# NIEC Core Aff

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# 1AC—Advantages

### 1AC—Plan

#### Plan: The United States ought to establish a National Investment Employment Corps.

[Mark Paul et. al, William Darity Jr., Darrick Hamilton (2018), Mark Paul is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, William Darity Jr. is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and the Director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, Darrick Hamilton is Professor of Economics and Urban Policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research, and Director of the Doctoral Program in Public and Urban Policy at The New School, The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3-9-2018]//CHS PK

Although the programs listed above may have been effective in reducing unemployment, poverty, hunger, and other social ills, they fall short of providing a social insurance system that offers a genuine path to full employment and the elimination of poverty. We recommend a slate of bold legislation to achieve and maintain full employment and end working poverty in the U.S. economy. We recommend: The permanent establishment of a National Investment Employment Corps (NIEC). The NIEC will provide universal job coverage for all adult Americans. The permanent establishment of the NIEC would eliminate involuntary unemployment. The elimination of poverty wages through the pay structure of the NIEC. The federal job guarantee would provide a job at a minimum annual wage of $24,600 for full-time workers (poverty line for a family of four) and a minimum hourly wage of $11.83. Workers would have the opportunity to advance within the program, rising from the minimum wage in the program to an estimated mean salary of $32,500. The wage would be indexed to the inflation rate to ensure that the purchasing power of enrollees is maintained and the wage will vary to allow for some degree of regional variation. The minimum wage rate in the program will also rise to meet the national minimum wage if it were to exceed the wage rate recommended here.[[11]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn11) The inclusion of fringe benefits. To provide a true non-poverty wage and meet the fundamental rights of American citizens, the policy will include health insurance for all full-time workers in the program. The health insurance program should be comparable to that offered to all civil servants and elected federal officials. In addition, the NIEC would offer benefits such as retirement plans, paid family and sick leave, and one week of paid vacation per three months worked. These benefits, in conjunction with non-poverty wages, will set a reasonable floor in the labor market—which, through competitive forces, will result in private-sector workers having the dignity of fringe benefits as well.

[Further specification in the doc.]

The NIEC would be administered by the Department of Labor and overseen by the Secretary of Labor.[[33]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn33) The Secretary would administer employment grants to eligible entities, including state, county, and local governments, as well as Indian Nations, to engage in direct employment projects. These projects should be designed to address community needs and provide socially beneficial goods and services to communities and society at large. In addition, the Secretary shall work with federal agencies to identify areas of needed investment in the U.S. economy, including goods (examples: infrastructure, energy efficiency retrofitting) and services (examples: elder care, child care, job training, education, and health services). If projects at the local, county, or state level are inadequate to maintain full employment in the region, the Secretary shall intervene in the locality to provide adequate employment opportunities. Projects will be designed to assure full employment in all localities. The NIEC can be deployed to cover a wide scope of activities including, but not limited to, the repair, maintenance, and expansion of the nation's infrastructure, housing stock, and public buildings; energy efficiency upgrades to public and private buildings; assistance with ecological restoration and services to reduce the country’s carbon footprint; engagement in community development projects; provision of high-quality preschool and afterschool services; provision of teachers’ aids; provision of high-quality elder care and companionship; rejuvenation of the nation’s defunded postal service; support for the arts; and other activities that shall support the public good.[[34]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn34) Because of the vital role of state and local governments in providing public workers and services, it is essential that federal agencies and the NIEC are empowered to work closely with these governments. Local and state governments will be encouraged to develop employment proposals in conjunction with community leaders, local government officials, labor organizations, and local residents to ensure the proposals will serve the needs of the constituents and available pool of labor. The employment proposals may not be used to employ individuals who will replace or speed the displacement of existing employees or individuals who would otherwise perform similar work.[[35]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn35) The program will cover wage, benefits, and material expenses.[[36]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn36) This structure will largely parallel the direct employment programs under the New Deal, whose projects were developed and proposed by local and state governments. Fostering partnerships and buy-in from local and state partners is critical to the success of the program, as localities may be most aware of the skills of their available workers as well as projects that will provide the greatest benefit to their communities. Who is eligible to work under the program? Employment opportunities under the NIEC are open to all individuals age 18 and older in the United States.[[37]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn37) While much of the existing safety net in the U.S. forces individuals and families to be exposed to poverty before receiving assistance, the NIEC will provide a job upon request from those who are unemployed, underemployed, or currently outside of the labor force. Employment can be either part-time (20 hours a week) or full-time (35–40 hours a week) depending on the needs of the employee. For employees to receive their compensation, they must show up to their job and perform the tasks assigned to them. As was the case with the WPA, a Division of Progress Investigation (DPI) should be established to monitor shirking or corruption. If workers are found to be negligent, or generally disruptive to the workplace, disciplinary action can be taken by the DPI. The duration of employment shall be as long as the individual is in need of employment at non-poverty wages. To assist with individuals’ move from the job guarantee to other employment opportunities, the program shall establish a website and database listing individuals employed under the program as available for, and seeking, employment. Thus, in many respects, job recipients under the program will still function as a reserve pool of workers; however, they will be gainfully employed under the program rather than subject to unemployment and economic and personal hardship, as well as the social stigma associated with being unemployed. In turn, individuals shall be allowed up to one day (8 hours) per employed month to seek alternative employment and for professional development. The wage for employees should be set at a minimum of $11.83 an hour, plus benefits, and indexed to inflation. While most benefits will be available to all workers, since this is primarily a jobs program, to avoid the moral hazard of participation solely for the health insurance benefit, health insurance will only be available to full-time workers (35–40 hours per week). Wage variation would be built into the program to account for workers’ previous experience, education, and region of residence, as well as the prospect of promotion within the NIEC. Therefore, while the base wage in the NIEC will be $24,600 for full-time workers, we estimate a mean wage for all employees at approximately $32,500. Regional variation could follow the scales currently used in the federal government established by the Office of Personnel Management.[[38]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn38) Once the program is initiated, it will take time, perhaps two to three years, to scale the program to meet countrywide demand for employment.[[39]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn39) In the initial phases of the program, the supply of employment opportunities will likely be insufficient to meet the demand for jobs. During this period, the Secretary shall target employment grants and engage in direct hiring in areas with the greatest level of need. These should be determined by indicators such as the unemployment and “underemployment rate” (“U-6” from the monthly employment report)[[40]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn40), the poverty and extreme poverty rate, and the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP). To manage projects past, present, and future, we recommend that the NIEC create a website where all projects will be listed. The website can function as a jobs and projects bank, where a list of the needs of communities, states, and the federal government will be maintained and updated, along with aggregate demographic indicators of job recipients. The website will help local and state administers match projects with existing workers in the NIEC. Furthermore, this database will guard against hastily planned emergency work, ensuring public employment be planned in advance and coordinated with the policies and needs of the government.

### --Extra Solvency

#### The NIEC boosts employment massively along with a bunch of other things— this card has a lot of warrants in it

Paul et al 18 – Mark Paul et. al, William Darity Jr., Darrick Hamilton (2018), Mark Paul is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, William Darity Jr. is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and the Director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, Darrick Hamilton is Professor of Economics and Urban Policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research, and Director of the Doctoral Program in Public and Urban Policy at The New School, The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3-9-2018 As+

The majority of Americans secure their livelihoods, and those of their dependents, through paid employment, yet a job at non-poverty wages is out of reach for millions of Americans. Since most people must live by work, a first objective of an economic-security program must be to reach and maintain full employment. Thus, it is the purpose of the NIEC to provide employment for all persons seeking a job and to perform the work necessary to maintain and expand the nation’s physical and human infrastructure. The establishment of the NIEC will provide a direct mechanism for achieving permanent full employment in the U.S. economy.

The NIEC would be administered by the Department of Labor and overseen by the Secretary of Labor.33 The Secretary would administer employment grants to eligible entities, including state, county, and local governments, as well as Indian Nations, to engage in direct employment projects. These projects should be designed to address community needs and provide socially beneficial goods and services to communities and society at large. In addition, the Secretary shall work with federal agencies to identify areas of needed investment in the U.S. economy, including goods (examples: infrastructure, energy efficiency retrofitting) and services (examples: elder care, child care, job training, education, and health services). If projects at the local, county, or state level are inadequate to maintain full employment in the region, the Secretary shall intervene in the locality to provide adequate employment opportunities. Projects will be designed to assure full employment in all localities.

The NIEC can be deployed to cover a wide scope of activities including, but not limited to, the repair, maintenance, and expansion of the nation's infrastructure, housing stock, and public buildings; energy efficiency upgrades to public and private buildings; assistance with ecological restoration and services to reduce the country’s carbon footprint; engagement in community development projects; provision of high-quality preschool and afterschool services; provision of teachers’ aids; provision of high-quality elder care and companionship; rejuvenation of the nation’s defunded postal service; support for the arts; and other activities that shall support the public good.34

Because of the vital role of state and local governments in providing public workers and services, it is essential that federal agencies and the NIEC are empowered to work closely with these governments. Local and state governments will be encouraged to develop employment proposals in conjunction with community leaders, local government officials, labor organizations, and local residents to ensure the proposals will serve the needs of the constituents and available pool of labor. The employment proposals may not be used to employ individuals who will replace or speed the displacement of existing employees or individuals who would otherwise perform similar work.35 The program will cover wage, benefits, and material expenses.36 This structure will largely parallel the direct employment programs under the New Deal, whose projects were developed and proposed by local and state governments. Fostering partnerships and buy-in from local and state partners is critical to the success of the program, as localities may be most aware of the skills of their available workers as well as projects that will provide the greatest benefit to their communities.

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Once the program is initiated, it will take time, perhaps two to three years, to scale the program to meet countrywide demand for employment.39 In the initial phases of the program, the supply of employment opportunities will likely be insufficient to meet the demand for jobs. During this period, the Secretary shall target employment grants and engage in direct hiring in areas with the greatest level of need. These should be determined by indicators such as the unemployment and “underemployment rate” (“U-6” from the monthly employment report)40, the poverty and extreme poverty rate, and the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP).

To manage projects past, present, and future, we recommend that the NIEC create a website where all projects will be listed. The website can function as a jobs and projects bank, where a list of the needs of communities, states, and the federal government will be maintained and updated, along with aggregate demographic indicators of job recipients. The website will help local and state administers match projects with existing workers in the NIEC. Furthermore, this database will guard against hastily planned emergency work, ensuring public employment be planned in advance and coordinated with the policies and needs of the government.

### 1AC—Advantage—Populism

#### Poverty and unemployment are rampant and rising.

[Jeanna Smialek et. al, Sarah Kliff, Alan Rappeport (9/15), Jeanna Smialek writes about the Federal Reserve and the economy. She previously covered economics at Bloomberg News, where she also wrote feature stories for Businessweek magazine, Sarah Kliff is an investigative reporter for The New York Times. Her reporting focuses on the American health care system and how it works for patients, Alan Rappeport is an economic policy reporter, based in Washington. He covers the Treasury Department and writes about taxes, trade and fiscal matters in the era of President Trump. He previously worked for The Financial Times and The Economist, U.S. Poverty Hit a Record Low Before the Pandemic Recession, The New York Times, 9-15-2020]//CHS PK

WASHINGTON — A record-low share of Americans were living in poverty, incomes were climbing, and health insurance coverage was little changed in 2019, a government report released on Tuesday showed — though the circumstances of many have deteriorated as pandemic lockdowns and industry disruptions have thrown millions out of work. The share of Americans living in poverty fell to 10.5 percent in 2019, the [Census Bureau reported](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2020/income-poverty.html), down 1.3 percentage points from 2018. That rate is the lowest since estimates were first published in 1959. Household incomes increased to their highest level on record dating to 1967, at $68,700 in inflation-adjusted terms. That change came as individual workers saw their earnings climb and as the total number of people working increased. Methodology changes made after 2013 make comparing data across time tricky. But even adjusting for those differences, the 2019 income figures appeared to be the highest on record, based on Census Bureau estimates. The data may also have been somewhat skewed by the pandemic. Interviews for this year’s income and poverty report were disrupted by the virus, the Census Bureau said. Some economists [warned](https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2Fhshierholz%2Fstatus%2F1305870768912433153) that the disruptions could have made the data look too rosy: The people who responded to surveys were more likely to have [high education](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/research-matters/2020/09/pandemic-affect-survey-response.html) and income levels. Analysts at the [Census Bureau estimated](https://www.census.gov/library/working-papers/2020/demo/SEHSD-WP2020-10.html) that poverty would have been slightly higher, at 11.1 percent, without the resulting data quirks. “It doesn’t change the overall picture — we had a tight labor market that was pulling people in and reducing poverty,” said Heidi Shierholz, director of policy at the Economic Policy Institute. But it underscores that “there was still a lot of room for improvement.” Despite the record-long expansion, about 26 million Americans — 8 percent of the population — still lacked health coverage for all of 2019. That was a slight decrease from the 27.5 million who were not covered in 2018. While that change is small, it is notable because 2019 was the first year in which the Affordable Care Act’s [mandate to purchase coverage](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/health/obamacare-mandate.html) was no longer in effect. A second health insurance survey, which asks Americans if they had coverage at the moment they were interviewed, did show a slight increase in the uninsured rate, from 8.9 percent in 2018 to 9.2 percent in 2019. The data suggests that the individual mandate, which the law’s drafters saw as crucial to increasing insurance sign-ups among healthy Americans, may not have been that effective. The mandate regularly polled as the health law’s least popular feature before congressional Republicans [repealed the fines](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/upshot/individual-health-insurance-mandate-end-impact.html) in late 2017. “The initial consensus when the law passed was the mandate was a critical feature,” said Benjamin Sommers, an assistant professor of health policy and economics at Harvard. “Over the years of implementation, the studies that have come out have been less convincing in terms of its importance.” The census figures showed a slight increase in Americans receiving health coverage at work and a decrease in those buying their own policies, suggesting that a stronger labor market could be driving the better coverage numbers. Enrollment in Medicaid, the program that covers low-income Americans, declined slightly. That could reflect more Americans gaining coverage at work and many states tightening their eligibility rules. The report highlights how strong the job market and economy were ahead of the pandemic, following a record-long expansion that began in 2009. Yet it underscores how, despite those gains, many families remained vulnerable to such a major shock. Unemployment was hovering at around 3.5 percent before the crisis took hold, the lowest in 50 years, and wages were steadily rising. Yet at the end of 2019, three in 10 adults said they could not cover three months’ worth of expenses with savings or borrowing in the case of a job loss, according to a [Federal Reserve survey](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/business/economy/coronavirus-jobless-unemployment.html). Minority groups experienced bigger declines in poverty in 2019, the census report showed, but also have much higher poverty rates. The poverty rate for whites dropped 1 percentage point to 9.1 percent; for Asians it was down 2.8 percentage points to 7.3 percent. Black poverty dropped 2 points to 18.8 percent, and Hispanic poverty decreased by 1.8 percentage points to 15.7 percent. “The very groups who need a stronger economy to pull them back are the ones getting disproportionately hit by the downturn we’re in now,” Ms. Shierholz said. The figures suggest that many families were still on edge as state and local lockdowns prompted the sharpest job losses on record, pushing the [unemployment](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE) rate up to 14.7 percent in April. While unemployment has declined to 8.4 percent as employers call back their temporarily furloughed workers, that left about [10 million fewer people](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS) employed in August than in February. Members of minority groups have [been hard hit](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/09/04/business/stock-market-today-coronavirus#after-taking-the-heaviest-employment-hit-women-make-a-sharp-rebound) by those job losses, as have workers with lower education levels. Economists warn that many layoffs in the service sector could turn permanent as casinos, concert venues and hotels struggle to fully reopen as the coronavirus continues to spread. President Trump, who has been highlighting the bright spots in the 2019 economy, is likely to embrace the positive news in the income and poverty report. Mr. Trump’s [campaign pitch](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/us/politics/trump-rnc-speech-transcript.html) focuses on the idea that his administration “built the strongest economy in the history of the world.” Some figures argue against that statement: growth rates below historical records and high inequality prevailed before the crisis, and fewer people participated in the labor market than in the late 1990s. But it is true that a record-long expansion and strong labor market were helping workers to make meaningful gains before the pandemic. Median incomes for white, Black, Asian and Hispanic households all increased in 2019, adjusting for inflation, the census report released Tuesday showed. Even as incomes rose, census officials said that the measure of income inequality was statistically unchanged last year. That suggests that despite higher levels of employment and pay, different policy measures would need to be used to narrow the gap between the rich and poor. The 2020 recession is most likely worsening such gaps — between rich and poor, between racial groups, and in terms of both economic and health outcomes. “The populations who are hit the hardest by the coronavirus are also those with the least stable access” to insurance coverage, said Katherine Baicker, the dean of the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. [Minority and disadvantaged groups](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/05/us/coronavirus-latinos-african-americans-cdc-data.html) are often more likely to have underlying health conditions, and are also more likely to work in jobs that cannot be performed from the safety of their homes — meaning that many were either laid off or left exposed on the front lines. “All of those things are lining up to tragically exacerbate disparities,” she said.

#### This exacerbates a populist surge rooted in socioeconomic insecurity—robust studies prove

[Martin Wolf (2017), Chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, London. He was awarded the CBE (Commander of the British Empire) in 2000 “for services to financial journalism”, The economic origins of the populist surge, Financial Times, 6-27-2017]//CHS PK

Why has the appeal of populist ideas grown in western countries? Is this a temporary phenomenon? In the wake of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, the collapse in support for established political parties in France and the rise of the Five Star Movement in Italy, not to mention the surge of authoritarian populism in central and eastern Europe, these are important questions. What, first of all, is a populist? The abiding characteristic of populism is its division of the world into a virtuous people on the one hand, and corrupt elites and threatening outsiders on the other. Populists distrust institutions, especially those that constrain the “will of the people”, such as courts, independent media, the bureaucracy and fiscal or monetary rules. Populists reject credentialed experts. They are also suspicious of free markets and free trade. Rightwing populists believe certain ethnicities are “the people” and identify foreigners as the enemy. They are economic nationalists and support traditional social values. Often they put their trust in charismatic leaders. Leftwing populists identify workers as “the people” and the rich as the enemy. They also believe in state ownership of property. Why have these sets of ideas become more potent? Ronald Inglehart of the university of Michigan and Pippa Norris of Harvard Kennedy School argue that the reaction of older and less educated white men against cultural change, including immigration, better explains the rise of populism than economic insecurity. This is part of the truth but not the whole truth. Economic and cultural phenomena are interrelated. This study considers immigration a cultural shift. Yet it can also be reasonably viewed as an economic one. More important, the study does not ask what has changed recently. The answer is the financial crisis and consequent economic shocks. These not only had huge costs. They also damaged confidence in — and so the legitimacy of — financial and policymaking elites. These emperors turned out to be naked. This, I suggest, is why Mr Trump is US president and the British chose Brexit. Cultural change and the economic decline of the working classes increased disaffection. But the financial crisis opened the door to a populist surge. To assess this, I have put together indicators of longer-term economic change and the crisis, for the G7 leading economies, plus Spain. The longer-term indicators include the loss of manufacturing jobs, the globalisation of supply chains, immigration, inequality, unemployment and labour force participation. The indicators of post-crisis developments include unemployment, fiscal austerity, real incomes per head and private sector credit (see charts). The four most adversely affected of these economies in the long term were (in order) Italy, Spain, the UK and US. Post-crisis, the most adversely affected were Spain, the US, Italy and the UK. Germany was the least affected by the crisis, with Canada and Japan close to it. It is not surprising, then, that Canada, Germany and Japan have been largely immune to the post-crisis surge in populism, while the US, UK, Italy and Spain have been less so, though the latter two have contained it relatively successfully.

#### The plan pays for itself while functionally eliminating poverty and unemployment and boosting long term stability better than any alternative—that solves the root cause of populism.

[Mark Paul et. al, William Darity Jr., Darrick Hamilton (2018), Mark Paul is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, William Darity Jr. is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and the Director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, Darrick Hamilton is Professor of Economics and Urban Policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research, and Director of the Doctoral Program in Public and Urban Policy at The New School, The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3-9-2018]//CHS PK

We expect the number of workers employed under the NIEC to fall substantially as the private sector responds to the sizable increases in employment and the growth of workers’ purchasing power under the program. Harvey (2011) provides estimates of indirect job creation from a job guarantee program, finding that for every direct job created by the government, the private sector could generate an estimated .26 jobs; however, multipliers tend to be smaller under full employment. Although the job guarantee may result in the displacement of some workers currently employed in the private sector, especially at the low end of the labor market, evidence from the minimum wage debates may provide insight into the employment dynamics with a job guarantee. Previous research estimating the employment effects of increases in the minimum wage by Allegretto, Dube and co-authors consistently shows that the employment effects of modest increases to the minimum wage are not distinguishable from zero.[42] Since the job guarantee places a floor in the labor market, employers will likely have to offer compensation packages at least as desirable as those offered under the NIEC. Thus, it is, de facto, similar to a rise in the minimum wage; in fact, the increase in total compensation under NIEC exceeds our traditional conception of the minimum wage.[43] The gross cost of implementing the NIEC would be offset substantially by increases in local, state, and federal tax revenues, decreases in uptake of existing social insurance programs, increases in the growth rate of GDP, and substantial productivity and capacity gains in the U.S. economy. While we do not argue for the elimination of existing social insurance programs, the uptake of employment through the NIEC coupled with the establishment of a new floor in the labor market will result in many families earning incomes above program thresholds. The Congressional Budget Office’s Budget and Economic Outlook provides current expenditures on social insurance programs.[44] Using actual government expenditures from 2016, we see that the U.S. government already spends hundreds of billions on social insurance programs annually. While these programs have been estimated to have reduced the poverty rate by half, they have not gone far enough to totally eliminate working poverty.[45] [46] What programs could we expect to be scaled back through the reduction of need? With the job guarantee providing employment at non-poverty wages, we expect the demand for unemployment insurance ($33 billion FY 2016) to fall substantially.[47] Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF; $16 billion FY 2016) could be nearly eliminated, as the job guarantee would be able to fill the gap for qualifying families in many instances. Additionally, with higher wages from the job guarantee, fewer households may qualify for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC; $70 billion FY 2016). For instance, those without dependents working full-time would no longer qualify, while those with dependents would be more likely to see EITC benefits reduced as they phase out of the program due to higher earnings. With increased earnings, many families are likely to exceed the income limits for the necessary food assistance program, known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; $73 billion FY 2016). Finally, with the provision of health benefits to full-time workers through the NIEC, we expect to see a sizable fall in the need for Medicaid ($368 billion FY 2016) and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP; $14 billion FY 2016).[48] Beyond savings from the reduced need for existing social insurance programs, we argue the NIEC will also generate sizable increases in tax revenue throughout the economy by increasing productive capacity and maintaining consumer spending. While the majority of economists in recent history have argued that monetary policy was sufficient to stabilize the economy, there has been a recent shift amongst economists recognizing an “activist fiscal policy” is necessary for full employment and macroeconomic stabilization.[49] [50] There would also be cost savings associated with enhanced human capacities from a job guarantee. Research indicates that extended periods of high rates of unemployment in the economy can lead to “skill losses among workers, reducing human capital and lowering future output.”[51] Putting millions of people to work through the NIEC will result in the buildup of the United States’ human and physical infrastructure and the provision of additional socially useful goods and services, resulting in a profound impact on the productivity and the long-term growth rate of the economy. The program could be financed through a variety of mechanisms. While financing the job guarantee is not the focus of the paper, we provide three ways to finance the program policymakers should consider. First, as discussed above, the implementation of a job guarantee will substantially reduce costs in existing social insurance programs. Non-poverty wages will mean many workers no longer need to rely on government assistance to meet their basic needs. A recent UC Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education study found that $153 billion a year is currently spent on public assistance programs because of low wages, money which could be repurposed to provide more people with a non-poverty standard of living.[52] Also, the program could be financed through implementing a financial transaction tax (as proposed in Rep. John Conyers’ H.R. 1000 bill), modifying estate and gift tax provisions, or the implementation of carbon taxes.[53] Conclusion A job guarantee would fundamentally transform the current labor market in the United States. Our current conception of full employment is inadequate; we discuss a bold policy in this paper to bring the United States to a permanent, more accurate indicator of full employment­—by which we mean that everyone who seeks a job can find one at non-poverty wages. Beyond providing full employment, the job guarantee could be a turning point for American workers. Workers are faced with stagnating real wages and a continued erosion of labor’s share of income. The job guarantee could significantly alter the current power dynamics between labor and capital—particularly for low-wage workers and traditionally marginalized groups. Benefits of the program reach beyond those directly employed under the NIEC. If a job guarantee were to be implemented, it also would function as a de facto employment floor in the labor market. Private employers would have to offer wages and benefits that are at least competitive with the NIEC in order to attract workers. The universal nature of the program would ensure jobs for all—including those with some forms of disability who may not be employed through the private sector. The universal design is critical to ending working poverty and involuntary unemployment; this is in contrast to other forms of intervention in the labor market, such as minimum wage laws, which do not ensure access to employment in the first place. Nevertheless, complementary changes to the existing social insurance system would be necessary to eliminate poverty entirely, as some individuals may be unable to work for various reasons.[54] Despite the discussion of full employment as a national priority for nearly a century now, policymakers have failed to deliver an economy that prioritized employment for all. Full employment is a goal that the private market in unable to achieve, therefore requiring government intervention in the labor market. Above, we discuss a transformative policy proposal—a federal job guarantee—whereby the government engages in the direct hiring of workers at non-poverty wages to achieve, and maintain, a full employment economy. Whether or not policymakers agree with the specifics we suggest in our proposal, we encourage them to think about bold solutions to achieve and maintain full employment. Restructuring our public policies to eradicate involuntary unemployment and poverty is within our reach.

#### First is Democracy—

#### Populism uproots the foundations of democracy in the United States—the aff is key to solve decades of bad policy.

[Martin Wolf (2017), Chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, London. He was awarded the CBE (Commander of the British Empire) in 2000 “for services to financial journalism”, The economic origins of the populist surge, Financial Times, 6-27-2017]//CHS PK

Thus the rise of populism is understandable. But it is also dangerous, often even for its supporters. As a recent report from the European Economic Advisory Group notes, populism may lead to grossly irresponsible policies. The impact of Hugo Chávez on Venezuela is a sobering example. At worst, it may destroy independent institutions, undermine civil peace, promote xenophobia and lead to dictatorship. Stable democracy is incompatible with a belief that fellow citizens are “enemies of the people”. We must recognise and address the anger that causes populism. But populism is an enemy of good government and even of democracy. We can tell ourselves a comforting story about the future. The political turmoil being experienced in a number of large western democracies is in part another legacy of the financial crisis. As economies recover and the shock dwindles, the rage and despair it caused may also fade. As time passes, trust may return to institutions essential to the functioning of democracies, such as legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, the press and even politicians. Bankers might even find themselves popular. Yet this optimism runs into two big obstacles. The first is that the results of past political follies have still to unfold. The divorce of the UK from the EU remains a process with unfathomable results. So, too, is the election of President Trump. The end of US leadership is a potentially devastating event. The second is that some of the long-term sources of fragility, cultural and economic, including high inequality and low labour force participation of prime-aged workers in the US, are still with us today. Similarly, the pressures for sustained high immigration continue. Not least, the fiscal pressures from ageing are also likely to increase. For all these reasons, the wave of populist anger is only too likely to be sustained. If so, those who wish to resist the rising tide of populism have to confront its simplifications and lies, as Emmanuel Macron did in France. As he understands, they must also directly address the worries that explain it. Cultural anxieties are relatively immune to policy, except over immigration. But the economic anxieties can and must be addressed. Of course, politicians can also do the opposite. That is what is happening in the US. That will not end the populist surge, but promote it. This is, no doubt, the intention.

