mission while seeking revenues or chasing rankings. **We are** committed to remaining disqualified from the U.S. News rankings. We’re **done with standardized testing**, the SAT, and ACT.

## !

#### Evi may be bracketed for problematic rhetoric or clarity. I’ll defend standardized testing, colleges and universities, and college admissions decisions as defined by \_\_ respectively if you want me to.

#### Spikes are at the bottom. If there is any issue with that ^, pls lmk before we start!

## ac

### angela’s vers.

#### Education should focus on the process of learning, not content; it instills reflexive, life-long habits that contextualize reductionist views and process and apply abstract information to real-world scenarios. Standardized testing in social studies prioritizes rote memorization of the dominant viewpoint to perpetuate the squo which is epistemically disingenuous

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The era of NCLB has turned the goal of public education from how to think to what to think. While the difference may seem like simple semantics, Dewey (1910) believes otherwise: If our schools turn out their pupils in that attitude of mind which is conducive to good judgment in any department of affairs in which pupils are placed they have done more than if they sent out their pupils merely possessed of vast stores of information. (p. 101) The Virginia SOLs are very conscious of making sure that all grade levels throughout the Commonwealth are learning the same types of information, but there is no congruency about the method in which the information is taught. The standards list content from specific time periods in history but offer few ways to connect specific facts to larger themes. This creates curriculum that either functions by tedious routine or sporadic covering of content, neither of which is conducive to learning (Dewey, 1910). As Dewey (1910) argues, when teachers are given standards and the responsibility to ensure successful performance of those standards, then developing useful habits of the mind is a secondary goal. In other words, if teachers are teaching to the test, they are not developing life skills of analytical and critical thinking for their students (Anagnostopoulos, 2005; Vogler & Virtue, 2007). The high-stakes testing component used to quantify NCLB is not necessarily changing what students are learning but the way in which they are learning the material. There is little in the Virginia SOLs for U.S. History that would surprise the average citizen, but the amount of information needed to be covered by the end of the school year forces teachers to change their methods for analyzing historical actions, as evidenced in the studies by van Hover and Pierce (2006) and Yeager and van Hover (2006). For example, most adults remember studying Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan to end World War II. By using primary sources and discussing the reasoning behind the decision—dropping the bomb actually saved both American and Japanese lives—students could appreciate that a decision of such magnitude is not merely a means to an end that one finds in a history textbook. Students today are not consistently exposed to such arguments and debates due to the time constraints placed on teachers by standardized tests (Parker, 2006; Vogler & Virtue, 2007). This creates an injustice much deeper than simply a poor appreciation of history. Instead, American students are not being taught to think critically about problems and are, therefore, avoiding higher levels of Bloom’s taxonomy (Pattiz, 2004). Wright (2002) defines critical thinking as “criteria [of] accuracy, clarity, plausibility, relevance, having a weight of evidence for a claim, and logic” (p. 258). For that reason, many educators scoff at the notion of having high school courses specifically designed for teaching critical thinking. This separates analytical thinking from common applications; in short, it does not create the habit of critical thinking necessary for life situations (Wright, 2002). Analytical thinking needs to be repeatedly used as a tool to solve problems in school, which will allow students to critically view social issues later in life. Dewey (1938) calls the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies the notion that “a person learns only the particular thing he is studying at the time” (p. 48). Instead, students not only learn facts or solutions to problems, but they also learn the methods and techniques used to understand such data. Segregation of historical facts apart from the historical process created by standardization forces students into developing a skewed perception of history. According to Dewey (1938), separating content from the process of discovery creates experiences that “[are] not available under the actual conditions of life” (p. 48). Lee (2004) concurs, claiming that students must become familiar with the historical process in order to understand that history is open to interpretation. Multiple versions of history exist; however, teachers often only expose their students to the master narrative presented in textbooks and standards. Standardization narrows the social studies curriculum, forcing teachers to implement tedious memorization techniques that only allow for the teaching of specific content (Savage, 2003). Evaluations of student knowledge have also become more simplistic. Multiple-choice and true or false assessments have taken the place of essays and projects, in part because teachers want to model what their students will see on end-of-course tests. In other words, NCLB has turned education into a right or-wrong, black-or-white experience (Pattiz, 2004). This is especially disconcerting to social studies where human emotions and conditions are studied, creating gray areas in all aspects of history (Lee, 2004). Movements such as fascism in Germany or chattel slavery in antebellum America cannot adequately be explained as “wrong” without looking at the events and eras that led to the creation of these situations. Students are not oblivious to this change as well. Kanevsky and Keighley (2003), in an attempt to understand academic discouragement, conducted a study of middle and high school students who were labeled as gifted and talented in elementary school but were academically underachieving in their secondary years. The students surveyed targeted their boredom at the techniques of their teachers, specifically “copying, memorizing, regurgitating, repetition [and] waiting.” (p. 21). One student reported, “I remember always thinking I want to learn something and we’re not learning anything and we did the same things over and over again.” (p. 20). Another telling response was, “The only thing you do at school is memorize . . . They don’t expect you to understand.” (p. 24). Chiodo and Byford (2004) performed a similar study solely for the field of social studies, using eighth and eleventh grade history students. The authors found negative attitudes towards social studies with students referring to their history courses as “dull, boring, and irrelevant,” due to instruction based on lecture and worksheets (p. 16). The eighth-grade students preferred their social studies courses to involve more “group projects, group work, debates, and simulations,” activities which are often stifled by standardization (p. 20). As any educator knows, when the enjoyment is taken out of learning, students will find other ways to focus their motivation. More importantly, even though the students in both studies did not use Deweyan terminology, they saw the habits being forced upon them as detrimental to their education. They knew that the superficial techniques of their teachers were hiding a deeper understanding of the subject. As a former high school teacher in Virginia, I had a perfect student pass rate on the Virginia SOL tests for U.S. History and World History Part II during the 2004-2005 school year. While my school principal and district supervisors were thrilled with my results, I felt that my history students did not receive as beneficial an education as my Advanced Placement Government students, who were free from an end-of-course SOL testing requirement. In the government course, I had the freedom to cover material without the restraints of time or pressure. My students engaged in advanced levels of thinking such as student-lead classroom discussions and oral debates on controversial issues. The course was demanding, but at the end of the year, nearly half of my students told me that government was the most rewarding course they had taken in high school, because they learned about themselves, both personally and politically, and that the class had forced them to perform a variety of tasks that they had never before attempted. The course instilled new habits in those students, such as formulating arguments and public speaking, both of which will remain useful to them in their academic and professional careers. Unfortunately for my history students, their educational experience was limited due to the constant pressure to cover the required standards before the end-of-course test, similar to the aforementioned studies by van Hover and Pierce (2006), Vogler (2005), and Yeager and van Hover (2006). Their courses were dominated by worksheets, lectures, and repetition of facts—a true Machiavellian method where the ends justified the means. Dewey (1910) warns against using such techniques in the teaching of history: The danger in those studies where the main emphasis is upon acquisition of skill is just the reverse. The tendency is to take the shortest cuts possible to gain the required end. This makes the subjects mechanical and thus restrictive of intellectual power. (p. 51) One could argue that my history and government students will likely forget most of the content of their respective courses as they reach adulthood, but my government students may remember those habits of formulating arguments and effective public speaking. As Dewey (1938) states, “Collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and often is much more important than the spelling lesson or lesson in geography or history that is learned” (p. 48). Consider a sports analogy: A baseball player with any remote skill can face a hard-throwing pitching machine and eventually learn to hit the ball consistently, because the motion of the machine and the speed and location of the pitches will remain constant. All the hitter has to do is adjust his timing. Of course, replace the machine with a hard-throwing pitcher and suddenly the batter flails hopelessly. While the speed is similar to that of the machine, the movement of the ball and the release point of the pitcher are going to vary with each pitch. Therefore, having a player learn to hit exclusively off of a pitching machine is ineffective, because it creates poor habits and the hitter is unable to adjust when minor variances are implemented. Instead, a more effective technique would be to equip the hitter with basic habits of hitting such as keeping one’s eye on the ball, maintaining a solid base, and using a level swing. The same philosophy holds true for students: Teach them the tools necessary to learn and they will be able to learn in a multitude of environments.

They continue

In this era of special education, IEPs, and 504 plans, it almost seems asinine for anyone to question the individuality of public education. Using those parameters, it could easily be argued that we currently live in the most individualized educational system in history. Indeed, great pains have gone into ensuring that schools cater to the learning styles of individual students by modifying instructional strategies to meet intellectual or physical exceptionalities. Dewey (1938) recognizes the need for individualism in education: [Not] every pupil will respond or that any child of normally strong impulses will respond on every occasion. There are likely to be some who, when they come to school, are already victims of injurious conditions outside of the school and who have become so passive and unduly docile that they fail to contribute...The teacher has to deal with [those students] individually. (p. 56) Even in an era prior to modern classifications of student exceptionalities, Dewey understood that all students learn differently and would suffer from the social Darwinian style used in the early part of the last century. While Dewey would approve of the steps taken to promote individuality regarding how students learn, he would be horrified at the methods the state has taken to regulate what students learn. In many ways, our public schools have regressed to the traditional schools that Dewey (1938) admonishes in his writings. One of the innate flaws of the traditional schools was that they “consisted of subject-matter that was selected and arranged on the basis of judgment of adults as to what would be useful for the young...material to be learned was settled upon outside of the present life-experience of the learner” (p. 76). Dewey sees a much stronger purpose in education which is to “prepare the young for future responsibilities and for success in life, by means of acquisition of the organized bodies of information and prepared form of skill which comprehend the material of instruction” (p.18). He views strict implementation of educational policy from higher authorities as oppressive to “expression and cultivation of individuality” (p. 19). Forgoing a debate on the reality of NCLB, one can easily see the problem with the current system, which operates with the underlying assumption that all students should strive to go to college. Once again, this dilemma is not unique to our current time and place. Dewey realized that preparing students for life and college were two very different endeavors (Reid, 2002). As Dewey (1916) states, “a society to which stratification into separate classes would be fatal, must see to it that intellectual opportunities are accessible to all on equable and easy terms” (pp. 87-88). Dewey paraphrases Plato when he states that “the business of education [is] to discover what each person is good for, and to train him mastery of that mode of excellence” (p. 309). Sadly, standardization is forcing schools to phase out programs designed to promote individuality and self-exploration. Many school districts have had to cut funding for art, music, theatre, vocational education, and other electives to budget for remediation programs for students who did not pass one or more of their standardized assessments. Students unsuccessful in the eyes of NCLB are being pulled out of elective courses and forced to participate in even more repetitious remediation, when many of those same students were finding their passion in those specialty classes (Darling-Hammond, 2004; Ryan, 2004).

#### Education should focus on the process of learning, not content; it instills reflexive, life-long habits that contextualize reductionist views and enable them to process the information thrown their way. Standardized testing in social studies kills that by prioritizing rote memorization of the dominant viewpoint which is epistemically disingenuous

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#### Thus, decision-making is a never-ending procedural not substantive, it’s the procedure that generates habits not the evaluation of what impacts matter most.

### Advocacy

#### I defend: Resolved: In the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests of US History in undergraduate admissions decisions. Speed 15. Neg should check interps, links, etc. in cross-ex to focus on substance, there’s infinite things I violate w bidirectional interps. Santa

Speed, Shannon. “‘Pro-American’ History Textbooks Hurt Native Americans.” HuffPost, 21 Jan. 2015, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/proamerican-history-textb\_b\_6199070. [(Chickasaw Nation) is professor of gender studies and anthropology and director of the American Indian Studies Center at the University of California, Los Angeles. ] cw//az

They feel the purpose of teaching history, as one school board member recently stated, is to “teach students to be proud American citizens.” But as a professor at Texas’ flagship university, I have found these omissions to have the opposite effect. My students are usually quite surprised to find that they have been provided a whitewashed version of history. They are often outraged. They feel lied to. Omission of the truth is, in fact, a form of lying. I would offer that the purpose of teaching history in schools is to create critical thinkers capable of meaningful participation in a democratic society. Not surprisingly with attitudes like those exhibited by their stance on history, Texas is often failing to do that. I am regularly alarmed at my first year students’ lack of critical thinking ability. These are bright students. They wouldn’t be at UT if they weren’t. They simply haven’t been taught to think critically because their education favored memorization and successful performance on standardized tests. This is exactly the problem the overhaul of the AP U.S. History test and related curriculum was designed to overcome. But the board found the new curriculum to be “anti-American” because it includes “negative aspects” of U.S. history. Pat Hardy, another conservative school board member, said “To me there was a negativity to the standards, and very few positives about America were found.” While the school board claims the problem is anti-American bias, the material in question is not a matter of interpretation. The United States expanded by systematically eliminating Native Americans from under official policies and acts of Congress with names like “removal,” “reorganization,” “termination,” and “relocation.” Millions died, and many millions of acres of their [lands](http://cdn.thewire.com/img/upload/2012/07/19/native-american-land__.gif) were taken from them to serve the advancing settlers. Ideologies of white racial superiority were widespread from colony through the early 20th century and were regularly and openly offered as the justification for these harms as necessary to the civilizing mission. These are historical facts. These events and dynamics shaped our country. And they should be taught to our students. Providing our students with a strictly “positive” version of U.S. history does not produce proud Americans. Nor does teaching the difficult truth of our country’s history necessarily produce citizens that are not patriotic. For example, Native Americans are among the most patriotic people I know. They serve in the U.S. armed forces in disproportionately high numbers, with the [highest troop-to-population ratios](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/08/who-serves-in-the-us-military-the-demographics-of-enlisted-troops-and-officers) of any racial or ethnic group. Natives revere their veterans and honor them for their service to this country. No powwow begins without the entry of the Honor Guard, and the posting of the American flag alongside state and tribal flags. My own tribe begins its annual meeting with the pledge of allegiance. And they know their history.

### framing

#### I value morality.

#### Meaning and truths are good insofar as it makes a difference in action: we only know concepts like hard and heavy because of the effects of those things.

#### Democracy requires practical deliberation as the method of moral inquiry to advance communal truth.

**Serra 09** [Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member.]

This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that ethics is valuable as a science in a broad sense. But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, through the examination of past actions and the self-correction of the self in view of future action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life can be lived. In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his system, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct (or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re- search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, moral inquiry is performed in a deliberative[ly] way, weighing up argumentations, beliefs and principles, and comparing them either with their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as well as possible experiences that can be forceful or impinge upon the deliberative subject in such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint- ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and thought experiments... Such responsiveness is part of what it is to mak[ing]e a moral decision and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)3. Likewise, this same deliberative activity implies an effort to acquire habits, beliefs and principles that contribute to a truly free deliberation which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas- ticity and receptiveness to experience4. Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi- ment carried out within imagination [by] that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef-forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con- crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even more, according to Peirce, the activity takes the form of experimentation in the inner world; and the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. The real and living logical conclusion is that habit (CP 5.491, 1907). Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided (CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in- fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative subject.

#### Prefer: 1] Self-justification: To question against deliberation is deliberation and concedes it’s valuable. Outweighs:

#### A] Solves infinite regress - frameworks are only applicable if they unify and guide action.

#### B] Bindingness – morality must prevent opt out– this is solved through constitutivism; we cannot be anything but agents.

#### 2] Explanatory coherence – ethics is approaching limits. We didn’t derive Kant and conclude violence bad. We condemn violence and this belief developed into a habit which is internal links to rules. doubt is key to action since their framework assumes that we must win a certainty but that’s not how motivation works

#### 3] Epistemic Reliability: disagreement is rife in the squo so most theories are wrong - prefer relative reliability. The law of large numbers proves when we test more it gets closer to true probability so when we test theories under this fw we’ll get the best calculus.

#### A] Even if my framework is wrong it’s non-unique we assume everyone is wrong – if ours is more reliable, independent of the actual framework it is truer on the higher epistemic layer.

