# JanFeb US China V2 Aff

## 1AC

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan: The United States and People’s Republic of China ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

States: The Untied States and the People’s Republic of China

Method of Elimination: Disassemble nuclear warheads and separate nuclear material from warhead. Store all nuclear materials in canisters and place in a safe storage location.

Enforcement: IAEA regulations

Nuclear Arsenal: Any actively deployed or decommissioned nuclear warhead.

### 1AC – Taiwan

#### Tensions over Taiwan are at a breaking point – all sides are moving towards conflict due to mismatched perceptions which raises risk of miscalculation

Gries and Wang 2019 (Peter Gries, Lee Kai Hung Chair and Director of the Manchester China Institute and Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Manchester, and Tao Wang, doctoral candidate in East Asian politics at the University of Manchester, "Will China Seize Taiwan? Wishful Thinking in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington Could Spell War in 2019", Foreign Affairs, February 15 2019, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-02-15/will-china-seize-taiwan>, MJ)

China must be, and will be reunified,” Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in a speech in January. Xi spoke of “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan, but he warned, “We do not forsake the use of force.” Ever since Hong Kong and Macau rejoined Mainland China in 1997 and 1999, respectively, Chinese expectations that Taiwan would follow suit have grown. When, a decade ago, the Beijing Olympics and the global financial crisis boosted China’s confidence on the world stage, those expectations redoubled.

But “peaceful reunification” has proved elusive. After Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-wen, of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to the presidency in 2016, many Mainland Chinese lost patience with the idea. Some Chinese nationalists now argue that China has only a brief window of opportunity to seize Taiwan. Talk of “forceful reunification” is ascendant.

China has already begun to tighten the noose. It has forced Taiwan out of international bodies, such as the World Health Organization; required airlines to replace “Taiwan” with descriptions such as “Taiwan, Province of China”; and induced five more countries to sever relations with Taipei.

Beijing seems to believe that the United States will sit by as it squeezes Taiwan. Taipei, meanwhile, has convinced itself that China has no plans to invade. And U.S. President Donald Trump seems to think he can rock the boat without consequences. All are wrong—and their wishful thinking is raising the odds of conflict.

“CHINA DREAM” IN BEIJING

Now that Xi has consolidated power, he seeks a legacy befitting the great emperors of old: the reunification of the Middle Kingdom. “The only thing that will make him the greatest leader in the Chinese Communist Party’s history is to take Taiwan back,” Shen Dingli, a foreign relations scholar at Fudan University, told Quartz in 2018. “If he were to achieve China’s reunification, who will say he is second to Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping?"

Xi, whose “China Dream” promises to make China great again, likely agrees. “Fight a war, win a war,” is one of his signature slogans. In 2017, he presided over a military parade with a replica of Taiwan’s presidential palace visible in the distance. Chinese soldiers had constructed it to train for an invasion of Taiwan. That same year, China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, circumnavigated Taiwan twice. “The PLA is likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with China by force,” the U.S. Defense Department told Congress in 2018.

There are signs that Xi believes the world will sit by if China invades Taiwan. “Xi has told people that he was impressed by Putin’s seizure of Crimea,” a Beijing insider told the reporter Evan Osnos in 2015. “[Putin] got a large piece of land and resources” and met little resistance from the West.

Many among China’s elite have embraced military action. “The possibility for peaceful reunification is gradually dissipating,” Wang Zaixi, a former deputy director of the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, declared in 2017. “There will very likely be military conflict,” retired Chinese General Wang Hongguang told the People’s Daily in December.

Many ordinary Chinese agree. “If we want to take our island back, we have to use force.” reads a Weibo post from last November. Both Chinese academics and journalists argue that this sentiment is widespread. “Mainland Chinese public opinion became impatient with Taiwan a long time ago,” former director of the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s Institute of Taiwan Studies Zhou Zhihuai wrote in 2017. “Mainland Chinese will be very happy to see the PLA take action to punish a ‘pro-independence Taiwan’,” a Global Times editorial claimed in 2018.

WISHFUL THINKING IN TAIPEI

Despite this increased militancy across the Strait, Taipei has convinced itself that China will not attack. Many in the ruling Democratic Progressive Party have persuaded themselves that China is too sensible to take military action. “The mainland Chinese leader today is a rational decision maker,” Tsai claimed in 2017: Xi would not provoke a war likely to drag in Japan and the United States. Others in the DPP depict China as too weak. “China has too many domestic problems” to capture Taiwan, professor Fan Shih-Ping wrote in 2017.

Taiwan’s major opposition party, the Kuomintang, takes a rosy view of Beijing that rejects the idea that China might invade. “There is no problem,” former president Ma Ying-jeou declared last year. “Nowadays Beijing’s top strategy is peaceful rise,” the journalist Huang Nian wrote in April. “Forceful reunification would derail it.”

This complacency has led Taiwan to neglect its armed forces. Taiwan’s military suffers from a desperate shortage of officers—nearly half of all lieutenant positions are unfilled. In 2018, Taiwan made matters worse. Just as talk of “forceful reunification” was rising in Mainland China, the government ended compulsory military enlistment—but allowed felons to serve. Morale has plummeted. The United States has recommended that Taiwan consider restoring conscription. “The shift to a voluntary military was a mistake,” U.S. officials concluded. In an April 2018 poll, more than 40 percent of Taiwanese said they had “no confidence at all” that their military could defend Taiwan; but 65 percent had convinced themselves that the PRC would not take military action against the island; and only six percent believed that an attack was “very likely.”

“AMERICA FIRST” IN WASHINGTON

The withering of Taiwan’s armed forces has increased Taiwan’s military reliance on the United States—just when many in Beijing are questioning the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. Trump’s “America first” doctrine has convinced many Chinese that the United States is now too isolationist to come to Taiwan’s defense. “America will absolutely sacrifice Taiwan,” the Global Times insisted in 2017. “On the premise of America First … the United States is not likely to send troops to fight for Taiwan.”

For decades, a U.S. policy of “dual deterrence” has helped prevent conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Washington has warned Beijing not to attack Taiwan unprovoked, but reassured Chinese leaders that the United States would not support Taiwanese independence. It has told Taipei, in turn, that the United States would come to its defense—as long as it did not provoke Beijing by declaring independence. Making the policy work has meant treading a fine line, but for decades, dual deterrence has allowed Taiwan to enjoy de facto independence and helped prevent a war with China.

Trump has upset that delicate balance. In December 2016, Tsai called Trump to congratulate him on his victory. The incoming Trump administration then began to talk of “revisiting” the One China policy, under which the United States recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, but maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan.

Beijing was outraged. Xi refused to talk to Trump until he recommitted the United States to the One China policy. In February, Trump capitulated. In a phone call with Xi, he affirmed that the United States would continue to support the “One China” policy. “Trump lost his first fight with Xi,” the Beijing scholar Shi Yinhong bragged to the New York Times. “He will be looked at as a paper tiger.”

Last year, however, the pendulum swung back toward confrontation. In February, Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act, encouraging (but not requiring) high-level U.S. officials to visit Taiwan, and high-level Taiwanese officials to visit the United States. In the fall, Trump started a trade war with China, generating anxiety among Chinese nationalists. They now believe Trump is using Taiwan as part of a new Cold War against China, creating a sense of urgency for reunification.

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

China could well move to take Taiwan before 2020, when some Chinese fear that Taiwan’s presidential election will close Beijing’s window of opportunity for military action. Many Mainland Chinese nationalists were disappointed, rather than relieved, by the pro-independence DPP’s poor showing in last November’s local Taiwanese elections. This counterintuitive reaction reveals an alarming calculus: should a weakened Tsai and the DPP lose the presidency in 2020 to a more pro-China candidate, the opportunity for “forceful reunification” would be lost. “What a pity,” one Weibo user from Beijing wrote about the DPP’s losses. “We could be further away from the day of reunification.” It is the hated DPP that gives Chinese nationalists a pretext to take Taiwan back now.

That disappointment has fed a sense of urgency among many Chinese nationalists. “I request that Mainland China issue a timetable for reunification,” one outraged Weibo user wrote in November. “Whether peaceful or forceful, please don’t drag this out again and again.”

The 2020 U.S. presidential election also looms in the minds of Chinese nationalists. Trump looks less likely to win reelection after Democratic victories in the 2018 midterms, and many Chinese worry that a Trump loss would make forceful reunification harder. Trump is seen as a businessman and isolationist willing to bargain Taiwan away. “America will sell Taiwan out in the blink of an eye,” a People’s Daily editorial claimed last year. (Few Chinese recognize the possibility that Trump might respond forcefully to an attack on Taiwan to rally support at home.) A Trump successor, “forceful reunification” advocates fear, may not be so willing to cut a deal.

Some in Beijing even think China can retake Taiwan without violence. China may “break the enemy’s resistance without fighting,” Wang Zaixi told the Global Times in 2017. Just as the Communist Party seized Beijing in 1949 without shooting a single bullet, he argued, China could capture Taiwan peacefully by surrounding the island, imposing economic sanctions, and cutting off its oil supply. “No need to shed blood,” he concluded.

The idea that China can force reunification without fighting is delusional and dangerous. Tightening the military or economic noose around Taiwan would likely provoke a reaction from the United States. Given popular nationalist pressures, Beijing would then feel compelled to respond. Things could get out of control fast. All sides need to wake up to the dangers of backing into a conflict that few want.

#### This ensures nuclear conflict –

#### First is warhead ambiguity – Chinese ballistic entanglement ensures US threat conflation.

Rovner 17 [Joshua **Rovner 17**. Associate Professor @ School of International Service @ American University. 07/29/2017. “Two Kinds of Catastrophe: Nuclear Escalation and Protracted War in Asia.” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 696–730.] **IV**

Finally, inadvertent escalation may occur when conventional attacks put the adversary’s nuclear force at risk. Under these conditions, the target state might reasonably worry that the attack is only the first phase of a larger war. There may be no way to offer credible reassurances that it is not. Fearing the destruction or incapacitation of its nuclear deterrent, the target state might face a “use it or lose it” dilemma. Inadvertent escalation is especially likely if key command and control nodes are vulnerable or if conventional and nuclear target sets are indistinguishable. The danger also increases if military organizations indulge organizational preferences for offensive action. This encourages planners to err on the side of attacking all available targets. While it might sense to allow the adversary to retain some capabilities in order to reduce the incentives for escalation, planners may bridle at the thought of consciously allowing the enemy to retain the capacity for attack.14 In recent years, China has invested heavily in capabilities that will complicate US maritime operations and threaten US bases in Japan and Guam. Equipped with a range of anti-access capabilities, China may be able to deter the United States from intervening in the case of a regional war. If it does intervene, China may attempt to damage or destroy US assets or force carrier groups to operate at prohibitively long distances from the mainland. Chinese doctrine for using these weapons has lagged behind acquisition.15 Nonetheless, the appearance of its new “anti-access/area denial” (A2AD) systems caused concern in Washington. US officials subsequently unveiled Air–Sea Battle (ASB), an operational concept for integrating naval and air assets in order to overcome the entire range of anti-access capabilities. The concept was announced in spring 2011 by the then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and responsibility for developing the concept fell to the Air–Sea Battle Office in the Pentagon. In January 2015, the Department of Defense changed the name of ASB to the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, but there is no indication that the substance has changed.16 And because ASB has influenced the debate about a hypothetical US–China conflict, I will continue to use the term here. The Air–Sea Battle Office released some information about the concept, and leaders from the Navy and Air Force wrote about it in service publications. The most comprehensive treatment, however, came in the form of a monograph from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). Although it may be ahead of the Department of Defense (DOD) concept, the CSBA analysis is broadly consistent with official descriptions.17 ASB envisions two broad phases in a war against countries like China with advanced anti-access capabilities. The first is a blinding attack on key facilities, including long-range weapons that could target US bases and carrier groups, as well as the radar systems needed to cue them. Kinetic and electronic attacks would also target Chinese satellites and anti-satellite weapons. According to the CSBA report, attacks on Chinese space assets, along with land-based radars and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and communications platforms, would “severely limit China’s space-based situational awareness.” 18 China would struggle to organize forces after such an attack. Prompt strikes on Chinese missile launchers and C2 nodes would be equally important. “Countering or thinning the PLA offensive missile threat is a principle AirSea Battle line of operation,” the report continues. Not only would the United States regain the advantage, but ASB would also deny China any chance of a rapid and decisive victory. “Success is critical in preventing China from achieving a quick ‘knock-out blow.’”19 The second phase would seek to deny a Chinese naval breakout. Because of the vast distances involved in moving forces across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, these attacks would be required to allow time for US forces to arrive in theater.20 This is an appealing conventional approach, but it has never been tested against a great power with nuclear weapons. The danger is that ASB increases the risk that China will use them. In fact, it opens all three pathways to escalation. ASB deliberately seeks to create confusion at the start of the war, making it very hard for the adversary to understand signals of restraint and declarations of limited intent. Coercion requires not only threats but also credible assurances that the target will not be punished if it complies. There is little reason to comply absent such promises.21 In addition, all of the psychological problems described above would be activated if the United States implemented ASB. In addition to the danger of misperceptions in the confusing aftermath of a blinding attack, attribution bias would almost surely cause the Chinese leadership to suspect the worst about the United States. Prospect theory would also likely kick in because China would suddenly fear losing an object of great national value, especially if the war is fought over Taiwan and the result is independence and permanent separation from the mainland. ASB would exacerbate the domestic problem for the Chinese Communist Party, creating political incentives to use nuclear weapons. The Communist Party of China (CCP) long ago gave up its ideological mandate, replacing communism with a combination of nationalism and economic growth. In the event of an economic slowdown, the CCP will only have nationalism to fall back on. In these circumstances, the party might become more risk-acceptant, especially if it is fighting over a core national interest like Taiwan.22 If it stands on the edge of a monumentally humiliating loss, the CCP might well escalate the war rather than risking the end of its regime. ASB promises such a loss. It is hard to imagine a more humiliating outcome than being blinded and befuddled, forced to wait as the United States slowly husbands naval power offshore. Finally, ASB runs the risk of inadvertent escalation. China has been steadily moving towards a posture of assured retaliation. It seems to believe it can deter other powers with a relatively small number of nuclear weapons, but only if it can assure the survivability of its arsenal.23 ASB may remove that sense of security. The targets in the hypothetical first strike would include China’s ballistic missiles and launchers, as well as space- and ground-based facilities for targeting and guidance. This means that the United States would target elements of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which oversees both nuclear armed and conventional missiles. It also means targeting China’s intelligence and C2 networks, making it harder for leaders to determine whether their nuclear force is at risk. China has not published a detailed and authoritative statement on its nuclear doctrine, though its defense white papers offer clues. Historically, it has chosen to enhance deterrence through ambiguity and mobile launchers in place of high numbers of warheads, obscuring its capabilities to guard what it calls a “lean and effective” force. While this might plant a seed of doubt in potential attackers, it also increases the danger of mistaken targeting, and some analysts believe the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities is getting fuzzier.24 Moreover, different variants of China’s land-based DF-21 are equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads. In the words of a recent open-source assessment of China’s arsenal, “This potentially dangerous mix of nuclear and conventional missiles increases the risk of misunderstanding, miscalculation, and mistaken nuclear escalation in a crisis.” 25 Analysts disagree about the level of overlap, however, and there is evidence that China has taken steps to separate nuclear and conventional missiles while protecting its retaliatory force from preemptive attack. A recent survey of Chinese open sources finds that the majority of missiles are not co-located. Conventional and nuclear brigades answer to separate commands, and China has invested in more secure and redundant command and control. That said, both kinds of brigades may utilize the same C2 infrastructure, and the Central Military Commission, which commands nuclear forces, can take command of conventional forces “under special circumstances.” Finally, Chinese officials may view an attack on conventional missile brigades as proof that the United States has the capacity to destroy nuclear ones.26

#### Second is doctrine – China’s moving away from its NFU.

Lowsen 18 [Ben Lowsen, The Diplomat, "Is China Abandoning Its ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy? – The Diplomat", March 21, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/is-china-abandoning-its-no-first-use-nuclear-policy/] **IV**  
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shapes itself into a “world-class force,” it is also modernizing its nuclear weapons stockpile. Keeping one’s nuclear deterrent in good repair, maintaining strict control, and clearly communicating its purpose is the mark of a responsible actor. China, however, is doing much, much more while keeping the rest of the world in the dark. Now, some observers even suggest China may abandon its longstanding “No First Use” (NFU) nuclear policy, which would signal China’s intent to stand alongside the United States and Russia as a nuclear power capable of inflicting destruction beyond ordinary catastrophe. During the September 2015 World War II Victory Parade in Beijing, the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) unveiled China’s DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile, capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional payloads throughout the western Pacific. The PLA is further continuing to develop its DF-41 ICBM, which Western analysts suspect may carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Furthermore, China is developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent with its Jin class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (Type 094 SSBN). The PLA will begin building a new class of SSBN in the early 2020s: Type 096, equipped with the JL-3 next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). China’s nuclear deterrent is also increasing in size: between 2015 and 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense reported an increase in China’s ICBM force from between 50 and 60 missiles to between 75 and 100. Xinhua in 2010 and again in 2013 reported China’s first successful tests of missile defense technology under what it calls Project 863. Although China’s air expeditionary capabilities currently lag those at sea, one wonders whether an air-based nuclear deterrent can be far behind. Although these advances are significant, particularly in light of stagnant U.S. defense spending, most striking is China’s de facto acknowledgment that its DF-5C missile is equipped with MIRVs, as reported by China’s official military newspaper. If China’s nuclear force remains the “countervalue” force that it claims — possessing only the capability to deliver a punitive second strike after another power has struck it – it has yet to explain why it is increasingly taking on the profile of a great nuclear power. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Is it possible that China is simply modernizing its arsenal while upholding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s stated goals of “cessation of the nuclear arms race” and undertaking “effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament?” Some Chinese scholars still recommend NFU as a policy not just for China, but for all nuclear powers to follow. Zhou Bo of the PLA Academy of Military Science states: “China is not the strongest power either in nuclear weapons or in conventional weapons. If China can make such a commitment [to No First Use], why can’t the U.S., Russia, Britain and France do the same? It is a shame for the strongest military powers with superiority in conventional weapons to talk about using nuclear weapons first.” But veteran security commentator Nan Li of the National University of Singapore notes that “it is evident that as China modernizes its nuclear forces, it is also debating a shift in strategy, including the abandonment of its No First Use (NFU) policy.” He continues: “One view is that NFU may impose certain limitations on the strategic use of China’s Rocket Force, implying reduced crisis response flexibility due to the highly centralized decision-making in employing nuclear weapons. Moreover, some believe that NFU reduces the credibility of China’s already small nuclear forces, and that abandoning NFU may enhance China’s nuclear deterrent.” According to Li, some Chinese strategists envision first use of nuclear weapons in certain situations: Taiwanese independence, attacks targeting China’s nuclear weapons or nuclear command and control, a conventional attack with force equivalent to a nuclear attack, and of course if faced with regime change. But are these questions particularly new or serious? I do not think so. Rather they reflect the ongoing internal debate about long-term issues. A good example of such a debate is China’s stance on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. China-DPRK relations were once those of normal allies. When China normalized diplomatic and economic relations with South Korea in the 1990s, however, it was only natural for some to wonder about China’s commitment to its ally. But it wasn’t until North Korea smashed the nuclear status quo on the peninsula that China brought this dispute out in the open, culminating in China’s willingness to punish North Korea. In contrast, China’s NFU policy is still in the second stage of questioning: the development of new technology is providing China some incentives to abandon the policy, but there has not been a crisis comparable to North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons to shift the debate in China. Until it occurs, I do not believe China will abandon its policy. Particularly operative in this respect is the fact that China is free at any time to abandon its policy and use nuclear weapons. Thus, unless it saw some indispensable deterrent effect of jettisoning NFU — for example to keep Taiwan from declaring independence, or to prevent the U.S. from supporting Taiwanese independence — China is unlikely to alter its commitment to NFU. DIPLOMAT BRIEF WEEKLY NEWSLETTER N Get first-read access to major articles yet to be released, as well as links to thought-provoking commentaries and in-depth articles from our Asia-Pacific correspondents. SUBSCRIBE NEWSLETTER China is, however, entering the realm of the nuclear great powers, previously limited to the United States and Russia, without the attendant controls, especially the MRBM treaty. As long as China refuses to take on the responsibilities of a great nuclear power — or make clear its status as a lesser nuclear power — its opaque policies will strain the status quo and become yet another area in which China has chosen to disrupt the international system.

#### Third is Deterrence – Deterrent posture wrecks relations.

Lewis A. **Dunn 17**. Independent contractor for the Center for Global Security Research, Principal with Science Applications International Corporation, Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassador to the 1985 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. 09/02/2017. “The Strategic Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: An Alternative Global Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament.” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 24, no. 5–6, pp. 401–435.

Similarly, continued efforts to put in place a process of US–China mutual reassurance and restraint as part of a redefined nuclear-disarmament agenda, thereby at least tempering today’s growing strategic competition between the two countries, also would serve US interests as well as those of its allies in Asia. Intensified US–China strategic competition and increasingly prominent mutual reliance on nuclear deterrence would make it more difficult to successfully manage the other competitive aspects of the relationship. Reliance only on deterrence also could be expected to reinforce worst-case strategic thinking in both countries, particularly in the absence of direct insights into the military plans, thinking, and capabilities of the other country. As a result, the risk of miscalculation and conflict in the event of a future regional incident or crisis would grow. Furthermore, heightened strategic competition would divert resources needed for domestic purposes and impede US efforts to gain China’s cooperation to meet shared regional and global challenges.

#### US-Sino war in Taiwan goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18 [Caitlin, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-China War Could Spiral Out of Control,” accessible online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option>, published Nov/Dec 2018]

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline. If such escalation appears far-fetched, China’s history suggests otherwise. In 1969, similar dynamics brought China to the brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In early March of that year, Chinese troops ambushed Soviet guards amid rising tensions over a disputed border area. Less than two weeks later, the two countries were fighting an undeclared border war with heavy artillery and aircraft. The conflict quickly escalated beyond what Chinese leaders had expected, and before the end of March, Moscow was making thinly veiled nuclear threats to pressure China to back down. Chinese leaders initially dismissed these warnings, only to radically upgrade their threat assessment once they learned that the Soviets had privately discussed nuclear attack plans with other countries. Moscow never intended to follow through on its nuclear threat, archives would later reveal, but Chinese leaders believed otherwise. On three separate occasions, they were convinced that a Soviet nuclear attack was imminent. Once, when Moscow sent representatives to talks in Beijing, China suspected that the plane transporting the delegation was in fact carrying nuclear weapons. Increasingly fearful, China test-fired a thermonuclear weapon in the Lop Nur desert and put its rudimentary nuclear forces on alert—a dangerous step in itself, as it increased the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch. Only after numerous preparations for Soviet nuclear attacks that never came did Beijing finally agree to negotiations. China is a different country today than it was in the time of Mao Zedong, but the 1969 conflict offers important lessons. China started a war in which it believed nuclear weapons would be irrelevant, even though the Soviet arsenal was several orders of magnitude larger than China’s, just as the U.S. arsenal dwarfs China’s today. Once the conventional war did not go as planned, the Chinese reversed their assessment of the possibility of a nuclear attack to a degree bordering on paranoia. Most worrying, China signaled that it was actually considering using its nuclear weapons, even though it had to expect devastating retaliation. Ambiguous wartime information and worst-case thinking led it to take nuclear risks it would have considered unthinkable only months earlier. This pattern could unfold again today.