#### Democratic backsliding leads to an AI apocalypse.

[Yuval Noah Harari (2018), Yuval Noah Harari is a historia-n and philosopher at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the author of 21 Lessons for the 21st Century, Why Technology Favors Tyranny, The Atlantic, October 2018]//CHS PK

We are unlikely to face a rebellion of sentient machines in the coming decades, but we might have to deal with hordes of bots that know how to press our emotional buttons better than our mother does and that use this uncanny ability, at the behest of a human elite, to try to sell us something—be it a car, a politician, or an entire ideology. The bots might identify our deepest fears, hatreds, and cravings and use them against us. We have already been given a foretaste of this in recent elections and referendums across the world, when hackers learned how to manipulate individual voters by analyzing data about them and exploiting their prejudices. While science-fiction thrillers are drawn to dramatic apocalypses of fire and smoke, in reality we may be facing a banal apocalypse by clicking. The biggest and most frightening impact of the AI revolution might be on the relative efficiency of democracies and dictatorships. Historically, autocracies have faced ~~crippling handicaps~~ [debilitating challenges] in regard to innovation and economic growth. In the late 20th century, democracies usually outperformed dictatorships, because they were far better at processing information. We tend to think about the conflict between democracy and dictatorship as a conflict between two different ethical systems, but it is actually a conflict between two different data-processing systems. Democracy distributes the power to process information and make decisions among many people and institutions, whereas dictatorship concentrates information and power in one place. Given 20th-century technology, it was inefficient to concentrate too much information and power in one place. Nobody had the ability to process all available information fast enough and make the right decisions. This is one reason the Soviet Union made far worse decisions than the United States, and why the Soviet economy lagged far behind the American economy. However, artificial intelligence may soon swing the pendulum in the opposite direction. AI makes it possible to process enormous amounts of information centrally. In fact, it might make centralized systems far more efficient than diffuse systems, because machine learning works better when the machine has more information to analyze. If you disregard all privacy concerns and concentrate all the information relating to a billion people in one database, you’ll wind up with much better algorithms than if you respect individual privacy and have in your database only partial information on a million people. An authoritarian government that orders all its citizens to have their DNA sequenced and to share their medical data with some central authority would gain an immense advantage in genetics and medical research over societies in which medical data are strictly private. The main ~~handicap~~ [challenge] of authoritarian regimes in the 20th century—the desire to concentrate all information and power in one place—may become their decisive advantage in the 21st century. New technologies will continue to emerge, of course, and some of them may encourage the distribution rather than the concentration of information and power. Blockchain technology, and the use of cryptocurrencies enabled by it, is currently touted as a possible counterweight to centralized power. But blockchain technology is still in the embryonic stage, and we don’t yet know whether it will indeed counterbalance the centralizing tendencies of AI. Remember that the Internet, too, was hyped in its early days as a libertarian panacea that would free people from all centralized systems—but is now poised to make centralized authority more powerful than ever.

#### That causes borderless algorithmic warfare that destroys the world.

[Jayshree Pandya (2019), Ph.D. founder and CEO of Risk Group LLC is working passionately to define a new security centric operating system for humanity, The Weaponization Of Artificial Intelligence, Forbes, 1-14-19]//CHS PK

Technological development has become a rat race. In the competition to lead the emerging technology race and the futuristic warfare battleground, artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly becoming the center of the global power play. As seen across many nations, the development in autonomous weapons system (AWS) is progressing rapidly, and this increase in the weaponization of artificial intelligence seems to have become a highly destabilizing development. It brings complex security challenges for not only each nation’s decision makers but also for the future of humanity. The reality today is that artificial intelligence is leading us toward a new algorithmic warfare battlefield that has no boundaries or borders, may or may not have humans involved, and will be impossible to understand and perhaps control across the human ecosystem in cyberspace, geospace, and space (CGS). As a result, the very idea of the weaponization of artificial intelligence, where a weapon system that, once activated across CGS, can select and engage human and non-human targets without further intervention by a human designer or operator, is [causing great fear.](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2017/Pros-and-Cons-of-Autonomous-Weapons-Systems/) The thought of an intelligent machine or machine intelligence to have the ability to perform any projected warfare task without any human involvement and intervention -- using only the interaction of its embedded sensors, computer programming, and algorithms in the human environment and ecosystem -- is becoming a reality that cannot be ignored anymore. As AI, machine learning and deep learning evolves further and moves from concept to commercialization, the rapid acceleration in computing power, memory, big data, and high-speed communication is not only creating innovation, investment and application frenzy but is also intensifying the quest for AI chips. This [ongoing rapid progress and development](https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/610842/the-us-military-desperately-wants-to-weaponize-ai/) signify that artificial intelligence is on its way to revolutionizing warfare and that nations are undoubtedly going to continue to develop the automated weapons system that AI will make possible. When nations individually and collectively accelerate their efforts to gain a competitive advantage in science and technology, the further weaponization of AI is inevitable. Accordingly, there is a need to visualize what would an algorithmic war of tomorrow looks like, because building autonomous weapons systems is one thing but using them in algorithmic warfare with other nations and against other humans is another. As reports are [already emerging](http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/10/15/army-researchers-chart-ai-course) of complex algorithmic systems supporting more and more aspects of war-fighting across CGS, the truth is that the commoditization of AI is a reality now. As seen in cyberspace, automated warfare (cyberwarfare) has [already begun](https://www.csoonline.com/article/3246196/cyberwarfare/2018-the-year-of-the-ai-powered-cyberattack.html) -- where anyone and everyone is a target. So, what is next, geo-warfare and space-warfare? And, who and what will be the target? The rapid development of AI weaponization is evident across the board: [navigating and utilizing unmanned naval](https://www.naval-technology.com/features/featureautonomous-intelligent-the-era-of-unmanned-naval-warfare-4175458/), aerial, and terrain vehicles, producing collateral-damage estimations, [deploying “fire-and-forget” missile systems](http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4678/is-the-european-meteor-air-to-air-missile-really-the-best-in-the-world) and using stationary systems to automate everything from personnel systems and equipment maintenance to the deployment of [surveillance drones](https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-drones), [robots](https://www.cio.com/article/2463903/robotics/5-uses-for-the-surveillance-robot-of-tomorrow.html) and more are all examples. So, when algorithms are supporting more and more aspects of war, it brings us to an important question: what uses of AI in today and tomorrow's war should be allowed, restricted and outright banned? While Autonomous Weapons Systems are believed to provide opportunities for reducing the operating costs of the weapons system -- specifically through a more efficient use of manpower -- and will likely enable weapons systems to achieve greater speed, accuracy, persistence, precision, reach and coordination on the CGS battlefield, the need to understand and evaluate the technological, legal, economic, societal and security issues still remain. Amidst these complex security challenges and the sea of unknowns coming our way, what remains fundamental for the safety and security of the human race is the role of programmers and programming along with the integrity of semiconductor chips. The reason behind this is programmers can define and determine the nature of AWS (at least in the beginning) until AI begins to program itself. However, if and when a programmer who intentionally or accidentally programs an autonomous weapon to operate in violation of the current and future international humanitarian law (IHL), how will humans control the weaponization of AI? Moreover, because AWS is centered on software, where should the responsibility for errors and the manipulation of AWS systems design and use lie? That brings us to the heart of the question -- when and if an autonomous system kills, who is responsible for the killing, irrespective of whether it is justified or not? In short, algorithms are by no means secure—nor are they immune to bugs, malware, bias, and manipulation. And, since machine learning uses machines to train other machines, what happens if there is malware or manipulation of the training data? While security risks are everywhere, connected devices increase the ability of cybersecurity breaches from remote locations and because the code is opaque, security is very complex. So, when AI goes to war with other AI (irrespective if that is for cyber-security, geo-security, or space-security), the ongoing cybersecurity challenges will add monumental risks to the future of humanity and the human ecosystem in CGS. While it seems autonomous weapons systems are here to stay, the question we all individually and collectively need to answer is will artificial intelligence drive and determine our strategy for human survival and security, or will we?

#### Second is Warming—

#### Sustainable energy transition is impossible in the age of populism – the plan is key to prevent irreversible warming.

Matthew Lockwood, 6-13-2019, [Matthew Lockwood is a Senior Lecturer in Energy Policy at the University of Sussex. He has worked previously at the University of Exeter, the Institute of Development Studies and the Institute for Public Policy Research, as well as for national and London governments, and a number of non-governmental organisations. He has a long-standing interest in the politics of climate and energy policy, and has published research on a range of issues including the implications of Brexit for energy policy, the political sustainability of the 2008 Climate Change Act and the politics of lobbying in the electricity sector.]"Right-Wing Populism and Climate Change Policy," Oxford Research Group, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/right-wing-populism-and-climate-change-policy//CHS PK

Populist parties are often hostile to climate change policy. But there has been relatively little attention paid by researchers to links between populism and climate scepticism. The rise of what is usually called right-wing populism has become one of the defining features of politics in the post-financial crash world. The election of Trump and the 2016 Brexit referendum result in particular have come to symbolise the shattering of the mainstream consensus. Though their rise may seem sudden, populist parties have been building their presence in continental Europe over a much longer period, and made further inroads, albeit not a breakthrough, in the European Parliament elections last month. The main preoccupation of most right-wing populists has been immigration or minorities. However, it is also the case that populist party platforms are often hostile to policy designed to address climate change, and their leaders and supporters express forms of climate scepticism that place them outside the political and scientific mainstream. This pattern can be seen in settings as diverse as the US, where the Trump administration is withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, seeking to restrict climate science and even trying to bring back incandescent light bulbs, and Finland, where the populist Finns Party recently accused mainstream politicians of "climate hysteria" and argued that environmental measures would “take the sausage from the mouths of labourers”. A recent study by German consultancy group Adelphi shows that right wing populist parties have consistently voted against climate legislation in the European Parliament. Despite this pattern, and the threat to progress on mitigating climate change that it poses, there has been relatively little attention paid by researchers to links between populism and climate scepticism, and why such a relationship exists. Climate scepticism and the 'left behind' One potential explanation rests on an analysis of populism as a response to structural change in the global economy. In this approach, emphasis is given to the fact that right-wing populist parties have had particular appeal amongst those – especially male, industrial and manufacturing workers and those in less skilled white collar occupations – whose jobs, incomes and wider economic security have been most eroded by processes of globalisation, automation and de-unionisation. Political scientist Hans-Georg Betz has called this group the ‘losers of modernisation’, and more recently they have been referred to in the media as the ‘left behind’. This group have not only been unable to benefit from the rise of the knowledge economy, but they have also lost their political voice, as mainstream political parties have become more technocratic and converged on a policy agenda aimed at middle-class voters, creating a ‘cartelisation’ of politics. On this view, the ‘left behind’ have disproportionately rallied around populist parties precisely because they stand outside the consensus. Certainly, some of the characteristics of those who are more likely to express climate scepticism in surveys, i.e. being older, male, working class, fit this account of the populist base. But why would the ‘left behind’ be hostile to the climate agenda specifically? One argument is that many of the sectors most affected by structural change – manufacturing, heavy industry and mining (especially coal) – are also the most carbon intensive, so climate policies pose a further threat to livelihoods. This is a hard argument to assess, as there are relatively few studies of attitudes to climate science and policy amongst specific occupational groups . However, one challenge to this view is that the number of people working in core high-carbon industries is actually very small. For example, coal miners often play an iconic role in right wing populist narratives, but direct employment in the coal industry even in major producers is tiny, making up at most 0.5% of total employment even in countries such as Poland and Australia, and much less in the USA. This casts doubt on whether the experience of such a small group could in itself have such a decisive effect in the positioning of populist movements on climate change. Perhaps a more plausible argument is that climate policies ‘threaten to pile new burdens’, as Martin Sandbu has recently put it, on a group that already feels economically insecure and politically excluded. On this view, levies on electricity bills to subsidise the growth of renewable energy, carbon taxes and other policies are resented, in part because they are highly regressive in their incidence. The most obvious and dramatic example of this is the ‘gilets jaunes’ revolt in France, sparked by a climate-driven tax on diesel. Because many of those unable to benefit from the knowledge economy are concentrated outside of metropolitan cities, and rely more on cheaper, older cars for mobility, road transport fuel taxes seem to be especially politically toxic. However, these accounts are insufficient on their own These ‘structuralist’ explanations, which focus on material interests, are undoubtedly important, but have limits. Support for populism is not limited to poorer voters – the mean household income of Trump supporters in the 2016 Presidential election was actually higher than that for Clinton supporters (although the reverse is true for populist supporters in the UK and France). At the same time, while the structuralist account might explain why populist voters and parties dislike some climate policies, it does not by itself offer a compelling explanation of why they embrace a wider scepticism about and hostility to climate science. For this, I would argue that we must also look at the ideological content of populism for such an explanation. The role of ideology and hostility to elites Several related dimensions of right-wing populist ideology are relevant here. One is the importance of socially conservative and nationalist values for right-wing populism. These values arguably produce hostility to the climate agenda because it is seen as being espoused principally by a socially liberal, cosmopolitan elite, counter to national interests, rather than an engagement with the issue of climate change itself. Climate change is seen as the cosmopolitan issue par excellence, often identified by populists in Europe with the European Union and by those in the US with the United Nations, and bound up their hostility to those institutions. While not the primary target of current populist concern in most cases, the climate agenda can in this sense be seen as suffering a form of ‘collateral damage’. Another relevant feature of populism here is the idea that the link between ‘the people’ and political elites has been broken. Modern representative democracy promises to place power in the hands of the people but is often necessarily complex and opaque in its workings, and the tension between the promise and the reality can undermine its legitimacy. Populism promises a simpler vision of direct democracy with government by the people, rather than politicians, bureaucrats or experts. Climate policy is particularly vulnerable on this terrain: policy making in most areas means technical complexities, distributional trade-offs and compromises between different groups, but climate policy also involves high levels of uncertainty, long-time frames, impacts across multiple sectors, international collective action problems and diffuse benefits, all of which add to the opaqueness of the relationship between actions and outcomes. These features arguably make it particularly aggravating for socially conservative nationalist populists already ill-disposed to such policy on values grounds. A final aspect of populist ideology potentially at work is the theme that elites are corrupted by special interests, what the Chilean scholar Pierre Ostiguy has argued are seen by populists as ‘nefarious minorities’. The primary targets of hostility are typically immigrants, but within the sphere of climate change they are environmentalists and climate scientists, who are often accused of pushing a false agenda to further their own interests. A related issue is that populist movements have been fertile ground for conspiracy theories regarding climate change. As the result of an invisible, highly complex, global set of processes, climate change is ideal material for conspiracy theories. This can be, for example, in the framing of the ‘Climategate’ case, in which a leaked set of emails by climate scientists about publishing data was seized on as evidence for a conspiracy to gain political influence and funding. Conclusion Our understanding of the links between the drivers of populism, populist world views and climate scepticism is still at an early stage. More systematic evidence is needed to test some of the arguments discussed here. But for those who are concerned about climate change, this should be an urgent agenda. Any effective response to the populist challenge will need to rest on such an understanding.

**Warming is linear—every decrease in rising temperatures radically mitigates the risk of existential climate change.**

Xu and Ramanathan 17, Yangyang Xu, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323//recut CHS PK

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).

### --Extra Impact

#### Democracies are not a monolithic system—even if some democracies are problematic, ones with more accountability and civic engagement are less likely to engage in regional warfare, have armed conflict, etc.

Cortright 13 [David Cortright, American Scholar and peace activist, director of policy studies at the Kroc Institute for international peace studies at the university of Notre Dame and Chair of the Board of the Fourth Freedom forum, “How State Capacity and Regime Type Influence the prospects for war and peace, <https://oefresearch.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Cortright-Seyle-Wall-Paper.pdf> ] JJ

A recurring trend runs through nearly all of the empirical studies on the democratic peace effect. Fully mature democratic states with high threshold scores on indicators of voice and accountability have the lowest risk of war and armed conflict. The characteristics of democracy that are most strongly associated with the absence of armed conflict and violent repression are political representativeness and inclusiveness. These are made possible by, and help to sustain, essential civil liberties and human rights. Walter, Reynal-Querol, Joshi, Davenport, and other scholars come to similar conclusions on the irenic effect of inclusive and participatory forms of governance. Jeffrey Dixon confirms these findings in his synthesis of quantitative studies on the correlates of civil war. As democracies become more inclusive, their risk of armed conflict diminishes. Discriminatory policies increase the risk of civil war, while guarantees of political freedom reduce that risk.140 The more participatory and open the political governance system the lower the chances of armed conflict and political violence. Peace is more likely when people are free to participate actively in choosing political decision makers and when diverse interests have effective political representation. Programs that foster citizen participation, inclusive institutions, accountability mechanisms, and greater public oversight bolster the conditions for peace. The two parts of this paper examine state capacity and democracy separately, but the irenic features of these separate dimensions overlap and reinforce one another. Effective institutions prevent armed conflict when they provide security and civilian services, and when they are inclusive and representative. A narrow focus on one dimension of governance—for example building strong institutions while ignoring the need for democratic accountability—could be counterproductive. Effective capacity and democratic governance go hand in hand and need to be combined to create the greatest peace effect. Social science research confirms that governments are better able to prevent armed conflict if they have strong institutions and maintain effective control over their territory, and if they provide the full range of public goods, including essential social services. The findings also highlight the importance of fostering governance systems with greater citizen participation and oversight, more inclusive and accountable forms of representation, and guarantees of political freedom and human rights. These and other policy approaches help to reduce the risk of armed conflict and are part of the process through which good governance promotes peace.

### 1AC—Advantage—Political Trust

#### US democracy is a given right now, but certain actions and constant erosion push us over the brink

Miller and Quealy 17 — Claire Cain Miller is a correspondent for The Times, where she writes about gender, families and the future of work for The Upshot, a Times site for analysis of policy and economics. She was part of a team that won a Pulitzer Prize in 2018 for public service for reporting on workplace sexual harassment issues. Kevin Quealy is a graphics editor and reporter at The New York Times, where he writes and makes charts for The Upshot, the Times site about politics, economics, and everyday life. He writes about a range of topics, including sports, politics, health care and income inequality; “Democracy in America: How Is It Doing?”; Feb. 23, 2017; nytimes.com/2017/02/23/upshot/democracy-in-america-how-is-it-doing.html

Democracy in the United States is strong, but showing some cracks. That is the conclusion of a new survey of 1,571 political scientists.

Almost all said that the United States performed well on some of the most important measures of democracy: free and fair elections, freedom of speech and judicial limits on executive power.

But fewer than two-thirds said other important standards of democracy were being met: no interference with the press and respect for judicial independence by elected branches of government. And a minority said the United States was succeeding at equal rights or basic behavioral norms of civil discourse.

The survey was the first to be conducted by Bright Line Watch, a new project formed by four researchers — two from Dartmouth and one each from Yale and the University of Rochester — to study democratic performance in the United States after the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump, and to compare it with other countries. The researchers said the survey was devised to try to avoid political bias, although before the election three of them wrote an open letter saying Mr. Trump threatened democracy. “Our concern is bringing academic expertise to the question, ‘How strong, or under threat, are basic institutions of American democracy?’ ” said Susan Stokes, a professor of political science at Yale and an organizer of Bright Line Watch. “That’s a nonpartisan question in the same sense that the Constitution is a nonpartisan document.” The fourth organizer, who did not sign the letter, is Brendan Nyhan, a professor of government at Dartmouth and a contributor to The Upshot. Bright Line Watch conducted the survey by contacting 9,820 faculty members from 511 institutions represented at the American Political Science Association meeting.

The project plans to survey the scholars quarterly, and The Upshot will follow the results.

In their initial assessments of the health of United States democracy in February, the political scientists were measured, in contrast with the sense of alarm expressed by some left-leaning thinkers.

“It reinforces the story that the U.S. is a high-functioning democracy,” Mr. Nyhan said. “It’s not perfect, but it has stronger and more resilient institutions than other countries that have had democratic backsliding or turns toward authoritarianism.”

The survey asked political scientists to rate the importance of 19 characteristics of a democratic government, then rate how well the United States currently fares on each. The bulk of respondents said the United States fully or mostly met half of the democratic standards, and fell short on half.

By far the most important element of democratic government, they said, was that elections are conducted and ballots counted without fraud or manipulation. This was also the element they thought the United States did best: 86 percent said the United States fully or mostly meets that standard. That assessment stands in sharp contrast to Mr. Trump’s unfounded claims of widespread voter fraud.

The United States is doing less well on the second- and third-most essential elements of a democracy, according to the respondents: equal political and legal rights and equal voting rights. About one-third said the country did not meet or only partly met these standards.

Two red flags — principles that were deemed important to democracy, but in which the United States is underperforming — have arisen during the Trump administration. They are that government officials do not use public office for private gains, they said, and that elections are free from foreign influence.

About half of respondents expressed skepticism that Congress and the Constitution were able to effectively limit executive power.

The areas in which American democracy is failing — according to more than 80 percent of respondents — concerned civil behavior. This involved norms that elected majorities should act with restraint and reciprocity, that politicians should campaign without disparaging their opponents’ patriotism or loyalty, and that public officials should recognize bureaucratic or scientific consensus.

The experts said that these were not essential to democracy, but that they were beneficial. Although behaviors like these aren’t enshrined in the Constitution or in statutes, political scientists say they help make democracies work.

Researchers who study how democracies have formed and fallen apart in other parts of the world have said that democracies often erode slowly, and identified various unwritten rules that get broken, like fair play or an acceptance that the opposition will sometimes win. Examples are giving nominees a confirmation hearing, or graciously accepting election results.

“They’re norms not in the Constitution but the kinds of practices that generate compromise, and if they go away things can unravel pretty quickly,” Mr. Nyhan said.

#### Unemployment is uniquely dangerous in a democratic system— empirics prove

Muro and Vidal 17— Dr Diego Muro is Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in International Relations at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews. He previously held positions at King’s College London (2003-2009) and the Pompeu Fabra University (2009-2016). He has also been Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute (2008-09) and Senior Fellow at the University of Oxford (2011-12). Guillem Vidal is a postdoctoral researcher at the chair for comparative politics at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, and at the Center for Civil Society Research at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. He obtained his Ph.D. in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the European University Institute, where he was involved in the ERC-POLCON project. With a background in economics and international relations, he has a multidisciplinary approach to his areas of interest, which span across the fields of comparative politics, politi cal economy and political sociology. “Is Unemployment the Worst Enemy of Democracy? Political Mistrust and the Economic Crisis in Southern Europe”; pg. 16-20; <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/59773/Muro_Vidal_Political_Mistrust_post-print_version.pdf?sequence=1> As+

Our second hypothesis (H2) is that political mistrust may be caused by changes in macroeconomic conditions. As we observe that changes of political attitudes coincide with the worsening of the global and European crisis, and that institutional performance appears not to be strongly correlated with political mistrust, we now turn to macroeconomic variables, in particular unemployment, to see whether there is any causal relationship. This second hypothesis is in line with recent empirical research (Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & Otter 2013; Morlino and Quaranta 2014), where unemployment levels appear to be closely related to the changes in the trust towards the main political institutions since 2008 in the EU. The underlying theory behind this hypothesis holds close parallelisms with studies of ‘economic voting’. According to this punishment-reward framework, growing levels of political mistrust would be the result of citizens’ unmet expectations with the perceived macroeconomic performance. In a nutshell, higher unemployment levels would generate higher rates of political mistrust.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the changes in trust towards the parliament, the unemployment levels for each country and the institutional performance rank, so as to provide an overall picture of each of these trends. Moreover, figure 5 illustrates those same variables conglomerated for each of the two 17 clusters. As opposed to the previous results, we find that unemployment behaves in a very similar manner to the changes in trust towards institutions, in particular from 2008 onwards. This is of course the case for the ‘debtor countries’, as little variation can be observed from the Northern European cluster.

[Insert Figures 3, 4, and 5 about here]

Regression analysis further supports the robustness of these results, as illustrated in Table 1. In order to account for the fixed effects of changes in unemployment on political mistrust we have controlled for other macroeconomic variables as well as institutional performance. Both clusters as well as the fixed effects from running panel data regressions indicate a strong positive impact of unemployment on mistrust towards parliament, that is, on political mistrust. Although other macroeconomic indicators such as inflation or GDP per capita also prove significant in the main regression, unemployment clearly remains the strongest indicator for both clusters.

 [Insert Table 1 about here]

Thus our analysis produces results that corroborate existing research on the empirical correlation between unemployment and trust towards parliament. Variables that measure economic performance are significantly more relevant in describing changes towards political attitudes than perceptions of institutional performance. While it would be an oversimplification to assert that economic variables can explain mistrust without taking into account other perfectly compatible institutional performance explanations such as corruption, we observe that during the period studied unemployment is a far better predictor of mistrust.

The fact that other economic indicators appear to have a smaller effect on political mistrust than unemployment suggests that citizens’ trust towards institutions is shaped on the basis of the information they receive from the national economic situation instead of ‘pocketbook evaluations’, that is, egotropic evaluations on personal finances. Confirming these results, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaiter (2007, p. 519) point out that ‘[i]n the overwhelming majority of studies, researchers have found that instead of emphasizing on personal finances, votes are much more likely to be considering the national economic situation when casting their vote’. This type of sociotropic evaluation could also serve as a framework to understand the formation of institutional trust beyond the punishment of the incumbent, especially under dire economic circumstances such as economic depressions.

Although some studies have concluded that the weight of unemployment, as opposed to other macroeconomic variables, is relatively ‘modest’ (Clarke et al. 1992), our results side with scholarly literature that has found that ‘there is a major role for macroeconomic conditions in shaping confidence in democratic institutions [...] through the effects of unemployment’ (McAllister 1999, p. 189). This further suggests that unemployment becomes a key determinant of trust during economic depression or when its levels reach a certain point. To sum up, we find that sociotropic evaluations of the national economy (unemployment in particular) become the main explanatory variable of political mistrust in times of economic crisis for Southern European cases.

4. Conclusion

This paper has examined the sources of political mistrust in Western Europe before and after the Great Recession. Prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, continental levels of mistrust were remarkably stable. After 2008, it was possible to trace an important variation between Southern and Northern clusters of EU member states. The combined effect of the Great Recession and the Eurozone’s debt crisis was especially hard-felt in the Southern periphery of the EU, which struggled with austerity measures and structural reforms in an attempt to regain competitiveness and market confidence from 2009 onwards. Europe’s internal disparity between creditor and debtor countries was due to the fact that the ‘economic crisis’ was not one and the same for everyone. Besides being a multi-level crisis of global, regional and national dimensions, the crisis was multifaceted and its impact on each country’s sovereign debt, banking system and economic growth was also different. Needless to say, country-level causes of the crisis – from housing bubbles to structural deficits – also accounted for the inner disparity.

