# 1AC- The Eternal Emptiness

### Part 1- The Emptiness

Rest your hands on your lap or your knees and let your shoulders shrug

Remember that you don’t have anywhere else to be in this moment but right here, right now, doing this

Take a deep breath and feel the air go through your nose and through that nickel-sized spot right at the beginning of your throat

Feel it fill up your lungs and remember that this is life.

Take a few more breaths and with each one feel the cycle of the universe filling all living beings with life and purpose– know this is where you came from and where we all go at the end.

…

“The pearl of compassion is entirely auspicious,

The wisdom lotus cannot be tainted,

All phenomena arise interdependently and are therefore intrinsically nonarising,

May all beings be able to realize these truths”

* Gao et al, 19, A Randomized Controlled Trial of Awareness Training Program (ATP), a Group-Based Mahayana Buddhist Intervention, SpringerLink, 1-17-2019, DOA: 1-14-2022, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12671-018-1082-1, r0w@n

### Part 2- The Advocacy

#### Nice to meet you judge, I’m you, you’re me, we’re all each other– now vote aff

Segura 11 (Alejandro Chavez Segura - PhD in Divinity (University of St. Andrews) Expert in AQAL integral approach Research interests: religion and politics, international political theory and philosophical approaches to peacebuilding Expert in Easter philosophy, mainly Buddhism and Taoism. A Theology of International Relations: A Buddhist Approach to Religion and Politics in an Interdependent World, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277090486_A_theology_of_international_relations_a_Buddhist_approach_to_religion_and_politics_in_an_interdependent_world>, r0w@n

Therefore,  the  method  of  causality  will  be  used  throughout  the  thesis.  This method is rooted in a Buddhist understanding of the empty nature of all phenomena and thus the interdependent reality of everything in existence. Everything, from human existence to relations between states and institutions is a consequence of particular arrangements of causes and conditions. This implies a constant flux of emotions, 1 ‘The Heart Sutra’ in Buddhist Wisdom Books: The Diamond Sutra and the Heart Sutra, Edward Conze trans. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958), 81. 9 thoughts, actions and interests in play, driven by different emotions such as anger, hatred and delusion or compassion, generosity and mindfulness. The Buddha clearly established this dependent nature of all phenomena, and thus its emptiness of independent arising,2 in the formula: when there is this, there is that (imasmim sati idam hoti); when this arises, that arises (imassuppada idam uppajjati); when this is not, the other is not (imasmim asati idamna hoti); ceasing this, that ceases (imassa nirodha idam nirujhati). In this methodology, where everything is taken as interdependent, the levels of analysis are intertwined but primacy had been given to the individual level. This is not to overlook or dismiss the social, institutional, state, interstate or global levels but, to the contrary, this methodology argues that these levels are the projection of the sum of individual will and ways of thinking, which are institutionalized through the process of intersubjective consensus. Therefore, this Theology of International Relations is the result of the sum of a Buddhist theological root, an international validity, case studies which ratify its basic premises and, finally, the construction of variables and causal explanatory arguments to guide further study of the role of individuals in re-creating their own relative reality and the possibility of making this reality a compassionate and satisfactory existence.

#### The ego- or the fake perception of the individual- is the root of all suffering

De Silva, 98 (Padmasiri de Silva, Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at Monash University, *Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in Buddhism*, pg 37-38)//DH+ r0w@n

The Buddhist analysis of ego-centricism may be explained in relation to a number of doctrinal strands**. The roots of unwholesome motivation are greed, aggression, and delusion**; and non-greed, non-aggression and non-delusion are the roots of wholesome motivation. Of these, as mentioned earlier, what is referred to as **delusion is** basically an existential confusion about the usage of conventional terms like the “self” and “ego”. What we call the **ego instincts** in Buddhism **is one of the forms of craving**. The three forms of craving are the craving for sensuous gratification, craving for egotistic pursuits and the craving for self-annihilation. **The craving for egotistical pursuits** **has** its **deeper spring in** the dogma of personal immortality. This is **the belief in an ego entity independent of the physical and the mental processes that constitute life.** The ego illusion (atta-ditthi) may also be related to an annihilationist belief, where the ego-entity is associated with the mental and physical processes that are assumed to come to an end at death. **Such** annihilationist **views** may be **closely related to hedonistic and materialistic lifestyles, destructive behavior and even suicide**. The Buddhist middle path accepts only the processes of physical and mental phenomena, which continually arise and disappear. This process, which is referred to as dependent origination, provides the basis for understanding the nature of the human-social-nature matrix within which we live. **The ego illusion is** not merely an intellectual construction, but is **fed by deeper affective processes.** Human traits like acquisitiveness, excessive possessiveness, the urge to hoard and acquire things more than needed, the impulse to outdo other, envy, and jealousy are reciprocally linked to the belief in an ego. Beliefs influence desires and desires influence beliefs. Some of **the social, economic and political structures that people build collectively** may turn out to be **more subtle expressions of their ego**, while other human creations may be expression caring and sharing. Apart from the tendency to construct a pure ego and the related expressions of excessive craving, there are also more subtle conceits(mana) which are only transcended at a later stage on the path to liberation from suffering. The Buddha in fact mentions twenty forms of wrong personality beliefs (de Silva, 1992b, 119-27).

#### Self-effacing epistemic networks like debate operate from the nexus of direct communication embroiled in fixed paths of knowledge and discovery – only the aff’s research project creates allows for an alternative modality to escape karmic desire

**Wang 2k** [Youru Wang, Philosophy Department, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong, “The Pragmatics of ‘Never Tell Too Plainly': indirect communication in Chan Buddhism”, 7-31-2000; https://terebess.hu/zen/YouruWang.html]///vishfish

This essay borrows terms or categories, such as pragmatics and indirect communication, from contemporary Western philosophical discourses to examine relevant issues in Chan Buddhist thought. As a general term for the study of language use, pragmatics here is not used in the same way as Anglo-American philosophers of language would use. The adoption of this term is closer to Deleuze's or Lyotard's use of the term.[1] It comprises a critique of Anglo-American pragmatics in supposing that neither intention nor conventional rules can ensure a shared structure for all language use. Therefore, pragmatics, when it is applied in the examination of Chan communication, is certainly contextual, historical and structurally open-ended. In this study, the term pragmatics will be sometimes interchangeable with the 'general principle' or 'general strategy' of Chan communication that is distinguished from those sub-categories or more specific strategies of Chan communication. However, no matter how `general' it could be for the convenience of analysis, this pragmatics will only attempt to delineate some structural features of Chan communication in their contexts that are determined by various factors. It does not seek, by theoretic abstraction, any fixed system or foundation for understanding Chan communication out of its changing context. Nor does it attempt to discover something like a scientific conclusion for all `indirect communication' . It turns away from these tendencies and tries to keep up with the dynamic, living reality of Chan language use. As for indirect communication, it is obviously different from direct communication. The former involves a critique of the latter. The traditional concept of direct communication in the West can be traced back to Aristotle's Rhetoric.[2] This concept can be broadly defined as the following: it is speaker-oriented and assumes a linear, teleological [p9] relation between the speaker and the receiver; it presupposes the direct or corresponding relation between language and thought, thought and object; it regards the message or what is communicated as objective, context-free and separable from existentio-practical concerns; it considers meaning determined, unequivocal, and transparent; it confines itself to the direct use of language, namely, the descriptive, cognitive, or propositional use of language. Indirect communication, on the contrary, can be broadly defined as listener- or reader-oriented, and non-teleological; it assumes an interactive relation between the speaker and the listener; it abandons the correspondence theory of language; it is concerned with the existentio-practical dimension of what is communicated; it considers meaning open-ended and indeterminate; it adopts indirect language, such as metaphorical, poetic, paradoxical language. This concept of indirect communication is recently favoured by Western philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida and even the later Wittgenstein from one side, and Kierkegaard from the other side. Kierkegaard expounds that existential reality can only be communicated indirectly, since each individual must live in it.[3] Heidegger and other philosophers reveal that the process of communication is always open-ended, non-teleological, interactive between the speaker and the listener, and therefore always indirect.[4] Although their emphases are different, the underlying connection between Kierkegaard' s view and that of more recent philosophers has been exposed by recent studies.[5] My definition of indirect communication here, as one can see, is a synthesis of all these philosophers' contributions. Although we should never forget to clarify all historical contexts, this concept of indirect communication embraces those important issues that the Chan strategy of indirect communication already addresses. This categorising does not conceal that the Chan Buddhist approach to indirect communication is more analogous to the Kierkegaardian approach in the sense that existentio-practical dimension is primordial to the way of communication. However, Chan Buddhists do share some important views with contemporary philosophers on the indirection of communication. [6] The issue of communication has been salient in Chan Buddhism ever since Chan Buddhists made the claim that Chan is a 'special (or separate) transmission outside theoretic teachings' . This special transmission is sometimes also identified by Chan Buddhists as `the transmission from mind to mind'. The uniqueness of the claim for Chan transmission or communication has drawn the attention of several modern scholars and interpreters. De Martino, in his essay on Chan/Zen communication, clearly states that Chan/Zen communication could `be spoken of as a communication that is no-communication'.[7] D.T. Suzuki, in his famous debate with Hu Shi, reaches the same point concerning Chan/Zen communication. He writes: `Strictly speaking, ... there is no conveying at all'.[8] These interpretations quite obviously tend to draw a line between Chan communication or transmission and our ordinary communication as conveyance of information or knowledge. As my definition has shown, we subsume the latter type of communication under the category of direct communication. The Chan strategy of communication, then, without doubt, fits into our category of indirect communication. Hu Shi, in his important essay 'Chan (Zen) Buddhism in China: Its History and Method' , pays special heed to one of Chan's peculiar methods of instruction —`never tell too plainly' (bushuopo).[9] Hu Shi points out that by using this method of never explaining things `in too plain language', the Chan masters let `the individual find out things through his own effort and through his own ever-widening life experience'.[10] To show the practical consequence of this method, Hu Shi cites a quote about bushuopo from the sayings of a great Chan master Dongshan Liangjie: ‘It is not [p9] my former master's virtue or Buddha Dharma that I esteem, only that he did not make exhaustive explanations for me'.[11] This saying illustrates that in the master-disciple communication of Chan, the indirect way of communication itself is inseparable from, and even more important than, what is communicated. It has an important bearing on the realisation of enlightenment. Hu Shi' s effort to call attention to the study of the Chan strategy and principle of `never tell too plainly' is, therefore, significant to any more advanced investigations of indirect communication in Chan. Unfortunately, not much has been done in this regard since Hu Shi's discussion.

#### Debaters have the wrong intent- that means they will NEVER overcome attitudes of self-cherishment which condemns their policies and their analysis to structural failure and they will fail to overcome their own internal suffering

John M. Yowell, 15, “IF THE HELLS ARE NOT EMPTY”: A FRAMEWORK FOR A BUDDHIST CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY, The University of Texas at Arlington, May 2015, DOA: 1-1-2022, https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/bitstream/handle/10106/25077/Yowell\_uta\_2502M\_13122.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, r0w@n

If their work is to be truly impactful and accessible in the spirit of the Bodhisattva ideal it must be undertaken with the intent to advance more than idle knowledge. This is not to condemn pure research; but simply to place it outside of the scope of our concern at the moment. As has been previously discussed, it is the intent behind one’s actions rather than the act itself which determines its karma. This altruistic intent, bodhicitta, allows one to overcome an attitude of self-cherishing which is strongly associated with the generation of suffering within the self (Hattam, 2004). The mind which cultivates bodhicitta works not for the benefit of self but instead from a quality of mind characterized by love and compassion. It utilizes a logic of basic 43 goodness which disregards preconception and expectation and acts in the moment for positive ends. For the critical theorist this intent should be fairly straight forward. Those whose work is aimed at the provocation of liberatory action of all sorts can be said to have this right intent. In fact, one of the few tropes present in existing engagements between critical theory and Buddhism is that of Marx as bodhisattva. For Marx, the ultimate goal of the theorist is not simply to facilitate an understanding of the world but to change the material conditions which contribute to suffering. It is not a vehicle for the advancement of a particular political agenda, although this may be an unintended consequence of knowledge gained through critical inquiry. Turning again to Marx, his advocacy of socialism was not the sole purpose of his work but rather the necessary result of his formulation and understanding of political economy and the alienating forces contained therein. Simply put, to undertake the task of critical inquiry with a particular agenda in mind makes one’s work a slave to that agenda.

#### Debate’s indulgence in contemporary politics condemns us to their fear-machines

John M. Yowell, 15, “IF THE HELLS ARE NOT EMPTY”: A FRAMEWORK FOR A BUDDHIST CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY, The University of Texas at Arlington, May 2015, DOA: 12-29-2021, https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/bitstream/handle/10106/25077/Yowell\_uta\_2502M\_13122.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, r0w@n

Buddhism, as we have seen, is fundamentally revolutionary in its history and teachings. From the Buddha’s sudden abandonment of his worldly life to seek out liberation, this revolutionary spirit has been cultivated throughout Buddhist philosophy as a means of promoting the immediate possibility of enlightenment and liberation. This immediacy is what sets Buddhism apart from much of the world’s dominant religions and philosophies. It is also what makes it especially well suited to the task of understanding and responding to the pressing issues of the present, the resolution of which cannot possibly be sought through gradualist means. Buddhist philosophy further operates through an understanding that each individual is intrinsically interconnected and therefore must operate as though every action, no matter how superficially benign, is meaningful in that it contributes to the collective activity of society, writing its social karma, and moving society either closer to or further away from liberation in that moment. The individual agency to affect change is meaningless without this understanding, particularly in light of the various alienating forces of modernity; conditions which we must all concern ourselves with. Gary Snyder, in 1961, described the importance of individual action based on Buddhist principles in response to the social, political, and economic conditions of his time: No one today can afford to be innocent, or indulge himself in ignorance of the nature of contemporary governments, politics and social orders. The national polities of the modern world maintain their existence by deliberately fostered craving and fear: monstrous protection rackets. The “free world” has become economically dependent on a fantastic system of stimulation of greed which cannot be fulfilled, sexual desire which cannot be satiated and hatred which has no outlet against oneself, the persons one is supposed to love, or the revolutionary aspirations of pitiful, poverty-stricken marginal societies... They create populations of “preta” – hungry ghosts, with giant appetites and throats no bigger than needles. The soil, the forests and all animal life are being consumed by these cancerous collectivities; the air and water of the planet is being fouled by them (1969). 35 Despite the more than fifty years which have passed since Snyder authored this characterization, painfully little has been done in the way of alleviating the political, social, and economic roots of the innumerable sufferings of humanity.

#### Debate is a performance of the link of a problem to its solution- that ignores the way mindsets and situational dynamics shape our world and doom any potential for movements

Hershock, 07, (Peter D. Hershock, Coordinator of the Asian Studies Development Program, degrees from Yale University (B.A., Philosophy) and the University of Hawai’i (Ph.D., Asian and Comparative Philosophy) and has focused his research on the philosophical dimensions of Buddhism and on using Buddhist conceptual resources to address contemporary issues, including: technology and development, education, human rights, and the role of values in cultural and social change, Towards Global Transformation, proceedings of the third international conference on gross national happiness, Oct. 7, 2009, “Activating Difference: Appreciating Equity in an Era of Global Interdependence”, pgs. 1-9.)//LOH

For most of us, having been educated to a global modern standard, it Is natural to assume that It is only through moving In the direction of greater universalIty and equality that lnequtiy can be overcome, poverty reduced, and dignity made possible kir all. That Is. we believe that It Is through our eonuixnialtty - not our dIfferences — that we will find a happy rente to global tranafonnatlon. M I understand it, the main tille of this conference, Woridvtews Make s Dllfererice. in.’itsts otherwise. And I would like to take a few moments to press the point that global transformation for greater equity, dignity asid happiness will not come abon I through deepening our sense of coinnionafity alone, but only to the degree that we also activate our diflërences as the basic condition for nuituol confrthutfrwr it Is a cantraJ tenet of Buddhist Qdjtis - but one that I believe Is shared by all systems of effective religious, social and political peaetlee - that meaningful change can only be Initiated and sustained on the basis of present circumstances, as they have corne to be. In the present era, the any things have come to be is very much a function of the interlocking array of pence-ses that we refer to as ‘globalisation’. Let me mention three key siflcts of these Processes, each of them in large measure both driven by and driving sclenupæ ap techookigical advances. ¡ and most notably perhaps. Is accelerattp,g and Intenslfy change. Globalisation la bringing not only nave thenge traire rapidly, but alan the advent of qualitatively distinct kinds of change Of particular Importance is the phenomenon kflOWi1 ‘emergence’. stnicturaliy significant changes occurring ¡ in con1pie, syst that in principle could not have been nucipe, but that after the fact do make pertaci sense.Second are homogenislng effects that led many early cnc globalisation to fear the Westernisation or Me nialdisation world, but that In fact have fostered truly global forms of pul culture and, more Importantly, patterns of convergence that. for example. allow credit cards to be used the world over and are beginning to enable students to take advantage of virtually borderleas higher education. Third arr pluralizing effects that hase taken the form of resurgent national and ethnic Identities, but also niche global production networks, and such acutely uneven geography of development that the top 2% of the world’s people now own of global wealth while the bottom 50% own less than 1%. As a combined result. we are not only in an era of change. but a change of eras. More specifically, I would submit that we are in the midst of a transition from an era dominated by problem-solution to one dominated by predicament-resolution. Problems arise when changing circumstances make evident the laihire of existing practices for meeting abiding needs and interests. **Solving problems Involves developing new or improved means for arriving at ends we fully intend to continue pursuing**. For example, gas/electric hybrid automobile engines solve the problem’ of rising fuel costs. Predicaments occur when changing circumstances lead to or make us aware of conflicts competition among our own values. Intereata. development sitas, and constructions of meaning. **Predicaments cannot be solved- They can only be resolved through sustaining detailed attention to** situational dynamics and realising both enhanced clarity and more thoroughly and deeply coordinated commitments. World hunger Is not a problem. Enough food is grown to supply adequate nutrition for all, **What Is lacking Is the resolve** to bring our economic. social and political values, Intentions and practices into alignment with doing so. World hunger is a predicament. And an increasingly significant part of the reason that we make so little headway In addressing It and other apparently intractable issues like global climate change, illiteracy and mounting economic inequity is because we persist in thinking about them as problems awaiting technical solution, rather than as predicaments commanding sustained and ever deepening resolve. In sum 21st centuiy patterns of globalisation are raising crucial questions about the owa arid riwwung difference, presenting u with a poradoxicaJ Impasse ur axnia On the other hand, we need to more fully recognize and respect difference, going beyond tolerating differences from and among others to enable differences to matter more, not less. On the Other hand, we nerd to engage In more robust collective action and global common cause. ,omtrng differences within shared find deepening To Ignore our differences now is to fail resolving current predicaments and to foster conditions for more, and more Intense, predicaments in the future.

#### Debates about appropriation are the wrong starting point- awareness is the path that comes from love

Middleton, Deborah; Plá, 18, Adapting the Dharma: Buddhism and Contemporary Theatre Training, No Publication, 2018, DOA: 1-15-2022, https://www.proquest.com/openview/65b575f54e7bf8260fe0501e909c4f21/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=39853, r0w@n

When viewed and experienced in this way, free from habitual ‘discursiveness of mind and body’, the perceived reality of the body can profoundly change. As Ray writes, of his own Buddhist bodywork, ‘We might find that, rather than being solid, our body seems filled with space’ (Ray, 2014: 207). Space Awareness The opening exercise in the MSA ‘First Set’ is called ‘Intensification of Space’. Starting from the sense of one’s body, lying in position on the floor, awareness is expanded towards and then through and beyond the other people in the room, the walls, floor and ceiling, and out into the expanses of earth, sky, and cosmos. The ‘space’ of MSA is all-pervasive; as intimate as the space between one’s arm and the side of one’s body; as extensive as outer space. ‘Awareness’ of space is both the act of tuning into the proprioceptive information available to the psychophysical system, and the act of imagining beyond the reach of the immediate sensory environment. As a mental training, Worley tells us that, ‘The practice rekindles the mind’s natural flexibility by not allowing it to fixate, narrow, or become biased...’ (Worley, 2016: 109). One cannot both hold a sense of inner and outer space and at the same time retract into a narrow ego-consciousness. Thus, the sense of a separate ‘I’ is difficult to sustain through the experiences of intensified and relaxed relating to space. Worley notes that when muscular intensification is released into deep relaxation, ‘habitual clutching at “me” and “my body” dissolves’ and ‘an empty but bright spaciousness appears’ (Worley, 2016: 110).

#### Political debates condemn real problems to death- only action-based frameworks achieve practical results

John M. Yowell, 15, “IF THE HELLS ARE NOT EMPTY”: A FRAMEWORK FOR A BUDDHIST CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY, The University of Texas at Arlington, May 2015, DOA: 1-1-2022, https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/bitstream/handle/10106/25077/Yowell\_uta\_2502M\_13122.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, r0w@n

The political impact of this lack of focus on the present is a similar mode of inactivity. When mired in the back and forth of political discourse between parties working toward disparate, albeit similarly apocalyptic, ends, the result is often to do nothing, assuming that given enough time a solution will emerge which adheres to the perspective of at least a majority of those concerned. This is of course just waiting for a different rabbit to hit a different stump. It would further seem that the more pressing an issue, the more politicized it becomes, fueling the divisive fires of hopefulness and moving humanity further away from even attempting to act. The obvious example of such an issue is climate change. Despite overwhelming academic consensus on the matter, the social and political response has been largely one of inaction. This inaction is the result of multiple manifestations of the apocalyptic worldview. Across the spectrum we have seen a lack of response justified in many ways; the Christian belief that God ultimately controls all things and therefore we have no agency to intervene, the argument that the economic costs of responding to climate change are not justified due to a particular interpretation of scientific data, the claim that the science itself is entirely faulty, and the belief that if incentivized enough the free market will address the issue itself. Even within more progressive circles conflict is perpetuated between those who support cap-and-trade and those who would like to see a carbon tax. Each of these points of view, as well as the innumerable others, carries with it the hopeful fantasy that it represents a solution, if not the solution, to the issue of climate change. What results is a universal hesitancy to act at all in any manner which might prove successful. This situation parallels the Buddhist tale of Zen Master Nansen: Nansen saw the monks of the eastern and western halls fighting over a cat. He seized the cat and told the monks: "If any of you say a good word, you can save the cat." No one answered. So Nansen boldly cut the cat in two pieces. That evening Joshu returned and Nansen told him about this. Joshu removed his sandals and, placing them on his head, walked out. Nansen said: "If you had been there, you could have saved the cat." (Ekai, 1934) This story is a demonstration of the Buddhist mind oriented in the present. The lesson being that an action taken in the present, toward the preservation of good, in this case the life of the 41 cat and Nansen’s karma, is far superior to inaction. Joshu obviously would have had no way of knowing that his response would have saved the cat’s life, but his ability to demonstrate that he would have acted in that moment to attempt a resolution is what sets his enlightened mind apart from the unenlightened minds of the bickering monks. He is not concerned with taking the ‘right’ path but rather in connecting with the world without hesitation. This is the mindset which facilitates the sudden action of liberation for the self and in turn all beings. It is the heart of a revolutionary critical Buddhism

#### Every act is always either liberatory or counterliberatory

John M. Yowell, 15, “IF THE HELLS ARE NOT EMPTY”: A FRAMEWORK FOR A BUDDHIST CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY, The University of Texas at Arlington, May 2015, DOA: 12-29-2021, https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/bitstream/handle/10106/25077/Yowell\_uta\_2502M\_13122.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, r0w@n

Buddhism, as we have seen, is fundamentally revolutionary in its history and teachings. From the Buddha’s sudden abandonment of his worldly life to seek out liberation, this revolutionary spirit has been cultivated throughout Buddhist philosophy as a means of promoting the immediate possibility of enlightenment and liberation. This immediacy is what sets Buddhism apart from much of the world’s dominant religions and philosophies. It is also what makes it especially well suited to the task of understanding and responding to the pressing issues of the present, the resolution of which cannot possibly be sought through gradualist means. Buddhist philosophy further operates through an understanding that each individual is intrinsically interconnected and therefore must operate as though every action, no matter how superficially benign, is meaningful in that it contributes to the collective activity of society, writing its social karma, and moving society either closer to or further away from liberation in that moment. The individual agency to affect change is meaningless without this understanding, particularly in light of the various alienating forces of modernity; conditions which we must all concern ourselves with. Gary Snyder, in 1961, described the importance of individual action based on Buddhist principles in response to the social, political, and economic conditions of his time: No one today can afford to be innocent, or indulge himself in ignorance of the nature of contemporary governments, politics and social orders. The national polities of the modern world maintain their existence by deliberately fostered craving and fear: monstrous protection rackets. The “free world” has become economically dependent on a fantastic system of stimulation of greed which cannot be fulfilled, sexual desire which cannot be satiated and hatred which has no outlet against oneself, the persons one is supposed to love, or the revolutionary aspirations of pitiful, poverty-stricken marginal societies... They create populations of “preta” – hungry ghosts, with giant appetites and throats no bigger than needles. The soil, the forests and all animal life are being consumed by these cancerous collectivities; the air and water of the planet is being fouled by them (1969). 35 Despite the more than fifty years which have passed since Snyder authored this characterization, painfully little has been done in the way of alleviating the political, social, and economic roots of the innumerable sufferings of humanity.

#### Thus the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best endorses the politics of mindfulness. The aff engages in a rejection of karmic desire systems in favor of wisdoms of detachment through poetic mindfulness.