#### Nuke war and winter cause extinction.

Steven Starr, 8-14-2015, "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation Of American Scientists, <https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/> ccajs

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs. Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.] The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

#### Goes nuclear – even one limited exchange reduces the US and China to radioactive wastelands.

Wittner 11 [Lawrence S., Emeritus Professor of History – State University of New York Albany and Former Editor – Peace and Change Journal, “Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?”, 11-28, [www.huntingtonnews.net/14446](http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)]

While **nuclear weapons** exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess **large numbers** of **nuclear weapons**. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying **horribly** of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would **blot out the sun** and bring on a “**nuclear winter**” **around the** globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

### 1AC – Relations

#### A continued adversarial US-China relationship *fuels misperception and distrust*, locking in miscalc and crisis escalation

Chai 18 11-4-2018 (Tommy is a member of the East and South East Asia team. He covers political, economic and security developments in the Indo-Pacific, with a concentration on flashpoints in East Asia., "Cold war? Towards an era of adverse US-China competition," *Foreign Brief*, https://www.foreignbrief.com/asia-pacific/cold-war-towards-an-era-of-adverse-us-china-competition/)

STRATEGIC COMPETITION TURNING ADVERSARIAL

While ‘strategic competition’ has become the Trump administration’s preferred label to frame Washington’s relations with Beijing, the US has been sending signals that it views the relationship as increasingly adversarial and zero-sum. For example, the NDS acknowledges China’s quest for “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”

The US has sought to prevent this and is preparing forces not only to deter but to win a war against China. Such reaction and response have called into question whether Beijing is merely a ‘competitor’ or is in fact emerging as a threat that warrants a more aggressive response. As Anthony H. Cordesman from the CSIS warns, “it is becoming steadily harder to distinguish between efforts designed to limit or contain the other state and those that might lead to actual conflict.”

More dangerously, the ‘strategic competition’ label is feeding an ideological narrative that divides Americans and Chinese into ‘us’ and ‘them’. Robert Keohane and Jeff Kogan, for example, advocate that Washington “nurture a uniquely American social identity and a national narrative [t]hat will require othering authoritarian and illiberal countries.” The NSS and NDS have, in line, developed an image of China as a “revisionist power” bent on shaping “a world consistent with their authoritarian model” and “antithetical to US values and interests.”

However, ideological narratives have the tendency to facilitate simple-minded worldviews and reduce the foreign ‘other’ to stereotypes, which fuels misperception and unnecessary distrust, and are instrumental to opportunist leaders especially during critical junctures of domestic political transition. Pence’s speech was partly fuelled by suspicion rather than facts; his accusation that China is “influencing the [US] midterms [elections]” was contradicted by the Department of Homeland Security and has led to speculation that he was shoring up domestic support to fuel his neoconservative agenda.

AN EMERGING COLD WAR?

The adversarial undertone in US-China relations has generated speculation of an emerging ‘cold war’ (see here and here). However, a ‘cold war’ will first require both parties to develop opposing perceptions of each other and Beijing seemingly remains ambiguous as to how it views itself and its relations with Washington. For now, China is caught between simultaneously pursuing peaceful development and its ambitions of territorial reunification and great-power respect. The former requires maintaining a conducive environment for prosperity, including peaceful relations with the US and its neighbours. But the latter requires acting tough on issues where sovereignty and autonomy are challenged, leading to more assertive and aggressive conduct in international affairs.

During the 19th Party Congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping sought to address these two agendas — but only as separate issues. He has yet to affirm which one is accorded greater priority. Without addressing the contradiction between peace and assertiveness, it is difficult to see how China can formally clarify its perception of the US as either a strategic partner or an ideological threat; the US has both contributed immensely to China’s rise and engaged in actions hostile to Beijing’s aspirations. Professor Chen Dingding posits that there are currently three dominant views in Beijing regarding Washington’s future China policy: containment, competition and cooperation. The question is how far China will tolerate US policies suggestive of a containment strategy before it pushes back with “calls for active Chinese measures to counterbalance possible U.S. aggressive actions in a possible all-out conflict.”

Moreover, any talk of a ‘cold war’ is unlikely to manifest in the same manner as that between the US and the USSR, which was contested globally through the policies of containment and comprehensive economic decoupling. The world is not currently moving towards bipolar global blocs with close-to-no economic interaction; both China and the US are far too connected to each other and to the global economy. While they currently engage in a trade war, the US is (outwardly) seeking to revise the rules of the game rather than abandon the policy of engagement.

It is difficult to assume that China will simply collapse under the weight of US containment as the USSR did in 1991 — its relative economic strength vis-a-vis the US is already greater than that of the Soviet Union at its peak. Furthermore, as Graham Allison notes, “if the US leads [in containing China], who will follow”? US allies and partners have significant interests in maintaining strong relations with both powers — usually in the form of economic ties with China and security commitments with the US — and do not want to make a choice between the two.

INSTABILITY IN THE NEW ERA

However US-China relations proceed, they are unlikely to remain as stable as the US-USSR bipolar era, which had over time developed a series of tacit and formal signalling and normative arrangements that worked towards ameliorating what could have had been a series of escalatory outbreaks. Today, the structures of the international system are substantially different. The multipolar dynamic, with its uneven distribution of power and influence, creates a greater risk of miscalculation. Rapid technological changes (advanced conventional weapons, cyberwarfare and artificial intelligence) will also make competition increasingly difficult to manage as the global rules and norms fail to keep pace.

Both the US and China will need to manage their differences lest the rivalry transforms into a downward spiral of confrontation. However, the outlook is foreboding. If President Trump withdraws from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty amidst accusations of unfair Chinese and Russian practices, he will set a precedent that could undermine the future stability of global arms control and plunge the world into another arms race.

#### That causes China to sell weapons to Iran – only denuclearization solves

Haotan WU, 6-17-2017, is a Ph.D. candidate at Peking University, majoring in International Politics, the Middle East in particular.  China’s Non-proliferation Policy and the Implementation of WMD Regimes in the Middle East, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 11:1, 65-82, DOI: 10.1080/25765949.2017.12023326//ER

However, throughout the 1980s until today, the US government never ceased to claim that China was trying to export WMD-related materials and technologies to the Middle East. By closely examining these allegations, there is no doubt that most of the accusations were based on unconfirmed evidence. To further circumvent Chinese companies from transferring arms-related materials to the Middle East, the US has continuously imposed sanctions based on US laws rather than on international non-proliferation regimes. In other words, the US, rather than the UN or other international regimes, was acting as an international policeman to inspect Chinese arms transfers. Such a US role could have double results on the issue of China’s participation in the non-proliferation sphere. On the one hand, the great pressure from the US, economic sanctions in particular, pushed the Chinese government and entities, to join the international non-proliferation regimes and strengthen China’s national control on arms transfers, especially those related to WMDs. On the other hand, US pressure based on US national interests could generate more abhorrence from China, especially when it is linked with China’s national interests, such as on the issue of Taiwan. In 1992, for instance, China ended its participation in the “Arms Control in the Middle East” talks after being informed that George H. W. Bush had approved the sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters to Chinese Taiwan. Again in 1998 US-China Summit in Beijing, China asked the US to pledge not to sell defensive missiles to Chinese Taiwan, otherwise, China would not stop selling missiles to Iran. No agreement was reached. Words of an unnamed China Foreign Ministry official told the Associated Press on February 26, 2002 to provide an implicit explanation as to the problematic US policy toward China’s non-proliferation policy. He said that the US “can’t just accuse us of violating our commitments and at the same time, sell large amounts of arms to Taiwan,” because such arms sales are “also a kind of proliferation.” ķ In sum, the double standards of the US policy could be the hindrance in promoting China’s non-proliferation efforts, especially when the effectiveness of US economic sanctions was also put into question.

#### Iran A2AD and buildup through Chinese arms transfers causes asymmetrical warfare and destabilization.

Wuthnow 16 [Joel Wuthnow , The National Interest, "Are Chinese Arms About to Flood Into Iran? | The National Interest", January 13, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/are-chinese-arms-about-flood-iran-14887?page=2] **IV**  
The Iran nuclear deal could spawn a resurgence of Chinese arms exports to Iran by lifting UN sanctions and helping diminish Iran’s ‘pariah state’ status. China, and other states, would be allowed to export major conventional weapons to Iran in the next eight years with UN Security Council approval. After eight years, even those restrictions would be lifted, assuming Iran complies with the agreement. In addition, certain types of weapons could be sold to Iran without a waiver. For instance, Russia has argued that its sale of S-300 missile defenses to Iran are permissible because this system is not specifically prohibited under the nuclear deal. China could make a similar argument regarding small arms, short-range missiles and other systems. In the coming years, China might attempt to sell a wide variety of advanced arms to Iran. These could include J-10 fighters, the possible sale of which has been reported in Chinese media. Another system would be the Houbei-class high-speed missile boat, which China is also poised to sell to Pakistan. This would be a logical choice given the expanding navy-to-navy relationship between China and Iran. China might also transfer advanced cruise missiles and technical know-how, allowing Iran to improve its domestic cruise missile program. Other systems could include UAVs, space and counter-space weapons, missile defense components and electronic warfare systems. Sales of most of these items would likely require UN approval, which China might attempt to secure as a permanent member of the Security Council. SPONSORED CONTENT Recommended by What Are The Best Home Security System Brands? Research Best Self Install Home Security on Yahoo Search Yahoo Search The implications of enhanced Sino-Iranian arms cooperation for the United States and regional security could be significant. Provision of high-speed missile boats, anti-ship missiles, and other systems would allow Iran to strengthen its “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) capabilities—referring to the ability to hold U.S. forces at bay in the event of a crisis. Indeed, China would be in an excellent position to assist Iran in enhancing its A2/AD capabilities since Beijing has been developing weapons of just this sort to counter U.S. intervention—notably in the context of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. For instance, Iran could use Chinese-supplied arms to increase the threat to U.S. naval ships in the Strait of Hormuz, a strategically vital channel for Gulf state oil exports to world markets. Iran might also use these weapons to conduct additional provocative exercises explicitly targeting U.S. forces in the region. In February 2015, Iranian forces destroyed a mock U.S. aircraft carrier using high-speed boats, shoulder-launched rockets, and cruise missiles. In December, Iran test-fired a missile within 1500 yards of the U.S. carrier Harry S. Truman, which was transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Chinese support could lead to a continuation or expansion of such destabilizing activities. Report Advertisement Chinese military assistance could also enable Iran to improve its long-range missile capabilities, which could endanger more distant U.S. military targets, such as U.S. facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. China has pledged to adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines limiting transfer of components and technologies that can be used in long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, but its compliance with its commitments has sometimes been problematic. Chinese arms exports to Iran could also pose proliferation concerns. For instance, as part of its effort to expand influence in the region, Iran could elect to re-export weapons to states such as Syria, where Tehran is militarily supporting the Assad regime. Iran may also transfer Chinese-made arms to terrorist groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as to Shi’a militias in Iraq. These groups could in turn use Iran-supplied arms to strike military and civilian targets.

#### Middle East prolif goes nuclear

Warren 13

(Roslyn, is an M.A. candidate in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, “Miscalculating Nuclear Deterrence in the Middle East: Why Kenneth Waltz Gets It Wrong,” <http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2013/12/19/miscalculating-nuclear-deterrence-in-the-middle-east-why-kenneth-waltz-gets-it-wrong/>)

In his Foreign Affairs article, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Kenneth Waltz suggests that a nuclear-armed Iran is nothing to fear. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that Iran’s membership in the nuclear club will actually increase stability in the Middle East. However, Waltz misses an essential point: nuclear deterrence does not rule out the potential for conventional escalation, which can destabilize regions in unpredictable and potentially catastrophic ways. When it comes to nuclear-armed adversaries, the outbreak of “full-scale war”[1] cannot be the only definition of instability. Tense relations between nuclear-armed foes, be they offensive posturing or limited conventional conflict, create opportunities for miscalculation and escalation to the nuclear level. A closer examination of relations between India and Pakistan reveals that nuclear weapons embolden revisionist nuclear states – i.e., states dissatisfied with the existing regional balance of power – and raises the propensity for and incidence of conventional conflict. Taking Pakistan as a model, a weaponized Iran, believing it has a significant deterrent capability, will, at a minimum, increasingly antagonize Israel without fear of nuclear reprisal. Another, more frightening, side effect of Iranian weaponization runs contrary to Waltz’s deterrence model: Both Israel and Iran could each believe a preemptive strike lay in its favor. For these reasons, Waltz’s assertion that a nuclear Iran will increase stability in the Middle East is wrong. Waltzian neorealists claim that states are rational actors seeking, above all, security within an anarchical international system. States maximize their own security by attempting to balance their power against the status quo power; i.e., a state content with the existing, regional balance of power. Security imbalances spur instability. For Waltz, such is currently the case in the Middle East. Because of Israel’s nuclear dominance, it can project undeterred hostility towards its neighbors.[2] The defensive realist remedy for this type of instability is nuclear balance. Waltz suggests that, “By reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less.”[3] Given that all states are rational actors seeking to maximize their relative security, Waltz argues that fear of nuclear reprisal vis-à-vis a second-strike capability acts as a sufficient deterrent between two nuclear-armed adversaries.[4] Hence, if Iran developed nuclear weapons, relations between the two most powerful actors in the Middle East would become more stable. In contrast, many nuclear proliferation experts use the stability-instability paradox to explain how regions with rival nuclear powers become increasingly unstable. The stability-instability paradox posits that two nuclear-armed, adversarial states, believing that neither will initiate a nuclear strike, can and will increasingly engage in offensive posturing and limited conflict with one another.[5] The newly-weaponized, revisionist state – for example, Pakistan or potentially Iran – feels emboldened, and more freely resorts to adventurism in the form of enhanced offensive posturing, increasing low-level conflict, and perhaps stronger support for terrorists. On the other hand, the status quo state – India or Israel in these cases – perceives its freedom of action constrained by its adversary’s new status.[6] Instability at the conventional level in the form of more pronounced aggressive posturing and/or limited conflict heightens tensions between major regional powers, and leaves the door open for escalation and miscalculation at the nuclear level. For Waltz, India and Pakistan prove his point: These two nuclear-armed adversaries have not launched a nuclear war against one another because they fear a reciprocal strike, thereby balancing each other and stabilizing their relations. However, Waltz’s analysis only explains why India and Pakistan have not yet launched a calculated nuclear attack against one another. He fails to consider how tensions across the conflict spectrum have increased since India and Pakistan both weaponized, which could inadvertently escalate to the nuclear level. Flashpoints between India and Pakistan highlight the stability-instability paradox clearly. S. Paul Kapur reveals how Pakistan’s weaponization has “encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior,” whereby it can challenge India “without fearing catastrophic Indian retaliation.”[7] In the Kashmir crisis, Pakistan supported a violent insurgency in Kashmir and the Indian state of Jammu. While the extent to which Pakistan involved itself in the initial fighting remains unclear, Pakistani forces did engage in their “largest-ever peacetime military exercise” and announced a strategic shift to a “policy of offensive defense” in relations with India.[8] Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto acknowledged, “Nuclear weapons ‘came out’ as an important tool in that struggle,” allowing Pakistan to “provide extensive support for ‘a low-scale insurgency’…while insulat[ing it] from a full-scale Indian response.”[9] Similarly, in the Kargil crisis, the Pakistani military “marshaled a substantial body of forces” and crossed the Line of Control (the military border between the Indian and Pakistani-controlled parts of the disputed region), resulting in Indian air and ground mobilization and significant casualties on both sides.[10] Sumit Ganguly explains, “Absent nuclear weapons, Pakistan would not have undertaken the…misadventure.”[11] Relations between India and Pakistan reveal that weaponization emboldens revisionist nuclear states and raises the propensity for conventional conflict. While exhibiting nuclear restraint in both of these situations, India has made “aggressive changes” to its “conventional military posture.”[12] India’s new Cold Start doctrine, for example, “enable[s] India to rapidly launch a large-scale attack against Pakistan.”[13] Responding to this, the director-general of Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), illustrates how conventional instability can escalate to the nuclear level: Cold Start “is destabilizing; it is meant to circumvent nuclear deterrence […]. If it becomes too threatening we [Pakistan] will have to rely on our nuclear capability.”[14] While the line at which Pakistan would employ nuclear weapons remains unclear, this statement suggests that Pakistan’s strategic calculations in responding to conventional conflicts with India now include a nuclear contingency plan. Equally disconcerting, Indian officials believe they can “calibrate” their actions relative to Pakistan’s tolerance, “stopping short of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear thresholds.”[15] Erroneously appraising another country’s red lines could have catastrophic effects, leading to unintended drastic escalation.[16] The India-Pakistan relationship displays how the stability-instability paradox subjects the region to escalation and miscalculation on a nuclear scale. The stability-instability paradox also holds true for the Israel-Iran case. Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton, and Matthew Irvine point out that a nuclear-armed Iran could stir regional conflict, producing high-stakes miscalculations with “some inherent risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear war.”[17] A Middle East where “conflict below the nuclear threshold seem[s] ‘safe’” will likely “encourage Iranian adventurism, reduce Israeli freedom of action, and increase aggressive actions by Iranian proxies.”[18] Geographic proximity and mutual distrust could lead “Israel and Iran [to] adopt ‘launch-on-warning’” doctrines for their nuclear arsenals, increasing the chances that “false warnings of an impending attack by one side” could unravel into an “accidental nuclear war.”[19] When it comes to a weaponized Iran, Waltz’s contention fails to follow its own rational deterrence logic. In this scenario, it is not fear of a second strike that deters Israel and Iran, but vulnerability to a first strike that could lead one side or the other to initiate a nuclear attack. Kahl notes, “Reciprocal fears of surprise attack could produce incentives for either side to launch a deliberate pre-emptive attack.”[20] Israel, with its nuclear superiority, fearing a nuclear-armed Iran, could seek to annihilate Iran’s small arsenal by initiating a first strike. Even if Iran only feared an Israeli conventional attack, Iran’s nascent nuclear arsenal, extremely vulnerable to an Israeli strike, could generate an Iranian “use them or lose them” sentiment, where Iran could also calculate that a first strike lay in its favor.[21] This would leave two nuclear-armed adversaries without diplomatic relations living in close proximity to one another, both feeling vulnerable and potentially believing a first strike could work to its advantage.[22] In the Middle East, even the prospect of a weaponized Iran heightens the potential for conflict to escalate to nuclear levels. While no one can know with certainty what the regional security environment will look like if Iran joins the nuclear club, one thing is certain: nuclear weapons sustain the possibility of nuclear war. The Waltzian deterrence model may hold true in a Cold War retrospective, but unintended accidents and escalation are still possible. When adversarial states both possess a nuclear second-strike capability, relative security gains cannot be achieved at the nuclear level. Waltz concedes that because states seek to maximize their relative security, nuclear states may choose to develop a massive conventional weapons arsenal as well. In this way, even Waltz acknowledges the paradoxical nature of nuclear weapons, admitting heightened aggression and limited war is possible even when both states are nuclear-armed.[23] As demonstrated by the nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons generate increasingly aggressive behavior, creating greater opportunities for conflict, not fewer. A likely scenario between Israel and a nuclear Iran involves increased low-intensity conflict where low-level skirmishes could lead to unintended escalation or accidental nuclear detonation. At worst, nuclear-armed foes could decide that a first strike is worth the risk.

#### Prolif causes global nuclear war – accidents, brinksmanship, adventurism, and preemptive strikes

**Kroenig 15** (Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015)

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

#### EVEN IF they are right China isn’t revisionist writ-large---they specifically want to undermine U.S. leadership---that’s all we need to access our impact

Bonnie S. Glaser and Khairulanwar Zaini 19. \*Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington DC, where she works on issues related to Asia-Pacific security with a focus on Chinese foreign and security policy. \*\*Research Associate at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. 4-5-2019. “China as a Selective Revisionist Power in the International Order.” ISEAS. <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_21.pdf>. accessed 6-28-2019//JDi

CHINESE ACTIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER – China in the South China Sea Beyond rhetoric, it is also important to examine China’s foreign policy actions. Beijing’s conduct in the South China Sea is illustrative of what it is trying to achieve with respect to international maritime law. The rejection of the 2016 arbitration ruling by the United Nations Conventional on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal suggests an effort by the Chinese to carve out an exception in how UNCLOS should be implemented, at least in the South China Sea. China differs from the United States and other Western countries in its interpretations on certain provisions of UNCLOS, especially as it pertains to the conduct of military activities in Exclusive Economic Zones and whether foreign military ships have to seek permission to enter into a country’s territorial waters. China is however not unique in holding these perspectives on UNCLOS, which may encourage China to corral other countries to support its views on UNCLOS in the near future. The negotiations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member-states on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea (CoC) also merit mention. China has reportedly proposed two provisions to the code which would prohibit cooperation with energy companies from countries outside the region as well as the holding of joint military exercises with countries from outside the region.14 The first provision would not only curb the autonomy of countries in the region to pursue their own energy extraction policy, but would also provide the Chinese—as the only party to the CoC with deep-drilling technology and expertise—with an effective monopoly over any exploitation of natural resources in the region. The second provision would bar any military exercises with foreign power unless all CoC signatories have given their consent, thus providing China with a veto on all exercises in the region. Although it is unlikely that such provisions would garner support from the other ASEAN countries, it is revealing of China’s intention and efforts to curtail U.S. military presence in the region. - China and international norms In the realm of values and norms, China has also consistently opposed certain norms that have gained popular currency among Western countries, such as “the responsibility to protect”, which they view as legitimizing foreign intervention. The Chinese are also ambivalent about efforts to further democracy promotion and freedom of information in the fear that foreign countries will use these tools to undermine the authority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They are primarily concerned about the prospect of such norms being applied not only to other countries, but also being directed against China. China has also been active in creating new rules and norms, especially within the framework of existing institutions such as the United Nations. China, along with Russia, has been at the forefront of a concerted effort within the UN to define cyber-sovereignty as a right which justifies a country’s control over content within its borders and state censorship of the Internet. Moreover, China has prioritized the role for states to craft the rules for the newlyemerging field of cyber-governance, emphasizing the importance of state sovereignty and territoriality in the digital space, and rejecting the inclusion of civil society groups in the UN Group of Governmental Experts. China also pushed for references to “multistakeholders” to be replaced with “multilateral” and the deletion of “freedom of expression” and “democratic” in its submission of a revised International Code of Conduct for Information Security in 2015. In the UN Human Rights Council, China has also promoted orthodox interpretations of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs which weaken international norms of human rights, transparency, and accountability. This is a departure from the Hu Jintao era, when discussion about finding a universalist conception of human rights was encouraged. However, under Xi Jinping, the approach has been instead to develop a ‘socialist’ definition of human rights. The withdrawal of the United States from the Human Rights Council has also allowed China to propagate its views without any strong pushback. - Chinese and parallel institutions China has also engaged in attempts at revisionism through the creation and development of parallel institutions. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which emerged out of the Shanghai Five grouping of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, has been expanded to include countries such as Iran. So far, however, the organization has mostly focused on addressing issues and concerns of its members, such as counterextremism efforts and economic development. It seems unlikely that the SCO will have much potential to challenge or displace the existing security architecture of the region. China has also developed global financial institutions such as the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The AIIB has proven to be a good contribution to global governance, working effectively in tandem with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Indeed, the AIIB may have evolved to be operating in ways that differ from China’s original plan. When it was first proposed, the AIIB was greeted with concern and skepticism by the Obama administration. One primary reason for AIIB’s positive evolution lies in the participation of many Western countries, which allowed them to influence the operations of the bank from the inside and ensure that the AIIB adopt the kind of rules that major international financial institutions adhere to. - China’s Belt and Road Initiative Much international attention has been directed towards Xi Jinping’s signature project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Currently, it seems that all of China’s external economic activities—including those in the Arctic, Africa, and Latin America—are being subsumed under the BRI. It is no longer limited to the six corridors that comprised the “One Belt, One Road” plan in the aftermath of Xi Jinping’s announcement of the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in 2013. It is however a mistake to see the BRI as a coherent grand strategy that is being executed in the same way all over the world. Although the programme has evolved since its inception, it bears recalling that one of the early drivers for the BRI was Beijing’s desire to redirect its excess domestic capacity for absorption outside China. Nevertheless, there is an increasing element of strategy as China has sought to deploy BRI projects in a way to increase beneficiary countries’ economic dependence on China as a means of gaining political leverage. Moreover, the BRI enables the Chinese to subtly establish new standards for foreign investments which depart from Western conventions. In sum, it is important to recognize that, at least at present, Beijing does not oppose the entirety of the post-war international order—it is selectively revisionist regarding what it views as unjust elements of the order and U.S. hegemony. In accepting the concept of a rules-based order, China however remains dissatisfied with certain elements of the international order, although it does recognize the benefits that it have derived from the order during the post-Cold War period. In general, China has accepted and become integrated into the global economic order, it has implemented some changes in the global financial order, and it remains skeptical about aspects of the global political order. Furthermore, although China is selectively writing new rules and developing new norms, it prefers incremental change in the international order, not sudden global shifts that could harm political and economic stability. China establishes parallel institutions when it perceives that current institutions are not working to its advantage. In the years ahead, we can expect that China will demand more of a say in shaping the international order as a condition for its support, while proactively seeking ways to lead reform of global governance.