In order to explain variation in political mistrust, this paper has sided with the scholarly view that privileges short-term explanations of mistrust, as opposed to arguments that explain trust as a function of longstanding processes of political socialization. The paper rejected the so-called cultural model early on because one of the assumptions of this approach is that political attitudes change in the longterm and, as result, this approach could not account for short-term variations caused by the economic depression. Instead, the paper focused on two variants of the performance model. More specifically, the paper tested two hypotheses that connected political mistrust with either institutional performance (H1) or macroeconomic performance (H2). Another important research choice was to identify the Eurozone as a conglomerate of countries in which we could examine the role of an external shock (e.g., the Great Recession) in creating distinct clusters of countries (debtors vs. creditors) and producing different levels of political mistrust.

The initial expectation of the paper was that different levels of trust (dependent variable) could be affected by the efficiency and responsiveness of political institutions to the economic crisis. We originally anticipated that effective and responsive political institutions that provided the general public with policies and goods they desired would have a positive impact on citizens’ evaluation of these institutions. Similarly, we expected governments that neglected the electorate’s preferences while insisting on fiscal austerity and structural reforms to alienate the public and implement self-defeating policies. This initial argument was both intuitive and plausible but our research findings suggested that, contrary to what political scientists may expect of an efficient principal-agent relationship, institutional performance is a less relevant independent variable than macroeconomic performance in predicting political mistrust. In the analysis we also discussed clarity of responsibility, that is, the extent to which citizens’ are able to identify the responsible agents of the economic situation and thus trust or mistrust institutions accordingly, as an intervening variable that could explain such unexpected results.

The paper has shown that unemployment may be considered the worst enemy of democracy. In times of want individual citizens get first-hand experience of the economic crisis in the form of declining disposable income, lower social mobility, rising inequality and, above all, joblessness. However, it appears to be the case that individuals’ negative perception of the national economy (sociotropic evaluations) greatly affects political opinions and eventually produces a critical assessment of political institutions as ultimately responsible for the dire economic situation. The unemployment rate accurately predicts the increase of mistrust but it is unclear that a causal mechanism connects employment growth and decline of mistrust.

#### Unemployment is the highest its been for a very long time and recovery efforts are slowing down

Casselman 10/08 — Ben Casselman writes about economics and other business topics for The New York Times, with a particular focus on stories involving data. He previously served as chief economics writer for the data-journalism web site FiveThirtyEight, and before that as a reporter for The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Casselman won a Loeb Award in 2011 for his coverage of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, and was part of a team that was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for national reporting. A graduate of Columbia University, Mr. Casselman lives in New York with his wife; “Staggeringly High’: U.S. Jobless Claims Remained Elevated Last Week”; Oct. 8, 2020; <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/08/business/economy/unemployment-jobless-claims-coronavirus.html> As+

Applications for jobless benefits remained high last week, even as the collapse of stimulus talks in Washington raised fears of a new wave of layoffs.

Unemployment filings have fallen swiftly from their peak of more than six million last spring. But that progress has recently stalled at a level far higher than the worst weeks of past recessions. That pattern continued last week, the Labor Department said Thursday: More than 800,000 Americans filed new applications for state benefits, before adjusting for seasonal variations, roughly in line with where the total has been since early August.

“The level of claims is still staggeringly high,” said Daniel Zhao, senior economist at the career site Glassdoor. “We’re seeing evidence that the recovery is slowing down, whether it’s in slowing payroll gains or in the sluggish improvement in jobless claims.”

That slowdown comes as trillions of dollars in government aid to households and businesses has dried up. Prospects for a new stimulus package, already dubious in a divided Washington, appeared to fall apart this week when President Trump said he was pulling out of negotiations. Economists across the ideological spectrum warn that the loss of federal help will lead to more layoffs and business failures, and more pain for families.

The continued high level of jobless claims, combined with large monthly job gains, highlights the remarkable level of churn still roiling the U.S. labor market. Companies are continuing to rehire workers as they reopen, even as other companies cut jobs in response to still-depressed demand for goods and services. The result is a job market that is being pulled in two directions at once — and economic data that can appear to tell contradictory stories.

Adding to the challenge for analysts and forecasters, the pandemic has thrown the data itself into disarray. For the second week in a row, the jobless claims data carried a Golden-State-size asterisk: California last month announced that it would temporarily stop accepting new unemployment applications while it addressed a huge processing backlog and installed procedures to weed out fraud.

In the absence of up-to-date data, the Labor Department is assuming California’s claim number was unchanged from its pre-shutdown figure of more than 225,000 applications, or more than a quarter of the national total. The state began accepting new filings this week, and is expected to resume reporting data in time for next week’s report.

While the lack of data from California makes week-to-week comparisons difficult, the bigger picture is clear: The economic recovery is losing momentum, even as millions of Americans remain out of work.

Monthly jobs data released last week showed that job growth slowed sharply in September, and that last spring’s temporary furloughs are increasingly turning into permanent job losses. Major corporations like Disney and Allstate have announced thousands of new job cuts. And with winter approaching, restaurants and other businesses that were able to shift operations outdoors during warmer weather could be forced to pull back anew.

Separate data from the Census Bureau on Wednesday showed that 8.3 million Americans reported being behind on rent in mid-September, and 3.8 million reported that they were likely to be evicted in the next two months. Both figures have changed little since August.

#### The plan solves – it creates stable long-term growth—COVID makes the aff try or die.

[Mark Paul et. al, William Darity Jr., Darrick Hamilton (2018), Mark Paul is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, William Darity Jr. is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and the Director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, Darrick Hamilton is Professor of Economics and Urban Policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research, and Director of the Doctoral Program in Public and Urban Policy at The New School, The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3-9-2018]//CHS PK

The benefits of permanent full employment in the U.S. economy through the creation of the NIEC would be substantial. They include, but are not limited to: The elimination of involuntary unemployment. A public option for employment means workers will no longer be forced into unemployment. The policy would eliminate cyclical and structural unemployment and provide workers with the dignity and sense of purpose that comes with employment. Furthermore, the elimination of involuntary unemployment would bypass the social and personal ills associated with unemployment, such as the erosion of skills, increased rates of physical and mental illness, suicide and attempted suicide, and failed relationships, among others.[[31]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn31) A true floor in the labor market. While minimum- and living-wage laws have historically been implemented to place a floor in the labor market, they fail to provide viable pathways to employment or out of poverty for those looking for work but unable to obtain employment in the first place. The job guarantee would function as a de facto floor in the labor market, greatly increasing the bargaining position of workers throughout the economy. For private employers to attract employees, they would have to offer a job that is at least as good as the one offered by the government. The elimination of working poverty. Unemployment is one of the strongest predictors of poverty in the United States. Households whose usual breadwinners are out of work are three times more likely to be poor than working households.[[32]](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn32) The job guarantee would substantially reduce poverty by eliminating involuntary unemployment and setting a non-poverty wage and compensation floor in the labor market. Improving workers livelihoods as the Federal Reserve manages its dual mandate. As noted above, the Federal Reserve has a dual mandate—maximum employment and price stability. Through its use of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve plays a vital role in promoting full employment; however, monetary policy has proven insufficient for eliminating involuntary unemployment. Historically, the Federal Reserve has had a significant role in increasing unemployment as a result of combating any inflationary pressures that may exist in the economy. With a job guarantee policy in place, the Federal Reserve can conduct monetary policy without promoting rising levels of unemployment. In this scenario, the job guarantee program can maintain employment and consumption expenditures while the Federal Reserve employs monetary policy to reduce private investment in order to cool the economy. Thus, U.S. workers would be less vulnerable to the Federal Reserve not adhering to their responsibility of a dual mandate appropriately due to their cultural over-emphasis—a function of their close ties to the financial sector—on price stability. The restoration of local and state tax bases. By providing for full employment, the job guarantee will increase employment, and therefore expenditures and tax revenues for local and state governments. Although the job guarantee is designed as a universal program, more resources will flow to communities that currently have the highest rates of unemployment and underemployment (presumably because of higher uptake of NIEC employment opportunities). This will result in increased government resources to better serve their constituents. Macroeconomic stabilization. The job guarantee would function as a robust automatic stabilizer in the economy, maintaining levels of employment during economic downturns through direct hiring, and freely allowing workers to flow from the jobs program to the private sector during economic boom times. While workers may see some decrease in their purchasing power during an economic contraction, the job guarantee will automatically expand as demand for employment in the private sector contracts, providing a buffer to incomes and guarding against major pitfalls in effective demand. The provision of socially useful goods and services. During the Great Depression, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) were public employment programs designed to put Americans back to work. The programs were implemented near the height of the Great Depression, when the national unemployment rate reached 25 percent. These programs, implemented under the Roosevelt administration, provided goods and services that benefited all Americans by facilitating the logistics and technological expansion of our public infrastructure, including 650,000 miles of new or improved roads; 39,000 schools built, improved, or repaired; 4,000 new or improved utility plants; and 225,000 concerts performed. Under a job guarantee, even those who do not receive employment via the NIEC will likely benefit through the increased provision of public goods and socially desirable goods and services. Furthermore, the provision of productive goods and services will dampen inflationary concerns.

#### US hegemony is sustainable and secure -- BUT America’s role requires a continued commitment to upholding democracy that give it a structural edge over revisionist powers

Kroenig 20 -- Matthew Kroenig (American political scientist, best-selling author, and an award-winning national security strategist. Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University), 2020, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China, ISBN 9780190080242 WJ

Great power rivalry has returned to international politics. After a quarter century of virtually uncontested American leadership, the United States faces serious geopolitical challenges from autocratic competitors, Russia and China. Will the United States retain its position as the world’s leading state, or will the U.S.-led global order be disrupted or displaced by Russia and China?

This book argued that democracies have built-in advantages in long-run geopolitical competitions and that the United States will likely remain the world’s leading state for the foreseeable future. It came to this conclusion by building on the political philosophy canon and contemporary social science research to develop a new way of thinking about power in international politics, tracing the origins of global power to domestic political institutions. It argued that to succeed in international political competition, a state must possess economic, diplomatic, and military strength. It further maintained that *democracies* perform better in key economic, diplomatic, and military functions. For this reason, democracies tend to amass more wealth and power than their autocratic competitors and to excel in great power rivalries.

This argument was then demonstrated through some simple statistics and a series of seven historical studies, comparing democratic and autocratic rivals from the ancient world to the present, including Athens against Persia and Sparta, the Roman Republic versus Carthage and Macedon, the Venetian Republic against the Byzantine Empire and the Duchy of Milan, the Dutch Republic and the Spanish Empire, Great Britain and France, the United Kingdom and Germany, and the United States and the Soviet Union. These studies did not show that democracies maintain permanent global hegemony, but they did reveal that open states have consistent, structural advantages in great power competitions. It also demonstrated that democracies have a knack for landing at or near the top of the global pecking order and that they have, on balance, fared better in enduring rivalries than their autocratic rivals. More open polities have played an outsized role in great power competition for over two thousand years and have ruled the international system for the past half a millennium. Autocrats, such as Xerxes, Phillip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin, have repeatedly made bids for global mastery, but they failed in the end, with their democratic competitors standing triumphantly over them.

The same fate likely awaits Messrs. Xi and Putin. Indeed, this book examined the current competition between the democratic United States and its autocratic rivals, Russia and China. The exercise demonstrated that Washington possesses significant power advantages over Moscow and Beijing. In many important areas, the gap in America’s favor even seems to be growing. A careful examination into the domestic political institutions of all three states showed that, for all of its problems, America’s fundamentals still look much better than Russia’s and China’s.

Taken together, therefore, the book found significant support for the idea that democracies enjoy a systematic advantage in great power politics. The United States will likely remain the world’s leading power and Russia and China may be in trouble.

The competing autocratic advantage argument was considered, but it did not hold up under investigation. To be sure, autocracies can perform certain tasks, like taking bold action, more easily than democracies, but this so-called advantage often leads to big mistakes. Moreover, other supposed advantages of autocracies are not really inherent to autocracies. Some argue that autocracies are better at steady, long-run planning or at acting without scruples, but throughout history we have seen many fragile and fickle autocrats and stable and stony democrats. Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom, we saw that democracies tend to maintain a more stable long-term strategic direction. Further, the alleged weaknesses of democracies put forward by autocratic advantage advocates, such as checks and balances resulting in stalemate and discord, are actually among their greatest strengths. There is just not that much evidence for the idea that autocratic systems are better suited for great power rivalry. Currently, many in the West are concerned that President Xi in China and Russia’s President Putin are tightening their grips on power. They see these steps as indications of firm leadership, just as Western democracies appear to be more fractious and harder to govern than ever. But this is the wrong lesson to draw. The increasingly autocratic systems in Russia and China are a major problem, not for the United States, but for Russia and China. As Xi and Putin systematically eliminate any domestic political obstacles to their unchecked power, they also exacerbate the weaknesses inherent in their autocratic political models.

This book, therefore, made the “hard-power” case for democracy. Generally, democracy is admired because it is the best political system for advancing freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and human dignity. Those are important attributes, and democracy is rightly celebrated for these normative reasons. But by focusing too much on these softer assets, we overlook other important and practical benefits of democracy: Democracy is the best machine ever invented for generating enormous state wealth, influence, power, and prestige on the international stage. Indeed, it is difficult if not impossible to achieve lasting global mastery without it.

The United States and its democratic allies and partners should be proud of their domestic political systems not just because they are morally superior but also because they are more effective. Autocrats have some explaining to do, not just because their political systems are immoral, but also because they are corrupt, inefficient, and ultimately make their countries weaker.

International relations (IR) scholars have thoroughly studied the role of power in international politics, but they have largely overlooked some of the most interesting and important issues. They have asked: What kind of international distribution of power is more stable? Are bipolar worlds with two major powers more or less peaceful than multipolar worlds with three or more great powers? What are the conditions under which power transitions lead to war? Do international systems with one dominant power tend to have greater levels of economic openness? And the list goes on.

In all of these studies, however, IR scholars have been obsessed with the effects of power, not its causes. Rather, they take power as a given, or “exogenous” variable, and do not examine what generates power in the first place.

But questions about the fundamental causes of power may be the most critical to understanding international politics. Why are some countries more powerful than others? Why do some countries rise to enter the circle of the great powers while others do not? Why do some great powers achieve global ascendancy while others burn out? Why do power transitions occur? After millennia of the world’s leading thinkers pondering the role of power in world statecraft, we have barely begun to scratch the surface on this set of important questions.

This book advances IR theory, therefore, by providing a clear and novel theoretical explanation that traces the origins of power in world politics to domestic political institutions. The argument of this book is that democracies dominate.

There are other implications for international relations theory as well. IR scholars argue that states form coalitions to balance against dominant states, but this study showed that balancing behavior often depends on the regime type of the potential hegemon. States balance against autocracies, consistent with past theory, but they often bandwagon with powerful democracies. In addition, foreign-imposed regime change is often seen as an aberration, especially following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but the historical review in this book revealed that it is actually a recurring feature of international politics. Democratic and autocratic states alike regularly attempt to overthrow the enemy’s form of government and install a new one in their own image. Moreover, democratic peace theory may hold in more modern times, but open states often engaged in direct warfare in the past, from the ancient world to the Italian Renaissance.

Turning to real-world implications, while many predict an end to the American era, this book gives us good reason to believe that the United States will continue to be the world’s leading country indefinitely. We are no longer living in the “unipolar moment” of overwhelming American primacy that we witnessed for the twenty-five years from 1989 to 2014.1 But the United States is and likely will continue to be the leading state among multiple, competing great powers.

By my calculation, the average reign for a dominant democracy atop the international system is 130 years, with a range of 95 years for Athens at the low end and 221 years for Great Britain at the high end. The United States clocks in at 75 years and counting. If history is any guide, therefore, it still has a couple of good decades and maybe another century to go.

The laws of social science, however, are probabilistic and not deterministic. In other words, unlike the laws of gravity in physics, none of our theories are certain in international relations. As Machiavelli cautions, success in international politics is the result of both virtu and fortuna. The literal translations of these words are virtue and fortune, but his intended meaning was somewhat closer to what we would today call skill and circumstances. Machiavelli argued that even the most skilled leaders sometimes fail due to other overriding forces and that when circumstances are propitious, skilled leaders must still be prepared to seize the moment. In other words, the U.S. system is competitive, but Washington still must compete. So, what should the United States do at this moment to maximize its chances of success?

To design a sound strategy, one must first accurately survey the strategic environment. Russia and China are unlikely to replace the United States as global leader, but they do pose a serious threat to U.S. and allied security and economic well-being.

Moscow and Beijing rightly believe that the U.S.-led, liberal international order poses an existential threat. They do not like to see the United States projecting military power across the globe. They are bothered by the spread of America’s alliance network right up to their sovereign borders. They do not have to play by the rules at home, so they chafe under an expectation that they follow a rules-based order abroad. They cannot outcompete market economies and they are frustrated that the democratic core is pushing back on their attempts to prey on the international economic system. They rightly fear that the spread of democracy could led to the very collapse of their regimes. In sum, they are threatened by the U.S.-led, rules-based order and they are doing their best to either revise it or tear it down; as President Putin has said, “new rules or no rules.”

Make no mistake, the threat these states pose to the U.S. led order is ideological in nature. The renewed great power competition with Russia and China is not purely a realist game of great powers pragmatically jockeying for power and influence. Rather, like many of the autocracy versus democracy battles we have seen throughout history, it is a clash of political models. It is a fundamental dispute about the best way to govern societies both at home and abroad. For some, the autocratic system of domestic repression, state-led economies, and an illiberal foreign policy will be appealing. But nearly all of America’s traditional friends and allies will be much more attracted to the U.S. model of open markets and free politics. We must make it clear to these partners that their day-to-day engagements with Russia and China are not, therefore, isolated decisions about whether to, for example, buy cheap Russian gas or allow Chinese infrastructure investment, but rather a more fundamental choice between democracy and autocracy. They must decide what type of political system they want for themselves and others and what kind of world system they want to inhabit.

Some have argued that Russia and China do not pose an ideological challenge because, unlike the Soviet Union, they are not intentionally looking to export their model. China is, however, helping autocrats around the world deploy technology that will help governments repress their citizens. Moreover, Moscow and Beijing are contributing to an international environment characterized by democratic backsliding globally as other strongmen eagerly emulate their models. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, this is an ideological competition because Moscow and Beijing are threatened by democratic ideology. They want to create an international system in which their regimes can continue to survive and thrive; they want to make the world safe for autocracy.

These are not objectives that the United States and its allies should accommodate. While the U.S.-led order may not serve the interests of autocrats in Russia and China, it has made the world a more peaceful, prosperous and well-governed place over the past seventy-five years. Giving in to Russia and Chinese demands would mean a return to international conflict, decreased worldwide living standards, and the retreat of global democracy and good governance.

How then can the United States best maintain its international leadership position? To stave off decline, it can begin by learning from the fates of the liberal hegemons that have preceded it. We have seen in this book that democratic great powers have done quite well historically, but they have fallen for three reasons. Athens was defeated primarily due to a rash decision permitted by its system of direct democracy. Rome and Venice lost their vitality when they closed the open political systems that had sustained their rise. Finally, the Dutch Republic and Great Britain were surpassed by other, even more competitive, democratic rivals; England overtook the Dutch Republic and Great Britain passed the baton of democratic global leadership to the United States.

Domestically, therefore, Washington must continue to nurture its greatest source of strength: its institutions. Some argue that America’s greatest advantage is its innovative economy, its global network of alliances, or its military dominance, but this book explained how all of these positive attributes are, in fact, byproducts of America’s underlying domestic political system. Democracy is the master variable that explains U.S. success

#### Declining US hegemony leads to great power competition which causes extinction

Kumar 18 – Rajesh Kumar is an Associate Fellow at the Institute, currently working on a project titled “Emerging Powers and the Future of Global Governance: India and International Institutions.” He has PhD in International Organization from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Prior to joining IDSA in 2016, he taught at JamiaMilliaIslamia, New Delhi (2010-11& 2015-16) and University of Calicut, Kerala (2007-08). His areas of research interest are International Organizations, India and Multilateralism, Global Governance, and International Humanitarian Law. "Will Great-Power Conflict Return?" <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/great-power-conflict-rkumar-060418>

Great power conflict is becoming a reality on the global agenda, once again. For the past nearly three decades, the primary focus of the global strategic community was on small wars, counter-terrorism, and climate change, poverty, pandemics and transnational organized crime. Further, during these years, there was optimism that globalization and interdependence could bring about political and economic transformation inducing global peace and stability. The post-Cold War world with the United States as the superpower, a weak Russia, and rising China did not witness the intense geopolitical struggles of the earlier generations. The realigned blocs and alliances and growth of regional organizations across the globe also limited the possibilities of such conflict.

But developments in the past couple of years herald a new era of high politics. The relative decline of the US, the rise of China as America’s leading competitor, the re-emergence of Russia and its desire for greater role in global politics all seem to be serving as stimuli for a renewed round of great power competition. The mounting tensions in East and South China Seas, ‘trade war’ between China and the US, and Russia's assertive engagement in Ukraine and Syria are cases in point.

Further, three recent US government documents — National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) — herald the return of great power competition by emphasising that terrorism is no longer the top US priority and that the US focus from now will be on strategic competition with great powers such as Russia and China.1 The responses of China and Russia and their articulations also point to competition which can ultimately push the world into great power conflict.

Thus, on the one hand, the US, worried about the relative decline of its primacy, has declared that great power competition will be its primary focus from now on.2 Accordingly, it is prioritising military options and arms race over diplomacy and arms control. On the other, with worldviews that stand in contradiction to that of the US, China and Russia are also flexing their muscles. Against this backdrop of the return of great power conflict, this issue brief analyses the strategic documents and the actions of the US, China, and Russia3 to draw insights into the prospects for productive cooperation among great powers on critical international issues.

Threat of Great-Power Conflict: Hype vs Reality

The majority of the explanations for the return of great-power conflict hark back to the history of world politics, particularly the accounts of power shifts and their ramifications. Indeed, changes in the power hierarchy have been one of the most familiar explanations for great power conflict.4 One such example is the idea of a ‘Thucydides Trap’, which has been articulated by Graham Allison in Destined for War. The ancient Greek historian Thucydides observed that “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”5

In the present-day context, as China challenges American hegemony, misconceptions between these two powers about the other’s actions and intentions could lead them into a similar trap. Allison analyses 16 cases of great power conflicts in the past 500 years, in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling one and concludes that, among these, 12 ended in war.6 British efforts to contain the rise of Germany and the outcome, First World War, are the 20th century reference for the destined path of power transition in global politics.

History is not the only source and support for reasoning about great power conflict. In January 2018, The Economist published a cover story titled, 'The Next War: The Growing Threat of Great Power Conflict’, which detailed how shifts in technology and geopolitics are bringing the threat of great-power conflict back. In this view, “conflict on a scale and intensity not seen since the Second World War is once again plausible.”7 Discussing the likelihood of a second Korean War, the article observes that beyond the nuclear quandary in the Korean peninsula, China is at the cusp of great-power competition with the West.8 Interestingly, many of the defence industries in the US have started preparing for a great power conflict with serious investment in new technologies.9 The massive Russian and Chinese arms modernisation efforts are also geared towards a similar objective.10

A large number of analysts hold the threat of great power conflict in their priority listing. Some see great power competition across all three regions of Eurasia and beyond as well as the revival of a global ideological struggle as the core characteristic of the emerging era.11 Dmitri Trenin explains this phenomenon in a global context. He observes that the mounting tensions in the East and South China Seas, the arrival of nationalist leaders in Tokyo and New Delhi, and the revisionist, resurgent Russia as an emerging trend of great-power competition.12 A recent report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) titled 'Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts' evaluates the plausibility and military implications of future great power conflicts.13 Stephen F. Cohen, Professor Emeritus of Russian Studies in New York University and Princeton argues that both the NDS and NPR validate what he has been warning for the last 20 years — a second Cold War with Russia.14

US and the Future of Great-Power Conflict

At the core of the burgeoning scholarly interest in great-power conflict are three recent US government documents: the NSS, NDS and NPR. The NSS observes that “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned.” Further, it said that China and Russia began to reassert their regional and global influence and fielding military capabilities designed to deny American access. Through challenging the geopolitical advantages of the US, China and Russia are trying to change the international order in their favour, the NSS observed.15

While discussing future regional strategies, NSS also signalled the possibility of the return of an ideological struggle similar to the Cold War by stating that “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.”16 The NSS explicitly and repeatedly criticises China’s efforts at using economic incentives and military threats to “persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda.”17 Moreover, in rather tough words, the document criticises China’s prestigious Belt and Road Initiative for its “unfair trade practices” and “extractive economic policies.”18 As the NSS shows, the US views China and its rise as a threat to US hegemony.

Similarly, the NDS also paints Russia and China with the same brush, but in darker hues. While releasing the document at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Secretary of Defence James N. Mattis indicated the shift in strategy by saying “great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of US national security.”19 He also added that “we face growing threats from revisionist powers as different as China and Russia are from each other, nations that do seek to create a world consistent with their authoritarian models, pursuing veto authority over other nations' economic, diplomatic and security decisions.”20 Mattis expressed a similar view in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee as well. He said: “A return of great power competition, marked by a resurgent and more aggressive Russian Federation and a rising, more confident and assertive China, places the international order under assault.”21

While the NSS talks of a Chinese threat to the Indo-Pacific region, the NDS presents it as an imminent threat to the rules-based world order in which China seeks to replace the US as the global leader. The strategy contains elements of both the notion of ‘winner takes all’ and the concept of Thucydides Trap. For instance, the US sees China’s military modernisation programme as an effort to displace US hegemony and achieve global pre-eminence. The basis of such calculations is the same strategic distrust and worst-case assumptions explained by Graham Allison. These fundamental shifts in US policy, prioritising inter-state competition, supplemented with similar responses from China and Russia, have brought the threat of great power conflict to the top of the global agenda. The new NPR also acknowledges the emergence of great power tensions as the driving force in international security. Taking advances in Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities seriously, the review proposes a comprehensive nuclear recapitalisation programme to meet the future threat. Here too, the priority for Washington is to “maintain a forward military presence capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating any adversary.”22

Many see these developments as an inevitable fall out of the Trump Presidency. However, the Obama administration had also identified Russia and China as the greatest security challenges to the US. For instance, in his Defense Posture Statement, the then Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter described “great power competition from a resurgent Russia and a rising China” as the top two challenges for the US in future.23 The statement continued:

“Russia and China are our most stressing competitors, as they have both developed and are continuing to advance military systems that threaten our advantages in specific areas, and in some cases, they are developing weapons and ways of war that seek to achieve their objectives in ways they hope would pre-empt a response by the United States.”24

Chinese and Russian views on Great-Power Competition

While US strategic documents identify China and Russia as great powers and competition with these countries as its future priority,25 the articulations and responses from China and Russia also signal the return of high politics. Both China and Russia view themselves as great powers. China’s economic weight, rapidly expanding military power including nuclear weapons, population size and UNSC veto virtually guarantee great power status. Though Russia has limited capabilities outside the nuclear realm and UNSC membership, it still enjoys the power to disrupt and reconfigure the international system. It has the ability to devastate a significant portion of the globe with its nuclear and conventional weapons arsenal. Another significant factor is Russia’s strategic geographical location, which makes it an indispensable player in both Asia and the Greater Middle East. Finally, with its huge energy resource, Russia is an energy superpower as well.