Matthew J. Moore, 16, Buddhism, Mindfulness, and Transformative Politics, California Polytechnic State University, 2016, DOA: 1-4-2021, <https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=poli_fac>, r0w@n

The Buddha laid out his core teachings in his first sermon (the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta6). The teachings begin with the Four Noble Truths. The first is that life is dukkha, which means “suffering” but also can mean something a bit less harsh: that life is inevitably and persistently unsatisfactory. The second noble truth is that suffering is caused by clinging (ta૽hā; the word literally means “thirst”) to ideas, sensations, desires, and other phenomena of our experience. The third truth teaches that suffering can be stopped (nirodha; “cessation”) by learning not to cling, and the fourth identifies following the Noble Eightfold Path as the way to cease clinging, by practicing right understanding, intention, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and concentration. In the Satipatଣଣhāna Sutta, the Buddha identified mindfulness—non-judgmental present-moment awareness—as an especially helpfulpath toward overcoming clinging and achieving enlightenment. The Buddha describes how one can build thefour establishments of mindfulness, which are awareness of the body (sensation), feeling(emotion), mind (thoughts), and phenomena (other mental activity): Monks, this is the one-way path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the passing away of pain and dejection, for the attainment of the true way, for the realization of Nibbāna [Sanskrit: Nirvana]—namely, the four establishments of mindfulness. What are the four? Here monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly comprehending, and mindful, having subdued longing and dejection in regard to the world**.** [The same formula is repeated for feeling, mind, and phenomena.]….And how, monks, does a monk dwell contemplating the body in the body? Here a monk, gone to the forest, to the foot of a tree, or to an empty hut, sits down; having folded his legs crosswise, straightened his body, and established mindfulness in front of him, just mindful he breathes in, mindful he breathes out. [Similar instructions are given for feeling, mind, and phenomena.]7 In essence, mindfulness is the opposite of clinging. One is simply, non-judgmentally aware of one’s experience, without either chasing after pleasant experiences or avoiding unpleasant experiences. The four foundations of mindfulness—body, feeling, mind, and phenomena— collectively exhaust the possible objects of experience, so that there is nothing excluded from one’s mindful awareness. Later in the same text, the Buddha says that someone who could practice this for seven days would either achieve Nibbāna or would suffer only one further rebirth before achieving enlightenment.8

#### Meditation and reflection unifies the body and the mind- shedding us from the ego and helping us embrace ethicality

Forge, 97, (Paul G. La Forge, Divine Word Missionary and professor in the Business Management Department of Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan, Masters Degree in Clinical-Counseling Psychology, he holds a third class black belt in Kodokan Judo, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 16, No. 12/13, From the Universities to the Marketplace: The Business Ethics Journey: The Second Annual Internationa Vincentian Conference Promoting Business Ethics (Sep., 1997), pp. 1283-1295, “Teaching Business Ethics through Meditation”, JSTOR)//LOH + r0w@n

Business Ethics taught only from books and textual materials may occupy an important place in education, but my purpose is different. My goal is to help the students become ethical persons. This requires an ability to perform three seemingly simple tasks: First, to recognize ethical issues; second, to analyze them; and third, to act upon them. The ethical principles derived from textual materials covered in a Business Ethics course have their place, but only as a tool or a standard used by an ethical person. The purpose of this article is to show how **meditation can be used to** help the student to **become an ethical person**. My purpose in using meditation to teach Business Ethics is to produce people with an "Ethical Vision". Meditation gives students an awareness of ethical issues in their lives and leads to the discovery and application of models of ethical conduct to serve as guides to behavior in general and to ethical decision making in particular. In effect, I use meditation to stop the world. There are many ways to stop the world and many kinds of meditation. I will restrict myself to two forms, namely, discursive and non-dis cursive meditation. The classroom communica tion process between the instructor and the students is slowed down by both non-discursive and discursive meditation so that students can learn to use meditation to accomplish the three tasks mentioned above. Non-discursive **meditation greatly contributes to the process of constructing** a vision because it gives people **a sense of themselves and their place in the world.** Discursive meditation, in its many forms, gives substance to an ethical vision because it leads to an awakening to the existence and importance of ethical issues in life. In part one, I will describe how the students are led through non-discursive meditation to discover themselves as ethical persons. They are also given the tools to explore ethical issues through non-discursive meditation. In part two, I will discuss a transition state between non-discursive and discursive medita tion. After discovering themselves as ethical persons, the students are led to use non-discur sive meditation as a technique to construct their own ethical value system and apply it to their own lives. At this transition stage, an art medium is extremely useful for discovering and analyzing meanings, especially ethical meanings. Through non-discursive meditation, the indi vidual is taught to become aware of him/herself and his/her place in the world. However, non discursive meditation is not an end in itself. Discursive meditation, as is explained in more detail in part three, gives the participant a chance to compare who he/she is with what he/she should be. Here the student is encouraged to compare the values he/she has discovered about him/herself during non-discursive meditation with an ideal, and construct a system of ethical principles for him/herself using discursive meditation. Textual materials are recommended here and the student is encouraged to search for the ideal. The result is the development of a person with an ethical vision through meditation in both non-discursive and discursive forms. I. Discovering ethical issues through non-discursive meditation An ethical person must become aware of his/her self, his/her ethical values, and his/her place in the world. Non-discursive meditation can be a powerful device **to teach** students how they can stop their world and take stock of their lives because **the body itself participates in the meditation as the locus of experience and insight, inseparably one with the mind** (Takeuchi, 1993, p. xx). At this point, the process is entirely self centered and observational, without the con straint of reference to any system of ethics or values. Thus viewed, it is only a first step, but a very necessary first step **to** becoming an ethical person. Because this step is only a means to an end, virtually any school of non-discursive meditation will suffice. There are many kinds of non-discursive meditation techniques, such as Taikyokken, Zen, and Yoga; these teach people to look at and reflect on their place in the world. The goal is to teach students a way of stopping and reflecting, to provide a context for devel oping and applying their own values. Therefore, non-discursive meditation is not used as an end in itself. Taikyokken, Yoga, or Zen all have their proponents, but in an ethics class, they serve only as a tool, not as a philosophy. **Non-discursive meditation serves to** stop the world. Students, like business people, lead busy, active, stressful lives. Non-discursive meditation serves to put a brake on the activities of a busy day. The ethical person must be able to stop this world and reflect upon life. This is an ability to step aside from normal activities in order to recognize ethical issues that arise in business or personal life.

#### Purely technical knowledge is useless – must be tied to INTERNAL self-awareness in order for education to retain transformative power

Snauwaert 9 - Associate Professor of Educational Theory and Social Foundations of Education; Chair of the Department of Foundations of Education, University of Toledo

(Dale, “The Ethics and Ontology of Cosmopolitanism: Education for a Shared Humanity,” Current Issues in Comparative Education 12.1, Directory of Open Access Journals)//BB

The Ghandhian perspective is not foreign to Western philosophy and education. It was the dominant paradigm of Ancient philosophy. For the Greeks and Romans, philosophy did not primarily concern the construction of abstract theoretical systems; philosophy was conceived as a choice of a way of life, a justification for that choice, and the articulation of the path or curriculum leading to the realization of the ideals of that way of life. The focus of philosophy and education was the transformation of one’s life as a mode of Being. As a path, philosophy included sets of spiritual exercises necessary for the transformation of one’s being in accordance with the spiritual vision of the philosophy. Schools were formed out of the chosen way of life of the philosophy and those attracted to the philosophy. In these schools, the way of life defined by the philosophy and the understandings and exercises necessary to live that life were developed, taught, and experienced. Philosophy and inner transformation are linked in such a way that the discovery of the true and the good is contingent upon the transformation of the truth seeker’s being. **Education is** thus **devoted to the internal transformation of the consciousness of the student** (Foucault, 2005; Hadot, 1993, 2002; Hadot & Davidson, 1995; Hadot & Marcus, 1998). The necessity of internal transformation was not only pertinent to the search for truth; it had great relevance for morality as well. The moral response to others was thought to be contingent upon the quality of the moral agent’s character. Character was understood as a structure of virtues or capacities that enabled one to morally respond to others. The care of the self was thus thought to be interconnected and interdependent with care for others. However, as Michel Foucault demonstrates, at the beginning of modernity (referred to as the “Cartesian” moment), modern epistemology divorces the true and the good from the subject, resulting in **the separation of knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge** becomes **merely the technical discovery of truth divorced from the subjectivity of the knower**; education in turn becomes the transmission of technical knowledge with little or no concern for the internal subjectivity of the student. In addition, care of the self is disconnected from care of others. In this separation, **modern knowledge, ethics, and education lose their transformative power** (Foucault, 2005). The cosmopolitan perspective calls for a reclamation of the ontological perspective of Gandhi and Ancient Western philosophy. **If we are to be capable of responding to the inherent value and dignity of all human beings, we must undergo an internal self-transformation**. The following developmental hypotheses elaborate further the interconnection between a universal duty of moral consideration and internal transformation: 1. “Self-transformation” (i.e., decreased egoic attachment, increased pre-discursive, nonpositional self-awareness, and the realization of the Unity of Being) increases the capacity for empathy and, in turn, compassion. The more self-aware I am, the more I can be aware of the subjectivity of others, and thus, the more empathetic and compassionate I can be. 2. “Self-transformation” increases one’s capacity for tolerance. As egoic attachment decreases, holding on to one’s own truth decreases; openness to falsification and dialogue increases; hearing and understanding the other’s truth increases. One becomes less rigid, decreasing the tendency to impose and thereby increasing one’s capacity for tolerance. 3. “Self-transformation” increases one’s capacity for restraint from doing harm. One gains a more heightened awareness of internal contradiction and disharmony. This awareness prevents one from doing harm and/or withholding charity to others. 4. “Self-transformation” decreases fear. Fear is born of duality, and it drives violence. If valid, these hypotheses can be translated into educational aims focused on internal selftransformation. These aims define the core of a cosmopolitan education grounded in internal self-transformation.

#### Only a focus on consciousness through mindfulness converts critical thinking to problem-solving – it’s a pre-requisite to coherent action

Zajonc 6 **–** Professor of physics at Amherst College

(Arthur, “Contemplative and Transformative Pedagogy,” Kosmos Journal 1.1, http://www.arthurzajonc.org/uploads/Contemplative\_Pedagogy%20Kosmos.pdf)//BB

I approach the question of shaping worldviews as an educator and as one who, like so many, is moved by widespread violence and global economic inequities. What is it about worldviews that results in the identity politics of Iraq where Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds all act along ethnic and religious lines, or in Darfur where issues of identity cut deeper, leading to Arabs perpetrating mass killing and rape against their Muslim brothers and sisters who are 'black Africans' from non-Arab tribes? What is it about worldviews that leads to a large and growing divide between the rich and the poor? In the face of increasing per capita GDP, the global median income is decreasing, and 100 million more are in poverty today than ten years ago.1 What can I as an educator offer in the face of these tragic realities of today's world? To offer an alternative or 'better' worldview is to no avail. In fact, efforts to promote that better viewpoint may initiate or aggravate conflict. In this article I advance a view of the human being in which the individual develops the capacity to move among worldviews, transcending particular identities while simultaneously honoring each of them. Even more, we can learn to live the complexity of diverse identities that are in truth everpresent in us as well as in the world. In reality, the interconnectedness of the world has its reflection in the connections among the diverse aspects of ourselves. When we find peace among the component parts of our own psyche, then we will possess the inner resources to make peace in a multicultural society. Only in this way will the crises I have mentioned be addressed at their roots. I see education—formal and informal—as the sole means of developing this remarkable human capacity for interior harmony, which in the end is the capacity for freedom and love. The Function of Frames The content of education is infinite in extent. Every day more information is available, new research is published, political changes occur, and businesses collapse. All of these demand our attention. Education is largely comprised of acquiring and organizing such information, and for this purpose students are taught the skills needed to assimilate and transmit information through reading, writing, and mathematics. But such **simple input-output functions are but one dimension of education.** Something **more is needed to convert information into meaningful knowledge. Surrounding and supporting the information we receive is the 'form' or structure of our cognitive and emotional life that goes largely unobserved**. To understand how information becomes meaningful, we must turn our attention to this hidden container or 'frame of reference,' as Jack Mezirow termed it.2 A frame of reference is a way of knowing or making meaning of the world. Enormous quantities of sensorial and mental data stream into human consciousness, but somehow that stream is brought into a coherent meaningful whole. At first sight it may seem that such meaning-making is an entirely natural and universal process, and to some degree it certainly is. Evolution has incorporated reflexes and drives deep into the human psyche. But the way we make sense of the world is also conditioned profoundly by societal forces, among them education. That is to say, we are socialized into a worldview that operates largely unconsciously and behind the scenes, but which affects the way we understand what we see, hear, and feel. According to the Leo Apostel Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Belgium, "A worldview is a map that people use to orient and explain the world, and from which they evaluate and act, and put forward prognoses and visions of the future." In the course of a lifetime we may shed one worldview and adopt another. In other words, we can change the structure that makes meaning for us. Thus while worldviews can be understood as deep cognitive structures, they are not immutable. The solutions to Darfur and economic inequality (among many other problems) will ultimately not be found through more information or better foreign aid programs, but only here at the level where information marries with values to become meaning. Human action flows from this source, not from data alone. An education that would reach beyond information must work deeper; it will need to transform the very container of consciousness, make it more supple and complex. For this, we educators need pedagogical 2 tools other than those optimized for information transfer. At its most advanced stage, we will need to help our students and ourselves to create a dynamic cognitive framework that can challenge established intellectual boundaries, and even sustain the conflicting values and viewpoints that comprise our planetary human community. Challenging Conventional Divisions In recent years I have spent time with members of the Native American Academy, a group largely comprised of academics who are also Native Americans. In our meetings we have explored the character of Native knowledge systems and research methods in comparison to those of orthodox Western science. From the first, the differences were marked. The place of our meeting was of special consequence, Chaco Canyon. It is the site of an ancient indigenous settlement whose remaining structures are clearly aligned according to a detailed astronomical knowledge. Following a long drive we turned onto the approach road, stopping in the middle of nowhere to make a small offering of bee pollen and tobacco. The first evening included a long ceremony performed by a knowledge-keeper from the local Native population, which concluded with a sensitive presentation of the problems we were likely to encounter in our endeavors. The sacred and the secular so seamlessly blended in the indigenous mind contrasts strongly with the conventional division between science and spirituality in the modern West. In the Western worldview, science is often defined in opposition to spirituality. My work with Native American colleagues challenges that presupposition at its root. Our time is one in which such unreflective assumptions must increasingly be challenged. Last year I was seated among over 10,000 neuroscientists listening to the fourteenth Dalai Lama address them concerning the interaction between Buddhist philosophers and Western scientists. The occasion was the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, and the Dalai Lama was the keynote speaker because of his groundbreaking collaborative work to bridge the traditional cultural divide between science and the contemplative traditions. Because of his openness and that of a growing number of scientists, Buddhist meditative insights have been joined to scientific research in ways that are very fruitful for the fields of cognitive science and psychology.3 This is a second example in which traditional divisions have been challenged with fruitful consequences. Contemplative Pedagogy **One of the** most powerful **transformative** interventions developed by humanity **is** contemplative practice or meditation. **It** has been specifically designed to **move human cognition from a delusory view of reality** to a true one: that is, **to one in which the profound interconnectedness of reality is directly perceived**. Global conflict has its deep source in the privileging of worldviews, in the reification of our particular understanding and the objectification of the other. Such ways of seeing our world are, at root, dysfunctional and divisive. Contemplative practice works on the human psyche to shape attention into a far suppler instrument, one that can appreciate a wide range of worldviews and even sustain the paradoxes of life, ultimately drawing life's complexity into a gentle, non-judgmental awareness. The usefulness of secular contemplative practice is being increasingly appreciated by educators at hundreds of North American universities and colleges. For example, in collaboration with The Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, the American Council of Learned Societies has granted 120 Contemplative Practice Fellowships to professors over the last ten years, supporting them in designing courses that include contemplative practice as a pedagogical strategy.4 At conferences and summer schools at Columbia University and Amherst College and elsewhere, professors have gathered to share their experiences in the emerging area of contemplative pedagogy. Their efforts range from simple silence at the start of class to exercises that school attention; and most recently, to innovative contemplative practices that relate directly to course content. The 2005 Columbia Conference focused specifically on the role of contemplative practices in "Making Peace in Ourselves and Peace in the World." Courses are offered that range from theater to economics, from philosophy to cosmology, in which university teachers are experimenting with a wide range of contemplative exercises, thus creating a new academic pedagogy. I have become convinced that contemplation 3 benefits both students and faculty, and that secular contemplative practices should assume a significant place on our educational agenda. Contemplative practices fall into two major classes, those that school cognition and those that cultivate compassion. We are well aware that our observation and thinking require training, but we often neglect the cultivation of our capacity for love. In his letters to a young poet, Rainer Maria Rilke wrote, "For one human being to love another, that is perhaps the most difficult of all our tasks, the ultimate, the last test and proof, the work for which all other work is but a preparation. For this reason young people, who are beginners in everything, cannot yet know love, they have to learn it. With their whole being, with all their forces, gathered close about their lonely, timid, upwardbeating heart, they must learn to love." 5 We are well-practiced at educating the mind for critical reasoning, critical writing, and critical speaking as well as for scientific and quantitative analysis. But is this sufficient? In a world beset with conflicts, internal as well as external, isn't it of equal if not greater importance to balance the sharpening of our intellects with the systematic cultivation of our hearts? We must, indeed, learn to love. Educators should join with their students to undertake this most difficult task. Thus true education entails a transformation of the human being that, as Goethe said, "is so great that I never would have believed it possible." **This transformation results in the human capacity to live the worldviews of others, and** even **further to sustain in our mind** and heart the contradictions that are an inevitable part of engaging **the beautiful variety of cultures, religions, and races that populate this planet**. We can sustain the complexities of the world because we have learned to honor and embrace the complex, conflicting components of ourselves**. Our inner accomplishments**, achieved through contemplative education**, translate into outer capacities for peace-building.** From there it is a short distance to the perception of interconnectedness and the enduring love for others, especially for those different from us. We are increasingly becoming a world populated by solitudes. When Rilke declares that the highest expression of love is to "stand guard over and protect the solitude of the other," he is expressing his respect for and even devotion to the uniqueness of every person and group. If, however, we are to avoid social atomization or the fundamentalist reaction to this tendency, we will need to learn to love across the chasms that divide us. Only a profoundly contemplative and transformative education has the power to nurture the vibrant, diverse civilization that should be our global future. As Maria Montessori wrote, "Preventing conflicts is the work of politics; establishing peace is the work of education."6

#### Buddhist non-attachment strategies implemented in the context of educational spaces are clinically proven to ameliorate suffering and improve psychological health amongst students – we’ve got empirics!

**Wu 19** [Bonnie Wai Yan Wu, Junling Gao, Hang Kin Leung and Hin Hung Sik, “A Randomized Controlled Trial of Awareness Training Program (ATP), a Group-Based Mahayana Buddhist Intervention”, 1-17-2019; https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12671-018-1082-1.pdf]///vishfish

The data from our study indicated that wisdom in the form of nonattachment (NAS) served as the key component of ATP to mediate the improvement of the levels of perceived stress (PSS), sense of coherence (SOC), and psychological wellbeing (GHQ). This supported our hypothesis that wisdom in the form of nonattachment is an important and effective mediator to reduce an individual’s delusions and suffering. These findings endorse Sahdra’s assertion (Sahdra et al. 2010, p. 125) that release from mental fixation (nonattachment) is thought to encourage more objective perception, greater compassion, reduced selfishness, and release from, or letting go of, what Buddhist call ‘afflictive’ emotion, thus alleviating suffering.^ A significant maintenance effect was also found at 3-month follow-up. We attribute this significant maintenance effect of the ATP to the effectiveness of the three pedagogical steps of developing the wisdom of nonattachment as taught in the Fig. 2 Mediation diagrams that summarize the hierarchical linear regression and bootstrap analyses by using nonattachment as a mediator of the effect of the intervention on stress, sense of coherence, and psychological well-being. ATP Awareness Training Program, PSS Perceived Stress Scale, SOC Orientation to Life, GHQ General Health Questionnaire, NAS Nonattachment Scale, BS results of bootstrap analyses, HLR results of hierarchical linear regression analyses; \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001. If zero is not included within the estimated confidence interval, it indicates a significant mediation effect at the 0.05 level. Numbers in parentheses are the B after controlling for the mediator. Numbers in square brackets are the lower level confidence interval and upper level confidence interval 1290 Mindfulness (2019) 10:1280–1293 Sandhinirmochana Sūtra. Under this pedagogical system, practitioners must first learn and memorize the teaching, then repeatedly focus and contemplate on its meaning and finally accept and practice accordingly. It would seem that the cognitive learning and reflective learning helped the participants to retain their knowledge acquired from the program, as demonstrated in the high pass rate of the pop quiz at 3-month follow-up. Moreover, many participants maintained their meditation practice within the post-follow-up period. The findings of this study, together with the school-based contemplative education program (Sik and Wu 2015), support that the Buddhist pedagogy of the three wisdoms may be a desirable method to foster participants’ learning experience. Another factor that might have contributed to the significant maintaining effect of the ATP is the importance of NAS to psychological well-being. Our findings reveal that changes in NAS mediate the maintenance impact of the ATP on participants’ stress levels, sense of coherence, and psychological well-being. Our findings are consistent with the only other group-based study for adults that used NAS as an outcome measure in an interventional study (Van Gordon et al. 2017). The findings of Van Gordon et al.’s study also demonstrated that nonattachment was enhanced both at post and at post-follow-up, and it continued to positively mediate the psychological distress outcome for participants with fibromyalgia. In addition, the ATP and the findings of this study may inform second-generation MBIs’ theory and research. In this study, we posited that the developing trend of the Bsecond-generation MBIs,^ that is, to formulate an MBI by referring back to its Buddhist origins, could be further developed by formulating an intervention that systematically combines a Buddhist theoretical model with a compatible meditation practice. The development of the ATP and the significant findings of this study demonstrate that a semisecular group intervention based on Mahayana Buddhist teaching that adopts a textually aligned approach with a coherent theory and praxis could be an effective means to enhance the psychological health and well-being of people in contemporary society. Since this is the first attempt to develop and investigate an intervention that adopts a textually aligned approach, these positive findings may inform researchers’ future approaches to formulate and design Buddhist-derived interventions

#### Our educational model is a pre-requisite for breaking down dominant power structures

De Silva, 98 (Padmasiri de Silva, Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at Monash University, *Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in Buddhism*, pg 182)//DH

Education and culture are the two main pathways for effective environmental discourse. But till we dismantle the economic and political discourse that pervades the wrong type of social paradigm that humans have embraced, we may not get to the roots of the malady of environmentalism. But even if the correct diagnosis of the malady is made, to dismantle the pervading political and economic discourse, people have to be moved to do so. It is time for philosophers to revise their classification of epistemological resources, from which new perspectives for environmental education may emerge. Buddhist pedagogy, reaching back 25 centuries, provides insights into how this project may be developed.

#### Only a Buddhist mindset can inform our worldview- otherwise we fall into the trap of apocalyptic worldviews

John M. Yowell, 15, “IF THE HELLS ARE NOT EMPTY”: A FRAMEWORK FOR A BUDDHIST CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY, The University of Texas at Arlington, May 2015, DOA: 1-1-2022, https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/bitstream/handle/10106/25077/Yowell\_uta\_2502M\_13122.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, r0w@n

For the better part of the last two-thousand years the people of the Western world have been conditioned to view our existence in terms of our history; not simply the recollection of events of the past, but a view of history as a revelatory process that carries with it the potential for a grand fulfillment of one kind or another. This is the root of the apocalyptic worldview; a reading of historical events as a preordained means of facilitating an absolute end to all things. It is a way of looking at the world with certainty that a specific outcome is inevitable. These outcomes naturally vary depending on one’s dominant ideology, religion, or political perspective, but in as much as they serve as a way of interpreting the past with the intention of moving toward a particular future, they can be said to be apocalyptic. While the word apocalyptic often carries with it a religious connotation, evoking images of the fulfillment of God’s plan by means of rapture, judgement, and the destruction of the world as we know it, the apocalyptic focus on inevitable ends are present in many of the prevailing ideologies of the West as well, even those which may seem fundamentally opposed to each other. For example, proponents of free market capitalism tend to argue that, when left to its naturally self-regulating state, capitalism will eventually solve issues of poverty, homelessness, and the like. While income disparity and general economic inequality may exist for any number 36 of reasons, for the capitalist it is a certainty that all boats will indeed rise if only given the chance. From the opposing position of the Marxist, capitalism’s tendency towards crisis, one of its hallmark characteristics, ensures that such a mode of political economy will inevitably be abandoned and replaced with socialism and eventually communism. While modern Marxists would no doubt argue that their political goals are no longer subject to the orthodoxy of Marx’s ‘laws of motion of modern society’, the fact remains that the Marxist position is one which is driven toward a specific conclusion built upon historical conditions. These are merely examples meant to convey the general form of the apocalyptic worldview, but what of its function? Spellmeyer (2010) points out that this way of looking at the world is so appealing because it provides certainty in the face of an increasingly complex reality. This complexity is all encompassing in modernity, challenging both traditional ways of understanding the world, such as religion, and our individual and collective confidence in a reliable preordained future of any kind. As is often the case when systems of belief, either formal or informal, are challenged, the response to this uncertainty has been a widespread clinging to the apocalyptic worldview. In addition to the certainty provided by such beliefs, they can also be seen as providing one’s life with a sense of order and a connection to some transcendent value system. That sense of transcendent cosmic order can be internalized and the individual believer is suddenly made to feel his life newly purposeful and in touch with eternity. More than just a sense of immortality, he experiences himself in alliance with the deity – or with history – enabling him to share in His or its ultimate power to destroy and re-create. Feelings of weakness or despair can be replaced by a surge of life power or even omnipotence (Lifton, 2003:61). Lifton further suggests that it is because such views satisfy the psychological needs for order and purpose that the holders of these beliefs are strongly driven to impose them on others. In cases where these beliefs fall in stark contrast to contemporary scientific or rational understanding this active proselytization serves to both stifle internal conflict and self-doubt and affirm one’s convictions. The most obvious example of this would be the prevalence of religious fundamentalism in recent years. Whether in reference to religiously inspired conflict or acts of 37 terrorism, or the influence of Christian fundamentalism on public policy, we are presented with daily reminders that in spite of the technological and scientific advancement we have undergone as a species, these self-reinforcing beliefs are, for lack of a better word, inevitable under current conditions. Taken as a whole, the apocalyptic tendency of modern society ultimately frames all problems in these familiar and disruptive terms. Issues are framed in terms of past or future, as resulting from a single cause, or as the work of divinity. They are then discussed in similarly apocalyptic language which becomes detrimental to the possibility of legitimate public discourse and engagement. If the patterns of argument typical of religious prophecy are also observable in any public discourse that anticipates or predicts catastrophe, then we should be skeptical of the public’s ability to reasonably evaluate any appeal to urgency in the face of disaster. At the same time, we also run the risk of dismissing valid threats because they are couched in the form, if not the language, of traditional prophetic warnings. (O’leary, 1997:310, in Foust & William, 2009) This process is harmful to progress at all levels. It makes all problems the result of a particular mindset; a product of our collective way of approaching reality. Perhaps most importantly it is exploited at every turn by news media and politicians to reinforce public support for existing power structures, which at the moment represent the best hope for addressing many of the most pressing contemporary issues faced by humanity as a whole. As we have seen, the revolutionary potential for a Buddhist critical social theory to provoke mass change is found in individual agency, and in addressing the issue of an apocalyptic worldview the emphasis remains the same. However, rather than focus on specific individual mental states as they contribute to personal suffering, the creation of a Buddhist worldview in defiance of the apocalyptic position requires the cultivation of a global mindfulness and situation in the present moment. It can be understood as facilitating the embrace of the chaos and complication of the world rather than its destruction. However, before I delve into the specifics of the Buddhist worldview a note of clarification is in order.