#### Plan solves tensions.

Weidi 16 [Xu Weidi, Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, "China's Security Environment and the Role of Nuclear Weapons", 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ChineseNuclearThinking\_Final.pdf] **IV**  
The international nuclear arms control process led by the United States and the Soviet Union was an important external factor for the construction of China’s nuclear forces. Although Chinese leaders paid significant attention to this process, they also tried to avoid being restrained by it. During different periods of time and under different international circumstances, China somewhat adjusted the focal point of the country’s policy on international nuclear disarmament. From its founding until the early 1960s, China focused on and emphasized opposition to nuclear war, advocated for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and strove to achieve world peace. Mao and other Chinese leaders advocated for using, as Mao put it, the “utmost efforts to prohibit atomic wars and to strive for the conclusion of a mutual nonaggression pact between the two camps.”61 Tis course of advocacy not only involved cooperation with the Soviet Union but also helped China obtain the moral high ground and explore the laws of international security and politics in the context of nuclear weapons. Mao repeatedly proposed an international treaty, as well as plans to avoid using atomic bombs.62 “Is it possible,” he posited, “to reach an agreement similar to that on the prohibition of chemical weapons, just like during World War II when everyone did not use chemical weapons? Or in this case, to not use nuclear weapons?”63 As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated after the mid-1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union tended to increase restrictions on China, and Beijing in turn took further 30 UNDERSTANDING CHINESE NUCLEAR THINKING steps to criticize the selectivity, discrimination, and deceptiveness of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation process led by the United States and the Soviet Union. In October 1964, Mao Zedong stated that “the so-called nuclear nonproliferation of the United States is a nonproliferation in socialist countries, but in capitalist countries, it is a proliferation.”64 In January 1965, he added that “there is no such thing as a comprehensive and complete disarmament. A widespread military buildup is currently taking place. It might be possible to reduce the number of infantry battalions, and use the money saved to build atomic bombs. We will not participate in a tripartite treaty. Tat is a form of deception and blackmail meant to suppress us, which only allows them to own [nuclear weapons] and does not allow us to own them.”65 In May 1965, a sentence in Mao’s poetry—“don’t you know that a tripartite treaty was concluded under the bright autumn moon two years ago?”—expressed his strong sense of revulsion and sarcasm toward the Partial Test Ban Treaty concluded by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in 1963.66 China began to participate in international nuclear arms control negotiations in the 1980s. In upholding the theory of a few in its nuclear force construction, China did not participate in the international nuclear arms race. In accordance with its no-first-use principle, China was the first country to provide negative security assurances to countries without nuclear weapons, stating that it would not use nuclear weapons to threaten other countries that did not possess them. In conjunction with a strategic shift of focus and major adjustments to the guiding ideology for the military, China proactively reduced its troop count by 1 million in 1985 and advanced the international arms control process in its own unique way, thereby contributing to the maintenance of world peace. Chinese leaders emphasized that in order to oppose nuclear war, the idea of hegemony must be opposed.67 These leaders maintained that hegemony is the root cause of nuclear war, and not nuclear weapons themselves.68

### **1AC – Framing**

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### 1] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first.

#### 2] Actor specificity:

#### A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – governments decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### C] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

#### 3] Intuitions matter – they’re a side-constraint on theories – the way philosophers conduct work is they make a theory but if it violates basic intuitions it’s thrown out the window regardless of logical consistency.

### 1AC – Theory

#### 1] 1AR Theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) drop the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time.

#### 2] Aff Reasonability on T – a) Evaluate with a brightline of open source disclosure and link and impact turn ground, b) prefer due to bidirectional theory – aff can never be topical due to bidirectional interps which makes reasonability the only way to fairly adjudicate aff topicality, c) resolvability – competing interps leads to race to the top and no one interp is the best so infinite possible interps with no way to aggregate.

#### 3] Aff RVI’s on T – a) Skew – no 2AC for carded offense which means that they invest more time into substance and theory. The crowded 1AR can’t cover both sufficiently making rounds structurally neg skewed. Give aff RVI to make up for time with ballot access, b) Reciprocity – make theory a two way street to allow both debaters equal access to the ballot. Access is k2 fairness bc w/o it db8ers can’t engage fairly within the round since it structurally favors one of them.

#### 4] Reject circumvention args and presumption – a] moots topic education by not engaging with the aff – topic ed k2 debate because it’s the only education we get from debate that meets educational standards, b] moots 6 minutes of AC offense and creates 13-7 time skew – time skew k2 fairness bc time is necessary to make arguments, c] they’re silly – doesn’t allow the aff to even debate because they assume that something’s gonna go wrong with enforcement. That’s a fiat issue and fiat good because that’s the only way we can have debate in the first place.

## 1AR – Case

### Overview – Taiwan

#### War in Taiwan is imminent and only nuclear elimination an prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Taiwan is pushing for its independence at all costs and the US has every incentive to get involved. This forces China’s hand in war and mixed signals between the US and China lead to nuclear annihilation. Only the aff solves by eliminating nuclear arsenals to de-escalate conflict in Taiwan. Nuke war outweighs – reversibility and magnitude.

### Overview – Relations

#### Shotty relations between China and the US makes China seek to undermine US hegemony. Arms sales between China and Iran creates instability in the ME and causes massive prolif – terminalizes to extinction. Disarm solves as an act of good faith – prevents ideological threat con and makes peace more reachable.

### A2 No US Fill-in

#### US-Sino war happens due to irresolvability of Taiwan.

Michael D. Swaine 19, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies., 2-21-2019, "The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-solutions-pub-78429

The ugly dynamic of growing suspicion and worst-case assumptions is increasing the likelihood of future U.S.-China political or military crises in Asia, crises that could in turn eventually propel the two sides into a Cold War or worse. The deepening suspicion and hostility in the relationship is occurring during, and (in part) as a result of, a shifting balance of power in Asia within the First Island Chain. This negative turn also reflects a general failure to resolve several contentious issues in the region, including the Korean Peninsula; Taiwan; maritime disputes; and military-related intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. I believe that China’s continued growth in military and economic power and influence in Asia, and the resulting relative decline in U.S. maritime predominance, will eventually create an unstable rough parity between China and U.S./allied states within the First Island Chain along China’s maritime periphery (within approximately 1,500 kilometers of the country’s coast). This could cause China to overestimate its leverage and ability to advance its interests on contentious and provocative issues such as Taiwan and maritime sovereignty disputes. At the same time, it could also cause the United States and Japan to overreact to such behavior, partly to disabuse China and others of the notion that the United States is losing its dominant position. Without adequate communication and a clear sense of each other’s red lines, and without reassuring understandings on limits and intentions, such miscalculations could easily escalate into tests of relative resolve, with neither side willing to make accommodations to reach a middle ground. Although Beijing and Washington could perhaps avoid letting such a crisis devolve into actual military conflict, even a major nonviolent confrontation could severely, and perhaps irreparably, damage U.S.-China relations well beyond anything seen thus far, producing untold shocks to the global economy and both regional and global security. Under present conditions, the issue of Taiwan is particularly concerning. Given the current and worsening U.S. trend toward a zero-sum strategic competition with Beijing in virtually all areas, it is quite possible that anti-China zealots in or around the U.S. government could successfully argue that Washington should start regarding Taiwan as a strategic asset that it should deny China. These sentiments are already found among defense analysts in the United States and Japan. Needless to say, if such views became policy, the U.S. One China policy would collapse, along with the original basis for normalized relations with Beijing. The result could be a military conflict. I am certainly not predicting such an outcome. But I am less confident today than I was a few years ago that it can be avoided. HOW TO SALVAGE CONSTRUCTIVE U.S.-CHINA TIES What should policymakers do about this troubling state of affairs? First, serious, influential individuals in both countries (and not just experts on U.S.-China relations) need to speak out more forcefully. They need to call for an end to reckless rhetoric, soothing propagandistic utterances about win-win outcomes, and mild, half measures for dealing with the serious sources of discontent and suspicion in the relationship. For its part, in the near term, China needs to focus like a laser on dealing with the sources of Western businesses’ discontent and cyber espionage, while indicating a clear willingness, through actions and not just words, to involve Western capitals and business interests in Chinese economic enterprises such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Such actions, along with the efforts of U.S. state and local officials to strengthen close economic ties with China, could contribute greatly to reestablishing the U.S. business community as a major pillar of the U.S.-China relationship. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress should hold hearings on the future strategic balance in Asia and its implications for U.S. policy. This exercise should involve a full assessment of how medium- and long-term changes in the military, economic, political/diplomatic, and soft-power resources that the United States, China, and other Asian states possess will likely affect regional stability, especially in terms of changing levels of risk tolerance and regional threat perceptions. The point of this assessment would be to confirm and define more clearly the power shift occurring in Asia and to determine the most feasible and effective policy options. In my view, this should lead the two countries to accept the need for a stable (and real) balance in Asia and a defusing of the most likely sources of conflict through mutual accommodation, alongside genuine efforts to integrate the region economically. Such a mentality should take the place of what currently appear to be U.S. efforts to deepen strategic competition through a largely futile attempt to stay well ahead of China in the region while isolating Beijing economically.

#### No checks on escalation---communication is collapsing and election cycles make moderation and conflict neutrality impossible

Ryan **Hass** 4/22**/**20**19** David M. Rubenstein Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center Cross-Strait risks are rising and need to be managed Monday, April 22, 2019 Taipei Times https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/cross-strait-risks-are-rising-and-need-to-be-managed/

In other words, Washington, Taipei, and Beijing are falling into an action-reaction cycle on cross-Strait issues, even as they disagree on who is the initiator of this cycle. This is occurring at a time when there is under-developed muscle memory at senior levels in all three capitals for managing cross-Strait tensions, U.S.-China relations are **severely strained**, and cross-Strait **relations are becoming more contested in more domains**.

On top of that, we are entering a dangerous period for **resolve-testing** behavior. As elections approach in Taiwan in January 2020 and in the United States in November 2020, there may be **shrinking political space for moderation** in response to perceived Chinese provocations.

All this is occurring at a time when there are **atrophying channels of communication** between Beijing and Washington and Taipei, respectively, on cross-Strait issues. Some of this is due to Beijing’s reflexive dismissal of Tsai’s initial offers of reassurance, and its preference for punishment over genuine efforts to bridge differences, including by freezing official channels for cross-Strait communication. In the U.S.-China context, the primary channels that previously were used to manage cross-Strait tensions — in-depth conversations at the presidential level and in the Strategic Security Dialogue — are **no longer available**.

As a consequence, all three sides have a less granular understanding of each other’s sensitivities. In the absence of an ability to clarify the meaning of events, **all sides will face a bias toward assuming the worst** intentions of the other’s actions, which risks leading to exaggerated threat assessments of the other. A case in point is Beijing’s interpretation of recent U.S. Congressional resolutions, which reflect the political views of members of Congress and do not require the Trump administration to take specific actions, yet are treated by Beijing as substantively significant.

Taken together, these are the types of ingredients that could **spark a crisis** that nobody wants, but that nobody feels they could avoid. While the risk of deliberate military conflict remains low given the catastrophic consequences of any such action, the risk of an **unplanned incident leading to unintended escalation** is rising.

#### Crisis over Taiwan draws in the US

Charles Glaser 11, GWU political science professor, “Will China's Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, March/April, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-03-01/will-chinas-rise-lead-war>)

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### Extended deterrence fails – China believes no rational state would risk war for another.

White ‘15 (Hugh, Professor of Strategic Studies in the School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, “Taiwan: US deterrence is failing,” accessible online at <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/taiwan-us-deterrence-failing>, published 05/22/15).

Deterrence is a beguiling concept. It offers the hope that we can prevail over our opponents without actually fighting them because our mere possession of military power will be sufficient to compel them to our will. This seductive idea seems to be the basis of Michael Cole's view that deterrence will allow America and its allies to defend Taiwan from China with incurring the costs and risks of conflict, and that they should therefore commit themselves to doing so. This view is set out in Michael's most recent contribution to an exchange between us about this issue, and I'd like to thank him for his thoughtful part in our exchange on this sensitive topic. Alas, I think this view of deterrence is mistaken. Deterrence can work, of course, but only where the deterred power believes that the deterring power is willing to incur the costs and risks of conflict. So Washington can only deter Beijing from using force against Taiwan if Beijing is reasonably sure that Washington is willing to actually fight to do so. Moreover, because the stakes are so high and the nuclear threshold is so unclear, Washington must convince Beijing that it is willing to fight a nuclear war over Taiwan if it is to deter China from starting a conventional one. Simply possessing armed forces, including nuclear forces, is not enough to do this. You also have to convince the other side that you are willing to use them, and are willing to incur the costs and risks of the resulting conflict. There is, as Michael acknowledges, a parallel here with the Ukraine. Many in the West believed Russia could be deterred from any military intervention in the Ukraine. But deterrence did not work because Moscow did not believe that Washington cared enough about Ukraine to accept the costs and risks of a military conflict with Russia. Some might hope that China can be convinced that the US is willing to fight, even if it isn't. This is called bluffing, and it's a dangerous and unreliable tactic. And this is precisely why America cannot reliably deter China from attacking Taiwan. As Michael himself acknowledges, there are real doubts that America would be willing to go to war with China. It seems likely that those doubts are shared in Beijing, and they cannot be dispelled simply by rhetorical reaffirmations of the Taiwan Relations Act, because they arise from a quite reasonable assessment of the balance between costs to America of reunification on the one hand, and the costs of war with China on the other. This assessment does not minimise the costs of unification, both to America and to the Taiwanese themselves. It simply sets them realistically against the costs and risks of war with China, which Michael seems to agree are exceptionally grave. And if Americans are not convinced of US resolve, why should we expect China's leaders to be? And if they are not reasonably sure that the US would be willing to actually commit its formidable forces to fight for Taiwan, how can they deter China from attacking it? The conclusion seems clear: America cannot defend Taiwan unless it is really willing to fight China to do so, and unless it is plainly willing to do that, Washington should not mislead the Taiwanese into thinking that they can rely on American support if the worst happens.

### A2 No Nuke Extinction

#### Nuclear winter causes famine and climate change – extinction

Ward 18 [(Alex, Staff writer covering international security and defense issues former associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security) internally cites Reisner (Jon, Scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory) and Robock (Alan, Distinguished Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University) “This is exactly how a nuclear war would kill you” VOX, 12/26/2018] BC  
It’s worth reiterating that all of the above are estimates for one strike on one location. An actual nuclear war would have much wider and more devastating consequences. And if that war spiraled out of control, the effects after the conflict would be much worse than the attacks themselves — and change the course of human history.

“Almost everybody on the planet would die”

It’s possible you have an idea of what a post-nuclear hellscape looks like. After all, disaster movies are obsessed with that kind of world. But scientists and other nuclear experts care deeply about this issue too — and their research shows the movies may be too optimistic.

Alan Robock, an environmental sciences professor at Rutgers University, has spent decades trying to understand what a nuclear war would do to the planet. The sum of his work, along with other colleagues’, is based on economic, scientific, and agricultural models.

Here’s what he found: The most devastating long-term effects of a nuclear war actually come down to the black smoke, along with the dust and particulates in the air, that attacks produce.

[image]

In a nuclear war, cities and industrial areas would be targeted, thereby producing tons of smoke as they burn. Some of that smoke would make it into the stratosphere — above the weather — where it would stay for years because there’s no rain to wash it out. That smoke would expand around the world as it heats up, blocking out sunlight over much of Earth.

As a result, the world would experience colder temperatures and less precipitation, depleting much of the globe’s agricultural output. That, potentially, would lead to widespread famine in a matter of years.

The impact on the world, however, depends on the amount of rising smoke. While scientists’ models and estimates vary, it’s believed that around 5 million to 50 millions tons of black smoke could lead to a so-called “nuclear autumn,” while 50 million to 150 millions tons of black smoke might plunge the world into a “nuclear winter.”

If the latter scenario came to pass, Robock told me, “almost everybody on the planet would die.”

Let’s take each in turn.

1) “Nuclear autumn”

A nuclear fight between New Delhi and Islamabad could cause a “nuclear autumn.”

“Even a ‘small’ nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs,” Robock and Toon, the University of Colorado Boulder professor, wrote in 2016, “could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply.”

Here’s why: an India-Pakistan nuclear fight of that size could emit at least 5 million to 6 million tons of black smoke into the stratosphere.

At that point, American and Chinese agricultural production, particularly in corn and wheat, would drop by about 20 to 40 percent in the first five years. It’s possible that the cooling would last [at least a decade](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/AlanAGUfellowsLecture.mp4), plunging temperatures to levels “colder than any experienced on Earth in the past 1,000 years,” Robock and Toon wrote.

Ira Helfand, a board director at the anti-nuclear war Physicians for Social Responsibility, calls this scenario a “nuclear autumn.”

As many as [2 billion people](https://www.psr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/two-billion-at-risk.pdf) would be at risk of starvation even in that “limited” range, he estimates, most of them in Southeast Asia, Latin America, North America, and Europe. “The death of 2 billion people wouldn’t be the end of the human race,” he told me, “but it would be the end of modern civilization as we know it.”

The effects could get worse. The lack of food would drive up prices for what sustenance remains. Surely there would be worldwide skirmishes — and perhaps wars — over remaining resources. The situation could get so bad that we might see another nuclear war as states try to seize control of more food and water, Helfand fears.

That’s a scary scenario — but it could be even more horrifying still.

2) “Nuclear winter”

The absolute doomsday scenario is a “nuclear winter.” For that to happen, the US and Russia would have to use about 2,000 nukes each and destroy major cities and targets, Toon told me. Each country would effectively take out the other — and likely bring down most of humanity as well.

According to [Robock and others](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf), the roughly 150 million tons of black smoke rising from burning cities and other areas would spread around to most of the planet over a period of weeks. That would plunge surface temperatures by about 17 to 20 degrees Fahrenheit for the first few years, and then come back up just by 5 degrees Fahrenheit for the following decade.

The Northern Hemisphere would suffer the coldest temperatures, but the world would feel the impact. “[T]his would be a climate change unprecedented in speed and amplitude in the history of the human race,” they wrote.

Global precipitation would also drop by around 45 percent. Between that and the cold, almost nothing would grow, ensuring those who didn’t die in the nuclear firefight soon would of starvation. And if that didn’t do it, the depleted [ozone layer](http://www.pnas.org/content/105/14/5307) — a side effect of a major nuclear war — would allow large amounts of ultraviolet light to make it to the surface. That would harm nearly every ecosystem and make it harder for some humans to go outside. “A Caucasian person couldn’t go outside for a few minutes before getting a sunburn,” Toon told me.

A close up of a map

Description automatically generated

Christina Animashaun/Vox

Some experts, however, disagree with the conclusions of Robock and his colleagues’ work. In 1990, five scientists who coined the term “nuclear winter” said their original findings were overblown and that a large-scale nuclear war wouldn’t extinguish humanity. And in February 2018, Jon Reisner and others in a government-backed study wrote that the impact of smoke in the atmosphere would be bad, but not as dire as Robock’s crew have predicted.

Still, the point remains the same: A nuclear war would almost certainly affect hundreds of millions or billions of people not directly caught in the fighting. Its effects would reverberate, sometimes literally, around the planet.

That’s why some don’t ever want to run the risk of a nuclear conflict — and are trying to do something about it.

What to do about nuclear weapons?

There’s only one surefire way to stop the future use of nuclear weapons: remove them entirely.

Former senior US leaders have made this case for years. Four of America’s elder statesmen — former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Sen. Sam Nunn — wrote in 2007 in the [Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116787515251566636) that they wanted to see “a world free of nuclear weapons.” Having nukes in the Cold War made sense, they said, but now they’re “increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.”

And current health and humanitarian officials worry about nuclear use’s impact on the world.

“Even a limited use of nuclear weapons would have devastating, long-lasting and irreparable humanitarian consequences,” Kathleen Lawland, the arms unit chief for the International Committee of the Red Cross, said at the UN on October 17. “The only safeguard against nuclear catastrophe is nuclear disarmament. It is a humanitarian imperative.”

#### Our study is best—Reisner et al is garbage

Toon et al 19 [Owen B. Toon, Physics at Cornell; Charles G. Bardeen, Atmospheric Chemistry Observations and Modeling Laboratory, National Center for Atmospheric Research; Alan Robock, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick] “Comment on “Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapon Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based on Detailed Source Calculations” by Reisner et al.” 10-19-19 RE

Reisner et al. (2019, hereafter Reisner et al.) revisit a study we had done (Mills et al., 2014) modeling the climate impacts of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, in which fires started by 100 15‐kt atomic bombs would produce 5 Tg of soot injected into the upper troposphere. When Reisner et al. repeated our climate model simulations with a 5‐Tg soot injection, they reproduced the same climate response. Similar results have also been reported using different models (Mills et al., 2008; Pausata et al., 2016; Robock et al., 2007). However, using results from their simulation of a mass fire in suburban Atlanta with HIGRAD‐FIRETEC, a model which is not available from them preventing others from recreating their calculations, Reisner et al. calculate that much less soot would be injected into the upper troposphere because the plumes from fires would not rise as high in the atmosphere, and therefore there would be less climate response. While we agree that this reduced smoke input would result in a much smaller climate response, we have serious concerns that the fire they modeled is not typical of the type of mass fire likely to result from a nuclear attack on densely populated cities in India and Pakistan and therefore their smoke estimate may significantly underestimate the amount of smoke likely to rise into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere during a nuclear war.

Reisner et al. state that they are simulating a mass fire, presumably of the sort that would be expected in an urban area after a nuclear explosion. However, it is clear that they did not simulate a firestorm such as occurred in Hamburg, Dresden, and Hiroshima during World War II. Without them demonstrating that their model can accurately simulate these actual firestorms, it is difficult to interpret conclusions from their simulations. Firestorms have strong inflowing winds so that they have little spread, extremely tall convection columns or smoke plumes, and burn for long durations until all the fuel within their perimeter is consumed (e.g., Glasstone & Dolan, 1977). Numerous studies of firestorms (e.g., Badlan et al., 2017; Cotton, 1985; Penner et al., 1986; Small et al., 1989; Small & Heikes, 1988) show smoke rising into the stratosphere from simulated firestorms, and explore the dependence of smoke altitude on fire intensity, atmospheric stability, moisture, fire size, wind speed, and other parameters. In a nuclear conflict over a large country involving a large number of weapons many of the fires would be expected to develop into firestorms. Glasstone and Dolan (1977) suggested, based on the experience with 69 mass fires in Japan and many others in Germany during World War II, that firestorms occur when the following criteria are met:

a minimum burning area of about 1.3 km2;

half the structures in the area are on fire simultaneously;

a fuel load of at least 4 g/cm2; and

ambient winds less than 3.6 m/s.

Glasstone and Dolan (1977) and results from Reisner et al. show that, assuming flat topography, a 15‐kt weapon would ignite fires in a ~13‐km2 area including a majority of the structures within that area, thus fulfilling the first two criteria. However, the second two criteria were not met in the Reisner et al. study.