#### B] we take the premise of many theories claims into practice so advantages of other frameworks are non-unique.

#### C] Freezes action - Resolves equally true methods and should serve as a tiebreaker

#### 3] AC tests new strategies in a way that turns power against itself to change the rigid political culture. Prefer abductive methods – avoids dogmatism as we constantly question our beliefs which is key to coalitions of social change as people are actually convinced as to why an ideology is true rather than being shamed into believing it, Anderson 15

Elizabeth Anderson 15 [I am Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and John Dewey Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. I teach courses in ethics, social and political philosophy, political economy, philosophy of the social sciences, and feminist theory. My research focuses on democratic theory, equality in political philosophy and American law, racial integration, the ethical limits of markets, theories of value and rational choice (alternatives to consequentialism and economic theories of rational choice), the philosophies of John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, social epistemology, and feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. I am currently working on the history of egalitarianism, with a special focus on the social epistemology of moral learning, taking the history of abolitionism as a central case study. I designed and was the first Director of UM's Program in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics.], “Moral Bias and Corrective Practices: A Pragmatist Perspective”, presidential address delivered at the one hundred twelfth Central Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association on 20 Feb 2015, BE

Yet, moral beliefs about slavery did change. After the Civil War, while Southern whites insisted on white supremacy, most came to accept sharecropping as superior to slavery.44 The practical success of emancipation led them to drop all of the arguments they had previously made in support of the supposed necessity of slavery. The full story of how this change in moral beliefs came about is too complex for this lecture. Here I stress two major factors. First, to change moral beliefs, slavery had to be challenged not only in pure moral arguments but in practical, collective action. Second, slaves and free blacks had to actively participate in those challenges.¶ In social theory, “contention” refers to practices in which people make claims against others, on behalf of someone’s interests. “Contentious politics” consists of coordinated contention by groups around a shared agenda, involving governments as “targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.”45 Contentious practices span a spectrum from pure moral argument at one end, to riots, war, and other violent acts on the other. Between pure argument and violence is a wide range of contentious activities that are more or less disruptive of habitual ways of life, from petitioning, publicity campaigns, theatrical performances, candlelight vigils, litigation, and political campaigns, to street demonstrations, boycotts, teach-ins, sit-ins, picketing, strikes, building occupations, and other forms of civil disobedience. As people move beyond the pure moral argument pole, they manifest in action and not only words their refusal to go along with the moral norms they are rejecting. Once it gets beyond pure moral argument, contention consists in the collective, concerted repudiation of morally objectionable practices by means of actions that disrupt the routine functioning of those practices, and that express rejection of the moral authority of people to practice them.¶ Contention aims to secure the satisfaction of claims by eliciting the recognition of those in power of the legitimacy of those claims, and thereby the incorporation into social institutions of an established recognition of those claims.46 It might seem that violent acts, on this definition, could not count as contention, even if they have political aims. To be sure, political violence used simply to get one’s way by force, as in cases of genocide and ethnic cleansing, does not address the victims as agents of whom it is demanded that they respond to claims. But other kinds of violence do aim at eliciting the practical recognition from authorities of legitimate claims. For example, the American War of Independence aimed not simply at obtaining de facto independence from Britain but at securing recognition from Britain of the United States as a sovereign nation. The war was a form of violent contention.¶ I claim that, in some circumstances, practical contention brings about collective moral learning—learning on the part of societies—that pure moral argument cannot. We have evidence that moral change induced by contention counts as learning—as an improvement of moral beliefs— if the contention blocks, counteracts, bypasses, or corrects cognitive or moral biases that supported the status quo ante, such that the new moral beliefs embodied in altered practice are not, or at least less, distorted by those biases. In such cases, we have similar grounds for claiming that the new moral beliefs are more reliable as in cases of belief change on the basis of blinded placebo-controlled clinical trials.¶ Practical contention, not just individual moral persuasion, is needed to effect collective moral belief change because collective moral beliefs are embodied in social norms. Social norms are sustained by reciprocal expectations of conditional conformity. They involve tacit or explicit agreements within a society to conform to the norm, on condition that enough others conform. Collective moral beliefs are embodied in social norms of discussion, joint deliberation, and claim-making. A group shares a belief if that belief shapes discourse within the group: the group takes it for granted as a premise for further argument, not needing independent justification; its truth is treated as a settled matter; disputing it is regarded as, if not beyond the pale, requiring a heavy burden of proof; disputants are liable to censure or even social exclusion for calling such convictions into question.47 For belief in a moral principle to be collectively accepted also requires that the principle regulates interpersonal claim-making: members are free to make claims in accordance with the principle and generally do so when they are victimized by violations of it; other members acknowledge the legitimacy of such claims; the principle is widely if not completely obeyed by group members; the group punishes disobedience; members take steps to transmit the principle to future generations.48¶ Because collective moral beliefs are sustained by reciprocal expectations, an individual can privately dissent while still participating in the practices that sustain the belief for the group. Hence, merely changing an individual’s mind through moral argument need not change the collective belief. Furthermore, individuals may resist acting on their personal conclusions because a belief is held collectively. This is not simply because they lack the courage of their convictions. They may wonder whether they have reasoned correctly if they reach conclusions contrary to the group consensus, and think that the group’s belief is more reliable than their own reasoning. Pure moral argument may also lack a certain degree of seriousness, insofar as it is advanced in contexts outside of interpersonal claim-making, by people who lack direct stakes in what they are saying.¶ Contentious politics avoids these weaknesses of pure moral argument. In contentious political practices, people advance moral beliefs in the context of actual claim-making: the stakes are real and serious. Because these practices involve mass action in public repudiation of existing norms, they destabilize the shared expectations that hold those norms in place, casting doubt on the robustness or authenticity of the purported consensus around them. Their mass public nature may give courage to those who privately dissented, proving that their doubts about existing norms were not merely the product of idiosyncratic reasoning. To the extent that contentious politics disrupts the routine operation of challenged norms, it forces genuine practical deliberation about what to do, not mere idle speculation. In refusing to concede legitimacy to the enforcement of challenged norms, contentious politics threatens a loss of honor on the part of those who do enforce them—something that may inspire the enforcers to reconsider them.49¶ Contentious politics thus serves to awaken societies to serious practical reflection on entrenched moral beliefs. More is needed, however, to ensure that the direction their reflection takes is less biased. Many features of contention can play this role. Here I stress one: the participation of the victims of injustice in challenging the norms that oppress them.¶ So far I have discussed the moral arguments made by white abolitionists such as Hepburn, Clarkson, Weld, and Garrison. As we have seen, their strategies were ineffective against the slaveholding culture of the South. Racism posed powerful obstacles to their efforts. Despite the abstract commitment of white abolitionists to the equality of blacks before God, and hence their equal moral considerability, racism biased their representation of the evils of slavery. They overwhelmingly represented slaves as victims of cruelty and material deprivation. Weld’s American Slavery as It Is (1839) (the inspiration for Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which, with Weld’s work, constituted the two most influential white abolitionist publications in the U.S.) documents in exhaustive detail the material deprivations inflicted on slaves and their subjection to cruel tortures. Notably, these wrongs can be suffered equally much by animals. By contrast, Weld’s work passes relatively lightly over slavery’s manifold assaults on slaves’ specifically human, dignitary interests in their agency and in recognition from others: the deprivation of autonomy, legal rights, education, and opportunities for self-advancement; the theft of the fruits of their labor; the dishonor inflicted on female slaves through slaveholder rape; the dishonor imposed on male slaves by denying them authority over family life, powers to protect their wives and children, and access to avenues for developing and exercising military virtues. White abolitionists thus tended to cast slaves more as objects of pity than as subjects of dignity entitled to command respect. They were notably weak in addressing slaveholders’ claims that blacks lacked intelligence, talent, foresight, and capacities for self-governance, and so would be unable to compete with whites in a free labor market, but sink into destitution, vagrancy, and crime if they were freed—key elements in slaveholders’ patriarchal defense of slavery as necessary for blacks’ welfare and social order.¶ Black abolitionists placed greater emphasis on the ways in which slavery deprived slaves of dignity, honor, and access to distinctively human rights and achievements. The central theme of Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl Written by Herself was the vulnerability of slave women to sexual harassment and rape at the hands of their masters. The female slave “is not allowed to have any pride of character. It is deemed a crime in her to wish to be virtuous.” Jacobs rated this injury as far worse than slavery’s material deprivations or consignment to a life of drudgery. She hid in a tiny, dark attic for almost seven years to avoid sexual assault, judging this fate better than slavery, even though she had never been whipped, beaten, or overworked as a slave.50 Frederick Douglass agreed with Jacobs’s priorities. Worse than the whip was slavery’s consignment of slaves to ignorance and incapacity to think for themselves. Indeed, the fundamental point, and greatest injury, of material deprivation and brutal physical punishment was to disable slaves from aspiring to freedom, to the exercise of rational capacities, to any kind of estimable activity.51 From this dignitary perspective, Douglass exposed slaveholders’ boasts of the material indulgence they granted their slaves on holidays, when they were encouraged to get drunk and discouraged from any work, as a great fraud, designed only “to disgust their slaves with freedom, by plunging them into the lowest depths of dissipation.”52¶ Black abolitionists’ alternative critique of the evils of slavery led them to advocate a different strategy for bringing about moral change— one addressed as much to antislavery Northerners as to advocates of slavery. Their critique identified racism—the widespread, deeply entrenched contempt for blacks, based on prejudicial feelings of their being unfit for freedom and equal dignity with whites—as the core moral bias upholding slavery. To counteract this prejudice, much more than pure moral argument was required. Blacks needed to demonstrate in action their interest, capacity, and worthiness for freedom and dignity. “We . . . wish to see the charges of Mr. Jefferson refuted by the blacks themselves” for, if blacks fail to try, “we will only establish them.”53 As James McCune Smith, the first African-American to earn a medical degree, and editor of Douglass’s My Bondage and My Freedom, put the point:¶ The real object of that [antislavery] movement is not only to disenthrall, it is, also, to bestow upon the Negro the exercise of all those rights, from the possession of which he has been so long debarred. But this full recognition of the colored man to the right, and the entire admission of the same to the full privileges, political, religious and social, of manhood, requires powerful effort on the part of the enthralled, as well as on the part of those who would disenthrall them. The people at large must feel the conviction, as well as admit the abstract logic, of human equality; the Negro . . . must prove his title first to all that is demanded for him; in the teeth of unequal chances, he must prove himself equal to the mass of those who oppress him . . ..54¶ Without such effort by blacks themselves “to disprove their alleged inferiority, and demonstrate their capacity for a more exalted civilization than slavery and prejudice had assigned to them,” whites would “reconcile themselves” to blacks’ “enslavement and oppression, as things inevitable, if not desirable.”55¶ This task stood in tension with white abolitionists’ strategy to present slaves as objects of pity. Douglass grated under their requests that he merely “give us the facts,” and “we will take care of the philosophy.” They implored him to speak to audiences with an uneducated plantation accent, lest Northern whites think he wasn’t really a fugitive slave. They objected to his establishing a paper of his own, preferring that he continue to lecture under their sponsorship, oblivious to the importance Douglass saw in demonstrating blacks’ capacities and inspiring, through his achievements, other blacks to that call.56¶ In this dispute, black abolitionists proved to be far keener moral psychologists than their white counterparts. White abolitionists, in stressing the pathos of slavery, operated on the assumption that the core moral bias of slavery advocates was heard-heartedness. On that assumption, the key strategy for counteracting that bias should be to highlight those facts about slavery that arouse people’s sympathies and to cultivate social practices that encourage sentimentality and open­ heartedness, so that people feel free to respond appropriately to those facts. Black abolitionists identified the core weakness of this strategy: “Human nature is so constituted, that it cannot honor a helpless man, although it can pity him; and even this it cannot do long, if the signs of power do not arise.”57 If the core moral bias of slavery advocates was racist contempt, then this can only be counteracted by resisting subordination and oppression, demanding respect, and seizing it, by force if necessary, from those who withhold it. To demonstrate worthiness of respect, one must conduct oneself as entitled to it. Failing that, the contemptuous will think their targets uninterested in, incapable of, and hence undeserving of respect.¶ On this point, black abolitionists were united. Their writings repeatedly testify to the power of blacks’ standing up for their rights, and the supreme importance of their doing so. Jacobs “resolved never to be conquered” and resisted her master’s sexual advances. Escaping North, she successfully opposed racial discrimination in hotel service by telling the black servants that they should stand up to oppose it.58 Douglass admired the unbowed resistance of Nelly to overseer Mr. Servier’s blows, noting that he never whipped her again.59 This incident prefigured his own triumphant struggle against the slavebreaker Covey, from which he drew his central insight into the moral psychology of overcoming oppression: to obtain recognition of one’s respectability from others, one must manifest self-respect in action by exacting respect from others.¶ This call to resistance was the core of David Walker’s Appeal.60 And resist the slaves did, taking deeds, more than words, as the key to progressive moral change. Slaves exploited the legal codes of the South to extract recognition of rights through innumerable acts of resistance on the plantations, including, in some cases (astonishingly!), the right to kill their masters in self-defense.61 There was no better proof that slaves desired freedom and repudiated enslavement than the steady flow of fugitives North, without regret or reversal. Toward the end of the Civil War, the Confederacy, running out of soldiers, debated whether to draft slaves into the army. Howell Cobb, one of the founders of the Confederacy, answered, “If slaves will make good soldiers our whole theory of slavery is wrong.”62 But fugitive slaves demonstrated, in their courageous service in the Union Army, that slaves did make good soldiers. They thereby heeded Walker’s call for blacks themselves to refute Jefferson’s aspersions on their race and shattered the South’s “whole theory of slavery.” While their actions did not end racism, they did force a momentous retreat of this profound moral bias. Slavery advocates were forced to concede that the case for slavery was spurious, and that blacks were fit at least for the autonomy that the emergent sharecropping economy conceded to them. This was not full freedom by any means, but it was a giant step up from slavery.¶ 4. SOME PRAGMATIST PATHS FORWARD FOR MORAL PHILOSOPHY¶ Let us step back and draw some lessons from this monumental episode of collective moral learning. Recall that pragmatism replaces the quest for ultimate criteria of moral rightness, true in all possible worlds or at least at high levels of abstraction, with methods of intelligent updating. I argued that one important type of intelligent updating involves blocking, counteracting, or reducing the influence of moral biases. We have reasons to believe that social power biases moral reasoning in systematic ways. First, as Smith argued, people tend to feel more sympathy, and more esteem, for the rich and powerful relative to the poor and powerless, controlling for equal suffering and equal merit. The latter unjustly suffer contempt. He could have added that such contempt tends to be rationalized by biased notions of group inferiority. Second, as Dewey and Tufts argued, the powerful—who shape social institutions to benefit their social groups at others’ expense—tend to confuse what they want with what is right so long as they have the power to enforce their demands.¶ Faced merely with pure moral argument, we have seen that the powerful, and their advocates, typically have substantial resources at their disposal, from the intuitive moral ideas and principles available in their society, to rationalize their side of the debate. Nor does purely speculative, a priori moral argument typically activate real practical reasoning. Hence, the powers of pure moral argument to dislodge prejudice and bias tend to be weak.¶ Stronger methods are needed to counteract the biases induced by social power. My case study of a society-wide change in moral belief, from proslavery to abolitionist, focused on two such methods. First, contentious politics—active, practical, mass resistance to the moral claims embodied in social institutions enforced by and catering to the powerful—is needed to activate genuine practical reasoning across all levels of society. The powerful won’t really listen to reason—that is, to claims from below—until they no longer have the power to routinely enforce their desires. Second, the subordinated and oppressed must actively participate in that contention. They must manifest in deed and not only words their own interest, capacity, and worthiness for the rights and privileges they are demanding. For if they meekly submit to oppression, this tends to make observers—not only the powerful, but anyone, as Smith held—think that the downtrodden have no interest in or capacity for uplift and do not deserve it. The oppressed must show their determination to cast off oppression in order to arouse the esteem and thereby enlist the support or at least the acquiescence of others.¶ Walker, Jacobs, McCune, and Douglass understood this. Respect is obtained from others not by abstract argument but by dignified exaction. No wonder Douglass lost all patience for abstract moral argument:¶ [W]here all is plain there is nothing to be argued. . . . Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? . . . The slaveholders themselves acknowledge it . . . when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave. What is this but the acknowledgement that the slave is a moral, intellectual, and responsible being . . . [I]t is not light that is needed, but fire. . . . The feeling of the nation must be quickened; the conscience of the nation must be roused; . . . the hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed; and its crimes against God and man must be proclaimed and denounced.63¶ In the language of contemporary moral philosophy, Douglass was calling for a shift from third-person to second-person address, from abstract impersonal argument to interpersonal claim-making, founded on an assertion of authority to demand respect from others.64 To be called to account, to be addressed as a bearer of duties to the addresser, to be upbraided for failure to do what is authoritatively demanded—these are essential experiences needed to become a morally responsible being, fit for living with others. And these are the experiences to which slaveholders, holding irresponsible totalitarian power over slaves, were least exposed before the Civil War. Yet, in the perverse corruption of moral sentiments Smith identified, until the enslaved actively repudiated their subjection, it was the slaves, rather than the slaveholders, who were thought unfit for living freely with others.¶ From our current moral perspective, it is easy for us to see the errors of the past, with respect to slavery. A skeptic might wonder whether we are merely begging the question in favor of our current moral beliefs. The pragmatist answers that this change can be seen to be progressive, a case of moral learning, because it was brought about through practices that tend to counteract or reduce known moral biases rooted in human psychology. As clinical conclusions reached on the basis of blinded, placebo-controlled clinical trials are more reliable, due to the ways they check the biases of wishful thinking, moral conclusions reached on the basis of practical methods that counteract the biases of power are similarly more reliable.¶ This pragmatist perspective suggests an alternative research program for moral philosophy, reaching beyond the a priori methods to which we philosophers are so wedded. My point is to expand the tools we use, and to reduce our excessive reliance on the old tools. Just as a bolt will turn uselessly without a nut to fasten it, or glued joints will be weak if they haven’t been clamped, our abstract moral arguments will spin without conclusion or fall apart uselessly unless they are used in conjunction with empirically grounded tools. We can make better progress by working in close conjunction with the social sciences and history to consider empirically how different circumstances, including social relations, shape our moral thinking. If we discover an influence on our moral thinking that we can’t justify, or that experience shows us to lead to untoward consequences, we have discovered a moral bias. Then we can seek empirically reliable methods to correct, block, counteract, or bypass those biases, keeping in mind that pure reasoning may not be enough. Some methods may be practical, not just speculative or theoretical, and involve concerted action in the world, sometimes collective political action.¶ This alternative research program does not reject intuitions. They are a basic material of moral thinking; we have no way around them. But we must be alert to the possibility that our intuitions might suffer from bias and would be improved under alternative conditions.¶ My case study raises an alarm for philosophy as we currently practice it. Without active participation of the oppressed and disadvantaged, the moral views reached by philosophers are liable to be biased—ignorant of and unresponsive to the concerns and claims of those not present.65 Dewey and Tufts identified that problem, too. Morality, understood as what we owe to each other, arises from the need to adjudicate the claims that everyone makes on everyone else. If the claims of the subordinated are suppressed, silenced, ignored, or misunderstood, the conclusions reached on the basis of the subset of claims that are considered are liable to be systematically biased. My case study indicates that purely a priori methods of bias correction are unlikely to reliably counteract such biases.66 There is no reason to think that ever-more-elaborate exploration of the contours of one’s own moral thoughts, or of the thoughts of similarly situated persons, will capture everyone’s moral concerns. Knowledge of what we owe to each other can only be generated through processes of interpersonal claim-making that include those occupying the full range of diverse situations in society. For moral philosophy to make progress, it must practice inclusion of diverse philosophers.¶ In this lecture, I have focused on bias correction as one basic pragmatist method. Another is experiments in living. The conclusions we reach from real experiments in living are likely to be more reliable than the conclusions we reach from thought experiments. Thought experiments are at best no more reliable than deliberation. We often find that our deliberations have gone astray once we act on them and experience unexpected results—some of which may inspire us to revise the initial terms in which we formulated the stakes in our decision.67 Ascent to the a priori offers no protection from such revision. We know from the history of morals that conceptions of value thought to be immutable do, in fact, change over time.

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse consistency with democratic deliberation.