#### Buddhist poetry pairs the mindfulness of the 1AC and a subversive de-familiarization with Western pedagogical epistemes that opens lines of access towards a new indirect communication

**Wang 2k** [Youru Wang, Philosophy Department, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong, “The Pragmatics of ‘Never Tell Too Plainly': indirect communication in Chan Buddhism”, 7-31-2000; https://terebess.hu/zen/YouruWang.html]///vishfish

Here the term `poetic language' refers not only to words cast in a conventional verse form but also to words of poetic taste, or of poeticity, that do not conform to any conventional canon of poetry. I define `poeticity' or `poeticising' in a broad sense, namely, I define it as a kind of figurative, imaginative, or suggestive use of language that echoes, or evokes co-echoing with, the rhythm of life. This will allow us to take into consideration more than the Chan masters' frequent borrowing and composing of verses in their communication. It will take into account the entire way of poeticising characteristic of Chan discourse. Thus, Linji' s well-known verses in his explanation of `Four Procedures' are one example of using poetic language.[77] Some of Huangbo Xiyun' s sayings are another: Mountains are mountains; water is water; monks are monks; laymen are laymen. Mountains, rivers, and the great earth; the sun, the moon, and the stars — none of them is outside your mind ... The green mountains that [p24] everywhere meet your gaze — this void world — are so clear and bright that no single hairsbreadth is left there for your cognitive understanding.[78] Even Zhaozhou's famous answer, `The cypress tree in the yard', is a kind of poetic language. As Burton Watson correctly discerns, the Chan masters prefer ‘brief, highly compact poetical expressions that are suggestive rather than expository in nature' . This use of poetic language `eschews specifically religious or philosophical terminology in favor of everyday language, seeking to express insight in terms of the imagery and verse forms current in the secular culture of the period'.[79] Observations of this kind point to the relation between the Chan use of poetic language and the Chan emphasis on the realisation of enlightenment within all secular activities. Other scholars also see factors contributing to the evolution of Chan poetic expressions from Buddhist gāthās (hymns) — the facilitation of poetic expressions by the analogical nature of Chinese language, the centuries-long cultivation of poetic sensibilities before the golden age of Chan, the great literary notion and tradition of metaphor and allegory (bixing), etc.[80] Hajime Nakamura, among others, particularly regards the Chan preference for figurative, suggestive language as indicative of the `non-logical character' of Chan Buddhism. He chooses Linji's explanation of `Four Procedures' to show that Linji favours using figurative language instead of giving logical, speculative expositions.[81] All these interpretations may well provide answers, from a cultural perspective, to the question of why Chan Buddhists prefer using poetic language. However, they do not precisely answer the question of how poetic language functions in Chan communication. The study of the latter question, it seems to me, is crucial to a deeper understanding of the former question. This study will eventually reveal that poetic language is not a decorative feature of Chan discourse but plays a substantial role in the entire Chan communication.[82] It will disclose the inner logic of Chan poeticising. My preliminary investigation of this question will thus elucidate, in line with this thinking, the following aspects. First, the Chan use of poetic language is a kind of de-familiarisation that proceeds by deviating from or violating conventional Buddhist usage and all conventional ways of thinking. There are two types of de-familiarisation: moderate and radical. Moderate de-familiarisation designates a type of poetic expression in combination with conventional discursive language, such as the foregoing passage quoted from Huangbo Xiyun' s sayings. But even in combination with conventional discursive language, this inclusion of poetic expressions in the main part of preaching violates the rhetorical canon of Buddhist discourse. The Chan poetic expressions are no longer subsidiary to theoretical inquiries and logical expositions as those traditional Buddhist gāthās were. Moreover, the use of figurative, expressive language deliberately minimises or marginalises the conventional use of expository, propositional language and the cognitive mode of thinking. This is more prominent in the radical type of de-familiarisation. This type of de-familiarisation often occurs in the master-disciple conversation. The masters give completely figurative, expressive answers to the students' intellectual inquiries, such as `The cypress tree in the yard' and `The river from the Land of Peach Blossom goes around the pavilion of white cloud'.[83] Answers of this kind produce elusive effects. This elusiveness becomes a decisive force before which all conventional sequential thinking is doomed to lose itself. Since this use of poetic expression forcefully interrupts the conventional sequential thinking represented by the student' s question, it is, again, similar to a kind of `therapeutic shock'. In this context, the Chan use of poetic language, it could be said, comprises its apophasis. It denies the student's way [p25] of questioning and thinking. However, this denial is obviously different from any direct negation, for the poetic expressions here do not themselves directly engage in any negation. Therefore, secondly, although the use of poetic language within the Chan Buddhist context contains apophasis, it cannot be characterised as apophatic discourse. It rather manifests a kind of kataphasis, a poetic affirmation that is different from both conventional negation and affirmation.[84] In such poetic expressions — `The cypress tree in the yard' and `The river from the Land of Peach Blossom goes around the pavilion of white cloud' — we see that the everyday world, as vivid as it is, is poetically affirmed or reaffirmed in its naturalistic dynamism. To borrow Heidegger's words, `this multiple ambiguousness of the poetic saying ... leaves what is as it is'.[85] In this way Chan Buddhism remarkably poeticises the Mahayana belief that the nirvanic world is not different from the samsaric world and the Chinese Buddhist notion of `true emptiness within wondrous beings (zhenkong miaoyou)'. Therefore, even though the Chan masters ignore or deny the students' questions, they nonetheless say something meaningful and positive within the dialogical context by pointing to it poetically, and thus guide the students' soteriological practice. Thirdly, the elusiveness characteristic of these poetic expressions makes the understanding of their meanings more open to variation, to situational differences. In other words, it always allows or even encourages more than one understanding of what it says. The Chan masters maintain the necessity of this elusiveness and multiplicity of meanings in their use of poetic expressions. For instance, when Zhaozhou replies: `I do not use surroundings to show something', he asserts that there is no definite cognitive content or meaning hidden behind these metaphorical words — `The cypress tree in the yard'. Just as Heidegger thinks the multiplicity of meanings necessary to thinking,[86] the Chan masters consider the elusiveness and multiplicity of meanings necessary to provoking each individual's situational realisation of enlightenment. Scholars have divided Chan poetry into different types.[87] Among these types, those that demonstrate Buddhist dharmas and enlightenment experience are of primary importance. As we have discussed earlier, the Chan students must experience, realise and resonate with enlightenment existentially (practically) and non-dualistically. This requires that the Chan masters, in responding to the students' inquiries, must say something merely evocative, edifying, in order not to mislead the students, not to hinder their own realisation. That is to say, they must speak indirectly. The elusiveness and multiplicity of meanings inherent in Chan poetic expressions best serve this indirection of communication. These expressions challenge students' own effort and arouse students' creative imagination through the imagery closely associated with everyday experiences. Let us look at the following verses: (1) What green mountain is not a place for the practice of dao? Must you, cane in hand, make a pilgrimage to Qing Liang? Even if the golden-haired lion should appear in the clouds, It would not be an auspicious sight to the dharma eye![88] (2) The happy adventure of the romantic youth, His lady alone knows its sweetness.[89] The first case mainly suggests that you should not seek the dao externally or dualistically. The second case hints that the realisation and resonation of enlightenment must be achieved existentially and inwardly, and cannot be externalised or objectified. However, these are just hints or suggestions. They allow and even call forth divergent imaginations and understandings in terms of concrete, particular, personal experiences [p26] and situations of the everyday world. Thus they inspire and provoke in a way that theoretic teaching and discursive speech cannot do. Because of their close relationship with secular experiences, these poetic expressions also de-mystify the Chan enlightenment experience. In the final analysis, the use of poetic language as an indirect strategy is demanded by the inner structure of Chan communication. As living words, Chan poetic expression make Chan communication more effective and even more attractive to ordinary people.[90]

#### Competitiveness is irrationally derived from selfishness – mindset shifts can bring us away from the overconsumption it drives

Payutto 88 (a well-known Thai Buddhist monk, an intellectual, and a prolific writer. He is among the most brilliant Buddhist scholars in the Thai Buddhist history. He authored Buddha Dhamma, which is acclaimed to as one of the masterpieces in Buddhism that puts together Dhamma and natural laws by extensively drawing upon Pali Canon, Atthakatha, Digha, etc., to clarify Buddha's verbatim speech, Buddhist Economists: A middle way for the Marketplace, pg 5) //T.C.

If we are to honestly discuss economics, we must admit that emotional factors - fear and desire and the irrationality they generate - have a very powerful influence on the market place. Economic decisions about production, consumption and distribution - are made by people in their struggle to survive and prosper. For the most part, these decisions are motivated by an emotional urge for self-preservation fear and desire drive us to our worst economic excesses. The forces of greed, exploitation and over-consumption seem to have overwhelmed our economies in recent decades. Our materialistic societies offer us little choice but to exploit and compete for survival in today's dog-eat-dog world. But at the same time, it is obvious that these forces are damaging our societies and ravaging our environment.

# V2

### Stuff to change

#### T Spikes

**Indirect communication- also kind a functions as other model of communication**

**Wrong intent- also indicts competitive plus most ks**

Fear machines- only larp

Appropriation bad starting point- only larp- maybe replace with spacey card from harker

**Internal transformation key to ed**

Need-

Nothing really

#### K Spikes

Converts to action

ego

Need-

**Pess**, cap, ks that reject all communication, academy, humanism

#### Case impacts

Shedding ego

Transformative education

Healing

### Part 1: The Emptiness

All you have to do is take breaths

In…1…2…3…4…5…

Out…1…2…3…4…5…

Listen to the words around you and feel your breath.

Don’t pull up your file or think in analytics

Just let the language envelop you

…

#### IAGBTD

Right now

I’m here

You’re here

At this precipice before action

This silence before the

Cacophony

Before the swishing whirling blinding displays of

Rationality and logic and

Emotion and intelligence and

…

This moment

is quiet

…

In our heads the hype music’s still playing

The adrenaline’s pumping

But behind it all

Our hearts

Are beating as normal

Through them we may discover our commonality

In the fluctuating subject

We may find wholeness

Just as in the ocean

With its infinite water drops

We can find a singular surface

### Part 2- The Advocacy

#### Nice to meet you judge, I’m you, you’re me, we’re all each other– now vote aff

Segura 11 (Alejandro Chavez Segura - PhD in Divinity (University of St. Andrews) Expert in AQAL integral approach Research interests: religion and politics, international political theory and philosophical approaches to peacebuilding Expert in Easter philosophy, mainly Buddhism and Taoism. A Theology of International Relations: A Buddhist Approach to Religion and Politics in an Interdependent World, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277090486_A_theology_of_international_relations_a_Buddhist_approach_to_religion_and_politics_in_an_interdependent_world>, r0w@n

Therefore,  the  method  of  causality  will  be  used  throughout  the  thesis.  This method is rooted in a Buddhist understanding of the empty nature of all phenomena and thus the interdependent reality of everything in existence. Everything, from human existence to relations between states and institutions is a consequence of particular arrangements of causes and conditions. This implies a constant flux of emotions, 1 ‘The Heart Sutra’ in Buddhist Wisdom Books: The Diamond Sutra and the Heart Sutra, Edward Conze trans. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958), 81. 9 thoughts, actions and interests in play, driven by different emotions such as anger, hatred and delusion or compassion, generosity and mindfulness. The Buddha clearly established this dependent nature of all phenomena, and thus its emptiness of independent arising,2 in the formula: when there is this, there is that (imasmim sati idam hoti); when this arises, that arises (imassuppada idam uppajjati); when this is not, the other is not (imasmim asati idamna hoti); ceasing this, that ceases (imassa nirodha idam nirujhati). In this methodology, where everything is taken as interdependent, the levels of analysis are intertwined but primacy had been given to the individual level. This is not to overlook or dismiss the social, institutional, state, interstate or global levels but, to the contrary, this methodology argues that these levels are the projection of the sum of individual will and ways of thinking, which are institutionalized through the process of intersubjective consensus. Therefore, this Theology of International Relations is the result of the sum of a Buddhist theological root, an international validity, case studies which ratify its basic premises and, finally, the construction of variables and causal explanatory arguments to guide further study of the role of individuals in re-creating their own relative reality and the possibility of making this reality a compassionate and satisfactory existence.

#### The ego- or the fake perception of the individual- is the root of all suffering

De Silva, 98 (Padmasiri de Silva, Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at Monash University, *Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in Buddhism*, pg 37-38)//DH+ r0w@n

The Buddhist analysis of ego-centricism may be explained in relation to a number of doctrinal strands**. The roots of unwholesome motivation are greed, aggression, and delusion**; and non-greed, non-aggression and non-delusion are the roots of wholesome motivation. Of these, as mentioned earlier, what is referred to as **delusion is** basically an existential confusion about the usage of conventional terms like the “self” and “ego”. What we call the **ego instincts** in Buddhism **is one of the forms of craving**. The three forms of craving are the craving for sensuous gratification, craving for egotistic pursuits and the craving for self-annihilation. **The craving for egotistical pursuits** **has** its **deeper spring in** the dogma of personal immortality. This is **the belief in an ego entity independent of the physical and the mental processes that constitute life.** The ego illusion (atta-ditthi) may also be related to an annihilationist belief, where the ego-entity is associated with the mental and physical processes that are assumed to come to an end at death. **Such** annihilationist **views** may be **closely related to hedonistic and materialistic lifestyles, destructive behavior and even suicide**. The Buddhist middle path accepts only the processes of physical and mental phenomena, which continually arise and disappear. This process, which is referred to as dependent origination, provides the basis for understanding the nature of the human-social-nature matrix within which we live. **The ego illusion is** not merely an intellectual construction, but is **fed by deeper affective processes.** Human traits like acquisitiveness, excessive possessiveness, the urge to hoard and acquire things more than needed, the impulse to outdo other, envy, and jealousy are reciprocally linked to the belief in an ego. Beliefs influence desires and desires influence beliefs. Some of **the social, economic and political structures that people build collectively** may turn out to be **more subtle expressions of their ego**, while other human creations may be expression caring and sharing. Apart from the tendency to construct a pure ego and the related expressions of excessive craving, there are also more subtle conceits(mana) which are only transcended at a later stage on the path to liberation from suffering. The Buddha in fact mentions twenty forms of wrong personality beliefs (de Silva, 1992b, 119-27).

#### Buddhist poetry pairs the mindfulness of the 1AC and a subversive de-familiarization with Western pedagogical epistemes that opens lines of access towards a new indirect communication

**Wang 2k** [Youru Wang, Philosophy Department, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong, “The Pragmatics of ‘Never Tell Too Plainly': indirect communication in Chan Buddhism”, 7-31-2000; https://terebess.hu/zen/YouruWang.html]///vishfish

Here the term `poetic language' refers not only to words cast in a conventional verse form but also to words of poetic taste, or of poeticity, that do not conform to any conventional canon of poetry. I define `poeticity' or `poeticising' in a broad sense, namely, I define it as a kind of figurative, imaginative, or suggestive use of language that echoes, or evokes co-echoing with, the rhythm of life. This will allow us to take into consideration more than the Chan masters' frequent borrowing and composing of verses in their communication. It will take into account the entire way of poeticising characteristic of Chan discourse. Thus, Linji' s well-known verses in his explanation of `Four Procedures' are one example of using poetic language.[77] Some of Huangbo Xiyun' s sayings are another: Mountains are mountains; water is water; monks are monks; laymen are laymen. Mountains, rivers, and the great earth; the sun, the moon, and the stars — none of them is outside your mind ... The green mountains that [p24] everywhere meet your gaze — this void world — are so clear and bright that no single hairsbreadth is left there for your cognitive understanding.[78] Even Zhaozhou's famous answer, `The cypress tree in the yard', is a kind of poetic language. As Burton Watson correctly discerns, the Chan masters prefer ‘brief, highly compact poetical expressions that are suggestive rather than expository in nature' . This use of poetic language `eschews specifically religious or philosophical terminology in favor of everyday language, seeking to express insight in terms of the imagery and verse forms current in the secular culture of the period'.[79] Observations of this kind point to the relation between the Chan use of poetic language and the Chan emphasis on the realisation of enlightenment within all secular activities. Other scholars also see factors contributing to the evolution of Chan poetic expressions from Buddhist gāthās (hymns) — the facilitation of poetic expressions by the analogical nature of Chinese language, the centuries-long cultivation of poetic sensibilities before the golden age of Chan, the great literary notion and tradition of metaphor and allegory (bixing), etc.[80] Hajime Nakamura, among others, particularly regards the Chan preference for figurative, suggestive language as indicative of the `non-logical character' of Chan Buddhism. He chooses Linji's explanation of `Four Procedures' to show that Linji favours using figurative language instead of giving logical, speculative expositions.[81] All these interpretations may well provide answers, from a cultural perspective, to the question of why Chan Buddhists prefer using poetic language. However, they do not precisely answer the question of how poetic language functions in Chan communication. The study of the latter question, it seems to me, is crucial to a deeper understanding of the former question. This study will eventually reveal that poetic language is not a decorative feature of Chan discourse but plays a substantial role in the entire Chan communication.[82] It will disclose the inner logic of Chan poeticising. My preliminary investigation of this question will thus elucidate, in line with this thinking, the following aspects. First, the Chan use of poetic language is a kind of de-familiarisation that proceeds by deviating from or violating conventional Buddhist usage and all conventional ways of thinking. There are two types of de-familiarisation: moderate and radical. Moderate de-familiarisation designates a type of poetic expression in combination with conventional discursive language, such as the foregoing passage quoted from Huangbo Xiyun' s sayings. But even in combination with conventional discursive language, this inclusion of poetic expressions in the main part of preaching violates the rhetorical canon of Buddhist discourse. The Chan poetic expressions are no longer subsidiary to theoretical inquiries and logical expositions as those traditional Buddhist gāthās were. Moreover, the use of figurative, expressive language deliberately minimises or marginalises the conventional use of expository, propositional language and the cognitive mode of thinking. This is more prominent in the radical type of de-familiarisation. This type of de-familiarisation often occurs in the master-disciple conversation. The masters give completely figurative, expressive answers to the students' intellectual inquiries, such as `The cypress tree in the yard' and `The river from the Land of Peach Blossom goes around the pavilion of white cloud'.[83] Answers of this kind produce elusive effects. This elusiveness becomes a decisive force before which all conventional sequential thinking is doomed to lose itself. Since this use of poetic expression forcefully interrupts the conventional sequential thinking represented by the student' s question, it is, again, similar to a kind of `therapeutic shock'. In this context, the Chan use of poetic language, it could be said, comprises its apophasis. It denies the student's way [p25] of questioning and thinking. However, this denial is obviously different from any direct negation, for the poetic expressions here do not themselves directly engage in any negation. Therefore, secondly, although the use of poetic language within the Chan Buddhist context contains apophasis, it cannot be characterised as apophatic discourse. It rather manifests a kind of kataphasis, a poetic affirmation that is different from both conventional negation and affirmation.[84] In such poetic expressions — `The cypress tree in the yard' and `The river from the Land of Peach Blossom goes around the pavilion of white cloud' — we see that the everyday world, as vivid as it is, is poetically affirmed or reaffirmed in its naturalistic dynamism. To borrow Heidegger's words, `this multiple ambiguousness of the poetic saying ... leaves what is as it is'.[85] In this way Chan Buddhism remarkably poeticises the Mahayana belief that the nirvanic world is not different from the samsaric world and the Chinese Buddhist notion of `true emptiness within wondrous beings (zhenkong miaoyou)'. Therefore, even though the Chan masters ignore or deny the students' questions, they nonetheless say something meaningful and positive within the dialogical context by pointing to it poetically, and thus guide the students' soteriological practice. Thirdly, the elusiveness characteristic of these poetic expressions makes the understanding of their meanings more open to variation, to situational differences. In other words, it always allows or even encourages more than one understanding of what it says. The Chan masters maintain the necessity of this elusiveness and multiplicity of meanings in their use of poetic expressions. For instance, when Zhaozhou replies: `I do not use surroundings to show something', he asserts that there is no definite cognitive content or meaning hidden behind these metaphorical words — `The cypress tree in the yard'. Just as Heidegger thinks the multiplicity of meanings necessary to thinking,[86] the Chan masters consider the elusiveness and multiplicity of meanings necessary to provoking each individual's situational realisation of enlightenment. Scholars have divided Chan poetry into different types.[87] Among these types, those that demonstrate Buddhist dharmas and enlightenment experience are of primary importance. As we have discussed earlier, the Chan students must experience, realise and resonate with enlightenment existentially (practically) and non-dualistically. This requires that the Chan masters, in responding to the students' inquiries, must say something merely evocative, edifying, in order not to mislead the students, not to hinder their own realisation. That is to say, they must speak indirectly. The elusiveness and multiplicity of meanings inherent in Chan poetic expressions best serve this indirection of communication. These expressions challenge students' own effort and arouse students' creative imagination through the imagery closely associated with everyday experiences. Let us look at the following verses: (1) What green mountain is not a place for the practice of dao? Must you, cane in hand, make a pilgrimage to Qing Liang? Even if the golden-haired lion should appear in the clouds, It would not be an auspicious sight to the dharma eye![88] (2) The happy adventure of the romantic youth, His lady alone knows its sweetness.[89] The first case mainly suggests that you should not seek the dao externally or dualistically. The second case hints that the realisation and resonation of enlightenment must be achieved existentially and inwardly, and cannot be externalised or objectified. However, these are just hints or suggestions. They allow and even call forth divergent imaginations and understandings in terms of concrete, particular, personal experiences [p26] and situations of the everyday world. Thus they inspire and provoke in a way that theoretic teaching and discursive speech cannot do. Because of their close relationship with secular experiences, these poetic expressions also de-mystify the Chan enlightenment experience. In the final analysis, the use of poetic language as an indirect strategy is demanded by the inner structure of Chan communication. As living words, Chan poetic expression make Chan communication more effective and even more attractive to ordinary people.[90]

#### Debaters have the wrong intent- that means they will NEVER overcome attitudes of self-cherishment which condemns their policies and their analysis to structural failure and they will fail to overcome their own internal suffering

John M. Yowell, 15, “IF THE HELLS ARE NOT EMPTY”: A FRAMEWORK FOR A BUDDHIST CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY, The University of Texas at Arlington, May 2015, DOA: 1-1-2022, https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/bitstream/handle/10106/25077/Yowell\_uta\_2502M\_13122.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, r0w@n

If their work is to be truly impactful and accessible in the spirit of the Bodhisattva ideal it must be undertaken with the intent to advance more than idle knowledge. This is not to condemn pure research; but simply to place it outside of the scope of our concern at the moment. As has been previously discussed, it is the intent behind one’s actions rather than the act itself which determines its karma. This altruistic intent, bodhicitta, allows one to overcome an attitude of self-cherishing which is strongly associated with the generation of suffering within the self (Hattam, 2004). The mind which cultivates bodhicitta works not for the benefit of self but instead from a quality of mind characterized by love and compassion. It utilizes a logic of basic 43 goodness which disregards preconception and expectation and acts in the moment for positive ends. For the critical theorist this intent should be fairly straight forward. Those whose work is aimed at the provocation of liberatory action of all sorts can be said to have this right intent. In fact, one of the few tropes present in existing engagements between critical theory and Buddhism is that of Marx as bodhisattva. For Marx, the ultimate goal of the theorist is not simply to facilitate an understanding of the world but to change the material conditions which contribute to suffering. It is not a vehicle for the advancement of a particular political agenda, although this may be an unintended consequence of knowledge gained through critical inquiry. Turning again to Marx, his advocacy of socialism was not the sole purpose of his work but rather the necessary result of his formulation and understanding of political economy and the alienating forces contained therein. Simply put, to undertake the task of critical inquiry with a particular agenda in mind makes one’s work a slave to that agenda.

#### Debate’s indulgence in contemporary politics condemns us to their fear-machines

John M. Yowell, 15, “IF THE HELLS ARE NOT EMPTY”: A FRAMEWORK FOR A BUDDHIST CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY, The University of Texas at Arlington, May 2015, DOA: 12-29-2021, https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/bitstream/handle/10106/25077/Yowell\_uta\_2502M\_13122.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, r0w@n

Buddhism, as we have seen, is fundamentally revolutionary in its history and teachings. From the Buddha’s sudden abandonment of his worldly life to seek out liberation, this revolutionary spirit has been cultivated throughout Buddhist philosophy as a means of promoting the immediate possibility of enlightenment and liberation. This immediacy is what sets Buddhism apart from much of the world’s dominant religions and philosophies. It is also what makes it especially well suited to the task of understanding and responding to the pressing issues of the present, the resolution of which cannot possibly be sought through gradualist means. Buddhist philosophy further operates through an understanding that each individual is intrinsically interconnected and therefore must operate as though every action, no matter how superficially benign, is meaningful in that it contributes to the collective activity of society, writing its social karma, and moving society either closer to or further away from liberation in that moment. The individual agency to affect change is meaningless without this understanding, particularly in light of the various alienating forces of modernity; conditions which we must all concern ourselves with. Gary Snyder, in 1961, described the importance of individual action based on Buddhist principles in response to the social, political, and economic conditions of his time: No one today can afford to be innocent, or indulge himself in ignorance of the nature of contemporary governments, politics and social orders. The national polities of the modern world maintain their existence by deliberately fostered craving and fear: monstrous protection rackets. The “free world” has become economically dependent on a fantastic system of stimulation of greed which cannot be fulfilled, sexual desire which cannot be satiated and hatred which has no outlet against oneself, the persons one is supposed to love, or the revolutionary aspirations of pitiful, poverty-stricken marginal societies... They create populations of “preta” – hungry ghosts, with giant appetites and throats no bigger than needles. The soil, the forests and all animal life are being consumed by these cancerous collectivities; the air and water of the planet is being fouled by them (1969). 35 Despite the more than fifty years which have passed since Snyder authored this characterization, painfully little has been done in the way of alleviating the political, social, and economic roots of the innumerable sufferings of humanity.