The fuel load in Reisner et al. is too small to generate a fire storm. Mills et al. (2014) used smoke estimates from Toon et al. (2007), who calculate fuel loads ranging from 12.6 to 94.5 g/cm2 for the top 50 urban targets in India and Pakistan. These values are all significantly above the 4 g/cm2 threshold value needed to support a firestorm. In their paper, Reisner et al. do not provide either the target location or the fuel loads used in their fire model. Rather they state that they visually examined Google images of Indian and Pakistani cities and chose a similar area of Atlanta. In personal communications, Jon Reisner did connect us with the provider of their fuel loads, Joseph Crepeau of Applied Research Associates, Inc., so that we could assess these critical data. Their ground zero is near the East Lake Golf Club in suburban Atlanta (33.750°N, 84.305°W), more than 5 km east of downtown Atlanta. A Google Earth map of this region (Figure 1) shows that this suburban region with a golf course looks nothing like a city in India or Pakistan (e.g., Figure 2). From their fuel load maps, we were able to calculate the average burnable fuel load in the 13 km2 target area to be 0.14 g/cm2 and in the 10‐km × 10‐km domain of their model to be 0.91 g/cm2. Both of these values are well below the fuel load threshold for a firestorm, and the target area has 6 times less fuel density than the domain average. The fuel load for the target area is also well below the value calculated using maps of population density following Toon et al. (2007) of 0.87 g/cm2. Fundamentally Reisner et al. simply chose a target with very little fuel. The 0.14 g/cm2 value for the Reisner et al. target area is 15 to 110 times smaller than the top 50 targets in India and Pakistan which were considered in the Mills et al. (2014) study.

Reisner et al. assume a wind profile with 6–8 m/s winds in the boundary layer, which they call “very calm,” but which are significantly above the threshold of 3.6 m/s for a firestorm. Toon et al. (2007) did not consider the effects of surface winds in assuming firestorm conditions. For the top targets in India and Pakistan, during May our own numerical simulations with the version of the WACCM model used by Mills et al. (2014) suggest that surface winds for likely targets would be expected to be above the firestorm threshold about 50% of the time, so assuming sufficient fuel loads, about half of the targets should develop into firestorms and half into conflagrations.

Because of the choice of target location and wind speed, Reisner et al. simulated a weak conflagration rather than a firestorm. Furthermore, for their climate simulation they assume that all 100 targets have the same smoke emissions as this case. In Toon et al. (2007), targets were identified and smoke production scaled by population density and thus each location injected a different amount of smoke proportional to the population. Figure 5 of Reisner et al. shows that their fire is blowing downwind. Conflagrations were observed in World War II mass fires, and indeed were desired in order to burn the largest possible area. They are also commonly observed in modern forest fires. Reisner et al. state “As indicated below, the simulations include various worst case assumptions with regard to the specification of the fuel, weather conditions, and height of burst of the device. Therefore, they serve as upper bounds with regard to the expected outcome of an urban mass fire caused by a nuclear detonation.” We argue that the Reisner et al. simulation is clearly not a worst case. As we have already discussed Reisner et al. do not have a high fuel load, but one that is more than an order of magnitude smaller than even the lowest fuel loads in the urban areas of Pakistan and India considered in the Mills et al. (2014) study. Firestorms were also observed in World War II and lofted material to high altitudes (see Penner et al., 1986). Moreover, numerous conflagrations in forest fires with fuel densities similar to those assumed by Reisner et al. have produced smoke plumes that reached into the stratosphere (e.g., Peterson et al., 2018). In 2017 a fire in British Columbia produced a stratospheric smoke pall that was observed by satellites for 8 months (Yu et al., 2019). Aircraft studies have shown that debris from recent fires is common in the lower stratosphere (Ditas et al., 2018).

Reisner et al. neither compared their simulation with previous studies of mass fires, nor listed the basic parameters that would allow comparisons with past or future studies. They claim they have validated their model against observed mass fires, referring to their Figure 1 and three references (Linn, Canfield, et al., 2012; Linn, Anderson, et al., 2012; Pimont et al., 2009). However, two of these references (Linn, Canfield, et al., 2012; Pimont et al., 2009) and their Figure 1 focus on line fires emitting smoke into the boundary layer, which is not relevant to urban mass fires. The third reference (Linn, Anderson, et al., 2012) focuses on 150 m × 150 m or smaller burn plots, also not representative of a mass fire.

Unfortunately, Reisner et al. did not report where the fire they simulated was located, fuel loading, fraction of fuels burned, fire energy release, or energy release rate when simulations were terminated so their results could not be duplicated. They have subsequently provided us with the target location and fuel loads, which is an important first step to assessing their results and recreating their fire simulation in other models.

Additionally, Reisner et al. chose several parameters for their fire model that could suppress the vertical development of fires including: a stable boundary layer, a dry atmosphere, and a short simulation time. A less stable boundary layer (such as a daytime convective boundary layer) would support more upward motion. Water vapor allows for latent heat release when clouds form. Numerous studies have shown that sensible and latent heat release is essential to lofting smoke in either firestorms (e.g., Penner et al., 1986) or conflagrations (Luderer et al., 2006). Reisner et al. stated “A dry atmosphere was utilized, and pyrocumulus impacts or precipitation from pyro‐cumulonimbus were not considered. While latent heat released by condensation could lead to enhanced vertical motions of the air, increased scavenging of soot particles by precipitation is also possible. These processes will be examined in future studies using HIGRAD‐FIRETEC.” By not considering pyrocumulonimbus clouds, which by the latent heat of condensation can inject soot into the stratosphere, they have eliminated a major source of buoyancy that would loft the soot. They seem to suggest that any lofting of soot would be balanced by significant precipitation scavenging, but there is no evidence for that assumption. In fact, forest fires triggered pyrocumulonimbus clouds that lofted soot into the lower stratosphere in August 2017 over British Columbia, Canada. Over the succeeding weeks, the soot was lofted many more kilometers, as observed by satellites, because it was heated by the Sun (Yu et al., 2019). This fire is direct evidence of the self‐lofting process Robock et al. (2007) and Mills et al. (2014) modeled before. It also shows that precipitation in the cloud still allowed massive amounts of smoke to reach the stratosphere.

Reisner et al. stated that their fires were of surprisingly short duration, “because of low wind speeds and hence minimal fire spread, the fires are rapidly subsiding at 40 min.” However, they do not show the energy release rate so that we can tell if the fuel has been consumed within 40 minutes. And their claims of low wind speed are erroneous, as they choose wind speeds higher than typically observed in Atlanta. Real‐world experience with firestorms such as in Hiroshima or Hamburg during World War II or in San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake (London, 1906), and of conflagrations, such as after the bombing of Tokyo during World War II (Caidan, 1960), suggests that a 40‐minute mass fire is a dramatic underestimate; most of these fires last for many hours. A longer fire would make available more heat and buoyancy to inject soot to higher altitudes. If their fire had a short duration, and did not simply blow off their grid, it was likely due to the low fuel load assumed in their target area and combustion that did not consume all of the available fuel.

The claim that observations and models of the effects of volcanic eruptions support their results is erroneous. They refer to a paper by Timmreck et al. (2010) who modeled the climate effects of the 74 BP Toba eruption, taking into account growth of sulfate aerosol particles due to large SO2 emissions. This process represents completely different physics than would apply to black carbon aerosols. Black carbon (soot) is black, and highly absorptive of sunlight, causing lofting to the upper stratosphere and prolonging the lifetime in the stratosphere by years. This was shown in all our modeling work and observed after the 2017 British Columbia pyrocumulonimbus event (Peterson et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2019). Soot aerosol particles grow as fractals, limiting the effects of mass on fall speed. Sulfate aerosols only weakly absorb sunlight, and their growth reduces their stratospheric lifetime. These differences do not support volcanic sulfate growth as an analog for soot in the stratosphere.

In summary, Reisner et al. (2019) modeled a fire in an area with much different characteristics than considered in our studies including the following:

targeting a sparsely populated suburb surrounding a country club, not a city center;

having a fuel load that is more than an order of magnitude less than any of the 100 urban areas of Pakistan or India considered by Robock et al. (2007) and Mills et al. (2014);

omitting factors known to be important to smoke lofting (e.g., latent heat release); and

failing to model the full duration of the event.

Because of these choices, they did not simulate firestorms, which would be expected in densely populated urban areas and are known to have high altitude smoke plumes. Critically, they have not shown that their model is capable of reproducing historic firestorms, thus making it impossible to interpret their failure to generate a classic firestorm. Reisner et al. do raise an important point that not all mass fires in a nuclear war will be firestorms; however, these mass fires cannot be assumed to be weak conflagrations, either. Accurate understanding of target locations, fuel loads, and the effects of meteorology on the fire and smoke injection heights are critical to understanding the climatic consequences of fires from a nuclear war. Fire models like HIGRAD‐FIRETEC can be valuable tools for studying these issues, but the case presented by Reisner et al. is not typical of the conditions that would be expected in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan and certainly does not represent an upper bound on these effects.

### A2 Plan Doesn’t Solve (Second Advantage)

#### 1] Extend Weidi – proves that nukes are a key issue in resolving US-Sino disputes. If the US disarms and proves that their intent in disarming is pure, then China has more incentive to pull back on arms sales meant to detriment America.

#### 2] Plan prevents Iranian nuke acquisition – China can’t lend them any material for construction, as it’s all disarmed.

#### 3] Plan solves circumvention – IAEA regulations are literally the best and prevent continued prolif by other nations.

### A2 No US-China War

#### US-China tensions rising now – aggressive actions escalate to nuke war

Polina Tikhonova 17, Reporter, MA from Oxford University, citing Bruce G. Blair, the National Bureau of Asian Research, and Union of Concerned Scientists, 7/27/2017, “If Trump Orders A Nuclear Strike On China, Here’s What Happens”, https://www.valuewalk.com/2017/07/trump-orders-nuclear-strike-china/

The fact that Trump now has the obedience of the U.S. Pacific Fleet chief in the hypothetical, yet possible, decision to launch nuclear strikes against Beijing makes the whole let’s-nuke-China scenario even faster and easier to execute.¶ Less than five minutes. This is the approximate time that would elapse from President Trump’s decision to launch a nuclear strike against China to shooting intercontinental ballistic missiles out of their silos, according to Bloomberg estimations. The publication, citing former Minuteman missile-launch officer Bruce G. Blair, also estimates that it would take about 15 minutes to fire submarine missiles from their tubes.¶ While the expert predicts that there might be some minor hiccups in the let’s-nuke-China scenario – like some of the top brass trying to talk Trump out of launching a nuclear strike – it appears that it would be easier for the President to nuke an enemy than expected now that he has the public support from the commander of the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet.¶ US vs China Tensions Rising, But Is Nuclear War Imminent?¶ The mere thought of a nuclear war between the U.S. and China – the world’s two biggest militaries – sounds intimidating. Amid strained relations between Washington and Beijing, and with Trump recently giving U.S. Navy more freedom in South China Sea, the territory that China considers vital to its national and security interests, the possibility of the two nations going to a nuclear war cannot be ruled out anymore.¶ With Trump pledging to rein in China’s aggressive territorial expansion in the South China Sea during his presidential campaign, the Trump administration has made quite a few moves that could be pushing the two nations to the point of no return. In May, Trump ordered the U.S. Navy to conduct a freedom-of-navigation operation in the disputed area, which Beijing claims in its entirety despite the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and Taiwan also claiming parts of the disputed region.¶ Earlier this month, the Trump administration sent an even scarier war message to Beijing to challenge its military buildup on the artificial islands in the South China Sea. A U.S. destroyer passed through the international flashpoint in the South China Sea, a move that prompted a furious response from Chinese President Xi Jinping, who warned his American counterpart of “negative factors” in U.S.-China relations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry lambasted the incident as a “serious political and military provocation.”¶ US vs China War Would Be ‘Disastrous For Both’¶ Just last week, Trump approved the Pentagon’s plan to challenge Chinese claims in the South China Sea, where Beijing has been actively building reefs into artificial islands capable of hosting military planes. Breitbart News’s Kristina Wong exclusively reported that the President approved the plan to check China over its ongoing militarization of and actions in the South China Sea, a move that will most likely further stain U.S.-China relations.¶ The latest heated exchange of hostile gestures between Beijing and Washington cannot but make experts wonder: what would happen if the U.S. and China went to war? That would be “disastrous for both sides – politically, economically, and militarily,” according to VICE citing senior vice president for political and security affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research, Abraham Denmark.¶ While the two nations continue working together to prevent a potential nuclear threat from China’s neighbor – North Korea – it seems like an even bigger nuclear conflict is brewing between Washington and Beijing.¶ ‘Increased’ Possibility of Nuclear War¶ In ValueWalk’s recent comparison of the U.S., Chinese and Russian militaries, it was concluded that the outcome of any war involving the U.S. and China is quite impossible to predict, as there’s no telling what would be the scope and duration of the military confrontation and if nuclear weapons would be used.¶ It’s also unclear if Russia would join forces with its arguably one of the biggest allies – China. If it did, China’s chances of winning a war against Washington would considerably soar. After all, there are plenty of potential flashpoints in the relations between Washington and Beijing, notably Taiwan and the South China Sea. The U.S. has in its possession about 6,800 nuclear warheads – the world’s second largest nuclear arsenal after Russia – while China has only 270 nukes, according to recent estimations by the Arms Control Association.¶ According to a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, published last year, the U.S. going to “nuclear war with China is not inevitable – but the possibility that it could occur has increased.” However, with Washington and Beijing not being able to find common ground on such a vital issue for China’s national and security interests as the South China Sea, and with Trump ordering more actions that further strain U.S.-China relations, the risk of nuclear war between the world’s two biggest militaries could skyrocket.

### A2 Spark

#### No superintelligence – tech barriers and diminishing Moore’s law means it’d happen slowly

Edward Moore Geist 8-9-2015; MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Is artificial intelligence really an existential threat to humanity? http://thebulletin.org/artificial-intelligence-really-existential-threat-humanity8577

In the 1950s, the founders of the field of artificial intelligence assumed that the discovery of a few fundamental insights would make machines smarter than people within a few decades. By the 1980s, however, they discovered fundamental limitations that show that there will always be diminishing returns to additional processing power and data. Although these technical hurdles pose no barrier to the creation of human-level AI, they will likely forestall the sudden emergence of an unstoppable “superintelligence.” The risks of self-improving intelligent machines are grossly exaggerated and ought not serve as a distraction from the existential risks we already face, especially given that the limited AI technology we already have is poised to make threats like those posed by nuclear weapons even more pressing than they currently are. Disturbingly, little or no technical progress beyond that demonstrated by self-driving cars is necessary for artificial intelligence to have potentially devastating, cascading economic, strategic, and political effects. While policymakers ought not lose sleep over the technically implausible menace of “superintelligence,” they have every reason to be worried about emerging AI applications such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s submarine-hunting drones, which threaten to upend longstanding geostrategic assumptions in the near future. Unfortunately, Superintelligence offers little insight into how to confront these pressing challenges.

#### Governments aren’t looking to fund geoengineering – the public is against it and too focused on renewables

Goodman, 2015 (Bryce Goodman, Clean Tech Entrpreneur, 02/17/2015 11:59 pm EST, “Geoengineering and the Fight Against Climate Change: An Interview with David W. Keith”, published by Huffington Post in partnership with Generation Change NRG, < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bryce-goodman/geoengineering-and-the-fi\_b\_6680948.html>)

Unsurprisingly, there are a number of uncertainties and undesirable side-effects with this plan and some [oppose even studying geoengineering](http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2015/02/nrc_geoengineering_report_climate_hacking_is_dangerous_and_barking_mad.2.html). To date, there has been no major publicly funded research program in geoengineering. However, while the NAS report concluded that deploying geoengineering now would be "irrational and irresponsible", it was broadly supportive of public research to improve "understanding of the physical potential and technical feasibility of geoengineering approaches". That's one of the things about geoengineering that is so striking: people aren't just against geoengineering practice, they're also against geoengineering research. I cannot really think of another scientific field where this is the case. Do you have a sense of why this is? Trying to do this kind of deliberate intervention is a step that is different from what humanity has done before. Of course you can argue that we have transformed the environment in all sorts of ways for agriculture, etc. But this is the first thing that is really planetary scale with a deliberate effect. Another part has to do with the very strong, politically motivated commitment by some people in the climate activist world to only talk about emissions mitigation. They want to talk about renewable energy and nothing else. And while I think that large scale use of renewables is a very sensible thing to do, I think that this attitude is a kind of dangerous monomania. [Steve Rayner](http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/people/who-are-we/steve-rayner/) has said it is like the Southern Baptist attitude towards sexual education--if you don't talk about it people won't do it. Geoengineering is relatively cheap--you've said [a program costing $1 billion a year could have substantial effects](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/scientist-david-keith-on-slowing-global-warming-with-geoengineering-a-934359.html). So in theory a single country--or wealthy person for that matter--could decide to start deploying this tomorrow. Should geoengineering only proceed with a formal treaty and the blessing of the UN? We need international dialogue and collaboration but I'm not sure we need a formal treaty. And if geoengeering does happen I think the dynamic will be very simple. Some countries will do it--likely not the US--other countries will publicly say "we decry these actions without a UN treaty" but privately be happy because someone else is taking the heat and they get the benefit. **So then what's holding you back on conducting your proposed research?** The government wont fund it. And I think it's important in a democracy that these experiments go through a proper external risk assessment with substantial public funding.

#### No grey goo

Ronald Bailey, 2003 Member of American Scientist for Bioethics and Reason Correspondent, The Limitless Promise of Nanotechnology) http://www.dimaggio.org/A-nanotechnology.htm

The fact is that no one has yet definitively shown that Drexler's vision of molecular manufacturing using nanoassemblers is impossible. So let's suppose Smalley and Roco are wrong, and such nanobots are possible. How dangerous would self-replicating nanobots be? One of the ironies of the debate over regulation of nanotechnology is that it was nanotech boosters like Drexler who first worried about such risks. To address potential dangers such as the uncontrolled self-replication envisioned in his gray goo scenario, Drexler and others founded the Foresight Institute in 1989. Over the years, Foresight devised a set of guidelines aimed at preventing mishaps like a gray goo breakout. Among other things, the Foresight guidelines propose that nanotech replicators "must not be capable of replication in a natural, uncontrolled environment." This could be accomplished, the guidelines suggest, by designing devices so that they have an "absolute dependence on a single artificial fuel source or artificial 'vitamins' that don't exist in any natural environment." So if some replicators should get away, they would simply run down when they ran out of fuel. Another proposal is that self-replicating nanotech devices be "dependent on broadcast transmissions for replication or in some cases operation." That would put human operators in complete control of the circumstances under which nanotech devices could replicate. One other sensible proposal is that devices be programmed with termination dates. Like senescent cells in the human body, such devices would stop working and self-destruct when their time was up. "The moratorium is not a new proposal," says Foresight Institute President Christine Peterson. "Eric Drexler considered that idea a long time ago in The Engines of Creation and dismissed it as not a safe option. With a moratorium, we, the good guys, are going to be sitting on our hands. It's very risky to let the bad guys be the ones developing the technology. To do arms control on nanotechnology, you'd better have better nanotechnology than the bad guys." Software entrepreneur Ray Kurzweil is confident that nanotech defenses against uncontrolled replication will be stronger than the abilities to replicate. Citing our current ability to reduce computer viruses to nuisances, Kurzweil argues that we will be even more vigilant against a technology that could kill if uncontrolled. Smalley suggests we can learn how to control nanotech by looking at biology. The natural world is filled with self-replicating systems. In a sense, living things are "green goo." We already successfully defend ourselves against all kinds of self-replicating organisms that try to kill us, such as cholera, malaria, and typhoid. "What do we do about biological systems right now?" says Smalley. "I don't see that it's any different from biotechnology. We can make bacteria and viruses that have never existed before, and we'll handle [nanobots] the same way."

#### No extinction – or cosmic rays would have destroyed us

Don Lincoln 2-10-2016; Don Lincoln, Senior Scientist, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory; Adjunct Professor of Physics, University of Notre Dame “Will the World's Largest Supercollider Spawn a Black Hole? (Op-Ed)” http://www.livescience.com/53669-can-particle-accelerators-spawn-black-holes-and-global-extinction.html

Luckily, we have the most compelling answer of all: Nature has been running the equivalent of countless LHC experiments since the universe began — and still does, every day, on Earth. Space is a violent place, with stars throwing off literally tons of material every second — and that's the tamest of phenomena. Supernovas occur, blasting star stuff across the cosmos. Neutron stars can use intense magnetic fields to accelerate particles from one side of the universe to another. Pairs of orbiting black holes can merge, shaking the very fabric of space itself. All of those phenomena, as well as many others, cause subatomic particles to be flung across space. Mostly consisting of protons, those particles travel the lengths of the universe, stopping only when an inconvenient bit of matter gets in their way. And, occasionally, that inconvenient bit of matter is the Earth. We call these intergalactic bullets — mostly high-energy protons — "cosmic rays." Cosmic rays carry a range of energies, from the almost negligible, to energies that absolutely dwarf those of the LHC. To give a sense of scale, the LHC collides particles together with a total energy of 13 trillion (or tera) electron volts of energy (TeV). The highest-energy cosmic ray ever recorded was an unfathomable 300,000,000 TeV of energy. Now, cosmic rays of that prodigious energy are very rare. The energy of more common cosmic rays is much lower. But here's the point: Cosmic rays of the energy of a single LHC beam hit the Earth about half a quadrillion times per second. No collider necessary. Remember that cosmic rays are mostly protons. That's because almost all of the matter in the universe is hydrogen, which consists of a single proton and a single electron. When they hit the Earth's atmosphere, they collide with nitrogen or oxygen or other atoms, which are composed of protons and neutrons. Accordingly, cosmic rays hitting the Earth are just two protons slamming together — this is exactly what is happening inside the LHC. Two protons slamming together. Thus, the barrage of cosmic rays from space have been doing the equivalent of LHC research since the Earth began — we just haven't had the luxury of being able to watch. Now one must be careful. It's easy to throw numbers around a bit glibly. While there are lots of cosmic rays hitting the atmosphere with LHC energies, the situations between what happens inside the LHC and what happens with cosmic rays everywhere on Earth are a bit different. Cosmic ray collisions involve fast-moving protons hitting stationary ones, while LHC collisions involve two beams of fast-moving protons hitting head-on. Head-on collisions are intrinsically more violent; so to make a fair comparison, we need to consider cosmic rays that are much higher in energy, specifically about 100,000 times higher than LHC energies. Cosmic rays of that energy are rarer than the lower energy ones, but still 500,000,000 of them hit the Earth's atmosphere every year. When you remember that the Earth is 4.5 billion years old, you realize that the Earth has experienced something like 2 billion billion cosmic ray collisions with LHC-equivalent energies (or higher) in the atmosphere since the Earth formed. In order to make that many collisions, we'd need to run the LHC continuously for 70 years. Given that we're still here, we can conclude that we're safe.

## 1AR – Counterplans

### CP – No First Use/Dealert

#### 1] Extend Johnson – proves that a] our understanding of Chinese doctrines are flawed due to the limited nature of the information available and b] that China has moved towards a more aggressive doctrine, indicating that even an NFU doctrine can escalate.

#### 2] Extend Dunn – US and China will just assume the worst and will strike at any perceived attack. Heightened by warhead ambiguity on both sides, which supercharges the solvency deficit on NFU

#### 3] NFU causes conventional shift – turns the cp

Tiwari 16 (Dr Neha Kumar Tiwari has completed her PhD from Centre of International Politics, Orgnisation, Disarmament and Diplomacy, “Put an end to the threat,” 8-9, <https://www.telegraphindia.com/1160809/jsp/opinion/story_101314.jsp>)

There has been an endless debate about whether the US should adopt the NFU approach or not. However, the main question is whether an NFU policy would be sufficient to end the mad race for nuclear weapons. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, the world has been caught in a cycle of nuclear proliferation which is difficult to end. An NFU declaration by the US would mean that the nation would depend more on its advanced conventional weapons to deal with threats. Mad race Obviously, the US has vast resources to spend on conventional weapons; its inventory includes technologically complex ballistic missile defence systems, prompt global strike systems and even smart conventional weapons which can almost be considered an equivalent to nuclear weapons in their destructive power, minus radiation. The idea behind the US's policy could be about spending more on weapons it can actually use, rather than investing in nuclear weapons which have become mere showpieces in strategic circles. On the contrary, other nations do not have the capability or the resources to spend excessively on conventional weapons in order to compete with the US. America's adversaries include big nations like China and Russia, and small ones like Iran and North Korea. These countries have obvious reasons to be wary of the US's superiority when it comes to conventional weapons. Both allies and adversaries of the US have already seen the role played by technologically superior conventional weapons during the first Gulf war. As a result, they will depend on nuclear weapons during any kind of conflict in order to deal with America's conventional superiority. Russia had mentioned that it would resort to its nuclear weapons - including the policy of de-escalation - to counter any conventional weapons threat. The result of all this would be an inadvertent nuclear arms race, which even the US's NFU policy would not be able to deal with. It is like a vicious cycle of proliferation from which the world cannot escape. Therefore, the declaration of an NFU policy alone will not end nuclear proliferation. In fact, the conventional domination of the US is an impediment to achieving success in nuclear disarmament. The answer to ending this cycle of proliferation is to put a limit on conventional weapons along with an NFU declaration. The issue of conventional weapons has seldom been debated or discussed at international fora. It is high time that such issues were paid attention, so that real disarmament can be achieved on the international front.