**Taatila & Raij 12** [TAATILA, V., & RAIJ, K. (2012). Philosophical Review of Pragmatism as a Basis for Learning by Developing Pedagogy. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 44(8), 831–844. doi:10.1111/j.1469-5812.2011.00758.] cw//az

The authors of this paper do not claim that a natural world would not exist without social construction made by humans. However, if the goal is to have an effect on social practices, there should be a strong emphasis in any research activities on social construc- tion, acceptance and delivery mechanisms of revealed ‘truths’. A university needs to pay attention to the learning practices that are most effective in creating a social and personal acceptance of the subjects in curriculum and the competence to use this information in practice (Fugate & Jefferson, 2001). There is also a need to pass on the understanding and willingness to act on the ever-changing nature of science. As we know, in any academic subject some theories may be outdated at any time, and the alumni should be able to accept these changes and accommodate them into their own practices. Thus university graduates should be in a constant learning cycle, always acquiring new knowledge in addition to and replacement of the old truths (Chisholm, 2000). Learning is in a central position within a pragmati[sm]c framework. Since pragmatism [it] aims at translating useful knowledge of real-life problems into action, people must constantly acquire new knowledge and skills. The goal of learning is to create constantly new competence to fit the contemporary situation, or in Dewey’s words: ‘Instead of repro- ducing current habits, better habits shall be formed, and thus the future adult society can be an improvement of their own’ (Parker, 2003, xviii). Pragmatism does not see education only as an academic exercise to increase general knowledge, but also as an answer to why and what should one learn, and what the student will use learning for. Pragmatic learning is vocationally directed, so every learning situation should lead toward increased practical competence. This view is held in all types of learning situations, from deep science to very practical skills. ‘According to lecture method [realism] we live in order to learn, but according to the case method [pragmatism] we learn in order to live’ (Ardalan, 2008, p. 22). The pragmatic approach to education strongly critiques transmission-type teaching. Dewey in particular opposed this approach. He saw that the world was frequently presented to students as a set of ready-made knowledge, facts and laws, which scien- tists know to be untrue. For Dewey, the educative process was created by development and growth that takes place in intelligent inquiries into the environment (Seltzer-Kelly, 2008, pp. 293–294). An important aspect of teaching was not on the subject per se, but on making students learn to use scientific methods, and think and act on their own initiative. The requirements on the teacher in a pragmatic context are enormous. It is not sufficient to know the subject matter, but to be able to focus on the individual growth of the students, and to be able to ‘teach’ in open situations to solve problems with no fixed amount of variables. ‘The teacher must ... pay close attention to the particularities, to the individual students and their environmental influences, so that every instructional strategy can be adjusted in light of these’ (Seltzer-Kelly, 2008, p. 299). Dewey saw the teacher’s job as constant interactive intervention to contemporary problems with and by the students, to cultivate[s] the students with a caring but firm hand like that of a gardener (Seltzer-Kelly, 2008, p. 299). All this leads to a requirement for strong pedagogical skills. A teacher must master a large number of different methods to support learning, and be able to vary them according to situational needs ‘Only knowledge of the principles upon which all methods are based can free the teacher from dependence upon the educational nostrums which are recommended like patent medicines, as panaceas for all educational ills’ (McLellan & Dewey, 1908, p. 10). Still, the teacher is not the most important individual in a pragmatic learning process. The learner, the student, is most important. All learning takes place within the student. No amount of given support, instructions and facts can force her to learn if she actively opposes learning. In the pragmatic approach the student must be placed within the situation to personally experience the problems. In pragmatic learning environments, the students ‘... impose a meaningful framework on the unruliness of the case facts. They search for the key pieces of data, distinguishing central facts from peripheral ones. They organize the conflicting explanations and alternatives presented to them, and arrive at a reasonable recommendation for action. They express their views, feelings, reactions, attitudes, and prejudices which are reinforced or rejected by their colleagues. They have the opportunity to re-evaluate and re-appraise their recommendation, character, and personality’ (Ardalan, 2008, p. 28).

## Underview

### theory

#### aff theory and metatheory is legit, drop the debater, and the highest layer to check infinite NC abuse which o/ws on magnitude. 1AR is too short for drop the argument - Even if the shell is 4 minutes, the neg can dump on it for 5:30 and go for 30 seconds of substance and win

#### Fairness is a voter: Institutional rules first: Debate is competitive and governed by rules. You can’t evaluate who did better debating if the round is structurally skewed, so fairness is a gateway to substantive debate. Outweighs pedagogy as it proves that you have structurally positioned yourself around engagement.

#### Presumption and permissibility affirm: 1. I have to accomplish more in less time -7463, 2. I extend twice, neg does once. Prefer: time controls the int link, more time means more args

#### 3. ought “not” means neg proves active obligation to consider

#### No 2NR RVIs - creates a strat skew since people determine reading theory based largely on RVIs and force a 2ar on theory

#### Aff gets RVIs on counterinterps

#### The 2N has the option of going for either substance or theory with the layer I undercover, the RVI forces the 2N go for theory

#### The 2AR is the shortest speech which means I need to be able to collapse to the highest layer otherwise I have to beat back every layer in 3 min

#### Neg gets T so give an RVI to rectify reciprocity of opportunity

#### Robust social psychology evidence verifies our approach – political transformations like the aff intervene in social norms can prevent the formation of implicit biases

**Matthew 15.**Dayna Bowen Matthew, William L. Matheson and Robert M. Morgenthau Distinguished Professor of Law at UVA School of Law, F. Palmer Weber Research Professor of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, previously served on the University of Colorado law faculty as a professor, vice dean and associate dean of academic affairs, J.D. from the University of Virginia (*Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care*, “From Inequity to Intervention,” New York University Press, pages 155-158

Evidence that **Implicit Biases Are Malleable** **Social scientists have developed a body of empirical evidence that shows implicit biases are malleable** over the past quarter century.2 **The empirical** record is now well established and **offers strong evidence that implicit attitudes are neither inaccessible nor inescapable**; **they are**not impossible to control; they are not out of reach. In fact, **implicit associations can be influenced both by the individual who unconsciously holds these stereotypes and prejudices and by external factors**. Researchers have reported and reviewed numerous studies3 that put two important misconceptions about implicit biases to rest. First, **the evidence demonstrates that unconscious implicit attitudes are responsive to the deliberate choices and influences of an individual even though that person is not consciously experiencing the bias**. Second, implicit biases are not impervious to relatively short-term change even though they arise from social knowledge that was acquired slowly, and over a lifetime. In fact, the evidence reveals that learning cancontinue totake place and alter social group knowledge, after initial attitudes and associations are formed. Take, for example, a person who developed bad driving habits over time and subconsciously incorporated those habits into driving behavior for many years. If this person chooses to be mindful of improving his or her driving, either out of a conscious decision to do so or in response to external influences, those bad habits can be altered. External authorities may incentivize improvement through a media campaign, new rules of the road, prosecution for reckless driving, or a driver’s education class. Thus, malleability describes an ongoing learning process in which people with old, objectionable implicit biases learn to respond to newer**, more appropriate attitudes and**beliefs. Put another way, **longstanding and unconscious thinking can change**. This understanding of malleability is called the “connectionist” model of implicit bias. **Unlike the prior notion that implicit associations are static and inaccessibly fixed, the empirical record reveals that stereotypes and prejudicial beliefs to which we may adhere at any given time are “states” of thinking** that form based on past experiences and current inputs. Biases can be reviseddepending upon**current**informational inputs gathered and weighed with each new encounter. This flexible view**of stereotyping**replaces an outdated rigid one and allows for the evidence that individuals can constantly update the stored group knowledge that produces implicit biases. The connectionist model explains that a stereotype is merely a pattern of activation that, at a given point in time, is jointly determined by current input (i.e., the context) and the weight of the new information’s connection to existing and underlying beliefs.4 Psychologists now conclude that “**stereotypes are quite elastic and thus**any individual could hold and even change an infinite number of representations of social category’s members, **when viewed across time and place**.”5 The connectionist model contrasts with **early theories of implicit bias**, which **focused on their automaticity**. “Automaticity” refers generally to the way that individuals make associations without any awareness, without intentionality, and without responsibility for the influence the associations have in directing their conduct and choices.6 Early researchers concluded that automaticity meant inevitability. For example, one researcher said, “a crucial component of automatic processes is their inescapability; they occur despite deliberate attempts to bypass or ignore them.”7 This view is no longer correct. Over the past twenty years, **researchers have collected a strong record to contradict this notion that implicit attitudes change slowly**, if at all, **simply because they develop slowly over time**. This idea has been replaced by what Dr. Irene Blair has called “the now-bountiful evidence that automatic attitudes—like self-reported attitudes—are sensitive to personal, social, and situational pressures.”8 Blair points out that “**the conclusion that automatic stereotypes and prejudice are not as inflexible as previously assumed is strengthened by the number and variety of demonstrations**. . . . The fact that the tests were conducted in the service of many different goals, and by the similarity of findings across different measures.”9 The importance of understanding that implicit biases are malleable cannot be overstated. First, **malleability means that**interventions may be strategically introduced to provide current inputs that alter implicit biases. Thus, **we can expect that implicit biases can be reduced**. To say that biased attitudes may be “reduced” is to say that current informational inputs can be adjusted so that the resulting stereotype patterns no longer conform to traditional, discriminatory, or inequitable stereotypes, but instead lead individuals and institutions to more equitable judgments and more equitable conduct. Furthermore, **malleability also means that the discriminatory impacts that result from implicit biases also may be reduced**. The research that gave rise to the connectionist model has provided important insights concerning the several methods available to individuals and institutions wishing to ameliorate the discriminatory impact of decisions and conduct informed by implicit biases, stereotyping, and prejudice. Finally, **by demonstrating that even subconscious racial biases are within reach and control, researchers have provided a sound basis for**holding**individuals and**institutions responsible for reducing implicit racial and ethnic biases and for reducing**the** discriminatoryharms caused by unconscious racism.

#### Education is a space for democratic, communal deliberation but standardized tests incentivize teachers to discipline and ingrain unnatural habits, especially for students of color, Rury & Rice 17

John L. Rury, [John L. Rury is Professor of Education and (by courtesy) History and African & African American Studies at the University of Kansas. A past president of the History of Education Society and vice president of the American Educational Research Association, he has also served as an editor of the American Educational Research Journal.] Suzanna Rice [Associate Professor Suzanne Rice is the Deputy Director of the Assessment Research Centre. She has researched and published widely in the areas of testing policy and the impact of high-stakes testing programs. Her other research interests include teacher motivation and pathways, and career development provision in schools.]. “DEWEY ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TESTING, INTEREST, AND DISCIPLINE: DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION IN PERSPECTIVE” The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, Volume 16, Issue 4 October 2017 , pp. 488-499. Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2017. Society for Historians of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000354> cw//az

Passed with bipartisan support, **NCLB** was arguably the most ambitious educational reform program in American history. It **stipulated** that public **schools be** held **accountable** **for** student **learning** as measured **by standardized tests** of achievement, as reflected in mastery of particular subjects. Individual schools would be expected to raise the achievement of all children to proficiency, even those from groups that had lagged in the past. **This** soon **placed** enormous **pressure** **on** teachers and administrators in **lower** **performing** **schools, especially** those **serving** children in unusually **poor communities**, who often were threatened with displacement and school closure. It was a school reform program focused directly on the classroom, and standardized achievement tests became the principal means for evaluating teachers. Unfortunately, NCLB did not produce a dramatic improvement in student achievement nationally, although there was a slight reduction in long-standing achievement gaps between different groups of students. 26 Given the prominent roles played by testing in the reforms following A Nation at Risk, and especially NCLB, it is not difficult to imagine how John Dewey would respond to these developments. In his own career Dewey was notably critical of standardized testing, which was just being developed at the time that D&E was published, although most of his skepticism was aimed at IQ tests rather than standards-based assessments of the sort widely used today. One of the most widely discussed concerns at present is that this practice unduly drives the content of instruction. Teachers are encouraged, implicitly or explicitly, to devote additional time and energy to the subjects represented on the tests (and to basic skills within those subjects) and in extreme cases to focus instruction on actual test items. A central criticism is that, as a result of such practices, worthwhile content that would otherwise be integrated into the curriculum is given short shrift or is excluded altogether. As a consequence, students miss out on the opportunity to learn valuable lessons from considering such questions. 27 D&E points to a particular aspect of this problem that education reformers largely overlooked, namely, that teaching to the test leaves little room for teachers to accommodate students’ interests. Teaching to the test eventually became an issue for teachers and students, and for parents too, who called for modifications to the NCLB testing regime, or for waivers to be exempted from mandatory tests. This movement gained steam in the latter stages of NCLB, contributing to its eventual downfall, and a new federal policy that gave states considerably greater discretion in making schools accountable for improvement in instruction. Many called for greater attention to flexibility in how teachers tailored their instruction to meet the needs and interests of students. 28 This is a significant problem, Dewey argued, because **a failure to ground instruction in students’ interests is tantamount to closing the door on the schools’ democratic potential.** Why this is so can be better appreciated in light of Dewey's analysis of interest in D&E. To be interested is to be absorbed in, wrapped up in, carried away by, some object. To take an interest is to be on the alert, to care about, to be attentive. We say of an interested person both that he has lost himself in some affair and that he has found himself in it. Both terms express the engrossment of the self in an object. 29 As Dewey points out, etymologically, the word “interest” connotes something “between.” In this case it is bookended on one side by the student's “present powers,” intellectual, moral, and physical resources; and on the other side by an object (of interest). 30 **Interest** **is** thus **educationally** **significant** because **it** **attaches** a student's “**present** **powers**” **to** that more **remote** **object**. Learning occurs when the student encounters obstacles—and the means of overcoming them—as she pursues the object. Among the means of doing this are social relations among students and the knowledge and skills embedded in academic subjects. Prior to NCLB, Dewey's ideas were more likely to find expression in schools, especially at the elementary level, and in more affluent communities where pressure to attain higher achievement was not as pronounced. The short film Voyage of the Pilgrims ‘92, which features a group of public school fourth graders in Lexington, Massachusetts; their teacher, Steven Levy; and several classroom volunteers, provides an example of interest operating in a school setting, and, most significantly, illustrates the deep relation between “interest” with “democracy.” It is not clear whether this classroom was explicitly organized with Dewey in mind, but whether by intention or accident it clearly reflects Dewey's hope that schools would become embryonic democracies. 31 As shown in the film, at the start of the school year Levy challenged students to “create their own classroom.” Following much discussion among themselves and consultation with Mr. Levy, the students decided that they wanted, above all, to make their own desks: this was their main interest. From the start, they encountered many questions that they had to answer in order to advance their project: How would Pilgrims make furniture? What tools did they have? What desk design should they adopt? How much wood and stain will be needed? How will they finance the project? The children came up against numerous obstacles along the way, but persevered, often choosing to continue working through recess and before and after regular school hours. Most of the time, these students were not working individually, but in teams and small groups with shifting membership. Of necessity, they had to consult with one another, smooth over disagreements, find compromises when consensus could not be reached, and coordinate the different parts of this multifaceted project. Because realizing their shared interest in the form of functional desks required the contributions of all the students, they encouraged one another's learning. The interest in building desks soon expanded to include an interest in one's classmates. Students’ interest in making the desks provided the needed motivation for learning considerable academic content as well. Reading, history, writing, and math were all taught in the context of the project as students undertook such tasks as learning about the lives and times of the Pilgrims, writing letters to area businesses asking for funding and then keeping them informed about of the project's development, computing area in order to buy wood and stain, and keeping accounts of expenses. All of this learning was organically connected with the students’ central and genuinely held interest. 32 Dewey valued the knowledge encapsulated in school subjects and he appreciated the fact that reading and math (areas most widely tested in connection with NCLB) have a special place in students’ learning. **By helping students** to **pursue** their **interests, teachers are** also, as a general rule, **helping** **them** to become better readers and mathematicians. Depending on the students and interests involved, they could **become more competent in** the sciences, arts, **history**, and other areas. But accommodating students’ interests was important to Dewey not only as a means of helping students to learn academic content. He also theorized a connection between interest and the development of self-discipline, which in itself is an important educational goal. While many teachers agreed with the goal of raising achievement, they also worried that NCLB's focus on testing foreclosed the possibility of engaging students in lessons that sparked curiosity and attention. 33 **When interest is lacking, teachers** have little choice but to **use** what Dewey called “artificial inducements”: promises of **reward or** threats of **punishment**, in order to motivate students to attend to the lessons at hand. This has become somewhat commonplace during the NCLB era, and some schools have even experimented with the idea of offering monetary rewards for improvement on tests. 34 **When** such **inducements** **are** **ineffective**, direct, **teacher**-imposed **discipline** often **follows**, and students are denied privileges or given low grades for failing to meet externally imposed standards. **These** and other negative sanctions **demean students**, but from Dewey's perspective, that is only part of the problem: **when teachers routinely exercise control, it is more difficult for students to develop** control over themselves, or **self**-**disciplin**e. And as Dewey noted, such self-discipline is positively enabling: A person who is trained to **consider** his **actions**, to undertake them **deliberately**, is in so far disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen course **in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty**, and you have the essence of discipline. Discipline means power at command; mastery of the resources available for carrying through the action undertaken. … Discipline is positive. 35 The connection between interest and discipline is illustrated in the example above when the students persevere in the face of differences of opinion and difficult math problems, as well as when they willingly forego recess in order to work on their project. These students’ mental and physical powers are harnessed to a particular interest, but they are in the process of learning a more general “lesson” about what it means to be disciplined and the rewards of such discipline. For Dewey, students learn to be disciplined by being self-disciplined. Many educators associate “learning by doing” with the acquisition of skills, but, in Dewey's account, **habits and** traits of **character are** also **acquired in this manner**. As he often pointed out, **such learning is essential for** accomplishing any significant goal and, more broadly, for **purposefully living life rather being led through it** by others or, indirectly, by unexamined conventions and customs. While interest and discipline have many important implications for education, Dewey argues that their connection with democracy is of the greatest educational significance. A characteristic of **a democratic society** is that its **members have** common **interests** that can be **advanced** only **through** the **contributions of many, requiring** that **each** member **consider** **and execute** her **activities with others in mind**. As Dewey recognized, such a society requires certain educational arrangements: “[A democratic] society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and habits of mind which secure social change without introducing disorder.” 36 From a Deweyan perspective, one of the most serious shortcomings of **NCLB** is that it appears to **contradict** certain key **educational needs of democracy**. These **deficiencies come** into view **once** it is **realized** the extent to which **tests, rather than students’** interests, will **drive instruction.** Because it is the rare child who takes a direct interest in the skills tested, NCLB encourages teacher-imposed discipline, rather than self-discipline. Sacrificed are opportunities for students to work together with teachers to identify projects of interest that provide not only subject matter content, but also lessons in joint problem-solving and cooperation. Given this, it is little wonder that NCLB produced such modest improvements in student achievement, despite all of the time and resources devoted to its implementation as a reform program.