#### Space exploration and technology might create the mask of individuality but it is only a mask, only by creating a united ontology can we foster relationships of care that can create an onto-epistemological orientation that supports life

Gál 20 Réka Gál, PhD student at the Faculty of Information and a Fellow at the McLuhan Centre for Culture and Technology, work unites feminist media theory and postcolonial studies with the history of science and environmental studies and explores how technological tools and scientific methods are employed to purportedly solve socio-political problems. B.A American and Media Studies, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, M.A Cultural Studies, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. "Climate Change, COVID-19, and the Space Cabin: A Politics of Care in the Shadow of Space Colonization." mezosfera.org, Oct, 2020, mezosfera.org/climate-change-covid-19-and-the-space-cabin-a-politics-of-care-in-the-shadow-of-space-colonization. – Harker DS + r0w@n

As much as dominant cultural narratives encourage us to entertain the idea that humans stand separate from and above their environments, the planetary crises of climate change and COVID-19 are painful reminders of the ways in which human and nonhuman ecologies are perpetually entangled. It is well-known that industrialized human-nonhuman relations, based on the capitalist extraction of what are considered natural resources, stand at the root of numerous environmental problems that are contributing to climate change. Animal industries – specifically the livestock industry – are one of the largest contributors to deforestation, greenhouse gas emission, and species extinctions.17 COVID-19’s believed origins in the Huanan wild animal markets and its eventual spread to humans is further testament to the ways in which our ecologies are always inseparable, with their intertwined nature here manifesting violently towards humans. Moreover, the spread of the coronavirus lays bare how local exploitation of nature can have global repercussions: the wildlife industry in China exists to this day because wildlife is considered a natural resource owned by the state, and the breeding, domestication, and trading of wildlife is encouraged by law.18 What must be made clear to those who are entertaining the idea that space habitats could provide a solution to such crises is that leaving Earth does not render these entanglements null and void. As much as spacecraft have been positioned as examples of subordinating the rules of nature to human control, their material reality only further consolidates the reciprocity of human and nonhuman, including human-machine, relations. 19 Our dependence on our surroundings intensifies in outer space. The inhospitality of space makes even the most physically fit astronauts dependent on numerous life support systems: oxygen and food supplies, waste management, and humidity control are all technologically operated but require continuous maintenance by humans. As such, ensuring the normal operation of a spacecraft is a relevant analogy for how a relationship of care with the diverse life support systems on Earth could be established.20 However, governments and private companies have been selling people the dream of human spaceflight ever since the Cold War, and the origins of this project in a military enterprise have made a significant mark on its implications for care work. The world of the 1960-70s astronauts was extremely segregated: the popular narrative was that of the hypermasculine astronaut, able to cope with danger and pain without complaint, with a brave wife at home waiting for his return.21 This segregation has had a remarkable impact on the types of work which have been considered “worthy” of these hypermasculine astronauts. In fact, the first American to travel to space, Alan Shepard, explicitly objected to having to learn maintenance techniques. As historian David Mindell put it, “the hottest test pilots didn’t want to be repairmen in space.”22 Similarly, data collected from NASA’s Skylab and the International Space Station’s 4-8 expeditions reveal that the time needed to complete maintenance activities on the Environmental Control and Life Support Systems was vastly underestimated, and in some cases even completely left out of operations plans.23 Even as late as the 2000s, the gendered view of care activities aboard spacecraft persisted: regarding the first female commander of a Space Shuttle, Eileen Collins, NASA made sure that her public persona was level-headed but also “pleasing.” She was referred to as “nice.” She took care of her fellow astronauts on board, taking on emotional labor by “providing support in ways that ease[d] the long hours and tension of training.” Her Air Force nickname was Mom.24 When this article calls for a feminist critique of outer space colonization, the argument is not that banishing technology and returning to a “pristine” nature or some other type of utopian primitivism is going to solve our planetary crises. Nor is it the point that more women need to be hired. What is being critiqued here is what Debbie Chachra has pointed out as a masculinist-capitalist obsession with progress and technological innovation that casts all maintenance, repair, and care work as inferior to creation.25 Much as our current experience of physical isolation during COVID-19 has exhibited, only during breakdowns are such taken-for-granted services made visible anew.26 The privileging of production obscures the societal understanding of the very real relationality of living, and the ongoing care and maintenance work required to keep human life running smoothly both on Earth and in outer space. Therefore, the problem with extraplanetary colonization is not solely that this escape reinforces an enduring gendered opposition between exit and care, privileging the former over the latter, but also that machines only give the illusion of providing humans with independence from care work. Orsolya Ferencz, the Hungarian Secretary of Space Affairs, claims that Hungarian machines in outer space do not break down27 but the truth is that machines, just like our “natural” environments, do repeatedly break down. They require maintenance. Humans whose lives are intimately intertwined with technology are all too aware of this. Social scientist Laura Forlano writes about her experience as a diabetic who uses various technologies to monitor and maintain her blood glucose levels: “With respect to my insulin pump and glucose monitor, often, I am not really sure whether I am taking care of them, or they are taking care of me.”28 This interdependence additionally applies to the care for “natural” environments which can be regularly observed, for example, in the relationship of Indigenous communities to the environment. In the Hā’ena community in Hawaii, for instance, not only do they always return some of the fish caught to the water as a way of thanking the ocean, but they also managed to impose a ten-year fishing moratorium around their island in 2019, which will both help the renewal of the ecosystem and the recovery of the immediate environment, allowing future generations to fish sustainably.29 With this moratorium, the Hā’ena are providing care-based, restorative justice: the ocean ecosystem has fallen victim to injustice (overfishing), and remedying this ought to help heal the party wounded by the injustice, which is in this case the ocean.30 The extractive industry practices deeply embedded within Western social systems clearly propel us toward unsustainable development. Escaping Earth will not solve these problems. Rather, the solution requires a fundamental onto-epistemological shift, one that will enable us to move away from the exploitative Western-colonialist worldview and towards one that prioritizes care and sustainability. The works of feminist and Indigenous thinkers can inspire us to imagine and understand such a worldview. Numerous pre-colonial Indigenous cultures were sustainability-centric: the acceptance of the reciprocity between humans and their environment and the enforcing of the ethics of care in all areas of life were essential parts of several nations’ worldviews. Indigenous epistemologies see humans and nature as members of an ecological family in which humans, the nonhuman beings around them (for example, badgers, antelopes) and materials (for example, water, clay) all form part of their kinship structures.31 In Indigenous cultures that have survived colonization, such teachings and ethical approaches are passed down to this day.32 Research by Potawatomi scholar Kyle P. Whyte and Chris Cuomo demonstrate that Indigenous conceptions of care emphasize the importance of recognizing that humans, nonhumans (animals) and collectives (e.g. forests) exist in networks of interdependence. Indigenous care ethics manifest also in the fact that mutual responsibility is seen as the moral basis of relationships.33 An important part of this mutual responsibility is that care-based justice is not punishment-centered but recovery-centered: as in the example of the fishing moratorium of the Hā’ena, it seeks to promote restorative justice for those wounded by injustice. This restoration is aimed not only at people and communities, but also at nature.34 Similarly, an ethics of care in feminist philosophy treats the state of interdependence of human and nonhuman beings as a moral foundation.35 Since all infrastructures break, they require continuous maintenance. Information scientist Steven Jackson therefore proposes that the starting point to our thinking on the human relationship to technology has to be a contemplation of “erosion, breakdown, and decay, rather than novelty, growth, and progress.”36 If we accept that our world is “always-almost-falling-apart,”37 then instead of simply focusing on technological innovation as the vessel of our salvation,38 we need to look at the ways in which the world is constantly fixed, cared for, and maintained. This, of course, does not only translate to humans’ relationship to machines, but also to our relationship to our environment –in fact, feminist scholars have already made this point about dealing with our environmental problems: historian of science Donna Haraway’s concept of “staying with the trouble”39 explicitly pleads for the foregrounding of the inherent interconnectedness and interdependence of living, and for working on restoring our broken systems. What we are looking at here is a promising paradigm shift in human-machine and human-nature relations that promotes the recognition that the processes of care and maintenance are foundational to the way humanity relates to our biotic and abiotic environments.40 Both life during the social isolation of COVID-19 and life in the space cabin highlight our perpetual interdependence with our environments. Our life support systems are in a state of continuous decay, but the solution to this is not building more and more invasive risk-mitigation machines based on individualization, isolation and an imperative of absolute, one-directional control. Instead, a better, safer, more sustainable future starts with acknowledging one’s place in a web of interdependent relationships.41 Among other steps, this means that instead of acting as though our biotic and abiotic infrastructures can endlessly care for us, we need to care for them in return. This entails not only planting new forests and cleaning up shorelines, but also policy decisions such as the fishing moratorium mentioned above. As anthropologist Gökçe Günel indicates, even the technologies used for the harvesting of renewable energies require maintenance: solar panels, for example, need to be wiped clean of dust and sand regularly.42 Thinking through the lens of maintenance and care also means providing infrastructures for effectively repairing machines as opposed to producing e-waste and continuously buying new ones which are thrown away once a smarter version is released. Additionally, it means respecting and paying theworkers who are cleaning our hospitals, nursing our sick and harvesting food – most of them immigrants, predominantly women43 – better, as they are the reason we have clean hospitals, transport, and food on our tables, even during a global pandemic.44

#### Thus the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best endorses the politics of mindfulness. The aff engages in a rejection of karmic desire systems in favor of wisdoms of detachment through poetic mindfulness.

Matthew J. Moore, 16, Buddhism, Mindfulness, and Transformative Politics, California Polytechnic State University, 2016, DOA: 1-4-2021, <https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=poli_fac>, r0w@n

The Buddha laid out his core teachings in his first sermon (the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta6). The teachings begin with the Four Noble Truths. The first is that life is dukkha, which means “suffering” but also can mean something a bit less harsh: that life is inevitably and persistently unsatisfactory. The second noble truth is that suffering is caused by clinging (ta૽hā; the word literally means “thirst”) to ideas, sensations, desires, and other phenomena of our experience. The third truth teaches that suffering can be stopped (nirodha; “cessation”) by learning not to cling, and the fourth identifies following the Noble Eightfold Path as the way to cease clinging, by practicing right understanding, intention, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and concentration. In the Satipatଣଣhāna Sutta, the Buddha identified mindfulness—non-judgmental present-moment awareness—as an especially helpfulpath toward overcoming clinging and achieving enlightenment. The Buddha describes how one can build thefour establishments of mindfulness, which are awareness of the body (sensation), feeling(emotion), mind (thoughts), and phenomena (other mental activity): Monks, this is the one-way path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the passing away of pain and dejection, for the attainment of the true way, for the realization of Nibbāna [Sanskrit: Nirvana]—namely, the four establishments of mindfulness. What are the four? Here monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly comprehending, and mindful, having subdued longing and dejection in regard to the world**.** [The same formula is repeated for feeling, mind, and phenomena.]….And how, monks, does a monk dwell contemplating the body in the body? Here a monk, gone to the forest, to the foot of a tree, or to an empty hut, sits down; having folded his legs crosswise, straightened his body, and established mindfulness in front of him, just mindful he breathes in, mindful he breathes out. [Similar instructions are given for feeling, mind, and phenomena.]7 In essence, mindfulness is the opposite of clinging. One is simply, non-judgmentally aware of one’s experience, without either chasing after pleasant experiences or avoiding unpleasant experiences. The four foundations of mindfulness—body, feeling, mind, and phenomena— collectively exhaust the possible objects of experience, so that there is nothing excluded from one’s mindful awareness. Later in the same text, the Buddha says that someone who could practice this for seven days would either achieve Nibbāna or would suffer only one further rebirth before achieving enlightenment.8

#### Meditation and reflection unifies the body and the mind- shedding us from the ego and helping us embrace ethicality

Forge, 97, (Paul G. La Forge, Divine Word Missionary and professor in the Business Management Department of Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan, Masters Degree in Clinical-Counseling Psychology, he holds a third class black belt in Kodokan Judo, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 16, No. 12/13, From the Universities to the Marketplace: The Business Ethics Journey: The Second Annual Internationa Vincentian Conference Promoting Business Ethics (Sep., 1997), pp. 1283-1295, “Teaching Business Ethics through Meditation”, JSTOR)//LOH + r0w@n

Business Ethics taught only from books and textual materials may occupy an important place in education, but my purpose is different. My goal is to help the students become ethical persons. This requires an ability to perform three seemingly simple tasks: First, to recognize ethical issues; second, to analyze them; and third, to act upon them. The ethical principles derived from textual materials covered in a Business Ethics course have their place, but only as a tool or a standard used by an ethical person. The purpose of this article is to show how **meditation can be used to** help the student to **become an ethical person**. My purpose in using meditation to teach Business Ethics is to produce people with an "Ethical Vision". Meditation gives students an awareness of ethical issues in their lives and leads to the discovery and application of models of ethical conduct to serve as guides to behavior in general and to ethical decision making in particular. In effect, I use meditation to stop the world. There are many ways to stop the world and many kinds of meditation. I will restrict myself to two forms, namely, discursive and non-dis cursive meditation. The classroom communica tion process between the instructor and the students is slowed down by both non-discursive and discursive meditation so that students can learn to use meditation to accomplish the three tasks mentioned above. Non-discursive **meditation greatly contributes to the process of constructing** a vision because it gives people **a sense of themselves and their place in the world.** Discursive meditation, in its many forms, gives substance to an ethical vision because it leads to an awakening to the existence and importance of ethical issues in life. In part one, I will describe how the students are led through non-discursive meditation to discover themselves as ethical persons. They are also given the tools to explore ethical issues through non-discursive meditation. In part two, I will discuss a transition state between non-discursive and discursive medita tion. After discovering themselves as ethical persons, the students are led to use non-discur sive meditation as a technique to construct their own ethical value system and apply it to their own lives. At this transition stage, an art medium is extremely useful for discovering and analyzing meanings, especially ethical meanings. Through non-discursive meditation, the indi vidual is taught to become aware of him/herself and his/her place in the world. However, non discursive meditation is not an end in itself. Discursive meditation, as is explained in more detail in part three, gives the participant a chance to compare who he/she is with what he/she should be. Here the student is encouraged to compare the values he/she has discovered about him/herself during non-discursive meditation with an ideal, and construct a system of ethical principles for him/herself using discursive meditation. Textual materials are recommended here and the student is encouraged to search for the ideal. The result is the development of a person with an ethical vision through meditation in both non-discursive and discursive forms. I. Discovering ethical issues through non-discursive meditation An ethical person must become aware of his/her self, his/her ethical values, and his/her place in the world. Non-discursive meditation can be a powerful device **to teach** students how they can stop their world and take stock of their lives because **the body itself participates in the meditation as the locus of experience and insight, inseparably one with the mind** (Takeuchi, 1993, p. xx). At this point, the process is entirely self centered and observational, without the con straint of reference to any system of ethics or values. Thus viewed, it is only a first step, but a very necessary first step **to** becoming an ethical person. Because this step is only a means to an end, virtually any school of non-discursive meditation will suffice. There are many kinds of non-discursive meditation techniques, such as Taikyokken, Zen, and Yoga; these teach people to look at and reflect on their place in the world. The goal is to teach students a way of stopping and reflecting, to provide a context for devel oping and applying their own values. Therefore, non-discursive meditation is not used as an end in itself. Taikyokken, Yoga, or Zen all have their proponents, but in an ethics class, they serve only as a tool, not as a philosophy. **Non-discursive meditation serves to** stop the world. Students, like business people, lead busy, active, stressful lives. Non-discursive meditation serves to put a brake on the activities of a busy day. The ethical person must be able to stop this world and reflect upon life. This is an ability to step aside from normal activities in order to recognize ethical issues that arise in business or personal life.

#### Purely technical knowledge is useless – must be tied to INTERNAL self-awareness in order for education to retain transformative power

Snauwaert 9 - Associate Professor of Educational Theory and Social Foundations of Education; Chair of the Department of Foundations of Education, University of Toledo

(Dale, “The Ethics and Ontology of Cosmopolitanism: Education for a Shared Humanity,” Current Issues in Comparative Education 12.1, Directory of Open Access Journals)//BB

The Ghandhian perspective is not foreign to Western philosophy and education. It was the dominant paradigm of Ancient philosophy. For the Greeks and Romans, philosophy did not primarily concern the construction of abstract theoretical systems; philosophy was conceived as a choice of a way of life, a justification for that choice, and the articulation of the path or curriculum leading to the realization of the ideals of that way of life. The focus of philosophy and education was the transformation of one’s life as a mode of Being. As a path, philosophy included sets of spiritual exercises necessary for the transformation of one’s being in accordance with the spiritual vision of the philosophy. Schools were formed out of the chosen way of life of the philosophy and those attracted to the philosophy. In these schools, the way of life defined by the philosophy and the understandings and exercises necessary to live that life were developed, taught, and experienced. Philosophy and inner transformation are linked in such a way that the discovery of the true and the good is contingent upon the transformation of the truth seeker’s being. **Education is** thus **devoted to the internal transformation of the consciousness of the student** (Foucault, 2005; Hadot, 1993, 2002; Hadot & Davidson, 1995; Hadot & Marcus, 1998). The necessity of internal transformation was not only pertinent to the search for truth; it had great relevance for morality as well. The moral response to others was thought to be contingent upon the quality of the moral agent’s character. Character was understood as a structure of virtues or capacities that enabled one to morally respond to others. The care of the self was thus thought to be interconnected and interdependent with care for others. However, as Michel Foucault demonstrates, at the beginning of modernity (referred to as the “Cartesian” moment), modern epistemology divorces the true and the good from the subject, resulting in **the separation of knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge** becomes **merely the technical discovery of truth divorced from the subjectivity of the knower**; education in turn becomes the transmission of technical knowledge with little or no concern for the internal subjectivity of the student. In addition, care of the self is disconnected from care of others. In this separation, **modern knowledge, ethics, and education lose their transformative power** (Foucault, 2005). The cosmopolitan perspective calls for a reclamation of the ontological perspective of Gandhi and Ancient Western philosophy. **If we are to be capable of responding to the inherent value and dignity of all human beings, we must undergo an internal self-transformation**. The following developmental hypotheses elaborate further the interconnection between a universal duty of moral consideration and internal transformation: 1. “Self-transformation” (i.e., decreased egoic attachment, increased pre-discursive, nonpositional self-awareness, and the realization of the Unity of Being) increases the capacity for empathy and, in turn, compassion. The more self-aware I am, the more I can be aware of the subjectivity of others, and thus, the more empathetic and compassionate I can be. 2. “Self-transformation” increases one’s capacity for tolerance. As egoic attachment decreases, holding on to one’s own truth decreases; openness to falsification and dialogue increases; hearing and understanding the other’s truth increases. One becomes less rigid, decreasing the tendency to impose and thereby increasing one’s capacity for tolerance. 3. “Self-transformation” increases one’s capacity for restraint from doing harm. One gains a more heightened awareness of internal contradiction and disharmony. This awareness prevents one from doing harm and/or withholding charity to others. 4. “Self-transformation” decreases fear. Fear is born of duality, and it drives violence. If valid, these hypotheses can be translated into educational aims focused on internal selftransformation. These aims define the core of a cosmopolitan education grounded in internal self-transformation.

#### Only a focus on consciousness through mindfulness converts critical thinking to problem-solving – it’s a pre-requisite to coherent action

Zajonc 6 **–** Professor of physics at Amherst College

(Arthur, “Contemplative and Transformative Pedagogy,” Kosmos Journal 1.1, http://www.arthurzajonc.org/uploads/Contemplative\_Pedagogy%20Kosmos.pdf)//BB

I approach the question of shaping worldviews as an educator and as one who, like so many, is moved by widespread violence and global economic inequities. What is it about worldviews that results in the identity politics of Iraq where Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds all act along ethnic and religious lines, or in Darfur where issues of identity cut deeper, leading to Arabs perpetrating mass killing and rape against their Muslim brothers and sisters who are 'black Africans' from non-Arab tribes? What is it about worldviews that leads to a large and growing divide between the rich and the poor? In the face of increasing per capita GDP, the global median income is decreasing, and 100 million more are in poverty today than ten years ago.1 What can I as an educator offer in the face of these tragic realities of today's world? To offer an alternative or 'better' worldview is to no avail. In fact, efforts to promote that better viewpoint may initiate or aggravate conflict. In this article I advance a view of the human being in which the individual develops the capacity to move among worldviews, transcending particular identities while simultaneously honoring each of them. Even more, we can learn to live the complexity of diverse identities that are in truth everpresent in us as well as in the world. In reality, the interconnectedness of the world has its reflection in the connections among the diverse aspects of ourselves. When we find peace among the component parts of our own psyche, then we will possess the inner resources to make peace in a multicultural society. Only in this way will the crises I have mentioned be addressed at their roots. I see education—formal and informal—as the sole means of developing this remarkable human capacity for interior harmony, which in the end is the capacity for freedom and love. The Function of Frames The content of education is infinite in extent. Every day more information is available, new research is published, political changes occur, and businesses collapse. All of these demand our attention. Education is largely comprised of acquiring and organizing such information, and for this purpose students are taught the skills needed to assimilate and transmit information through reading, writing, and mathematics. But such **simple input-output functions are but one dimension of education.** Something **more is needed to convert information into meaningful knowledge. Surrounding and supporting the information we receive is the 'form' or structure of our cognitive and emotional life that goes largely unobserved**. To understand how information becomes meaningful, we must turn our attention to this hidden container or 'frame of reference,' as Jack Mezirow termed it.2 A frame of reference is a way of knowing or making meaning of the world. Enormous quantities of sensorial and mental data stream into human consciousness, but somehow that stream is brought into a coherent meaningful whole. At first sight it may seem that such meaning-making is an entirely natural and universal process, and to some degree it certainly is. Evolution has incorporated reflexes and drives deep into the human psyche. But the way we make sense of the world is also conditioned profoundly by societal forces, among them education. That is to say, we are socialized into a worldview that operates largely unconsciously and behind the scenes, but which affects the way we understand what we see, hear, and feel. According to the Leo Apostel Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Belgium, "A worldview is a map that people use to orient and explain the world, and from which they evaluate and act, and put forward prognoses and visions of the future." In the course of a lifetime we may shed one worldview and adopt another. In other words, we can change the structure that makes meaning for us. Thus while worldviews can be understood as deep cognitive structures, they are not immutable. The solutions to Darfur and economic inequality (among many other problems) will ultimately not be found through more information or better foreign aid programs, but only here at the level where information marries with values to become meaning. Human action flows from this source, not from data alone. An education that would reach beyond information must work deeper; it will need to transform the very container of consciousness, make it more supple and complex. For this, we educators need pedagogical 2 tools other than those optimized for information transfer. At its most advanced stage, we will need to help our students and ourselves to create a dynamic cognitive framework that can challenge established intellectual boundaries, and even sustain the conflicting values and viewpoints that comprise our planetary human community. Challenging Conventional Divisions In recent years I have spent time with members of the Native American Academy, a group largely comprised of academics who are also Native Americans. In our meetings we have explored the character of Native knowledge systems and research methods in comparison to those of orthodox Western science. From the first, the differences were marked. The place of our meeting was of special consequence, Chaco Canyon. It is the site of an ancient indigenous settlement whose remaining structures are clearly aligned according to a detailed astronomical knowledge. Following a long drive we turned onto the approach road, stopping in the middle of nowhere to make a small offering of bee pollen and tobacco. The first evening included a long ceremony performed by a knowledge-keeper from the local Native population, which concluded with a sensitive presentation of the problems we were likely to encounter in our endeavors. The sacred and the secular so seamlessly blended in the indigenous mind contrasts strongly with the conventional division between science and spirituality in the modern West. In the Western worldview, science is often defined in opposition to spirituality. My work with Native American colleagues challenges that presupposition at its root. Our time is one in which such unreflective assumptions must increasingly be challenged. Last year I was seated among over 10,000 neuroscientists listening to the fourteenth Dalai Lama address them concerning the interaction between Buddhist philosophers and Western scientists. The occasion was the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, and the Dalai Lama was the keynote speaker because of his groundbreaking collaborative work to bridge the traditional cultural divide between science and the contemplative traditions. Because of his openness and that of a growing number of scientists, Buddhist meditative insights have been joined to scientific research in ways that are very fruitful for the fields of cognitive science and psychology.3 This is a second example in which traditional divisions have been challenged with fruitful consequences. Contemplative Pedagogy **One of the** most powerful **transformative** interventions developed by humanity **is** contemplative practice or meditation. **It** has been specifically designed to **move human cognition from a delusory view of reality** to a true one: that is, **to one in which the profound interconnectedness of reality is directly perceived**. Global conflict has its deep source in the privileging of worldviews, in the reification of our particular understanding and the objectification of the other. Such ways of seeing our world are, at root, dysfunctional and divisive. Contemplative practice works on the human psyche to shape attention into a far suppler instrument, one that can appreciate a wide range of worldviews and even sustain the paradoxes of life, ultimately drawing life's complexity into a gentle, non-judgmental awareness. The usefulness of secular contemplative practice is being increasingly appreciated by educators at hundreds of North American universities and colleges. For example, in collaboration with The Center for Contemplative Mind in Society, the American Council of Learned Societies has granted 120 Contemplative Practice Fellowships to professors over the last ten years, supporting them in designing courses that include contemplative practice as a pedagogical strategy.4 At conferences and summer schools at Columbia University and Amherst College and elsewhere, professors have gathered to share their experiences in the emerging area of contemplative pedagogy. Their efforts range from simple silence at the start of class to exercises that school attention; and most recently, to innovative contemplative practices that relate directly to course content. The 2005 Columbia Conference focused specifically on the role of contemplative practices in "Making Peace in Ourselves and Peace in the World." Courses are offered that range from theater to economics, from philosophy to cosmology, in which university teachers are experimenting with a wide range of contemplative exercises, thus creating a new academic pedagogy. I have become convinced that contemplation 3 benefits both students and faculty, and that secular contemplative practices should assume a significant place on our educational agenda. Contemplative practices fall into two major classes, those that school cognition and those that cultivate compassion. We are well aware that our observation and thinking require training, but we often neglect the cultivation of our capacity for love. In his letters to a young poet, Rainer Maria Rilke wrote, "For one human being to love another, that is perhaps the most difficult of all our tasks, the ultimate, the last test and proof, the work for which all other work is but a preparation. For this reason young people, who are beginners in everything, cannot yet know love, they have to learn it. With their whole being, with all their forces, gathered close about their lonely, timid, upwardbeating heart, they must learn to love." 5 We are well-practiced at educating the mind for critical reasoning, critical writing, and critical speaking as well as for scientific and quantitative analysis. But is this sufficient? In a world beset with conflicts, internal as well as external, isn't it of equal if not greater importance to balance the sharpening of our intellects with the systematic cultivation of our hearts? We must, indeed, learn to love. Educators should join with their students to undertake this most difficult task. Thus true education entails a transformation of the human being that, as Goethe said, "is so great that I never would have believed it possible." **This transformation results in the human capacity to live the worldviews of others, and** even **further to sustain in our mind** and heart the contradictions that are an inevitable part of engaging **the beautiful variety of cultures, religions, and races that populate this planet**. We can sustain the complexities of the world because we have learned to honor and embrace the complex, conflicting components of ourselves**. Our inner accomplishments**, achieved through contemplative education**, translate into outer capacities for peace-building.** From there it is a short distance to the perception of interconnectedness and the enduring love for others, especially for those different from us. We are increasingly becoming a world populated by solitudes. When Rilke declares that the highest expression of love is to "stand guard over and protect the solitude of the other," he is expressing his respect for and even devotion to the uniqueness of every person and group. If, however, we are to avoid social atomization or the fundamentalist reaction to this tendency, we will need to learn to love across the chasms that divide us. Only a profoundly contemplative and transformative education has the power to nurture the vibrant, diverse civilization that should be our global future. As Maria Montessori wrote, "Preventing conflicts is the work of politics; establishing peace is the work of education."6

#### Buddhist non-attachment strategies implemented in the context of educational spaces are clinically proven to ameliorate suffering and improve psychological health amongst students – we’ve got empirics!