#### 4] NFU doesn’t work – doesn’t deconstruct norms about deterrence, meaning that NFU makes conventional warfare more likely. Also doesn’t solve the ill intent disad, meaning that China believes the US circumvents and launches anyway.

#### 5] De-alert doesn’t solve – doesn’t resolve the ill intent disad.

### CP – Asteroids

#### 1] Don’t buy their risk analysis – you shouldn’t vote for them if they’re not winning a scenario or a credible probability argument. Don’t make it the aff’s burden to do their weighing for them.

#### 2] No ! to asteroids—collisions are basically impossible, and it’s low magnitude anyway.

Feltman 19—Rachel Feltman, Science Editor (“We were not almost killed by an asteroid this week,” July 26th, *Popular Science*, <https://www.popsci.com/asteroid-close-earth-ok-2019/>)

"Scientists stunned by 'city-killer' asteroid that just missed Earth" is an awfully compelling headline. But it paints a much sexier—and scarier—portrait than the truth.

Let’s look at the facts. Did a big rock fly by Earth on Thursday morning? Yup: Asteroid 2019 OK is an estimated 187-427 feet across and moved at around 55,000 miles per hour. Did it catch scientists pretty much totally unaware? Yes indeed. Truly, they were shook. Did it “just miss” a collision with our planet? Yes and no.

When Asteroid 2019 OK careened through our neighborhood on Thursday, it came within 45,000 miles of Earth. That’s close, cosmically speaking; the moon is nearly 240,000 miles away. We don’t generally want big, smashy rocks coming closer to us than our own moon.

It might sound horrifying that this asteroid made such a close encounter, or like some serious scientific negligence must have occurred. Neither of these things is actually true.

For starters, asteroid strikes are a lot less scary than a headline can make them sound. Yes, you could dub 2019 OK a "city-killer" based on its size. A rock that large could cause serious harm to a city if it hit one. But according to experts, an asteroid at the lower end of 2019 OK's size estimate is only likely to hit our planet once every 1,000 years. An object on the high end of the size estimate only makes impact around once every 20,000 years.

And there's a reason we don't have tons of stories about less-than-city-killer-level asteroids walloping humans and their homes: rocks break up as they hurtle through our atmosphere, so they're much more likely to cause explosions in the sky (and potentially dangerous sonic booms) than leave craters in your backyard. When you factor in the fact that more than 70 percent of Earth is mostly-open ocean (and, while it's easy to forget if you live in the cities or 'burbs, that our landmasses are full of open spaces), the likelihood of a rock big enough to do damage hitting us, surviving entry, and then colliding with a populated area is infinitesimally small.

#### 3] Relying on nukes fails and causes fragmentation which independently cause extinction

Andrews ’19 - PhD in experimental volcanology, citing a study from Charles El Mir who researches asteroid destruction at Johns Hopkins

Robin George Andrews, “If We Blow Up an Asteroid, It Might Put Itself Back Together,” The New York Times, March 8, 2019, sec. Science, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/science/asteroids-nuclear-weapons.html>.

Faced with the prospect of a sizable asteroid heading toward Earth and causing doomsday, humanity has come up with various responses.

Hollywood may reckon that the best way to destroy an errant space rock is with nuclear weapons. This is [rarely the preferred option](http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20160510-what-we-would-actually-do-to-stop-a-doomsday-asteroid) of experts, but using some sort of spacecraft system to smash an asteroid into small, harmless pieces is seen as [a real-world possibility](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/National-Near-Earth-Object-Preparedness-Strategy-and-Action-Plan-23-pages-1MB.pdf). A new study, looking at a gigantic space rock-on-space rock clash, hints at how utterly ineffective this type of asteroid assassination attempt may be.

Using computer models, scientists simulated a 4,000-foot asteroid smashing into a 15.5-mile asteroid at 11,200 miles per hour. Immediately after colliding, the large asteroid cracked considerably, with debris flowing outward like a cascade of Ping-Pong balls. Despite some deep fractures, the heart of the asteroid was not comprehensively damaged.

As time went on, the gravitational pull of the asteroid’s resilient core was able to pull back ejected shards. It seems that asteroids don’t just absorb mind-boggling amounts of damage, but, as previous work [has hinted](https://www.aanda.org/articles/aa/abs/2013/06/aa21657-13/aa21657-13.html), they also are able to rebuild themselves.

Charles El Mir, who studies asteroid annihilation at Johns Hopkins University and is the paper’s lead author, said his findings “could be interpreted as an argument against ‘blowing up’ an asteroid as a defensive strategy.”

Asteroid collisions and demolitions have been simulated many times in recent decades. Earlier studies suggested that large asteroids are full of internal scars because of their violent history, and that a fast enough impact would completely shatter them.

The new study, published this month in the journal Icarus, tried a different simulation.

K.T. Ramesh, director of the Hopkins Extreme Materials Institute, said that Andy Tonge, a former graduate student, had developed a computational model that looked at how materials like bulletproof vests respond to impacts. Realizing that Dr. Tonge’s model could simulate asteroid impact events, the team merged it with another model that also replicated the effects of a large asteroid’s gravitational field.

This hybrid model allowed them to more realistically see how an asteroid responds to being hit by a powerful projectile. It captured previously missing but vital small-scale details, including where fractures would appear and precisely how they would spread.

Michele Bannister, a planetary astronomer at Queen’s University Belfast, described the research as “a nice upgrade on modeling the complex physical realities” of the solar system’s enigmatic rocky monsters.

The study has limitations. Both asteroids are modeled as simple, nonrotating chunks of rock, whereas real asteroids are far more variable. In addition, the larger asteroid, despite featuring a starting collection of cracks, did not have a history of multiple impacts as true asteroids would. A large space rock smashing into a humongous space rock also differs from a missile onslaught, or an atomic bomb exploding on or beneath an asteroid’s surface while a popular rock band plays.

The study doesn’t rule out using projectiles to destroy an incoming asteroid, Dr. El Mir said. But, he added, shattering a large asteroid may end up causing more problems than it solves. Turning a cannonball into shotgun-shell fragments could still result in Armageddon if the shards strike Earth.

NASA’s Planetary Defense Coordination Office, which keeps an eye on asteroids and comets that will one day pass close to Earth, instead suggests changing a space rock’s trajectory by giving it a small nudge well in advance of reaching our world. NASA and others aim to test this strategy in 2022 with the Double Asteroid Redirection Test, in which a spacecraft will deliberately crash into the smaller member of a binary asteroid system in an attempt to change its orbit around the larger body.

Ultimately, the choice between deflection and destruction largely depends on how quickly an incoming asteroid is spotted.

“A successful deflection becomes more difficult to execute as warning time decreases,” said Megan Bruck Syal, a planetary defense researcher at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. “For the shortest warning times, robust disruption and dispersal of the fragments may be the only viable option to prevent the impact.”

#### 4] No need for the CP – Russia can just do it.

#### PICs are a voting issue – 1] they moot the entire AC and force a 1ar restart creating a 13-7 time skew - kills reciprocity and fairness which is a voter since it’s constitutive of a competitive activity. 2] incentivizes debaters to find the most obscure and tiny parts of the lit that that are impossible for the aff to research and have little to no quality aff ground – also un-educational because it shifts the debate from the core of the topic to cheaty positions that avoid clash and engagement.

#### Vote for fairness and fairness outweighs education – it’s a gateway issue to clash, and only clash creates unique education in the debate space. Err aff on this substance – if we’re not winning the substance of this argument it’s because the position’s abusive

#### Drop the debater to deter them from further abuse and because the abuse has already happened – I had to spend a minute on this shell. Competing interps because they get more time and should have to defend their norm. No RVI’s – they can stick 6 min of answers to a short arg and win the debate.

### CP – US PIC

#### Problems with Kroenig don’t buy this claim and takes out all cp solvency – 1] Ev only works in the context of reductions, not elimination. Prefer ev specific to elimination because it is a completely different context 2] Discussions of being inferior is under the context of US and Russia reducing but not China – that’s not the plan. Everyone eliminates, making everyone equal. 3] Analysis of national security interests was from 1945 to 2001. That’s definitely not indicative of the current geopolitical landscape – don’t buy their claim. 4] The Kroenig evidence assumes that all nations still have access to a credible nuclear force – that’s not the case post-plan.

#### 1] The US exception independently turns the counterplan – destroys any credibility as far as international cooperation since everyone is skeptical of them – they were proponents of nuclear disarm but decided to keep theirs while the rest of the world disarmed.

#### 2] **US Heg leads to Southeast Asian conflict and destabilizes the region. Guarantees US-Sino war and turns the counterplan.**

#### Don’t let them read new impact ev in the 2NR – 13-7 neg time skew to explain the impact means they should be able to defend their impact card. If they can’t then they should just read better ev in the 1NC. 2NR impact restart chills educational impact debate due to 6 min dump of impact cards

#### PICs are a voting issue – 1] they moot the entire AC and force a 1ar restart creating a 13-7 time skew - kills reciprocity and fairness which is a voter since it’s constitutive of a competitive activity. 2] incentivizes debaters to find the most obscure and tiny parts of the lit that that are impossible for the aff to research and have little to no quality aff ground – also un-educational because it shifts the debate from the core of the topic to cheaty positions that avoid clash and engagement.

#### Vote for fairness and fairness outweighs education – it’s a gateway issue to clash, and only clash creates unique education in the debate space. Err aff on this substance – if we’re not winning the substance of this argument it’s because the position’s abusive

#### Drop the debater to deter them from further abuse and because the abuse has already happened – I had to spend a minute on this shell. Competing interps because they get more time and should have to defend their norm. No RVI’s – they can stick 6 min of answers to a short arg and win the debate.

#### Multi-plank fiat is a voter – 1] Predictability – multiplank fiat destroys predictability because it incentivizes debaters to read planks that can never be predicted. Predictability k2 fairness because it creates clash. 2] Time Skew – forces aff debaters to answer each plank independently in an already time-crunched 1AR. Destroys fairness through time skew – I don’t have enough time to answer each plank which means there’s no fair way to test the entire CP 3] Ground – explodes neg ground and aff prep burden. Reading multiple planks allows the neg to fit multiple DIFFERENT policy options under 1 argument, and explodes aff burden on already short 1AR. 4] Topic Ed – emphasizes breadth over depth and doesn’t allow for detailed discussion of policy options. Depth k2 education because then we would all be jack-of-all-trades and masters of none.

#### C/A voting issues and paradigm issues from PIC’s bad.

### 1AR – Condo Module

#### Conditionality is a voter – 1] Recirpocity – condo means they can kick the counterplan but I lose if I kick the AC. Recirpocity k2 fairness bc it ensures equal paths to the ballot. 2] Skew – they can just kick out of CP’s if I straight turn them or win any offense, which skews an already terrible 13-7 time skew. Time k2 fairness because we can’t make arguments without time – whoever has used their time more efficiently wins and shortchanging me with condo args eliminates any fair aspect. 3] Engagement – condo args encourage shifty debate where neg debaters decide to go for the most under covered argument while disregarding arguments that they lost. Engagement k2 education bc we won’t learn anything from a one-sided lecture of an issue. Clash is the only education unique to debate.

#### Vote aff for fairness and education – 1] debate is a game that requires a winner, and fairness is intrinsic in such activities. 2] education is the reason why schools fund debate.

#### Drop the debater to deter them from further abuse and because the abuse has already happened – I had to spend a minute on this shell. Competing interps because they get more time and should have to defend their norm. No RVI’s – they can stick 6 min of answers to a short arg and win the debate.

### 1AR – PIC’s Bad Module

#### PICs are a voting issue – 1] they moot the entire AC and force a 1ar restart creating a 13-7 time skew - kills reciprocity and fairness which is a voter since it’s constitutive of a competitive activity. 2] incentivizes debaters to find the most obscure and tiny parts of the lit that that are impossible for the aff to research and have little to no quality aff ground – also un-educational because it shifts the debate from the core of the topic to cheaty positions that avoid clash and engagement.

#### Vote for fairness and fairness outweighs education – it’s a gateway issue to clash, and only clash creates unique education in the debate space. Err aff on this substance – if we’re not winning the substance of this argument it’s because the position’s abusive

#### Drop the debater to deter them from further abuse and because the abuse has already happened – I had to spend a minute on this shell. Competing interps because they get more time and should have to defend their norm. No RVI’s – they can stick 6 min of answers to a short arg and win the debate.

## 1AR – Disadvantages

### DA – Deterrence

#### 1] Turn deterrence – That’s the Dunn evidence. Upholding a deterrence mindset is what is creating a situation of miscalculation between US and China. Without nukes, countries have no need to compile a deterrent to other nations.

#### 2] Empirics go aff – deterrence hasn’t prevented conflict and in some cases has caused escalation

**Wilson 8** (Ward Hayes Wilson is a Senior Fellow and director of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons project at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), a think tank focusing on nuclear disarmament based in London and Washington, D.C. "The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence," Nonproliferation Review, Vol 15 No 3, November 2008. <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/153_wilson.pdf>) *jsk*

The Uncertain Track Record of Nuclear Deterrence Some people try to make the case for nuclear deterrence not by explaining its theoretical basis but by simply pointing to its track record. They assert that nuclear deterrence prevented nuclear attacks for the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 and claim that that is proof enough of its efficacy. There are problems with this, however. In order to answer the question, ‘‘did deterrence work?’’ you must first be able to know whether your opponent had a fully formed intention to attack and then refrained from doing so because of your threat. Questions of intention, particularly the intention of world leaders\*who are typically reluctant to admit being thwarted in almost any circumstances\*are rarely documented, and when documentary evidence is present, difficult to judge. As George and Smoke note, ‘‘It is difficult . . . to identify cases of deterrence success reliably in the absence of better data on the policy calculations of potential initiators who were presumably deterred. Instances of apparently successful deterrence . . . may be spurious.’’39 There are also a number of other plausible explanations for the absence of war during this period. Most major wars are followed by periods, sometimes quite long 432 WARD WILSON periods, of relative peace. The hundred years following the Napoleonic wars were for the most part ones of peace in Europe. The period following the Thirty Years War also was strikingly pacific. Why does it make sense to attribute the peace following the Thirty Years War and the Napoleonic Wars to ‘‘war weariness,’’ ‘‘economic exhaustion,’’ or ‘‘domestic political distraction,’’ but the peace after World War II to nuclear deterrence? Consider, for example, the case of chemical weapons following World War I. The conditions necessary for deterrence with these weapons of mass destruction were present. In the early 1920s, Germany, England, France, Italy, Russia, the United States, and others possessed the means necessary (industrial capacity to mass produce the chemical agents, bombers with sufficient range and carrying capacity, naval ships capable of firing large shells over long ranges) to use chemical weapons against the densely populated coastal and interior urban centers of their enemies.40 Such attacks, properly planned and executed, could have killed hundreds of thousands. They would certainly have ranked on a par with the most deadly city attacks in World War II. Yet no standard histories of the post!World War I era ascribe the peace that was maintained during those years to a ‘‘delicate balance’’ of deadly weapons of mass destruction. We do not rush to give deterrence the credit for the peace of those years. If nuclear weapons are seen as preventing war from 1950 to 1980, why is it that chemical weapons are not seen as having prevented war for the seven years from 1918 to 1925?41 Locating the reason why an action or phenomenon did not occur, finding the cause of an absence, is always problematic. For example, I believe firmly that the garlic I wear around my neck has prevented vampire attacks. The proof, I say, is that no vampires have, as yet, attacked me. Yet objective observers might still be skeptical. The problem with the claim about deterrence is that although there were contingency plans on both sides, there is little evidence that either the United States or the Soviet Union was ever on the brink of launching an aggressive war against the other. There is certainly no evidence of such an action that was planned, agreed to, and then thwarted by the threat of nuclear counterattack.42 How is it possible to assert that deterrence prevented war without clear evidence that war was ever imminent? It might be argued that while there is no particular war that was abandoned because of deterrence, deterrence did engender a general mutual restraint both in normal diplomatic relations and during the numerous crises of the Cold War. It is true that the large nuclear arsenals in the United States and the Soviet Union induced caution during this period. Numerous memoirs of leaders on both sides attest to this fact. But this is not evidence that deterrence worked. The mutual caution of the Cold War is evidence that nuclear weapons are dangerous, not that they are effective weapons of war or useful for threatening. To understand this, imagine a counterfactual involving biological weapons. No one argues that biological weapons are ideal weapons. They are blunt instruments, clumsy and difficult to employ effectively. Targeting with precision is a particular problem, as the wind has an unfortunate tendency to blow in unexpected directions, and the biological agents can, under certain circumstances, blow back on your own troops or population. No one argues that biological weapons are decisive weapons of war, crucial for security. They argue instead that biological weapons are dangerous, clumsy weapons that are best banned. THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 433 Imagine, however, that following World War II the United States and Soviet Union had been armed with large arsenals of biological weapons mounted on missiles kept on hair-trigger alert. Is it difficult to believe that such arsenals would have induced caution on both sides? Yet we would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons were any less clumsy, difficult to aim, or difficult to control. We would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons are actually more militarily effective than we had previously thought. In the same way, nuclear weapons are dangerous (and induce caution) without being particularly effective. The caution on both sides during the Cold War is not proof of the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Although the successes of nuclear deterrence over the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 are speculative, its failures are not. Despite expectations to the contrary, the U.S. nuclear monopoly in the four years after World War II did not yield significantly greater diplomatic influence.43 Far from being cowed, the Soviets were very tough in post-war negotiations, culminating in the 1948 showdown over access to Berlin. Nuclear weapons also failed to give their possessors a decisive military advantage in war. The United States was fought to a draw in Korea and subsequently lost a war fought in Vietnam, despite possessing the ‘‘ultimate weapon.’’ The Soviet Union found that its nuclear arsenal could not prevent failure in its own guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Since Vietnam, the United States has fought in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.44 In none of these wars were its opponents intimidated into surrendering, nor could a practical use for nuclear weapons be devised. Against these failures are often offered a range of explanations. The enemy had an ally who possessed nuclear weapons, the war was not sufficiently central to the interests of the nuclear power to justify using weapons of last resort, and so on. These explanations, however, cannot account for the striking failure of deterrence in both the Yom Kippur War and the Falkland Islands War. Twice, during the Cold War, countries that had nuclear weapons were attacked\*were made war on\*by nations that did not have nuclear weapons. In both cases the threat of a nuclear retaliation failed to deter. How can these failures be accounted for? One of the benefits of deterrence is that it is supposed to protect against conventional assault. Yet in both these cases nuclear weapons failed to provide this protection. The case of Israel is particularly striking. Given the deep animus between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria, on the other, the repeated statements by various Arab spokesmen that Israel had no right to exist, and the resulting probability that Israel would interpret any attack as a threat to its very existence, the danger of a nuclear attack by Israel would seem to be far greater than in any instance of Cold War confrontation. Yet nuclear weapons failed Israel. They did not deter. In fact, they failed twice: neither Anwar Sadat, the leader of Egypt, nor Hafez al-Assad, the leader of Syria, was deterred.45 There is positive evidence that nuclear threats do not prevent conventional attacks, even in circumstances where nuclear deterrence ought to work robustly (extermination a possibility, implacable foes). Similarly the evidence provides little support for the notion that nuclear weapons provide diplomatic leverage. The only use for nuclear deterrence with no clear-cut failures (thankfully) is the claim that nuclear deterrence wards off nuclear 434 WARD WILSON attacks. Although the practical record does not indict this form of deterrence, the general theoretical objections to it still apply.

#### 3] Even if you win conventional war – preventing nuclear war outweighs on magnitude. That means the aff is still a net good if I’m winning a link scenario because it saves many more lives than the squo will.

#### 4] Nuclear Deterrence leads to the increase use of conventional war

**Navarro 16** (Peter, a distinguished keynote speaker and holds a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University. He has been a business professor at the University of California-Irvine for more than 20 years, “INTRODUCTION: CROUCHING TIGER - CHINA ACTS, AMERICA DITHERS” in “WARNING ORDER China Prepares for Conflict – and Why We Must Do the Same,” http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/China\_Warning\_Order\_PDF.pdf//NM)

As for the nuclear deterrence argument, Carnegie’s Ashley Tellis counters that China’s emergence as a credible nuclear power actually increases the risk of conventional war “because China has steadily acquired the capabilities to prevent the United States from coming to the assistance of its friends in Asia.” Toshi Yoshihara explains the stability-instability paradox underlying such risk: “If the Chinese can superimpose their anti-access strategy that might create strategic space for China to conduct conventional offensive military operations within the Asian maritime theater. And so, having nuclear weapons does not necessarily ensure that there will be no war. It simply opens up different avenues for different kinds of wars.”

### DA – CBW Prolif

#### 1] Countermeasures solve bioweapons but not nuclear war – that also deters states from using them even if countermeasures fail

Koblentz 15 [Gregory D. Koblentz is an associate professor and deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. He is the author Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Cornell University Press, 2009). The myth of biological weapons as the poor man’s atomic bomb. March 18, 2015. https://thebulletin.org/roundtable\_entry/the-myth-of-biological-weapons-as-the-poor-mans-atomic-bomb/]

The second major difference between nuclear and biological weapons concerns the availability of defenses. There are no effective defenses against the effects of a nuclear attack. There are, however, a number of countermeasures that can be taken before, during, and after a biological attack that can mitigate the consequences of such an attack. Masks and filters can prevent exposure to biological agents. Biological weapons are also unique in that vaccines can be used to protect soldiers and civilians before an actual attack occurs. Because diseases have an incubation period of days to weeks, defenders have a window of opportunity to detect an attack using sensors and biosurveillance systems. Early detection can trigger the distribution of medical countermeasures to treat the victims of an attack and there are already vaccines and /or treatments available for the most lethal diseases such as anthrax, plague, smallpox, and tularemia. As a result, the effects of a biological attack are not absolute and incontestable; they can be mitigated and limited by a well-prepared defender. This possibility is likely to reduce the confidence of states in their ability to reliably inflict unacceptable damage against an adversary in a retaliatory strike. The full panoply of defenses need not be deployed constantly at full readiness because the very availability of these defenses may be sufficient to dissuade a state from calculating that it can inflict unacceptable damage. Although civilian populations will remain more vulnerable to biological weapons than will military forces, damage limitation remains a viable option for larger, more advanced states facing less sophisticated adversaries.

