#### [INSERT TOPICAL LINKS]

#### Queer violence and the way it is portrayed in the status quo absolutely must be challenged or the lives of the queer will continue to be erased. Every moment that passes more lives are being purged from our history by heterosexual rejections of the notion of queer violence. Thus the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best combats structures of queer erasure

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Where statistics fail, scars rise to tell other histories. From the phenomenological vault of growing up different, to the flickers of brutal details, one would not have to dig deep to uncover a corpse. Yet even with the horrific details, antiqueer violence is written as an outlaw practice, a random event, and an unexpected tragedy. Dominant culture’s necessity to disappear the enormity of antiqueer violence seems unsurprising. Yet I suggest that mainstream LGBT discourse also works in de-politicized collusion with the erasure of a structural recognition. Through this privatization the enormity of antiqueer violence is vanished. Thinking violence as individual acts versus epistemic force works to support the normative and normalizing structuring of public pain. In other words, privatizing antiqueer violence is one of the ways in which the national body and its trauma are heterosexualized, or in which the relegation of antiqueer violence, not unlike violence against women, racist violence, violence against animals (none of which are mutually exclusive), casts the national stage of violence and its ways of mourning as always human, masculinist, able-bodied, white, gender-conforming, and hetero- sexual. For national violence to have value it must be produced through the tangled exclusion of bodies whose death is valueless. To this end, as mainstream LGBT groups clambe for dominant power through attachment of a teleological narrative of progress, they too reproduce the argument that antiqueer violence is something out of the ordinary.

#### Debate doesn’t end when your 2AR timer goes off; your flow reflects real conversations had between people. Our performances in this space reflect the way we act when we exit the round and our ballot is turned in. Our educational praxis has an obligation to be focused on using our discourse to access debate’s liberatory potential. This means that if I can win a link for why the 1AC is uniquely damaging to the debate space, you negate.

Vincent 13 (Christopher Debate Coach, former college NDT debater “Re-Conceptualizing Our Performances: Accountability In Lincoln Douglas Debate”[http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2013/10/re-conceptualizing-our-performances-accountability-in-lincoln-douglas-debate)](http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2013/10/re-conceptualizing-our-performances-accountability-in-lincoln-douglas-debate%29)

Charles Mills argues that “the moral concerns of African Americans have centered on the assertion of their personhood, a personhood that could generally be taken for granted by whites, so that blacks have had to see these theories from a location outside their purview.” For example, I witnessed a round at a tournament this season where a debater ran a utilitarianism disadvantage. His opponent argued that this discourse was racist because it ignores the way in which a utilitarian calculus has distorted communities of color by ignoring the wars and violence already occurring in those communities.  In the next speech, the debater stood up, conceded it was racist, and argued that it was the reason he was not going for it and moved on, and still won the debate.  This is problematic because it demonstrates exactly what Mill’s argument is. For the black debater this argument is a question of his or her personhood within the debate space and the white debater was not held accountable for the words that are said.  