**Wu 19** [Bonnie Wai Yan Wu, Junling Gao, Hang Kin Leung and Hin Hung Sik, “A Randomized Controlled Trial of Awareness Training Program (ATP), a Group-Based Mahayana Buddhist Intervention”, 1-17-2019; https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12671-018-1082-1.pdf]///vishfish

The data from our study indicated that wisdom in the form of nonattachment (NAS) served as the key component of ATP to mediate the improvement of the levels of perceived stress (PSS), sense of coherence (SOC), and psychological wellbeing (GHQ). This supported our hypothesis that wisdom in the form of nonattachment is an important and effective mediator to reduce an individual’s delusions and suffering. These findings endorse Sahdra’s assertion (Sahdra et al. 2010, p. 125) that release from mental fixation (nonattachment) is thought to encourage more objective perception, greater compassion, reduced selfishness, and release from, or letting go of, what Buddhist call ‘afflictive’ emotion, thus alleviating suffering.^ A significant maintenance effect was also found at 3-month follow-up. We attribute this significant maintenance effect of the ATP to the effectiveness of the three pedagogical steps of developing the wisdom of nonattachment as taught in the Fig. 2 Mediation diagrams that summarize the hierarchical linear regression and bootstrap analyses by using nonattachment as a mediator of the effect of the intervention on stress, sense of coherence, and psychological well-being. ATP Awareness Training Program, PSS Perceived Stress Scale, SOC Orientation to Life, GHQ General Health Questionnaire, NAS Nonattachment Scale, BS results of bootstrap analyses, HLR results of hierarchical linear regression analyses; \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001. If zero is not included within the estimated confidence interval, it indicates a significant mediation effect at the 0.05 level. Numbers in parentheses are the B after controlling for the mediator. Numbers in square brackets are the lower level confidence interval and upper level confidence interval 1290 Mindfulness (2019) 10:1280–1293 Sandhinirmochana Sūtra. Under this pedagogical system, practitioners must first learn and memorize the teaching, then repeatedly focus and contemplate on its meaning and finally accept and practice accordingly. It would seem that the cognitive learning and reflective learning helped the participants to retain their knowledge acquired from the program, as demonstrated in the high pass rate of the pop quiz at 3-month follow-up. Moreover, many participants maintained their meditation practice within the post-follow-up period. The findings of this study, together with the school-based contemplative education program (Sik and Wu 2015), support that the Buddhist pedagogy of the three wisdoms may be a desirable method to foster participants’ learning experience. Another factor that might have contributed to the significant maintaining effect of the ATP is the importance of NAS to psychological well-being. Our findings reveal that changes in NAS mediate the maintenance impact of the ATP on participants’ stress levels, sense of coherence, and psychological well-being. Our findings are consistent with the only other group-based study for adults that used NAS as an outcome measure in an interventional study (Van Gordon et al. 2017). The findings of Van Gordon et al.’s study also demonstrated that nonattachment was enhanced both at post and at post-follow-up, and it continued to positively mediate the psychological distress outcome for participants with fibromyalgia. In addition, the ATP and the findings of this study may inform second-generation MBIs’ theory and research. In this study, we posited that the developing trend of the Bsecond-generation MBIs,^ that is, to formulate an MBI by referring back to its Buddhist origins, could be further developed by formulating an intervention that systematically combines a Buddhist theoretical model with a compatible meditation practice. The development of the ATP and the significant findings of this study demonstrate that a semisecular group intervention based on Mahayana Buddhist teaching that adopts a textually aligned approach with a coherent theory and praxis could be an effective means to enhance the psychological health and well-being of people in contemporary society. Since this is the first attempt to develop and investigate an intervention that adopts a textually aligned approach, these positive findings may inform researchers’ future approaches to formulate and design Buddhist-derived interventions

#### There is something to work towards and a good solid world- we just have to look for it and only the affirmative will find it

Bennett 11, Oliver Bennett, The manufacture of hope: religion, eschatology and the culture

of optimism, Routledge, March 2011, Professor Oliver Bennett established Warwick's Centre for Cultural Policy Studies in 1999, having previously established the MA in European Cultural Policy and Management in 1993. He directed both the Centre and the MA course until 2008. He has published widely on cultural policy, intellectual history and cultural politics. He is the founding editor of the International Journal of Cultural Policy and a founder member of the Scientific Committee of the International Conference on Cultural Policy Research (ICCPR). In 2012, he was awarded a higher doctorate (DLitt) by Warwick for his contributions to cultural policy research. I have a pdf, r0w@n

Hindu concepts of salvation have much in common with Buddhism, which also incorporates the twin principles of karma and samsara (multiple rebirths). Both religions see release from samsara as the ultimate goal,6 although there are significant differences between them on what actually constitutes the self that is to be released.7 This is not the place to explore these ontological complexities further or to set out the various paths to moksa (nirvana in Buddhism) prescribed by the many different schools of Hinduism and Buddhism (see Brandon 1967, pp. 165–177, NeumaierDargyay 1997, Coward 2003, pp. 89–160). However, what can be noted here are the grounds for optimism that these doctrines offer. On the one hand, human beings are represented not as insignificant creatures stranded in an indifferent world, but as inhabitants of a moral universe underpinned by the unshakeable laws of karma; and on the other, death is viewed not as a final annihilation but as a stepping stone on the road to a higher destiny. Of course, optimism is not the entitlement of everyone and, as we shall see, Hindu and Buddhist eschatologies reflect concepts of supernatural justice that punish as well as reward. But what they indisputably do is bestow on human beings an intrinsic sense of significance that death not only cannot destroy but also plays a part in enhancing.

#### The only path into the darkness is a radical transformation of the subject- that requires a different way of being, the Buddhist self.

Robinson-Morris 15, David Wayne Robinson-Morris, An Ontological (re)Thinking: Ubuntu and

Buddhism in Higher Education, Louisiana State University, this person is literally the most qualified author I have ever read- see this website for everything- <https://www.drmphd.com/about>, <https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3439&context=gradschool_dissertations>, r0w@n

All writing is situated within the world, that is, history, reality (everyday lived experiences), and futurity are ever present–each word, phrase, and sentence is an amalgamation of a space/time trinitarian onto-epistemology intricately woven into the very matter of the communicatory medium (Derrida, 1972/1981). This inquiry is no exception. At the time of writing, the world seems to be in crisis, or perhaps my awareness1 of the physical, spiritual, ontological, and epistemological violence has been heighted as a result of the thinking and rethinking inherent in becoming-PhD (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987); at any rate, it seems that we are besieged from all sides by anti-intellectualism, totalitarian political conservatism, partisan politics, and a complete disrespect for the personhood of every individual. Over the past year, this country has experienced what can only be described as a year of killing, which among other things reveals–no, necessitates a different way of being. I argue, the murders of unarmed people of color at the hands of American law enforcement officers—i.e. Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, Freddie Gray—the recent mass shootings in South Carolina and closer to home in Lafayette, Louisiana; the kidnappings and religious massacres in Nigeria, the attacks of September 11, genocide, slavery, racism, war, colonialism, sexism, xenophobia, poverty, and homophobia are all symptoms of the same “dis-ease” (P. Hendry, personal communication, May, 7, 2015). This “dis-ease” (P. Hendry, personal 1 Awareness, according to Kuhn (1962/2012), “is prerequisite to all acceptable changes of theory” (p. 67). 2 communication, May, 7, 2015), this crisis at its core is found the symptoms of a deficit in understanding our shared humanity or a failure in knowing we “are not, in fact, the ‘other’” (Toni Morrison, 1989, p. 9). These events “have a way of imposing themselves” (Waldron, 2003, p. 145); as we watch the nightly news, read the daily paper, and browse various digital news sites we are bombarded with images, “with the multiple faces of human evil and suffering” and one could speculate that each of us, unconsciously, fears “an inescapably inhumane reality” (Waldron, 2004, p. 145). Indeed, to quote Shakespeare (1611/2004), it may appear that “Hell is empty, /and All the devils are here” (1.2.214-215); however, understanding the universe as pantareic2 compels us toward radical hope (Lear, 2008), which sets in motion a new “being becoming” (Ramose, 2002, p. 233)–an onto-epistemological metamorphosis3 , which will require not incremental adjustments to thinking and doing, but a serious transmutation of Western subjectivity, a new definition of self. The convergence of Buddhism from the East and Ubuntu from Africa ushers in a new way of thinking the Western subject, metamorphosing the Western subject into the re-conceptualized Being-West. William Waldron (2003) writing on the possibility of combining the Buddhist notion of subjectivity with evolutionary science to understand the mess we now find ourselves in, posits, the ills of humanity are caused by a false human understanding of self–of the ‘I’ that ‘we’ 2 A Greek philosophy of the universe, which holds that all things are in flux, ever-flowing. It also serves as the basis for the African philosophic conception of the universe, which holds that “order cannot be established and fixed for all time” (Ramose, 2002, p. 234). This concept undergirds chaos and complexity theory (Capra, 1996). Ramose (2002) uses the concept as justification of the inseparability of ontology and epistemology, of being and becoming. 3 Metamorphosis, derived from the Greek metamorphoun, is defined as “a change of form or nature of a thing or person into a completely different one, by natural or supernatural means” (Google online dictionary, n.d.). Following, Louw’s (2011) assertion regarding the use of the term transformation in the colonizing practices of Christian missionaries, metamorphosis or a derivative will be utilized in place of transformation where possible. Louw (2011) states, “Because nothing could be assimilated into the church, the buzzword was total transformation (transformation as engulfing and extinction) of indigenous culture without the possibility of any form of accommodation” (p. 186). 3 become. In consonant with Buddhist and Ubuntu4 thought, he argues human suffering is the result of the “construction of and a deep-seated attachment to our sense of a permanent identity, what we mistakenly take to be a unitary, autonomous entity, independent of and isolated from the dynamically changing and contingent world around us” (Waldron, 2003, p. 146). This dominant view of the self, the “I” that we speak in the West runs counter to the Buddhist perspective, which holds we are all “ever-changing conglomerates of processes (skandha) formed in self-organizing patterns that are ever open, like all organic processes, to change, growth and decay based upon the natural functions of assimilation, interpenetration and dissolution” (Waldron, 2003, p. 147). Similarly, Ubuntu notions of the subjectivity knocks the independent and autonomous Cartesian subject off kilter by reinforcing “[t]he ‘I am’ is not a rigid subject, but a dynamic self-constitution dependent on this otherness creation of relation and distance” (Eze, 2010, p. 191). In short, through Buddhism and Ubuntu, we come to understand that we are beings deeply interconnected, (re)created through and in dynamic interaction with the universe (and all it encompasses), and always in the process of being-becoming. Again, I argue, the West’s misguided understanding of self, our interconnectedness and interdependence is cause to the litany of inhumane effects that plague our existence. We have failed, I argue, in the collective memory of humanity to remember our interconnectedness, our shared being as human (Waghid, 2014). We–the global ‘we’–desperately need a dialogue on humanity; we need a dialogue on what it means to be a human being. If Nelson Mandela’s much quoted assertion, “Education is the most powerful weapon which you 4 Ubuntu will be spelled in two ways througout the entirety of the document. First, Ubuntu refers to the philosophical understanding or practice, which encompasses Ubuntugogical theories and ideologies utilized by African people to make sense of their lived experience. Ubuntu encompasses the spiritual, secular, comtemporary, and global understanding of the philosophical construct. On the other hand, ubuntu refers to an ethical or cultural pratice through which a person becomes a human. In short, Ubuntu refers to the philosophy and ubuntu, the ethic of practice through which a particular type of human being is produced (Praeg, 2014). 4 can use to change the world” (Nobel Peace Prize, 1993) rings with any truth, then it is within the hallowed halls of the academy—the training ground of future educators, politicians, lawyers, doctors, religious, law enforcement officers, policy makers, and leaders of the world–—that provides an opportune setting to dialogue on, to be, and to model our shared humanity. Educators, who perhaps are more powerful than armies, who by their example and sole utilization of the power of voice and pen, can set about building a community–a culture–that values individuals over machines, ideas over manufactured products, and the needs of the community over our own narrow self-interest (Slattery, 2013). What, then, is the role of higher education institutions—professors, administrators, and student affairs professionals—in providing a rich educative environment conducive for human being-becoming? In this context, being-becoming can be defined as the rhizomatic formation of self, whereby the multiplicity of self in communion with other selves is always perpetually caught up in lines of flight through and emerging from ruptures and fissures created under the influence and pressures of sociocultural, spiritual, and biological variables (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Tanaka, 2012).

#### Communication enables processing of nonindividuality and resets our intuitive commands, denying abstraction

Rueyling Chuang and Guo-Ming Chen 03, Buddhist Perspectives and Human Communication, 2003, <https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=com_facpubs>, r0w@n

Three ontological assumptions of Buddhist teachings are related to human communication. First, the non-duality feature of reality reveals a holistic nature of human communication in which opposites are transcended over time and space. Second, yuan (dependent originations) dictates that all elements in the communication process are interrelated. Third, the concept of samsara (Wheel of Life) indicates that human communication is an endless cycle with no real beginning or ending. The holistic view of human communication based on Buddhist teachings demands the interconnectedness between interactants in a constantly transforming temporal and spatial environment. In Zen Buddhist views, when two beings encounter each other due to the formation of yuan, they begin to establish the experience of non-separateness (Nordstrom, 1979). This mutual dependence or dependent origination, in accord with non-duality or nondichotomy, discloses the themes of relationality and circularity (Miike, 2002). Relationality indicates that the meaningful existence of human beings is embedded in an interdependent and interrelated network. Circularity infers that the transcendence of time and space “provides a sense of relatedness of the present to the past and the future, and a sense of relatedness of the life world to the whole of nature” (Miike, 2002, p. 6). In a nutshell, human communication becomes meaningful only in relation to others in a harmonious way. Finally, the mutually dependent interconnectedness beyond the temporal and spatial limitation penetrates the boundaries of different worlds of existence. Based on this, Ishii (2001) develops a model of triworld communication which shows the grand interfusion and interpenetration among human beings’ world, natural beings’ world, and supernatural beings’ world. Ethics of Human Communication Buddhist teachings offer abundant guidelines for how people should communicate, or what standards and rules should guide peoples’ conduct. According to Konsky, Kapoor, Blue, and Kapoor (2000), Buddhism strongly upholds “ethical concepts of tolerance, non-violence, respect for the individual, 72 Intercultural Communication Studies XII-4 2003 Asian Approaches to Human Communication love of animals and nature and a belief in the fundamental spiritual equality of all human beings” (p. 244). The ethical sources of Buddhism are mainly grounded on the principle of Eight Paths that specify what is right or wrong in dealing with another person. Among them, the third, fourth, and fifth paths, including right speech, right action, and right livelihood, are especially related to communication ethics. Kirkwood (1997) suggests five ethical guidelines for speech from the Buddhist perspective: 1. One should restrain the impulse for internal or overt speech and master the practice of silence. 2. One should avoid language which fosters ego-identificatin in oneself or others and select language which promotes accurate knowledge of the empirical ego. 3. One should restrain from speech which arouses strong desires or aversions in oneself or others and practice speech which promotes attitudes of desirelessness. 4. One should restrain from speech which is not consistent with one’s thoughts or actions and practice truthfulness. 5. One should restrain from speech which denigrates others or oneself and practice speech which honors others and oneself. (pp. 223-225) The Buddhist ethics of speech are quite consistent with the prominent universal principle of ethical communication that is comprised of four elements: mutuality, open-mindedness, honesty, and respect (Chen & Starosta, 1998). Communication Behaviors On the behavioral level, the Buddhist emphasis on harmony, mutual dependence, selflessness, compassion, and ethics that aim to reach enlightenment directly shows its impact on East Asians’ communication behaviors. The influence leads to five characteristics of East Asian communication: intuition, emphasis of silence, empathic, emotional control, and avoidance of being aggressive. The intuitive style of communication influenced by Buddhism rejects the Western linear or abstract thinking pattern, as well the Confucian preoccupation of conventional knowledge. Instead, it is greatly identified with Chinese Taoism emphasizing the inner liberation through a direct understanding of life or an original spontaneity to catch every instant moment of life (Watts, 1957). In other words, the intuitive communication style is “to feel” rather than “to analyze” or “think about” the situation in the process of interaction. Abstraction and conceptualization are denied (Suzuki, 1959).

#### The Buddhist mindset resets us from the apocalyptic worldview propagated by historical analysis and political theories– that’s key to creating a useful frame of reference and moving on from problematic power structures

John M. Yowell, 15, “IF THE HELLS ARE NOT EMPTY”: A FRAMEWORK FOR A BUDDHIST CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY, The University of Texas at Arlington, May 2015, DOA: 1-1-2022, https://rc.library.uta.edu/uta-ir/bitstream/handle/10106/25077/Yowell\_uta\_2502M\_13122.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, r0w@n

For the better part of the last two-thousand years the people of the Western world have been conditioned to view our existence in terms of our history; not simply the recollection of events of the past, but a view of history as a revelatory process that carries with it the potential for a grand fulfillment of one kind or another. This is the root of the apocalyptic worldview; a reading of historical events as a preordained means of facilitating an absolute end to all things. It is a way of looking at the world with certainty that a specific outcome is inevitable. These outcomes naturally vary depending on one’s dominant ideology, religion, or political perspective, but in as much as they serve as a way of interpreting the past with the intention of moving toward a particular future, they can be said to be apocalyptic. While the word apocalyptic often carries with it a religious connotation, evoking images of the fulfillment of God’s plan by means of rapture, judgement, and the destruction of the world as we know it, the apocalyptic focus on inevitable ends are present in many of the prevailing ideologies of the West as well, even those which may seem fundamentally opposed to each other. For example, proponents of free market capitalism tend to argue that, when left to its naturally self-regulating state, capitalism will eventually solve issues of poverty, homelessness, and the like. While income disparity and general economic inequality may exist for any number 36 of reasons, for the capitalist it is a certainty that all boats will indeed rise if only given the chance. From the opposing position of the Marxist, capitalism’s tendency towards crisis, one of its hallmark characteristics, ensures that such a mode of political economy will inevitably be abandoned and replaced with socialism and eventually communism. While modern Marxists would no doubt argue that their political goals are no longer subject to the orthodoxy of Marx’s ‘laws of motion of modern society’, the fact remains that the Marxist position is one which is driven toward a specific conclusion built upon historical conditions. These are merely examples meant to convey the general form of the apocalyptic worldview, but what of its function? Spellmeyer (2010) points out that this way of looking at the world is so appealing because it provides certainty in the face of an increasingly complex reality. This complexity is all encompassing in modernity, challenging both traditional ways of understanding the world, such as religion, and our individual and collective confidence in a reliable preordained future of any kind. As is often the case when systems of belief, either formal or informal, are challenged, the response to this uncertainty has been a widespread clinging to the apocalyptic worldview. In addition to the certainty provided by such beliefs, they can also be seen as providing one’s life with a sense of order and a connection to some transcendent value system. That sense of transcendent cosmic order can be internalized and the individual believer is suddenly made to feel his life newly purposeful and in touch with eternity. More than just a sense of immortality, he experiences himself in alliance with the deity – or with history – enabling him to share in His or its ultimate power to destroy and re-create. Feelings of weakness or despair can be replaced by a surge of life power or even omnipotence (Lifton, 2003:61). Lifton further suggests that it is because such views satisfy the psychological needs for order and purpose that the holders of these beliefs are strongly driven to impose them on others. In cases where these beliefs fall in stark contrast to contemporary scientific or rational understanding this active proselytization serves to both stifle internal conflict and self-doubt and affirm one’s convictions. The most obvious example of this would be the prevalence of religious fundamentalism in recent years. Whether in reference to religiously inspired conflict or acts of 37 terrorism, or the influence of Christian fundamentalism on public policy, we are presented with daily reminders that in spite of the technological and scientific advancement we have undergone as a species, these self-reinforcing beliefs are, for lack of a better word, inevitable under current conditions. Taken as a whole, the apocalyptic tendency of modern society ultimately frames all problems in these familiar and disruptive terms. Issues are framed in terms of past or future, as resulting from a single cause, or as the work of divinity. They are then discussed in similarly apocalyptic language which becomes detrimental to the possibility of legitimate public discourse and engagement. If the patterns of argument typical of religious prophecy are also observable in any public discourse that anticipates or predicts catastrophe, then we should be skeptical of the public’s ability to reasonably evaluate any appeal to urgency in the face of disaster. At the same time, we also run the risk of dismissing valid threats because they are couched in the form, if not the language, of traditional prophetic warnings. (O’leary, 1997:310, in Foust & William, 2009) This process is harmful to progress at all levels. It makes all problems the result of a particular mindset; a product of our collective way of approaching reality. Perhaps most importantly it is exploited at every turn by news media and politicians to reinforce public support for existing power structures, which at the moment represent the best hope for addressing many of the most pressing contemporary issues faced by humanity as a whole. As we have seen, the revolutionary potential for a Buddhist critical social theory to provoke mass change is found in individual agency, and in addressing the issue of an apocalyptic worldview the emphasis remains the same. However, rather than focus on specific individual mental states as they contribute to personal suffering, the creation of a Buddhist worldview in defiance of the apocalyptic position requires the cultivation of a global mindfulness and situation in the present moment. It can be understood as facilitating the embrace of the chaos and complication of the world rather than its destruction. However, before I delve into the specifics of the Buddhist worldview a note of clarification is in order.

# 1AR

## EXT

The world is infinitely interconnected and the root of all of our suffering is our misleading perception of the ‘ego’ or the internal self- that creates greed, selfishness, anger, hatred.

The Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debate that best endorses the politics of mindfulness- that means we integrate the practice of mindfulness as a way to deconstruct ignorance of the way of the universe into our political and social institutions- that unifies the mind and the body and lets us escape the present and join the timeless.

I win the rotb- the performance and the aff itself constitute a total endorsement of mindfulness.

Prefer my rotb

1. Only mindfulness can overcome the ego which is the root cause of all suffering
2. Our educational model is uniquely key to fostering good health, engaging usefully with debated content, and creating a more optimal fairness model.

## TFW

### Case Outweighs

#### Overview

I get to weigh case impacts over t- key to reciprocity and makes for better debates since my framework def thinks tfw is bad

#### Ethicality

Mindfulness is key to becoming an ethical person- without it you can’t truly understand how to be a part of the world.

That outweighs

1. Personal ethics last longer with us than any other impacts- also means they impact more people since they impact everyone we talk to
2. More ethicality brings more people to debate- having nice people is attractive

#### Indirect Communication

Debate is focused on direct communication- ie the linear relationship between you giving the speech and me understanding it- that never works for transmitting knowledge since people only learn through indirect communication- ie from poetic beauty and mysteries around them- that’s a reason to prefer the aff since we’re the only model that enables learning

#### Self-Awareness

Education only exists under my model- otherwise we don’t internalize it

#### Problem-solving

The understanding of the universe the aff conveys with mindfulness is key to turning knowledge into useful action- giving value to education

#### Health

Meditation within debate spaces improves mental health and alleviates material suffering to real people- means you presume aff since it’s an impact to voting aff that is 100% true

#### Power Structures

Mindful politics prereqs having the understandings that would let us deconstruct power structures- proves we’re key to useful education

### DAs

#### Overview

T is a defense of topical academic confrontational debate about hypothetical governmental action- if any of those things are bad they lose the shell

#### Wrong Intent DA

Debaters come at issues trying to learn and solve problems- only approaching debate from love and community building can create the basic preconceptions that makes useful knowledge and self-healing possible.

#### Dogma DA

Debate’s focus on singular frameworks makes people universally dedicated to single-minded perspectives in each round- that destroys education on the way the world actually works.

#### PTX DA

Politics maintains order by generating fear of the world- debate’s endorsement of these fears prevents action and destroys education.

#### Problem-solution DA

Debate represents the binary between a problem and the solution- that ignores how situational dynamics and complicated adaptive solutions are the only ones that works- makes debate education worthless.

#### Action Framework DA

Debate’s focus on words rather than actions ties us up in stupid debates with no actual action- destroys education on useful frameworks and makes change in the debate space impossible- means we’re a comparatively better model for fairness because we let change happen more fluidly.

#### Competitiveness DA

Debate’s focus on competition is bad- it drives negative emotions like selfishness and greed- that changes our egos to centralize around negativity- that destroys community building and healing

#### Apocalypse DA

Debate’s focus on massive impacts drives ignorance of truth, makes everything we do exploitable, and destroys engagement

#### Education outweighs fairness

1. Schools only fund debate because it’s educational- without schools there’s no tournaments which comes before engagement chronologically
2. Probability- debate’s been dying for a while even though it’s been getting more fair- proves education matters more to the event
3. it’s the only portable skill we take away- obviously other places can be fair
4. Scope- we can use the education we get from debate outside of debate, can’t crosseply fairness
5. Education’s why we do academic extracurriculars- ows cuz it’s how we all think

#### Healing outweighs fairness

1. You need to be healed to get to experience fairness
2. People being healed lets them shape fairness norms

### CI

#### Competing Interpretation: Debaters should endorse meditative politics.

Net benefits are the disads

### Standards

#### Overview

1. Disclosure solves- you had the aff a half an hour ahead, just write answers

#### Ground

1. generic disads that link to every aff bad- decreases education cuz you don’t have to do new prep, esp critical education cuz generic disads are boring
2. just read an opposing rotb and argue why it comes first- people have read cap rotb, dean rotb, tt rotb
3. read a counterplan and argue why it links better to meditative politics
4. turn my plan- my aff sounds kinda socialist and there are hella neocons out there

#### Limits

1. squirrels are inevitable and the incentive to be squirrely exists in both worlds

### Paradigm

#### Overview

All their fairness weighing presumes these affs collapse debate- obviously not true- people have been running k affs for decades- doesn’t disprove my solvency since nobody’s run Buddhism k affs

#### A2 SSD

1. Only the aff can establish a new model for a debate- they get to set a plan text and decide what to talk about- the neg has to be reactive

#### A2 TVA

1. All the disads to t are disads to the tva since my aff would impact turn itself if it were topical- that sets up a double bind
2. The aff rejects governmental action as the starting point

#### A2 No RVIS

1. Prevents spamming friv theory
2. incentives- if theory isn’t turnable it incentivizes straight theory ncs which a- destroys topic ed b- destroys fairness since I can’t turn the neg but they can turn the aff
3. we’re in a model v model debate- if I win you affirm

## A2 Ks

### Psycho

#### The aff o/w on specificity – ctrl-F the doc there’s no actual mention of Buddhist practice or meditative poetics - CX checks – but mindfulness is about maintaining emptiness in relation to materiality and detaching oneself from desire systems -- not finding some fixed ethical telos - this means that at worst we simply don’t link to their and at best we solve the K which is a reason to auto-vote aff

#### Perm do both – weak strength of link means either there’s no net benefit to the alt alone or even a 1% risk of solvency resolves any impact to the links as disads

#### Perm do the aff in the mindset of the alt – solves the Eurocentricity offense below since our model is a prerequisite towards fantastical traversal that can create true fulfillment

#### Perm double-bind – either the alt can’t solve or it resolves the links to the aff

#### Their psychoanalytic project pathologizes Buddhist orientations to desire by assuming a stasis of Western cognicentrism that mischaracterizes the aff as a contortion within desire instead of a disassociation from it – link turns the K and is a disad to the alt

**Walsh 93** [Roger Walsh, “Phenomenological Mapping and Comparisons of Shamanic, Buddhist, Yogic, and Schizophrenic Experiences”, Winter 1993; <https://drrogerwalsh.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Phenomenological-Mappping-and-Comparisons-of-Shamanic-Buddhhist-Yogic-and-Schizophrenic-Experiences-JORS-1993.pdf>] ///vishfish