#### 2] Bioweapons are better than nuclear weapons – less casualties, less efficient, and less reliable

**Horowitz and Narang 14**, “Poor Man's Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between "Weapons of Mass Destruction"” Author(s): Michael C. Horowitz ( Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, ) and Neil Narang ( 2 Department of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA 3 Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA) Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 3, Special Issue: Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (April 2014), pp. 509-535 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24545650> //GDS-MR

Additionally, most countries do not view CBWs as destructive enough to actually substitute for nuclear weapons. To this end, Zelicoff (2001) argues that the magnitude of destruction possible from chemical weapons means they are not WMDs 2 The historical record provides some support for this view. While the Germans achieved an important tactical breakthrough at the battle at Second Ypres in 1915, once both sides in World War I developed their own chemical arsenals and defenses, the weapons ceased to be decisive. Also, weather conditions such as sunlight and wind can heavily influence the relative effectiveness of chemical weapons (Hammond 1999,65). This makes them relatively unreliable in many cases. The difficulty of mating chemical weapons onto missiles also complicates perceptions of their relative effectiveness (Karp 1996). Even with the United States in World War I, when 26.8 percent of US casualties were due to chemical weapons, only 2 percent of those casualties died (Spiers 1994,4). Attempted uses of chemical weapons in the post-cold war era may also illustrate the difficulties involved in their delivery. When Aum Shinrikyo distributed sarin gas in the Japanese subway system in 1995, thousands were sent to the hospital but only twelve died (Tucker 2001). Similarly, biological weapons, while offering the possibility for massive destruction, also face a multiplicity of technical complications that potentially reduces their relative utility.3 First, biological agents are unlikely to survive for a long time in the open atmosphere, meaning they have to be delivered rapidly. Second, changing weather conditions could undermine the effectiveness of a BW attack (Panofsky 1998). Third, biological weapons would either have to be directly placed in a position to cause destruction, such as the poisoning of a water supply, or sprayed in the air above a city. This is harder to do than many realize and reduces the probability of a successful BW attack (Karp 1996). Finally, if proper warning and containment occur, passive defense measures can substantially cut into the impact of a BW attack (Office of Technology Assessment 1993,52). For these reasons, it is perhaps not surprising that the empirical record is mixed on the perceived effectiveness of biological weapons. For instance, the United States abandoned its offensive biological weapons program in the early 1970s, believing biological weapons did not provide a relative edge in combat. CBWs also have limited utility in counterforce usages against infrastructure and strategic targets. Since they are predominantly useful for generating casualties, they cannot substitute for the destructive counterforce power of nuclear weapons. Together, the substantial technical limitations of CBWs and the distinct patterns in their historical usage on the battlefield (smaller scale and often domestic threats) suggest that to some degree the three weapons may be treated as complements in Horowitz and Narang 515 states' overall weapons portfolio. If this supposition is accurate, the popular usage of the term WMD may obscure more than it clarifies, especially if it leads to a single WMD counterproliferation policy under the assumption that the demand for each type is driven by the same factors.

#### 3] Warrants in Narang are WRONG – 1] they don’t indicate that nations have an interest in shift it’s just an analysis of what the world would look like IF nations moved to the next WMD and 2] 1AC Brehm solves – disarm allows for global cooperation and peace and 3] We have a working treaty against the creation and use of bioweapons – no nation in their right mind is going to push for bioweapons.

### DA – Allied Prolif

#### 1] No Japan prolif

Terence **Roehrig 17**. Professor of National Security Affairs and the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group @ the U.S. Naval War College. 2017. “Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella; Deterrence After the Cold War.” Columbia University Press.

WOULD JAPAN EVER DEVELOP ITS OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS? The short answer to this question is “not likely,” though scholars disagree over the reasons.99 For years, analysts have spoken of a “nuclear allergy” in Japan resulting from World War II that prevented Japanese leaders from discussing nuclear weapons, much less consider acquiring them. Though constrained from discussing the issue publicly, Japan’s conservative leaders often discussed the issue privately, believing Japan must keep the option open.100 Yet for Japan to make the decision to go nuclear would require a drastic deterioration of its security environment accompanied by a collapse of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In many respects, a Japanese decision to head in this direction is what Campbell and Sunohara call “the ultimate contradiction.” Japan’s “standing as a non-nuclear nation is a virtual bedrock of the nonproliferation regime” yet “at the same time, suspicion and speculation have persisted that, given the right set (really the wrong set) of international and domestic conditions, Japan might seriously consider the nuclear option.”101 Japan clearly possesses the technology and infrastructure for a breakout through its extensive civil nuclear energy program should it desire to do so.102 Estimates of Japan’s necessary breakout time range from a few months to a year or two. The disaster that followed the March 2011 tsunami and nuclear catastrophe at Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant raised the possibility that Japan might permanently shut down its nuclear reactors and scrap its nuclear energy industry entirely, removing its breakout capability. Yet in the end, Japan remains committed to its nuclear energy program and in August 2015 restarted its first nuclear power plant since shutting them all down in 2011. A few months after the disaster, former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba stated, “I don’t think Japan needs to possess nuclear weapons, but it’s important to maintain our commercial reactors because it would allow us to produce a nuclear warhead in a short amount of time. It’s a tacit nuclear deterrent.”103 Maintaining a civilian nuclear program even after the tragedy at Fukushima has a clear connection to maintaining some level of nuclear breakout capability and nuclear deterrent. Referring to the LDP’s determination to maintain a nuclear energy program, Narushige Michishita argued, “What they are saying in a tacit manner is that 98 percent of our program is peaceful, but we have the potential for something else.”104 Japan would face some serious operational and political obstacles should it seek nuclear weapons. Japan’s people are concentrated in several densely populated urban areas that makes them very vulnerable to a nuclear exchange. To have an effective deterrent, Japan would need many weapons, and given Japan’s lack of geographical depth, there are few places to deploy these systems, making them vulnerable to a first strike. Acquisition of the necessary weapons systems, especially strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, would violate the constitution and the EDOP.105 Some disagree that nuclear weapons are acceptable as a defensive system used only for retaliation, and there would likely be a highly divisive debate in Japan should any government head in this direction under any but the most dire circumstances. Even in the wake of what many would argue is an increasingly aggressive China, Prime Minister Abe had a difficult time obtaining public support for a constitutional reinterpretation of collective self-defense. Finally, “going nuclear” would also entail leaving the NPT and damaging Tokyo’s reputation as a nonproliferation stalwart. Economic sanctions would likely follow, as well as restrictions on Japan’s nuclear industry.106 For all these reasons, Japan would incur a heavy cost, domestically and internationally, should it move to acquire nuclear weapons. Every time Japanese leaders have examined this possibility, they have acknowledged this reality and chosen instead to rely on the U.S. defense commitment. As one study notes, “In the context of the gulf between Japanese public opinion, which is largely ill-disposed toward nuclear weapons and security hawks at the elite level eager to push back against this ‘nuclear allergy,’ the END [extended nuclear deterrent] offered and continues to offer a neat and practical solution.”107 Thus, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. alliance and the nuclear umbrella while also slowly increasing its own conventional capabilities and leaving the door open for nuclear acquisition. In the end, Samuels and Schoff provide the most pointed analysis: “Although Japan’s nuclear hedging strategy is likely to continue in the near future, U.S. policy makers (and those throughout the region) should not be sanguine about this strategy continuing indefinitely. Japan’s choices will be determined ultimately by how well potential threats can be managed and by the strength of the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.”108

#### 2] South Korea will never acquire nukes – and multiple thumpers

Andrei **Lankov, 5-8**-2019, Professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, "Will South Korea Get Nuclear Weapons?," Valdai Club, http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/will-south-korea-get-nuclear-weapons/)SEM

On July 29, Cho Kyoung-Tae, one of the leaders of the Liberty Korea Party (LKP), went on record as saying that South Korea should give serious thought to developing a nuclear deterrent of its own. In actual fact, he said that an ideal solution would be to obtain America’s consent to the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons that were withdrawn in the early 1990s. If, however, the consent was not forthcoming, he said, South Korea should formally quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and start deploying its own nuclear missiles. The Liberty Korea Party is no marginal political group. Right now, the South Korean right-wing forces are in disarray but the LKP has a membership of three million and over 100 seats in parliament, which makes it the biggest right-wing conservative party and the main parliamentary opposition party. The question of South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons has been mooted for quite a while and, properly speaking, it was Seoul rather than Pyongyang that instigated a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula. In the early 1970s, the United States, influenced by the “Vietnam syndrome,” proclaimed the so-called Guam Doctrine that provided for a phased withdrawal of US forces from Asia. It was highly likely at that point that US troops would be withdrawn from South Korea as well. What is more, Washington was in fact considering this scenario. The then South Korean leadership was far from pleased with this turn of events, given that their entire strategy was based on a US military presence in the country. This is why Gen. Park Chung Hee’s government, on the one hand, took all conceivable diplomatic steps to prevent a US withdrawal, while on the other, launched a clandestine project to develop own nuclear weapons. The South Korean attempts of this kind soon ceased to be a secret and caused much concern in the United States. As a result, both governments reached a compromise in the late 1970s, with Washington promising to keep its military presence in South Korea and the latter pledging not to develop nuclear weapons. The compromise has held for 50 years, although over the last 10 or 15 years, many in South Korea have voiced discontent with the commitments Seoul assumed at that time. According to opinion polls, nuclear weapons are quite popular in South Korea, with 50 to 70 percent of respondents consistently supporting (for years!) the idea that their country should have a nuclear deterrent of its own. True, the polls reflect vox populi, whereas the political elites, until recently, had no nuclear ambitions. South Korea is an ideologically split society and the outlook of its left-wing nationalists (now in power) is a far cry from what their right-wing conservative opponents have in mind. Nevertheless, both flanks had a negative attitude to nuclear weapons. The South Korean right-wingers have taken a consistently – and I am even tempted to say a “radically” – pro-American position. For this reason, they, firstly, did not doubt (again, until recently) the reliability of the US “nuclear umbrella,” and, secondly, they were not prepared to do anything that would inevitably raise the ire of Washington. The left-wingers, on the contrary, are traditionally pacifist-minded and tend to believe that South Korea can cope with outside threats diplomatically, without recourse to military means or a deterrent. Moreover, they do not take the threat from the North so seriously as their right-wing opponents and for the most part are certain that the North Koreans will never use nuclear weapons against their kin. Nevertheless, some developments over the last two or three years could – at least at first sight – impel the South Korean establishment to change its attitude to nuclear weapons. One of these developments is the election of Donald Trump. After he assumed office in early 2017, Seoul, including its right-wing conservative elites, conceived doubts as to whether the United States was ready to perform its allied obligations under the new conditions. Contributing to these apprehensions are statements made by Trump himself, who is constantly displeased with both the system of US military-political alliances as a whole and the alliance with South Korea in particular. Second, North Korea’s technological breakthrough of recent years is also an important factor contributing to a change of sentiment in Seoul (at least on the right flank of South Korean politics). During 2017, North Korea tested two ICBM models capable of reaching targets on the North American continent and carried out successful tests of a thermonuclear charge. Work is also advancing on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), with North Korea ready to commission its second missile-carrying submarine. This means that the DPRK either already is or will soon become the world’s third country (after China and Russia) with the potential to wipe New York or Washington off the map. Under these circumstances, even the most pro-American members of the Seoul elite began asking themselves whether the United States would risk supporting South Korea if the cost of its interference in an inter-Korean conflict would be the death of millions of US civilians. In other words, South Korea is beginning to have doubts as to whether the US will be ready to sacrifice San Francisco to defend Seoul, while Donald Trump’s words and deeds only strengthen these misgivings. When the reliability of the main – and, in fact, the only – strategic ally is in doubt, the idea of creating one’s own nuclear deterrent begins to appear much more attractive than previously. Thus, it is clear why pro-nuclear sentiments have emerged among the South Korean right-wingers and why, taking into account the situation in which their country finds itself, this is quite logical. But does this mean that these plans can soon be translated into reality? Should we start being anxious about the “East Asian nuclear dominoes?” According to the “East Asian nuclear dominoes” concept, North Korea’s nuclear development effort may trigger a geopolitical chain reaction, with nuclear weapons being acquired first by Japan and South Korea, then by Taiwan, and later possibly by some Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam. All of these countries have the economic and technological potential to create and deploy their own nuclear deterrents within an acceptable timeframe. But most probably there is no cause for alarm and nuclear dominoes are unlikely to start falling in East Asia any time soon. Even if we assume that the South Korean conservatives (and the question of nuclear weapons is mooted only in the conservative camp, which is currently in opposition) will try to live up to their nuclear ambitions after coming to power in an election, they most likely are in for a failure. The obstacle to Seoul achieving its nuclear ambitions does not lie in technological or financial problems. There are no such problems for South Korea and it would take it a couple of years at the most to develop its own nuclear weapons. But if Seoul started working on nuclear weapons (which is frankly improbable), it would immediately face serious economic and political consequences which, more likely than not, would force it to change position and abandon its nuclear ambitions. By withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, South Korea would very probably lay itself open to international sanctions. For a number of reasons, on which we have no need to dwell, sanctions against South Korea would be less strict than those imposed on North Korea. Nevertheless, they would have a tangible impact on the country’s economic situation, given its strong dependence on international trade. China’s position will be an even more serious problem. Right now China is the country with the most reason to fear that the “nuclear dominoes” scenario in East Asia will become a reality. With the exception of South Korea, all countries in the region with the potential to acquire nuclear weapons of their own will do so primarily in order to contain China. For this reason, China must prevent the dissolution of the nuclear non-proliferation system in East Asia, for which purpose Beijing will stop at nothing, including operations by secret services, clandestine support for anti-nuclear groups in South Korea, and sabotage at research centers (if this seems like an exaggeration, please recall Israel’s reaction to the Iranian nuclear program). So, if and when South Korea’s putative nuclear project gets under way, the country will be subjected to the most severe Chinese sanctions. China may go as far as imposing a near total embargo on trade with South Korea. These sanctions will be a crushing blow for the South Korean economy, given that China accounts for nearly 23% of South Korean trade. International and particularly Chinese sanctions will inevitably result in a substantial deterioration in the country’s economic status. We saw something like this, albeit on a modest scale, in 2017, when Seoul allowed the United States to deploy its THAAD missile defense system on its territory and China in response introduced sanctions against South Korean companies. The sanctions were of a limited nature and included a restriction on the travel of Chinese tourists to South Korea and various “unofficial” obstacles for South Korean firms in China. Nevertheless, even this moderate action had a certain impact on the economy and proved a shock for the South Korean public. Eventually, the Moon Jae-in administration made concessions to Beijing. Any large-scale sanctions would cause a full-blown economic crisis and a perceptible drop in living standards. The resultant disaffection would be much greater than what came in the wake of those semi-symbolic moves that were undertaken in response to the THAAD deployment. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of South Koreans do not feel that their country is facing an existential threat or that its very existence is in question. With the exception of the right-wing conservative radicals, the people at large are surprisingly calm and relaxed with regard to the North Korean nuclear program. Seoul is certainly far from pleased with the fact that the neighboring hostile state has developed nuclear weapons, but the majority of South Koreans have no fear. Most of them are absolutely sure that North Korea will under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against its ethnic brothers. This certainty may be naïve but it is a political factor in its own right. This means that the ordinary South Korean voters, though theoretically supporting the idea of South Korea as a nuclear power, are not prepared to make considerable sacrifices for the sake of this goal. On the other hand, economic success is the criterion by which the South Korean public assesses the efficiency of any government. The Moon Jae-in administration has to become convinced of this once again as it sees the steady decline of its popularity ratings in the wake of a gradual deterioration in the economy. Therefore, the South Korean electoral reaction to a potential crisis provoked by international and Chinese sanctions would most likely be unequivocal. Outraged by a perceptible slide in living standards, voters would demand an immediate renunciation of the economically damaging and, from their point of view, hardly justified nuclear ambitions. If the ruling party refused to make concessions, its chances of winning the next election would drop to zero. In addition, the South Korean media, though extremely politicized, are not controlled by any single force, being equally divided between the left and right wings. Therefore, the right-wingers, even if they found themselves in a position of power, would hardly be able to carry out a proactive propaganda campaign in favor of the nuclear option. More likely than not, however, things will not go as far as this, since most Korean politicians are aware – or at least feel intuitively – that all attempts to create South Korea’s own nuclear potential are doomed to failure. There is every likelihood that all the talk about nuclear weapons, although reflecting the hidden hopes of many right-wing politicians, is just an additional means for bringing pressure to bear on Washington and the world community, a “soft blackmail” method, if you will. In this way, South Korea wants to elicit a more serious international attitude to the North Korean nuclear issue and is reminding the world that Seoul too can pose problems to the nuclear non-proliferation regime on a par with Pyongyang. Apart from that, the Korean rightists are hoping that this talk will impel Washington to strengthen the military alliance. For example, a group of US military experts, almost simultaneously with Cho Kyoung-Tae’s statement, made an informal proposal in a Joint Forces Quarterly article on US-South Korean joint control of a certain number of nuclear munitions. Agreements of this kind have long been in force with some NATO countries. In many respects, these ideas may be put forward in response to Seoul’s nuclear ambitions. This does not mean, of course, that the fears in connection with the “nuclear dominoes” scare, a geopolitical chain reaction in East Asia, are totally groundless. But there is no need to panic over such a turn of events in the near future. If, after all, the chain reaction does begin, Seoul is unlikely to be its hub, no matter what conservative South Korean politicians have been saying recently.

#### 3] Security commitments are collapsing

Lionel P. Fatton 18. Webster University Geneva, Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer. 2018. “‘Japan Is Back’: Autonomy and Balancing amidst an Unstable China–U.S.–Japan Triangle.” Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 264–278.

The credibility of American security commitments has weakened in recent years in the eyes of Tokyo, and this despite the pivot to Asia policy forged during the presidency of Barack Obama and seemingly embraced by President Donald Trump. The policy aims at guaranteeing the United States' interests and continuous engagement in Asia in the face of a rising China by allocating more resources to the region. Through the use of economic, diplomatic, and military instruments, Washington has devised incentives for China to develop into a peaceful and responsible power while making sure it remains ready for confrontation in case Beijing choses the belligerent path (Till, 2015). In other words, the United States has like Japan adopted a hedging strategy. This has not reassured Tokyo, however. Whatever the future shape of Sino‐American relations, cooperative or conflictual, uncertainty about American commitments is doomed to increase in Japan. If Sino‐American relations enter a confrontational cycle, Japan would become a frontline state in a struggle between the world's most powerful countries. Japan's geostrategic position and its role as the primary American ally in Asia would ensure Washington's sustained commitment to its defence. On the other hand, the United States' growing inability to project military power in East Asia and budget constraints would affect its credibility as Japan's protector. Put simply, Japan would be spared from the risk of being utterly abandoned but would face the prospect of buck‐passing by Washington, the country bearing the bulk of the costs of balancing against and of a potential conflict with China. The United States faces severe budget constraints to implementing the pivot to Asia, and in particular, its military dimension aimed at repositioning 60% of American air and naval forces to the region by 2020. This was reflected by the 2013 government shutdown, which quite symbolically led Barack Obama to cancel a tour in Southeast Asia. Another noticeable illustration occurred in March 2014 when Katrina McFarland, then U.S. Army's Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, said during a conference in Arlington that “right now, the Pivot is being looked at again, because candidly it can't happen” due to budget issues (Hwang, 2015, p. 158). Japan did not fail to interpret these and other signals as evidences that Washington encounters serious budgetary challenges to keep its words in regard to its ambitious plan toward Asia. The ability of the United States to defend Japan is also being jeopardised by the evolving geostrategic context. China has deployed a wide range of military assets, ballistic and cruise missiles in particular, that put American troops in East Asia at risks. Washington has responded to this growing vulnerability by reducing its military footprint in Northeast Asia and by dispersing American forces across the Asia‐Pacific region (Campbell, 2016). This is illustrated by the planned relocation of thousands of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Hawaii, Guam, and Australia. The development of long‐range strike and surveillance capabilities could reassure Japan about Washington's ability to fulfil its security commitments despite a regionally scattered force positioning. B‐1 and B‐2 bombers can, for example, operate in East Asia from Guam and even the continental United States while satellites can take over the target acquisition function of forward‐deployed radars (Calder, 2009). The reality is not that simple, however. China has developed a sophisticated anti‐access/area denial [A2/AD] strategy made of missiles, submarines, aircraft, and electronic warfare devices and dedicated to prevent the United States from projecting power in East and Southeast Asia. The Air‐Sea Battle concept formulated by the U.S. Navy and Air Force to overcome the Chinese strategy is unlikely to be sustainable as the balance of military technology tilts in favour of the defence. Stealth technology and electronic countermeasures cannot provide sufficient protection to strike capabilities while assets in outer space are vulnerable to earth‐based weapon systems, as exemplified by China's destruction of an ageing weather satellite with a ballistic missile in 2007. The evolving geostrategic context makes military operations in the defence of Japan increasingly costly for Washington and thus reduces the credibility of American security commitments (Hughes, 2014).

#### 4] Aff solves the disad – without US-Sino aggression, allies don’t need to fear a Chinese nuclear strike. This ensures no Allied prolif and makes the Southeast Asian region much more safe from prolif.

### DA – Defense Industrial Base

#### 1] Defense innovation slowing now – that destroys the LIO, military readiness and deterrence

Army Technology 18. Army Technology is the essential reading material for decision-makers in the defence industry. 3-29-2018, "Is the US military machine losing its innovation edge to China?," Army Technology, <https://www.army-technology.com/features/us-military-machine-losing-innovation-edge-china/> - AM

Innovation has been central to the US war machine since the end of WWII, and, by implication, to the success of the rules-based system that has governed international relations over the same period too. American advances in nuclear weapons technology in the 1950s made possible the ‘first offset strategy’ nullifying the Soviet superiority in conventional numbers, and when Moscow narrowed the gap, heavy ‘second offset’ investment in emerging stealth and smart weapons technologies ensured the US lead remained through the 80s and 90s. But what of the decades since? US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, warned in his speech at John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on 19th January, “our competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare, air, land, sea, space and cyberspace, and it is continuing to erode.” There is a growing consensus that the once-unassailable US technological advantage is fast fading, and might even soon be ceded to one of its rivals, probably China, in the course of renewed competition between ‘Great Powers’, the like of which the world has not seen for over half a century. On the face of it, it is hard to see why. The US has certainly not become any less innovative or technologically capable than either Russia or China; current Defense News data shows that the United States is home to no fewer than 15 of the world’s top 25 defence contractors, and according to Forbes, exactly the same holds true for technology companies too. The talent is evidently there – but this is a game as much about focus as capability, and US attention has been distracted. An era of distraction: the demands of asymmetric warfare In fairness, the Twin Towers was hardly an event to be simply ignored, but in launching its ‘War on Terror’, Washington suddenly and dramatically shifted focus onto a very different kind of adversary and the new and immediate demands of asymmetric warfare and counter-insurgency. “In launching its ‘War on Terror’, Washington shifted focus onto a very different kind of adversary.” At the same time ‘second offset’ technologies were proliferating around the world, resources that would otherwise have been allocated towards developing and cementing ‘third offset’ weapons, and capabilities to maintain military dominance, were instead expended in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the US focused on dismantling the terrorists’ networks, training camps and safe-havens, China steadily ramped up its defence investment and innovation, developing its own systems and technologies to equip its military for the 21st Century, and potentially challenge American hegemony in the Pacific. The irony is that, in many ways, the success of what Eisenhower dubbed the ‘military-industrial complex’, a success that first helped the US to global pre-eminence in the first place, has also brought about its current predicament. Could the model that seemed so right for so long, now be quite wrong? Consolidated dream teams and suffering competition “We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s weapons or equipment,” Mattis told his audience at John Hopkins, and yet in essence that is often what the Department of Defense (DOD) does when it comes to technological innovation. The DOD development blueprint was well-honed for the era in which it was devised, but it is now increasingly beginning to look as if it has become outmoded.