China, with its growing influence in the system, aims to reshape the international order to ensure that it is receptive to its concerns. Though China has not stated that great power competition is its priority, its grand strategy puts it in competition with the interests of the US and other powers in the system. When power transition theories suggested that arising power and the hegemon are unlikely to settle peacefully26 and projected China as the latest challenger to US hegemony, China responded with a curious phrase: 'A new model of great power relations'27 This notion refused to see great power relations as a zero-sum game and proposed a win-win situation for all through cooperation. It was Xi Jinping who proposed to establish a ‘new type of Great Power relations’ between China and the US during his trip to Washington in 2012. For several years thereafter, the promise of a 'new model' was nearly impossible for Chinese media and officials to avoid mentioning. For instance, in September 2015, on the eve of President Xi's visit to the United States, Cui Tiankai, the Chinese Ambassador to the US, used the phrase 12 times in a single editorial in the Peoples' Daily.28 However, since Donald Trump came to office, China has abandoned the phrase and focused on donning the mantle of global leadership. Xi's address on economic globalization in Davos is a case in point.29

It is true that, while the global media extensively debated the portrayal of China in the NSS as a threat to US hegemony, the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, did not even react to the criticism. However, militarily, China continues to invest in capabilities that are explicitly designed to exploit perceived US military vulnerabilities. China’s Military Strategy (2015) asserts that its armed forces will gradually shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations.30 Its anti-access/area-denial capabilities threaten to erode the foundation of the US security commitments in Asia.31 Chinese policies towards the Asia-Pacific inevitably challenge the US approach. For instance, in January 2017, 'China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation' strongly criticised the US on the issues of Anti-Ballistic Missile and South China Sea.32 Moreover, the Chinese military today represents a cutting-edge combat force that fields increasingly sophisticated capabilities in significant numbers. Its fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20, poses a vital threat to US air and naval power in the Indo-Pacific.33 The trade war between the US and China and Chinese plans to pay for oil in yuan instead of the dollar in future also indicate that the relationship between the two great powers will not be friendly.34

The deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West and Russia's worldview also enhance the threat of great power conflict. Russia believes that the Western system of order threatens its interests and wants to work towards the development of a new world order that promotes Russian interests.35 Russia’s security and military policy after 2014 sees the world as a hostile place marked by stiff competition amongst major powers and all documents emphasize the importance of military force in global politics.36 Russia’s military doctrine also reflects its tense relationship with the West. Maintaining Russia’s pre-eminence in the post-Soviet space remains its key foreign policy priority.37

The relationship between Russia and the West is in a new low with allegations of Russian involvement in US elections and also in the nerve agent attack against a former Russian spy on British soil. While NATO identifies Russia as the principal security threat to the West, alongside the Islamic State and Ebola, Russia is engaged in nuclear sabre-rattling to remind the West of the possible costs of military action against Russia. Russia is also making efforts to form a grand anti-US alliance with China.38 The Syrian conflict is another example of evolving Russia-US clash. While Russia supports Assad regime, the US backs some of the opposition forces including the Kurds.

Though the Cold War ended almost three decades ago, one of the alliances that owes its origins to that struggle, NATO, still plays a pivotal role in the mounting tensions with Russia. The crisis in Ukraine is a case in point. As John Mearsheimer argues, it was the West’s fault, NATO enlargement and EU’s eastward expansion that provoked Putin to use military force.39 NATO's defensive drill called 'Iron Wolf 2017' to deter Russian aggression in the Kaliningrad enclave of Baltic and Russia's response 'Zapad 2017' contributed a lot to the mounting tension.40 These military drills represent a shift from a “political” dispute to a “military” conflict between the two sides.

Conclusion

US strategic documents and the Chinese and Russian responses confirm that the geopolitical competition among the great powers is rising. However, none of this leads to the automatic conclusion that a great power conflict will break out anytime in the near future. Viewed through the prism of power transition theory, US strategies and decision to prioritise military options over diplomacy could pave the way towards military conflict. If the hegemon decides to check its decline by escalating tensions with other great powers in the system, the risk of conflict will rise.

The fundamentally anarchic nature of world politics supplemented by the deepening misperceptions and faulty calculations of the great powers would suggest a similar conclusion. Great power relations are the sole prominent make-or-break issue in determining whether major war or relative peace will characterize the international system. It also virtually conditions the response of the global community to other significant challenges. In any case, the geopolitical competition among great powers with or without direct conflict will lead to a situation where productive cooperation among great powers on international issues is likely to prove difficult. Consequently, it will limit the ability of the great powers to make positive systemic changes in the world order.

### 1AC—Advantage—CJS

#### Ex-prisoner unemployment is exploding.

[Jose Davila (2020), Managing Editor Yale Daily News, Workers with criminal records hit hard by pandemic job losses, The Blade, 6-68-20]//CHS PK

Great Depression-era levels of unemployment due to the coronavirus pandemic have hit many Americans hard, but those with criminal records are bearing the brunt even more. Shutdowns due to the coronavirus pandemic have restricted the availability of programs and resources that the ex-convict community normally relies on to find jobs and other necessities. Local reentry nonprofits like Lutheran Social Services of Northwest Ohio and The RIDGE Project said an influx of early releases from prisons due to the coronavirus and substantial layoffs have complicated their work. The groups have also worked to reorient their services to continue to help their clients while keeping clients and workers safe. "It has been harder for [those with criminal records] to obtain a position and that's due to barriers of receiving a state ID or a driver's license, a social security card, or a birth certificate," Lisa Garry-Wilson, a reentry case management specialist at Lutheran Social Services of Northwest Ohio, said. "You need those documents for employment, but with everything shut down, that created barriers." The coronavirus and resulting shutdowns have created high unemployment levels in Ohio. The state unemployment rate fell to 13.7 percent in May after a 17.6 percent rate in April. However, the state unemployment rate is still up from 4.1 percent from a year ago, according to data released by the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services last week. While specific data on ex-convict unemployment is sparse, a 2018 report from the Prison Policy Initiative found that 27 percent of ex-offenders nationwide were unemployed. At the time, the general unemployment rate in the country was four percent. Since the 1980s, millions of Americans, who are disproportionately black, have compiled a criminal record, severely complicating their search for work after release. Those that do find work often hold jobs in places like restaurants, warehouses, and construction where it is impossible to work from home. Many also work on a contract basis, which means that they might be the first people to be laid off in a crisis. Ms. Garry-Wilson and Ron Tijerina, co-founder of The RIDGE Project, a prison outreach nonprofit focused on empowering those with criminal records and their families, both said that they had clients who had been laid off from jobs in Northwest Ohio. Ms. Garry-Wilson said there had definitely been an increase in unemployment among those with records and said that she has helped a lot of clients with their unemployment applications. Mr. Tijerina said that, as workplaces have begun to reopen, the people he works with have been able to go back to work or find new jobs. Ms. Garry-Wilson's organization, Lutheran Social Services, comprises a range of different programs aimed to enhance the mental and social well-being of its clients, many of whom have been incarcerated in the past. However, due to the coronavirus pandemic many of those programs have changed or stopped altogether. In usual times, Ms. Garry-Wilson tries to place her clients in job training programs at LSS and other partners like OhioMeansJobs and Goodwill. She said most of the programs are still not up and running due to social distancing mandates. "Due to the impact of COVID within our facilities, a large portion of programming has been suspended. However, as we enter a new phase, Director Chambers-Smith is approving plans for facilities to resume some services and programming when and where it is safe to do so," said Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction spokesman JoEllen Smith. Mr. Tijerina oversees the prison ministry side of The RIDGE Project while his wife, Cathy Tijerina, heads the youth division. In his role, Mr. Tijerina mentors incarcerated and formerly incarcerated men and helps connect them to resources for a successful reentry. Recently, the nonprofit held a virtual entrepreneurial contest in which those behind bars could pitch their business idea to potential investors and win seed money for their idea. "Everything is still online. So, it has really forced [clients], if you don't have any computer skills, to become better at the computer," Mr. Tijerina, who has a criminal record of his own, said. "The libraries are just now finally reopening. So, in the past, they would go to the libraries and learn from there how to get on the job search sites, but they didn't have the equipment at home to do it...So, it really put a hindrance on them." Both LSS and The RIDGE Project have transitioned to providing more of their services online, but barriers to finding employment for those with criminal records due to the coronavirus remain. Obtaining appropriate documentation and finding housing for recently-released people has been hard with closures and limited hours still in effect across Northwest Ohio. A lack of job training and spotty internet access also stand in the way of ex-convicts looking for work. Businesses also have little reason to hire people with criminal records as there are still a lot of potential employees out of work due to the pandemic.

#### Coronavirus has uniquely worsened the employment prospects of ex-prisoners.

Gerber 20 [Marisa Gerber writes narrative stories about life in Los Angeles and across the Southland for the Los Angeles Times. She previously covered L.A. County’s criminal courts for The Times and, before joining the newspaper in 2012, wrote about life on the border for several publications in Arizona. Gerber grew up in Nogales, Ariz., and graduated from the University of Arizona.] “He worked hard to find a job after a nonprofit paid his bail. Then the coronavirus hit,” July 1st, 2020, Los Angeles Times, <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-01/during-covid-19-recession-its-even-harder-for-people-with-criminal-records-to-find-and-keep-jobs>, VM

Even in a thriving economy, people with arrest records often struggle to find work, and during recessions their prospects get even worse. The recent lockdowns not only shuttered restaurants and retail shops — some of the main low-wage, long-hours jobs that people with records often get boxed into — but also created a newly massive pool of Angelenos looking for work. That means that thousands of people who were recently released from custody, including those who got out early because of how dangerous it is to be inside a packed jail or prison during a pandemic, are competing for jobs against those who may have longer work histories, no record and more education, said Bryan Sykes, associate professor of criminology, law and society at UC Irvine.

#### Recidivism and incarceration rates are increasing in the status quo, leading to a litany of social and economic impacts.

Prison Scholar Fund 16 [The Prison Scholar Fund envisions a country that provides access to higher education for all its citizens, even those imprisoned. Article cites podcast - “The Founder of the Prison Scholar Fund Thrives in the Face of Adversity,” and The Independent Committee on Reentry and Employment. Report and Recommendations to New York State on Enhancing Employment Opportunities for Formerly Incarcerated People. The Independent Committee on Reentry and Employment, New York.] “The Problem: Recidivism & Mass Incarceration” https://www.prisonscholars.org/what-we-do/222-2/

The U.S. has a problem with mass incarceration. The U.S. has five percent of the world’s population yet incarcerates 25% of the world’s prisoners, incarcerating at a rate 4 to 7 times higher than other Western nations. This corrections system impacts American taxpayers over $80 billion per year. With over two million people “behind bars,” the U.S. has the highest total prison population in the world.The national crime rate and number of prisoners have declined over the past 5 years; however, the percentage of new crimes committed by individuals released from prison has been increasing. Recidivism has come to be known as “the revolving door” in and out of prisons. 67.8% of all released prisoners are re-arrested within three years of release. Incarceration and recidivism most directly affect non-white and poor individuals, reflecting the “disproportionate minority contact” of the criminal justice system [i], and the link between poverty and criminal justice system involvement. Poor communities of color also pay the price of high recidivism, in social and economic terms, via experiencing insufficient public safety , erosion of social relationships, and pervasive intergenerational poverty. Incarceration has a negative effect on economic mobility, with fiscal consequences not only for the formerly incarcerated but their families and communities as well.

#### FJG is key to stopping mass incarceration – those that are unemployed fall in the hands of the prison industry.

Coates 20 [Dr. Delman Coates is senior pastor of Mt. Ennon Baptist Church in Clinton, Md., and founder of the Our Money Campaign. He is a graduate of Morehouse College, Harvard Divinity School, and Columbia University.] Sojourners, Jan 22, 2020, “THE UNFINISHED WORK OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT” https://sojo.net/articles/unfinished-work-civil-rights-movement

“A recent poll found that a staggering 78 percent of Americans are now in favor of a federal job guarantee. Although it has been largely erased from public memory, the job guarantee was a centerpiece not only of FDR’s second bill of economic rights, but also of the civil rights movement’s policy agenda. Coretta Scott King mobilized 1.2 million people to march for full employment in the late 1970s. This culminated in the disappointing passage of the watered-down Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act in 1978, a bill that initially included a job guarantee. It is time that we complete the unfinished work of the civil rights movement, and the faith community must be at the forefront of this noble and historic work. The key point to observe about our current economic arrangement is that it is explicitly designed to fall short of achieving full employment. Much like a game of musical chairs in which someone is left out by design, our system engineers an economic environment in which millions find themselves unemployed and underemployed. Our policymakers actively and intentionally enforce an economy of mass unemployment, which happens to disproportionately claim black and brown casualties. In practice, what this looks like is when the private sector comes “too close” to achieving full employment (something it has never actually delivered), the Federal Reserve has historically taken steps, namely raising interest rates, to increase unemployment, in the name of protecting the economy from rising inflation. Today, even in a period of historically low unemployment, we still have 11 million Americans unemployed or underemployed. That’s 11 million Americans without proper “seats” in this game of musical chairs our policymakers have us playing. Nothing pushes one into a life of crime more forcefully than the inability to provide for one’s self and one’s family. In the context of mass incarceration, our mass unemployment regime pushes the unemployed into the waiting arms of the for-profit prison industry. During the Clinton-era welfare reform bill, with the prospect of a job guarantee forgotten, a bipartisan consensus would weaponize the biblical ethic of reciprocity to justify cuts to benefits for those left without a seat in our national game of musical chairs. “He who does not work, neither shall he eat,” we were told. How many of those who found it morally acceptable to withhold bread from those who refuse to contribute to society, realized that the reforms would, in fact, deny bread to those whose contribution society refuses? A great legacy of the civil rights movement is the understanding that society need not refuse the contribution of anyone. The job guarantee is a practical affirmation of the value of the contribution of each member of society. By accepting and facilitating the contribution of every person willing and able to work, the job guarantee adds to society’s abundance for the benefit of all. Those who have called attention to the need to dismantle our system of mass incarceration are correct to do so. However, to truly rectify the situation, we must provide the unemployed with a legal means of making a living. Our current economic arrangement uses interest rate policy to influence hiring by the private sector, and shuns direct hiring by the public sector as a means of delivering full employment. The private sector, meanwhile, is composed of for-profit businesses that bear no official responsibility for delivering full employment. In fairness to the private sector, only an institution that is not bound by the constraints of profitability can be charged with the responsibility of providing employment to all who seek it. This is why delivering full employment through a job guarantee is a proper role of government. The great advantage that efforts to pass a job guarantee have today, which previous generations did not, is a robust theoretical defense of the proposition that a job guarantee would neither cause excessive inflation nor require tax increases.”

#### Employment reduces recidivism – most comprehensive study finds.

Cove and Bowes 15 [America Works founder Peter Cove (l) and Lee Bowles (r), the organization’s CEO.] “Immediate Access to Employment Reduces Recidivism,” Real Clear Politics, June 11th, 2015, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/06/11/immediate\_access\_to\_employment\_reduces\_recidivism\_126939.html

More than half a million people are released from federal and state jails and prisons in this country each year. Following their release, roughly two-thirds of ex-offenders are arrested for a new offense within three years resulting in a seemingly unbreakable vicious cycle. After more than three decades of working with large populations of ex-offenders, we asked whether employment reduces recidivism to crime. Approaching think tanks and scholars, we were surprised to find that little research had been done on the subject. The idea that if you provided employment for those leaving prison might reduce their going back seems logical. But that is just not enough to convince policy makers that a new approach must be developed. Following years of speculation and anecdotal evidence, it was time to study the actual impact employment has on recidivism. We joined forces with the Manhattan Institute to address this pressing issue. Our company, America Works, operated the program and an independent research organization conducted the study. The Manhattan Institute recently released the study results, and yes, they support our original thesis. Work reduces recidivism but there’s an important caveat that we must point out - the sooner ex-offenders are employed, the less likely they will commit future crimes resulting in further jail and prison time. The study revealed that there was a 20 percent reduction in return to crime by non-violent offenders (who constitute the majority of incarcerated individuals). To put the findings in context, acclaimed NYU Professor of Politics and Public Policy Larry Mead said, “In most random social studies there are usually little or no positive effects. The results are huge.” To further supplement this study, we looked within our own prison-to-work programs in six cities across the United States. While they were not controlled studies, the results have been consistent and impressive. Statewide rates of recidivism range from about 31 to 70 percent, while the rates for those placed in jobs shortly after their release ranged from 3.3 to eight percent. One could claim that these were self-selected to be more employable and less likely to recidivate. But in High Point, NC, only violent offenders who were identified by the police as most likely to reoffend were referred to our office for jobs. The North Carolina statewide recidivism rate was 40.7 percent, while the recidivism rate for individuals referred and placed in jobs was five percent. Our Maryland office had equally successful results. The state’s recidivism rate hovers just over 40 percent. We found than there was zero recidivism for ex-offenders who reached six months of employment.

#### The aff is a moral and practical responsibility.

[Vanessa A. Bee (2018), Vanessa A. Bee is a lawyer, writer, and associate editor at Current Affairs, How a Federal Job Guarantee Can Help the Formerly Incarcerated, New York Magazine]//CHS PK

The reasons to proactively include people with criminal records in a jobs guarantee program are both moral — everyone who wants to enter the workforce should be given a chance to work — and practical: Employing people with criminal records would also empower the rest of the workforce. When people are desperate for work, their bargaining power plummets, an even more urgent problem in a country in which union power has shrunk over the past century. Under-employment allows employers to offer lower wages, fewer benefits, and poorer labor conditions. But the more people are employed in good jobs, the more everyone else can negotiate for better jobs. The class of people who fall into this category is not small: Close to 70 million Americans have criminal records, around 2.2 million of whom are incarcerated. Criminal records make it difficult to secure a job. Professional licensing rules contain [thousands of clauses](https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/map/) excluding people with records of misdemeanors and felonies, and finding work typically takes this class more than a year after being released. They remain less likely to be selected for an interview or receive a job offer, with even lower chances if the candidate is black. Controlling for other factors, this population’s wages also typically fall 10 to 40 percent below what other workers earn. And because individuals of color are incarcerated at higher rates than the rest of the population, it follows that these discriminatory employment practices hurt them and their families at disproportionate rates. This, in turn, only exacerbates inequality across our society. Despite the [misconceptions](https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160423_cea_incarceration_criminal_justice.pdf) that many employers have about people with criminal records, people with a steady stream of wage income are less likely to commit crimes again. And the higher the wage, the lower the chance of re-offending: Studies [show](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32106/411778-Employment-after-Prison-A-Longitudinal-Study-of-Releasees-in-Three-States.PDF) that even a modest wage increase to $10 or $12 per hour could halve the rate of recidivism and drop the crime rate by 5 percent. So while higher employment rates and wages would most directly benefit people with criminal records, society as a whole would enjoy collateral benefits like “reduced incarceration costs, increased income and payroll tax receipts, [and] lessened reliance on social services.” The dark irony is that there is already a sort of jobs guarantee for up to 22,000 federal prisoners — it’s just an exploitative one. Federal Prison Industries, Inc./UNICOR, a corporation wholly owned by the federal government, pays federal prisoners 23 cents to $1.15 per hour to manufacture an impressive array of products ranging from furniture, apparel, and data services, to electronics and solar energy equipment, which it then sells to various branches of the government. (In comparison, prisoners who do non-UNICOR maintenance work must settle for 12 to 40 cents per hour.) These “wages” — if we can call them that — allow UNICOR to reap profits that it could not if it was obligated to truly compete on the market. UNICOR reported sales of $453.7 million for fiscal year 2017. UNICOR does not operate in state prisons, which run their own work programs. Although some states pay a few cents or handful of dollars hourly, others like Georgia and Texas actually compel their prisoners to work for free. In many instances, this state labor is performed at the behest of private corporations that have no qualms about boosting their bottom line by replacing union workers with indentured prisoners. Courts help feed this labor pipeline. In a recent investigative report, Reveal News [described](https://www.revealnews.org/article/they-thought-they-were-going-to-rehab-they-ended-up-in-chicken-plants/) how state judges routinely send individuals to chicken farms and bottling plants operating labor camps, all under the guise of reducing the prison population. Their appalling labor conditions make it difficult to seriously argue that the formerly incarcerated should not be given a chance to work outside of prison. UNICOR is proof that people with criminal histories are perfectly capable of of learning new skills and performing useful jobs. In fact, UNICOR [claims](https://www.unicor.gov/fact_v_fiction.aspx) that its programs prepare inmates for re-entry. Of course, it is difficult to market and apply those skills when outside employers discriminate against criminal records even while they rely on incarcerated labor. In other regions, the jobs and willingness to hire may be there while the skill set does not match the work. Consider a world where, by law, UNICOR had to transition much of its work to free individuals with criminal records, with a corresponding jobs guarantee wage and benefits. Though justice is blind, perhaps having a significantly reduced labor force to exploit would encourage prosecutors, judges, and prisons to seek shorter sentences and advance release dates. It would prevent the government and private corporations from circumventing living wage laws (and the prohibition against slavery). Of course, UNICOR would no longer be able to force workers to show up every day. But most other employers are not legally permitted to enslave or indenture their workforce, and yet most workers show up every day. Including people with criminal records and releasing as many UNICOR workers as possible would probably increase the price tag of a Job Guarantee. On the other hand, it has repeatedly been proven that incarcerating people costs more annually than ensuring they are cared for on the outside. So in the long run, this approach may be more cost-effective.

#### Prospects for prisoners Bad now

Grant 18’ Duwe, Grant. “The Effectiveness of Education and Employment Programming for Prisoners.” American Enterprise Institute (2018). //RD

When individuals enter prison, approximately two-fifths do not have a high school degree or general educational development (GED) diploma.1 With recent data showing that 12 percent of adults lack a secondary degree,2 the rate for US prisoners is more than three times higher. But the disparity between prisoners and the rest of the population appears to be even greater for postsecondary education. Among adults in the US, 42 percent have an associate degree or more,3 which is more than four times higher than for prisoners.4 Data have long shown that increases in educational attainment are associated with less unemployment and higher earnings.5 Regardless of their educational attainment, however, the employment prospects for released prisoners are already weakened due to the stigmatizing effects of a felony record.6 Research has further indicated that many prisoners have unstable work histories.7 Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that we see relatively high unemployment rates for individuals both before and after their time in prison. A handful of studies have shown that pre-prison employment rates (in the year before coming to prison) for prisoners are no higher than 35 percent.8 These studies have generally found that post-release employment rates increased shortly after prisoners were released from prison but later declined,9 eventually returning to pre-prison employment levels within a few years.10 The most recent study on postprison employment for released prisoners found that nearly two-thirds did not find a job (or at least one with an employer who reported it to the unemployment insurance system) in their first two and half years after release from prison. And, even among the minority of prisoners who found employment after release, relatively few achieved consistent full-time employment.11 The evidence is clear that prisoners tend to be undereducated and underemployed. What if US prison systems placed a greater emphasis on improving educational and employment outcomes for prisoners? Would it improve other outcomes such as recidivism or prison misconduct? If so, to what extent? And, if US prison systems invested in more education and employment programming, would the benefits outweigh the costs? This report addresses these questions by providing an overview of the available evidence on the effectiveness of education and employment programming. In the following section, I begin by briefly reviewing the risk and protective factors for recidivism. Next, I review the bodies of research on education programming and employment programming. I conclude by summarizing the evidence on the effectiveness of education and employment programming and offering recommendations for correctional policy and practice. Education and Employment: Risk Factors

#### FJG has Huge monetary effect

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Even though the recidivism effect sizes for education programming have not been large, education programming has generated impressive cost-avoidance estimates. A 2013 study from Washington State reported an ROI of $19.62 for prison-based correctional education (basic and postsecondary) and $13.21 for vocational education.33 In other words, for every dollar spent on prison-based correctional education and vocational education, these interventions have delivered cost-avoidance benefits of $19.62 and $13.21, respectively. Another study on Minnesota prisoners found that for every dollar spent on secondary and postsecondary education interventions, these programs generated $3.69 in cost-avoidance benefits. Moreover, due to a high level of prisoner enrollment, education programming generated the second-highest cost-avoidance estimate ($3.2 million) among more than a dozen Minnesota prison-based programs that had been evaluated.34 Overall, prison-based education programming improves postprison employment, reduces prison misconduct and recidivism, and delivers a strong 6 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMING FOR PRISONERS GRANT DUWE ROI. Recent research suggests that postsecondary education programming may be more effective in improving employment and recidivism outcomes. Employment Programming Existing research suggests that work is a protective factor against crime and, more narrowly, recidivism.35 While it is important for offenders to obtain employment following their release from prison, maintaining it appears to be crucial in reducing recidivism.36 Indeed, individuals are less likely to commit crime when they work more often37 and have employment that is stable,38 considered satisfying,39 and perceived as having career potential.40 Given the difficulties released prisoners often face in finding a job, prison systems frequently provide inmates with employment programming, which includes prison labor opportunities and participation in programs such as work release. Work release allows participants, who are usually near the end of their prison terms, to work in the community and return to a correctional or community residential facility during nonworking hours. In doing so, work release provides offenders with a stable residence in a controlled environment, and it gives them opportunities to earn income and accumulate savings for their eventual release. Because employment programs such as work release are based in the community, research examining the effects of employment programming on institutional misconduct has been limited mostly to prison labor. In general, this research indicates that prison employment is associated with less misconduct.41 Results from a study on the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Post Release Employment Project (PREP) found that it significantly reduced misconduct.42 In addition, a 2014 study reported that the number of hours spent per week in a work assignment was negatively associated with both violent and nonviolent misconduct.43

**Mass incarceration is a form of modern genocide – it’s responsible for rampant intercity violence, crushing poverty, and massive loss of freedom**