One of the early assumptions that was often made about altered state inducing practices was that they exhibited equifinality. That is, many authors, including this one, mistakenly assumed that differing tech- niques, such as various meditations, contemplations, and yogas, neces- sarily resulted in equivalent states of consciousness. This largely reflected our ignorance of the broad range of possible ASCs that can be deliberately cultivated (Goleman). For example, the varieties of ASC that have been identified in Indian meditative and yogic practices alone include highly concentrated states such as the yogic samadhis or Bud- dhist jhanas, witness-consciousness states in which equanimity is so strong that stimuli have little or no effect on the observer, and states where extremely refined inner stimuli become the objects of attention such as the faint inner sounds of shabd yoga or the subtle pseudonirvanic bliss of Buddhist vipassana meditation (Goldstein; Goleman). Then too there are unitive states in which the sense of sepa- ration between self and world dissolves such as in some Zen satoris (Kapleau:281); there are others in which all objects or phenomena dis- appear such as in the Buddhist nirvana or Vendantic nirvikalpa samadhi; and there are states in which all phenomena are perceived as expressions or modifications of consciousness, e.g., sahaj samadhi (Wil- ber 1980:74; Free John: 589). Of course this is not to deny that certain states may display significant functional and experiential commonalities. Asian meditative and yogic states are now recognized as distinct states sui generis that may exhibit a variety of unique phenomenological, perceptual, electrophysiological, and hormonal changes (Shapiro: Sha- piro & Walsh; Wilber, Engler & Brown; Goleman). Until recently, however, these Asian meditative and yogic states were often regarded as pathological, and their practitioners were regarded as neurotic or psychotic (Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry). Thus one text- book of psychiatry concluded that the obvious similarities between schizophrenic regressions and the practices of yoga and Zen merely indicate that the general trend in ori- ental cultures is to withdraw into the self from an overbearingly difficult physical and social reality. (Alexander and Selesnich:457) The reasons for this long history of the conflation and pathologizing of religious states are probably several. These include a general bias against accepting the very existence of certain altered states; witness the nineteenth century surgeons who observed apparently painless amputa- tions performed under hypnosis and concluded that the subjects had been bribed to pretend they felt no pain (Tart 1986). Related to this is the limited range of Western categories for states other than waking, sleeping, and pathological ones. This dovetails with the widely observed bias in clinical psychiatry and psychology to pathologize unu- sual experiences (Jung:xlii; Maslow:5; Noll, 1983:444). This can be particularly important in cross cultural studies because "anthropologists sometimes fail to distinguish clinic and culture" (Opler:1092). Related to this is what Michael Hamer (1982:XVII) calls "cognicentrism," the tendency to assume that one's own usual state is optimal. Finally, most researchers have had little direct experience of the states they investigate. Yet classical descriptions, psychological and philosophical arguments (Tart 1983b; Walsh 1989d), and personal reports by Western trained researchers who have experienced altered states (e.g. Globus; Hamer 1982; Tart 1986; Ram Dass 1990) suggest that it may be difficult to comprehend fully and differentiate alternate states without direct experi- ence of them. However a number of phenomenological, clinical, psychometric, physiological, chemical, and theoretical comparisons have indicated sig- nificant differences between meditative-yogic states and those of psycho- logical disturbances, including schizophrenia (Komfield; .Shapiro; Walsh 1980; Wilber 1983; Wilber, Engler, and Brown). Indeed, several hundred studies now attest to potential therapeutic benefits of these practices (Shapiro; Shapiro and Walsh; Murphy & Donovan), and, as Ken Wilber (1980:78) concluded, meditative-yogic states and pathologi- cal states "can be seriously equated only by those whose intellectual inquiry goes no further than superficial impressions

### Marxism

#### The aff o/w on specificity – ctrl-F the doc there’s no actual mention of Buddhist practice or meditative poetics - CX checks – but mindfulness produces the discipline for revolutionary organizing – think about Dhasal’s poetry energizing Dalit Panther organizing or Ambedkar’s usage of Buddhism as a centering force for Dalit Marxism

#### Perm do both

#### Perm double-bind – either the alt can’t solve or it resolves the links to the aff

#### Marxism can’t prevent stuff like racism or transphobia from hacking the movement- ie stalin used antisemitism to rally people around the party- we create the harmonious state that solves back for other instances of violence

#### Communism fails— lack of incentives and knowledge ensure that mass death, starvation, and torture follow

Somin 17- law professor at George Mason University. He coauthored an amicus brief in California v. Texas, with a cross-ideological group of legal scholars, arguing that the challenge to the ACA as a whole should be rejected. [(Ilya Somin, “Lessons from a century of communism,” Washington post, 11/7/17, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/11/07/lessons-from-a-century-of-communism/](%28Ilya%20Somin%2C%20))//mcu

Today is the 100th anniversary of the Bolshevik seizure of power, which led to the establishment of a communist regime in Russia and eventually in many other nations around the world. It is an appropriate time to remember the vast tide of oppression, tyranny, and mass murder that communist regimes unleashed upon the world. While historians and others have documented numerous communist atrocities, much of the public remains unaware of their enormous scale. It is also a good time to consider what lessons we can learn from this horrendous history. I. A Record of Mass Murder and Oppression. Collectively, communist states killed as many as 100 million people, more than all other repressive regimes combined during the same time period. By far the biggest toll arose from communist efforts to collectivize agriculture and eliminate independent property-owning peasants. In China alone, Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward led to a man-made famine in which as many as 45 million people perished – the single biggest episode of mass murder in all of world history. In the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin’s collectivization – which served as a model for similar efforts in China and elsewhere – took some 6 to 10 million lives. Mass famines occurred in many other communist regimes, ranging from North Korea to Ethiopia. In each of these cases, communist rulers were well aware that their policies were causing mass death, and in each they persisted nonetheless, often because they considered the extermination of “Kulak” peasants a feature rather than a bug. While collectivization was the single biggest killer, communist regimes also engaged in other forms of mass murder on an epic scale. Millions died in slave labor camps, such as the USSR’s Gulag system and its equivalents elsewhere. Many others were killed in more conventional mass executions, such as those of Stalin’s Great Purge, and the “Killing Fields” of Cambodia. The injustices of communism were not limited to mass murder alone. Even those fortunate enough to survive still were subjected to severe repression, including violations of freedom, of speech, freedom of religion, loss of property rights, and the criminalization of ordinary economic activity. No previous tyranny sought such complete control over nearly every aspect of people’s lives. Although the communists promised a utopian society in which the working class would enjoy unprecedented prosperity, in reality they engendered massive poverty**.** Wherever communist and noncommunist states existed in close proximity, it was the communists who used walls and the threat of death to keep their people from fleeing to societies with greater opportunity. II. Why Communism Failed. How did an ideology of liberation lead to so much oppression, tyranny and death? Were its failures intrinsic to the communist project, or did they arise from avoidable flaws of particular rulers or nations? Like any great historical development, the failures of communism cannot be reduced to any one single cause. But, by and large, they were indeed inherent. Two major factors were the most important causes of the atrocities inflicted by communist regimes: perverse incentives and inadequate knowledge. The establishment of the centrally planned economy and society required by socialist ideology necessitated an enormous concentration of power. While communists looked forward to a utopian society in which the state could eventually “wither away,” they believed they first had to establish a state-run economy in order to manage production in the interests of the people. In that respect, they had much in common with other socialists. To make socialism work, government planners needed to have the authority to direct the production and distribution of virtually all the goods produced by the society. In addition, extensive coercion was necessary to force people to give up their private property, and do the work that the state required. Famine and mass murder was probably the only way the rulers of the USSR, China, and other communist states could compel peasants to give up their land and livestock and accept a new form of serfdom on collective farms – which most were then forbidden to leave without official permission, for fear that they might otherwise seek an easier life elsewhere. The vast power necessary to establish and maintain the communist system naturally attracted unscrupulous people, including many self-seekers who prioritized their own interests over those of the cause. But it is striking that the biggest communist atrocities were perpetrated not by corrupt party bosses, but by true believers like Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. Precisely because they were true believers, they were willing to do whatever it might take to make their utopian dreams a reality. Even as the socialist system created opportunities for vast atrocities by the rulers, it also destroyed production incentives for ordinary people. In the absence of markets (at least legal ones), there was little incentive for workers to either be productive or to focus on making goods that might actually be useful to consumers. Many people tried to do as little work as possible at their official jobs, where possible reserving their real efforts for black market activity. As the old Soviet saying goes, workers had the attitude that “we pretend to work, and they pretend to pay.” Even when socialist planners genuinely sought to produce prosperity and meet consumer demands, they often lacked the information to do so. As Nobel Prize-winning economist F.A. Hayek described in a famous article, a market economy conveys vital information to producers and consumers alike through the price system. Market prices enable producers to know the relative value of different goods and services, and determine how much consumers value their products. Under socialist central planning, by contrast, there is no substitute for this vital knowledge. As a result, socialist planners often had no way to know what to produce, by what methods, or in way quantities. This is one of the reasons why communists states routinely suffered from shortages of basic goods, while simultaneously producing large quantities of shoddy products for which there was little demand.

#### Socialism fails and causes a reversion back to capitalism – empirics

Muravchik 19 (Joshua, distinguished fellow @ World Affairs Institute, adjunct professor @ Institute of World Politics, former fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, “Socialism Fails Every Time,” Wall Street Journal, 4/9/19, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/socialism-fails-every-time-11554851786>, ccm)

Self-described socialist Bernie Sanders has become a favorite of young voters by posing as an apostle of daring new ideas. Socialism, however, is anything but new. It’s hard to think of another idea that has been tried and failed as many times in as many ways or at a steeper price in human suffering.

The term “socialism” was coined by followers of Robert Owen (1771-1858), whom Karl Marx would label a “utopian socialist.” In 1825 Owen founded New Harmony, an Indiana commune, to demonstrate the superiority of what was first called the “social system.” The same year, Owen explained his experiment to a joint session of Congress attended by Supreme Court justices, President James Monroe and President-elect John Quincy Adams. Although Owen poured his fortune into it, New Harmony collapsed in disarray and recrimination within two years.

Owen’s son Robert Dale Owen salvaged the community by implementing what he called “a policy the very reverse” of socialism: “giving each respectable citizen every facility and encouragement to become (what every adult ought to be) a landed proprietor.”

Undeterred, others founded some 40 to 50 similar communes during the 19th century, and all collapsed quickly. New Harmony’s two years proved to be their median lifespan.

Based on the uniformly dismal results, the idea of socialism might have died a quiet death were it not for Marx (1818-83), who transformed socialism from an experiment—tried, tested and failed—into a prophecy, “the riddle of history solved.” Ironically, he called his vision “scientific socialism.”

Inspired by the dream of proletarian revolution overthrowing capitalist immiseration, socialist parties sprouted across Europe. Yet instead of growing poorer, workers in industrialized countries saw improvement in their living standards; and instead of disappearing, middle classes expanded—all disproving Marx.

It took Vladimir Lenin’s “vanguard” and the horrors of World War I to give socialism new life. In Russia, Lenin pioneered modern communism, which in the 20th century was imposed on 18 countries and one-third of mankind. Repression was justified by socialism’s purported economic benefits, but the actual trade-off entailed economic misery and the snuffing out of as many as 100 million lives.

Today Communist parties rule six countries. Most follow the lead of China, where the party redefined itself to include entrepreneurs. A 2012 Wall Street Journal report identified 160 people with an average net worth of more than $1 billion holding high government or party seats. No Chinese Bernie Sanders rails against them.

“Social democrats” and “democratic socialists” rejected Lenin’s methods. But their goals remained transformational. As British Labour Party leader Clement Attlee, who became prime minister in 1945, explained: “Our policy was not a reformed capitalism but progress toward a democratic socialism.” Labour sought to bring “main factors in the economic system”—including banks, mining and energy—under “public ownership and control.” Nationalization worked so badly, however, that Attlee soon beat a retreat and was voted out in 1951.

In 1981 Socialist François Mitterrand was elected president of France promising a clean “rupture” with capitalism. The results of his spending and nationalizations were so alarming that in 1982 Mitterrand reversed course and implemented austerity measures, which he dubbed “socialist rigor” to save face. “The aim is to bring about a real reconciliation between the left and the economy,” explained Socialist Party chief Lionel Jospin.

American socialists like Mr. Sanders, while often defending the likes of Fidel Castro, Daniel Ortega, Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, prefer to point to Scandinavia as a model. But Scandinavian social democrats learned to settle for dense social safety nets underwritten by remarkably free, capitalist economies. On the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business scale, Denmark ranks third of 190 countries, Norway seventh and Sweden 12th.

Still other forms of socialism arose in the Third World. Encouraged by United Nations development experts, virtually all newly decolonized states adopted “African Socialism,” “Arab Socialism” or other variants. The result was years of economic stagnation until the successful models of East Asia began to reverse their thinking.

Successful socialism has been created in only one place on earth, the kibbutzim of Israel. They were democratic and egalitarian; sharing possessions, meals, even child rearing. But once the Jewish state was securely on its feet, kibbutzniks chose to switch to private enterprise. Socialism, they learned to their surprise, was not a happy way to live.

Socialism has failed everywhere it’s been tried—even where it succeeded. Surely today’s young people can create their own ideas and make their own mistakes rather than repeat those that darkened the times of their parents, grandparents and the generations before.

#### Historical examples do apply- the conditions they created were inevitable which is why they’ve ALWAYS HAPPENED

Somin 17- law professor at George Mason University. He coauthored an amicus brief in California v. Texas, with a cross-ideological group of legal scholars, arguing that the challenge to the ACA as a whole should be rejected. [(Ilya Somin, “Lessons from a century of communism,” Washington post, 11/7/17, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/11/07/lessons-from-a-century-of-communism/](%28Ilya%20Somin%2C%20))//mcu

III. Why the Failure Cannot be Explained Away. To this day, defenders of socialist central planning argue that communism failed for avoidable contingent reasons, rather than ones intrinsic to the nature of the system. Perhaps the most popular claim of this **sort** is that a planned economy can work well so long as it is democratic. The Soviet Union and other communist states were all dictatorships. But if they had been democratic, perhaps the leaders would have had stronger incentives to make the system work for the benefit of the people. If they failed to do so, the voters could “throw the bastards out” at the next election. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that a communist state could remain democratic for long, even it started out that way. Democracy requires effective opposition parties. And in order to function, such parties need to be able to put out their message and mobilize voters, which in turn requires extensive resources. In an economic system in which all or nearly all valuable resources are controlled by the state, the incumbent government can easily strangle opposition by denying them access to those resources. Under socialism, the opposition cannot function if they are not allowed to spread their message on state-owned media, or use state-owned property for their rallies and meetings. It is no accident that virtually every communist regime suppressed opposition parties soon after coming to power. Even if a communist state could somehow remain democratic over the long run, it is hard to see how it could solve the twin problems of knowledge and incentives. Whether democratic or not, a socialist economy would still require enormous concentration of power, and extensive coercion. And democratic socialist planners would run into much the same information problems as their authoritarian counterparts. In addition, in a society where the government controls all or most of the economy, it would be virtually impossible for voters to acquire enough knowledge to monitor the state’s many activities. This would greatly exacerbate the already severe problem of voter ignorance that plagues modern democracy. Another possible explanation for the failures of communism is that the problem was **bad leadership**. If only communist regimes were not led by monsters like Stalin or Mao, they might have done better. There is no doubt communist governments had more than their share of cruel and even sociopathic leaders. **But it is unlikely that this was the decisive factor in their failure**. Very similar results arose in communist regimes with leaders who had a wide range of personalities. In the Soviet Union, it is important to remember that the main institutions of repression (including the Gulags and the secret police) were established not by Stalin, but by Vladimir Lenin, a far more “normal” person. After Lenin’s death, Stalin’s main rival for power – Leon Trotsky – advocated policies that were in some respects even more oppressive than Stalin’s own. It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that either the personality of the leader was not the main factor, or – alternatively – communist regimes tended to put horrible people to positions of power. Or perhaps some of both.

### Semiocap

#### We have an ethical obligation to engage narratives of suffering and generate nuanced, compassionate politics in response – the alternative can’t resolve the inevitable viral circulation of images and reinforces hegemonic discourses

Wibben 15 – Associate Professor of Politics at the University of San Fransisco

(Annick T.R. “How stories matter: Thoughts on contextuality, temporality, reflexivity & certainty”, 12-29-15, http://duckofminerva.com/2015/12/how-stories-matter.html)

\*Note – “Alan” is Alan Kurdi, the Syrian Kurdish boy who drowned along with his mothe rand brother trying to cross the Aegean sea and whose photograph went viral

Alan’s death, which became known to us because someone took a picture that touched many (also because it was circulated widely), and his family’s story, brought to our attention again by Barnard’s article, has helped humanize an often unfathomable and overwhelming crisis in the Middle East and Europe for many. This is no solace to Abdullah Kurdi, whose grief is palpable in his description of himself as a shadow and whose journey since early September has lead him to repeatedly note that he’d rather have died with his family – but there is also hope in the journey of Abdullah’s brother Mohammed, who is resettling in Canada with the help of their sister Tima (Alan’s aunt), and his sister Hivrun who finally made it to Germany with her children (on the same perilous route) where she reunited with her husband. Their stories matter, just like the many others who are waiting to be told. They make it harder for us to look away and ignore how (often our own governments’) policies precipitate hardship for others. As I argue in Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach (Wibben 2011), these personal narratives are also security narratives – worthy of being taken just as seriously by scholars as abstract discussions of great power strategy, arms sales, or Turkish and U.S. foreign policy interests in Syria and beyond. When we take these (personal) security narratives seriously, it becomes clear that “there is always more than one story to be told and that the ‘normality’ presented in narrative is always contextual. Narratives shift and slide” (Wibben 2011: 109). Examining the conditions of possibility for some stories to be told and circulated (and to capture our attention as Alan’s story has) is one way to take these narratives seriously – posts by Megan MacKenzie, Tiina Vaittinen, Swati Parashar, and most recently Federica Caso, all speak to this in some or another manner. While Swati and Megan worry about the dangers of adding to the circulation of some stories and reinforcing particular framings, urging more reflection and even silence, Tiina and Federica point out to that academics have a political and ethical responsibility to speak out in the face of injustice. Federica suggests that speaking also implies listening: to those we write about, to each other as scholars, and to our inner voice, as Swati urges. There is no neutral position to which one might retreat: “Politics and international politics is a dirty business… and whether we get involved through political activity or scholarly research, there is no way that we can avoid the problem of dirty hands,” writes Federica. I would like to add just a few short considerations to this conversation. For one, the stories (and images) we scholars engage (or not) are already circulating and they are intelligible through frames that are familiar to us. These frames are shaped by the contexts we find ourselves in: Hearing, seeing, listening, contemplating, and speaking all happen within a particular (temporal, spatial, personal, professional, cultural, linguistic, etc.) context. This context, or horizon (in hermeneutic terms), shapes how we understand a particular situation – how we make it meaningful to us (and, later, to others). It is important to appreciate that these horizons constantly shift as new experiences, encounters, conversations, contemplative silences, and images expand our horizons (see also Wibben 2011). What is more, we are able to deliberately seek out new experiences and attend, as much feminist scholarship continues to do, to the stories of those on the margins. Second, the contexts for understanding and meaning-making also have an important element of temporality to them. As Cynthia Enloe has urged repeatedly, a key facet of good (feminist) scholarship is to stay attentive over the long haul – when the cameras have moved on to the next story; when Abdullah Kurdi has buried his children, when his story gets questioned (and he’s accused of being a smuggler – though he wasn’t), and when he is whisked away to meetings with the rich and powerful who did not attend to his family when they were alive. As Barnard’s piece begins to outline, the circulation of Alan’s image, his aunt’s activism, and the reactions of those who (for the first time or not) saw the humanity of the refugee/ migrant attempting impossible journeys through this story, did provoke (or at least hasten) some changes. This, of course, is not the end of the story – nor is there a single story to be told here. However – unlike the media which moves from one story to the next in its frenzy to fill the 24/7/365 media cycle, academics have the luxury to be slower thinkers and writers. Those of us in (ever dwindling) privileged academic positions (possibly even enjoying tenure) are able to stay attentive over the long haul, develop deep knowledge about a region or policy issue, and delve into contexts and connections. With that, in my view, comes a responsibility to do so to the best of our ability – and to do so critically and reflexively. As I previously wrote, “how open a researcher is to engaging in (self-)reflexive research processes interrogating their own positionality and privilege, questioning its impact on what can be perceived, being willing to be surprised, and adopting a stance of curiosity – all of these matter greatly” (Wibben 2011: 110) as we tell others’ stories. Reflexivity, as the scholars featured in Researching War: Feminist Methods, Ethics & Politics (Wibben 2016) also point out, needs to start early and can be an antidote to the same old style that pervades much academic (IR) scholarship. This style, which requires that academics speak with an authoritative voice, one that conveys certainty in the face of a complex and uncertain world (and which is warranted when those in power refuse to admit certain truths), is at a disadvantage when covering the nuances of, at times seemingly inconsistent, (personal) experiences. In such a framework of certainty it does not “make sense” that Alan’s aunt Hivrun, after several previous failed attempts to cross the Aegean Sea in a dinghy and near death experiences after which she refused to try again despite her family’s pleas, would make the same perilous journey across just weeks after her nephews died there (see Barnard’s piece). Or maybe it makes perfect sense if we were to pay more attention to the challenges that mark the family’s everyday experience in Turkey? Paying attention to the personal stories, in all their complexity and with varied inconsistencies (which narratives can accommodate, see Wibben 2011), teaches us much about global politics and engaging them also makes our work more relevant to broader audiences. Additionally, thinking and writing our scholarship as stories – to be questioned, expanded, made more nuanced – provides room for a variety of others to insert skepticism, share their truths … and to continue the conversation.

#### The negative challenge to “truth”, “reality” is coopted by right-wing forces – accelerates social injustice and turns the affs subjectivity claims

Wapner 2003 – professor of global environmental politics in the School of International Service at American University (Paul, “Leftist Criticism of "Nature": Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age,” Dissent50.1: 71)

MOST OF US are familiar with rightist attacks on environmentalism. For a long time, many people on the right have faulted environmentalists for wanting to curtail free enterprise, limit private property, and abridge individual freedom in the service of environmental well-being. We are less familiar with leftist criticism. Over the past decade or so, however, some parts of the left have launched their own attacks on environmentalism, and, although these are more philosophical in character, they threaten the movement every bit as much as those coming from the right.

Leftist environmental criticism is the work of a group of postmodern intellectuals and professors. Postmodernists expose the constructed quality of those things we take for granted. They unmask the given and show that "what is" is not necessarily "meant to be," but rather is a consequence of particular decisions and socio-historical conditions. Postmodernism is a natural ally of the left in that it deconstructs existing conditions and shows that, although they may appear natural or necessary, they are really contingent; they can be changed. This is a doctrine that has helped people look critically at their society and consider the possibility of other arrangements.

Leftist critiques of environmentalism start from this same premise. They point out that our notions of nature--the nonhuman world that environmentalists care so much about--are themselves social constructions and thus subject to various interpretations, none of which can provide absolute guidance for environmental policy. We never experience nature directly but always through the lenses of our own values and assumptions. "Nature" is thus not simply a physical entity that is "out there" or given; it is an idea that takes on different meanings in different cultural contexts, a social construction that directs us to see mountains, rivers, trees, and deserts in particular ways. Raymond Williams expressed this understanding when he wrote, "The idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history." To postmodernists, "nature" is not something the mind discovers but something that it makes.

This understanding of "nature" is helpful in guarding against insensitive environmentalist projects. We often assume that everyone concerned with a particular environmental issue shares the same understanding of the problem. But this is far from being the case. When it comes to preserving wilderness areas or protecting biological diversity, one person's wilderness is another person's neighborhood. What one person values as an endangered species is potential income, a threat, or dinner to someone else. Leftist criticism has been important in reminding us that "nature" is not a single realm with a universalized meaning, but a canvas on which we project our sensibilities, our culture, and our ideas about what is socially necessary.

The postmodern argument also poses challenges for anyone concerned with environmental protection. Environmentalism is fundamentally about conserving and preserving nature. Whether one worries about climate change, loss of biological diversity, dwindling resources, or overall degradation of the earth's air, water, soil, and species, the nonhuman world is the backdrop of concern. What happens when critics call this backdrop into question? What happens when they claim that one understanding of "nature" is at odds with another and that there is no definitive way to judge which one is better? How can a movement dedicated to protecting nature operate if the very identity of its concern is in doubt?

THESE MAY seem like academic questions, but they go to the heart of environmentalism and have begun to worry even the most committed environmentalists. After scholars such as William Cronon, Timothy Luke, and J. Baird Callicott introduced "eco-criticism" to the scholarly and popular publics, various environmental activists and thinkers have struggled to articulate a response. Their inability to do so in a decisive and persuasive manner has further damaged the environmentalist position. Even more troubling, now that the critique is out of the bag, it is being co-opted by people on the right. Anti-environmentalists such as Charles Rubin and Alston Chase, for example, now claim that, if there is no such thing as "real" nature, we need not treat the nonhuman world with unqualified respect. If we think it is in our interest, we can freely choose to pave the rainforest, wipe out the last panda bear, or pump high levels of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. What is critical to notice in both cases is that criticisms of "nature," whether they come from the left or are co-opted by the right, are playing an increasing role in structuring the confrontation between anti- and pro-environmentalists. And they are re-setting the fault lines within the environmental movement itself.

So far, there have been two responses from traditional environmentalists to postmodern eco-criticism. The first comes from those who dismiss postmodernism out of hand and simply reassert a modernist narrative of nature and its imperatives. According to activists such as Gary Snyder and Dave Foreman, eco-criticism is at odds with common sense and contemporary science. Yes, they say, there is a social dimension to how we think about nature, but nature is fundamentally a physical entity, and our understanding of it can be based on clear-eyed observation, direct experience, and scientific description. The whole notion that nature is constructed is simply intellectual sophistry practiced by those who either spend too much time indoors or who work at such high levels of abstraction that they never engage the phenomenal world. Those making this argument see postmodern attacks on nature as simply the latest manifestation of a long tradition associated with what David Ehrenfeld calls the "arrogance of humanism." Eco-criticism places human beings at the center of all phenomena and then is overly impressed with the self-referential character of human experience. Consequently, it is blind, as philosopher Albert Borgmann says, to nature's nonhuman "commanding presence."

Although many thoughtful scientists, activists, and writers take this position, and, while it remains an important response to eco-criticism, it fails to recognize the eco-critics as serious adversaries. As I have argued, leftist critiques of "nature" are compatible with broader postmodern sensibilities that currently animate much of our intellectual life. When anti-environmentalists claim that, because there is no authentic entity called "nature," we can choose to use trees, animals, canyons, and rivers as we see fit, staunch environmental modernists have little to say. They can disagree about first principles, complain about ontological and epistemological premises, but beyond this they have little to say. Simply rejecting eco-criticism and reasserting a modernist narrative doesn't reckon with the intellectual weight of contemporary attacks on "nature."

A second, more engaging, response goes in the other direction. It comes from people who agree with the critique of "nature" and, by way of response, advocate a post-nature environmentalism. Because everything we call "nature" is relative to our ideas, they argue, we should accept (indeed, embrace) our role as creators of "nature" and assume full responsibility for governing the so-called natural world. Environmentalists in this camp call for fully utilizing technology to confront environmental problems and ask that we be content with human-made landscapes and artificial substitutes for natural resources. They counsel ecological stewardship, of course, but maintain that our vision of stewardship need not be hindered by any preconceived notion of what is genuinely natural. Noting the ungrounded character of the idea of nature, Walter Truett Anderson suggests that we see ourselves for what we, in fact, are: eco-artists--designers and builders of the nonhuman world. This second response calls for dispensing with the category of nature altogether and fashioning an environmentalism along other lines of interest and concern.