Again for debaters of color, their performance is always attached to their body which is why it is important that the performance be viewed in relation to the speech act. Whites [Some] are allowed to take for granted the impact their words have on the bodies in the space. They take for granted this notion of personhood and ignore the concerns of those who do not matter divorced from the flow. It is never a question of “should we make arguments divorced from our ideologies,” it is a question of is it even possible. It is my argument that our performances, regardless of what justification we provide, are always a reflection of the ideologies we hold. Why should a black debater have to use a utilitarian calculus just to win a round, when that same discourse justifies violence in the community they go back home to? Our performances and our decisions in the round, reflect the beliefs that we hold when we go back to our communities.  As a community we must re-conceptualize this distinction the performance by the body and of the body by re-evaluating the role of the speech and the speech act. It is no longer enough for judges to vote off of the flow anymore. Students of color are being held to a higher threshold to better articulate why racism is bad, which is the problem in a space that we deem to be educational. It is here where I shift my focus to a solution.  Debaters must be held accountable for the words they say in the round. We should no longer evaluate the speech. Instead we must begin to evaluate the speech act itself. Debaters must be held accountable for more than winning the debate. They must be held accountable for the implications of that speech. As educators and adjudicators in the debate space we also have an ethical obligation to foster an atmosphere of education. It is not enough for judges to offer predispositions suggesting that they do not endorse racist, sexist, homophobic discourse, or justify why they do not hold that belief, and still offer a rational reason why they voted for it.  Judges have become complacent in voting on the discourse, if the other debater does not provide a clear enough role of the ballot framing, or does not articulate well enough why the racist discourse should be rejected. Judges must be willing to foster a learning atmosphere by holding debaters accountable for what they say in the round. They must be willing to vote against a debater if they endorse racist discourse. They must be willing to disrupt the process of the flow for the purpose of embracing that teachable moment. The speech must be connected to the speech act. We must view the entire debate as a performance of the body, instead of the argument solely on the flow. Likewise, judges must be held accountable for what they vote for in the debate space. If a judge is comfortable enough to vote for discourse that is racist, sexist, or homophobic, they must also be prepared to defend their actions. We as a community do not live in a vacuum and do not live isolated from the larger society. That means that judges must defend their actions to the debaters, their coaches, and to the other judges in the room if it is a panel. Students of color should not have the burden of articulating why racist discourse must be rejected, but should have the assurance that the educator with the ballot will protect them in those moments. Until we re-conceptualize the speech and the speech act, and until judges are comfortable enough to vote down debaters for a performance that perpetuates violence in the debate space, debaters and coaches alike will remain complacent in their privilege. As educators we must begin to shift the paradigm and be comfortable doing this. As a community we should stop looking at ourselves as isolated in a vacuum and recognize that the discourse and knowledge we produce in debate has real implications for how we think when we leave this space. Our performances must be viewed as of the body instead of just by it. As long as we continue to operate in a world where our performances are merely by bodies, we will continue to foster a climate of hostility and violence towards students of color, and in turn destroy the transformative potential this community could have.