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### Id pol

#### A Deweyan pragmatist philosophy does not devolve to abstract moral questions but is embedded in context and materiality – only this understanding allows us to appreciate knowledge as contextual, leaving room for social improvement and revision of ideas

Glaude 7, Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (5-7) cw//az recut

In a Shade of Blue is my contribution to the tradition I have just sketched. My aim is to think through some of the more pressing conceptual problems confronting African American political life, and I do so as a Deweyan prag-matist. I should say a bit about what I mean by this self-description. John Dewey thought of philosophy as a form of cultural and social criticism. He held the view that philosophy, properly understood as a mode of wis-dom, ought to aid us in our efforts to overcome problematic situations and worrisome circumstances. The principal charge of the philosopher, then, is to deal with the problems of human beings, not simply with the problems of philosophers. For Dewey, over the course of his long career, this involved bridging the divide between science, broadly understood, and morals—a divide he traced to a conception of experience that has led philosophers over the centuries to tilt after windmills. Dewey declared, “The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.”9Dewey bases this conclusion on several features of his philosophy: (1) anti foundationalism, (2) experimentalism, (3) contextualism, and (4) soli-darity.10 Antifoundationalism, of course, is the rejection of foundations of knowledge that are beyond question. Dewey, by contrast, understands knowledge to be the fruit of our undertakings as we seek “the enrichment of our immediate experience through the control over action it exercises.”11He insists that we turn our attention from supposed givens to actual consequences, pursuing a future fundamentally grounded in values shaped by experience and realized in our actions. This view makes clear the experimental function of knowledge. Dewey emphasized that knowledge entails efforts to control and select future experience and that we are always con-fronted with the possibility of error when we act. We experiment or tinker, with the understanding that all facts are fallible and, as such, occasionally afford us the opportunity for revision.12Contextualism refers to an understanding of beliefs, choices, and actions as historically conditioned. Dewey held the view that inquiry, or the pursuit of knowledge, is value-laden, in the sense that we come to problems with interests and habits that orient us one way or another, and that such pursuits are also situational, in the sense that “knowledge is pursued and produced somewhere, some when, and by someone.”13Finally, solidarity captures the associational and cooperative dimensions of Dewey’s thinking. Dewey conceives of his pragmatism as “an instrument of social improvement” aimed principally at expanding democratic life and broadening the ground of individual self-development.14Democracy, for him, constitutes more than a body of formal procedures; it is a form of life that requires constant attention if we are to secure the ideals that purportedly animate it. Individuality is understood as developing one’s unique capacities within the context of one’s social relations and one’s community. The formation of the democratic character so important to our form of associated living involves, then, a caring disposition toward the plight of our fellows and a watchful concern for the well-being of our democratic life.

#### Abolitionists weren’t unified around one conception of slavery: do we tolerate economic coercion? Be self employed? Through testing, societies like Jamaica, Haiti, use experiments to resolve cognitive biases and progress

Anderson, Elizabeth. “The Quest for Free Labor: Pragmatism and Experiments in Emanci-pation.” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 󰀹 (󰀲󰀰󰀱󰀴): 󰀱–󰀴󰀴. <http://www.amherstlecture.org/anderson󰀲󰀰󰀱󰀴/> [I am Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and John Dewey Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. I teach courses in ethics, social and political philosophy, political economy, philosophy of the social sciences, and feminist theory. My research focuses on democratic theory, equality in political philosophy and American law, racial integration, the ethical limits of markets, theories of value and rational choice (alternatives to consequentialism and economic theories of rational choice), the philosophies of John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, social epistemology, and feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. I am currently working on the history of egalitarianism, with a special focus on the social epistemology of moral learning, taking the history of abolitionism as a central case study. I designed and was the first Director of UM's Program in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics.]

In their contorted reasoning, we may detect the systematic operation of objectification bias. Objectifying a group involves three steps: Viewing a group in terms of its service to one’s desires (or the desires of one’s group); Enforcing that view by placing the group in a subordinate role, in service to one’s desires; Representing the group as inherently fit for that subordinate role, and unfit for superior roles.19 The third step incorporates a cognitive bias known as the fundamental attribution error: at- tributing a person’s observed behavior to their supposedly innate dispositions to behave that way, instead of to the external circumstances in which the person is placed.20 Objectification is a kind of iatrogenic fundamental attribution error, where the perceiver or the perceiver’s group causes the target’s behavior by constraining the target’s circumstances. Proslavery thinkers’ moral justification of racialized slavery expressed whites’ racial ob- jectification of blacks. They viewed blacks in terms of what they wanted blacks to do for them: primarily, grow cash crops (such as sugar, coffee, cotton, and tobacco) suitable for tropical and subtropical climates, secondarily, to fill other servile occupations. They enforced this view by enslaving blacks and forcing them to labor in menial jobs. To rationalize this treatment, they represented blacks as inherently fit for slavery and menial work, and inherently unfit for freedom.

They continue

The labor regimes that emerged in post-emancipation societies depended on the ability of freed people to gain access to land. In every case, however, policymakers and planters tested the outcome based on a conception of the progress of civilization in which the freed people would continue to function as primary producers of cash crops. In their view, Smith’s argu- ment for free labor would be vindicated only if free labor produced a higher volume of cash crops than slavery did. The British looked especially closely at sugar. Nearly everywhere, sugar production fell after the slaves were freed. In Jamaica, the most important colony of the British West Indies, sugar production dropped by more than fify percent, comparing the last years of slavery with the years after equalization of sugar tariffs in 1846 put British West Indies sugar in competition with slave-grown sugar in Cuba and Brazil. In Louisiana, it dropped seventy-five percent. In Haiti, it almost disappeared.51 Most white observers interpreted the results from the sugar plantations as a devastat- ing refutation of Smith’s view. Sugar production per worker was higher for slave labor than free. The key difference between the two labor regimes lay in the continuity of labor. Once cane ripens in the fields, it must be harvested and processed quickly before it spoils. Cuban slaves were driven to work continuously eighteen hours per day, seven days per week, permit ting the refineries to operate around the clock. Free Jamaicans were willing to work in this very taxing and dangerous industry only six hours per day, four days per week. Hence, even though, as Smith claimed, free workers were cheaper to hire than slaves, and more produc- tive per hour, the difference in labor hours overwhelmed the advantages of free labor from the planters’ point of view.52 The Civil War free labor experiments did not fare much better. The 1862 free-labor long-staple cotton yield at Port Royal was 26 pounds per acre, compared to 137 pounds per acre under slavery. Although other factors affected the 1862 yield, including a two-month delay in planting due to the disruptions of the war, loss of the best seeds (because the army sent the 1861 crop to be ginned in New York, where expertise in seed selection was lacking), conscription of the strongest fieldworkers into the army, and lack of incentive due to work- ers’ distrust of Northern cotton agents, who had defrauded them in 1861, the results did not look good for free labor. Even Philbrick, the most successful northern planter, managed only 90 pounds per acre in 1863.53 Similar patterns were found in the five U.S. states where cotton was the primary cash crop. Taking into account *all* crops grown in these states, an index of physical crop produc- tion per capita dropped from 100 in 1859 to below 60 from 1872–78, and was still at only 83.9 in 1908. Again, this was mainly a function of a drop in total labor hours. Labor produc- tivity probably increased in the immediate post-emancipation era, but the decline in total hours overrode that effect.54 Freed people did not only reduce their total labor hours. Wherever they could, they also shifted much of their labor from cash crop to subsistence crop production. Conservatives interpreted these outcomes as confirmation of the theory that blacks were lazy and had no interest in improving their condition through hard work. Officials in the British Colonial Office viewed Jamaicans’ abandonment of plantations in favor of subsistence farming on their own plots as a lapse from civilization back into African barbarism. Historian Thomas Carlyle fantasized that food grew so abundantly in the fertile tropics that he credulously ac- cepted the planters’ complaint that the freed people of the West Indies only worked a half hour per day to supply their needs. While this claim was absurd, it illustrates the influence of racism on whites’ perceptions.55 Even (white) abolitionists found the decline in work hours on the Jamaican plantations “a serious embarrassment.”56 Whites’ evaluations of blacks’ labor efforts were based on a racist double standard. No free white person had ever been willing to labor at the intensity and continuity that blacks had been forced to work under slavery. This was why planters had enslaved blacks. Least of all were planters willing to labor for their own subsistence. Black leaders did not only offer an alternative interpretation of the data. They gave an epistemic critique of the dominant discussion, arguing that its conclusion would be unreli- able if black voices were excluded. Pompée Valentin, Baron de Vastey, secretary to King Henri Christophe of Haiti, objected to denigrating views of Haitian outcomes: “How can they be competent to judge of our differences, if they hear only the clamor and declarations of one party, without the reply and just complaints of the others?” Similarly, Frederick Doug- lass, speaking of the conduct of the freed people in the United States, observed that “experi- ence proves that it takes more than one class of people to tell the whole truth about matters in which they are interested on opposite sides.”57 Why, then, did the freed people dramatically reduce their labor on the plantations? There were three main reasons. First, they shifted much of their labor from cash crops to subsistence crops. For the freed people of the Caribbean, this was a matter of sheer survival. Slaves were literally worked to death. In Saint-Domingue, slaves suffered a 5–10% annual death rate from overwork, malnutrition, brutal treatment, and disease. Similar death rates across the Caribbean and Brazil meant that these labor regimes could be sustained only with continuous imports of new slaves from Africa. Vastey extolled Haiti’s new agricultural system as “fitted to our wants and worthy of a free people.”58 He credited the Haitian people’s shift to a more diversified crop mix, including corn, barley, oats, and potatoes grown for domestic consumption, for improving the nutritional status of the population. The population figures vindicate Vastey’s assessment. In 1790, Haiti’s population was about 500,000, overwhelm- ingly slave, and falling rapidly in the absence of new slave imports. By 1823, one generation after independence, the population had gr[e]~~o~~wn to 800,000, and by 1830 to 935,000, nearly all by natural increase.59

They continue

We have seen that the results of the early free labor experiments were initially disap- pointing from the perspective of those who hoped to vindicate free labor from the standpoint of the argument from civilization. However, it takes time for societies to settle on the mean- ings of the experiments they undertake. Although emancipation reduced total crop produc- tion, in the longer view it became evident that the progress of civilization did not hang on maximizing the production of cash crops. Production continued after emancipation; only now those who wanted these crops had to pay more for them. And the importance of cash crops to modern economies shrank as their manufacturing capacities advanced.72 Thus, the productive capacities of society progressed rapidly without having to rely on slave labor. This success of (relatively) free labor so overwhelmed prior achievements that the argument from civilization was not merely decisively refuted; it was largely forgotten. Even more importantly, the ideal of civilization itself gradually became more inclusive. The revision of ideals in light of new possibilities made evident by experiments in living is a key part of moral progress from a pragmatist point of view. The progress of civilization came to be understood as requiring that more and more people be able to share in its fruits. A soci- ety that kept a large part of its population illiterate clearly fell behind others that supported universal literacy; one that barred marriage and destroyed the integrity of families was less advanced than one that supported these institutions for all. From this perspective, slavery came to be seen as itself a kind of barbarism, rather than a pillar of civilization. John Stuart Mill played a pivotal role in advancing this more inclusive conception of civilization, in his reply to Carlyle’s notorious tract against free labor.73 Resistance to the inclusive view could

### rfw

#### rfp - Rules cant secure their own application – applying a rule to new situation is indeterminate. If I see a sequence 1+1, I might think the answer was 2, because of different social rules. But, limited examples in the past can make no claim onto current ones, only more previous repetitions of action. This means that the only hope is in the unidentifiable moral particulars of life. Even if the content of their framework is true the application is impossible to apply to new situations.

### Trix

#### Sentences that assume a nonexistent entity has a property can be explained as conditional. Denying presupposition in non-empirical contexts is denying the antecedent of a conditional. That means indicting assumptions affirms.

#### Consider this example: Sentence A says that if A is true, then trivialism is true, which is a self-referential statement. If A is not true, then it contradicts condo logic: Also means permissibility affirms.Stanford philosophy[[1]](#footnote-1).

**Conditional statement**: an **“if p, then q”** compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); **p is called the** antecedent**, and q is the consequent.** A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; **any conditional with a true** antecedent **and a false consequent must be false. For any other combination of true and false** antecedents **and consequents, the conditional statement is true.**

**3. Neg may not read a new burden in the NC – A. Moots 6 minutes of AC offense because none of it applies which creates a 13-7 time skew, B. Unpredictable – You could read infinite burdens, making it impossible to win.**

### tt fw

#### Prefer: Tt

#### Any statement asserts some property is true. saying “I smell the roses” is the same as “it is true that I smell roses”: rotbs function under this paradigm

#### Textuality: the resolution doesn’t presume a shift from the status quo so fiat isn’t justified. Independently takes out comparative worlds.

#### Quantity of ground: Truth testing includes arguments under comparative worlds plus additional arguments, so prefer on risk of offense that my paradigm is more fair and educational because I coopt reasons why comparative worlds is good.

### State

#### I: centering disad- we cannot create a politics without a focus point because it can always get coopted by the state to justify bad problems

#### II. empirically gets beaten back- the zaptistas embraced anarchic nomadism but because of how fractured they were no one knew how to follow up their movements, use them to do things, or fight back against organized movements like the state.

#### III. the state has a monopoly on social and military resources which allows it to have the biggest impact on individuals- that means using the state gives us more ways to achieve our goals

#### IV: States are just social structures that come together and then either codify rules that protect each other – puts you in a double bind: either the state comes about post alt because black groups come together and create rules which is a state which means the state is not ontologically bad and it’s a tool which we can change or there is no state in which case you have the state of nature which is worse because all your white neighbors come out and kill you because they already have all the resources.

#### V. If you think lynching or assault should not happen to innocent bodies then you need legal protections to ensure that which requires that some institution to do it- which justifies the 1AC

### Cw fw

#### 1- truth testing gives the negative access to infinite outs- they can prove an assumption of the resolution is false or prove the converse - key to fairness because we both need equal shots at the ballot.

#### 2- Burden of proof- truth testing forces the aff to prove perfection and gives the negative the ability to win the round off a taint- means lopsided debates because a single deficit to the aff would be a reason to negate- also makes the 1AC a moot point because you can’t leverage offense if the negative defends nothing – key to fairness because it equalizes burdens

#### 3- Intuition- when we evaluate truth claims we consider the implications in the real world- we ask if our ethic was internalized if it would be net better- that outweighs- every ethical precept is grounded on some intuitive basis

### Util

####  Exclusive focus on pleasure and pain is impossible and ignores inquiry.

Elizabeth Anderson 14, "Dewey's Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), BE

Hedonism supposes that the value of acts can be reduced to the quantity of pleasure and pain they produce. Estimating such values requires that we be able to break down the pleasures and pains of different activities and experiences into simple identical units, and then sum them up again. This theoretical demand outruns the holistic and complex character of our experiences of pleasure and pain (LJP 40–1). In fact, pleasures and pains in reflective individuals are inextricably bound up with what Dewey called “ideational” factors — that is, with articulate conceptions of what they are taking pleasure in. They are therefore not pure sensory units but already contain elements of judgment or appraisal. Critical among these are considerations of the consequences of prizing certain things for one's own moral character. Since we form our character by cultivating habits of valuing some things over others, and we prize and appraise character itself, we cannot simply take current pleasures as given (E 193–4; LJP 41–2). Good and bad people take pleasure in different things. Such facts can give us reason to cultivate different tastes from those we currently have.¶ Although hedonism fails as a theory that gives us a fixed end, it does contain a methodological insight. Nothing is good that cannot be desired. All desire contains an element of enjoyment or liking. Hence, pleasure can be seen as a sign of the good, as evidence of what is valuable. Nevertheless, what makes desire a sound guide to the good is the fact that it incorporates foresight and reflection on the wider consequences of acting on it, not just that it incorporates a liking of its object (E 195–6).¶ Ideal or objective list theories attempt to harmonize conflicting desires not, as hedonism does, by reducing them all to a common denominator, but by systematically fitting them together into an ideal or plan of life. Dewey argued that people construct ideals that make sense in view of their particular social circumstances. For example, ideals of material or political advancement make sense of the strivings of business people and politicians. Such ideals have, at best, only contextual validity and cannot be prescribed as fixed ends for all people. There can no more be a single best way of life than there can be an ideal house for all times and places. To suppose that there is forecloses the possibility of imagination inventing something even better. Yet, ideals serve a highly important function for individuals, if they are considered as hypotheses about how one should live that one can test in experiences of living in accordance with them. So understood, ideals are tools for discovering evidence about the good (LE 59–68, 229–30; E 185, 189–91, 202–210).¶ Informed desire theories of the good, which define the good in terms of what an individual would desire if fully informed, come closest to Dewey's own account of the good. Dewey spoke of the good as the object of desires of which we approve in calm, informed reflection (E 208, 212). Yet Dewey's aims differ from that of most of today's informed desire theorists. The latter tend to accept as fixed the character of the individual whose good is being judged, and alter only the individual's cognitive capacities and beliefs so as to read off the good for the individual from what his cognitively enhanced self wants. This commits the same error that Dewey charged against hedonism, of omitting critical appraisal of one's own character as an important factor in determining what one ought to desire. In identifying the good with the objects of approved desires, Dewey highlighted the importance of character to identifying the good. Before we can endorse a desire, we need to ask whether we, or an impartial observer, could approve of someone who had it (E 239–47). The good is what good people — those possessing foresight and wide sympathies — desire. Dewey also resisted the conversion of a method of inquiry into a fixed criterion of value. There is never an end to inquiry — no such thing as complete information — because circumstances are always changing and imagination constructs new possibilities for living (E 213). Nor does the projection of desires we would have if we reached an end to inquiry offer a recognizable vision of human life. Fully informed people do not desire more information. But education, inquiry, and individual development in light of new discoveries are constitutive goods of human life. The desire to skip to the end to see what is ultimately valuable is a desire to skip human life, as if the process of learning through living were merely a means and not prized in itself (HNC 194–202). What, in light of inquiry, we reflectively desire, and approve of desiring, is evidence of what is good. But it is always defeasible in light of further inquiry.