#### 2] Limited budgets sharply improve defense innovation and productivity– surplus cash inhibits it – best data

Ward 14. Dan Ward, Retired Lieutenant Colonel who was an acquisition officer in the US Air Force, where he specialized in leading high-speed, low-cost technology development programs. The author of LIFT (2019), The Simplicity Cycle (2015), and F.I.R.E. (2014). He has three engineering degrees. 04-29-2014, "FIRE: How Fast, Inexpensive, Restrained, and Elegant Methods Ignite Innovation," HarperCollins Publishers, <https://www.harpercollins.com/9780062301901/fire/> - AM

NASA has some of the best failure and success stories around, and the pages that follow present several of each. For that matter, the federal government does not have a monopoly here, and as the book progresses we’ll look at stories from the private world as well—portable music players, household appliances, and science toys, to name a few. But before we consider any particular stories, let’s look at the disparities among them in general terms. Why do some programs deliver their product under budget, while others see their costs expand by orders of magnitude? Why do some deliver ahead of schedule, while others experience endless delay after endless delay? And, most critically, which products work better—the quick and thrifty, or the slow and expensive? Which situation leads to superior equipment? After a few years of conducting informal research into these questions, I spent eighteen months at the Air Force Institute of Technology looking at them more rigorously. The pattern that emerged is this: the most successful project leaders from government and industry alike tend to deliver top-shelf stuff with a skeleton crew, a shoestring budget, and a cannonball schedule. In interviews I read and those I personally conducted, project leaders continually echoed one theme: “We had no time and no money. We were just lucky to have a small team of really creative, dedicated people and we got it done.” In contrast, project leaders who are cursed with large budgets, large teams, and long schedules generally have a difficult time delivering even a fraction of the promised capability, an outcome often blamed on an excessively cumbersome process. Interestingly, when faced with cancellation due to severe cost overruns and delays, these leaders typically respond, “If I had a little more time and money, I could fix this.” Yes, those who had the largest budgets were most likely to ask for more money and least likely to deliver an actual working product. Those with the smallest budgets were most likely to have cash left over after delivering ten pounds of awesome on a five-pound purse. For reasons we’ll examine shortly, the faster, cheaper stuff also tends to perform better in actual use than the slower, more expensive stuff. The idea that spending less time and money leads to better outcomes sounds a bit like claiming that moderate amounts of red wine and dark chocolate are good for you. Surely this is too good to be true. And yet, as with the aforementioned health benefits, the data is compelling. In the pages that follow, we’ll take a closer look at exactly when, how, and why the FIRE approach leads to superior equipment and products. Be forewarned: just because FIRE is possible does not mean it is necessarily easy to implement, but I’m sure you didn’t come here looking for easy answers. We haven’t said much about complexity yet, so let’s remedy that right now. Successful project leaders tend to place a premium on simplicity in their organizations, processes, documentation, and technologies. They tend to view simplicity as a desirable attribute and pursue opportunities to simplify when they are able. Later in the book we’ll see some tools that will help us do precisely that. FIRE codifies the practices, principles, and tools used by some of the best technology developers in the world—people who sent spacecraft on intercept courses with asteroids or who built fighter planes that dominated the skies of World War II. FIRE also describes the way clever toy designers teach science lessons that are actually fun. In the stories that follow, we’ll see that project leaders who embrace speed, thrift, simplicity, and restraint tend to deliver affordable equipment that is available when it’s needed and effective when it’s used. You’ll learn how to do that too. One final note: while improving one’s process might be a fun way to spend a sunny July afternoon, FIRE is emphatically not a process improvement initiative. Given the modern popularity of process improvement methodologies, that last sentiment bears repeating: FIRE is not about process improvement. The primary objective is to improve our objectives and outcomes rather than our processes. There is a tremendous difference between them. Clever project leaders should certainly make an effort to streamline, simplify, and accelerate their processes, but the bulk of their attention is rightfully spent on the product itself and on taking care of the people who make it. The reason for this is simple. Process-centric improvement efforts have a maddening tendency to be process-centric, despite official protests to the contrary. This myopic orientation frequently overshadows both the team members and the product itself, and instead focuses on delivering a set of lovely, full-color, hypothetical process flow diagrams that signify nothing. In contrast, FIRE is all about helping people make good decisions as we design and create new things. Accordingly, this book presents a set of practical heuristics—rules of thumb designed to help actual people make good decisions. These little guidelines don’t dictate behavior; nor do they represent a step-by-step formula. Good luck trying to build a process flow diagram out of them. Instead, the heuristic approach echoes Visa CEO Dee Hock’s explanation of how he succeeded in founding the Visa credit card association: “We have no precise plan, only a clear sense of direction.” Before we get to the guidelines themselves, we need to take a closer look at the four components of FIRE, to see how they combine to foster that “clear sense of direction.” F Is for Fast The F in FIRE stands for fast, which says it’s important and good to have a short schedule. It’s about defining a project objective that can be satisfied on a short timeline, not one we know full well will require twenty years to accomplish. Now, the precise definition of “short timeline” will naturally vary from context to context. Some applications might deliver new capabilities every day and be considered hopelessly slow if they clock in on a monthly schedule, while for others, delivering in a year would represent a world-class commitment to speed. For military technology, a 2008 report from the Government Accountability Office says “system development should be limited to about five years,” and anything longer than that probably counts as “slow.” The point is, there is some amount of time that represents rapid delivery, so aim for that. Being fast means we don’t try to solve problems by adding days to the schedule. As the book progresses, we’ll look at some strategies for speed to help us accelerate our development timelines and to solve problems using more thoughtful techniques than simply asking for more time. The key is to treat he schedule as a constraint to be lived with, not as a starting point to be extended later. Although process improvement is not a central aspect of FIRE, it does have something to say about process. Specifically, FIRE proposes designing our organizations and processes with speed in mind and remaining on the lookout for opportunities to remove speed bumps from the process. This is where process improvement techniques can come in handy. The difference is that FIRE treats these techniques as tools rather than goals, as mechanisms to help achieve a larger objective rather than an objective to be pursued for its own sake—as so often happens in process-centric approaches. As a general rule, speed is good. Slow kills. Speed fosters stability within a program and reduces our exposure to the forces of change. Speed enhances accountability and learning for the team members. Speed increases the likelihood that the product will be well aligned with both the market’s interest and the available technologies. But here is the twist: we must not be content with the superficial appearance of speed, where we appear to be moving quickly but are in fact spinning our wheels or running in the wrong direction. Nor should we pursue speed at the expense of doing good work. This means no cutting corners, no skipping essential steps in the development process. The project is only fast if we do quality work on a short timeline. For example, most of the time we still need to design, document, and test the thing we are building. Rather than skipping those activities entirely or accomplishing them halfheartedly, FIRE offers ways to perform each essential step with speed in mind. So a performance test may only take a minute instead of a year, and it may be performed simultaneously with other activities, but failing to do any tests at all is not what we have in mind when we talk about being fast. Remember the lesson from the famous race in Aesop’s fable: the tortoise was faster than the hare because he got to the finish line first. So by all means, be fast. But don’t be hasty. There is also a big difference between being fast and being frantic. Fast is about speed with discipline, focused speed that efficiently moves us from where we are toward where we need to go. Frantic activity, in contrast, spins in circles and creates the appearance of rapidity without actually producing much in the way of forward momentum. Running around like a chicken with its hair on fire is the antithesis of productive action, no matter how exciting it might feel. I Is for Inexpensive The I in FIRE—for inexpensive—says it’s important to have a small budget. That may be an unpopular position in an environment in which budgets equal prestige, but in my experience I’ve found that the ability to deliver meaningful capabilities on a shoestring is actually a widely respected skill, even in the cash-rich defense business. Ask yourself: Would you rather be known as the person who manages a $50 billion project that is late or over budget, or the guy who makes great things happen without busting the bank? Which one do you think makes a better impact? Who sleeps better at night—the guy in charge of building the second Death Star, which is so far behind schedule it requires a Sith Lord to straighten things out, or Q, the head of James Bond’s quartermaster division, who always has a freshly tweaked vehicle ready for Her Majesty’s secret agent to take on his next mission? Being inexpensive is about designing our organizations and processes with thrift in mind and solving problems with intellectual capital instead of financial capital. It’s about setting program goals that can be satisfied on lean budgets and finding thrifty ways to perform even the expensive-sounding functions. The key is to treat the budget as a constraint, not a starting point to be expanded later. It’s a ceiling, not a floor.

#### 3] Be skeptical of my opponents authors – the MIC is paying journalists and researchers off to write favorably of the DIB in order that they may not be the next NRA.

#### 4] You should be skeptical of their claims – the DIB is bad for our defense sector because it doesn’t prioritize national security.

Cockburn 19 [Andrew Cockburn, Harper Magazine, "[Letter from Washington] The Pentagon Syndrome, by Andrew Cockburn | Harper's Magazine", June 2019, https://harpers.org/archive/2019/06/the-pentagon-syndrome/] **Tfane23**  
Scholarly commentators and pundits generally shrink from ascribing base pecuniary motives to the military-­industrial complex. Thus, one recent academic study of the reasons behind declining force numbers finds the answer in “an American cultural disposition favoring technology,” suggesting that our military leadership is driven to pour funds into technologically complex weapons systems, thereby skimping on troops’ basic needs, by some innate cultural imperative. The reality would seem to be somewhat simpler: the MIC has a compulsion to demand and receive more of our money every year. Contrary to common belief, this imperative does not mean that the budget is propelled by foreign wars. Rather, the wars are a consequence of the quest for bigger budgets. Recently, the Pentagon even proposed a war budget that won’t be spent on a war. The proposed 2020 budget includes $165 billion for “Overseas Contingency Operations” (O.C.O.), a special category invented in 2009 to support ongoing wars, rather as if a police department demanded extra money for catching criminals. In previous years, large chunks of this money have been quietly diverted to more urgent Pentagon priorities, such as funding new weapons programs. But now the diversion has become official—­the budget request acknowledges that $98 billion of the ­O.C.O. money is for routine “base requirements,” rather than fighting abroad. In other words, it’s all about the Benjamins. Understanding this fundamental fact makes it easier to understand the decisions underlying our defense policy. Why, for example, was the Seventh Fleet sent to sea on unnecessary deployments with shorthanded crews and broken equipment? The answer, according to an investigation by ­ProPublica, was that senior officials in Washington, led by Ray Mabus, secretary of the Navy throughout the Obama presidency, and the chief of naval operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, were determined to funnel as much money as possible into building more ships, a decision that proved quite profitable for politically influential shipyards. Why do we maintain a vulnerable land-based missile force as well as an invulnerable submarine-­based one? Because eliminating the Air Force’s ICBMs would entail a severe blow to the Air Force budget and defense contractors’ balance sheets. We’re left with a fighting force that needs to rely on loved ones for vital needs such as armor and night-­vision goggles, while we throw hundreds of millions of dollars at exotic contraptions such as the Compass Call N­OVA, a completely dysfunctional aircraft tasked with detecting I.E.D.s. The pattern such boondoggles follow is predictable: the services insist that new weapons are needed to replace our rapidly obsolescing fleets. Inevitably, unforeseeable and rapid enemy advances require new and more “capable” weapons, costing 50 to 100 percent more than their predecessors. The presumption that more capable weapons must cost more generally goes unquestioned, despite the fact that prices for more advanced personal computers and other civilian technologies have moved in the opposite direction. Once budgets for an optimistically priced new weapon are approved by the Pentagon leadership and Congress, a program schedule is devised so that no single failure to meet a deadline or pass a test can threaten the flow of funding. In addition, the contract, inevitably of crushing complexity, is designed to ensure the contractor gets paid to cover any and all technical and management failures, which generally guarantees another doubling or tripling of the cost beyond the originally inflated estimate

### DA – Nuclear Renaissance

#### 1] Nuclear will generate as much carbon dioxide as coal, nuclear industry underestimates

Sovacool 08 **[Dr.** Benjamin **Sovacool , July 15**, 2008, Jakarta Post, p. 6 (Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool is a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization, part of the distinguished Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.]

Opponents of nuclear power have responded in kind. In their calculation, Australian researchers have estimated that wind turbines have one-third the carbon equivalent emissions of nuclear power over their lifecycle and hydroelectric one-fourth the equivalent emissions. **The Oxford Research Group projects that if percentage of world nuclear capacity remains what it is today, by 2050 nuclear power would generate as much carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour (kWh) as comparable gas-fired power stations. One new study published in the August 2008 issue of the peer-reviewed journal Energy Policy attempts to answer this question by screening 103 lifecycle studies of greenhouse gas equivalent emissions for nuclear power plants.** The study attempts to identify a subset of the most current, original, and methodologically rigorous studies. **Researchers calculated** that while the range of emissions for nuclear energy over the lifetime of a plant reported from qualified studies examined is significant, **the mean value is about 66 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kWh** (gCO2e/kWh). **The frontend component of the nuclear fuel cycle** (uranium mining, milling, and enrichment) **is responsible for 38 percent of equivalent emissions. Decommissioning and plant operation, including the use of fossil-fueled generators to backup nuclear plants when they offline for servicing, account for 35 percent. The backend of the fuel cycle, which includes storing spent fuel and fuel conditioning, account for 15 percent of the emissions, and plant construction is responsible for 12 percent**. **This average-66 grams of carbon dioxide for every kWh-is staggeringly high compared to what the nuclear industry has reported. It also shows, conclusively, that nuclear energy is in no way "carbon free" or "emissions free,"** and that nuclear power is worse than the equivalent carbon emissions over the lifecycle of renewable and small scale distributed generators. To provide just a rough estimate of how much equivalent carbon dioxide nuclear plants emit over the course of their lifecycle, a 1,000 MW reactor operating at a 90 percent capacity factor will emit the equivalent of 1,427 tons of carbon dioxide every day, or 522,323 metric tons of carbon dioxide every year.

#### 2] The warrants on Muralidharan are pitiful – 1] 1NC Goldstien indicates that government support is critical for nuclear resurgence – Muralidharan doesn’t have a single case that shows explicit government support for nuclear power. 2] Space travel warrants are so bad – there’s no empirics for probability and the ev is just theorization.

#### 3] Nuclear power hurts indigenous populations and waste creates increased chances for cancer

Adebagbo ‘18 Adebagbo, Oluwaseun, Education Program Assistant at Stanford University School of Medicine. “Environmental Injustice: Racism Behind Nuclear Energy.” Stanford University. March 26, 2018. <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2018/ph241/adebagbo1/>

Nuclear power plant **(NPP**) reactors produce low-level ionizing radiation, high level nuclear waste, and are likely to lead to catastrophic contamination events. Power generated from NPPs produce nuclear waste that should kept away from humans for thousands of years. **[1]** The key concern **in NPP accidents** is when radioactive elements escape from the core into the environment. **[2] (See Fig. 1 for example of a power plant.)** Communities living near NPPs are alsoexposed to possible soil and water contamination. **[1]** Risks presented by NPP can have multigenerational effects on people and communities in close proximity to these power plants. **There are three key forms of environmental justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, and recognition justice.** According to Rawls theory of distributive justice, it is unjust for disadvantaged populations to bear further harms from the placement of nuclear power facilities un**less they derive special benefits**.Communities where **certain** disadvantaged populations (such as low income and minority groups) reside are where the U.S. stations waste facilities. **[3]** Environmental racism combines public policies and industry practices to provide benefits for whites while shifting the costs to people of color. **[4] Low-income and Minorities Disproportionately Impacted In a study done by Kynes,** there was a larger percentage of African Americans living within the 50 mile radius of NPPs, while there was a larger percentage of whites living outside the 50 mile radius. **[1] An example of this can be found from Warren County, the Savannah River nuclear facility. This facility which is a source of radioactive leaks, is located in a predominantly African American community in South Carolina. [3] Minorities communities are unequally more impacted by the NPP than white communities.** Minority and poverty-level communities often include higher percentages of women and children and both are more sensitive to ionizing radiation, yet most radiation standards are created to only protect adult males. **[5]** Despite the lack of consent from Indigenous peoples, NPP use their lands for uranium mining/processing. Indigenous people have been harmed by working in unregulated uranium mines or by exposure to uncontrolled uranium wastes on native lands. Uranium mining and milling on reservation lands in the Black Hills and Four Corners regions, are primary examples of nuclear colonism and racism. **[4]** In the U.S., Native-American uranium miners, face 14 times the normal lung-cancer risk

### DA – Hypersonics

#### 1] Don’t buy their hypersonic hype – defense mechanisms are out there.

Venable and Abercrombie 19 [Heather Venable and Clarence Abercrombie, War on the Rocks, "Muting the Hype over Hypersonics: The Offense-Defense Balance in Historical Perspective", May 28, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/muting-the-hype-over-hypersonics-the-offense-defense-balance-in-historical-perspective/] **Tfane23**  
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of hypersonics, which do, in fact, permit the development of defensive countermeasures. While hypersonic weapons travel at an extremely fast rate of approximately 2 miles per second, the speed of the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile, they still pale in comparison to the speed of directed energy weapons (which travel at the speed of light, 186,282 miles per second). Directed energy weapons such as lasers and high-power microwaves are gaining traction because they address the threat of hypersonics with an unconventional approach. Throughout history, militaries have tried to defeat weapons by creating the next most advanced version of those weapons. If one country created a missile capable of traveling 10 miles, another country would create a missile capable of traveling 20. However, with directed energy weapons, the approach is to defeat the technology that makes these advanced weapons so threatening. Lasers are capable of destroying targets using a focused beam of energy, while high-power microwaves are an invisible wave of electromagnetic energy capable of frying microprocessors. Hypersonic weapons are fast, but they are not instantaneous. Thus, when used against moving targets beyond certain distances, the weapons lose effectiveness as the target’s speed increases and its size decreases. Such limitations require most hypersonic weapons to have some form of onboard guidance, which in turn necessitates electronic circuits to do computations and make guidance adjustments. These circuits are highly susceptible to high-power microwave damage. Additionally, the beam width of high-power microwaves is significantly wider than that of a weaponized laser, which requires less time to be used for targeting. Although lasers are extremely effective, when it comes to countering hypersonic weapons, they are limited by line of sight, limited range, and power requirements. For this reason, when talking about defending against hypersonic weapons, high-power microwaves are the more logical choice. Additionally, because hypersonic weapons are so fast, they struggle with maneuvers in the final seconds against small fast-moving targets. This is due to maneuverability limitations at high speeds. Hypersonic weapons, therefore, are most effective for large and slow-moving or stationary targets, such as an aircraft carrier. Areas outfitted with high-power microwaves could provide area denial capabilities for high-value target areas against hypersonic weapons. Using the equations provided in a University of Maryland study of high-power microwave technology, a source power of 9.5 megawatts could deliver the power density required to damage a hypersonic weapon at a target 25 miles away. This would be about 12.5 seconds prior to the missile reaching the transmission site, assuming the hypersonic weapon is traveling directly toward it. This may not seem like a long time, but the slightest change in trajectory in anything traveling at those speeds would result in a drastically different termination point. For example, an angular change of half a degree would result in a miss distance of 1,150 feet. Additionally, depending on the fusing method, high-power microwaves may also be able to prevent the weapon from fusing and, ultimately, deny detonation.

#### 2] No nuclear retaliation – their ev is in the context of a pre-plan world and assumes that Russia thinks hypersonics are targeted at nuclear weapons. Make them read ev that is post-plan – anything else doesn’t apply.

#### 3] Nanotech doesn’t risk extinction – It can’t spread through the air

Dyson 03Freeman J. Dyson 03, Professor of Physics Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, 2-13-2003 New York Review of Books 50:3 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16053

It is easy to demonstrate that the details of the story are technically flawed. Consider for example the size of the nanorobots. In a commercial presentation advertising the Xymos medical diagnostic system, Julia says, "We can do all this because the camera is smaller than a red blood cell." The camera is one of her nanorobots. It must be as small as that, since Julia describes it swimming in the human bloodstream inside the capillaries that carry blood through the lungs. The capillaries are only just wide enough for red blood cells to pass through. But **later in the book Jack encounters swarms of nanorobots** chasing him in the open air like a swarm of ants or bees. These nanorobots are flying through the air as fast as he can run. **Fortunately** for Jack and unfortunately for the story, **the laws of physics do not allow very small creatures to fly fast. The viscous drag of air or water becomes stronger as the creature becomes smaller. Flying through air, for a nanorobot the size of a red blood cell, would be like swimming through molasses for a human being**. Roughly speaking, the top speed of a swimmer or flyer is proportional to its length. A generous upper **limit to the speed of a nanorobot flying through air or swimming through water would be a tenth of an inch per second, barely fast enough to chase a snail**. For nanorobots to behave like a swarm of insects, they would have to be as large as insects.

## 1AR – Kritiks

### K – Overview

#### [1] Lemme weigh the aff against the k – a] it moots 6 min of offense and forces me to restart in the 1AR with a 13-7 time skew AND time skew is the biggest link to fairness because you need time to make arguments. b] it’s not educational to exclude aff impacts because it denies education on material conditions of the world.

#### [2] Permutation: do the plan and the alternative--The permutation solves best: Methodological pluralism creates critical reflexivity and sustainable critique.

Bleiker 14 [Roland Bleiker 2014 (professor of international relations at the University of Queensland) INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique, 2014. Retrieved May 26, 2016 from EBSCOhost.] **Tfane23**

Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine’s sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101-102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructural deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine’s approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### [3] No root cause claims

**Thompson et al 13**

Jack S. Levy, Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly, "The Decline of War? Multiple Trajectories and Diverging Trends", International Studies Review, 2013, accessed: 18 July 2019, 15, pp. 396-419, R.S.

If true, we would have a unified theory of violence. Pinker subsequently steps back from this expansive claim. He notes that some other forms of violence— including homicides, lynchings, domestic violence, and rapes—do not fit a power law model, suggesting that the mechanisms driving these practices differ from those driving international war. Still, there are others who have insisted on a unified theory of violence. Examples might include Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of aggressive instincts as a root cause of war (Einstein and Freud 1933), frustration-aggression theory (Durbin and Bowlby 1939), and contemporary rational choice theories. We are highly skeptical. We fear that any theory broad enough to explain violence at the levels of the individual, family, neighborhood, communal group, state, and international system would be too general and too indiscriminating to capture variations in violence within each level, which is a prerequisite for any satisfactory theoretical explanation. It is difficult to imagine an explanation for great power war, or interstate war more generally, that does not include system-level structures of power and wealth, dyadic-level rivalries, and domestic institutions and processes. All but the latter contribute little if anything to an explanation of homicides and domestic violence. It is not even clear whether different kinds of organized warfare—hegemonic wars, interstate wars, colonial wars, and civil wars—can be explained with a single theory. In fact, the theoretical literature on interstate war and civil war remains for the most part two distinct literatures, with little overlap in their respective analyses of the causes of war.9 Exceptions include the concept of the security dilemma (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the increasingly influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995), which cut across both literatures. International relations scholars are even divided on the question of whether different kinds of interstate wars can be subsumed under a single theory. A 1990 symposium addressed the questions of whether big wars and small wars had similar causes and whether a single theory could account for both.10 Whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1990) argued that an expected utility framework can explain all kinds of wars, Thompson (1990) argued that system-level structures of power and wealth differentiate big wars from small wars.11 The closely related question of whether the outbreak and spread (expansion) of war are driven by the same or different variables and processes was the subject of another recent symposium (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011). Our skepticism about the utility of a unified theory of violence or war is reinforced by the systematic and rigorous evidence Pinker provides about the trends in different forms of violence over time.

#### AND, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that proves a material obligation to affirm or negate

**Status quo debate shuts down conversations about everyday violence—only focus on material violence that creates spaces for finding solutions is productive and ethical.**

**Curry ’14**

Dr. Tommy J, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Affiliated Professor of Africana Studies, and a Ray A. Rothrock Fellow at Texas A&M University; first Black JV National Debate champion (for UMKC) and was half of the first all Black CEDA team to win the Pi Kappa Delta National Debate Tournament. “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century.” 2014. IB

Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics **when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other.** In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “**ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics)**; [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” **At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively.** Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. **This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures** which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. **Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like.** At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics.’ How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### AND permutation double bind – either the alt is strong enough to solve any residual link or it can’t solve the aff so it can’t solve for everything.

### K – Security/Militarism

#### The aff should weigh case against the material consequence of the alt. Any other framework moots the 1AC and leaves the aff structurally behind, decreasing quality and depth of discussions.