### Alt 1: Politics

#### The alternative is to embrace a queer-centered politics where the figure of the child is no longer the praxis of political consideration. The ending of this figure is crucial to provide political livability for queer folk.

Panayotov, 11 Stanimir, Ph.D. candidate in comparative gender studies at Central European University, Budapest, Heart’s Unreason: A Reading of Edelman’s Anti-Futurism through Bataille, Идентитети: Списание за политика, род и култура, pg. 131-134, central and eastern european online library – bengle(s)

What can be called “anti-natalism” in Edelman is “where the future stops,” the “desire to die” now where “now” does not pass as the “future.” The lesson to be learned from Edelman is not a Foucaultian notion of writing the ontology of the present; it is to live the now as an unsigni-fied future coming in the figure of **the NO, and not NOW**. Just as being anti-natalist does not morally involve the committal of suicide, just as non-procreation does not nec-essarily mean human extinction, so the desire to die, or **the stopping of future, does not mean to stop living: it only means to start dying without signifying death as life** – to stop the world (see NF, note 42, 180). It only means that, as Thomas Ligotti would say, **it takes a “yes” in our hearts to say “no,”** and to live a life ethically complicit with this.6Sara Ahmed comes closer to this when she says that “[t]o embrace the negative or to say yes to a no cannot be de-scribed as a purely negative gesture” (Ahmed 2010, 162), but she already has in mind a certain dialectical optimism. I turn now to several arguments about the possibil-ity to make politics out of a form of non-reproductive futurism which negates Edelman’s negation of futurity altogether, albeit with the pretension to integrate his no-tion of politics=the social=reproductive futurism. What this means is, as vexing as this may sound, that all an-ti-liberal and allegedly sympathetic critics of Edelman should temporarily line-up behind a crypto-capitalist notion of social theory which allows them to invest in an-ti-capitalist theories of non-reproductive futurism. This is not a defendable position and the critics in question can only negate their own socially imposed anti-sociality and alienation from the dominant order so that the or-der becomes pervious to such undefendability, to result in a non-reproductive politics. No one can simply be-lieve that any scientific, state-funded establishment will intentionally support such futuristic social theory that negates non-reproduction. I take it, then, that the critics concerned here do not expect their investment in futu-rity to be graspable by today’s scientific redistributors of shortages in the dominant social order and that it is this depressing condition that supports their brandishing of hope and utopianism in social theory. If the central question, after Edelman, is: “can the sin-thomosexuals live without politics at all without risking to stop fucking with the jouissance?,” then we also have to inadvertently ask: is there any form of politics that could arise from the negation of all politics? What term of opprobrium do critics omit in order to advocate some form of compromise between their shared negation of re-productive futurism and socio-political utopianism and politics in general? In his review of No Future, Mark Fisher observes that “[o]ne of the great virtues of Edelman’s thesis is that it restores the distinction between queerness and homo-sexuality per se.” (Fisher 2005) This is so in as much as Edelman tells us intuitively that he will not work with a notion of queerness that is going to “affirm a structure” (NF, 3), as all politics are conservative since they affirm structures. But he does not tell us if he is going to propose a politic at all, and if he does not do that, what, if any-thing, comes after politics. This is why: [i]t is often not clear whether Edelman is opposed to pol-itics as such or is agitating for a wider definition of the political. It seems to me that, rather than equivocating poli-tics with “the social” (as Edelman seems to) the true site of political struggle lies in what the dominant order calls the extra-political. When there is only one (permissible) side, **it is imperative to locate the Outside**. (ibid.) As much as Edelman locates the Outside as sinthomo-sexuality, he does not want to bring what is not reducible for him to politics, i.e., the “extra-political” – quite com-prehensible for both left and right interests – to any form of politics. This means that Edelman refuses to reorder the social order should it be forced to, or is willing to, politicize the “excluded” extra-political and turn it into an “included” political livability (whence his criticism of Butler). The very idea of reordering the order is political, relational, and social, and thus it does not serve the end of Edelman: not to reduce queers to a sorry state where they have to politically legitimize and institute the death drive and the sinthomosexual figure. And **if this idea stops here, so does the future**. As Ahmed says, “[t]o affirm an order might be to define and regulate what is think-able in advance of thought.” (Ahmed 2010, 161) This is the always-already-prepoliticization of any social order through the imaginary inebriation of the future, done by the image of the Child; there is no other thought of and for the future than that of the Child-missile. What re-mains is the principle of “being for being against,” (ibid, 162) which does not evolve to rational queer commonal-ity, which is not read as a