The eco-artists clearly represent a position compatible with postmodern sensibilities. But dispensing with the category of "nature" means that there are no reigning guidelines for valuing one set of arrangements, or one artistic creation, over another. Yes, environmentalists favoring this second response can advocate certain environment-friendly actions, but how do they make their case? They have no ground on which to argue for this set rather than that set of ecological conditions. Certainly, their environmentalism would make most traditional environmentalists very uncomfortable. How could an Emerson, Muir, Leopold, Carson, or Brower sign on to such a viewpoint? What would it mean to be a post-nature environmentalist? Doesn't this position make a mockery of the long tradition of environmental concern?

#### Communication and meaning are possible and desirable – framing speech as pure flux destroys any benefits gained from intersubjective processes of meaning in specific political contexts

Merawi 11

(Fasil, Addis Ababa University, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, “Habermas and the Discourse of Modernity,” http://etd.aau.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/3596/3/FASIL%20MERAWI.pdf)

As Culler sees it, Derrida raised three main objections towards Searle’s speech act theory. First, any speech act can be quoted and be analyzed in another context and the idea that meaning will be the same in another context, is something fictional. Habermas criticized Derrida for failing to recognize that what Austin meant by the fixation of meaning in everyday communication and the normal use of language, is based on idealizing presuppositions that are present in every communicative action (PDM, 195-196). Second, Derrida argued that, for a normal speech act to be successfully employed, meaning needs to be arrested, and this to be done by presenting general rules and conditions under which a given utterance is to be employed and analyzed. But speech acts can have different meanings depending on the contexts. Here, Derrida speaks of ‘grafting’ i.e. that a speech act can be quoted in another context. So, the contexts are infinite and one cannot come up with a theory of the employment of speech acts specifying where and how they should be employed since meaning is contextual, and the contexts are many. Here, culler supports Derrida’s argument by claiming that even the “intentions of the speakers...are to be interpreted in different contexts.” (PDM, 197) Searle objected to Derrida’s second argument, by asserting that, what prevents flux and fluctuation of meaning is not found in what is uttered, but the general assumptions in which it is uttered. So, when using speech acts on a day to day level, participants are operating within a set of assumptions that define what something normally means and does not mean. Further, the assumptions within which speech acts occur, are not theoretical constructs that are built to arrest meaning, but necessary assumptions behind the process of communication. Finally, Derrida, against Searle argued that, it is the potential of the text to be interpreted in many ways and not our intentions and assumptions that make different interpretations possible. So, the text by itself plays a context creating function. As Habermas sees it, as long as participants in an intersubjectivist communicative process are oriented towards understanding, then meaning will not be deferred. Wrong interpretations and abnormal usages of language could be simply identified as something that hinders consensus and understanding. Idealizations that are found beyond communicative action and the fact that the various claims raised during communication are open to critique, and can be empirically tested will easily help to “distinguish between ‘usual’ and ‘parasitic’ uses of language” (PDM, 199). By ‘parasitic’, Habermas meant that the normal use of language in everyday communication is for reaching understanding. Other artistic, metaphorical and non-literal usages of language are derived from the normal usage. Further, eventhough ‘parasitic’ usages of language prevail in everyday communication; still actors are able to bypass these usages since they are oriented towards reaching understanding. By revising the Derrida/Searle debate and employing his arguments as well, Habermas believes that, he managed to defend his communicative rationality with its validity claims. In everyday communication the infinite flow of meaning, poetic and rhetoric elements are puts aside for the sake of understanding. Having done this, Habermas wants to refute the idea that there is no distinction between logic and rhetoric and that all texts can be analyzed on literary and rhetorical terms. The issue as, Habermas sees it, is the acceptance that all language contains literary and rhetorical elements, while at the same time defending philosophy and the special forms of inquiry against the domination of literary elements, and hence the viewing of their validity claims as something impure and contaminated with artistic and metaphorical elements. Habermas, claims that Derrida’s general notion of text as a mixture of Heterogeneous elements, makes him blind to the fact that in everyday communication there is the possibility to raise and defend claims in reference to the three validity claims, and that the various specialized forms of inquiry are also oriented towards solving specific problems (PDM, 205). Habermas thinks that there is an affinity between Rorty and Derrida in relation to their views on language, communicating subjects. In Rorty, the languages of the sciences and other forms of inquiries create the contexts that necessarily determine everyday communication. Further, the capacity of validity claims to challenged inherited horizons is unacknowledged. (PDM, 206) Furthermore, both Derrida and Rorty, failed to distinguish between everyday interaction in which distinct validity claims are raised, and the various forms of inquiry that are geared toward solving specific problems (PDM, 207). Derrida is accused by Habermas of failing to distinguish between how language has a capacity of making the world visible and intelligible and how it can be used to solve specific problems. So, Derrida in his general notion of a ‘text’ tried to merge all the sciences, including philosophy, criticism, art, literature and so on under one category of literature. Habermas claims that on the one hand, we have everyday world of communication based in the different validity claims, while on the other, the various specialized forms of inquiry that are geared at solving specific problems. Philosophy and literary criticism are found between the two. Literary criticism connects everyday world and the artistic realm, while philosophy, is related to the forms of inquiries in having a universalistic dimension. Philosophy facilitates disputation of claims between everyday world and specialized inquiries. (PDM, 207-208)

### Apess

#### Neurological, racial bias is flexible and determined by coalitional habit forming in the brain---orienting groups around institutional habit-based change best breaks down bias. This is offense because their theory rejects these solutions.

Cikara and Van Bavel 15. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/>)

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N\*\*\*\*\* In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending. It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions. Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances. The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology**.** Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts

#### Reducing black people to fungible bodies and reading their experiences through pain creates the worst form of depoliticization – not only do they disregard black agency and resistance, they further perpetuate a narrative of white domination

**Kelley 16,** Robin D.G. Kelley is one of the most distinguished experts on African American studies and a celebrated professor who has lectured at some of America’s highest learning institutions. He is currently Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California. 3/22/16, “Black Study, Black Struggle,” <http://www.blackagendareport.com/black_study_black_struggle>, NN

Second only to a desire for increased diversity, better mental health services were a chief priority for student protesters. Activists framed their concerns and grievances in the language of personal trauma. We shouldn’t be surprised. While every generation of black Americans has experienced unrelenting violence, this is the first one compelled to witness virtually all of it, to endure the snuffing out of black lives in real time, looped over and over again, until the next murder knocks it off the news. **We are also talking about a generation that has lived through two of the longest wars in U.S. history, raised on a culture of spectacle where horrific acts of violence are readily available** on their smartphones. What Henry **Giroux insightfully identifies as an addiction does nothing to inure or desensitize young people to violence**. On the contrary, it anchors violence in their collective consciousness, produces fear and paranoia – wrapped elegantly in thrill – and shrouds the many ways capitalism, militarism, and racism are killing black and brown people. So **one can easily see why the language of trauma might appeal to black students. Trauma is real; it is no joke**. Mental health services and counseling are urgently needed. **But reading black experience through trauma can easily slip into thinking of ourselves as victims and objects rather than agents, subjected to centuries of gratuitous violence that have structured and overdetermined our very being**. In the argot of our day, “**bodies” – vulnerable and threatening bodies – increasingly stand in for actual people with names, experiences, dreams, and desires**. I suspect that the popularity of Ta-Nehisi Coates’s Between the World and Me (2015), especially among black college students, rests on his singular emphasis on fear, trauma, and the black body. He writes: “In America, it is traditional to destroy the black body—it is heritage. Enslavement was not merely the antiseptic borrowing of labor—it is not so easy to get a human being to commit their body against its own elemental interest. And so enslavement must be casual wrath and random manglings, the gashing of heads and brains blown out over the river as the body seeks to escape. It must be rape so regular as to be industrial. . . . The spirit and soul are the body and brain, which are destructible—that is precisely why they are so precious. And the soul did not escape. The spirit did not steal away on gospel wings.” **Coates** implies that the person is the brain, and the brain just another organ to be crushed with the rest of the body’s parts. Earlier in the book, he **makes the startling declaration that enslaved people “knew nothing but chains.**” **I do not deny the violence Coates so eloquently describes** here, and I am sympathetic to his atheistic skepticism. **But what sustained enslaved African people was a memory of freedom, dreams of seizing it, and conspiracies to enact it** – fugitive planning, if you will. **If we reduce the enslaved to mere fungible bodies, we cannot possibly understand how they created families, communities, sociality; how they fled and loved and worshiped and defended themselves; how they created the world’s first social democracy.** “Trauma is real. But **reading black experience through trauma can lead to thinking of ourselves as victims rather than agents.”** Moreover, **to identify anti-black violence as heritage may be true in a general sense, but it obscures the dialectic that produced and reproduced the violence of a regime dependent on black life for its profitability**. **It was, after all, the resisting black body that needed “correction**.” Violence was used not only to break bodies but to discipline people who refused enslavement. And the impulse to resist is neither involuntary nor solitary. **It is a choice made in community, made possible by community, and informed by memory, tradition, and witness. If Africans were entirely compliant and docile, there would have been no need for vast expenditures on corrections, security, and violence. Resistance is our heritage.** And **resistance is our healing**. Through collective struggle, **we alter our circumstances; contain, escape, or possibly eviscerate the source of trauma; recover our bodies; reclaim and redeem our dead; and make ourselves whole.** It is difficult to see this in a world where words such as trauma, PTSD, micro-aggression, and triggers have virtually replaced oppression, repression, and subjugation. Naomi Wallace, a brilliant playwright whose work explores trauma in the context of race, sexuality, class, war, and empire, muses: “Mainstream America is less threatened by the ‘trauma’ theory because it doesn’t place economic justice at its core and takes the focus out of the realm of justice and into psychology; out of the streets, communities, into the singular experience (even if experienced in common) of the individual.” Similarly, George Lipsitz observes that **emphasizing “interiority,” personal pain, and feeling elevates “the cultivation of sympathy over the creation of social justice.” This is partly why demands for reparations to address historical and ongoing racism are so antithetical to modern liberalism.** “**Through collective struggle, we alter our circumstances; contain, escape, or possibly eviscerate the source of trauma**.” **Managing trauma does not require dismantling structural racism,** which is why university administrators focus on avoiding triggers rather than implementing zero-tolerance policies for racism or sexual assault. Buildings will be renamed and safe spaces for people of color will be created out of a sliver of university real estate, but proposals to eliminate tuition and forgive student debt for the descendants of the dispossessed and the enslaved will be derided as absurd. This is also why diversity and cultural-competency training are the most popular strategies for addressing campus racism. As if racism were a manifestation of our “incompetent” handling of “difference.” If we cannot love the other, we can at least learn to hear, respect, understand, and “tolerate” her. Cultural competency also means reckoning with white privilege, coming to terms with unconscious bias and the myriad ways white folks benefit from current racial arrangements. Powerful as this might be, the solution to racism still is shifted to the realm of self-help and human resources, resting on self-improvement or the hiring of a consultant or trainer to help us reach our goal. Cultural-competency training, greater diversity, and demands for multicultural curricula represent both a resistance to and manifestation of our current “postracial” moment. In Are We All Postracial Yet? (2015), David Theo Goldberg correctly sees postracialism as a neoliberal revision of multicultural discourse, whose proposed remedies to address racism would in fact resuscitate late-century multiculturalism. But why hold on to the policies and promises of multiculturalism and diversity, especially since they have done nothing to dislodge white supremacy? Indeed I want to suggest that the triumph of multiculturalism marked a defeat for a radical anti-racist vision. True, multiculturalism emerged in response to struggles waged by the Black Freedom movement and other oppressed groups in the 1960s and ’70s. But the programmatic adoption of diversity, inclusion, and multiculturalism vampirized the energy of a radical movement that began by demanding the complete transformation of the social order and the eradication of all forms of racial, gender, sexual, and class hierarchy. The point of liberal multiculturalism was not to address the historical legacies of racism, dispossession, and injustice but rather to bring some people into the fold of a “society no longer seen as racially unjust.” What did it bring us? Black elected officials and black CEOs who helped manage the greatest transfer of wealth to the rich and oversee the continued erosion of the welfare state; the displacement, deportation, and deterioration of black and brown communities; mass incarceration; and planetary war. We talk about breaking glass ceilings in corporate America while building more jail cells for the rest. The triumph of liberal multiculturalism also meant a shift from a radical anti-capitalist critique to a politics of recognition. This means, for example, that we now embrace the right of same-sex couples to marry so long as they do not challenge the institution itself, which is still modeled upon the exchanging of property; likewise we accept the right of people of color, women, and queer people to serve in the military, killing and torturing around the world. “I want to suggest that the triumph of multiculturalism marked a defeat for a radical anti-racist vision.” At the same time, contemporary calls for cultural competence and tolerance reflect neoliberal logic by emphasizing individual responsibility and suffering, shifting race from the public sphere to the psyche. The postracial, Goldberg writes, “renders individuals solely accountable for their own actions and expressions, not for their group’s.” Tolerance in its multicultural guise, as Wendy Brown taught us, is the liberal answer to managing difference but with no corresponding transformation in the conditions that, in the first place, marked certain bodies as suspicious, deviant, abject, or illegible. Tolerance, therefore, depoliticizes genuine struggles for justice and power: **Depoliticization involves construing inequality, subordination, marginalization, and social conflict, which all require political analysis and political solutions, as personal and individual, on the one hand, or as natural, religious, or cultural on the other.** Tolerance works along both vectors of depoliticization – it personalizes and it naturalizes or culturalizes – and sometimes it intertwines them. But **how can we embrace our students and acknowledge their pain while remaining wary of a culture that reduces structural oppression to misunderstanding and psychology**? Love, Study, Struggle Taped inside the top drawer of my desk is a small scrap of paper with three words scrawled across it: “**Love, Study, Struggle**.” It serves as a daily reminder of what I am supposed to be doing. **Black study and resistance must begin with love.** James Baldwin understood love-as-agency probably better than anyone. For him it meant to love ourselves as black people; it meant making love the motivation for making revolution; it meant **envisioning a society where everyone is embraced, where there is no oppression, where every life is valued – even those who may once have been our oppressors**. It did not mean seeking white people’s love and acceptance or seeking belonging in the world created by our oppressor. In The Fire Next Time (1963), he is unequivocal: “I do not know many Negroes who are eager to be ‘accepted’ by white people, still less to be loved by them; they, the blacks, simply don’t wish to be beaten over the head by the whites every instant of our brief passage on this planet.” But here is the catch: if we are committed to genuine freedom, we have no choice but to love all. To love all is to fight relentlessly to end exploitation and oppression everywhere, even on behalf of those who think they hate us. This was Baldwin’s point – perhaps his most misunderstood and reviled point. **To love this way requires relentless struggle, deep study, and critique**. **Limiting our ambit to suffering, resistance, and achievement is not enough**. **We must go to the root – the historical, political, social, cultural, ideological, material, economic root – of oppression in order to understand its negation, the prospect of our liberation**. Going to the root illuminates what is hidden from us, largely because most structures of oppression and all of their various entanglements are simply not visible and not felt. For example, **if we argue that state violence is merely a manifestation of anti-blackness because that is what we see and feel, we are left with no theory of the state and have no way of understanding racialized police violence in places such as Atlanta and Detroit, where most cops are black, unless we turn to some metaphysical explanation.** For my generation, the formal classroom was never the space for deep critique precisely because it was not a place of love. The classroom was – and still is – a performative space, where faculty and students compete with each other. Through study groups, we created our own intellectual communities held together by principle and love, though the specters of sectarianism, ego, and just-plain childishness blurred our vision and threatened our camaraderie. Still, the political study group was our lifeblood – both on and off campus. We lived by Karl Marx’s pithy 1844 statement: “But if the designing of the future and the proclamation of ready-made solutions for all time is not our affair, then we realize all the more clearly what we have to accomplish in the present – I am speaking of a ruthless criticism of everything existing, ruthless in two senses: The criticism must not be afraid of its own conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers that be.” “If we argue that state violence is merely a manifestation of anti-blackness because that is what we see and feel, we are left with no theory of the state and have no way of understanding racialized police violence.” Study groups introduced me to C. L. R. James, Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Barbara Smith, Angela Davis, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Chancellor Williams, George E. M. James, Shulamith Firestone, Kwame Nkrumah, Kwame Turé, Rosa Luxemburg, Antonio Gramsci, Chinweizu Ibekwe, Amílcar Cabral, and others. These texts were our sources of social critique and weapons in our class war on the bourgeois canon. As self-styled activist-intellectuals, it never occurred to us to refuse to read a text simply because it validated the racism, sexism, free-market ideology, and bourgeois liberalism against which we railed. Nothing was off limits. On the contrary, delving into these works only sharpened our critical faculties. Love and study cannot exist without struggle, and struggle cannot occur solely inside the refuge we call the university. Being grounded in the world we wish to make is fundamental. As I argued in Freedom Dreams nearly fifteen years ago, “Social movements generate new knowledge, new theories, new questions. **The most radical ideas often grow out of a concrete intellectual engagement with the problems of aggrieved populations confronting systems of oppression.”** Ironically I wrote these words with my students in mind, many of whom were involved in campus struggles, feeling a bit rudderless but believing that the only way to make themselves into authentic activists was to leave the books and radical theories at home or in their dorms. The undercommons offers students a valuable model of study that takes for granted the indivisibility of thought and struggle, not unlike its antecedent, the Mississippi Freedom Schools.

#### The negative engages in a politics of state-phobia that must be rejected – it’s based on the universalization of European history with the state, which maintains the colonizing gesture of applying European standards everywhere and independently misreads the position of the state

Dhawan, 2015

(Nikita, professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck, “Homonationalism and state-phobia: The post-colonial predicament of queering modernities,” accessed via Academia.edu, DL)

One of my main difficulties with current politics of anti-homonationalism and pink-watching is their rejection of any engagement with the state, which is censured as a form of co-option and appeasement. They almost seem to oppose the political agenda of providing non-normative sexualities with social recognition and legal protection through rights and policies, because this would mean acknowledging the existence of other forms of violence that are not reducible to Western racism and imperialism even as they are not entirely disconnected from them. This form of anti-statism denies others some of the protections postcolonial queers enjoy on the privileged side of transnationality, who live in states where homosexuality has been decriminalized. Anyone who addresses the issue of homophobia in minority cultures is simply racist and any talk of homophobic violence causes trouble for sexual minorities in their communities or countries. Anyone who supports ideals of equality, freedom, or emancipation is labeled ‘Western’ or functions as a trophy for liberal and conservative forces. My response to this position is that they do not take the consequences of colonialism seriously if they think decolonization is simply circumventing the legacies of modernity and the language of rights, equality, freedom and emancipation. While theorists like Puar rightly draw on Foucault to unpack how non-normative sexualities are deployed in the biopolitical production of different populations in relation to one another, namely, how European queers are constituted in terms of requiring protection from the threat of homophobic migrants at home and regressive Muslim cultures elsewhere. At the same time, one of my primary objects against Puar and the politics of anti-homonationalism is that they tend to dehistoricize, demonize and essentialize the state reducing it to its penal functions. In her discussions of Israeli ‘pink-washing’ or decriminalization of homosexuality in India, Puar gives the impression ‘as if ’ there is no difference between the US and Germany, or between Israel and India. This dangerously disregards Foucault’s critique of state-phobia in his governmentality lectures, where he simultaneously targets Marxists, ultra-left radicals, liberals, neo-liberals, which consider the state as predator that must be contained and ‘defanged’ (refer to Dhawan 2013). Rejecting Nietzsche’s image of the state as the ‘coldest of all cold monsters’, Foucault views the state an effect rather than cause of governmental practices and rationalities. Foucault’s historical investigations unfold how the experience with fascism und totalitarianism during National Socialism and Stalinism led to the rise of state-phobia in Europe. In order to reconfigure the relation between government and society, the subsequent efforts sought to replace the despotic state or police state through rule of law and constitutional state. According to Foucault, since the late 1970s anti-statism rapidly became the basis of liberal and left politics in the form of critique of securitization and repressive apparatus. This translated for instance into uncritical solidarity with soviet dissidents. Both amongst the liberals as well as amongst the left, the idea of state as threat gained traction, particularly in the context of fear of atomic war. Foucault problematizes the state-phobia of liberal as well as left politics, in that they fail to distinguish between administrative state, welfare state, bureaucratic state, fascist state and totalitarian state. He distances himself from such an inflationary form of liberal and left state- phobia. In contrast Foucault understands the state as ‘the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’ that overlap, but also contradict each other (2008: 77). This dynamic and ambivalent function of the state is dangerously ignored by scholars like Puar, whose critique of the state gravitates towards state-phobia in that every attempt by queer individuals and groups to negotiate with the state is denounced as homonationalism. One must bear in mind that there is a very fine line between critique of the state and state-phobia and anti-statism. The latter is marked by a deep distrust of state institutions per se. As Foucault compellingly argues, state-phobia forms a foundational premise for the emergence of neoliberal governmentality and conflates critique of state and critique of domination, with the state being characterized as the origin of all violence. The challenge for postcolonial queer theory is to formulate critique of the state and critique of hegemonic heteronormativity without reproducing state-phobia. Finally liberal and left state-phobia is informed by a Eurocentrism, in that a particular, specific European experience with fascism is universalized thereby erasing different historical processes of state-formation and state-building in postcolonial contexts. Puars critique of USA, Israel und India homogenizes very diverse anti-discrimination policies and laws simply as politics of appeasement. This approach is risky in its simplicity. Interestingly states like Saudi Arabia or Mauritania, where homosexual acts are punishable with death penalty are spared in Puar’s writings. Moreover, she equates the provisional decriminalization of same sex acts in India and invalidation of sodomy laws in USA as examples of homonationalism, discounting the differences between two very different historical and regional contexts. The two legal reforms are a result of complex social and legal struggles that produce ambivalent and diverse effects, which are questionably disregarded. If Europe universalized its norms and epistemologies through colonialism, then decolonization is incomplete without the deuniversalization and provincialization of Euro-American experiences and politics. This would entail a nuanced historical analysis of diverse configurations. In this context the specific German experience with fascism and totalitarianism must not be imposed seamlessly on post- colonial contexts to promote a transnational state-phobic queer politics. This would be disastrous.

### Queerpess

#### The negative engages in a politics of state-phobia that must be rejected – it’s based on the universalization of European history with the state, which maintains the colonizing gesture of applying European standards everywhere and independently misreads the position of the state

Dhawan, 2015

(Nikita, professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck, “Homonationalism and state-phobia: The post-colonial predicament of queering modernities,” accessed via Academia.edu, DL)

One of my main difficulties with current politics of anti-homonationalism and pink-watching is their rejection of any engagement with the state, which is censured as a form of co-option and appeasement. They almost seem to oppose the political agenda of providing non-normative sexualities with social recognition and legal protection through rights and policies, because this would mean acknowledging the existence of other forms of violence that are not reducible to Western racism and imperialism even as they are not entirely disconnected from them. This form of anti-statism denies others some of the protections postcolonial queers enjoy on the privileged side of transnationality, who live in states where homosexuality has been decriminalized. Anyone who addresses the issue of homophobia in minority cultures is simply racist and any talk of homophobic violence causes trouble for sexual minorities in their communities or countries. Anyone who supports ideals of equality, freedom, or emancipation is labeled ‘Western’ or functions as a trophy for liberal and conservative forces. My response to this position is that they do not take the consequences of colonialism seriously if they think decolonization is simply circumventing the legacies of modernity and the language of rights, equality, freedom and emancipation. While theorists like Puar rightly draw on Foucault to unpack how non-normative sexualities are deployed in the biopolitical production of different populations in relation to one another, namely, how European queers are constituted in terms of requiring protection from the threat of homophobic migrants at home and regressive Muslim cultures elsewhere. At the same time, one of my primary objects against Puar and the politics of anti-homonationalism is that they tend to dehistoricize, demonize and essentialize the state reducing it to its penal functions. In her discussions of Israeli ‘pink-washing’ or decriminalization of homosexuality in India, Puar gives the impression ‘as if ’ there is no difference between the US and Germany, or between Israel and India. This dangerously disregards Foucault’s critique of state-phobia in his governmentality lectures, where he simultaneously targets Marxists, ultra-left radicals, liberals, neo-liberals, which consider the state as predator that must be contained and ‘defanged’ (refer to Dhawan 2013). Rejecting Nietzsche’s image of the state as the ‘coldest of all cold monsters’, Foucault views the state an effect rather than cause of governmental practices and rationalities. Foucault’s historical investigations unfold how the experience with fascism und totalitarianism during National Socialism and Stalinism led to the rise of state-phobia in Europe. In order to reconfigure the relation between government and society, the subsequent efforts sought to replace the despotic state or police state through rule of law and constitutional state. According to Foucault, since the late 1970s anti-statism rapidly became the basis of liberal and left politics in the form of critique of securitization and repressive apparatus. This translated for instance into uncritical solidarity with soviet dissidents. Both amongst the liberals as well as amongst the left, the idea of state as threat gained traction, particularly in the context of fear of atomic war. Foucault problematizes the state-phobia of liberal as well as left politics, in that they fail to distinguish between administrative state, welfare state, bureaucratic state, fascist state and totalitarian state. He distances himself from such an inflationary form of liberal and left state- phobia. In contrast Foucault understands the state as ‘the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’ that overlap, but also contradict each other (2008: 77). This dynamic and ambivalent function of the state is dangerously ignored by scholars like Puar, whose critique of the state gravitates towards state-phobia in that every attempt by queer individuals and groups to negotiate with the state is denounced as homonationalism. One must bear in mind that there is a very fine line between critique of the state and state-phobia and anti-statism. The latter is marked by a deep distrust of state institutions per se. As Foucault compellingly argues, state-phobia forms a foundational premise for the emergence of neoliberal governmentality and conflates critique of state and critique of domination, with the state being characterized as the origin of all violence. The challenge for postcolonial queer theory is to formulate critique of the state and critique of hegemonic heteronormativity without reproducing state-phobia. Finally liberal and left state-phobia is informed by a Eurocentrism, in that a particular, specific European experience with fascism is universalized thereby erasing different historical processes of state-formation and state-building in postcolonial contexts. Puars critique of USA, Israel und India homogenizes very diverse anti-discrimination policies and laws simply as politics of appeasement. This approach is risky in its simplicity. Interestingly states like Saudi Arabia or Mauritania, where homosexual acts are punishable with death penalty are spared in Puar’s writings. Moreover, she equates the provisional decriminalization of same sex acts in India and invalidation of sodomy laws in USA as examples of homonationalism, discounting the differences between two very different historical and regional contexts. The two legal reforms are a result of complex social and legal struggles that produce ambivalent and diverse effects, which are questionably disregarded. If Europe universalized its norms and epistemologies through colonialism, then decolonization is incomplete without the deuniversalization and provincialization of Euro-American experiences and politics. This would entail a nuanced historical analysis of diverse configurations. In this context the specific German experience with fascism and totalitarianism must not be imposed seamlessly on post- colonial contexts to promote a transnational state-phobic queer politics. This would be disastrous.

