# Benatar

## K-Long

#### Link Work: The 1AC’s attempt to prevent extinction in favor the perpetuation of human life just reifies the endless suffering which they claim to stop- Impact turns the 1AC

#### Everyone will suffer and die and existing entails having the constant suffering of threats such as extinction which decreases happiness

Amaranthi 16-Nemus Amaranthi studies philosophy (not academically, just as a hobby of sorts) and I shares their work via their YouTube channel and via this website. "ANTI-NATALISM | ETHICS |" Disjunctive Media. Disjunctive Media, 6TH DECEMBER 2016. Web. 29 Dec. 2016.(<https://www.affirmation-zero.net/anti-natalism-ethics/>)

Another objection is that if we are lucky, we can tally the goods with the bads and a life with more goods was probably worth living. Anti-natalism does not deny the existence of goods, but it can’t guarantee it, it can only guarantee that we will eventually all suffer at some point and die. In developing countries and in more poverty stricken areas of the developed world, pain and suffering are more likely and so pro-creation definitely does more harm than good as parents have to provide, their life becomes a burden. On the other hand, better off people tend to consume more stuff than a mass of poorer people and this puts a strain on resources for everyone. Rich or poor, no one can avoid climate change, pollution, disease and war if it occur

#### To determine our happiness and suffering, we must examine the two possibilities. Either we experience an absence of pain which is not bad for both those who exist and those who don't, however the second possibility is an absence of pleasure which is only bad if one exists to experience its denial meaning in all instances it is not bad to not exist

Benatar 97 bracketed for language Benatar, David (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa). “Why It is Better Never to Come Into Existence.” American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 34, Number 3, July 1997.

Having rejected alternative evaluations, I return to my original diagram. To determine the relative advantages and disadvantages of coming into existence and never coming to be, we need to compare 1) with 3), and 2) with 4). In the first comparison we see that non-existence is preferable to existence. The advantage is a real one. In the second comparison, however, **the** pleasures **of the existent**, although good,are not a[n] realadvantage over nonexistence, because the absence of pleasures is not bad. **For the good to be a real advantage over non-existence,** [the absence of pleasure] it would have to be the case that its absence were bad**.** To illustrate this, **consider an analogy** which, because it involves the comparison of two existent people is unlike the comparison between existence and non-existence in this way, but which nonetheless may be instructive**.** S is prone to regular bouts ofillness**.** Fortunately for him, **he** is also so constituted that he recovers quickly**. H lacks the capacity for quick recovery, but he never gets sick. It is bad for S that he gets sick and it is good** for him **that he recovers quickly.** It is good that H never gets sick**, but it is not bad that he [doesn’t]** lacks the capacity to **heal speedily. The capacity for quick recovery, although a good for** S, is not a[n] real advantage over H. This is because the absence of that capacity is not bad for H (and H is not worse off than he would have been had he had the recuperative powers of S). S is not better off than H in any way, even though S is better off than he himself would have been had he lacked the capacity for rapid recovery

#### **Our epistemic skews seriously changes how we view death—absent that, there is not net joy in the world.**

Marsh 14Jason Marsh, pf of Philosophy @ St. Olaf College, “Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXIX No. 2, September 2014, p. 454-455

This last claim will be enough to convince many that **the life satisfaction account** of procreation is implausible. My present point, though, is just that such a view **will still generate severe** local **worries for procreation**, albeit less severe worries than the other views. This is because, **despite the general trend toward optimism mentioned earlier, recent international work on subjective wellbeing reveals that some countries have extremely low life satisfaction. In particular, some countries—not always the poor ones mind you** (Biswas-Diener et al. 2005)—**rank themselves as low as 3.2 out of 10** (Veenhoven 2010, 336). **The life satisfaction defense of procreation implies that the great majority of persons in such countries should stop procreating**.

#### We feel sadness when we see that people are suffering, however, we don't care about happy lives that would have been. Extinction prevents more people from coming into this earth- Impact Turns the 1AC

Benatar 06 -David Benatar is a Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town in Cape Town, South Africa(Wikipedia). Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006. Web

Finally, support for the asymmetry between (3) and (4) can be found in the asymmetrical judgements about (a) (distant) suffering and (b) uninhabited portions of the earth or the universe. Whereas, at least when we think of them, we rightly are sad for inhabitants of a foreign land whose lives are characterized by suffering, **when we hear that some island is unpopulated, we are not similarly sad for the happy people who, had they existed, would have populated this island.** Similarly, nobody really mourns for those who do not exist on Mars, feeling sorry for potential such beings that they cannot enjoy life. Yet, if we knew that there were sentient life on Mars but that Martians were suffering, we would regret this for them. The claim here need not (but could) be the strong one that we would regret their very existence. **The fact that we would regret the suffering within their life is sufficient to support the asymmetry** that I am defending. The point is that we regret suffering but not the absent pleasures of those who could have existed.