#### The aff enables colleges to innovate absent pressure of rankings; conversations shift to the best fit for the student rather than reducing them to a number, Lash 15

Lash 2015, Jonathan Lash (Past president, Hampshire College, sixth on forbes’ list of most entrepreneurial college. Jonathan Lash, President of Hampshire College, is also a Director of World Resources Institute, a DC-based environmental think tank, where he previously served as president. Jonathan is a widely recognized environmental leader who chaired President Bill Clinton's Council on Sustainable Development and was the State of Vermont’s Environmental Secretary and Commissioner. He holds a law degree and master’s degree in education from Catholic University of America and a bachelor’s from Harvard College.), "Results of Removing Standardized Test Scores from College Admissions." Hampshire College, September 21, 2015 https://www.hampshire.edu/news/2015/09/21/results-of-removing-standardized-test-scores-from-college-admissions cw//az

We completely **drop**ped **standardized tests** from our application as part of our new mission-driven admissions strategy, **distinct from** the “**test-optional” policy** that hundreds of colleges now follow. If we reduce education to the outcomes of a test, the only incentive for schools and students to innovate is in the form of improving test-taking and scores. Teaching to a test becomes stifling for teachers and students, far from the inspiring, adaptive education which most benefits students. Our greatly accelerating world needs graduates who are trained to address tough situations with innovation, ingenuity, entrepreneurship, and a capacity for mobilizing collaboration and cooperation. We weighed other factors in our decision: Standardized test scores do not predict a student’s success at our college SATs/ACTs are strongly biased against low-income students and students of color, at a time when diversity is critical to our mission We surveyed our students and learned not one of them had considered rankings when choosing to apply to colleges; instead they most cared about a college’s mission Some good students are bad test takers, particularly under stress, such as when a test may grant or deny college entry; Multiple-choice tests don't reveal much about a student We’ve developed much better, fairer ways to assess students who will thrive at our college. In our admissions, we review an applicant’s whole academic and lived experience. We consider an applicant’s ability to present themselves in essays and interviews, review their recommendations from mentors, and assess factors such as their community engagement and entrepreneurism. And yes, we look closely at high school academic records, though in an unconventional manner. We look for an overarching narrative that shows motivation, discipline, and the capacity for self-reflection. We look at grade point average (GPA) as a measure of performance over a range of courses and time, distinct from a one-test-on-one-day SAT/ACT score. A student’s consistent "A" grades may be coupled with evidence of curiosity and learning across disciplines, as well as leadership in civic or social causes. Another student may have overcome obstacles through determination, demonstrating promise of success in a demanding program. Strong high school graduates demonstrate purpose, a passion for authenticity, and commitment to positive change. We’re seeing remarkable admissions results **since disregarding standardized test scores**: Our **yield**, the percentage of students who accepted our invitation to enroll, **rose in a single year from 18% to 26**%, an amazing turnaround The quantity of applications went down but the **quality went up,** likely **because we made it harder to apply**, asking for more essays; Our **applicants** collectively **were more motivated,** mature, disciplined and consistent in their high school years than past applicants **Class diversity increased to 31%** students of color, the most diverse in our history, up **from 21% two years ago** The percentage of students who are the **first-gen**eration from their family to attend college **rose from 12% to 18%** in this year’s class. Our “No SAT/ACT policy” has also changed us in ways deeper than data and demographics: **Not once did we** sit in an Admissions committee meeting and "**wish we had a test score**." Without the scores, every **other detail of** the student’s **application became more vivid.** Their academic record over four years, letters of recommendation, essays, in-person interviews, and the optional creative supplements gave us a more complete portrait **than** we had seen **before**. Applicants gave more attention to their applications including the optional components, putting us in a much better position to predict their likelihood of success here. This move away from test scores and disqualification from the U.S. News rankings has allowed us to innovate in ways we could not before. In other words, we are free to innovate rather than compromise our mission to satisfy rankings criteria: **We no longer chase volumes** of **applications to superficially inflate** our "**selectivity" and game** the U.S. News **rankings**. We no longer have to worry that any applicant will "lower our average SAT/ACT scores" and thus lower our U.S. News ranking. Instead we choose quality over quantity and focus attention and resources on each applicant and their full portfolio. **At** college fairs and **info**rmation **sessions, we don’t** spend time answering high school families’ questions about our ranking and test score "cut-offs." Instead **we have conversations about** the things that matter: What does our unique **academic program** look like and what qualities does a student need to be successful at it? An unexpected benefit: this shift has **sav[ing]**~~ed~~ us **significant** time and operational **expense**. Having a smaller but more targeted, engaged, passionate, and robust applicant pool, we are able to streamline our resources. How can **U.S. News rankings** reliably measure college quality when their data-points **focus** primarily **on** the **high school performance** of the incoming class **in** such terms as GPA, **SAT/ACT**, class rank, and selectivity? **These** measures **have nothing to do with** the **college's** **results**, except perhaps in the college's aptitude for marketing and recruiting. **Tests** and rankings **incentivize schools to conform to** test performance and rankings **criteria, at the expense of** mission and **innovation**. Our shift to a mission-driven approach to admissions is right for Hampshire College and the right thing to do. We fail students if we reduce them to a standardized test number tied more to their financial status than achievement. We fail students by perpetuating the myth that high standardized test scores signal "better" students. We are in the top one percent of colleges nationwide in the percentage of our undergraduate alumni who (-To on to earn advanced degrees—this on the strength of an education where we assess their capabilities narratively, and where we never, not once, subject them to a numerical or letter grade on a test or course. At Hampshire College, we face the same financial challenges as many colleges. But these challenges provide an opportunity to think about who we are and what matters to us. We can not lose sight of our mission while seeking revenues or chasing rankings. **We are** committed to remaining disqualified from the U.S. News rankings. We’re **done with standardized testing**, the SAT, and ACT.

### pomo

#### Mckillop library no date] Clarity in information is key – I control the uniqueness,

 **“Information Literacy.” McKillop Library - Information Literacy, Salve Regina University, library.salve.edu/infolit2.html. cw//az \*bracketed for clarity**

In this Information Age, when the expansion of available information is proceeding at an unprecedented rate, clear concepts of how to access and evaluat[ing]e this information are essential. National organizations, including the American Association of Higher Education (AAHE), the Association of College and Research Libraries (ACRL), and a growing number of the regional accreditation associations are grappling with the issue of ensuring that our graduates are information literate.

When [people] citizens fail to understand how information is organized and accessed, they lose the freedom to seek and critically analyze information for themselves, the freedom to make personally informed decisions on political and social issues, and the freedom to make an enlightened contribution to the body of human knowledge. In this context, information literacy as a set of skills is much more than how to search the Internet or use the latest Microsoft product. Information literacy rises to the level of possessing a worldview that acknowledges that there is a wealth of information available and that an educated citizen should possess the ability to harness it to enhance his or her own life and the lives of those around them.

#### Experience is fluid and always different: Even if we have a constitutive feature, the experience of that feature is always different. Our framework accounts for this and allows interactions between ideas to account for the fluidity of experience.

#### Takes out universal conceptions of the agent that take that feature to ascribe a moral system, our system takes fluid experience to proscribe action.

#### Gordon ’16 Pedagogically valuableMordechai Gordon [Mordechai Gordon is a professor of education in the School of Education at Quinnipiac University. His areas of specialization are philosophy of education, teacher education, and humor. He is author of Ten Common Myths in American Education (Holistic Education Press, January, 2005) and the editor of Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing our Common World, winner of the 2002 AESA Critics Choice Award. Gordon has published numerous articles in scholarly journals such as Educational Theory, Journal of Teacher Education, Oxford Review of Education, and Journal of Aesthetic Education. Email: mordechai.gordon@quinnipiac.edu.] (2016) Why Should Scholars Keep Coming Back to John Dewey?, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 48:10, 1077-1091, DOI: [10.1080/00131857.2016.1150800](https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2016.1150800) cw//az

In this passage, Dewey reminds educators that an effective constructivist classroom is one in which there is a balance between teacher- and student-directed learning and one in which teachers take an active role in the learning process, including formal teaching. Similarly, with respect to the opposition between authority and freedom in education mentioned above, he emphasized that freedom cannot be simply identified with an absence of external controls. Instead, Dewey wrote that we need ‘a kind of individual freedom that is general and shared and that has the backing and guidance of socially organized intelligent control’ (Dewey, 1925/1991, p. 137). According to this view, intellectual liberty does not mean that one can say whatever one wishes (in- cluding racist or sexist comments), but rather that one can utilize one’s freedom of speech and press to communicate ideas that enhance the common good.

My point is that one of the reasons that scholars ought to keep returning to Dewey for guidance and wisdom is that his call on educators to maintain stability and com- mon sense while avoiding extreme fluctuations has proven to be[en] correct. The field of education is one in which teachers, administrators, and other professionals are often forced to react to the changes that are happening in society or to implement mandates coming from the national and local governments. Historically, educators working in schools and classrooms in the United States have rarely been consulted about what they should be teaching students, how to teach basic skills, or how to assess[ment] that stu- dents are actually learning. Moreover, when educators are required to implement new standards and regulations they had no part in creating. they tend to give in and com- ply without putting up a fight. Dewey’s approach can help remind educators that to merely vacillate from one side of the pendulum to the other in an effort to carry out the latest version of educational reform is misguided and can even be destructive for students. Remembering Dewey’s counsel can enable educators to maintain a sense of direction and keep their eyes focused on what’s most important to attend to in their work.

## Spikes

## Extensions

### extension v k

#### Overview: The role of the ballot is to endorse consistency with democratic deliberation.

#### The alt is a guide to action but humans aren’t good at abiding by it which is proven by the impact to the k so ethics must account for that by being fluid - prag operates with deliberation and testing the alt until we reach a conclusion. that accounts for the assumptions ethical theories make.

#### Double-bind: either a) through prag we reach your knowledge since it’s true and the K is non-unique w/ no link or b) your pedagogy is false

#### Extend Journell 7: one “right” answer of US History is the master narrative that reduces events like setcol and creates error replication since history is data for deliberation and testing. the aff forces people to rid misinformed ideas. That outweighs and Link turns the K by erasing bad knowledge production.

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#### Extend Rury & Rice 17: teachers discipline minority students with “objectively” bad scores which creates the school prison pipeline– that denies autonomy to deliberate and develop habits like the alt. that justifies perm do the aff then the alt.

#### Science

#### Testing 1’st

1. Deliberation is stagnant without new creative avenues from experimentation, testing allows for moral development as the only chance of progress.
2. Deliberation outside actual testing is merely armchair theory and useless in terms of practice.

#### Deliberation 1’st

1. Deliberation creates moral habits that affects how we test principles
2. Testing outside deliberation is useless, because interaction with outside perspectives influence how we deliberate allowing for moral progress.
3. Outside factors and systemic error can affect the accuracy of an experiment but deliberation self-reflexively checks back for error.

### extension v util

#### Overview on the fw: morality is a guide towards action but humans aren’t good at abiding by it so rules must account for that by being fluid - prag operates with deliberation and testing cases for the hypothesis until we reach a limit. that accounts for the assumptions ethical theories make. Outweighs: 1] our FW constrains assessment of reality and impacts - individual phenomena are irrelevant without deliberation, which means my framework controls the internal link. 2] deliberation creates long term habits and objective good that lead to integration of principles constitutive of action3] criteria can never be fixed as environments change and induction fails. Prag takes your criteria and incorporates them as tools in deliberation. Hijacks your framework as we can get your criteria in our framework but the opposite is never true so our framework has the highest chance at arriving at moral truth.

#### Extend Rury and Rice 17: teachers discipline minority students with “objectively” bad scores – that denies autonomy to deliberate. I also have util offense – discipline results in the school to prison pipeline and poor scores result in school closure and intergenerational violence. Structural violence outweighs: 1. Probabiltiy – impact happening now 2. big stick impacts are the logic that the civil rights movement was “too risky”

#### Testing 1’st

1. Deliberation is stagnant without new creative avenues from experimentation, testing allows for moral development as the only chance of progress.
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#### Deliberation 1’st

1. Deliberation creates moral habits that affects how we test principles
2. Testing outside deliberation is useless, because interaction with outside perspectives influence how we deliberate allowing for moral progress.
3. Outside factors and systemic error can affect the accuracy of an experiment but deliberation self-reflexively checks back for error.

#### our framework doesn’t care about content of discussions but rather the decision-making procedure that gives us answers not the impacts themselves. Takes out your ends-based turns and means your FW doesn’t compete with the aff, we are not an account of what is good or bad but a procedural mechanism to reach the fw.

#### Err aff on the turns because since the sample size of the aff is so large, it errs towards better norms.

#### Takes out the CP/PIC because our norm is more likely to be better because of our sample size, even if there is an exception, the average tends towards the aff.

#### 1] card says if he would do any test it would be this one- not that he would actively endorse this one so aff offense outweighs in terms of warranted cohesion between this and the system

#### 2] no real government test exists like this and if it did and was evaluated at a standardized level it would be biased towards the ruling party and everyone would answer normalized criteria that kills creativity and experimentation because you study to a test

#### 3] testing isnt conducive- even the card indicates its the thinking thats valuable so perm: do the aff and mandate required gov classes

#### Extinction is irrelevant:

#### Extinction might happen in a scenario but the law of large numbers means that the aff as a general principle would be a good idea because the aff would not result in extinction the most times.

#### Extinction calculus freezes deliberation because it ensures that we never deliberate and engage in the telos of social criticism since every action has a risk of someway ending in extinction

#### Deliberation is how we decide what to do about extinction – aff prereq

#### They view deliberation as an end not a method we use to cultivate moral habits so it doesn’t make sense to maximize it.

### at dump

**A2: Theory is Exclusionary**

**A2: Fairness is bad**

### AT Epistemic Modesty

#### we are a decision-making *procedure* just like EM so we function on the same level but are preferable since 1) fallibility is built into pragmatism whereas EM only uses it in conjunction with certain theories 2) avoid abstract conceptions of the good detached from practice 3) avoids a reductive criteria like expected value to make judgments

#### 4) resolvability

### AT Kant

### AT Particularism

A) rule following paradox is not an argument for particularism, even major particularists like David McNaughton and Piers Rawling acknowledge this — if it were an argument it would prove things like math does not use principles, which is nonsense, just because the principles cannot be inductively defined in a way that eliminates

Intellectual humility also does not mean particularism.

A) the problem would reverberate upward, you make a universal judgment that we should not use principles

b) this just proves we should be willing to revise principles in light of new evidence, not that principe based decision making is bad

### AT Virtue

1. Extend Pierce; meaning only makes sense in the context of the difference it makes to our action. Extend Serra 1; moral inquiry is deliberative where we weigh experience and arguments, which culminates in moral habit that makes a practical difference in our action. Outweighs: a) our FW constrains assessment of reality, which means your framework rests upon pragmatism b) deliberation creates long term habits that lead to integration of principles constitutive of action and c) precludes your FW because it attempts to understand ethics from the debate room but that is incoherent, knowledge must come from the practice of ethics.
2. Extend LaFollete; criteria can never be fixed or complete as what once worked may not work now as environments are always changing. Pragmatism takes these criteria and incorporates them as tools in deliberation. Hijacks your framework as we can get your criteria in our framework but the opposite is never true and means our framework has the highest chance at arriving at moral truth by incorporating many views.
3. There is no metric to determine what a good virtue is which means either a) your framework is abstract and meaningless or b) there is a metric which we can improve upon through deliberation.

## K

### Content warning

#### their choice to read the case is inherently exclusionary and forces students out of debate and increases notions of the ideal debater being one who is disengaged.

Bridges 16 George S. Bridges. “Why students need trigger warnings and safe places.” *Seattle Times.* Originally published August 29, 2016 at 3:50 pm Updated August 29, 2016 at 9:22 pm <https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/why-students-need-trigger-warnings-and-safe-places/> cw//az recut \*bracketed for problematic language and clarity

Either the university is completely tone deaf to the academic and developmental needs of many students or is launching its own counterattack on what it perceives as an unwarranted assault of political correctness on campus. Or both. In each instance, ~~trigger~~ [content] warnings can alert students to genuinely distressing content that could otherwise [harm] ~~cripple~~ their learning. Colleges and universities must change as the society changes. And unlike 10 to 20 years ago, schools must now acknowledge and address issues they have largely ignored in the past: sexual violence on campuses and its effects on student victims, the impact of war experiences on veterans returning to college and the mental-health challenges faced by increasing numbers of students. Imagine a rape survivor entering a class in which sexual violence is the subject of academic debate or a veteran just returning from a combat assignment suffering from acute post-traumatic stress syndrome, anxiety or depression in a classroom where accounts of a war are disputed. These students can make critically important contributions to their classrooms, but if we refus[al]~~e~~ to acknowledge that they also have unique barriers to participating in that discussion, we send[s] the message that they are not welcome. As a lifelong educator, I have witnessed firsthand the negative impact that reliving personal trauma in a classroom can have on a student’s academic performance. Indifference to such traumas diminishes a student’s likelihood of success. A simple warning about troubling content acknowledges students’ unique personal circumstances, enables students to prepare and adapt if necessary and fosters a classroom climate focused on the student as a learner with unique capacities and assets. Equally important are the demographic changes in our society over the past two decades. Many students attending colleges now are the first in their family to pursue postsecondary education. Others overcome enormous personal obstacles often related to family poverty just to get to college. These students and others often lack confidence in their capacity to succeed, believing that they don’t belong at a major college or university (the so-called “impostor syndrome”). At The Evergreen State College, where I serve as president, 90 percent of our students belong to at least one group traditionally underserved by higher education: first-generation college students, low income, people of color, veterans, people with disabilities or students of nontraditional age. These students face personal challenges that many in previous generations didn’t. Many are reluctant to engage faculty and staff with questions or arguments out of fear of failure or rejection. They and their families have no experience in navigating college studies, debating academic issues and ideas or pursuing critical sources of financial aid. Providing safe spaces for these students — that is, places and contexts in which they can reflect on and address these unfamiliar issues without fear of failure or rejection by others — proves critical to their success. As colleges and universities seek to increase rates of student retention and graduation, we must (and we are) creating these spaces. We are responding to the unique needs of many of our students solely for the purpose of increasing their academic and personal success.” In doing so, are we succumbing to the pressures of political correctness on campus? No. We are responding to the unique needs of many of our students solely for the purpose of increasing their academic and personal success. Ironically, the University of Chicago’s welcoming message is, in itself, a trigger warning to students — the campus offers no safe spaces or warnings about potentially offensive or harmful content in its curricula or programs.