**Thompson 14** [(Heather Ann, Associate professor of African American studies and history at Temple University) “Inner-City Violence in the Age of Mass Incarceration,” The Atlantic, 10/30/2014] DD, Recut VMJust as **hyper-segregation doesn’t explain the violence that so many have to endure today in America’s inner city communities** while still raising children, attending church, and trying to make ends meet, **neither does highly-concentrated poverty. Because of their exclusion from virtually every program and policy that helped eventually to build an American middle class, non-whites have always had far less wealth than whites.** From the ability to maintain land ownership after the Civil War, to the virtual guarantee of welfare benefits such as Social Security and FHA loans during the New Deal, to preferential access to employment and [housing](http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/fairhsg/hsg_discrimination_2012.html) in the postwar period, white communities have always had considerably more economic advantage than communities of color. **And yet**, no matter how poor they were, **America’s most impoverished communities have never been plagued by the level of violence they are today.** But if neither racial segregation nor the racial poverty gap can account for the degree to which poor communities of color are traumatized today, then what does? What is altogether new is the extent to which these communities are devastated by the working of our nation’s criminal justice system in general and by mass incarceration in particular. **Today's rates of incarceration in America's poorest, blackest, and brownest neighborhoods are historically unprecedented.** By 2001, **one in six black men had been incarcerated** and, by the close of 2013, **black and Latino inmates comprised almost 60 percent of the nation’s federal and state prison population.** The numbers of incarcerated black women are also stark.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, **young black women ages 18 to 19 were almost five times more likely to be imprisoned than white women of the same age** in 2010. **When President Lyndon B. Johnson passed the Law Enforcement Assistance Act in 1965—legislation which, in turn, made possible the most aggressive war on crime this nation ever waged—he was reacting not to remarkable crime rates but to the civil rights upheaval that had erupted nationwide** just the year before. **This activism, he and other politicians believed, represented not participatory democracy in action, but instead a criminal element that would only grow more dangerous if not checked.** Notably, the national policy embrace of targeted and more aggressive policing as well as highly punitive laws and sentences—**the so-called “War on Crime” that led eventually to such catastrophic rates of imprisonment—predated the remarkable levels of violence that now impact poor communities of color so disproportionately. The U.S. incarceration rate more than quadrupled between 1965 and 1995.** In fact, **the U.S. homicide rate in 1965 was** [**significantly lower**](http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/hmrttab.cfm) **than it had been in several previous moments in American history**: 5.5 per 100,000 U.S. residents as compared, for example, with 9.7 per 100,000 in 1933. Importantly, though, whereas the violent crime rate was 200.2 per 100,000 U.S. residents in 1965, it more than tripled to a horrifying 684.6 per 100,000 by 1995. Though mass incarceration did not originate in extraordinarily high rates of violence, **mass incarceration created the conditions in which violence would surely fester. The quadrupling of the incarceration rate in America since 1970 has had devastating collateral consequences. Already economically-fragile communities sank into depths of poverty unknown for generations, simply because anyone with a criminal record is forever “marked” as dangerous and thus rendered all but permanently unemployable.** Also, **with blacks incarcerated at six times and Latinos at three times the rate of whites** by 2010, **millions of children living in communities of color have effectively been orphaned.**  Worse yet, **these kids often experience high rates of post-traumatic shock from having witnessed the often-brutal arrests of their parents** and having been suddenly ripped from them. De-industrialization and **suburbanization surely did their part to erode our nation’s black and brown neighborhoods, but staggering rates of incarceration is what literally emptied them out.** As this Pew Center of the States graphic on Detroit shows, the overwhelmingly-black east side of the Motor City has been ravaged by the effects of targeted policing and mass incarceration in recent years with one in twenty-two adults there under some form of correctional control. In some neighborhoods, the rate is as high as one in 16. Pew Center for the States **Such concentrated levels of imprisonment have torn at the social fabric of inner city neighborhoods** in ways that even people who live there find hard to comprehend, let alone outsiders. As the research of criminologist Todd Clear makes clear, **extraordinary levels of incarceration create the conditions for extraordinary levels of violence.** But even mass incarceration does not, in itself, explain the particularly brutal nature of the violence that erupts today in, for example, the south side of Chicago. To explain that, we must look again carefully and critically at our nation’s criminal justice system. The level of gun violence in today's inner cities is the direct product of our criminal-justice policies—specifically, the decision to wage a brutal War on Drugs. When federal and state politicians such as New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller opted to criminalize addiction by passing unprecedentedly punitive possession laws rather than to treat it as a public health crisis, unwittingly or not, a high level of violence in poor communities of color was not only assured but was guaranteed to be particularly ugly. This new drug war created a brand-new market for illegal drugs—an underground marketplace that would be inherently dangerous and would necessarily be regulated by both guns and violence. **Without the War on Drugs, today's levels of inner-city gun violence would not exist.** Indeed, without the War on Drugs, the level of gun violence that plagues so many poor inner-city neighborhoods today simply would not exist. The last time we saw so much violence from the use of firearms was, notably, during Prohibition. “[As] underground profit margins surged, gang rivalries emerged, and criminal activity mounted [during Prohibition],” writes historian Abigail Perkiss, “the homicide rate across the nation rose 78 percent…[and] in Chicago alone, there were more than 400 gang-related murders a year.” As important as it is to rethink the origins of the violence that poor inner city residents still endure, we must also be careful even when using the term “violence,” particularly when seeking to explain “what seems to be wrong” with America’s most disadvantaged communities. A level of state violence is also employed daily in these communities that rarely gets mentioned and yet it is as brutal, and perhaps even more devastating, than the violence that is so often experienced as a result of the informal economy in now-illegal drugs.This is a violence that comes in the form of police harassment, surveillance, profiling, and even killings—the ugly realities of how law enforcement wages America’s War on Drugs. Today, young black men today are 21 times more likely than their white peers to be killed by the police and, according to a recent ProPublica report, black children have fared just as badly. Since 1980, a full 67 percent of the 151 teenagers and 66 percent of the 41 kids under 14 who have been killed by police were African American. Between 2010 and 2012 alone, police officers shot and killed fifteen teens running away from them; all but one of them black. This is the violence that undergirded the 4.4 million stop-and-frisks in New York City between 2004 and 2014. This is the violence that led to the deaths of black men and boys such as Kimani Gray, Amadou Diallo, Sean Bell, Oscar Grant, and Michael Brown. This is the violence that led to the deaths of black women and girls such as Rekia Boyd, Yvette Smith, and 7-year-old Aiyana Stanley-Jones. And this is the violence that has touched off months of protests in Ferguson, Missouri just as it also touched off nearly a decade of urban rebellions after 1964. A close look at the violence that today haunts America’s most impoverished and most segregated cities, in fact, fundamentally challenges conventional assumptions about perpetrators and victims. America’s black and brown people not only don’t have a monopoly on violence, but, in fact, a great deal of the violence being waged in their communities is perpetrated by those who are at least officially charged with protecting, not harming, them. As residents of Ferguson well know, for example, in the same month that Michael Brown was shot to death by a police officer, four other unarmed black men were also killed by members of law enforcement. Indeed, **the true origins of today’s high rates of violence in America’s most highly segregated, most deeply impoverished, and blackest and brownest neighborhoods**—whoever perpetrates it—**are located well outside of these same communities. Simply put, America’s poorest people of color had no seat the policy table where mass incarceration was made. But though they did not create the policies that led to so much community and state violence in inner cities today, they nevertheless now suffer from them in unimaginable ways.**

#### Ending the war against mass incarceration comes first under any framework and serves as an impact filter – it causes various threats to our democracy and economy.

Edelman 13 – MARIAN WRIGHT EDELMAN activist for the rights of children. She has been an advocate for disadvantaged Americans for her entire professional life. She is president and founder of the Children's Defense Fund. (“Dismantle the Cradle to Prison Pipeline—Our Future Depends on It” https://allinnation.org/ms-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/10/Chapter9.pdf)¶ , Recut VM

“Today a toxic cocktail of violence, poverty, racial disparities in child-serving systems, poor education, and racially unjust zero-tolerance policies are fueling a Cradle to Prison Pipeline® crisis that is funneling millions of poor children and adults into dead-end, powerless, and hopeless lives.¶ A black boy born in 2001 has a one-in-three chance of going to prison in his lifetime, and a Latino boy has a one-in-six chance of the same fate. $e United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world: 7.1 million adults are under some form of correctional supervision including prison, jail, probation, or parole. Black males have an imprisonment rate that is nearly seven times higher than white males, and Hispanic males have a rate more than twice that of their white counterparts. This epidemic of mass incarceration has created one of the most dangerous crises for the black community since slavery and it affects everyone in our nation.¶ Federal spending on prisons totaled $6.6 billion in 2012 and annual state spending on corrections tops $51 billion. This federal and state spending spree to warehouse prisoners has perverted our nation’s priorities. **States spend on average two and half times more per prisoner than they spend per public school student**, this at a time when a majority of children of all racial and income backgrounds cannot read or compute at grade level in fourth- or eighth-grade and huge numbers of youth drop out of schools. The privatization of juvenile and adult prisons is yet another added danger. The world’s largest for-profit, private prison corporation, the Corrections Corporation of America, recently offered to run the prison systems in 48 states for 20 years if the states would guarantee a 90 percent occupancy rate.¶ The greatest threat to America’s democracy and economic security comes from no enemy, but rather from our failure to dismantle this Cradle to Prison Pipeline and to invest in and prepare all our children for the future. Tomorrow is today. **Children of color, who already are a majority of babies being born in the United States and who will be a majority of our child population within this decade, face bleak futures without high-quality early childhood programs and high-quality, equitable public schools that would prepare them for college and our workforce.¶ Closing the income and racial achievement gaps between poor and non-poor children and between white and nonwhite children is an urgent national priority**. Today, every 1.5 seconds during the school year**,** a public school student is suspended; every 8 seconds during the school year, a public high school student drops out; every 19 seconds a child is arrested; and every 3 hours and 15 minutes, a child or teen is killed by a gun.¶

# 1AC—Framing

### FW

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### Prefer it:

#### 1] Actor specificity:

#### A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – governments decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### C] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

o/w

#### 2] Lexical pre-requisite: threats to bodily security preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibits the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose

#### 3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 3] Substitutability—only consequentialism explains necessary enablers.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

A moral reason to do an act is consequential if and only if the reason depends only on the consequences of either doing the act or not doing the act. For example, a moral reason not to hit someone is that this will hurt her or him. A moral reason to turn your car to the left might be that, if you do not do so, you will run over and kill someone. A moral reason to feed a starving child is that the child will lose important mental or physical abilities if you do not feed it. All such reasons are consequential reasons. All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides amoral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently ofits consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialist or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitutability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.

# ----1AR----

# F/L—Case

## 1AR—Overview

#### [Econ] Plan eliminates poverty and unemployment spurring economic growth—that prevents extinction through worldwide nuke war.

#### [Econ+Populism] Plan eliminates poverty and unemployment spurring economic growth and security which solves populism—that prevents extinction through worldwide nuke war, AI apocalypse, and warming.

#### [Political Trust] Plan eliminates unemployment which solves eroding political trust in institutions that spurs hegemony—that prevents extinction from great power nuclear war.

#### [Criminal Justice]

## 1AR—Dedevelopment

### 1AR—AT: Clary

#### Clary’s dataset includes only rival dyads from 1950

Clary 15 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2015-­‐8, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712)//CHS> PK

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.

### 1AR—AT: Unsustainable

#### Long-term trends prove growth is sustainable and causes less environmental destruction – dedev causes extinction and flips their impacts

Adjaye et al 15 - professor of environmental economics at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia + 17 others (John, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto”, April 2015, [http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5515d9f9e4b04d5c3198b7bb/t/552d37bbe4b07a7dd69fcdbb/1429026747046/An+Ecomodernist+Manifesto.pdf)//recut CHS](http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5515d9f9e4b04d5c3198b7bb/t/552d37bbe4b07a7dd69fcdbb/1429026747046/An%2BEcomodernist%2BManifesto.pdf%29//recut%20CHS) PK

To say that the Earth is a human planet becomes truer every day. Humans are made from the Earth, and the Earth is remade by human hands. Many earth scientists express this by stating that the Earth has entered a new geological epoch: the Anthropocene, the Age of Humans. As scholars, scientists, campaigners, and citizens, we write with the conviction that knowledge and technology, applied with wisdom, might allow for a good, or even great, Anthropocene. A good Anthropocene demands that humans use their growing social, economic, and technological powers to make life better for people, stabilize the climate, and protect the natural world. In this, we affirm one long-standing environmental ideal, that humanity must shrink its impacts on the environment to make more room for nature, while we reject another, that human societies must harmonize with nature to avoid economic and ecological collapse. These two ideals can no longer be reconciled. Natural systems will not, as a general rule, be protected or enhanced by the expansion of humankind’s dependence upon them for sustenance and well-being. Intensifying many human activities — particularly farming, energy extraction, forestry, and settlement — so that they use less land and interfere less with the natural world is the key to decoupling human development from environmental impacts. These socioeconomic and technological processes are central to economic modernization and environmental protection. Together they allow people to mitigate climate change, to spare nature, and to alleviate global poverty. Although we have to date written separately, our views are increasingly discussed as a whole. We call ourselves ecopragmatists and ecomodernists. We offer this statement to affirm and to clarify our views and to describe our vision for putting humankind’s extraordinary powers in the service of creating a good Anthropocene. Humanity has flourished over the past two centuries. Average life expectancy has increased from 30 to 70 years, resulting in a large and growing population able to live in many different environments. Humanity has made extraordinary progress in reducing the incidence and impacts of infectious diseases, and it has become more resilient to extreme weather and other natural disasters. Violence in all forms has declined significantly and is probably at the lowest per capita level ever experienced by the human species, the horrors of the 20th century and present-day terrorism notwithstanding. Globally, human beings have moved from autocratic government toward liberal democracy characterized by the rule of law and increased freedom. Personal, economic, and political liberties have spread worldwide and are today largely accepted as universal values. Modernization liberates women from traditional gender roles, increasing their control of their fertility. Historically large numbers of humans — both in percentage and in absolute terms — are free from insecurity, penury, and servitude. At the same time, human flourishing has taken a serious toll on natural, nonhuman environments and wildlife. Humans use about half of the planet’s ice-free land, mostly for pasture, crops, and production forestry. Of the land once covered by forests, 20 percent has been converted to human use. Populations of many mammals, amphibians, and birds have declined by more than 50 percent in the past 40 years alone. More than 100 species from those groups went extinct in the 20th century, and about 785 since 1500. As we write, only four northern white rhinos are confirmed to exist. Given that humans are completely dependent on the living biosphere, how is it possible that people are doing so much damage to natural systems without doing more harm to themselves? The role that technology plays in reducing humanity’s dependence on nature explains this paradox. Human technologies, from those that first enabled agriculture to replace hunting and gathering, to those that drive today’s globalized economy, have made humans less reliant upon the many ecosystems that once provided their only sustenance, even as those same ecosystems have often been left deeply damaged. Despite frequent assertions starting in the 1970s of fundamental “limits to growth,” there is still remarkably little evidence that human population and economic expansion will outstrip the capacity to grow food or procure critical material resources in the foreseeable future. To the degree to which there are fixed physical boundaries to human consumption, they are so theoretical as to be functionally irrelevant. The amount of solar radiation that hits the Earth, for instance, is ultimately finite but represents no meaningful constraint upon human endeavors. Human civilization can flourish for centuries and millennia on energy delivered from a closed uranium orthorium fuel cycle, orfrom hydrogen-deuterium fusion. With proper management, humans are at no risk of lacking sufficient agricultural land for food. Given plentiful land and unlimited energy, substitutes for other material inputs to human well-being can easily be found if those inputs become scarce or expensive. There remain, however, serious long-term environmental threats to human well-being, such as anthropogenic climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification. While these risks are difficult to quantify, the evidence is clear today that they could cause significant risk of catastrophic impacts on societies and ecosystems. Even gradual, non-catastrophic outcomes associated with these threats are likely to result in significant human and economic costs as well as rising ecological losses. Much of the world’s population still suffers from more-immediate local environmental health risks. Indoor and outdoor air pollution continue to bring premature death and illness to millions annually. Water pollution and water-borne illness due to pollution and degradation of watersheds cause similar suffering. Even as human environmental impacts continue to grow in the aggregate, a range of long-term trends are today driving significant decoupling of human well-being from environmental impacts. Decoupling occurs in both relative and absolute terms. Relative decoupling means that human environmental impacts rise at a slower rate than overall economic growth. Thus, for each unit of economic output, less environmental impact (e.g., deforestation, defaunation, pollution) results. Overall impacts may still increase, just at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. Absolute decoupling occurs when total environmental impacts — impacts in the aggregate — peak and begin to decline, even as the economy continues to grow. Decoupling can be driven by both technological and demographic trends and usually results from a combination of the two. The growth rate of the human population has already peaked. Today’s population growth rate is one percent per year, down from its high point of 2.1 percent in the 1970s. Fertility rates in countries containing more than half of the global population are now below replacement level. Population growth today is primarily driven by longer life spans and lower infant mortality, not by rising fertility rates. Given current trends, it is very possible that the size of the human population will peak this century and then start to decline. Trends in population are inextricably linked to other demographic and economic dynamics. For the first time in human history, over half the global population lives in cities. By 2050, 70 percent are expected to dwell in cities, a number that could rise to 80 percent or more by the century’s end. Cities are characterized by both dense populations and low fertility rates. Cities occupy just one to three percent of the Earth’s surface and yet are home to nearly four billion people. As such, cities both drive and symbolize the decoupling of humanity from nature, performing far better than rural economies in providing efficiently for material needs while reducing environmental impacts. The growth of cities along with the economic and ecological benefits that come with them are inseparable from improvements in agricultural productivity. As agriculture has become more land and labor efficient, rural populations have left the countryside for the cities. Roughly half the US population worked the land in 1880. Today, less than 2 percent does. As human lives have been liberated from hard agricultural labor, enormous human resources have been freed up for other endeavors. Cities, as people know them today, could not exist without radical changes in farming. In contrast, modernization is not possible in a subsistence agrarian economy. These improvements have resulted not only in lower labor requirements per unit of agricultural output but also in lower land requirements. This is not a new trend: rising harvest yields have for millennia reduced the amount of land required to feed the average person. The average per-capita use of land today is vastly lower than it was 5,000 years ago, despite the fact that modern people enjoy a far richer diet. Thanks to technological improvements in agriculture, during the half-century starting in the mid-1960s, the amount of land required for growing crops and animal feed for the average person declined by one-half. Agricultural intensification, along with the move away from the use of wood as fuel, has allowed many parts of the world to experience net reforestation. About 80 percent of New England is today forested, compared with about 50 percent at the end of the 19th century. Over the past 20 years, the amount of land dedicated to production forest worldwide declined by 50 million hectares, an area the size of France. The “forest transition” from net deforestation to net reforestation seems to be as resilient a feature of development as the demographic transition that reduces human birth rates as poverty declines. Human use of many other resources is similarly peaking. The amount of water needed for the average diet has declined by nearly 25 percent over the past half-century. Nitrogen pollution continues to cause eutrophication and large dead zones in places like the Gulf of Mexico. While the total amount of nitrogen pollution is rising, the amount used per unit of production has declined significantly in developed nations. Indeed, in contradiction to the often-expressed fear of infinite growth colliding with a finite planet, demand for many material goods may be saturating as societies grow wealthier. Meat consumption, for instance, has peaked in many wealthy nations and has shied away from beef toward protein sources that are less land intensive. As demand for material goods is met, developed economies see higher levels of spending directed to materially less-intensive service and knowledge sectors, which account for an increasing share of economic activity. This dynamic might be even more pronounced in today’s developing economies, which may benefit from being late adopters of resource-efficient technologies. Taken together, these trends mean that the total human impact on the environment, including land-use change, overexploitation, and pollution, can peak and decline this century. By understanding and promoting these emergent processes, humans have the opportunity to re-wild and re-green the Earth — even as developing countries achieve modern living standards, and material poverty ends. The processes of decoupling described above challenge the idea that early human societies lived more lightly on the land than do modern societies. Insofar as past societies had less impact upon the environment, it was because those societies supported vastly smaller populations. In fact, early human populations with much less advanced technologies had far larger individual land footprints than societies have today. Consider that a population of no more than one or two million North Americans hunted most of the continent’s large mammals into extinction in the late Pleistocene, while burning and clearing forests across the continent in the process. Extensive human transformations of the environment continued throughout the Holocene period: as much as three quarters of all deforestation globally occurred before the Industrial Revolution. The technologies that humankind’s ancestors used to meet their needs supported much lower living standards with much higher per-capita impacts on the environment. Absent a massive human dieoff, any large-scale attempt at recoupling human societies to nature using these technologies would result in an unmitigated ecological and human disaster. Ecosystems around the world are threatened today because people over-rely on them: people who depend on firewood and charcoal for fuel cut down and degrade forests; people who eat bush meat for food hunt mammal species to local extirpation. Whether it’s a local indigenous community or a foreign corporation that benefits, it is the continued dependence of humans on natural environments that is the problem for the conservation of nature. Conversely, modern technologies, by using natural ecosystem flows and services more efficiently, offer a real chance of reducing the totality of human impacts on the biosphere. To embrace these technologies is to find paths to a good Anthropocene. The modernization processes that have increasingly liberated humanity from nature are, of course, double-edged, since they have also degraded the natural environment. Fossil fuels, mechanization and manufacturing, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, electrification and modern transportation and communication technologies, have made larger human populations and greater consumption possible in the first place. Had technologies not improved since the Dark Ages, no doubt the human population would not have grown much either. It is also true that large, increasingly affluent urban populations have placed greater demands upon ecosystems in distant places — the extraction of natural resources has been globalized. But those same technologies have also made it possible for people to secure food, shelter, heat, light, and mobility through means that are vastly more resource- and land-efficient than at any previous time in human history. Decoupling human well-being from the destruction of nature requires the conscious acceleration of emergent decoupling processes. In some cases, the objective is the development of technological substitutes. Reducing deforestation and indoor air pollution requires the substitution of wood and charcoal with modern energy. In other cases, humanity’s goal should be to use resources more productively. For example, increasing agricultural yields can reduce the conversion of forests and grasslands to farms. Humans should seek to liberate the environment from the economy. Urbanization, agricultural intensification, nuclear power, aquaculture, and desalination are all processes with a demonstrated potential to reduce human demands on the environment, allowing more room for non-human species. Suburbanization, low-yield farming, and many forms of renewable energy production, in contrast, generally require more land and resources and leave less room for nature. These patterns suggest that humans are as likely to spare nature because it is not needed to meet their needs as they are to spare it for explicit aesthetic and spiritual reasons. The parts of the planet that people have not yet profoundly transformed have mostly been spared because they have not yet found an economic use for them — mountains, deserts, boreal forests, and other “marginal” lands. Decoupling raises the possibility that societies might achieve peak human impact without intruding much further on relatively untouched areas. Nature unused is nature spared. Plentiful access to modern energy is an essential prerequisite for human development and for decoupling development from nature. The availability of inexpensive energy allows poor people around the world to stop using forests for fuel. It allows humans to grow more food on less land, thanks to energy-heavy inputs such as fertilizer and tractors. Energy allows humans to recycle waste water and desalinate sea water to spare rivers and aquifers. It allows humans to cheaply recycle metal and plastic rather than to mine and refine these minerals. Looking forward, modern energy may allow the capture of carbon from the atmosphere to reduce the accumulated carbon that drives global warming. However, for at least the past three centuries, rising energy production globally has been matched by rising atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. Nations have also been slowly decarbonizing — that is, reducing the carbon intensity of their economies — over that same time period. But they have not been doing so at a rate consistent with keeping cumulative carbon emissions low enough to reliably stay below the international target of less than 2 degrees Centigrade of global warming. Significant climate mitigation, therefore, will require that humans rapidly accelerate existing processes of decarbonization. There remains much confusion, however, as to how this might be accomplished. In developing countries, rising energy consumption is tightly correlated with rising incomes and improving living standards. Although the use of many other material resource inputs such as nitrogen, timber, and land are beginning to peak, the centrality of energy in human development and its many uses as a substitute for material and human resources suggest that energy consumption will continue to rise through much if not all of the 21st century. For that reason, any conflict between climate mitigation and the continuing development process through which billions of people around the world are achieving modern living standards will continue to be resolved resoundingly in favor of the latter. Climate change and other global ecological challenges are not the most important immediate concerns for the majority of the world’s people. Nor should they be. A new coal-fired power station in Bangladesh may bring air pollution and rising carbon dioxide emissions but will also save lives. For millions living without light and forced to burn dung to cook their food, electricity and modern fuels, no matter the source, offer a pathway to a better life, even as they also bring new environmental challenges. Meaningful climate mitigation is fundamentally a technological challenge. By this we mean that even dramatic limits to per capita global consumption would be insufficient to achieve significant climate mitigation. Absent profound technological change there is no credible path to meaningful climate mitigation. While advocates differ in the particular mix of technologies they favor, we are aware of no quantified climate mitigation scenario in which technological change is not responsible for the vast majority of emissions cuts. The specific technological paths that people might take toward climate mitigation remain deeply contested. Theoretical scenarios for climate mitigation typically reflect their creators’ technological preferences and analytical assumptions while all too often failing to account for the cost, rate, and scale at which low-carbon energy technologies can be deployed. The history of energy transitions, however, suggests that there have been consistent patterns associated with the ways that societies move toward cleaner sources of energy. Substituting higher-quality (i.e., less carbon-intensive, higher-density) fuels for lower-quality (i.e., more carbon-intensive, lower density) ones is how virtually all societies have decarbonized, and points the way toward accelerated decarbonization in the future. Transitioning to a world powered by zero-carbon energy sources will require energy technologies that are power dense and capable of scaling to many tens of terawatts to power a growing human economy. Most forms of renewable energy are, unfortunately, incapable of doing so. The scale of land use and other environmental impacts necessary to power the world on biofuels or many other renewables are such that we doubt they provide a sound pathway to a zero-carbon low-footprint future. High-efficiency solar cells produced from earth-abundant materials are an exception and have the potential to provide many tens of terawatts on a few percent of the Earth’s surface. Present-day solar technologies will require substantial innovation to meet this standard and the development of cheap energy storage technologies that are capable of dealing with highly variable energy generation at large scales. Nuclear fission today represents the only present-day zero-carbon technology with the demonstrated ability to meet most, if not all, of the energy demands of a modern economy. However, a variety of social, economic, and institutional challenges make deployment of present-day nuclear technologies at scales necessary to achieve significant climate mitigation unlikely. A new generation of nuclear technologies that are safer and cheaper will likely be necessary for nuclear energy to meet its full potential as a critical climate mitigation technology. In the long run, next-generation solar, advanced nuclear fission, and nuclear fusion represent the most plausible pathways toward the joint goals of climate stabilization and radical decoupling of humans from nature. If the history of energy transitions is any guide, however, that transition will take time. During that transition, other energy technologies can provide important social and environmental benefits. Hydroelectric dams, for example, may be a cheap source of low-carbon power for poor nations even though their land and water footprint is relatively large. Fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage can likewise provide substantial environmental benefits over current fossil or biomass energies. The ethical and pragmatic path toward a just and sustainable global energy economy requires that human beings transition as rapidly as possible to energy sources that are cheap, clean, dense, and abundant. Such a path will require sustained public support for the development and deployment of clean energy technologies, both within nations and between them, though international collaboration and competition, and within a broader framework for global modernization and development. We write this document out of deep love and emotional connection to the natural world. By appreciating, exploring, seeking to understand, and cultivating nature, many people get outside themselves. They connect with their deep evolutionary history. Even when people never experience these wild natures directly, they affirm their existence as important for their psychological and spiritual well-being. Humans will always materially depend on nature to some degree. Even if a fully synthetic world were possible, many of us might still choose to continue to live more coupled with nature than human sustenance and technologies require. What decoupling offers is the possibility that humanity’s material dependence upon nature might be less destructive. The case for a more active, conscious, and accelerated decoupling to spare nature draws more on spiritual or aesthetic than on material or utilitarian arguments. Current and future generations could survive and prosper materially on a planet with much less biodiversity and wild nature. But this is not a world we want nor, if humans embrace decoupling processes, need to accept. What we are here calling nature, or even wild nature, encompasses landscapes, seascapes, biomes and ecosystems that have, in more cases than not, been regularly altered by human influences over centuries and millennia. Conservation science, and the concepts of biodiversity, complexity, and indigeneity are useful, but alone cannot determine which landscapes to preserve, or how. In most cases, there is no single baseline prior to human modification to which nature might be returned. For example, efforts to restore landscapes to more closely resemble earlier states (“indigeneity”) may involve removing recently arrived species (“invasives”) and thus require a net reduction in local biodiversity. In other circumstances, communities may decide to sacrifice indigeneity for novelty and biodiversity. Explicit efforts to preserve landscapes for their non-utilitarian value are inevitably anthropogenic choices. For this reason, all conservation efforts are fundamentally anthropogenic. The setting aside of wild nature is no less a human choice, in service of human preferences, than bulldozing it. Humans will save wild places and landscapes by convincing our fellow citizens that these places, and the creatures that occupy them, are worth protecting. People may choose to have some services — like water purification and flood protection — provided for by natural systems, such as forested watersheds, reefs, marshes, and wetlands, even if those natural systems are more expensive than simply building water treatment plants, seawalls, and levees. There will be no one-size-fits all solution. Environments will be shaped by different local, historical, and cultural preferences. While we believe that agricultural intensification for land-sparing is key to protecting wild nature, we recognize that many communities will continue to opt for land-sharing, seeking to conserve wildlife within agricultural landscapes, for example, rather than allowing it to revert to wild nature in the form of grasslands, scrub, and forests. Where decoupling reduces pressure on landscapes and ecosystems to meet basic human needs, landowners, communities, and governments still must decide to what aesthetic or economic purpose they wish to dedicate those lands. Accelerated decoupling alone will not be enough to ensure more wild nature. There must still be a conservation politics and a wilderness movement to demand more wild nature for aesthetic and spiritual reasons. Along with decoupling humankind’s material needs from nature, establishing an enduring commitment to preserve wilderness, biodiversity, and a mosaic of beautiful landscapes will require a deeper emotional connection to them. We affirm the need and human capacity for accelerated, active, and conscious decoupling. Technological progress is not inevitable. Decoupling environmental impacts from economic outputs is not simply a function of market-driven innovation and efficient response to scarcity. The long arc of human transformation of natural environments through technologies began well before there existed anything resembling a market or a price signal. Thanks to rising demand, scarcity, inspiration, and serendipity, humans have remade the world for millennia. Technological solutions to environmental problems must also be considered within a broader social, economic, and political context. We think it is counterproductive for nations like Germany and Japan, and states like California, to shutter nuclear power plants, recarbonize their energy sectors, and recouple their economies to fossil fuels and biomass. However, such examples underscore clearly that technological choices will not be determined by remote international bodies but rather by national and local institutions and cultures. Too often, modernization is conflated, both by its defenders and critics, with capitalism, corporate power, and laissez-faire economic policies. We reject such reductions. What we refer to when we speak of modernization is the long-term evolution of social, economic, political, and technological arrangements in human societies toward vastly improved material well-being, public health, resource productivity, economic integration, shared infrastructure, and personal freedom. Modernization has liberated ever more people from lives of poverty and hard agricultural labor, women from chattel status, children and ethnic minorities from oppression, and societies from capricious and arbitrary governance. Greater resource productivity associated with modern sociotechnological systems has allowed human societies to meet human needs with fewer resource inputs and less impact on the environment. More-productive economies are wealthier economies, capable of better meeting human needs while committing more of their economic surplus to non-economic amenities, including better human health, greater human freedom and opportunity, arts, culture, and the conservation of nature. Modernizing processes are far from complete, even in advanced developed economies. Material consumption has only just begun to peak in the wealthiest societies. Decoupling of human welfare from environmental impacts will require a sustained commitment to technological progress and the continuing evolution of social, economic, and political institutions alongside those changes. Accelerated technological progress will require the active, assertive, and aggressive participation of private sector entrepreneurs, markets, civil society, and the state. While we reject the planning fallacy of the 1950s, we continue to embrace a strong public role in addressing environmental problems and accelerating technological innovation, including research to develop better technologies, subsidies, and other measures to help bring them to market, and regulations to mitigate environmental hazards. And international collaboration on technological innovation and technology transfer is essential in the areas of agriculture and energy. We offer this statement in the belief that both human prosperity and an ecologically vibrant planet are not only possible but also inseparable. By committing to the real processes, already underway, that have begun to decouple human well-being from environmental destruction, we believe that such a future might be achieved. As such, we embrace an optimistic view toward human capacities and the future. It is our hope that this document might contribute to an improvement in the quality and tenor of the dialogue about how to protect the environment in the 21st century. Too often discussions about the environment have been dominated by the extremes, and plagued by dogmatism, which in turn fuels intolerance. We value the liberal principles of democracy, tolerance, and pluralism in themselves, even as we affirm them as keys to achieving a great Anthropocene. We hope that this statement advances the dialogue about how best to achieve universal human dignity on a biodiverse and thriving planet.