politics, but recedes into the isolated world of stand-alone individuals whose puppet master is the death drive. The remainder of queerness, “embodying the remainder of the Real internal to the Symbolic order,” (NF, 25) is some sort of mechanistic quasi-society/temporally designed mass of queer pup-petry in incessant hyper-teleological gang-bang. It is a community whose telos is political self-destruction. As Edelman riffs on Lacan, “political self-destruction in-heres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life.” (NF, 30) **The refusal of all politics**, to repeat the earlier claim here, **is to live death and the death drive literally/figuratively** and not to live the life as the Heideggerian Sein zum Tode, **for “queerness could never constitute an authentic or substantive identity, but only a structural po-sition determined by the imperative of figuration.”** (NF, 24) Sein zum Tode, read as a phenomenological political imperative of sorts, is still reducible to a liberalist pro-life queer positionality: it does acknowledge the formerly suppressed self-consciousness for death, but it seeks to abolish it at the expense of birthing more death. Even as queers/sinthomosexuals occupy the place of the death drive (its “khôra”), “[t]he structural position of queer-ness, after all, and the need to fill it remain.” (NF, 27) Only that **the fill-up of death is not communal**. We do not have to read **political self-destruction** as the end of children’s life; rather, it **is the end of the figure of the Child that frames the future for those who do not want a future with children and who embrace the dis-figuration of identity**. It is in this sense that “queerness ... is understood as **bringing children and childhood to an end**.” (NF, 16) Hence, what is at stake here is that sin-thomosexuals’ inherent “meaninglessness is not a kind of jouissance**, it is merely the acknowledgement that chil-dren are always-dying so that others may live**.” (Power 2009, 14) Repeating the Child is not merely the politics of meaninglessness, it is something much more anx-ious: the politics of re-signifying the crashing course of an impending meaninglessness on to the future as such. Anti-futurism seeks a way out of the imposed ethical re-sponsibility to repeat the very figural status of children’s finality (and the ethics of guilt behind this that breeds reproductive futurism from behind). So the alleged tem-porality of queer anti-futurism, which still appears to feature some retained future, comes from the very act of childhood’s repetition, and with this, politics as such. Once the figure of the Child is exchanged for the oblitera-tion of jouissance’s lack, anti-futurism culminates in the arrest of history. As Floyd says, “[f]or Edelman, child-hood figures the homogeneous, narcissistic time of mere repetition.” (Floyd 2010, 15) Doing away with this “time” amounts to a highly egoistic queer negativity, whose only point of temporally achievable commonality is the art of fucking with and for the jouissance: the ability to be the senseless acrobat of the death drive, the craftsmanship of fucking with the heterosexual matrix not in its name. In seeking a way out of anti-futurism and such queer pes-simism, Ahmed has this presumption in mind: Queer pessimism matters as a pessimism about a certain kind of optimism, as a refusal to be optimistic about “the right things” in the right kind of way. ...Queer pessimism becomes interesting as an alien effect although **to become pessimistic as a matter of principle is to risk being optimis-tic about pessimism itself**. (Ahmed 2010,162) Yet, queer pessimism is an “alien effect” only in a social order which does not aim at its own political self-destruc-tion. It is the “natural” (quasi-consensual) effect of queer anti-politics. It is the position that having children and future is “not all right” (which is “against all reason”) and that this cannot take any right direction. Thus, the differ-ence which I think Edelman makes here, the step towards a non-dialectical anti-futurist queer pessimism which fears not its political dissolution, but desires it (even if this desire is introduced to only suspend the very dialec-tic of desire), is that even if the dialectic is temporarily kept, it is kept to only seize the temporality as the pes-tilent fungus onto the “future:” its construal under queer negativity stops the production of the third term, that is, both the child and the civil society (be it the left prole-tariat or the right vigilantism). In this sense Edelman’s anti-futurism is a queer response of Marx’s civil society against itself, but without any envisioned political agen-da ahead, for **the heads of queer anti-futurists is full only with the mindlessness of jouissance**. Meaningless it may be not, but if it is something in actuality, it is mindless-ness, and this is why **it is “against all reason.”** The only remaining intellect would be some mechanical recollec-tion of how to fuck with other sinthomosexuals which figure the non-assimilable extra-political. Edelman’s insistence on sinthomosexuality (which explicitly does not reduce itself to queers) in his plea against relational-ity is precisely because – and Muñoz is absolutely right in saying this – “the antirelational turn in queer studies was a partial response to critical approaches to a mode of queer studies that argued for the relational and contin-gent value of sexuality as a category.” (Muñoz 2009, 11) Sinthomosexuality is this anti-political quasi-category of self-destruction which does not aim to preserve neither paradoxality nor utopianism.