#### A destruction of the state forces queer people to turn to even less accountable forces for protection.

Dhawan, 2015

(Nikita, prof of poli sci at the University of Innsbruck, “Homonationalism and state-phobia: The post-colonial predicament of queering modernities,” accessed via Academia.edu, DL)

As Foucault himself warns state-phobia is deeply inscribed in liberal and neo-liberal ideas of civil society. The wickedness of the state is juxtaposed against the inherent goodness of civil society, so that the aim is the ‘whithering away of the state’. This anti-state-centric approach to political power locates radical politics in extra-state space of innovation. This is why Puar and others reject pragmatic politics of same-sex marriage or anti-discrimination legislations. In contrast they support civil society campaigns like pink-watching that increasingly deploy the strategy of surveillance for shaming states into good behavior. Even as one critiques the harnessing of gender and sexuality by neo-liberal capitalism, the rejection of all feminist- queer politics oriented towards the state as part of a biopolitical agenda is disingenuous state-phobic rhetoric. Postcolonial-queer-feminists are caught in an ambivalent, double-bind vis-à-vis the state: On the one hand, the state has historically been the source of violence and repression through the criminalization and pathologization of non-normative sexual practices. And yet, queer strategies seek to instrumentalize the state to promote sexual justice. Even as the state is known to perpetuate heteronormative ideologies, which are founding myths of nations, the hope is that the state can function as a site of redress of gender and sexual inequality. Despite the problematic track-record with regard to sexual politics of all nation-states, whether European or non-European, it is dangerous to disregard the immense political implications of state-phobic positions, which are increasingly popular in radical discourses in the West. As the recent re-criminalization of homosexuality in Uganda, India and Nigeria demonstrate, negotiations with state are indispensable and imperative for emancipatory queer politics in the global South. This is not a plea for statism; rather, one must be aware of the dangers of the replacement of state with non-state actors as motors of justice. Against this background, the recent anti-statist stance within postcolonial queer scholarship is alarming, as it ignores the importance of the state for those citizens who do not have access to transnational counterpublic spheres to address their grievances. Decolonization, whether in USA, Israel or India, cannot be achieved merely through a strategy of shaming the state. Rather in the Gramscian- Spivakian sense, it is imperative to enable vulnerable disenfranchised individuals and groups to access the state (Dhawan 2013). Accordingly, instead of a for or against position vis-à-vis the state, the more challenging question is how to reconfigure the state, given that its institutions and policies are the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities. Thus the challenge is how to pursue a non-statephobic queer politics that at the same time neither rationalizes the biopolitical state project nor makes the queer bodies governable. In postcolonial contexts, the state is like a pharmakon, namely, both poison and medicine. Postcolonial queer politics must explore strategies of converting poison into counterpoison (Spivak 2007: 71). Herein the ambivalent function of the state must be addressed. As Pharmakon, the inherent condradictions must be engaged with: Violence and justice, ideology and emancipation, law and discipline. If, following Foucault, the state has no stable essence, then it is marked by undecidability or doubleness. The sole focus on the negative aspects of the Pharmakon, namely the destructive and repressive traits, neutralizes and ignores the enabling and empowering aspects. Thus postcolonial-queer-feminist politics must transform poison into remedy and formulate critique of the state beyond state-phobia. A challenging task, but anything else would be too risky!

### Exhaustion

#### No link- fluid intersectional models of the subject don’t mark disabled people differently

#### No link- we don’t define a linear theory of time

#### Prefer fluid theories of power- lets us adapt to discriminatory movements when they come up- ie Marxism became more and more ableist over time

#### Perm do both- the Da Silva evidence says we can solve back for the impacts they isolate

#### Prefer the aff to the alt- our methods of healing are good for disabled people suffering in debate- that’s also a rejection of their rotb since it proves that healing exists in fluid dynamics

#### Covid has created immense binaries against disabled bodies which the alt cannot overcome

Thorneycroft and Asquith, 21 (Ryan Thorneycroft - Western Sydney University, Australia. Nicole L Asquith - University of Tasmania, Australia) “Unexceptional violence in exceptional times: Disablist and ableist violence during the COVID-19 pandemic.” International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy10(2): p 143 – 144 <https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.1743> accessed 7-16-2021

Following Connell’s (2020: 745) call that we take ‘the viewpoint of the virus’, it is clear that COVID-19 is intent on: a) killing disabled (and older) people, and b) creating more disabled people in this world. The virus, in and of itself, is disabling, but so too are the social practices that operate in response to the virus. COVID-19 is highly contagious, and as it started to expand its grip around the world, governments stepped in to implement rules and allocate resources to help manage its spread. The rules implemented and the resources allocated disproportionately affected disabled people, yet, paradoxically, they were justified by governments as necessary to protect them. Social distancing rules were implemented, many industries shut down, international borders were closed, stay-at-home orders were mandated for non-essential activities, sick people were forced into self-isolation, many surfaces decontaminated by cleaners, and people were only allowed to congregate with other residents of their household. Many governments battled to source and provide hand sanitiser, surgical gloves, face masks and ventilators, as well as to ensure the supply lines for food and essential products were maintained. Millions around the world lost their jobs, while others were forced to work from home if they could. Tens of millions have been infected by COVID-19, and over two million people have died (at the time of writing). The sudden onset of COVID-19 has created profound disorientation in people’s lives. The immediate effects of COVID-19 were disabling. Many disabled people already receive little (social) support (Malli et al. 2018), and this was stripped from them as COVID-19 measures were implemented. The effects of this are yet to be fully realised, but access to food, medications, physiological and emotional support have been affected (Henriques-Gomes 2020a; Safta-Zecheria 2020; Simmons 2020). The consequences include malnutrition, pain, bedsores and poor mental health outcomes (Grech 2020). Many communities were hit with food and sanitary shortages, and while many abled people can travel between shops or visit the shops regularly, the barriers can be too complex for many disabled people (Ryan and Marsh 2020). With the implementation of mandatory face masks in some jurisdictions, communication has also been forestalled, especially for those reliant on lip-reading (Munro 2020). Many care homes for disabled people have also been put into isolation or lockdown, and while this is done in the interests of disabled people’s health and safety, the ‘reduction of formal oversight mechanisms’ this creates also ‘comes with an increase in the risk of violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation’ (Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability 2020: 4).

#### Alt fails – doesn’t account for neoliberal exploitation and categorization is key to activism

Vehmas & Watson 13 (Simo Vehmas & Nick Watson, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, p. 646-648)

Critical disability studies and justice

The influence of CDS and its challenge to the assumption that disability is a uniform condition have enabled the emergence of new ideas on disability. In particular, this has enabled the development of a theory that can take account of not only impairment effects but also can include class, ethnicity, sexual orientation or cultural identities. It has also argued for the re-emergence of a new political identity, one where a solidarity that was previously built on a common single identity is replaced by one that incorporates multiple voices including representatives from across the range of constituencies. The politics that it seeks to develop will be the ending of the single interest group identity of the disability movement to be replaced by single-issue groups campaigning for different social issues. To paraphrase Lister (1998, 74), if disability and impairment are simply to be ‘deconstructed into a kaleidoscope of shifting identities’ and ableist discourses, **there will be no disabled people left to either fight for the right to be, or to be a citizen.** If the principles of CDS are evaluated critically in the light of disadvantage, its analytical and political value becomes questionable. Its relativism and its suggestions that impairments are ethically and politically merely neutral differences are false. Impairments often have very tangible effects on people’s well-being, many of which cannot be explained away by deconstruction (for example, Shakespeare 2006; Thomas 1999). Recognizing impairment effects is necessary in order to secure proper treatment and social arrangements that enhance disabled people’s well-being and social participation. CDS runs the risk of dismissing not only the personal experiences of living with impairment, but also the significance of the differences between socially created disadvantages. These disadvantages that often result from oppressive social arrangements, are very much real and take place in different ways for different disadvantaged groups. Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to the market and capitalism, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). On top of these materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as deviant and undesirable, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition; **they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement** (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require **more than ideological change**, and ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change. CDS **fails to account for the economic basis of disability** and offers only the tools of deconstruction and the abolishment of cultural hierarchies to eradicate economic injustice. This, as Fraser (2000) has argued, would be possible in a society where there were no relatively autonomous markets and the distribution of goods were regulated through cultural values. In such a society, oppression based on identity would translate perfectly into economic injustice and maldistribution. This is far from the current reality where ‘marketization has pervaded all societies to some degree, at least partially decoupling economic mechanisms of distribution from cultural patterns of value and prestige’ (Fraser 2000, 111). Markets are not controlled by nor are they subsidiary to culture; ‘as a result they generate economic inequalities that are not mere expressions of identity hierarchies’ (Fraser 2000, 111–112). The disadvantage related to disability is to a great extent a matter of economic injustice, and before this injustice can be corrected we have to be able to identify those individuals and social groups that have been disadvantaged by social arrangements. Whilst this does create and foster categories and binaries between groups of people, it also requires some sort of categories to start with; namely, the various categories of disadvantage. Both the social and physical mechanisms that produce human diversity are real, and they produce tangible differences that cannot be challenged, let alone abolished, merely by pointing out the wanton nature of difference, and deconstructing the meanings attached to disability. Changing the social conditions that disadvantage and disable some people demands that the diverse, sometimes dualistic, reality of social advantage and disadvantage between different groups of people is recognized. This is exactly why group identities based on, for example, impairment, gender, or sexuality have been invaluable tools in the resistance against discrimination and oppression – in the fight against socially produced disadvantage. Confident, positive disability identity has enabled many disabled people to actively challenge the status quo that disadvantages them and to claim rights and power and participation in dominant institutions. Being different from the so-called normal majority is no longer considered to conflict with a good life, equality and respect. Quite the opposite, positive realization of one’s difference has been liberating and empowering to many disabled people (Shakespeare 2006; Morris 1991). For a radical and active disability movement to emerge and for disabled people to take action on their own account, they have to see themselves as an unfairly marginalized or disadvantaged constituency and a minority group (Shakespeare and Watson 2001). The category disabled/ non-disabled is a good abstraction that can **enable the development of communities of resistance**, and without it is hard to see how these could develop. CDS is premised on the idea that difference acts as a precursor to the normalizing of behaviour and a requirement to treat people differently and, importantly, less favourably. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the categories that are applied to disabled people create an unnecessary divide between disabled and nondisabled people. You could equally make the point that without these categories we would not know what it is we have to do, what actions we have to take or what services we have to put in place to include disabled people. Indeed, for many disabled people the disadvantages they are subjected to arise not as the result of domination but through neglect and the denial of services and through society failing to take responsibility for those in need. As Wolff (2009, 114) points out: ‘anti-discrimination policy needs to identify a group to be protected.’ In other words, it is impossible to fight the oppression of a group of people that does not exist. Recognition of impairment is also crucial regarding legislation and policy that aim to protect disabled people against discrimination. The point of anti-discrimination legislation is to protect people from discrimination on the basis of their physical and mental properties, not on their opportunity to achieve equal participation and respect. Thus, ‘the parallel to race and gender is not disability but impairment’ (Wolff 2009, 135).

#### Progress is possible – we can tackle ableism by first addressing the flawed logic of the laws and social contexts in which it exists

Hirschman and Linker 15, Nancy - Professor of Politics at the University of Pennsylvania; her specialties are the history of political thought, analytical philosophy, feminist theory, disability theory and Beth - Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania in the Department of the History and Sociology of Science “Civil Disabilities” Disability, Citizenship, and Belonging: A Critical Introduction pp. 4-5//mr

To begin with, it is always important to note that neither citizenship nor disability is a static or universal concept. Readers new to disability will find a variety of definitions in any number of texts, ranging from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to activist websites to articles and books in a wide variety of academic disciplines. Th authors of the essays in the present volume consider different specific instances of physical and intellectual disability, such as mobility impairment, blindness, deafness, tuberculosis, and cognitive and psychological impairment. So offering one overarching understanding of the concept may not be appropriate, and most of the essays here do not define what they mean by the term “disability.” But all the authors— and indeed most disability scholars— subscribe to at least some form of the “social model of disability.”11 For readers new to disability studies, this model holds that disability is not a physical condition pertaining to a “defective” or “inferior” or “abnormal” body but rather a social condition brought about by social norms, practices, and beliefs; it is both socially produced and socially experienced. What makes something a disability is thus not bodily difference per se— not my impaired vision, or my deafness, or my weak or missing limbs, or my autism— but rather **the social contexts in which they exist**; disability is constituted by the interaction between environmental factors and the particularities of specific bodies. The fact that I have difficulty walking and use a wheelchair, for instance, does not in itself constitute a “disability”: rather, the fact that most buildings have stairs rather than ramps and lack elevators and automatic doors is what disables my body from gaining access to the building. Because of the ways in which social relations, the built environment, laws, customs, and practices are structured and organized, certain bodies are disabled by those environments, while other bodies are facilitated and supported. “Impairment” is a term that refers to a natural part of biological life rather than an “abnormal” part and is generally incorporated into a person’s sense of self. “Disability,” by contrast, refers to what society, social conditions, prejudices, biases, and the built environment have produced by treating certain impairments as marks of inferiority. As Disability, Citizenship, and Belonging 5 Devlin and Pothier put it, “Disability is not just an individual impairment but a systematically enforced pattern of exclusion.”12 “Disability” does not describe the body per se, but the body in a hostile social environment. Among disability studies scholars, the social model has been an important corrective to the more dominant way of understanding disability, dubbed the “medical model,” which views disability as a pathology found in a particular individual body that must be fixed or cured. Disability in this model is seen as both **intrinsic** to the body that “suffers” from it, which must be made to adapt to the preexisting environment; and simultaneously alien to the body, a hostile force that undermines the individual’s true preferences. “The body” that is held up as the standard against which it is measured is what feminist disability scholar Rosemarie Garland Thomson calls the “normate”— male, white, perfect in health and physical attributes, a standard that almost everyone fails to meet but nevertheless informs our assumptions about the body and how it should function in the world.13 Th e terms “social” and “medical” models are referred to throughout these essays, so the reader who is new to disability studies will want to keep this distinction in mind. For most disability scholars today, the social model is largely accepted as the preferred way of understanding disability, whereas the medical model tends to be disparaged.

#### Progress is possible-ableism is based on contingent and changeable structures that can be altered through reformism-ADA Proves

Braswell, PhD Candidate at Emory, 2011

(Harold, “Can there be a Disability Studies Theory of "End-of-Life Autonomy"?”, <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1704/1754>, LASA-IZP)

The Americans with Disabilities Act is based on providing accommodations so that individuals with disabilities can enter the labor force (Colker, 2007, p. 2; O'Brien, 2005, p. 1). As Ruth O'Brien notes, the Act defines "disability" in a manner that is situational, rather than inherent: "Disability," in the Act's meaning, is defined "by virtue of what a person cannot do rather than in terms of a specific medical condition or disease" (O'Brien, 2005, p. 1). This shift transforms disability from a discrete medical category affecting a static group of people to an "open-ended category that is nonessential, ever-evolving, and socially constructed" (p.1). While the benefits of the ADA's situational definition of disability are significant, its emphasis on access to labor reifies a distinction between those who work and those who are unable to do so. In the Act's terms, entry into the workforce means access to society; such access entails "equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" (Colker, p.1). Those individuals who do not work lack these traits, and their continued inability to labor renders them representatives of "dependence and nonproductivity" (Colker, p. 1). The Act's progressive narrative involves moving persons with disabilities from their state of non-productive dependence to the independence of productive labor. The related binary distinctions between independence and dependence, work and non-work are thus intrinsic to the Act's self-justification as a libratory project. While the benefits of the ADA for millions of Americans cannot be denied, it raises a dilemma for those individuals who suffer from medical ailments that preclude their entry into the workforce no matter what the accommodation. Such individuals become representative of the very dependence that the ADA liberated persons with disabilities from. That such dependence continues to be shunned is a necessary precondition of the Act's liberation narrative. The ADA thus creates a clear split in the disabled community between the "good" persons with disabilities who can work and the undeserving disabled individuals who are unable to live up to the Act's standards of independence. But, paradoxically, the manner in which the Act degrades this latter group is by stripping them of the title of "disability" and refusing to recognize them as part of the disabled community. This underscores Campbell's observation that even the disability rights movement can be subject to an ableistic logic that devalues disability. The "terminally ill" who are potentially subject to physician-assisted suicide and those "critically ill" persons dependent on respirators would clearly seem to fall into this category of individuals so disabled that they are no longer counted within the hegemonic conception of "disability." These individuals cannot work in the conventional sense and it is difficult to understand what form of "reasonable accommodation" would allow them to integrate into the workforce—or what exactly the point of their doing so would be. Even O'Brien's radical rethinking of the ADA—which suggests making the workplace into a caretaking environment—leaves out those unable to work (O'Brien, p. 3). It thus reifies the exclusion of the terminally ill. The beauty of Snyder and Mitchell's rethinking of the parasitic logic of society is that there is no one outside of the structure of work. It is thus not a question of moving people from dependence to independence. Rather, liberation comes via the understanding of the constitutive interdependence of social life. The failure to recognize this interdependence is what creates and simultaneously degrades the non-laboring members of society as representatives of pure dependence. But, in a typical projection, the stigmatizing of these individuals as dependents only allows the laboring class to mask their own dependence on social life. It is a structural repetition of the exclusion of disability that Garland-Thomson identified as characteristic of liberal individualism. The solution to this dilemma is not to make more people "autonomous" in these terms, but rather to change the definition of "autonomy" to include all people.

### Humanism

### Academy

#### Perm do both- our aff is literally a rejection of the direct communicative spaces that academia relies on to co-opt movements

#### Their theory of power makes zero sense- debate is not academia, we’re not people that could actually make change if we weren’t debating since we’re just a bunch of kids

#### Communication’s inevitable- just shutting up means it’s easier for the machine to crowd out your voice

#### Their alt links to the k- radical passivity and postmodernist bullshit is exactly the kind of thing your k rants at- we need realistic solutions that create tangible reforms- that’s why you vote for the meditational

#### You haven’t read a single non-white non-professor author in this k- proves you’re controlled by the university

#### Their obsession noncommunicative forms of solvency a- prevents those solutions from making sense since we can’t debate them b- infuses capitalism within activist movements under the guise of ‘maximizing productivity’- they’re a Facebook movement

Hoofd 17 [Ingrid M. Hoofd (2017) “Higher Education and Technological Acceleration: The Disintegration of University Teaching and Research” Palgrave Macmillan, New York, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51409-7]//jz

Several years ago, the media and communications programme in NUS saw the need for an ethics module, and I was invited to create and teach this module. That this course became mandatory within this particular programme is, in light of the connection I outlined in Chap. 1between communication technologies and academic acceleration, no surprise: the integration of more and more complex media technology into society creates a host of new ethical dilemmas, and students, so the argument goes, should be taught how to manage these dilemmas and technologies in their ‘real’ jobs after university. This argument is of course not unique to this particular university. The shift from an industrial social order towards a society marked by new media technologies has resulted in a proliferation of debates and agendas on the teaching of moral guidelines in academia and other educational institutions, and in many ways follows Ortega y Gasset’s call to teach the students what they need to know by way of imparting only that cultural and moral knowledge that may function as a ‘method’ or roadmap. At Utrecht University, for instance, the Media and Culture Department in the Humanities Faculty at which I currently teach has attempted to heed students’ needs by responding to the advice from an external visiting committee demanding more transparency in teaching. The Department did so by implementing the requirement that end goals and methods are made explicit in module syllabi and student theses, and that courses are to focus on the transmission of clear skills rather than ‘obscure theory.’ But while such attempts at transparency are seemingly well meant and generous to the students, they ultimately divorce methods IDEALISTIC SELF-DELUSIONS AND THE LIMITS OF NOSTALGIA 73and skills from their grounding theoretical (and hence always subjective) perspectives, much like Ortega y Gasset implies that the teaching of mere ‘roadmaps’ is an ultimately neutral or positive affair. Methods, as its etymology indeed suggests, are convenient roadmaps in Ortega y Gasset’s sense, but are always specifi c to a certain theoretical tradition and hence can always be questioned for their limitations. What is more, the emphasis on methods seems to arise from a fear of the confusion and partial subjectivity of student assessment on the basis of the inter-subjective teacher– student relationship within a certain tradition, and hence appears as an attempt to stamp out the ‘noise’ emanating from the Lyotardian ‘demise of great narratives’ in the postmodern European context. This obsession with methods can therefore be interpreted as akin to the onslaught of cybernetics and quantifi cation, which seeks to suppress the complications of thinking as dialectical in the university at large from the larger speedelitist context which this cybernetic machinery serves. Staff and student work in turn increasingly resembles a fi nally immoral—because blind to its reproduction of inequalities—form of automated production and an ever more hastily churning out of research and writing. Student theses, for instance, having to bow to the demands of a standardised assessment form in which supposedly crucial aspects of the thesis are presented as separate entities (for instance, the method employed needs to be rendered explicit and is assessed separately from the theoretical framework in the form), leads to narrow ‘assembly-line’ write-ups that merely seek to ‘tick the boxes’ without any critical or holistic considerations around rhetoric and perspective. More disturbingly, students that attempt a more daring or original piece of writing for their theses tend to get penalised when, for instance, not explicitly stating the method employed, even if management claims that the form is not meant to be prescriptive. This deplorable practice is therefore reminiscent of the ‘drilling’ and disciplining of the student (and the lecturer or supervisor), as the compulsory transparency of goals and methods lead to a situation that becomes completely blind and disrespectful to how the outcome of the pedagogical student–teacher relationship can and should never be fully known in advance in order to remain a scene of insightful transformation for the student and teacher away from the cybernetic compulsion of the neoliberal economy. In other words, if the pedagogical scene wishes to be as hospitable and promissory as possible so that radically new understandings may emerge (and the student can truly grow), it is imperative that module goals remain partly oblique and emergent, and that methods 74 I.M. HOOFDare always also questioned and unpacked for their partial and subjective (often European and masculine) theoretical underpinnings and traditions. After all, the term ‘theory’ is derived from the Greek θεωρειν or ‘being a spectator in a theatre,’ and hence always implies not only a partial or subjective position, but also an element of contextual inter-subjectivity. The formulation of strict methods is therefore one particular instance of a problematic transcendence via an erasure of the non-neutral grounds of theory. The faculty examination board at Utrecht thus attempts to ‘eliminate the noise’ of teacher and student subjectivity and respond to the demands of the market, while failing to understand that not only such inter-subjective ‘noise’ is precisely what makes teaching, learning, and pedagogical communication possible, but also that the main ‘culture’ of the humanities traditionally is one of questioning methods and critiquing all forms of non-neutral automation in order to invite a radically different future. The acceleration of the aporia can therefore be keenly felt around these pedagogical demands from the management (and beyond) as well as in my supervision and teaching at Utrecht University; an increasingly unsure student body demand being taught ever clearer ‘methods’ and ‘skills,’ while at the same time, some of these students get ever more self-doubting and even display a recalcitrance with the university as such, being unsure how to properly understand their own fears and doubts as a logical product of the aporetic demands the university and the lecturer makes on them. What is more, the rendering transparent of methods and goals while eliding the controversies underlying them has in many cases the paradoxical outcome of making the students understand less, as they, for instance, logically cannot comprehend why all the great texts of the humanities tend not to have an explicit methods section, while they have to focus so much on methods in their theses. Eventually therefore, this attempt at complete transparency does the students and the staff a disservice, even if it seems to dutifully cater to their needs and uses. Interestingly also, while the harking back to the teaching of theoretical traditions in media studies may seem an antidote to the obsession with clear methods and roadmaps, the acceleration of the aporia emerges even stronger in such well-meant attempts to rethink the pedagogical scene as one of Bildung via theoretical—yet eventually also largely white and masculine—culture. In order to counter the obsession with methods and end goals, several of my colleagues and I at Utrecht University set up a task force for rethinking student assessment and pedagogical goals. Our line of reasoning largely is that a more appropriate and generous teaching and IDEALISTIC SELF-DELUSIONS AND THE LIMITS OF NOSTALGIA 75assessment should instead focus on the teaching of the main grounds, theories, and traditions in the humanities at large, so that an ethic of critique and questioning can once more be foregrounded in the media and culture curriculum, as it was in the past. While this at least allows the students to address methods and texts in a critical fashion, the question of course remains whether such a revision—while certainly remaining more hospitable to subjective student and staff otherness than the blind quest for objective module transparency and methodological automation—not also remains wedded to a nostalgic and ultimately problematic Enlightenment agenda. Such a nostalgia for the grounds of (critical) theory hence also appears as a complicit product of the acceleration of higher education, insofar it also performs the Janus-faced logic of academic optimism in light of larger social desperation. What is more, the art of critique (which comes from the Greek κρινειν or ‘to separate’) also requires that aspects are split out or distinguished from one another—left from right, East from West, and neo-liberal from liberal—whereas such divisions are nonetheless intimately entangled with and constitutive of one another, so that technological conditions that collapse the semiotic and functionalist spheres, the simulated playing out of such illusory differences lead to their accelerated reproduction. The problem is thus one of conceiving a truly radical form of questioning or critique by looking closer at the ‘theatrical’ aspect of θεωρειν, while admitting that such a questioning itself performs such theatricality just as much. It is for this reason that, for instance, Gary Genosko addresses the problem of radical theory in Baudrillard’s work as similar to the problem of how to conceive of ‘political theatre’ in “The Drama of Theory,” about which more in Chap. 5 . So in short, I suggest that the debates and agendas that see the solution in a rigorous implementation of moral or methodological roadmaps almost always concern the issue of how to teach a form of refl ection fi t to deal with the moral confusion and supposed ‘loss of values and direction’ (in line with Ortega y Gasset’s lament of fragmentation) due to the arrival of the information age; any illusion of grounding university teaching in some superior European cultural and theoretical tradition runs the risk of closing off alterity, so that it must also question its own grounds. This also becomes clear in the ethics course I had to set up for the communications programme in Singapore, to which I will now turn.

## Theory

## LBL

## Cross

## Phil

### Skep

1. Skep doesn’t negate Buddhism- I don’t think normative ethics or normative phil is good and nothing in the aff justifies that
2. Negating ethics is incoherent- ethics are constantly changing with our desire systems- only interrogating our relationship with these desire systems can let us understand ethics

## Trix

### TT

#### Overview

Be really suspect of this- everyone know TT is just topicality for trix kids- hold the line on unwarranted arguments and ask yourself ‘why didn’t they just read t’

#### A2 fiat illusory

1. Our evidence indicates specific tangible impacts of bringing mindfulness into the space

#### A2 triggers constitut

1. No warrant why wins good means rules matter
2. T isn’t a rule

#### A2 Constituitive

1. No reason why intrinsicness matters
2. Our aff indicts dictionaries- using western models of communication and thought is EMPIRICALLY bad- a ballot to reject it is good

#### A2 Logic

1. I have reasons for why discussing my model is good

#### A2 can’t change structure

1. You’re adding topicality which is a rule lol
2. No warrant why comp incentives skewing is bad
3. No model for out of round rules setting

#### A2 bindingness

1. The arguments aren’t false until you prove them false
2. My rob is better than tt lol- that was the aff