#### Cap sustainable and no movements now

Cap “collapsing” doesn’t mean it’s gone tomorrow – might take hundreds of years – we need a strategy for the intermediate period

Calhoun 16 (Craig, Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science, “The future of capitalism,” *Socio-Economic Review*, 2016, Vol. 14, No. 1)

Does capitalism have a future? Of course, it does. But it is not necessarily pretty. Wealth can be generated in evermore extensive and intensive ways even in a world full of crises and challenges. And because capitalism is the dominant economic system in the world, it could continue to contribute to climate change, conflict, inequality and instability. But this does not mean it will collapse. The USSR collapsed as a state following a long period of stagnant growth and expensive arms race. This was bracing, perhaps a warning to other states, but not necessarily a model for the end of capitalism.

Much critical engagement with capitalism has focused on its internal contradictions and potential collapse. Contradictions are real and collapse is possible, but the language is misleading. We speak of the collapse of the Roman Empire, but this took 300 years of decline, instability and conflict. We speak of the collapse of feudalism, but it would again be more accurate to see a long process of transformation as feudal structures were less able to organize social, economic and even military life, and less able to reproduce key elements of their power structure while gradually states and what we now call capitalism grew. Capitalism has already proved that although it is prone to generating crises, it is not merely a short episode between feudalism and socialism, as the Communist Manifesto implied. It has endured much longer than Marx and Engels thought, and along with the nation-state system dominated global geopolitics and economics for some 400 years. It may well last much longer—but this continued existence could be marked by both growing systemic diffi- culties internal to capitalism and upheavals beyond capitalism that are exacerbated by it and pose challenges to it.

Capitalism is more than just markets or economics in general. It is a system of production based on ever more intensive deployment of capital and pursuit of productivity (and profit)— and hence a driver of both expansion and technological and organizational innovation. It is a system of relations between states and other economic actors in which states guarantee forms of property, security of contract and regimes of accumulation. Together these make it a system that drives not only expansion, but also accumulation and concentration of capital.

But capitalism is not always the same. In the first place, it always exists in social and political contexts, not in a ‘pure’, abstract form. In the real world, capitalism is always shaped by state support, regulation and mediation of conflicts; states may carry the costs of capitalism’s negative externalities. In addition, capitalism’s internal character varies. Of most immediate importance, since the 1970s, capitalism has seen a dramatic ascendancy of both finance and service work. Industry has not disappeared any more than land lost all value during the industrial revolution. But where perhaps a quarter of capital was held in the form of financial assets 40 years ago, the figure now is about three-quarters. There has been similar proportionate growth in service employment. There may yet be a productivity revolution in service work— though in what proportion that will bring freedom and opportunity ( probably only for an elite) or only low wages and unemployment (for the rest of us) remains to be seen. The claim that we are moving into a ‘sharing economy’ points to some new developments, but fails to address basic structural dimensions of capitalism.

To be sure, there is also variation in the forms of enterprise. The development, expansion and international spread of corporations have been remarkable innovations. Corporations may be organized through legal fictions—as artificial persons ‘without a soul to damn or body to kick’—but also as basic social institutions. Firms are almost as important as states. So ubiquitous are corporations (even though legal regimes vary) that it is now hard to recall capitalism before corporate capitalism. More recently, however, corporations have themselves have become commodities bought and sold. From IPOs to mergers and acquisitions, this has enriched financial institutions. It has also made both capital markets and labour markets less stable. And it has brought a real cost in social solidarity. This is shaped by a decline in longterm employment, undermining of ties between firms and their localities, and financial pressures—ever more intensive and short-term—against the provision of health care, pension and other benefits to employees.

Likewise, capitalism in any one time or place may be shaped more or less by entrepreneurs and the formation of new enterprises. Entrepreneurs were crucial to the rise of merchant capitalism and in the industrial revolution. They were important in the ‘gilded age’, not just among the robber barons but also in launching a host of family businesses. And entrepreneurs played a central role in the rise of new industries in the last 40 years. There should be appreciation for the creative, enterprising spirit of entrepreneurs. But we should not be blinded by either the hagiography of individuals or the celebration of entrepreneurship in general to think that entrepreneurial successes are quite as individualistic as the ideology suggests. Entrepreneurs depend on social networks and whole ecologies of support from universities to venture capitalists. Much of the achievement of technology firms in the last 40 years has been grounded in commercializing scientific advances that were funded by governments during the cold war—and then, quite remarkably, made publicly available with no claim to property rights by the government on behalf of citizens.

The term entrepreneur can be used so elastically as to encompass both those acquiring great fortunes by building companies in Silicon Valley and those working at a near subsistence level as contractors in new service economy businesses—like drivers organized through online booking agencies. Typically paid a fee for each service, these are entrepreneurs only in the same sense that ‘independent’ knitters and weavers were during the industrial revolution. As mechanization of spinning and expansion of markets drove up demand, knitters set up shop in their own homes, often enlisting family members as assistants. They provided their own equipment, sometimes bought on credit, including knitting frames (machines that were human-powered but able to produce much more than simple handwork). They sold their work to intermediaries who ran ‘putting out’ businesses, distributing thread to knitters and collecting finished cloth. As intermediaries, these were arguably the 18th and early 19th century counterparts to Uber and other firms organizing services through ‘apps’. Framework knitting was initially a good occupation, requiring only modest skill though intense concentration and physical labour. But it was an easy business to enter and knitters were eventually driven to work longer and longer hours both to repay their capital costs and to support their families. The creators of self-exploiting tiny businesses, more stable small businesses and ‘start-ups’ that might grow with venture capital and successful public offerings are all important. However, lumping them under the single term ‘entrepreneurs’ can be misleading as can an overly rosy picture of the ‘sharing economy’.

Not least of all, states may themselves pursue capitalist ends like expansion of markets and accumulation of capital. They may either own capitalist firms or actively try to manage capitalist enterprise and finance. Even countries in which liberal capitalist separation of state from market was celebrated have used such models. The US accomplished projects like rural electrification partly through state-owned enterprises and partly through preferential financing and state-guaranteed monopolies. Railroads that were initially private ventures were in many countries consolidated as public service companies. Only rarely was there clarity about whether to run them as for-profit firms (thus subsidized the state) or as services funded partly by the state. Still, they demanded investment and generally became more capital-intensive. More strikingly, the Soviet Union was arguably as much an example of state capitalism as of socialism. And today, China is arguably the model for a capitalist future in which the boundary between state and economy is not celebrated—as it has been in the ideology of liberal capitalism. State-related enterprises and direct state organization of finance may be as basic to the near-term future of capitalism as, say, entrepreneurs.

Still, capitalism works. Certainly it only works more or less, and not always as well or in the ways we might wish. But it works well enough that it need not reach an end at any specific point. It is a good bet that it will still dominate global economics tomorrow, next year, and when the next crisis comes. But, capitalism is not an order of nature. It is a humanly created historical system. So, it will change. It will likely end, change beyond recognition or continue to exist. It will almost certainly lose its capacity to dominate.

Capitalism is good at some things, not others, and actively bad at some. It is good at creating wealth and driving innovation, indeed extraordinarily good. Even Marx and Engels praised capitalism for this (though they thought it was important at some point to say ‘we have enough, let’s concentrate on how wealth is shared’). Capitalism’s capacity to create wealth is why less developed countries are betting on it today. But by comparison, capitalism is bad at equitable distribution. It is not necessarily worse than all other systems: feudalism and slave societies are hardly models of equitable distribution of wealth. But arguably because capitalism depends on consumer markets it needs distribution of wealth to survive. It thus operates in an uneasy (or outright denied) collusion with trade unions and other mechanisms that increase returns to labour and with states that ensure some levels of distribution of wealth. High employment industries may make distribution of wealth (and thus funding of consumer markets) easier; the erosion of industrial employment makes this harder, at least temporarily.

Of course, capitalism’s extraordinary ability to generate wealth is not counterbalanced only by problems of distribution. Capitalism also produces the opposite of wealth—which is not poverty but what John Ruskin called ‘illth’. Illth is bad stuff: accumulation of waste, pollution of air and water and even climate change offer good examples. But so do erosions of social solidarity and mutual support systems. States often step in to deal with illth and other negative externalities of capitalism. This is what Karl Polanyi analysed as the ‘double-movement’ of capitalism that led to the rise of the welfare-state. There are also market-based solutions, however, like insurance companies. And philanthropy is also sometimes important, channelling privately accumulated capital to public purposes. But one way or another, illth and negative externalities demand attention.

So, what challenges capitalism now?

There is still risk—indeed high probability—of systemic financial crises. Addicted to finance and growth, the world continues to hope that the source of so much recent upheaval can become the source of salvation from it. The dominance of finance in contemporary capitalism ties every country into a global system that has risks built into its very architecture.

Some apparent solutions—like the spreading of risk through markets for derivatives—create new and intensified risks. So far, ‘financial engineering’ has helped create great fortunes but it has not produced the equivalent of bridges that do not collapse. And when financial crises have come, the prevailing pattern of response is to turn private problems into public ones— for example by nationalizing the toxic assets of failing banks. And yet we do not know what to do except invest.

Risk can be mitigated, though this depends on both good analyses and organizational will. Financial markets, instruments and contractual agreements are extraordinarily complex. Unfortunately, the financial system is poorly understood even though it is the product and object of brilliant research. This reflects not just complexity, but the extent to which the study of finance is bound up with the production of ‘financial engineering’ products that can actually work in practice. For example, unrealistic assumptions like unlimited liquidity are embedded into algorithms that price derivatives (and indeed to some extent organize derivatives markets). This is not an error; it is a way of accomplishing effective pricing—except in those times where liquidity limits do become significant, in which cases the system is prone to crisis.

Both the complexity of the global financial system and its systemic risk are increased by organizational factors. The system is not the product of some moment of rational planning. It grew by accretion and incremental if rapid change. Different actors set out to solve different problems: expanding mortgage availability to expand home ownership, for example, or attracting funding to new business ventures, or building transportation and communication infrastructures. These are organized through different firms and government agencies. There is innovation in law (derivatives are contracts) as well as in finance per se, so different professions are involved with their different perspectives. The development of regulation usually lags, but so does the development of organizational competence even in private firms. Senior executives may not have full understanding of what subordinates—say traders—are doing and how it creates risks. ‘Silos’ separate different functions within firms, for example, and give different knowledge and incentives to traders, risk officers and general managers.

The risk is also exacerbated when international regulation and risk management is weak. This can also be a problem of inadequate understanding (and inadequate access to information, which is largely in the hands of firms with proprietary interests in it). But there is a deeper problem. International cooperation is weak on a number of different dimensions and policy areas, even while it is as crucial as ever. The financial crisis showed how difficult it was to generate effective cooperation for changes to financial processes, not just at the global level but even within Europe—which found its institutions unexpectedly inadequate even after decades of development. The Bretton Woods institutions face new challenges, including a proliferation of alternative mediators of global finance from the BRICs bank to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank led by China and the US development of alternative regional trade agreements. But insufficient international cooperation in finance is mirrored by weaknesses in other areas: refugee and security policies are notable examples at the moment. In any case, difficulty organizing effective and efficient regulation and support institutions for global finance multiplies risks. But the risks do not just concern financial collapse. They concern the possibility that no solutions will be found to paying for the costs externalized by capitalist firms.

Another challenge for capitalism, also made evident in the financial crisis, is the huge scale of what we might call ‘unofficial capitalism’. This is wealth and flows of wealth that are unrecorded or incompletely recorded, and perhaps more importantly unregulated or ineffectively regulated. Some of this derives from organized crime, including trafficking in drugs, arms and people. But some of it derives simply from tax evasion. Whatever the provenance of illicit capital, it amounts to trillions of euros trading in dark or at least obscure markets, and sometimes mingling with more legitimate capitalism in destabilizing ways. The flow of Russian money into Cyprus before the crisis of 2012–2013 was an example. Of course, unofficial economic activity helped many people survived financial crisis and austerity policies. There are relatively benign, small-scale forms of off-the-books enterprise in certain businesses and ‘alternative economies’. Even these, however, deprive states of revenues that could be used to finance social expenditure. The impact of large-scale illicit capitalism is much greater.

Diversion of funds into illicit capitalism and weak international cooperation are both factors in widespread destruction of the political and social conditions for capitalism. Even more basically, this is driven by financial capitalism itself and accompanying market fundamentalist ideology. There has been a weakening of welfare states. This is often a matter of explicit state policy. Privatization may be driven by pro-market views, but also by criticism of inefficiencies in actual bureaucracies. It is also often driven by state fiscal challenges, which are in turn shaped by difficulty collecting taxes (not least where it is easy for money to flow across borders). Another way of looking at this is that it costs a lot of money to deal with capitalism’s externalities. There are the costs of coping with illth, and there are the costs of providing education, health care, unemployment benefits and community services that not only sustain national populations and thus stabilize society, but also lower costs to capitalist firms—e.g., of skilled and healthy workers.

The weakening of welfare states is only one example of much more pervasive institutional deficits. Corporations themselves can be important social institutions that provide their members with what amount to welfare benefits and even some sense of community. But long-term corporate employment and benefit structures are in decline, subjected to shortterm financial market pressures influenced by the ideology of ‘shareholder value’. In other words, institutions of basic social importance are being made responsive only to one class of interests—those of investors. Assertions of value for other stakeholders are generally less effective. Other directly economic factors also challenge capitalism, such as unemployment, inequality and slow (or negative) growth. These are potentially disruptive to the capacity to realize profits, but also to social solidarity.

At the same time, we should not underestimate how hard people try to make existing systems work, to find their way to enough material resources and social integration for their own lives. They do this in part by continuing to participate in capitalist system. It is a source of frustration for many, though they do not always identify their personal problems with this systemic source. It also a widespread source of hope—not least in many poorer and developing countries. People continue to seek jobs and start businesses. And this is a matter of emotional attachments as well as economic practicality.

To those optimistic about revolutions, I would stress that these do not often turn out very well. In addition, one distinctive feature of the recent and in some ways continuing financial crisis has been the near-absence of anti-systemic movements. There have been occupations of public spaces, though these have been focused more on failures of government and power of global finance than on capitalism as such. There are populists on both Left and Right, but almost no real socialist mobilization. There are remarkable experiments in local-level alternative economies of barter and mutual support. But there are not large-scale movements for truly transcending capitalism and replacing it by an alternative scalable economic system.

So, what could happen?

Well, yes, capitalism could collapse. If this happens, purely economic calamity will likely be entwined with war and environmental disaster. If any historians survive this apocalypse, they will argue over whether capitalism caused the catastrophe, or only exacerbated other problems like climate change failures of international cooperation or decline in social solidarity. There could also be technological or other innovation that reinvigorates aspects of capitalism and deals with some of its costly externalities. Opportunities for expansion of capitalism’s reach are shrinking as it reaches the whole world. Still, there could be indefinite continued intensification.

The liberal hope that capitalism and democracy are somehow naturally linked is likely to be proven specious. Capitalist democracies may persist, but more state-authoritarian versions of capitalism are at least as likely to prosper. Global integration will not bring homogeneity, but diversity of political, economic and social arrangements.

Governments will attempt to compensate for problems created by capitalist development. This may bring aspects of Polanyi’s double movement, but probably not a renewal of the welfare state project—and ( perhaps ironically) particularly not in democratic states. How much states can do and how well will depend on how they are linked in international cooperation, at regional as well as global levels. In any case, though, it is important to look at whether compensation for illth and positive virtues of solidarity may be produced in other ways, including in business institutions, philanthropy and social entrepreneurship.

Small achievements in mitigating problems are worth the effort and worth cherishing. But neither reducing inequality nor stemming climate change is easy, and neither is likely without trade-offs with freedom or growth.

What seems very unlikely is a pure collapse or revolutionary transformation creating socialism. If capitalism is to be replaced by a new dominant economic form, this is likely to come about through a prolonged period of ambiguity, difficulty and conflict. The end of capitalism may be more like the end of the Roman Empire or of feudalism than like the end of the Soviet Union. In this context, creating and defending islands of civility, solidarity and relative social justice may be a challenging but crucial project.

### 1AR—AT: War Turn

#### Growth solves war on a massive scale

Dafoe 14, Political Science and International Economics (Allan & Nina Kelsey; assistant professor in political science at Yale & research associate in international economics at Berkeley; Journal of Peace Research, “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/5/619.full)

Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013).More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications. To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB. In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions.We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias. We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling. Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1 To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling may be operative in the most serious disputes, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategic market-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict. Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene; a dyadic acceptance of the status quo could promote both peace and capital openness; and countries seeking to institutionalize a regional peace might instrumentally harness the pacifying effects of liberal markets. The correlation: Open capital markets and peace The empirical puzzle at the core of this article is the significant and robust correlation noted by GLB between high levels of capital openness in both members of a dyad and the infrequent incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars between the members of this dyad (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). The index of capital openness (CAPOPEN) is intended to capture the ‘difficulty states face in seeking to impose restrictions on capital flows (the degree of lost policy autonomy due to globalization)’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003: 575). CAPOPEN is constructed from data drawn from the widely used IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls; it is a combination of eight binary variables that measure different types of government restrictions on capital and currency flow (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407). The measure of CAPOPEN starts in 1966 and is defined for many countries (increasingly more over time). Most of the countries that do not have a measure of CAPOPEN are communist.2 GLB implement this variable in a dyadic framework by creating a new variable, CAPOPENL, which is the smaller of the two dyadic values of CAPOPEN. This operationalization is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak-link’ specification since the functional form is consonant with a model of war in which the ‘weakest link’ in a dyad determines the probability of war. CAPOPENL has a negative monotonic association with the incidence of MIDs, fatal MIDs, and wars (see Figure 1).3 The strength of the estimated empirical association between peace and CAPOPENL, using a modified version of the dataset and model from Gartzke (2007), is comparable to that between peace and, respectively, joint democracy, log of distance, or the GDP of a contiguous dyad (Gartzke, 2007: 179; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 412). In summary, CAPOPENL seems to be an important and robust correlate of peace. The question of why specifically this correlation exists, however, remains to be answered. The mechanism: Market-mediated signaling? Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) argue that the classic liberal account for the pacific effect of economic interdependence – that interdependence increases the expected costs of war – is not consistent with the bargaining theory of war (see also Morrow, 1999). GLB argue that ‘conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponent’s reticence to fight’ (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 400.)4 Instead, GLB (see also Gartzke, 2003; Gartzke & Li, 2003) argue that financial interdependence could promote peace by facilitating the sending of costly signals. As the probability of militarized conflict increases, states incur a variety of automatic and strategically imposed economic costs as a consequence of escalation toward conflict. Those states that persist in a dispute despite these costs will reveal their willingness to tolerate them, and hence signal resolve. The greater the degree of economic interdependence, the more a resolved country could demonstrate its willingness to suffer costs ex ante to militarized conflict. Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s mechanism implies a commonly perceived costly signal before militarized conflict breaks out or escalates: if market-mediated signaling is to account for the correlation between CAPOPENL and the absence of MIDs, then visible market-mediated costs should occur prior to or during periods of real or potential conflict (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). Thus, the proposed mechanism should leave many visible footprints in the historical record. This theory predicts that these visible signals must arise in any escalating conflict, involving countries with high capital openness, in which this mechanism is operative Clarifying the signaling mechanism Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s signaling mechanism is mostly conceptualized on an abstract, game-theoretic level (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). In order to elucidate the types of observations that could inform this theory’s validity, we discuss with greater specificity the possible ways in which such signaling might occur. A conceptual classification of costly signals The term signaling connotes an intentional communicative act by one party directed towards another. Because the term signaling thus suggests a willful act, and a signal of resolve is only credible if it is costly, scholars have sometimes concluded that states involved in bargaining under incomplete information could advance their interests by imposing costs on themselves and thereby signaling their resolve (e.g. Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007). However, the game-theoretic concept of signaling refers more generally to any situation in which an actor’s behavior reveals information about her private information. In fact, states frequently adopt sanctions with low costs to themselves and high costs to their rivals because doing so is often a rational bargaining tactic on other grounds: they are trying to coerce their rival to concede the issue. Bargaining encounters of this type can be conceptualized as a type of war-of-attrition game in which each actor attempts to coerce the other through the imposition of escalating costs. Such encounters also provide the opportunity for signaling: when states resist the costs imposed by their rivals, they ‘signal’ their resolve. If at some point one party perceives the conflict to have become too costly and steps back, that party ‘signals’ a lack of resolve. Thus, this kind of signaling arises as a by-product of another’s coercive attempts. In other words, costly signals come in two forms: self-inflicted (information about a leader arising from a leader’s intentional or incidental infliction of costs on himself) or imposed (information about a leader that arises from a leader’s response to a rival’s imposition of costs). Additionally, costs may arise as an automatic byproduct of escalation towards military conflict or may be a tool of statecraft that is strategically employed during a conflict. The automatic mechanism stipulates that as the probability of conflict increases, various economic assets will lose value due to the risk of conflict and investor flight. However, the occurrence of these costs may also be intentional outcomes of specific escalatory decisions of the states, as in the case of deliberate sanctions; in this case they are strategic. Finally, at a practical level, we identify three different potential kinds of economic costs of militarized conflict that may be mediated by open capital markets: capital costs from political risk, monetary coercion, and business sanctions. T

## 1AR—Frontlines

### 1AR—AT: Can’t Solve Inequality

#### A federal jobs guarantee decreases wage inequality—empirics prove

Darity et al 18 – William Darity Jr. is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and the Director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University; — Mark Paul is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University; Darrick Hamilton is Professor of Economics and Urban Policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research, and Director of the Doctoral Program in Public and Urban Policy at The New School. “The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment”; MARCH 9, 2018; <https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment> As+

The persistence of involuntary unemployment in the U.S. economy is the status quo—but it need not be. Recent research has highlighted the policy mechanisms behind rising inequality in the United States; likewise, unemployment substantially affects inequality and is itself affected by the policy.[12] While the Federal Reserve initially had a single mandate of price stability, the 1978 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (commonly known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) legally required the Federal Reserve to pursue “maximum employment,” thereby creating the modern dual mandate of the Federal Reserve. While the maximum employment mandate has resulted in sizable employment gains when the Federal Reserve chooses to prioritize it, the mechanism has proven far from sufficient in achieving full employment in the Keynesian sense—that is, an economy where anyone who wants a job can find a job.[13]

Although the federal government has established full employment as a national goal in the past—via the Employment Act of 1946 and the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978—it has failed to achieve these goals through macroeconomic stabilization policies, monetary or fiscal. The only time the United States was operating near full employment was during World War II. From 1943 to 1945, the U.S. operated at an average unemployment rate under 1.7 percent.[14] Thus, this paper proposes the creation of a National Investment Employment Corps to achieve permanent full employment in the U.S. economy through large-scale, direct hiring by the federal government.[15] We argue that not only would such a policy bring the economy to sustained full employment, but it also would constitute a sizable restructuring of the labor market.[16]

The federal job guarantee would provide a job, at non-poverty wages, for all citizens above the age of 18 that sought one.[17] The minimum wage rate in the program is $11.83 an hour, equivalent to $24,600 per year for full-time workers, which is the current poverty line for a family of four. This rate would be indexed to inflation, ensuring that workers’ purchasing power is maintained over time.[18] The program would incorporate wage variation based on time and performance in the program, a worker’s previous experience, education, and region of residence; thus, we estimate a mean annual wage for all employees at approximately $32,500.[19]

#### Multiple scenarios prove why a jobs guarantee solves poverty

Rainey 18 — “How Much Would a Federal Jobs Guarantee Cost?”; December 6, 2018; <https://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2018/12/06/How-Much-Would-Federal-Jobs-Guarantee-Cost> As+

One of the more provocative ideas being kicked around on the progressive left these days is a federal jobs guarantee. Proponents say that too many American workers have been left behind in an increasingly service-oriented economy, leaving millions unemployed or underemployed, struggling just to survive with little hope for the future. The federal government should step in to correct this market failure, the theory goes, offering jobs to all who want them, thereby providing dignified work and livable wages while reviving the many rural and industrial communities that have suffered from economic stagnation or collapse over the last few decades.