#### Therefore, the alternative is to walk into extinction and reject anything attempting to prevent the alternative. The human race will die out eventually with extinction, it happens in the way that minimizes the most suffering because we don't pointlessly bring new people into existence. There is no reason to perpetuate the human race-

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The human race therefore, as it is now, will die out one way or another. Whether it is destroyed through warfare, disease, heavenly bodies, or changed via adaptation that gave rise to us in the first place, our species will almost beyond all doubt cease to exist. This will happen anyway. As we face it now, we have questions about how we deal with suffering and what we can do to alleviate that suffering. (I am ignoring science-porn examples of freezing ourselves, curing death, etc.) This does not answer my claim, nor does it explain something even more fundamental. What is so special about our species that we ought to keep it going? When I read John Wyndham’s sci-fi classic The Day of the Triffids, about a post-apocalyptic world in which most people are blinded and everyone is hunted by giant, man-eating plants, I was struck by one of the first points of focus for the survivors: continuing the human ‘race’. It disgusted me because the central committee decreed that women would now have to submit to the awful lecherousness of men inserting themselves into these women, out of some sense of anthropocentric ‘duty’. The race must continue! But why? It is so automatic in assumptions there are even horrid jokes about: ‘If I was the last man and you were the last women, would you sleep with me?’ – as if being the Anti-Adam and Anti-Eve means you have some duty to continue the species. No you don’t. We are not special. There is no cosmic purpose to us being here, nor is there some cosmic purpose we are fulfilling by continuing to exist or making horrid laws chaining women’s organs to the desires of men for more humans. The worst part of course is that this is not as fictional as we would like to believe: women are treated this way, sometimes even in modern Western democracies. Sometimes they also treat themselves this way, which seems to ignite the idiocy completely: the human species must continue, so I will have bagfuls of children. This is perhaps the most fundamental reason people, I think, will continue to create children. Making people seems to push the horizon of death or at least complete non-existence further back. I will return to this point shortly.

## K-Short

#### **Life sucks, humans are bad, and we shouldn’t make any more people. We impact turn preventing extinction.**

Benatar 15

 ‘We Are Creatures That Should Not Exist’: The Theory of Anti-Natalism, July 15, 2015 2:00 pm Published by David Benatar

**Anti-natalism is the view that we ought to desist from procreating** – that it is wrong to have children. There are various routes to this conclusion. Some of these are what we might call “philanthropic” routes. They emanate from concern for the humans who will be brought into existence if we do procreate. According to these arguments **life is filled with suffering and we ought not to create more of it. Many** pro-natalists balk at this suggestion and **claim**, at the very least, that **the good in life outweighs the bad.** They should pause to remember the following. **First**, **there is ample evidence from psychological research that** (most) **people are prone to** an **optimism bias and** are subject to other psychological traits that lead them to **underestimate the amount of bad in life** [4]. We thus have excellent reason for distrusting most people’s cheery assessments of how well their lives are going. **Second**, when we look closely we notice just how much **suffering** there is. Consider, for example, the **millions** **living in poverty** **or subjected to violence** or the threat thereof. **Psychological distress** and disturbance is widespread. Rates of **depression** are high. Everybody suffers frustrations and bereavements. Life is often punctuated by periods of **ill-health**. Some of these pass without enduring effects but others have long-term sequelae. In poorer parts of the world, infectious **diseases** account for most of the burden of disease. However, those in the developed world are not exempt from appalling diseases. They suffer from strokes, from various degenerative diseases and from cancer. **Third**, even if one thought that the best of human lives were good (enough), **to procreate is to inflict, on the being you create, unacceptable risks of grotesque suffering**, even if that occurs at the end of life. For example, **40% of men** and 37% of women **in Britain** **develop cancer** at some point. Those are just terrible odds. **To inflict** **them** **on another person by bringing him into existence is reckless**. Rust Cohle expresses this idea when he says that he thinks “about the hubris it must take to yank a soul out of nonexistence into this … Force a life into this thresher …” [5] (His talk of souls should obviously be taken metaphorically.) Another route to anti-natalism is via what I call a “misanthropic” argument. According to this argument **humans are a deeply flawed and a destructive species that is responsible for the suffering and deaths of billions of other humans and non-human animals**. [6] **If that level of destruction were caused by another species we would rapidly recommend that new members of that species not be brought into existence**.

#### Pleasure its good but its absence isn’t bad—you have no offense under util.

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# 2NR

## Overview

#### The thesis of the K is that we impact turn extinction. Extinction is net good and we should strive to achieve it as fast as possible. That means we impact turn the 1AC’s need to save the world from extinction. Suffering is inevitable and so is death and extinction, the 1AC only moves the extinction line further back which means more suffering will occur as disease and poverty mangle billions. The argument of asymmetry goes like this, the absence of pain is not bad for those who exist and don’t exist, but the absence of pleasure is instrumentally bad only for those who exist. An absence of pleasure for those who don’t exist is not bad. Which means in all cases it’s better to not exist. Extinction means procreation is impossible and no new lives will be brought into the world. That means we reduce pain and suffering more than the AC and for longer. The 1AC has 0 offense under util. – ignore their risk of happiness argument, [a] un-warranted and impossible to prove [b] it’s net safer for none of us to procreate.

# Frontlines

## A2 Benatar Doesn’t Say Extinction

#### Extinction now prevents future suffering

Benatar 06

David, philosopher, Better Never to Have Been, books.google.com/books/about/Better\_Never\_to\_Have\_Been\_The\_Harm\_of\_Co.html?id=-6UbHqrdWy4C

In order to determine whether this regrettable feature of impending extinction is bad all things considered, we must take account not only of the final people’s interests, but also of the harm that is avoided by not producing new generations. Whenever humanity comes to an end, there will be serious costs for the last people. Either they will be killed or they will languish from the consequences of dwindling population and the collapse of social infrastructure. All things being equal, nothing is gained if this happens later. The same suffering occurs. But there is a cost that does not have to be paid if extinction occurs earlier—the cost to the intervening new generations, those that exist between the present generation and final one. The case for earlier extinction is thus strong.