#### That’s an independent voting issue – If competitive stakes incentivize debaters to run marginalizing arguments, then the stakes of the game need to be changed to eliminate that incentive. By making it unstrategic to run arguments that endorse trauma induction we affect the community.

#### Tva solves their offense: read a content warning about x before introducing the case

#### o/ws - Argumentative agency – we are people before we are debaters and weought be held accountable to the arguments we create.

### AT Weheliye

#### Ov: framework and Ks are 2 ways to explain the world and take action, the only difference is mine isn’t impact justified and can identify what the problems are, that was anderson nd, which justifies aff then alt – how does weheliye explain what oppression is? the aff doesn’t implement and doesn’t encourage kids to go to school but says people already there should get education that doesn’t erase native scholarship. Moral truths are created throughout time by continually deliberating their consequences and intentions on agents – that’s the fw syllogism

#### Extend Journell 7: regurgitating one “right” answer of US History is the master narrative that reduces events like setcol the aff forces people to rid misinformed ideas. That outweighs and Link turns the K by erasing bad knowledge production.

#### The alt is a guide to action but humans aren’t good at abiding by it which is proven by the impact to the k but u don’t account for that - prag fluidly operates with deliberation and testing the alt until we reach a conclusion. that accounts for the assumptions ethical theories make.

#### Double-bind: a) through prag we reach your knowledge since it’s true and the K is non-unique w/ no link or b) your pedagogy is false

#### On the k proper

#### 1] Perm do the aff and then the alt in all other instances – A] epistemic modesty net benefit – prefer specific case impacts over a broad overarching theory since they’re most verifiable – no way to make absolute claims about a subject. B] shields the link – if the alt can resolve every other instance of static subject formation in the status quo then it should be able to overcome a single link.

#### 2] Link is inevitable as people can’t weigh and nuq to the squo

3] tests are boo under weheliye – form of categorization

#### Their inclusion model is flawed – rights aren’t finite. Giving one group rights doesn’t trade off with helping another. They’ll say it’s about structural adjustment but that’s a problem with individual racist policymakers not the system which proves the aff solves.

#### Root cause claims bad – color line can’t explain the world because violence is too complex to reduce to racial phenotype. Your kritik can’t explain why a wealthy black man like Obama can have more power than a rural white one.

Perm aff then alt

Empirically rights work differently today than in the 1850s which is when their sociological studies were developed.

### AT Wilderson

#### Ov: framework and Ks are 2 ways to explain the world and take action, the only difference is mine isn’t impact justified and can identify what the problems are, that was anderson nd, which justifies aff then alt

#### Blackness is Ontological framing issue1. vote aff on a risk of defense to ontology—there’s no disad to trying if they’re right if violence is inevitable, but if they’re wrong, they foreclose meaningful change 2. Answering ontology answers links since they presume the thesis claim3. They have to win all pillars to win ontology – gratuitous violence affects queer bodies too so there’s no uniqueness

#### Ontology isn’t an end all be all, black folk deliberate outside of civil society with their unique experiences e.g. slave songs, black churches, so there’s social life in social death – winning ontology isn’t sufficient to negate

#### libidinal explanations of anti-blackness are based on habits, we control the int link

Hudis 15 [Peter Hudis, Professor of English and History @ Queens College, 2015, “Frantz Fanon: Philosopher of the Barricades,” Pg. 35-37]

Fanon’s vantage point upon the world is his situated experience. He is trying to understand the inner psychic life of racism, not provide an account of the structure of human existence as a whole. Racism is not, of course, an integral part of the human psyche; it is a Social construct that has a psychic impact. Any effort to comprehend social distress that accompanies racism by reference to some a priori structure- be it the Oedipal Complex or the Collective Unconscious- is doomed to failure. Carl Jung sought to deepen and go beyond Freud's approach by arguing that the subconscious is grounded in a universal layer of the psyche- which he called "the collective unconscious:' This refers to inherited patterns of thought that exist in all human minds, regardless of specific culture or upbringing, and which manifest themselves in dreams, fairy tales, and myths. Jung referred to these universal patterns as "archetypes:' It may seem, on a superficial reading, that 1 Fanon is drawing from Jung, since he discusses how white people tend to unconsciously assimilate views of blacks that are based on negative stereotypes. Even the most "progressive" white tends to think of blacks a certain way (such as "emotional;' "physical," or / "aggressive"), even as they disavow any racist animus on their part. However, Fanon denies that such collective delusions are part of a psychic structure; they are not permanent features of the mind. They are habits acquired from a series of social and cultural impositions. While they constitute a kind a collective unconscious on the part of many white people, they are not grounded in any universal "archetype." The unconscious prejudices of whites do not derive from genes or nature, nor do they derive from some form independent of culture or upbringing. Fanon contends that Jung "confuses habit with instinct." Fanon objects to Jung's "collective unconscious" for the same reason that he rejects the notion of a black ontology. His phenomenological approach brackets out ontological claims on both a social and psychological level insofar as the examination of race and racism is concerned. He writes, "Neither Freud nor Adler nor even the cosmic Jung took the black man into consideration in the course of his research.” This does not mean that Fanon rejects their contributions tout court. He does not deny the existence of the unconscious. He only denies that the inferiority complex of blacks operates on an unconscious level. He does not reject the Oedipal Complex. He only denies that it explains (especially in the West Indies) the proclivity of the black "slave" to mimic the values of the white "master." And as seen from his positive remarks on Lacan's theory of the mirror stage, he does not reject the idea of psychic structure. He only denies that it can substitute for an historical understanding of the origin of neuroses .23 Fanon adopts a socio-genetic approach to a study of the psyche because that is what is adequate for the object of his analysis. For Fanon, it is the relationship between the socio-economic and psychological that is of critical import. He makes it clear, insofar as the subject matter of his study is concerned, that the socio-economic is first of all responsible for affective disorders: "First, economic. Then, internalization or rather epidermalization of this inferiority."24 Fanon never misses an opportunity to remind us that racism owes its origin to specific economic relations of domination- such as slavery, colonialism, and the effort to coopt sections of the working class into serving the needs of capital. It is hard to mistake the Marxist influence here. It does not follow, however, that what comes first in the order of time has conceptual or strategic priority. The inferiority complex is originally born from economic subjugation, but it takes on a life of its own and expresses itself in terms that surpass the economic. Both sides of the problem-the socio-economic and psychological-must be combatted in tandem: "The black man must wage the struggle on two levels; whereas historically these levels are mutually dependent, any unilateral liberation is flawed, and the worst mistake would be to believe their mutual dependence automatic:''5 On these grounds he argues that the problem of racism cannot be solved on a psychological level. It is not an "individual" problem; it is a social one. But neither can it be solved on a social level that ores the psychological. It is small wonder that although his name never appears in the book, Fanon was enamored of the work of Wilhelm Reich. This important Freudian-Marxist would no doubt feel affinity with Fanon's comment, "Genuine disalienation will have been achieved only when things, in the most materialist sense, have resumed their rightful place:'27

#### Psychoanalysis fails to prescribe action – that’s a net benefit to my fw Wilderson et al[[2]](#footnote-2):

If Blacks became part of the human community then the concept of “contemporaries” would have no outside; and if it had no outside it could have no inside. Lacan assumes the category and thus he imagines the analysand’s problem in terms of how to live without neurosis among ones contemporaries. Fanon interrogates the category itself. For Lacan the analysands suffer psychically due to problems extant within the paradigm of contemporaries. For Fanon, the analysand suffers due to the existence of the contemporaries themselves and the fact that s/he is a stimulus for anxiety for those who have contemporaries. Now, a contemporary’s struggles are conflictual—that is to say, they can be resolved because they are problems that are of- and in the world. But a Blacks problems are the stuff of antagonisms: struggles that cannot be resolved between parties but can only be resolved through the obliteration of one or both of the parties. We are faced—when dealing with the Black—with a set of psychic problems that cannot **be** resolved through any form of symbolic intervention such as psychoanalysis—though [A]ddressing them psychoanalytically we can begin to explain the antagonism (as I have done in my book, and as Fanon does), but it won’t lead us to **a cure.**

#### Doublebind; Empirics can’t generate ontological changes else the aff could too

#### progress possible—proven with integration of black representation, crm, etc.

#### On the links

1. t: junior partner complicit in the structure – hypercharged since there’s black mvmts in the squo and you deny actual black bodies their voice: dr. shante williams, davita galloway, etc.
2. t: non black debaters ought not condemn the social standing of black bodies, that coopts black scholarship – that’s an independent voter
3. t: concede tests force teachers to discipline minority students that was the first piece of evi – we check the school to prison pipeline
4. State/academia is inevitable and not ontologically bad – it’s a group of ppl coming together to deliberate which happens every discussion

#### AT Alt

1. Burning the state ignores black single mothers on welfare which justifies perm do the aff with the orientation of the alt and force the judge to writ the pedagogy on the ballot. Net Better because judge’s deliberation gets more coalition building
2. No solvency – done before, cruel optimism, link turns the k
3. Colorism da
4. Perm do both: Endorse their anti-state orientation while understanding that certain actions can ensure black material safety Wilderson 16[[3]](#footnote-3):

The question is, can Black political organizing in Ferguson and Balti-more and these places catch up with that, because unfortunately, we have a problem in that the country is so much more of a police state than it has ever been and you know that just by watching television. When I was in school, if you liked the American flag, if you liked the police, you didn’t have any friends. Now, I find young college students are very slow to say that they hate America, very slow to say that they hate the police. What we’re trying to do now is to infuse an antagonistic orientation in Black people who are white-collar people in college so that their intellectual skills can be enhanced by the orientation that is felt by Black people in the ghetto. If this doesn’t happen they run risk of being anointed and ap-pointed (by the power structure) to manage the anger of Black people in the street, rather than relate to that anger. So that’s a hurdle that we have to overcome. You know, I’ve been doing political education workshops for Black Lives Matter in New York and Los Angeles, and probably will do more in Chicago. And what I hope to have people do workshop exercises around is this concept that I have called “Two Trains Running (Side by Side).” By that I mean, you can do your political organizing that will help us get relief from police brutality right now. We need that. We need that. But that work that we do should be seen as puny in terms of its philosophical and theoretical orientation so that we can educate ourselves politically to be against the police as an institution and against the United States as a country, even while we are working to reform police practices, because we do not have the strength right now that we had in the 1960s and 1970s to act in the way the Black Liberation Army did, or Baader-Meinhof, we do not have the strength to act in the revolutionary mode, but that lack of strength, that lack of capacity, should not contaminate our orientation. We should not feel that we have to accept the existence of police even if we’re working in reformist measures politically. Hopefully this idea of two trains running will pick up. Black Lives Matter has done a great job in opening up a new Black political organizing space. That’s great. Now let’s use that space for an educational project that is soundly anti-American, and soundly anti-police even if tactically, we have to work for police reforms.

1. Perm do the aff: vote aff to embrace my conception of identity as defined by experience and action while doing the alt – ontology is reductive and there is on singular understanding of history, Glaude 7[[4]](#footnote-4)

In my view, three difficulties—descriptive, theoretical, and existential—attend such accounts. The descriptive problematic involves the plotline of the story. I am reminded here of James Baldwin and Ralph Ellison’s criti-cisms of Richard Wright. Both worried that Wright’s representations of black life betrayed the complexity of African American existence. The same can be said of stories of African American experience that are mainly about liberation and presuppose a subject in constant struggle. There is much more to our living than simply resisting white supremacy. More-over, the singular focus often results in a relatively coherent account in which the internal fissures of black communities are obscured. Suffering and resistance then subordinate all other considerations—even the dif-ferential experience of that suffering and the different aims of resistance. The theoretical problematic refers to the Christian dimension of the problem of being both black and Christian. Like Anderson, I worry that God talk among black theologians, at least in their worst moments, functions merely as a source of the strenuous mood, serving simply to justify and sanctify a particular political orientation—even though it is precisely in our relation to God and His relation to us that we resist oppression.24.Lastly, the existential problematic again entails a simplification of the complexity of African American lives. The existential involves how to live, how to hope, and how to love. But if our lives are reduced simply to struggle and our stories presume an understanding of black agency as always already political, then the various ways we have come to love and hope are cast into the shadows as we obsess about politics, narrowly un-derstood, and as History orients us retrospectively instead of prospectively. We end up, despite our best intentions, ignoring the sheer joy of black life and unwittingly reduc[e]ing our capacity to reflect and act in light of the hardships of our actual lives. Perhaps, more importantly, “our abil-ity to make delicate distinctions” is lost as History settles beforehand the difficult existential questions “Who am I?” “How should I live?” and “What should I do?”

1. alt’s the endpoint of the failure of thousands of years of theorizing – that’s proven by ur inherency - and the starting point of mine

### AT Set Col

#### Overview: The role of the ballot is to endorse consistency with democratic deliberation.

#### Evaluate fw v k as a method v method since it’s j two ways of guiding action and explaining the world. that no links out of consequential links – the aff doesn’t implement and doesn’t encourage kids to go to school but says people already there should get education that doesn’t erase native scholarship. Moral truths are created throughout time by continually deliberating their consequences and intentions on agents – that’s the fw syllogism

#### Extend Journell 7: regurgitating one “right” answer of US History is the master narrative that reduces events like setcol and creates error replication since history is data for deliberation and testing. the aff forces people to rid misinformed ideas. That outweighs and Link turns the K by erasing bad knowledge production which is the root cause.

#### The alt is a guide to action but humans aren’t good at abiding by it which is proven by the impact to the k but u don’t account for that - prag fluidly operates with deliberation and testing the alt until we reach a conclusion. that accounts for the assumptions ethical theories make.

#### Double-bind: a) through prag we reach your knowledge since it’s true and the K is non-unique w/ no link or b) your pedagogy is false

#### On the k proper

#### T: the aff is a move away from ‘objective’ notions of thanksgiving to recognize the native view of history where we forced natives to give us food after killing their people

#### No link - we recognize the land we are on by injecting that mention in the ac, that was the speed 15 evi, who is literally a native scholar, so err aff

#### Perm do both: colleges don’t evaluate standardized tests in the world of the alt so they aren’t mutually exclusive.

#### Overview on the alt: Allow for pragmatic DAs else they recreate the impact in other regions e.g. black separationist mvmts pushed out natives to establish neocolonial rule in Liberia

#### Turn: Some ppl don’t know where to go due to natal alienation or have culturally changed so they’ll spread more colonialist logic

#### cede the political: u kill a growing native mvmt rn e.g. dakota access pipeline in favor of ppl like ted cruz who are going to drag on the processes

#### cruel optimism da, ppl vote on the alt all the time, u don’t solve and investment that u do creates psychological violence and establishes opportunity costs

#### On the link debate:

#### Perfcon:

#### [insert their identity] from [insert school] articulating themselves as decolonizers in debate relegates Native people to philic objects and sutures native identity to Land which fuels settler/master desires. this recreates the reservation.

#### Double turn: you rely on Lockean conceptions of sovereignty e.g. that natives deserve the land b/c they were here first

#### Paternalism da: problematic to tell natives that they don't know what to do when they're already infiltrating politics which is exactly what the 2nd point proves eg. the native women in congress

#### Perm do the aff as a method of the alt – prag accepts diverse perspectives and clarifies decolonization instead of reducing natives to savages which allowed for colonization in the first place – decolonization on its own will inevitably face backlash due to the antagonistic relationship they’ve warranted

Pratt, S. L. (2016). Geography, History, and the Aims of Education: The Possibility of Multiculturalism in Democracy and Education. Educational Theory, 66(1-2), 199–210. doi:10.1111/edth.12162 cw//az

Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang have cautioned against the easy adoption of “decolonization” as a term for a new version of progressivism. “Scholars swap out prior civil and human rights based terms” to signal an awareness of indigenous issues and include indigenous groups “as an additional special (ethnic) group or class,” but their analyses leave the structures of settler colonialism in place.21 Such work marks an attempt to preserve the process of civilization by “attempt[ing] to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity.”22 Instead, “decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically.”23 The result, they continue, is that “decolonization is necessarily unsettling” and is framed by what they call “an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization.”24 In this sense, decolonization begins with the recognition of boundaries, some of which offer no common ground and, in this sense, are impassible. Even as boundaries mark divisions between lands, cultures, and groups, they also provide the conditions necessary for what Taiaiake Alfred, Leanne Simp- son, and Jeff Corntassel (among others) have called “resurgence.”25 For Alfred, “[i]nstitutions and ideas that are the creation of the colonial relationship are not capable of ensuring [indigenous] survival; this has been amply proven by the absolute failure of institutional and legalist strategies to protect [indigenous] lands and ... rights.” What is called for in response is a process of “the regeneration of an identity created out of the stories of this land, standing up for what is right, and restitution for harm that has been done.”26 Resurgence calls for “the reconnection of people to their lands, the reunification of their communities, and the restoration of cultural security in individuals and collectives.”27 Here bound- aries are not those established as part of the colonial process of making land “territory” that can be bought and sold, but those that mark the diverse “home- lands” of indigenous peoples.28 The practical respect for such boundaries opens up the possibilities for diverse ends-in-view, as Simpson suggests when she concludes from her Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg perspective:29 “Building diverse, nation-culture-based resurgences means significantly reinvesting in our way of being: regenerating our political and intellectual traditions; articulating and living our legal systems; language learning; ceremonial and spiritual pursuits; creating and using our artistic and performance-based traditions.”30 In short, decoloniza- tion “requires us to reclaim the very best practices of our traditional cultures, knowledge systems and life-ways in the dynamic, fluid, compassionate, respectful context within which they were originally generated.”31 Boundaries, from the perspectives of Alfred and Simpson, afford the develop- ment of situated aims that emerge from the “homelands” and history of indigenous peoples. Progress as achieving ends-in-view provides another way of thinking about the processes of decolonization and resurgence in the context of education. Rather than presuming that every boundary is a limit to be crossed, progress in this sense presumes that some boundaries provide the context in which communities and their members can generate their own futures and make their own meanings. Shared meaning across different communities can then be seen as an ongoing effort to respond to the particular circumstances at hand — decolonization as ongoing inquiry or, as Dewey called it in Experience and Education, social intelligence.32 In order to understand the boundaries that make decolonization possible, some indigenous thinkers call for the need to understand the history of colonization and challenge the presuppositions that explain the presence of settler peoples in places not their own. Such histories cannot be abstract accounts, but must be narratives tied to places that make sense at once of the human connections that brought domination and destruction and the physical connections that were experienced as the destruction of people and places. It is here that Dewey’s vision of education and the subject matters of geography and history can form a starting place for undermining settler colonialism and settler common sense. Multicultural education in this decolonial context is as much about boundary making as it is about boundary crossing. Here separation and integration work side by side, framed not only by individual educational aims, but also by aims that are set by communities committed to preserving the boundaries that make their aims meaningful. Geography in Dewey’s sense becomes problematic when it becomes disconnected from larger purposes, but these “larger” purposes do not have to be “civilizing.” The familiar fences that mark the limits of the village can be connected to situated purposes and so become meaningful both as boundaries that mark the invasion by “great nations” and mark the places of the formative events of the community, its resistance to the invasion, its losses and gains. History is likewise problematic when it becomes the recitation of names and dates based on some external vision of what matters. But history as part of a place becomes part of the life of the place, a process of ongoing construction and reconstruction of the community. Dewey opens the door to geography and history that is decolonizing when he claims, “An intelligent study of the discovery, explorations, colonization of America, of the pioneer movement westward, of immigration, etc., should be a study of the United States as it is to-day: of the country we now live in” (DE, 222). If education engages in such a study, not to discover a path toward civilization, but as a way of fostering the diverse places that make up the lands we call the United States, the results would seem to be a step in undoing the consequences of civilizing progress. Decolonization involves challenging received histories in order to uncover the operations of settler colonialism. Such history is not stultifying but an ongoing, sit- uated practice. “There is no material available for leading principle and hypotheses save that of the historic present,” Dewey writes. “As culture changes, the concep- tions that are dominant in a culture change. Of necessity new standpoints for view- ing, appraising and ordering data arise. History is then rewritten.”33 The geography and history of multicultural education that engages students and their communi- ties in the process of understanding their places and stories has the potential to provide resources for an educative practice that is decolonizing. Leanne Simpson concludes her introduction to Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back with a summary of the pedagogical position suggested by Dewey’s discussion of aims in education: “I have been careful throughout this chapter and the book not to define ‘resur- gence.’ It is my hope that readers will take the concepts and ideas presented [here], return to their own communities, teachings, languages, and Elders or Knowledge Holders and engage in a process where they figure our what ‘resurgence’ means to them, and to their collective communities.”34 Multicultural education critically grounded in Democracy and Education not only could foster the development of robust curricula responding to particular situations, it could also foster the respect for boundaries that must be negotiated in the process of learning.

### At baudy

#### prag doesn’t say we have perfect understandings of ideal worlds – baudy assumes tech destroys the real but dk what happens after tech recreates what semiotics is. Only prag resolves skep conclusions to understand futurity

#### simulation is an imperfect understanding of the Real that assumes there is a Real constantly reproduced, but simulations are just copies of copies as there is no Real.

Massumi 87, Brian. *Realer than Real The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari*. 1987, [www.brianmassumi.com/textes/REALER%20THAN%20REAL.pdf](http://www.brianmassumi.com/textes/REALER%20THAN%20REAL.pdf). KL

This cannot be done by whining. The work of Baudrillard is one long lament. Both linear and dialectical causality no longer function, therefore everything is indetermination. The center of meaning is empty, therefore we are satellites in lost orbit. We can no longer act like legislator-subjects or be passive like slaves, therefore we are sponges. Images are no longer anchored by representation, therefore they float weightless in hyperspace. Words are no longer univocal, therefore signifiers slip chaotically over each other. A circuit has been created between the real and the imaginary, therefore reality has imploded into the undecidable proximity of hyperreality. All of these statements make sense only if it is assumed that the only conceivable alternative to representative order is absolute indetermination, whereas indetermination as he speaks of it is in fact only the flipside of order, as necessary to it as the fake copy is to the model, and every bit as much a part of its system. Baudrillard's framework can only be the result of a nostalgia for the old reality so intense that it has difformed his vision of everything outside of it. He cannot clearly see that all the things he says have crumbled were simulacra all along: simulacra produced by analyzable procedures of simulation that were as real as real, or actually realer than real, because they carried the real back to its principle of production and in so doing prepared their own rebirth in a new regime of simulation. He cannot see becoming, of either variety. He cannot see that the simulacrum envelops a proliferating play of differences and galactic distances. What Deleuze and Guattari offer, particularly in A Thousand Plateaus, is a logic capable of grasping Baudrillard's failing world of representation as an effective illusion the demise of which opens a glimmer of possibility. Against cynicism, a thin but fabulous hope--of ourselves becoming realer than real in a monstrous contagion of our own making.

#### Rather than rejecting the simulation on face, use the simulation to disrupt subjectivity that props up the Real, which creates a new reality where subjects are unable to be gridlocked.

Massumi 2, Brian. *Realer than Real The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari*. 1987, [www.brianmassumi.com/textes/REALER%20THAN%20REAL.pdf](http://www.brianmassumi.com/textes/REALER%20THAN%20REAL.pdf). KL

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari invent a vocabulary enabling them to discuss both modes of simulation without lapsing into the terminology of representation. The key concept is double becoming. There are always at least two terms swept up in a fabulous process that transforms them both.21 David Cronenberg's film, The Fly, presents an instance of this, although a failed one. A scientist named Brundle accidentally splices him self with a fly as he is experimenting with a machine that can dematerialize objects and transport them instantly to any chosen location, in defiance of gravity and Newtonian physics generally. When the accident occurs, Brundle does not so much become fly, nor the fly human. Rather, certain properties or potentials of both combine in a new and monstrous amalgation: a Brundle-Fly that can walk on walls and think and speak well enough to describe itself as the world's first "insect politician." It tries to purify itself of the fly in it by repeating the process backwards, but only succeeds in combining with the machinery itself. In limitative or negative becoming as portrayed in Vendémiare, one of the terms is an abstract identity and the body in question must curtail its potentials in order to fit into the grid, or at least appear to. In nonlimitative or positive becoming, as in The Fly, both terms are on the same level: rather than looking perpendicularly up or down, one moves sideways toward a another position on the grid for which one was not destined, toward an animal, a machine, a person of a different sex or age or race, an insect, a plant. The fabulatory process, though as abstract as subatomic physics, is immanent to the world of the things it affects, and is as real as a quark.22 The transporting machine is on the same plane as the terms it combines. Its operating principle dips into that world's quantum level, into its pool of virtuality, to create an as yet unseen amalgamation of potentials. It produces a new body or territory from which there is no turning back. The only choice is to keep on becoming in an endless relay from one term to the next until the process either makes a breakthrough or exhausts its potential, spends its fuel, and the fabulous animal dies. Likening this to interplanatary space can be misleading: there is nothing farther from free-floating weightlessness than this. There is no such thing as total indetermination. Every body has its own propulsion, its own life force, its own set of potentials defining how far it can go. And it moves in a world filled with the obstacles thrown down by sedimentations of preexisting simulations of the "real" persuasion. There is no generalized indetermination, but there are localized points of undecidability where man meets fly. The goal is to reach into one's world's quantum level at such a point and, through the strategic mimickry of double becoming, combine as many potentials as possible. Deleuze and Guattari, of course, are not suggesting that people can or should "objectively" become insects. It is a question of extracting and combining potentials, which they define as abstract relations of movement and rest, abilities to affect and be affected: abstract yet real. The idea is to build our own transporting machine and use it to get a relay going and to keep it going, creating ever greater and more powerful amalgamations and spreading them like a contagion until they infect every identity across the land and the point is reached where a now all-invasive positive simulation can turn back against the grid of resemblance and replication and overturn it for a new earth. Deleuze and Guattari insist on the collective nature of this process of becoming, even when it is seemingly embodied in a solitary artist. Revolutionary or "minor"23 artists marshal all of the powers of the false their community has to offer. They create a working simulation that may then reinject itself into society like Feuillade's wine assemblage, but to very different, though perhaps equally intoxicating, effect.

### 2ar on baudy

extend Massumi. Rather than rejecting the way that technology props up the hyperreal, we should co-opt technology and use it to queer our own subjectivity, and become intelligible on the grid of identity. We simulate another gender, race, species etc. to the point where we do not resemble anything and only proliferate affect. This solves the links of the K because we toy at the idea of ‘the real’ existing, and rather utilize the simulation as a method of proliferating new assemblages.

### AT Foucault

Perm do both: pragmatic genealogy is possible and necessary for social critique Koopman[[5]](#footnote-5):

The strategy I am proposing for this effort can be described as one of delegation.58 We should delegate the problem-raising work to genealogists such as Foucault and the problem-fixing work to pragmatists such as Dewey. Though the methods of genealogy and pragmatism largely face different directions, there is no principled philosophical opposition that stands in the way of the proposed methodological delegation. There is no deep metaphysics at work in Dewey and Foucault which prevents us from bringing them together at the methodological level of their empirical commitments to a micro-physics of problems and responses. Dewey and Foucault are in agreement on all the important philosophical points. This has led some commentators to suggest that the obvious differences that separate the two are of a mostly dispositional nature.59 If interpreted as a psychological claim, I am not sure that we have sufficient evidence for even this view. But if interpreted as a comment about a methodological distinction, then we can accept it in the sense that Deweyan method tends to inspire an American hope whereas Foucaultian method tends to arouse a French skepticism. There is, however, no reason why we cannot be both hopeful and skeptical, both cautious about the world in which we find ourselves caught and confident that we can work to disentangle ourselves some. Indeed, my view is that we should take it upon ourselves to find room for both of these moods in our philosophies and our histories. The interpretations of genealogy and pragmatism I have provided above not only show that there is no principled opposition between pragmatism and genealogy, they also invite a combination-via-delegation of Foucaultian problematization and Deweyan reconstruction in terms that are internal to each tradition. Both traditions share a functionally similar specification of the value of history. Both Foucault and Dewey argue that history matters because it helps us specify the conditions of the problems we face in the present, and helps us so specify in such a way that we might then go on to improve the problematic situations in which we find ourselves. In virtue of this similarity, both traditions are ripe for being put to work alongside one another. Adherents of genealogy and pragmatism may protest that I am delegating too much to the other philosophical tradition. It may be objected that Foucault gives us all that we need including an ethics such that we ought not to bother with pragmatism, or that Dewey is a philosopher capacious enough to obviate a need for poststructuralist genealogy. I agree that both of the traditions I have been focusing on suggest that both problematization and reconstruction are crucial. My claim is just that each tradition has thus far done a better job of emphasizing and developing only one of these aspects. Genealogists like Foucault have focused most of their energy on the problematizing work of historical inquiry while pragmatists like Dewey have been largely interested in the reconstructive work of philosophical inquiry. Sure, Foucault attempted to elaborate an ethics in the final years of his life – and of course Dewey engaged in the work of history at crucial junctures. Although both Foucault and Dewey understood the value of a historical-philosophical amalgam of these two projects, each in their own work revealed a decided preference, at least most of the time, for only one part of this enterprise. This has led to a persisting lacuna in each approach especially insofar as contemporary genealogists and pragmatists are, predictably, extremely cautious about straying too far from the paths of their masters. For the purposes of my proposed delegational combination, we need not efface lingering differences. We can admit that Dewey described reconstruction as a response to a problematic situation, but failed to spell out in sufficient detail how we come to recognize situations as problematic. Problems do not appear out of nothing – problems have histories. We can also admit that Foucault described problematization as provoking the work of reconstructive thought, but failed to engage in detailed reconstructive thought to the satisfaction of even his most charitable critics. Problems stand in need of reconstructive responses – that is why we experience them as problematic. What these lacunae in the work of Dewey and Foucault suggest is that Deweyan pragmatism and Foucaultian genealogy stand to gain much by engaging each other more seriously. Pragmatism without genealogy has nothing to do, no work to perform, no problem to solve. Genealogy without pragmatism will get us nowhere, saddle us with insoluble problems, and accomplish very little. The yield of my interpretations is the possibility of recognizing the importance and value of integrating genealogy and pragmatism into a fluid practice of immanent cultural critique which we could call genealogical pragmatism or pragmatist genealogy. According to this conception, critical inquiry operates along two tracks. On one track it works to problematize or destabilize those of our practices which we effortlessly involve ourselves in (yet this genealogical track need not overturn or reject these practices). On a second track it works to ameliorate the difficulties and dangers we find in ourselves (yet this reconstructive track need not assume the orientation of seeking definitive solutions approximating fixed ideals). These tracks are co-present and negotiated in simultaneity – it is not that there is a chronological sequencing of a time for problematization and a time for reconstruction. Though these tracks operate simultaneously, that which they operate on can be taken as chronologically distinct – genealogy works on the present from the perspective of the past whilst pragmatism works on the present from the perspective of the future. In the midst of this dualperpsectival work on our selves, we need to constantly work at being both suspicious and productive.

### AT Deleuze

#### Can’t weigh – prag solves that

#### 1] Perm do the aff and then the alt in all other instances – A] epistemic modesty net benefit – prefer specific case impacts over a broad overarching theory since they’re most verifiable – no way to make absolute claims about a subject. B] shields the link – if the alt can resolve every other instance of static subject formation in the status quo then it should be able to overcome a single link.

#### 2] Link is inevitable – everything, even their post-modern bullshit, still relies on objective truth claims – for example, that affect is affect and becoming is becoming.

3] tests are boo under deleuze

Go to the alt

#### Perm do both: use deleuzean conceptions of identity in conjunction with pragmatism’s social theory. The aff is a constant interrogration Marchetti[[6]](#footnote-6):

Bignall shows how both thinkers were interested in providing an account of experimental existence as the outcome of a “nonfoundational, continuous and creative” self-fashioning. Despite this convergence in goals, for Bignall the two thinkers part ways in their different understanding of the “event”, that is of the particular conditions and workings of this activity of self-fashioning. Deleuze characterizes “the event” as the sum of those virtual and accidental elements involved in the constitution of our selves, whereas Dewey depicts it as what shows up as “factual” and “actual” only – and one fact that shows up is what he calls the problematic situation, which is what triggers the particular form of experimental existence subjects develop to resolve the sense of uneasiness and trouble caused by such problems. According to Deleuze, subjects are neither completely in charge of their own destiny (hence defined by their own will) nor merely determined by external contingencies (hence completely alienated from their will), but rather always involved in the negotiation with the difference built into the situation they struggle with. The result of this process is an experimental renegotiation and renewal of one’s individuality, which necessarily involves the encounter with the other. However, when it comes to envision the “social and political conditions associated with this particular manner of relational individuation and transformation” Deleuze, according to Bignall, is allusive at best. Dewey’s elaborate understanding of the event as a state of actual uncertainty the resolution of which [End Page 314] will eventually lead to a socio-political democratic configuration works well as a complement to the Deleuzian picture, as it provides a positive account of the dynamics of self-constitution implicit in these practices of “intelligent experimentation” in community. For Bignall, Dewey in fact worked with a “politicized concept of the “event of existence” as “simultaneously precarious and stable””, which would mirror Deleuze’s anti-foundationalist picture of self-constitution. For Dewey intelligent experimentalism is “a way of life that proceeds critically from immediate experience and learns constructively from past experience, aiming to improve future experience…through social contact and communication”.

#### Perm do the aff and no-link: the aff is becoming, Shook 13

Shook, John. (2013). Dewey's Ethical Justification for Public Deliberation Democracy. Education and Culture. 29. 3-26. 10.1353/eac.2013.0006. cw//az

For Dewey’s progressive liberalism, democratic individualism must evolve towards democratic socialism: the expansion of every individual’s capacities and powers is precisely the process of social coordination requiring some political management. Dewey was hardly the first political theorist to identify the function of politics as managing the social coordination of everyone’s proper development. This view of politics has resulted in theories across the centuries which defend autocracy, aristocracy, fascism, communism, as well as varieties of democracy. These theories almost always start from some concrete notion of what constitutes a person’s proper development. Dewey’s progressive liberalism is nearly unique because it offers no specific concept of what could constitute a person’s proper development. Dewey’s writings are replete with pleas for the development and empowerment of people’s abilities. But nowhere can Dewey say anything specific about the best character traits or the finest virtues or the best way of life for a person in general. There is no specific human telos in Dewey’s philosophy. Dewey self-consciously refuses to give any such specifics: Dewey has no idea what those things are. His ignorance is a key foundation to his theory of democracy. And Dewey would make us see that his ignorance should be our ignorance. No one could know what a human being ought to become. We can still have some ideas about what a human being ought not to become. There should be moral and political constraints upon what a person should become, constraints that follow from the ethical principle that all people should have the equal opportunity to realize their potential. Political theories have typically remained focused on constraints, because that is the far easier problem to solve: given a conception of the human telos, and a notion of the social coordination required for groups to attain their telos together, the needed constraints on human behavior can be derived fairly easily. Dewey’s political theory has no conception of human telos and only an understanding of many of the forms of social coordination tried so far. That’s how Dewey derives his theory of democracy: the people themselves must take the responsibility for exploring their potentials and coordinating their common search using novel social organizations. Democracy is an endless experiment designed and conducted by the people themselves.