#### Epistemology and Ontology not 1st and cedes politics

Jarvis 2K (D.S.L., Lecturer n Government - U of Sydney, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF POSTMODERNISM, p. 128-9)

Certainly **it is right** and proper **that we** ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations**, engage in epistemological** and **ontological debate**, and **analyze** the sociology of our **knowledge.** **But to suppose** that **this is the only task** of international theory, **let alone the most important one, smacks of** intellectual **elitism and displays** a certain **contempt for** those who search for guidance in their **daily struggles** as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project his deconstructive efforts, or valiant tight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed and destitute? **How does it help solve** the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, **the casualties of war,** or the emigres of death squads**?** Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rarionality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But **to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or** is in some, way **bad—**is a contemptuous position that **abrogates any hope of solving** some of the **nightmarish realities that millions confront** daily. Holsti argues, **we need ask** of these theorists and these theories tne ultimate question, “**So what?”** **to what purpose do they** deconstruct **problematize, destabilize**, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches**?** **Does this** get us any further**, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition?** **In what sense** **can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of** **epistemology and** **metaphysics**" **be judged** pertinent relevant **helpful**, or cogent **to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract** and recondite **debate.**

#### Prefer particularity – we’ve identified conflicts coming in the SQ– prefer the specificity of the aff’s impacts over their root cause claims

PRICE ’98

(RICHARD PRICE is a former prof in the Department of Anthropology at Yale University. Later, he moved to Johns Hopkins University to found the Department of Anthropology, where he served three terms as chair. A decade of freelance teaching (University of Minnesota, Stanford University, Princeton University, University of Florida, Universidade Federal da Bahia), ensued. This article is co-authored with CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT – Monash University – European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 1998 via SAGE Publications – http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~courses/PoliticalScience/661B1/documents/PriceReusSmithCriticalInternatlTheoryConstructivism.pdf)

One of the central departures of critical international theory from positivism is the view that we cannot escape the interpretive moment. As George (1994: 24) argues, ‘the world is always an interpreted “thing”, and it is always interpreted in conditions of disagreement and conflict, to one degree or another’. For this reason, ‘there can be no common body of observational or tested data that we can turn to for a neutral, objective knowledge of the world. There can be no ultimate knowledge, for example, that actually corresponds to reality per se.’ This proposition has been endorsed wholeheartedly by constructivists, who are at pains to deny the possibility of making ‘Big-T’ Truth claims about the world and studiously avoid attributing such status to their findings. This having been said, after undertaking sustained empirical analyses of aspects of world politics constructivists do make ‘small-t’ truth claims about the subjects they have investigated. That is, they claim to have arrived at logical and empirically *plausible* interpretations of actions**,** events or processes**,** and they appeal to the weight of evidence to sustain such claims. While admitting that their claims are always contingent and partial interpretations of a complex world, Price (1995, 1997) claims that his genealogy provides the best account to date to make sense of anomalies surrounding the use of chemical weapons, and Reus-Smit (1997) claims that a culturalist perspective offers the best explanation of institutional differences between historical societies of states. Do such claims contradict the interpretive ethos of critical international theory? For two reasons, we argue that they do not. First, the interpretive ethos of critical international theory is driven, in large measure, by a normative rejection of totalizing discourses, of general theoretical frameworks that privilege certain perspectives over others. One searches constructivist scholarship in vain, though, for such discourses. With the possible exception of Wendt’s problematic flirtation with general systemic theory and professed commitment to ‘science’, constructivist research is at its best when and because it is question driven, with self-consciously contingent claims made specifically in relation to *particular* phenomena, at a *particular* time, based on *particular* evidence, and always open to alternative interpretations. Second, the rejection of totalizing discourses based on ‘big-T’ Truth claims does not foreclose the possibility, or even the inevitability, of making ‘small-t’ truth claims. In fact, we would argue that as soon as one observes and interacts in the world such claims are unavoidable, either as a person engaged in everyday life or as a scholar. As Nietzsche pointed out long ago, we cannot help putting forth truth claims about the world. The individual who does not cannot act, and the genuinely unhypocritical relativist who cannot struggles for something to say and write. In short, if constructivists are not advancing totalizing discourses, and if making ‘small-t’ truth claims is inevitable if one is to talk about how the world works, then it is no more likely that constructivism per se violates the interpretive ethos of critical international theory than does critical theory itself.

#### Perm do both – Repoliticizing critical theory requires connecting it with concrete political realities – hegemonic forces in academia depoliticize theoretical developments

**Kurki 11** – (7/7, Milja, International Politics Department, Aberystwyth University, UK, “The Limitations of the ‘Critical Edge’: Reflections on Critical and Philosophical IR Scholarship Today,” Millennium)

We must of course note at the outset that it might be somewhat unrealistic to expect critical theory to directly contribute towards a better world ‘out there’. As Herbert Marcuse pointed out, critical theory ‘possesses no concepts which could bridge the gap between present and its future; holding no promise and showing no success, it remains negative’.3 Yet, this is not the only interpretation of the role of critical theory. Indeed, I argue that critical and philosophical theorising in IR can and should be reunified, re- concretised and re-politicised. I suggest that not only were philosophical and critical theoretical strands more closely connected to each other in the past, they also had much greater interest in bringing philosophical and critical reflections to bear on real-world political developments. It is these trends we need to recapture in order to resist the increasing structural and disciplinary pulls towards conformism and conservatism, even among critical theorists. At present, as academic professionalisation, disciplinisation and fragmentation take effect, philosophical debates in IR are increasingly depoliticised and abstract and critical theory increasingly offers many divergent but internally rather insular theoretical visions. I suggest that the ‘academic success’ of philosophical and theoretical agendas, or their increasing diversity, is not necessarily progressive in IR, nor emancipatory for the world at large.4 This article will proceed in three steps. Firstly, I ask: is there a dearth of critical and philosophical research in IR? As the first section of this article shows, the answer is ‘no’: some of the most famous and productive authors today are critical and philo- sophical theorists. Yet, I also point out some worrying trends in these literatures. Not only is philosophical research increasingly removed from critical theory, but critical theory itself is becoming fragmented. Also, as is evident from the lack of change in the international sphere, the critical theoretical research does not seem to be particularly effective in imparting critical knowledge or change on society. The reasons for the movement towards depoliticisation, fragmentation and poor effectiveness are pon- dered in the next section. I suggest here that the failures of critical theory could origi- nate from many causes. They could be suggestive of failures of critical thinking per se. Alternatively, the problems may be disciplinary, structural or strategic. I argue that a hegemonic set of forces in academia and in society at large may be successful in hindering and silencing the critical edge of philosophical and theoretical work in IR. This contributes to a set of strategic failures in critical theorists’ engagements with concrete political practice. In the third section, I argue that to address the praxaeological failures not only should academics seek closer interaction with real-world political struggles5 – perhaps most urgently in challenging the dominant forms of positivism in global gov- ernance practice today – but also that, through various slight reorientations in theorising, critical and philosophical interventions in IR can be re-politicised, brought back closer together and reinvigorated.

#### The alt fails – even if discourse focus is important, reality exists and their meta-theoretical philosophizing disables action – this card is specific to debate

Lipschutz 11 (Ronnie Lipschutz, Professor of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, “Cal Round Robin – Policy,” video, post-round criticism of the final round of the California Round Robin at the College Preparatory School in Oakland, CA, in which the Georgetown Day School went for a Foucaultian critique of knowledge production against Damien High School’s conventional deterrence affirmative, February 18, transcribed by Josh Clark, debate coach at the University of Michigan, <http://nfltv.org/2011/02/24/cal-round-robin-policy/>)

RONNIE LIPSCHUTZ: Well, many, many years ago…one day when I was reading the San Francisco chronicle, I clipped a little phrase. I’ve never been able to find it, but it was something like, one of the emperor Fredricks said, “The surest way to ruin your country is to put it under the charge of college professors.” I have to say that I am now fully convinced of the truth of that statement. But since I have been charged here with taking on the philosophical side of things, I want to make a few points about – in particular the negative arguments – but also I think about the affirmative. I’m not a debater, by the way, so I don’t quite understand what’s been going on. But what I think in particular is a problem is, first of all, we have incommensurate conceptual categories going on here; that the affirmative is taking a very narrow policy question and proposing a change to it. The negative then raises these questions of epistemology and ontology which, in a way, are not obviously confronting the policy question which, and I agree with Erin, is very, very narrowly construed. I mean, there was no question about – well, let me put it this way: that although there was a discussion of the virtues of the alliance with Japan, it was largely taken as a given, and therefore of course that causes a problem, and by taking this epistemological and ontological approach, it is…ships passing in the night. And then, of course, the theory question came up and that, I thought, was problematic for both sides. A couple of things I want to say: the first one is that social constructions can kill. And I think this is a very important thing to remember that, threats can be socially constructed but threats, social constructions have material components, and they are aimed in particular directions. So the fact that something is a social construction or is epistemologically and ontologically questionable does not mean that there aren’t missiles being deployed, and that those missiles are not going to go off . These arguments are, I think, operating at a somewhat different space, and it does raise the question: how is it that we judge what is a threat in the first place? And of course we have nuclear friends and nuclear enemies. You ought to ask the question, “Why is it that Great Britain has nuclear weapons and yet there is nobody, as far as I know, that is planning a war with Great Britain?”. Now I could be wrong about this, since the Pentagon probably has plenty of analysts who have nothing to do. ERIN SIMPSON: They make Powerpoints. LIPSCHUTZ: Yeah, they make Powerpoints. So that, then, of course raises some of these epistemological questions. Which, I think if you want to somehow deploy the stuff that it seems like, sadly, I have said somewhere, it is important to take that much more carefully into account. The other thing that I am struck by is that I’ve become in recent – in the last year or so – a great fan of Pierre Bourdieu. All of these guys, all of my "friends" that you were citing – though I don’t consider Mearsheimer a friend – as I listen to this I think, “What patent nonsense it is that they are basically spouting.” But this is the way that the academic realm goes. I mean, it’s attack and counter-attack. And, I think you have to be very careful, again, in interrogating. So, if you’ve got to be critical, you should be very critical of those who are critical, to ask what is the politics behind the critique. Because there are politics in all of this. Not just politics in the policy—interests and all kinds of deeply imbedded commitments, which are impossible to change. If you watch Congress in action right now, you can see that. But also that there is a kind of…I mean it is – academics is war by other means, I guess, to take a leaf from both Clausewitz and Foucault. Anyway, to go back to Bourdieu. Bourdieu, who’s a sociologist who died several years ago, has a very interesting approach to some of these things which is oriented around practice. What are the practices that groups and societies engage in, and how do we understand those practices reinforcing normative beliefs and policies and approaches. And if you really are interested in “how do things change?,” you have to look at how practices change rather than intellectual arguments on the one hand or arming to the teeth on the other. So perhaps I would encourage, if you are to go on with debate, you should probably take a look at Bourdieu. I’m done.

## 1AR – Theory

### A2 E – SPEC

#### 1] We meet – delineated text solves.

#### 2] We meet – we eliminate nuclear arsenals, which means we get rid of them.

#### 3] Counterinterp: Aff can spec enforcement issues without a solvency advocate.

#### A] Innovation: solvency advocate means that we can never try anything new in debate. Destroys education bc we’re stuck to the same forms of elimination which means we don’t leand anything that we don’t already know. Hurts fairness as well – limits aff ground while incentivizing neg prepout on all enforcement mechs.

#### 4] Counterinterp: Neg debaters must not read E – SPEC unless they have clarified intent and aff spec issues in cross. Independent voter on fairness – encourages arbitrariness on spec issues. Neg debaters read e – spec even if aff debaters are ok to change their stance to fit neg interps – this arg is just a ballot grab. As an educator, you should prevent cheap shot victories and allow for theory to be used as a way to check actual abuse and not to get easy w’s.

#### On their shell:

#### A] Holdren justifies an independent we meet – elimination is considered an independent clarification of intent as per the first line. Proves that we solve the enforcement crisis and the resolution semantically provides a consensus.

#### B] No ground offense – they read circumvention anyway and incentivizes a crazy aff prepout on enforcement.

#### C] Shell is bidirectional – there’s no way we met bc they’ll just read “don’t spec” with semantics justifications and win that way. Be very skeptical of the norm they want.

#### D] Semantics first – we have an obligation to be topical first before adhering to “norms”

#### E] Impact turn – interp encourages hyperspecific plan writing and blows up neg prep burden. Turns the ground advantage.

### A2 T – Nebel

#### 1] Counterinterp – Aff may spec a state.

#### A] Stable advocacy: Whole rez incentivizes aff shiftiness on neg links. Moving targets wreck fairness because they cause 2NR restart with 7-6 aff time skew. Turs fairness – we need time to make argument and only an equal time allocation solves.

#### B] Field context – no single nuclear disarm policy exists and most topic lit is centered around single scenarios – the neg’s norm doesn’t endorse an real-life educational model of this topic.

#### Pragmatics come first – 1] most people prep from the wiki as a stasis point, not the res 2] No point in doing something if semantics make it impossible to do. 3] Topic lit and disclosure solve.

#### Depth over breadth – the aff is good bc it forces us to delve completely into a specific topic. We get more nuanced education from this aff than whole rez which will be spread all over the place.

#### 2] We meet – the aff is a subset of the bare plural, which means we affirm a bare plural.

#### On their shell –

#### Err aff—they most likely misinterpreted bare plurals

Reiter and Frank ’10 (Nils Reiter and Anette Frank Department of Computational Linguistics Heidelberg University, Germany, July 2010. “Identifying Generic Noun Phrases” <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5078/2fb22573c8b612743aade2d3e0b241f8ae0f.pdf>)

The above classification of generic expressions is well established in traditional formal semantics (cf. Krifka et al. (1995))2. As we argue in this paper, these distinctions are relevant for semantic processing in computational linguistics, especially for information extraction and ontology learning and population tasks. With appropriate semantic analysis of generic statements, we can not only formally capture and exploit generic knowledge, but also distinguish between information pertaining to individuals vs. classes. We will argue that the automatic identification of generic expressions should be cast as a machine learning problem instead of a rule-based approach, as there is (i) no transparent marking of genericity in English (as in most other European languages) and (ii) the phenomenon is highly context dependent. In this paper, we build on insights from formal semantics to establish a corpus-based machine learning approach for the automatic classification of generic expressions. In principle our approach is applicable to the detection of both generic NPs and generic sentences, and in fact it would be highly desirable and possibly advantageous to cover both types of genericity simultaneously. Our current work is confined to generic NPs, as there are no corpora available at present that contain annotations for genericity at the sentence level. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces generic expressions and motivates their relevance for knowledge acquisition and semantic processing tasks in computational linguistics. Section 3 reviews prior and related work. In section 4 we motivate the choice of feature sets for the automatic identification of generic NPs in context. Sections 5 and 6 present our experiments and results obtained for this task on the ACE-2 data set. Section 7 concludes. 2 Generic Expressions & their Relevance for Computational Linguistics 2.1 Interpretation of generic expressions Generic NPs There are two contrasting views on how to formally interpret generic NPs. According to the first one, a generic NP involves a special form of quantification. Quine (1960), for example, proposes a universally quantified reading for generic NPs. This view is confronted with the most important problem of all quantificationbased approaches, namely that the exact determination of the quantifier restriction (QR) is highly dependent on the context, as illustrated in (3)3. (3) a. Lions are mammals. QR: all lions b. Mammals give birth to live young. QR: less than half of all mammals 3Some of these examples are taken from Carlson (1977). c. Rats are bothersome to people. QR: few rats4 In view of this difficulty, several approaches restrict the quantification to only “relevant” (Declerck, 1991) or “normal” (Dahl, 1975) individuals. According to the second view, generic noun phrases denote kinds. Following Carlson (1977), a kind can be considered as an individual that has properties on its own. On this view, the generic NP cannot be analysed as a quantifier over individuals pertaining to the kind. For some predicates, this is clearly marked. (1.a), for instance, attributes a property to the kind lion that cannot be attributed to individual lions. Generic sentences are usually analysed using a special dyadic operator, as first proposed by Heim (1982). The dyadic operator relates two semantic constituents, the restrictor and the matrix: Q[x1, ..., xi]([x1, ..., xi] | {z } Restrictor ; 9y1, ..., yi[x1, .., xi, y1, ..., yi] | {z } Matrix ) By choosing GEN as a generic dyadic operator, it is possible to represent the two readings (a) and (b) of the characterising sentence (4) by variation in the specification of restrictor and matrix (Krifka et al., 1995). (4) Typhoons arise in this part of the pacific. (a) Typhoons in general have a common origin in this part of the pacific. (b) There arise typhoons in this part of the pacific. (a’) GEN[x; y](Typhoon(x);this-part-of-thepacific( y)^arise-in(x, y)) (b’) GEN[x; y](this-part-of-thepacific( x);Typhoon(y)^arise-in(y, x)) In order to cope with characterising sentences as in (2.a), we must allow the generic operator to quantify over situations or events, in this case, “normal” situations which were such that Erd˝os took amphetamines. 2.2 Relevance for computational linguistics Knowledge acquisition The automatic acquisition of formal knowledge for computational applications is a major endeavour in current research 4Most rats are not even noticed by people. 41 and could lead to big improvements of semanticsbased processing. Bos (2009), e.g., describes systems using automated deduction for language understanding tasks using formal knowledge. There are manually built formal ontologies such as SUMO (Niles and Pease, 2001) or Cyc (Lenat, 1995) and linguistic ontologies like Word- Net (Fellbaum, 1998) that capture linguistic and world knowledge to a certain extent. However, these resources either lack coverage or depth. Automatically constructed ontologies or taxonomies, on the other hand, are still of poor quality (Cimiano, 2006; Ponzetto and Strube, 2007). Attempts to automatically induce knowledge bases from text or encyclopaedic sources are currently not concerned with the distinction between generic and non-generic expressions, concentrating mainly on factual knowledge. However, rulelike knowledge can be found in textual sources in the form of generic expressions5. In view of the properties of generic expressions discussed above, this lack of attention bears two types of risks. The first concerns the distinction between classes and instances, regarding the attribution of properties. The second concerns modelling exceptions in both representation and inferencing. The distinction between classes and instances is a serious challenge even for the simplest methods in automatic ontology construction, e.g., Hearst (1992) patterns. The so-called IS-A patterns do not only identify subclasses, but also instances. Shakespeare, e.g., would be recognised as a hyponym of author in the same way as temple is recognised as a hyponym of civic building. Such a missing distinction between classes and instances is problematic. First, there are predicates that can only attribute properties to a kind (1.a). Second, even for properties that in principle can be attributed to individuals of the class, this is highly dependent on the selection of the quantifier’s restriction in context (3). In both cases, it holds that properties attributed to a class are not necessarily 5In the field of cognitive science, research on the acquisition of generic knowledge in humans has shown that adult speakers tend to use generic expressions very often when talking to children (Pappas and Gelman, 1998). We are not aware of any detailed assessment of the proportion of generic noun phrases in educational text genres or encyclopaedic resources like Wikipedia. Concerning generic sentences, Mathew and Katz (2009) report that 19.9% of the sentences in their annotated portion of the Penn Treebank are habitual (generic) and 80.1% episodic (non-generic). inherited by any or all instances pertaining to the class. Zirn et al. (2008) are the first to present fully automatic, heuristic methods to distinguish between classes and instances in the Wikipedia taxonomy derived by Ponzetto and Strube (2007). They report an accuracy of 81.6% and 84.5% for different classification schemes. However, apart from a plural feature, all heuristics are tailored to specific properties of the Wikipedia resource. Modelling exceptions is a cumbersome but necessary problem to be handled in ontology building, be it manually or by automatic means, and whether or not the genericity of knowledge is formalised explicitly. In artificial intelligence research, this area has been tackled for many years. Default reasoning (Reiter, 1980) is confronted with severe efficiency problems and therefore has not extended beyond experimental systems. However, the emerging paradigm of Answer Set Programming (ASP, Lifschitz (2008)) seems to be able to model exceptions efficiently. In ASP a given problem is cast as a logic program, and an answer set solver calculates all possible answer sets, where an answer set corresponds to a solution of the problem. Efficient answer set solvers have been proposed (Gelfond, 2007). Although ASP may provide us with very efficient reasoning systems, it is still necessary to distinguish and mark default rules explicitly (Lifschitz, 2002). Hence, the recognition of generic expressions is an important precondition for the adequate representation and processing of generic knowledge. 3 Prior Work Suh (2006) applied a rule-based approach to automatically identify generic noun phrases. Suh used patterns based on part of speech tags that identify bare plural noun phrases, reporting a precision of 28.9% for generic entities, measured against an annotated corpus, the ACE 2005 (Ferro et al., 2005). Neither recall nor f-measure are reported. To our knowledge, this is the single prior work on the task of identifying generic NPs.

#### On Limits – 1] you still get access to disads like deterrence and CBW, which means you can engage. 2] Overlimiting bad – don’t force me to read 1 aff for the rest of my senior year. 3] Limits bad – there are 9 affs on the topic that’s not much at all. 4] TVA doesn’t solve – you can link out of the advocacy to avoid any advantage debate, which moots the 1AC.

### A2 T – Extra

#### We meet – the fiat implementation of the resolution.

#### Counter Interp: The aff may specify a method of implementation

#### Prefer for field context – there are infinite methods of implementation such as disarmament, detonation, etc. Aff specification means we can have an actual debate on actual methods of implementation and promotes education about the mechanisms of the topic.

Prefer additionally for **Policymaking education– we learn about how enforcement of policies works in the real world. Vague affs get rolled back by implementers since they don’t know how to implement it AND states don’t follow.**

#### Perkovich and Acton 09 (George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons a debate”, Carnegie Endowment. 2009. <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf>. AH)

**Enforcement** Many contributors to this volume acknowledge the salience and difficulty of the enforcement challenges we raise in chapter 4. Some who criticize us for underemphasizing the benefits of abolition or focusing too much on obstacles do not actually address how these enforcement problems can be resolved. It seems inescapable that the potential to authorize use of force, and to muster effective instruments of coercion, would be necessary to secure a world without nuclear weapons. In this vein, Schell and Pan rightly criticize us for paying too little atten- tion to the problem of enforcing a nuclear weapon prohibition if one of the major military and economic powers, for example the United States or Russia, were found in noncompliance. We noted that smaller economic and military powers would feel inhibited from undertaking economic sanctions or military action against a great power, but the issue deserves greater consideration. States that now rely on their own nuclear deterrents or extended nuclear umbrellas against larger powers would need to be convinced that reliable means would exist to deter or defeat a larger adversary that breaks out from a nuclear weapon prohibition. 322 **| George Perkovich and James M. Acton** Some might argue that the major military powers would be the least likely to violate a nuclear weapon prohibition, because they would have adequate conventional military power to deter aggression against them- selves or those whose security they guarantee. Yet, if conventional military balances among the major powers—say, the United States, Russia, and China—were not managed to give each confidence in its sufficiency, one or more of these powers could be tempted under duress to take measures that could raise questions about compliance. Obviously this is a circular dynamic: The major powers would not agree to eliminate their nuclear arsenals if their relations and military balances were not stable. Still, in the near to medium terms, the history of moves to abrogate or violate arms control agreements, as occurred when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Russia was found not to have elimi- nated all its biological weapons as required under the Biological Weapons Convention, have to be overcome. Zedillo advances the enforcement discussion thoughtfully in his analy- sis of the impediments posed by the veto mechanism in today’s Security Council. He argues persuasively that “[t]here is no obvious reason why an enlarged Security Council would inherently be more functional than the present one.” Functionality—effectiveness—would be determined more by the rules of the council’s decision making. “[F]ailure to accomplish veto reform,” Zedillo writes, “would leave the abolition process in a dead end.” Raghavan makes an elliptical point that “India would be unlikely to find it in its interests to join ... a coalition of enforcers.” This deserves elabo- ration. It seems to reflect a belief that India’s attainment of a permanent seat on the Security Council would meet with objections that India would not want to exacerbate by having council membership related to disarma- ment enforcement. But if India were a permanent member, and the Security Council had a role in enforcing a prohibition on nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable, wouldn’t India have to participate? How else would the nuclear disarmament that India now advocates be enforced? Raghavan writes that “[t]he power to enforce would also need to be subordinated to the intent of all states represented in the United Nations.” But among other questions, this raises anew the problem of ensuring that enforcement would be reliable and timely. Similar questions of timeliness and efficacy would also seem to confound Mian’s interesting suggestion that “the International Court of Justice, rather than the Security Council, could serve as the body that adju- dicates disputes over compliance involving nonproliferation, arms control, and abolition agreements.”

#### Education is a voter – schools fund debate for its educational value and debate educates us in both he academic world and leaves us with portable skills. Outweighs fairness because we can take education out of the round with us, making it a lasting impact.

#### On their shell –

#### 1] They can still access core generics under our interp – things like deterrence, hypersonics, and Chinese SCS aggression still link to the aff regardless of advocacy method.

#### 2] Reasonability good – if I’m topical and am still predominantly defending the resolution you shouldn’t vote neg. 1] Competing interps causes an RTTT and leads to decision paralysis. Brightline is link and impact turn ground.

#### 3] Theory is about in-round abuse – you shouldn’t punish me for something that they think can happen in another round. If my abuse is not big enough to irreparably skew the round, then I shouldn’t lose bc of it.