### Alt 2: Queer Suicide Bomber

#### The alternative is to embrace the figure of the queer suicide bomber, to disrupt normative discourse of queerness and heteronormative progress

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Ghassan Hage wonders ‘‘why it is that suicide bombing cannot be talked about without being condemned first,’’ noting that without an unequivocal condemnation, one is a ‘‘morally suspicious person’’ because ‘‘only unqualified condemnation will do.’’ He asserts, ‘‘There is a clear political risk in trying to explain suicide bombings.’’≥≥ With such risks in mind, my desire here is to momentarily suspend this dilemma by combining an analysis of these representational stakes with a reading of the forces of affect, of the body, of matter. In pondering the modalities of this kind of terrorist, one notes a pastiche of oddities: a body machined together through metal and flesh, an assemblage of the organic and the inorganic; a death not of the Self nor of the Other, but both simultaneously, and, perhaps more accurately, a death scene that obliterates the Hegelian self/other dialectic altogether. Self-annihilation is the ultimate form of resistance, and ironically, it acts as self-preservation, the preservation of symbolic self enabled through the ‘‘highest cultural capital’’ of martyrdom, a giving of life to the future of political struggles—not at all a sign of ‘‘disinterest in living a meaningful life.’’ As Hage notes, in this limited but nonetheless trenchant economy of meaning, suicide bombers are ‘‘a sign of life’’ emanating from the violent conditions of life’s impossibility, the ‘‘impossibility of making a life.’’≥∂ This body forces a reconciliation of opposites through their inevitable collapse— a perverse habitation of contradiction. Achille Mbembe’s devastating and brilliant meditation on necropolitics notes that the historical basis of sovereignty that is reliant upon a notion of (western) political rationality begs for a more accurate framing: that of life and death, the subjugation of life to the power of death. Mbembe attends not only to the representational but also to the informational productivity of the (Palestinian) suicide bomber. Pointing to the becomings of a suicide bomber, a corporeal experiential of ‘‘ballistics,’’ he asks, ‘‘What place is given to life, death, and the human body (especially the wounded or slain body)?’’ Assemblage here points to the inability to clearly delineate a temporal, spatial, energetic, or molecular distinction between a discrete biological body and technology; the entities, particles, and elements come together, flow, break apart, interface, skim off each other, are never stable, but are defined through their continual interface, not as objects meeting but as multiplicities emerging from interactions. The dynamite strapped onto the body of a suicide bomber is not merely an appendage or prosthetic; the intimacy of weapon with body reorients the assumed spatial integrity (coherence and concreteness) and individuality of the body that is the mandate of intersectional identities: instead we have the body-weapon. The ontology of the body renders it a newly becoming body: The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon. Unlike the tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body is invisible. Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body that at the time of its detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon. The body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in a truly ballistic sense.≥∑ Temporal narratives of progression are upturned as death and becoming fuse into one: as one’s body dies, one’s body becomes the mask, the weapon, the suicide bomber. Not only does the ballistic body come into being without the aid of visual cues marking its transformation, it also ‘‘carries with it the bodies of others.’’ Its own penetrative energy sends shards of metal and torn flesh spinning off into the ether. The body-weapon does not play as metaphor, nor in the realm of meaning and epistemology, but forces us ontologically anew to ask: What kinds of information does the ballistic body impart? These bodies, being in the midst of becoming, blur the insides and the outsides, infecting transformation through sensation, echoing knowledge via reverberation and vibration. The echo is a queer temporality—in the relay of affective information between and amid beings, the sequence of reflection, repetition, resound, and return (but with a difference, as in mimicry)—and brings forth waves of the future breaking into the present. Gayatri Spivak, prescient in drawing our attention to the multivalent textuality of suicide in ‘‘Can the Subaltern Speak,’’ reminds us in her latest ruminations that suicide terrorism is a modality of expression and communication for the subaltern (there is the radiation of heat, the stench of burning flesh, the impact of metal upon structures and the ground, the splattering of blood, body parts, skin): Suicidal resistance is a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through. It is both execution and mourning, for both self and other. For you die with me for the same cause, no matter which side you are on. Because no matter who you are, there are no designated killees in suicide bombing. No matter what side you are on, because I cannot talk to you, you won’t respond to me, with the implication that there is no dishonor in such shared and innocent death. We have the proposal that there are no sides, and that the sides are forever shifting, crumpling, and multiplying, disappearing and reappearing, unable to satisfactorily delineate between here and there. The spatial collapse of sides is due to the queer temporal interruption of the suicide bomber, projectiles spewing every which way. As a queer assemblage— distinct from the queering of an entity or identity—race and sexuality are denaturalized through the impermanence, the transience of the suicide bomber, the fleeting identity replayed backward through its dissolution. This dissolution of self into other/s and other/s into self not only effaces the absolute mark of self and other/s in the war on terror, but produces a systemic challenge to the entire order of Manichaean rationality that organizes the rubric of good versus evil. Delivering ‘‘a message inscribed on the body when no other means will get through,’’ suicide bombers do not transcend or claim the rational nor accept the demarcation of the irrational. Rather, they foreground the flawed temporal, spatial, and ontological presumptions upon which such distinctions flourish. Organic and inorganic, flesh and machine, these wind up as important as (and perhaps as threatening) if not more so than the symbolism of the bomber and his or her defense or condemnation.