### AT Cap

1. Extend Pierce; meaning only makes sense in the context of the difference it makes to our action. Extend Serra 1; moral inquiry is deliberative where we weigh experience and arguments, which culminates in moral habit that makes a practical difference in our action. Outweighs: a) our FW constrains assessment of reality, which means your alternative rests upon pragmatism and deliberation creates long term habits that lead to integration of principles constitutive of action.
2. Extend You and Rud: the aff forces people to restructure their beliefs and get rid of old misinformed preconceptions. Link turns the K by ruining old forms of knowledge production and puts you in a double-bind: either a) through deliberation we would reach your knowledge making the K non-unique or b) the education you champion is false which we should reject. Also offense for us because more people join the resistance so we get control the internal link to alt solvency.
3. Extend Kiersz: case outweighs because since the sample size of the aff is so large, it errs towards better norms. Even if there is are exceptions, the average tends towards better norms.
4. We can’t tell people who need to put food on the table that they can’t rely on cap, which justifies perm do the aff then the alt to understand how to do the alt better.
5. Perm – do the alt in every other instance – the pragmatic method through active learning is k2 to resisting capitalism Brooks ‘94[[7]](#footnote-7):

Dewey's other early essay on education, The School and Society, continues in the same vein. Most chapters were designed to stand alone as lectures in education, so they tend to repeat and elaborate on familiar themes in Dewey's work. In a chapter on "The School and Social Progress," readers are reminded that the school is much more than a collection of individuals. Students should not enter simply to acquire knowledge as a businessman enters the marketplace to acquire profit. The progress of an individual can only be seen in relation to the needs of the community. Dewey asserted that in the school "individualism and socialism are at one" and it was "especially necessary to take the broader view" over the narrow and acquisitive course. Like Marx, Dewey informed his readers that inevitable changes were forthcoming in the "modes of industry and commerce" and, again like Marx, Dewey was convinced that his predictions were based on scientific laws generated through the methods of dialectical materialism. Indeed, in one of his later works, Dewey was very forthright in declaring that "we are in for some kind of socialism, call it whatever name we please, and no matter what it will be called when it is realized, economic determinism is now a fact not a theory." In the light of his convictions, Dewey sought to conceive a new philosophy of education. Dewey's school would be intricately connected with the unfolding of materialist history or as Dewey put it "part and parcel of the whole social evolution." The new school would become an instrument of dealienation. Dewey echoed the Marxist contention that the intimate connection between men and their occupations which had existed in preindustrial societies, had been lost in the capitalist mode of production. He alerted his readers to the concentration of industry and division of labour that "had practically eliminated household and neighbourhood occupations." The new mission of the school was to become a training ground for cooperative labour, instead of a place set apart in which to learn lessons. The "mere absorbing of facts," Dewey warned, was a selfish act in which he could see no redeeming value: There is no obvious social motive for the acquirement of mere learning; there is no clear social gain in success thereat. Dewey was convinced that the introduction of manual training and the activity method would create a vigorous occupational spirit in the educational process. The school would affiliate itself with the life of the child and the community. It would become an embryonic socialist community. The new school communities would become incubators for peaceful social revolution. Dewey saw the new school providing a unique and irresistible example to capitalist society because its aim was "not the economic value of the product but the development of social power and insight." School, liberated from the religious influences -- which, like Marx, he regarded as medieval superstitions -- would demonstrate to all that it was neither God nor Providence but the earth and man's labour that were responsible for all progress. Training in "social directions" would raise the child's consciousness and allow him to "locate the source of our economic evils." Evil was hidden in the structures of late capitalism, and, like Marx, Dewey saw a rewrite of history as the key tool of the exorcist. For Dewey, there were no grounds for including classical history in the curriculum, but: Not so when history is considered as an account of the forces and forms of social life ... Whatever history may be for the scientific historian, for the educator, it must be an indirect sociology -- a study of society which lays bare its process of be-coming and its modes of organization. Dewey's entire chapter on "The Aims of History in Elementary Education" recommends nothing less than a Marxist history for the new curriculum. If history was to become "dynamic" and "moving," its "economic and industrial aspects" had to be emphasized. This alone could prevent the tendency to "swamp history in myth, fairy story and merely literary renderings" of the bourgeois culture he sought to usher out.

Perm do both: pragmatic genealogy is possible and necessary for social critique Koopman[[8]](#footnote-8):

The strategy I am proposing for this effort can be described as one of delegation.58 We should delegate the problem-raising work to genealogists such as Foucault and the problem-fixing work to pragmatists such as Dewey. Though the methods of genealogy and pragmatism largely face different directions, there is no principled philosophical opposition that stands in the way of the proposed methodological delegation. There is no deep metaphysics at work in Dewey and Foucault which prevents us from bringing them together at the methodological level of their empirical commitments to a micro-physics of problems and responses. Dewey and Foucault are in agreement on all the important philosophical points. This has led some commentators to suggest that the obvious differences that separate the two are of a mostly dispositional nature.59 If interpreted as a psychological claim, I am not sure that we have sufficient evidence for even this view. But if interpreted as a comment about a methodological distinction, then we can accept it in the sense that Deweyan method tends to inspire an American hope whereas Foucaultian method tends to arouse a French skepticism. There is, however, no reason why we cannot be both hopeful and skeptical, both cautious about the world in which we find ourselves caught and confident that we can work to disentangle ourselves some. Indeed, my view is that we should take it upon ourselves to find room for both of these moods in our philosophies and our histories. The interpretations of genealogy and pragmatism I have provided above not only show that there is no principled opposition between pragmatism and genealogy, they also invite a combination-via-delegation of Foucaultian problematization and Deweyan reconstruction in terms that are internal to each tradition. Both traditions share a functionally similar specification of the value of history. Both Foucault and Dewey argue that history matters because it helps us specify the conditions of the problems we face in the present, and helps us so specify in such a way that we might then go on to improve the problematic situations in which we find ourselves. In virtue of this similarity, both traditions are ripe for being put to work alongside one another. Adherents of genealogy and pragmatism may protest that I am delegating too much to the other philosophical tradition. It may be objected that Foucault gives us all that we need including an ethics such that we ought not to bother with pragmatism, or that Dewey is a philosopher capacious enough to obviate a need for poststructuralist genealogy. I agree that both of the traditions I have been focusing on suggest that both problematization and reconstruction are crucial. My claim is just that each tradition has thus far done a better job of emphasizing and developing only one of these aspects. Genealogists like Foucault have focused most of their energy on the problematizing work of historical inquiry while pragmatists like Dewey have been largely interested in the reconstructive work of philosophical inquiry. Sure, Foucault attempted to elaborate an ethics in the final years of his life – and of course Dewey engaged in the work of history at crucial junctures. Although both Foucault and Dewey understood the value of a historical-philosophical amalgam of these two projects, each in their own work revealed a decided preference, at least most of the time, for only one part of this enterprise. This has led to a persisting lacuna in each approach especially insofar as contemporary genealogists and pragmatists are, predictably, extremely cautious about straying too far from the paths of their masters. For the purposes of my proposed delegational combination, we need not efface lingering differences. We can admit that Dewey described reconstruction as a response to a problematic situation, but failed to spell out in sufficient detail how we come to recognize situations as problematic. Problems do not appear out of nothing – problems have histories. We can also admit that Foucault described problematization as provoking the work of reconstructive thought, but failed to engage in detailed reconstructive thought to the satisfaction of even his most charitable critics. Problems stand in need of reconstructive responses – that is why we experience them as problematic. What these lacunae in the work of Dewey and Foucault suggest is that Deweyan pragmatism and Foucaultian genealogy stand to gain much by engaging each other more seriously. Pragmatism without genealogy has nothing to do, no work to perform, no problem to solve. Genealogy without pragmatism will get us nowhere, saddle us with insoluble problems, and accomplish very little. The yield of my interpretations is the possibility of recognizing the importance and value of integrating genealogy and pragmatism into a fluid practice of immanent cultural critique which we could call genealogical pragmatism or pragmatist genealogy. According to this conception, critical inquiry operates along two tracks. On one track it works to problematize or destabilize those of our practices which we effortlessly involve ourselves in (yet this genealogical track need not overturn or reject these practices). On a second track it works to ameliorate the difficulties and dangers we find in ourselves (yet this reconstructive track need not assume the orientation of seeking definitive solutions approximating fixed ideals). These tracks are co-present and negotiated in simultaneity – it is not that there is a chronological sequencing of a time for problematization and a time for reconstruction. Though these tracks operate simultaneously, that which they operate on can be taken as chronologically distinct – genealogy works on the present from the perspective of the past whilst pragmatism works on the present from the perspective of the future. In the midst of this dualperpsectival work on our selves, we need to constantly work at being both suspicious and productive.

The alt fails alone – its too reductive, it must be put to the test of pragmatic deliberation West 89[[9]](#footnote-9):

True to the American pragmati[sm]c grain, Dewey rejects the metaphysical residues in Marx: the Hegelian-inspired penchant toward totalizing history, universalizing collectivities, and simplifying emancipation. These residues tend to overlook the vast complexities of history, the sheer heterogeneity of collectivities, and the various complications of emancipation. Therefore, for Dewey, Marxist perspectives (given his rather frail yet still noteworthy grasp of them}2 tend toward premature totalities, and homogeneities that ignore uniqueness, difference, and diversity. Yet, like any other viewpoint, Marxisms have to be put to the tests of critical scrutiny, experimental consequences, and moral valuation. In the twenties (after his visit to Russia), Dewey celebrates the Soviet experiment in education, but by the mid-twenties he castigates Stalinism in quite harsh terms.3 For Dewey, the march of freedom in history is embodied in the best of American democracy, and the march of America in history is to be viewed criti-cally in light of the best of American democracy. He puts pragmatism on the international historical stage, yet he still views history through an American lens. In this way, Dewey -like Hegel and Marx - historicizes philosophy; and, like Emerson, James, and Peirce, Americanizes history. In short, Dewey tries to take history seriously as he creatively revises the Emersonian evasion of modern philosophy, carefully affirms the Emersonian theodicy, and critically enriches the American pragmatic tradi-tion. John Dewey is not only the giant of this tradition and the towering force in American philosophy; he is also the sifting funnel through which much of the best and some but little of the worst of American culture flow. As Horace Kallen noted in 1939, "As I see it, it will be Dewey, not Ford, not Edison, not Roosevelt, who, when the last word has been said and the last vote has been counted, will figure as the pregnant symbol of what is best in the America of today and most hopeful for the American-ism of tomorrow."4

### AT BioPol

1. You and Rud turns the K, because we make the problems visible through discussions. Eithe a) only action is necessary which means only the aff actions’ matter or representations and perceptions are key which means the aff representations are a pre-requisite to engaging in the K.
2. Perm do the aff then the alt - we understand how to do the alt better.
3. Double-Bind: either the education of the K is true and we would arrive at it through deliberation or its false in which case we should reject it.

#### Action’s key. Prior questions will never be settled.

Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

#### Perm do both. Combining methods solves best; no one theory will give a complete account of the world

**Caprioli ‘4** (Mary Caprioli, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, International Studies Review, June 2004 pp.256-8

The purported language difference between feminist and IR scholars appears to be methodological. In general, feminist IR scholars 2 are skeptical of empiricist methodologies and "have never been satisfied with the boundary constraints of conventional IR" (Tickner 2001:2). As noted above, conventional international relations is defined on the basis of methodology as a commitment "to empiricism and data-based methods of testing" (Tickner 2001:149). Ironically, some feminist IR scholars place boundary constraints on feminist IR scholarship by limiting its definition to a critical-interpretive methodology (see Carpenter 2003:ftn. 1). Rather than pushing methodological boundaries to expand the field and to promote inclusiveness, conventional IR feminists appear to discriminate against quantitative research. If conventional feminists are willing to embrace multicultural approaches to feminism, why restrict research tools? There would seem to be a lack of consistency between rhetoric and practice. Especially at the global level, there need not be only one way to achieve feminist goals. Hence, conventional feminist IR scholars might benefit from participating in mainstream IR scholars' evolving embrace of methodological pluralism and epistemological opportunism (Bueno de Mesquita 2002; Chan 2002; Fearon and Wendt 2002). One must assume that feminist IR scholars support the pursuit of research that broadens our understanding of international relations. Such a research agenda must include both evidence and logic (Bueno de Mesquita 2002; Chan 2002). Theorizing, case study evidence (specific details), and external validity (generality) are all necessary components of research—only through a combination of all three modes of inquiry can we begin to gain confidence in our understanding. "And still we debate what seems to have been obvious to our predecessors: to gain understanding, we need to integrate careful empirical analysis with the equally careful application of the power of reason" (Bueno de Mesquita 2002:2). Different types of scholarship "make different contributions that can be mutually beneficial, as when historical studies isolate immediate causes that act as catalysts for the general tendencies identified in aggregate analyses" (Chan 2002:754). Without logic and theory, the general tendencies identified through quantitative analysis are incomplete. "In the absence of guidance from such logic, the data exercises degenerate into mindless fishing expeditions and are vulnerable to spurious interpretations" (Chan 2002:750). Most scholars concerned with gender certainly owe a debt to Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987), Cynthia Enloe (1989), and Ann Tickner (1992). These IR feminists shattered the publishing boundary for feminist IR scholarship and tackled the difficult task of deconstructing IR theory, including its founding myths, thereby creating the logic to guide feminist quantitative research. It is only through exposure to feminist literature that one can begin to scientifically question the sexist assumptions inherent in the dominant paradigms of international relations. Feminist theory is rife with testable hypotheses that can only strengthen feminist IR scholarship by identifying false leads and logical errors or by identifying general tendencies that deserve further inquiry. Without the solid body of feminist literature that exists, quantitative feminist IR scholarship would be meaningless. The existing feminist literature based on critical-interpretive epistemologies forms the rationale for quantitative testing. No one methodology is superior to the others. So, why create a dichotomy if none exists? **All methodologies contribute to our knowledge**, and, **when put together** like pieces of a puzzle, **they offer a clearer picture**. **The idea is to build a bridge of knowledge, not parallel walls that are equally inadequate** in their understanding of one another and in explaining international relations. Further **undermining the false dichotomization** between positivist and interpretivist methodologies **is the lack of proof that quantitative methodologies cannot challenge established paradigms** **or, more important**, **that a critical-interpretive epistemology is unbiased or more likely to uncover some truth** that is supposedly obscured by quantitative inquiry. Part of the rationale for the perpetuation of the dichotomy between methodologies and for the critique of quantitative methodology as a valid type of feminist inquiry involves confusing theory and practice. On a theoretical level, quantitative research is idealized as value-free and objective, which of course it is not—particularly when applied to the social sciences. Feminists opposed to quantitative methodologies imagine that other scholars necessarily assume such scholarship to be objective (see Brown 1988). **Few social scientists using quantitative methodologies,** however**, would suggest that this methodology is value-free, which is why so much emphasis is placed on defining measures**. This procedure leaves room for debate and provides space for feminist inquiry. For example, feminists might wish to study the effect of varying definitions of democracy and of security on the democratic peace thesis, ultimately combining methodologies to provide a more thorough understanding of the social matrix underlying state behavior.

#### Impact Calc:

**Serra 2** [Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member.] Cw//az

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION As LaFollette presents it, the key to understanding pragmatist ethics is that it is not an ethical theory per se, but rather it is an anthropology, a way of understanding the human being and his moral action. Therefore, pragmatist ethics in reality does not propose a new ethical theory, but rather “reconstructs” through a new prism the basic intuitions of the best ethical theories. The fundamental element on which the attention of pragmatist ethics centers is deliberation. Deliberation is not directly responsible for directing action, but only does so indirectly, by means of a critique of past actions, the effort to correct or reinforc[ing]e certain habits and mental experiments that each actor performs in order to determine his own future conduct, and even to determine in a general manner the way in which one wishes to live one’s life (or, what amounts to the same thing, the type of person one wishes to be). The task of a pragmatist ethics, therefore, is not to provide final solutions, but rather to indicate that it is only via the testing and communication of experiences that the superiority of one moral idea over another can be demonstrated. In this sense, one of the principal missions of any given version of pragmatist ethics is to indicate some general manner in which habits can be acquired which, later, will facilitate personal deliberation – both internal and external – in the broad variety of circumstances which make up the moral life.

### Menos

1. Knowledge is a sliding scale not known or unknown– I can still know the existence of an unknown based on word of mouth even if I don’t know everything about it. 2. No implication – aff isn’t meant to provide education but is about something you already known – prag. 3. Presumption/permissibility

b) this is the whole point of deliberation, even if we can’t ask ?s about things we don’t know, through deliberation we answer old ?s and create new ones through discussion

C) prag gives us a framework to apply to different situations that we can’t even conceive of yet, I.e. if we meet aliens, or if non-humans learn to speak means that we better resolve this

D) Even if this is true don’t reject the Fw b/c it doesn’t have to be perfect, that’s why we keep deliberating and finding better fw

1. STANFORD PHILOSOPHY <http://www.stanford.edu/~bobonicha/dictionary/dictionary.html> Abbreviated Dictionary of Philosophical Terminology An introduction to philosophy Stanford University [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Wilderson, Frank B. [Afro-Pessismist Scholar], and Percy Howard [Interviewer]. “Wallowing in the Contradictions: Part 1." Percyhoward.com, July 9, 2010,. BE [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. (Frank B. III, interviewed by Samira Spatzek and Paula von Gleich, “‘The Inside-Outside of Civil Society’: An Interview with Frank B. Wilderson, III.” Black Studies Papers, 2.1 (2016): 4–22, https://www.academia.edu/26032053/\_The\_Inside-Outside\_of\_Civil\_Society\_An\_Interview\_with\_Frank\_B.\_Wilderson\_III) OS [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (78-79) NP 3/3/17. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Genealogical Pragmatism: How History Matters for Foucault and Dewey Colin Koopman University of Oregon [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. [Sarin Marchetti](https://muse.jhu.edu/results?searchtype=regular&filtered_content=author&search_term=%22Sarin%20Marchetti%22) and [Alan Rosenberg](https://muse.jhu.edu/results?searchtype=regular&filtered_content=author&search_term=%22Alan%20Rosenberg%22)

Sean Bowden, Simone Bignall and Paul Patton (Eds.) Deleuze and Pragmatism New York / London, Routledge, 2015, xvi + 279 pp. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. William Brooks. "Was Dewey a Marxist?" St. Lawrence Institute for the Advancement of Learning. Discourse 13, Winter 1994. [www.stlawrenceinstitute.org/vol13brk.html](http://www.stlawrenceinstitute.org/vol13brk.html). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Genealogical Pragmatism: How History Matters for Foucault and Dewey Colin Koopman University of Oregon [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Cornel. (Cornel Ronald West (born June 2, 1953) is an American philosopher, political activist, social critic, author, and public intellectual). The American Evasion of Philosophy : A Genealogy of Pragmatism. University of Wisconsin Press, 1989. The Wisconsin Project on American Writers. Pg 71. NP 2/25/17. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)