While the idea has plenty of critics on both the left and the right – see here and here, for example – several liberal think tanks have offered serious proposals for how a jobs guarantee might operate, and earlier this year Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) released a bill that would create a pilot program.

The Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution just released a new analysis of several leading proposals for a federal jobs guarantee, including those from the Center for American Progress and the Levy Institute. The Brookings analysis delves into some of the many sticky issues surrounding the idea, such as its effect on the overall job market, its potential size and, crucially, its likely cost. Here are some of the data and conclusions from the report:

\* The potential size of the program is enormous. There are currently about 50 million working-age people who are unemployed or out of the workforce altogether, and roughly another 50 million who are employed but making less than $15 an hour (see the table below).

\* Not all potential participants would actually sign up, and much depends on the wages offered, with proposals ranging from $10 an hour to $15 an hour, with variable benefits.

\* The roughly 6 million workers who are currently unemployed would likely participate at high levels, along with several million low-wage workers who would switch jobs. Some people currently out of the workforce would take jobs as well.

\* Some employed workers who could switch to the federal program would stay in their current jobs, though at higher wages sparked by the competition from the jobs guarantee.

\* In one projection, the U-6 unemployment rate, which includes the unemployed, marginally attached workers and some part-timers, would fall sharply to 1.5 percent, down from its current 9.7 percent – with nearly 10 million people gaining full-time work.

\* Wages for the bottom 80 percent of workers would rise by as much as 5 percent, and poverty rates would fall.

\* Participation would likely vary significantly by geography.

\* The kind of work that could be done by participants includes teachers and teaching assistants, personal care providers, construction and maintenance workers, security and police forces, and office support.

\* The costs would likely be in the billions of dollars, with two of the more aggressive proposals coming in at more than $500 billion per year (see the table below).

#### Turn— inequality in the squo is uniquely worse

Blackwell and Hamilton 20– “Will We Face Depression-Era Job Losses? Let’s Not Find Out”; May 9, 2020; <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/09/opinion/federal-jobs-guarantee-coronavirus.html> As+

On Friday, the Labor Department announced that over 20.5 million Americans lost their jobs in April, bringing the unemployment rate to 14.7 percent. This level of devastation has not been reached since the Great Depression. With more than one in four companies shuttered to minimize the pandemic’s death toll and at least 30 million workers seeking unemployment benefits, we are in the throes of an unprecedented jobs crisis.

Just like the health crisis, economic fallout is hitting black and brown communities particularly hard. Far more black, Latinx, and Native American households are financially impacted or severely harmed by the coronavirus than white households. People of color make up an outsized share of the essential workers — grocery store clerks, bus drivers, janitors and home care workers — who risk exposure to the virus while earning low wages with few benefits.

While Congress has taken some important steps to provide relief, more must be done to keep people safe, prevent job losses and maintain incomes. We face a recession with the potential for Depression-era job losses, and we know from experience that black and brown workers bear the greatest risk of long-term economic setbacks. To ensure an inclusive recovery and a more resilient future, Congress needs to enact a federal job guarantee: a public option for a job with living wages and full benefits on projects that meet long-neglected community needs.

This idea is not new. The Humphrey-Hawkins Act — introduced in the 1970s by Senator Hubert Humphrey, a Democrat from Minnesota, and Representative Augustus Hawkins, a Democrat from California — proposed employment guarantees. The original bill allowed citizens to sue the government if they couldn’t find a job. A version of federal job protections has been percolating for years. In 2018, three Democratic senators — Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Cory Booker of New Jersey and Bernie Sanders of Vermont — approved of the idea. Hundreds of scholars, leaders and organizations working for racial, economic and environmental justice have signed on to a Jobs for All pledge calling for a federal guarantee.

The coronavirus exposes the extreme vulnerability of a system that actively produces inequality. A job guarantee is a powerful solution that would not only address urgent needs but also bend our economy toward racial and economic justice.

As Pavlina Tcherneva, an economist at Bard College, described, some of these guaranteed jobs could be in disaster preparation and monitoring. We could hire workers to conduct the community-based testing, monitoring and contract tracing necessary to contain the virus and safely reopen the economy. Workers would be equipped with proper personal protective equipment, and could have access to child care provided through the program. Employment (rather than unemployment) offices across the country could identify and fill shortages of ventilators and masks.

The program would be funded by the federal government and administered locally, with community input to identify projects that address long-term physical and care infrastructure needs. Communities could implement energy efficiency retrofits and environmental restoration efforts to fight climate change. They could hire teacher’s assistants, child care providers and elder care aides to support our youth and seniors. And they could remediate brownfields and create new public art.

States and cities could also implement larger-scale projects, for example laying municipal broadband networks that plug disconnected communities into the modern economy — a divide made visible as public schools scrambled to implement distance learning.

By ensuring that everyone can have not just any job, but a good job with dignified wages, benefits, health care, safe working conditions and full worker rights, a job guarantee would deliver long-needed worker reforms. It would tackle poverty by providing a viable alternative for the 40 percent of workers who earn less than $15 per hour. And it would reduce racial employment disparities by guaranteeing good jobs for everyone, including black, Latinx and Native American workers who face hiring discrimination and are disproportionately relegated to low-wage jobs.

A federal commitment to universal employment has deep roots in the New Deal and the civil rights movement. The Works Progress Administration employed 8.5 million people over eight years, building infrastructure that supported and powered the nation over the next century. In 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called for an Economic Bill of Rights, beginning with the right to employment. Martin Luther King, Jr., pushed for guaranteed jobs in his final years and Coretta Scott King led a grass-roots movement championing it.

An updated version of Roosevelt’s vision would increase bargaining power and expand the social safety net for all workers. By hiring workers at the beginning of a downturn, a permanent job guarantee would operate as an automatic stabilizer in perpetuity, maintaining consumer spending and protecting us from recessions — making our economy more resilient as well as more inclusive.

This time last year, no one would have predicted that a global pandemic would bring us to the brink of economic collapse. But we can predict with certainty that Covid-19 will not be our last economic shock. A job guarantee can mitigate this harm and usher in a more just and equitable economic future.

### 1AR—AT: Inherency Press

#### There’s a need now for an alternative to private sector jobs.

Carpenter and Hamilton 20 Daniel Hamilton, Professor of Government and Director, Center for American Political Studies, Harvard University, Executive Director of the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, The Ohio State University “A FEDERAL JOB GUARANTEE: ANTI-POVERTY AND INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY FOR A BETTER FUTURE” <https://scholars.org/contribution/federal-job-guarantee>

-covid tanked

This will not be a V-shaped recession. Public health restrictions are [likely to remain in place](https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/03/americans-are-underestimating-how-long-coronavirus-disruptions-will-last-health-experts-say/) for many months more and to resurface in fall 2020. Many small and medium-sized businesses that have closed or will close in the coming weeks and months will not re-open, and if they do, they will not likely hire their full pre-crisis workforce. This is in part due to the usual cycles of business downsizing and the costliness and delay of start-up after lay-up and scrapping, but part of it comes from the economic disruption of COVID-19. Until a coronavirus vaccine is widely available (not merely a matter of medical innovation but of mass administration of the treatment to hundreds of millions of Americans), American consumers will likely refrain from spending at anything like the rate they did before January 2020. Indeed, older Americans (who are on average wealthier than younger generations and with more disposable income) are the most likely to continue to curtail their spending behavior in the summer and fall of 2020 and into 2021, forgoing restaurants and bars, gyms, haircuts and other businesses where people gather or there is physical proximity. Add to this the well-known psychological effects of major recessions, and it is likely that the coming years will be characterized by greater savings behavior (which happened after the Great Depression, for instance). More robust savings would be a good thing in many respects, but in a heavily service-oriented economy dependent upon consumer spending, it means that millions of private sector jobs are not coming back.

### 1AR—AT: Can’t Solve Recidivism

#### FJG reduces recidivism and increases long-term employment

Peter 98’ Finn, Peter. Successful job placement for ex-offenders: The Center for Employment Opportunities. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1998. //RD

Government programs to bring ex-offenders into the labor market began with the passage of the Manpower Demonstration and Training Act of 1962 and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. These acts led to the creation of hundreds of employment and training programs for offenders and exoffenders. However, shortcomings in the research methods used to evaluate these programs made it difficult to conclude that the efforts improved employment or reduced recidivism among ex-offenders. During the 1970s, more controlled experiments of ex-offender employment programs were undertaken, especially the supportedwork demonstrations implemented by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC). These studies generally failed to prove that such projects improved participants’ employment or earnings or reduced their recidivism, with one exception. A 1972 study conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice, located in New York City, evaluated work crews for chronically unemployed ex-offenders and former heroin addicts. The model involved closely supervised employment on work crews consisting entirely of employees at the Wildcat Services Corporation. Wages were subsidized; participants did real work but were sheltered from the full demands of the workplace; stress was gradually increased; and counseling was available after hours if needed. Vera researchers randomly assigned ex-offenders to a test group that Previous Supported-Work Initiatives participated in the Wildcat program or to a control group that received no assistance. Program participation increased ex-offenders’ stability and earning capacity significantly during the 3-year followup period; however, while participants were arrested less often than the control group during the first year, by the end of the third year the difference in recidivism had evaporated.a Further study is needed to determine whether the difference evaporated because recidivism among participants had increased or because recidivism among the control group had decreased. A review of labor markets and crime risk factors found that “even after 30 years of trying, . . . no program—in-prison training, transitional assistance (both in-kind and monetary assistance), or pretrial diversion— has consistently shown itself capable (through a rigorous random assignment evaluation) of decreasing recidivism through labor market-oriented programs, inside or outside of prison.” However, the review observes that “the intuition of . . . [postrelease transitional income supplement] programs is still valid. . . . Ex-offenders with jobs commit fewer crimes than ex-offenders without jobs, and those with higher earnings commit fewer crimes than those with lower earnings.”b Supporting this intuition, a 1992 study of Project RIO—a statewide program run by the Texas Workforce Commission that provides job placement services to more than 15,000 parolees each year—found that after 1 year, 69 percent of program participants had secured employment, compared with only 36 percent of a group of parolees who did not enroll in Project RIO. Furthermore, during the year after release, 48 percent of high-risk RIO participants were rearrested, compared with 57 percent of nonparticipating highrisk parolees; 23 percent of the RIO participants were reincarcerated, compared with 38 percent of nonparticipants. Although parolees in the study were not assigned randomly to control and treatment groups, the two groups of ex-offenders studied had similar demographic characteristics and risks of reoffending.c

#### FJG Works well with financial crisis and necessity for work

Peter 98’ Finn, Peter. Successful job placement for ex-offenders: The Center for Employment Opportunities. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1998. //RD

Success “That’s the good thing about coming here. They really help you.”—A participant talking to a newcomer in the Center for employment Opportunites waiting room The primary goal of CEO is to reintegrate ex-offenders into the community by helping them find employment in unsubsidized, permanent jobs that pay more than minimum wage and offer growth potential and benefits. Between 1992 and 1996, the program placed an average of 766 participants in permanent jobs each year, for an average annual placement rate of approximately 70 percent. The remaining 30 percent dropped out of the program at different stages: ■ Five percent of all program participants failed to show up for the first day of program activities. ■ Fifteen percent dropped out of life skills classes. ■ Five percent never showed up for the first day of crew work. ■ Five percent were terminated for failing to follow work crew rules. According to executive director Mindy Tarlow, the first 30 days are the critical time for sticking with the program; after participants are working with an employment specialist, they tend to remain with the program until they find a job. At a time when the minimum wage was $4.25 an hour, the average hourly wage for CEO participants who were placed between 1992 and 1996 ranged from $4.25 to $20. In 1996, their average wage was nearly 50 percent higher than the minimum wage, representing almost $4,000 in earned income above the minimum wage over the course of the year. Nearly two-thirds of the jobs provided full benefits. In 1996, approximately 75 percent of placed participants were still on the same job after 1 month, 60 percent were still employed after 3 months, and 38 percent after 6 months. Many remain much longer. For example, among 12 participants one local business had hired over a 3-year period, “more worked out than didn’t,” according to the owner. “One stayed 21 / 2 years, two for 11 / 2 years, a couple for 1 year.” The most common reason for becoming unemployed is drug relapse, despite CEO’s availability to refer any employed former participant to treatment. The success of CEO’s work crews has inspired the agency to adapt their principles to a program encouraging young offenders to stay in school (see “Young Probationers’ Program”).ccording to Christopher Stone, the executive director of the Vera Institute of Justice who supervised CEO’s spinoff as an independent organization (see “CEO’s Origins”), “Any postprison agency responsible for reducing recidivism can set up work crews in conjunction with vocational development services.” However, there are several keys to the success of a program like CEO: ■ A local criminal justice system agency—preferably a division of parole or probation—must become a program partner to ensure an adequate supply of work for all their referrals extremely attractive, especially when alternative job programs cannot promise quick employment; fail to provide the structure, discipline, and followup that help offenders secure above-minimum-wage work; and may require participants to apply for welfare. ■ Times of fiscal crisis can work to the advantage of a program like CEO, because governments may be more willing to take cost-cutting measures—such as releasing inmates early with assurances of appropriate supervision. ■ Engaging participants in day labor is essential to keeping them motivated and out of trouble. Income from the work crews also supports day-labor operations. However, being able to establish work crews may depend on the political will of government partners and local community representatives (see “How CEO Finds Work Crew Customers”). ■ Hiring competent operations staff, such as crew supervisors and senior field supervisors, is critical. Local

#### Federal jobs include benefits – solves for drug use

Peter 98’ Finn, Peter. Successful job placement for ex-offenders: The Center for Employment Opportunities. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1998. // RD

Highlights Many newly released offenders have difficulty reintegrating into society. The Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) in New York City is one of many programs that help ex-offenders prepare for, find, and keep jobs. CEO’s program is unique because it provides day labor for participants, most of whom have been released only the previous week from boot camp. In addition to enabling the participants to earn a daily income, the work crews help the participants structure their lives and develop good work habits. The work crews also generate revenue that covers direct day-labor expenses. The work crews are a short-term means of achieving CEO’s overall mission: placing ex-offenders in permanent, unsubsidized, full-time jobs that provide benefits and compensation above minimum wage. Distinctive features of CEO include the following: ■ A set of consistently enforced rules builds on and sustains the self-discipline and self-esteem most participants have developed in boot camp; these rules also foster the reliability that employers value most in hiring CEO participants. ■ The program acts as a free human resources department to employers by screening participants for suitability and by serving as an employee assistance program, offering help with such problems as substance abuse to any of the employers’ workers—not just CEO graduates. ■ The program pays for half of employees’ wages for 8 weeks or more through the Federal Job Training Partnership Act if specific criteria are met. ■ Program employment specialists help employers obtain any available job tax credits. The program helps about 70 percent of its participants find full-time employment within 2 to 3 months, with most jobs paying more than minimum wage and providing fringe benefits. Staff offer ongoing services to all placed participants for at least 6 months after placement. Approximately three-fourths of participants placed are still employed at the same job after 1 month and of these about half are still working at that job after 6 months.

### 1AR—AT: No Brink For Democracy

#### Even though democracy in the U.S. might be a given, we are on a downward spiral towards more authoritarian tendencies and breakdown of legitimate norms.

Osnos 20 [Evan Osnos, staff writer in 2008 and covers politics and foreign affirs, His recent pieces include a profile of Mark Zuckerberg, a tale from Donald’s Trump war on “the deep state,” and a visit to North Korea during the nuclear crisis. The book won the 2014 National Book Award and was a finalist for the 2015 Pulitzer Prize. Previously, Osnos worked as Beijing bureau chief for the Chicago Tribune, where he was part of a team that won the 2008 Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting. “Why Democracy is on the decline in the United States,” <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-democracy-is-on-the-decline-in-the-united-states>] JJ

The [latest edition](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy) was published last week, and, as you might expect, it recorded the fourteenth straight year of deteriorating freedom around the world; sixty-four countries have lost liberties in the past year, while only thirty-seven registered improvements. (India, the world’s largest democracy, has seen some of the most alarming declines.) Its assessment of the United States is also disturbing. In 2009, the U.S. had a score of ninety-four, out of a hundred, which ranked it near the top, just behind Germany, Switzerland, and Estonia. In the decade since, it has slipped eight points; it now ranks behind Greece, Slovakia, and Mauritius. Looking at the United States, Freedom House analysts note the types of trends that they more customarily assign to fragile corners of the globe: “pressure on electoral integrity, judicial independence, and safeguards against corruption. Fierce rhetorical attacks on the press, the rule of law, and other pillars of democracy coming from American leaders, including the president himself.”

Explaining what, exactly, accounts for this decline is the work of a growing body of literature. Much of it focusses, of course, on the tenure of Donald Trump, but, interestingly, some scholars and advocates tend to identify a point of origin well before the election of 2016. According to Protect Democracy, a legal-watchdog group dedicated to combatting the rise of authoritarianism in America, “the growth and spread of democracies that defined the 20th Century peaked in the early days of the 21st; since 2005, the state of democracies around the world has receded.”

One of the most frequently cited theories for this change is depicted in what’s known as the “elephant graph.” The graph, which the economist Branko Milanović popularized, in 2013, is, in fact, a chart that shows income growth by stratum (or, in technical terms, by “percentiles of the global income distribution”) in the twenty years leading up to the 2008 global financial crisis. The graph got its name because it looks like an elephant: on the left, there is a plump body of rising incomes—China, India, and other beneficiaries of globalization—and, on the right, a rapidly rising trunk, which reflects the spectacular fortunes of the world’s top one per cent. The most politically significant part of the elephant is in between: the bottom of the trunk, which shows the stagnant incomes of American and European working and middle classes. Those groups have proved to be fertile bases of support for populist rebellions against democratic traditions that, from their vantage point, now appear false or obsolete.

### 1AR—AT: No Brink For Unemployment

#### Corona supercharges unemployment— the aff is more critical now than ever

Roberts 20 — “30 million Americans are unemployed. Here’s how to employ them.”; https://www.May 4, 2020; vox.com/science-and-health/2020/5/4/21243725/coronavirus-unemployment-cares-act-federal-job-guarantee-green-new-deal-pavlina-tcherneva As+

In the last six weeks, there were a staggering 30 million unemployment claims in the US — unprecedented at least since the Great Depression, possibly in the country’s history.

The flood quickly overwhelmed America’s already rickety unemployment system. The underfunded patchwork of different offices, laws, and procedures across states has meant wide disparities in who receives benefits and how much. Overall, less than a third of the unemployed received their benefits in March. Surveys indicate these failures are ongoing.

For many of America’s unemployed, already so close to the financial edge, failure to receive benefits will mean food insecurity, skipping medications, or losing a home, with accelerating social costs in depression, domestic abuse, drug abuse, suicides, and sickness. In the US, unemployment is allowed to metastasize into something much worse.2

That is one reason some economists and activists on the left — including the authors of the Green New Deal resolution — have advocated for a federal job guarantee. It would be better, they argue, if all those unemployed people could be slotted into public service jobs. They could maintain their incomes, their homes, and their health.

In US politics, a job guarantee was seen as hopeless lefty radicalism as recently as a month ago. But the shock of the virus has opened the conversation to bigger ideas. As unemployment spirals into a range of social pathologies, history is catching up to economist Pavlina Tcherneva.

Chair of the economics department at New York’s Bard College, Tcherneva studies macroeconomics and full employment and has been a key figure in the emergence (or reemergence) of Modern Monetary Theory, the newly popular idea that the only limit on the spending power of federal governments (at least governments that print their own currency, like the US) is inflation. It argues, contra the scarcity mindset of fiscal austerity, that we can have nice things.

In July, Tcherneva’s new book is coming out. It’s called The Case for a Job Guarantee, and as the title indicates, it makes the case for a federal program that ensures a job for anyone who wants one. When she began making this case in her academic work, with unemployment at 4 percent, she was dismissed as a fringe figure. Now, as unemployment rockets past 20 percent, toward 30, she sounds more like a prophet.

I reached Tcherneva by phone on April 30 to talk about a job guarantee, how it would work, what it would mean for the larger economy, and why it’s necessary even if other safety net policies like a universal basic income are already in place.

Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity. David Roberts: How long has the idea of a job guarantee been around, and what is it exactly?

Pavlina Tcherneva: A job guarantee is the idea that people who want decent work should be guaranteed that opportunity. It is a public option for a basic, decent job with basic living wages and basic benefits.

The idea has been around for a while. You can find it in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Even before that, labor movements pushed for the right to guaranteed employment in various forms. The idea was resurrected, at least in the popular discourse, during the civil rights movement.

Around the world, you see various forms of large-scale employment programs for the unemployed, but a job guarantee is different. It is a missing piece of the safety net. When you think about how we provide the safety net for other things — we have a problem with retirement security? Guarantee retirement income. There’s food insecurity? Guarantee food. A problem with shelter? Guarantee shelter.

### 1AR—AT: No Impact To Incarceration

#### Incarceration is violent and dehumanizing

Allegra McLeod 15, Associate Professor of Law at Georgetown, “Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice” UCLA Law Review 1156, 2015, <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2502&context=facpub>)

Prisons are places of intense brutality, violence, and dehumanization.70 In his seminal study of the New Jersey State Prison, The Society of Captives, sociologist Gresham M. Sykes carefully exposed how the fundamental structure of the modern U.S. prison degrades the inmate’s basic humanity and sense of selfworth.71 Caged or confined and stripped of his freedom, the prisoner is forced to submit to an existence without the ability to exercise the basic capacities that define personhood in a liberal society.72 The inmate’s movement is tightly controlled, sometimes by chains and shackles, and always by orders backed with the threat of force;73 his body is subject to invasive cavity searches on command;74 he is denied nearly all personal possessions; his routines of eating, sleeping, and bodily maintenance are minutely managed; he may communicate and interact with others only on limited terms strictly dictated by his jailers; and he is reduced to an identifying number, deprived of all that constitutes his individuality.75 Sykes’s account of “the pains of imprisonment”76 attends not only to the dehumanizing effects of this basic structure of imprisonment—which remains relatively unchanged from the New Jersey penitentiary of 1958 to the U.S. jails and prisons that abound today77—but also to its violent effects on the personhood of the prisoner:

**\*Note: Not Mine**

### 1AR—AT: Unskilled Workers

#### NIEC includes training and more

SDCC – The Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity is a scholarly collaborative that studies the causes and consequences of inequality and develops remedies for these disparities and their adverse effects; “National Investment Employment Corps”; No date but it was written based off a study by their professors called “The Federal Job Guarantee—A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment”; <https://socialequity.duke.edu/portfolio-item/federal-job-guarantee-national-investment-employment-corps/> As+

Each NIEC job would offer individuals nonpoverty wages: a minimum salary of $23,000, plus benefits including federal health insurance. NIEC would work similarly to the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps developed in response to the unemployment crisis of the Great Depression. The types of jobs offered could address the maintenance and construction of the nation’s physical and human infrastructure, from building roads, bridges, dams and schools to staffing high-quality day care. The program would include a training component to equip employees with the skills necessary to fill state and municipal needs.

The program would be cost effective, too. If the program put 15 million Americans to work – the total number of people out of work at the nadir of the recent recession – at an approximate cost of $50,000 per employee, the bill for the program would be $750 billion. In 2011, the total cost of the nation’s anti-poverty programs was about $740 billion. Since the National Investment Employment Corps would function simultaneously as an employment assurance and anti-poverty program, the existing anti-poverty budget could be slashed drastically, with those savings going to finance the job guarantee.

In short, the NIEC program would drastically transform the American labor market. Its universal nature would ensure jobs for all and greatly aid in reducing poverty, assist labor in its long-losing fight against capital, and finally allow the government to reach and maintain an economy with full employment.

### 1AR—AT: UE Doesn’t Affect Democracy

#### Unemployment encourages extremist voting— empirics prove

Bauer 18 — Paul C Bauer is a research fellow & project director at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). Previously, he worked at the European University Institute and the University of Bern. He conducts research in the areas of political sociology, -behavior, -communication and methodology; “Unemployment, Trust in Government, and Satisfaction with Democracy: An Empirical Investigation”; January 5, 2018; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2378023117750533 As+

Trust in government and more generally satisfaction with democracy are regarded as indicators of the stability and performance of democratic systems but also as important determinants thereof (Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton 2004; Easton 1975; Hetherington 2005; Levi and Stoker 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Especially in the wake of the economic crisis in 2008, scholars rang the alarm bells and pointed to the threat rising unemployment levels may pose to democratic systems (Arias et al. 2013; Kroknes, Jakobsen, and Grønning 2015; Muro and Vidal 2014; Roth 2009). Although most research focuses on unemployment’s negative personal consequences, such as depression or suicidal tendencies, there is also a long research tradition that links it to political phenomena such as voting behavior and political extremism (e.g., Bay and Blekesaune 2002; Falk, Kuhn, and Zweimueller 2011; Jahoda and Zeisel 1974; Linn, Sandifer, and Stein 1985; Lundin and Hemmingsson 2009; Siedler 2006; Stokes and Cochrane 1984). This research program, in part, speaks to the classic debate that contrasts pocketbook voters whose preferences are assumed to be “swayed most of all by the immediate and tangible circumstances of their private lives” (Kinder and Roderick Kiewiet 1981:130) and sociotropic voters whose preferences are influenced by a country’s economic condition (Hansford and Gomez 2015; Kinder and Roderick Kiewiet 1981:129–30).

The present study is guided by the following question: Does unemployment affect political evaluations in the form of trust in government and satisfaction with democracy? The study contributes to current scholarship in several ways. First, whereas the classic pocketbook versus sociotropic voter debate focuses on voting behavior, I investigate the link between unemployment and political evaluations (i.e., trust in government and satisfaction with democracy) (e.g., Hansford and Gomez 2015; Kinder and Roderick Kiewiet 1981). Both are regarded as essential resources for the performance and stability of political systems (e.g., Hetherington 1998; Levi and Stoker 2000). This research thereby contributes to a growing literature that investigates this link empirically (e.g., Arias et al. 2013; Kroknes et al. 2015; Muro and Vidal 2014; Roth 2009). I summarize previous arguments and empirical evidence and provide an overview of what is known so far.

Second, empirical evidence on this relationship is limited. It is either U.S. centered, comparative in nature, and/or characterized by certain shortcomings. Although unemployment regularly appears as a control variable in multivariate models (Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Foster and Frieden 2017; Mishler and Rose 2001), few studies focus on it as a principal cause, and if so, they operate on the group level, comparing either countries or cohorts (Arias et al. 2013; Roth, Nowak-Lehmann, and Otter 2011). Here, I focus on the impact of direct, individual-level experiences of unemployment.1 My study provides a stronger set of evidence in that it expands macro-level evidence with evidence on the individual level and focuses on causal identification. In doing so, I rely on panel data, which allows me to investigate the impact of individual-level changes in employment status on individual-level changes in political evaluations. I study this relationship on the basis of data from two different European countries, Switzerland and the Netherlands. This choice is linked both to data availability—I can rely on high-quality panel surveys that contain the necessary measures—and to the fact that I expect fewer crisis-induced distortions in those countries.

Third, I also examine the effect of unemployment on a control outcome: life satisfaction. This additional analysis allows me to ensure that the findings are not merely a result of design choices. By showing that the design identifies short-term effects of unemployment on life satisfaction, I alleviate concerns that it may be too conservative to study effects on trust in government or satisfaction with democracy. I proceed as follows: section 2 outlines arguments and empirical evidence that link unemployment and political evaluations. Section 3 presents the design, data, and measures. Section 4 summarizes the results. Section 5 provides a summary, discusses limitations, and provides rationales for future research.

Theory, Hypotheses, and Empirical Evidence

In this study, I link short-term unemployment to political evaluations.2 Various studies have pointed to direct and indirect mechanisms that connect unemployment to political evaluations (Ahn, García, and Jimeno 2004; Chabanet 2007; Hudson 2006; Newton and Zmerli 2011). First, it may be argue that there is a direct causal path. Let us assume that A loses her job. Given that A blames the government or the political system in general, one would assume that A’s support for these same institutions decreases (Hudson 2006:59; Mishler and Rose 2005). Following this idea, it is argued that job “displacement may erode institutional-based trust in employers and the economic sphere in general” (Laurence 2015:47).3 Although one would expect stronger effects for evaluations of government, people may very well translate their frustration into dissatisfaction with a political system in general.

Second, there may be various indirect causal paths: becoming unemployed leads to other events that in turn may affect someone’s political evaluations. To start, unemployed individuals encounter and experience various institutions that assess their right to benefits and assist them in finding a new job. Those institutions often demand a lot of engagement on the part of the unemployed. Negative experiences with such lower level institutions (e.g., an employment office) may spill over into one’s overall evaluation of political institutions. Unemployment is also linked to various other negative outcomes: it is presumed to lead to a loss of identity and self-esteem, to a feeling of marginalization, or to decreased life satisfaction, optimism, personal efficacy, and political participation and to increased stress, anxiety about the future, and depression (Ahn et al. 2004; Archer and Rhodes 1993; Chabanet 2007; Goldsmith, Veum, and Darity 1996; Laurence 2015; Leana and Feldman 1992; Linn et al. 1985; Rantakeisu, Starrin, and Hagquist 1997; Scott and Acock 1979; Waters 2007; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998; Zawadzki and Lazarsfeld 1935:235). These outcomes in turn may affect political evaluations such as trust in government and satisfaction with democracy. For instance, as depression changes the outlook on life more generally, it should also affect the evaluation of political objects negatively. Overall, these various mechanisms lead to a first hypothesis: Unemployment has a negative effect on trust in government and satisfaction with democracy (H1).

At the same time, the above arguments hinge on certain assumptions, the rejection of which leads to an alternative hypothesis. In what concerns the direct effect described, it really hinges on the assumption that someone who becomes unemployed blames the political system or specific institutions for his misfortune. In other words, if someone does not draw the connection between his or her personal situation and the government or political system, this explanation loses validity. It is also possible that the blame is directed at other actors (e.g., economic actors).

Second, states make various efforts to cope with the problem of unemployment and implement policies as well as special programs to simplify the reinsertion in the labor market. Fighting unemployment is one of governments’ most important tasks (Cezanne 2005:275). Someone who loses his or her job is not left alone but rather helped by the state in many ways, especially in developed countries. If unemployed persons feel that the political institutions are on their side and help them, their political evaluations should either not change at all or possibly in a positive direction (Roth 2009). These arguments lead to an alternative hypothesis: Unemployment has no effect on trust in government and satisfaction with democracy (H0).

#### Unemployment kills democratic legitimacy— more empirics prove

Bauer 18 — Paul C Bauer is a research fellow & project director at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). Previously, he worked at the European University Institute and the University of Bern. He conducts research in the areas of political sociology, -behavior, -communication and methodology; “Unemployment, Trust in Government, and Satisfaction with Democracy: An Empirical Investigation”; January 5, 2018; <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2378023117750533> As+

Together with Denis Cohen I also recently started the book project "Applied Causal Analysis (with R)" under contract with Chapman & Hall/CRC. And together with a PhD student I will start working on my DFG-funded project "TRUSTME: Measuring and explaining Trust" in November 2020.

Trust in government and more generally satisfaction with democracy are regarded as indicators of the stability and performance of democratic systems but also as important determinants thereof (Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton 2004; Easton 1975; Hetherington 2005; Levi and Stoker 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Especially in the wake of the economic crisis in 2008, scholars rang the alarm bells and pointed to the threat rising unemployment levels may pose to democratic systems (Arias et al. 2013; Kroknes, Jakobsen, and Grønning 2015; Muro and Vidal 2014; Roth 2009). Although most research focuses on unemployment’s negative personal consequences, such as depression or suicidal tendencies, there is also a long research tradition that links it to political phenomena such as voting behavior and political extremism (e.g., Bay and Blekesaune 2002; Falk, Kuhn, and Zweimueller 2011; Jahoda and Zeisel 1974; Linn, Sandifer, and Stein 1985; Lundin and Hemmingsson 2009; Siedler 2006; Stokes and Cochrane 1984). This research program, in part, speaks to the classic debate that contrasts pocketbook voters whose preferences are assumed to be “swayed most of all by the immediate and tangible circumstances of their private lives” (Kinder and Roderick Kiewiet 1981:130) and sociotropic voters whose preferences are influenced by a country’s economic condition (Hansford and Gomez 2015; Kinder and Roderick Kiewiet 1981:129–30).

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#### Fed guarantee creates a net positive GDP balance and enjoys bipartisan support.

Tcherneva 7/22 Tcherneva, Pavlina. “Read & Annotate without Distractions.” *Outline*, July 2020, outline.com/uC6C4z. | MU

More sweeping federal action is called for. Without the guarantee of a job, the effective minimum wage for those seeking work but unable to find it is zero. The job guarantee would help secure a true minimum wage and benefits package and establish standardized working hours and conditions, because it would eliminate unemployment and offer an alternative to unstable jobs that pay poverty wages. Indeed, poverty-wage-paying employers would be enticed to match or exceed the decent pay and benefits of the job guarantee if they wished to retain workers. But that would not be hard to do, because these firms, too, would be thriving in a stronger and more stable economy.

Our research at the [Levy](http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/public-service-employment-a-path-to-full-employment) Economics Institute demonstrates that a large job guarantee program, employing 15 million people at $15 an hour with benefits, would permanently boost economic growth by $550 billion (more than 2.5 percent of GDP) and private-sector employment by three to four million jobs, without causing inflation. It would furnish considerable relief to state budgets and reduce overall welfare expenditures on other programs. The price tag? Only 1.3 percent of GDP—not a high price to pay for full employment, price stability, and economic security. The fallout from COVID-19 may require the program to be bigger than earlier anticipated, but one thing is certain: one way or another, the government and society will be paying unemployment. The question is how: whether by providing decent job opportunities or by sustaining an economy in which masses of people remain unemployed.

New Deal programs made an enormous difference in the lives of Americans. As the Rutgers law and economics professor Philip Harvey has [noted](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/ZLkcC82B36i6JN8ZFKqTvg?domain=urldefense.proofpoint.com), the short-lived Civil Works Administration was so popular that workers started to regard the jobs and the projects it offered as opportunities the government owed them. The primary opposition to the program came from racist employers and farmers in the South, who wanted to be able to pay workers—especially black and migrant laborers—poverty wages. But as Harvey has noted, the program was so popular that both Roosevelt and his conservative budget director, Lewis Douglas (who was no friend of the CWA), believed that if they had reauthorized the program, they might never have been able to end it.

Today, the job guarantee [polls](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/tzYOC9rL9QfkZ4Vgs2qy5J?domain=urldefense.proofpoint.com) extremely well among Americans, including in deep red states. It is one of the rare policies that enjoys [broad bipartisan](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/SpbWC0RX8VCGEN0DIjY2N8?domain=urldefense.proofpoint.com) support—and its popularity extends even [beyond](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/UyyaCgJQpLUAgE5xc8EWpp?domain=urldefense.proofpoint.com) the borders of the United States.

Perhaps the policy owes its popularity to the basic logic at its core: to guarantee a right to work is to fundamentally reject the notion that people in economic distress, communities in disrepair, and an environment in peril are the unavoidable side effects of a market economy. As the world confronts the grim consequences of COVID-19, it could do worse than to inoculate itself against the devastating effects of mass unemployment. A job guarantee would be a long overdue step on the road to economic and social justice.

### 1AR—AT: Can’t Solve Climate Change

#### The aff flips the script on climate change and is the only way to engender the necessary policy.

Prakash and Meyerhoff 18 (Varshini Prakash and Sarah Meyerhoff. May 24, 2018. Directors of Sunrise Movement. “It’s Time for the Climate Movement to Embrace a Federal Jobs Guarantee” <https://inthesetimes.com/article/climate-movement-federal-jobs-guarantee-bernie-sanders-2018>) DLuo

Across the coun­try, young peo­ple face dai­ly reminders that our soci­ety doesn’t serve our futures. We suf­fer from unem­ploy­ment and under­em­ploy­ment that is well beyond the nation­al aver­age, with young peo­ple of col­or strug­gling dis­pro­por­tion­ate­ly to find work and eco­nom­ic oppor­tu­ni­ty. We are strad­dled with his­toric stu­dent loan debts. And in a moment when we should be work­ing quick­ly to avert cli­mate cat­a­stro­phe and tran­si­tion to an inclu­sive, fos­sil-free econ­o­my, many of our elect­ed offi­cials remain pas­sive as the Trump admin­is­tra­tion attacks our air, water and land. As youth lead­ers in the cli­mate jus­tice move­ment, we believe now is the time to embrace a bold polit­i­cal vision that address­es cli­mate change while work­ing to end racial­ized eco­nom­ic inequality. A cen­ter­piece of that vision is a fed­er­al jobs guar­an­tee, a pol­i­cy through which the gov­ern­ment direct­ly employs any­one who wants a job but doesn’t have one. The jobs guar­an­tee has deep roots in the U.S. pro­gres­sive tra­di­tion and is see­ing grow­ing sup­port from schol­ars and [move­ment lead­ers](https://www.thenation.com/article/the-government-should-guarantee-everyone-a-good-job/) who tout its poten­tial to put Amer­i­cans to work while help­ing to rebuild our infra­struc­ture, schools and health­care sys­tem. With [Sen. Bernie Sanders](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/04/23/bernie-sanders-to-unveil-plan-to-guarantee-every-american-a-job/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b206be93760d) devel­op­ing a jobs guar­an­tee pro­pos­al, as well as a score of down-bal­lot can­di­dates and [Demo­c­ra­t­ic pres­i­den­tial hope­fuls](https://theintercept.com/2018/04/01/federal-job-guaranteed-jobs-program/) also voic­ing sup­port, the pol­i­cy is sure to fea­ture promi­nent­ly in the 2018 and 2020 elec­tion cycles. Cli­mate sci­en­tists say that the next few years may be the [only ones we have left](http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/11/29/carbon/?utm_term=.ac031ccee1ad) to avert cat­a­stroph­ic glob­al warm­ing. A jobs guar­an­tee pro­gram with a strong focus on stop­ping and prepar­ing for cli­mate change — a cli­mate jobs guar­an­tee — might be the last, best hope to quick­ly mar­shal pub­lic sup­port and resources behind cli­mate action. Sim­ply put, this is a can’t‑miss oppor­tu­ni­ty for the cli­mate move­ment — and for our generation. Toward a cli­mate jobs guarantee Solv­ing the cli­mate cri­sis will be no easy feat. It will require mas­sive invest­ments, to the tune of tril­lions of dol­lars over the next few decades — to tran­si­tion toward a 100 per­cent renew­able ener­gy econ­o­my; to over­haul how we farm, trans­port and con­sume food; to restore deplet­ed ecosys­tems; and to empow­er the com­mu­ni­ties already affect­ed by the cli­mate cri­sis to adapt to changes that can­not be reversed. Each of these under­tak­ings will also require mas­sive job cre­ation. A cli­mate jobs guar­an­tee has the poten­tial to cre­ate a labor force that could be the engine of rapid decar­boniza­tion, and the ser­vices it gen­er­ates can enhance com­mu­ni­ties’ resilience to cli­mate impacts. Impor­tant­ly, such a pro­gram can ele­vate those com­mu­ni­ties who have been sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly exclud­ed from eco­nom­ic pros­per­i­ty as well as those work­ers who risk being left behind by the tran­si­tion to a renew­able ener­gy economy. A cli­mate jobs guar­an­tee could be the cli­mate movement’s ​“Medicare-for-All” pol­i­cy — a uni­ver­sal pro­gram big enough to address the mas­sive and com­pli­cat­ed cri­sis of cli­mate change, but still tan­gi­ble and pop­u­lar among the vast major­i­ty of Americans. Like Medicare for All, a jobs guar­an­tee is wild­ly pop­u­lar. Polling firm Civis Ana­lyt­ics iden­ti­fied it as ​“one of the most pop­u­lar issues [they’ve] ever polled,” with a [major­i­ty](https://www.thenation.com/article/why-democrats-should-embrace-a-federal-jobs-guarantee/) of Amer­i­cans’ sup­port, and with [dis­pro­por­tion­ate inter­est](https://www.thenation.com/article/why-democrats-should-embrace-a-federal-jobs-guarantee/) among low-income groups and com­mu­ni­ties of col­or, who tend to bear the brunt of unem­ploy­ment, under­em­ploy­ment and cli­mate chaos. While we’ve seen grow­ing momen­tum around calls for 100 per­cent renew­able ener­gy and keep­ing fos­sil fuels in the ground, a jobs guar­an­tee is the most promis­ing means of pop­u­lar­iz­ing the deficit spend­ing and enlarged role of gov­ern­ment that rapid decar­boniza­tion of the econ­o­my will require. Fram­ing the cli­mate movement’s efforts around empow­er­ing Amer­i­cans from all walks of life to build an inclu­sive econ­o­my will not only gar­ner more pop­u­lar sup­port for cli­mate jus­tice goals, it could also help build stronger rela­tion­ships with labor, eco­nom­ic, social and racial jus­tice move­ments which will like­ly also throw their weight behind such jobs pro­gram pro­pos­als. The cli­mate jobs guar­an­tee offers an oppor­tu­ni­ty to strike down one of the deep­est fis­sures on the left, that between some labor and envi­ron­men­tal activists. By ham­mer­ing home the mes­sage that we can put Amer­i­cans to work solv­ing the cli­mate cri­sis, we can help end the fal­la­cy that has long under­cut our ties with labor and oth­er allies — that access to good-pay­ing jobs is incom­pat­i­ble with the well-being of our planet.

### 1AR—AT: Female Reps

#### A jobs guarantee vastly benefits women and marginalized workers

Lowrey 18 Annie Lowrey [Annie M. Lowrey is an American journalist who writes on politics and economic policy for The Atlantic magazine.], 5-11-2018, "A Promise So Big, Democrats Aren’t Sure How to Keep It," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/the-democratic-party-wants-to-end-unemployment/560153/> AG

The biggest benefits, its proponents argue, would rebound to society’s poorest and most marginalized—among them individuals with a criminal record, mental-health problems, disabilities, and literacy challenges, all of which are powerful barriers to getting and keeping a job. Beyond that, the program might be a powerful tool to correct racial inequalities. The unemployment rate for black workers currently sits at 6.9 percent, versus 3.6 percent for white workers. Getting a college or a graduate degree does nothing to level these numbers out. That helps to foster a racial earnings gap and to fuel the pernicious, generation-spanning racial wealth gap, with black families with an employed head of household poorer, on average, than white families with a jobless one. A jobs guarantee would drive down black workers’ rates of unemployment, both in absolute terms and relative to white workers, Darrick Hamilton, who co-authored the CBPP proposal, told me.

Depending on how it were structured, a jobs guarantee also might act as a powerful boon to women, due to their prevalence in the poverty-wage workforce and their burden of uncompensated care work. Several proposals suggest providing a jobs guarantee to hire child-care and elder-care workers, something that would both keep the parents of young children in the labor market and ensure that caregivers got a living wage. “There are not nearly enough home care workers to aid the aged and disabled. Many working families with children under the age of five need access to affordable child care. Schools need teachers’ aides, and cities need EMTs,” the Center for American Progress jobs-guarantee outline argues. “There is no shortage of people who could do this work. What has been missing is policy that can mobilize people.”

Workers in high-unemployment regions might find their hometowns revitalized, with the government pouring vastly more money into places like Salinas, California, and Ocean City, New Jersey, in both of which the unemployment rate sits above 10 percent. Middle-class households might benefit alongside lower-income households, with the private sector competing more fiercely and directly to win workers over. Additionally, Khanna told me, a jobs guarantee might help soften the threat of automation, and the fear that another recession might lead to robots taking all of our jobs.

### 1AR—AT Small Business

#### A federal jobs guarantee increases profit of small businesses which turns their argument

Paul et. al. 18 – Mark Paul is a postdoctoral associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University. William Darity Jr. is Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African American Studies, and Economics, and director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University. Darrick Hamilton is associate professor of economics and urban policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics, New School for Social Research, and director of the doctoral program in public and urban policy at the New School. Khaing Zaw is a research associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University. “A Path to Ending Poverty by Way of Ending Unemployment: A Federal Job Guarantee”; RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences; Vol. 4, No. 3; Anti-Poverty Policy Initiatives for the United States (February 2018); pp. 44-63 (20 pages); <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7758/rsf.2018.4.3.03#metadata_info_tab_contents> As+

Would the Federal Job Guarantee Hurt Small Businesses?

The goal of the FJG is to simultaneously eliminate poverty and unemployment while supporting a robust and inclusive economy—including a small-business sector. The FJG will have adverse effects on small businesses that rely upon low-wage labor. But the magnitude of these effects can be approximated by looking both at the historic data and recent research on the effects of increases in the minimum wage.

Under the FJG program, in 2016, the wage would have been $11.56 plus benefits. An increase of this magnitude would increase the wages of millions of workers—ensuring all the dignity of a decent wage.29 This degree of compensation is not beyond historical trends tracking the magnitude of the minimum wage. During the late 1960s, when we saw peak real values of the minimum wage, the small-business sector did not collapse—nor do we anticipate it doing so under the FJG. Rather, we do anticipate, initially, a redistribution of profits in favor of labor and a modest rise in price levels.30

Recent research on the minimum wage provides additional evidence. Starting with work by David Card and Alan Krueger (1994, 2000), we now have compelling evidence on the employment effects of higher minimum wages. Their approach has been refined and replicated by Arindrajit Dube, William Lester, and Michael Reich (2010). Consistently, these researchers find no evidence of job losses in high-impact sectors from modest increases in the minimum wage.31 However, larger employment effects may take place since the total compensation under the program—inclusive of benefits—amounts to $16 an hour, an amount beyond the scope of existing empirical minimum wage models (for additional discussion of the minimum wage, see Romich and Hill 2018).

Some employment effects could be overcome by growing evidence indicating that a rise in the minimum wage can reduce job turnover (Dube, Kaplan, and Zipperer 2014) and increase per capita output to the extent that higher wages spur greater productivity (Reich et al. 2016). Reductions in turnover and increases in productivity explain why many small businesses have chosen to invest in higher compensation packages for employees with great success (Ton 2012) and generally support (60 percent) a $12 minimum wage pegged to inflation (Small Business Majority 2015).

Finally, through the FJG, we expect to see a substantial rise in effective demand, as well as investment in infrastructure across the country—boosting sales while driving down transportation and utility costs for small businesses. Furthermore, research has found that in many instances higher minimum wages are associated with superior outcomes for small businesses. A study by the Fiscal Policy Institute analyzed the impact of higher minimum wages on small businesses between 1998 and 2001, finding that small businesses grew twice as fast in states with higher minimum wages—3.1 percent to 1.6 percent (2004).32

Because workers, especially those at the low end of the income distribution, have a higher marginal propensity to consume, we would expect a substantial uptick in sales for businesses and perhaps an uptick in small businesses in currently economically depressed geographical areas. A report by the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank on the impact of spending as a result of a minimum wage increase found every dollar increase in the wage resulted in an annual spending increase of $2,996 (Aaronson, Agarwal, and French 2007).33 Given the robust literature on the minimum wage, we do not believe the FJG will drastically reduce the small businesses sector.

### 1AR—AT: Natives

#### The aff’s good for Native

Murray 18 (Michael J. Murray is an Associate Professor at Bemidji State University and a Research Scholar at the Binzagr Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, “Full Employment and Social Justice”, Binzagr Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, Chapter 8: On the Reservation: Toward a Job Guarantee Program for American Indian Nations, 2018) //EG

Ignorance is bliss. This statement encapsulates the oblivious attitudes toward the economic catastrophe that exists within most American Indian nations. The American Indian economic crisis is easy to miss. American Indians make up less than 2 percent of the total US population (about 1.6  million individuals). Less than half of these (about 700,000 as of 2011) live on (or near) American Indian reservations. The small populations on American Indian reservations are both a consequence of US government policy and a consequence of poverty. Historically, US government policies geared toward American Indians have focused1 on assimilation, acculturation, and termination. Government policies against American Indian communities contributed to the physical loss of land and property, loss of population, loss of language, and loss of culture. The economic toll of government policies has been—and still is—devastatingly high. Unemployment and poverty on American Indian reservations is among the highest rates in the USA.

The sheer lack of meaningful economic opportunities contribute to societal problems including school dropouts, criminal and gang activity, substance abuse, and alcohol abuse (Forstater 2002). American Indian reservations are no exception. Nevertheless, perhaps unlike other groups, these consequences become attributed to American Indians as a people, thereby re-enforcing negative stereotypes and igniting negative race relations. There are perceptions of the “lazy Indian,” “Indian time” and “Indian cars”. These perceptions are so ingrained in some American Indian communities that individuals internalize these character traits (Treuer 2010, p. 73). However, as Treuer also notes, these traits are not predispositions. Unemployment, poverty, and their social costs are not Indian problems; just like, they are not black problems, nor Hispanic problems, nor problems that are uniquely identifiable to any race or ethnicity. These are societal problems. Unemployment and poverty run deeper and are more pronounced in American Indian communities, and are re-enforced because of direct and indirect discrimination of US government policies toward American Indians or simply because of inattention. The socio-economic problems experienced on American Indian reservations are multi-layered and inter-connected. Unlike other minority groups experiencing similar problems, the socio-economic consequences for American Indians include loss of sovereignty, loss of language, and loss of culture.

When the official unemployment rate in the USA rose to 10 percent after the global financial crisis it was called the Great Recession. In a newly released analysis of American Indian labor markets by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the 2005 on-reservation unemployment rate stood at 50 percent. This is before the Great Recession when the national average U-5 unemployment rate (which includes all those marginally attached to the labor force) stood at just under 6 percent. Staggering rates of unemployment and poverty as witnessed in 2005 are the norm on American Indian reservations rather than the exception. Figure  8.1 partially details the sobering reality of the economic life on reservations.

Given the unique nature of the American Indian experience, here it is proposed to enact a federally funded job guarantee (JG) program as a partial solution to the multifaceted problems facing American Indian nations. The JG program is organized differently than existing federal programs and it offers benefits that address the larger societal goals of American Indian reservations. Mainstream federal programs are geared toward pro-capitalist development. Typically, these programs emphasize efficiency (meaning cost minimization and profit maximization production) which entails the development of for-profit, privatized production, and the proliferation of capitalistic development. In contrast, JG programs are non-profit. They emphasize social efficiency rather than capitalist efficiency. The JG program strives toward societal enrichment and community development as much as advancing economic opportunity. Meaning that JG programs are not to be evaluated using the same yardstick as is used by private sector, for-profit enterprises. Rather successful JG programs are measured by their contributions and benefits toward the communities that they serve. Because of these differences, JG programs may be used to encourage non-capitalist forms of development and growth alongside creating an environment for mainstream development of local businesses (Forstater 2013).

# F/L—Topicality/Theory

## 1AR—Topicality

### 1AR—T-A

#### We meet— our plan is the whole res.

Dodge 04/23 — Joel Dodge is a civil rights attorney and public policy researcher in New York City. He writes about domestic policy and politics with a focus on social insurance, healthcare, poverty, and reforming government.; “The promise of a jobs guarantee”; <https://jdodgeblog.wordpress.com/2018/04/23/the-promise-of-a-jobs-guarantee/> As+

Booker’s bill is based on work by scholars Mark Paul, William Darity, Jr., and Darrick Hamilton, who recently wrote up a jobs guarantee proposal at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. They propose creating a “a National Investment Employment Corps to achieve permanent full employment in the U.S. economy through large-scale, direct hiring by the federal government.”

#### We establish a federal jobs guarantee through the US government which makes it a federal plan under the whoe res

SDCC – The Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity is a scholarly collaborative that studies the causes and consequences of inequality and develops remedies for these disparities and their adverse effects; “National Investment Employment Corps”; No date but it was written based off a study by their professors called “The Federal Job Guarantee—A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment”; <https://socialequity.duke.edu/portfolio-item/federal-job-guarantee-national-investment-employment-corps/> As+

The federal job guarantee allows any American, 18 years or older, to be able to find work through a federally funded public service employment program – a National Investment Employment Corps (NIEC). While providing a particular benefit – such as raising the minimum wage – for those Americans in the most desperate straits, a universal job guarantee would benefit all Americans who experience joblessness now or in the future.

Moreover, a universal job guarantee would mean that all Americans would have access to jobs promising an income above the poverty threshold.

#### Counter-interp: the aff can specify a federal jobs garauntee.

#### “A” is singular.

Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/a IB

used as a function word before singular nouns when the referent is unspecified

#### Both readings are correct.

Cambridge Dictionary

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/a

a

determiner

used to mean any or every thing or person of the type you are referring to:

#### Use context—framer’s intent was a singular plan which is why the res is “A federal jobs garuantee” and not “federal jobs garuantees.”

#### Specific instances prove generics which also means I meet

Cimpian et al 10 (PhDs – Andrei, Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications, Cogn Sci. 2010 Nov 1; 34(8): 1452–1482)

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. Keywords: generic language, concepts, truth conditions, prevalence implications, quantifiers, semantics Go to: 1. Introduction A statement is generic if it expresses a generalization about the members of a kind, as in “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” or “Birds lay eggs” (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Such generalizations are commonplace in everyday conversation and child-directed speech (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008), and are likely to foster the growth of children’s conceptual knowledge (Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman, 2004, 2009). Here, however, we explore the semantics of generic sentences—and, in particular, the relationship between generic meaning and the statistical prevalence of the relevant properties (e.g., what proportion of birds lay eggs). Consider, first, generics’ truth conditions: Generic sentences are often judged true despite weak statistical evidence. Few people would dispute the truth of “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, yet only about 1% of mosquitoes are actually carriers (Cox, 2004). Similarly, only a minority of birds lays eggs (the healthy, mature females), but “Birds lay eggs” is uncontroversial. This loose, almost negligible relationship between the prevalence of a property within a category and the acceptance of the corresponding generic sentence has long puzzled linguists and philosophers, and has led to many attempts to describe the truth conditions of generic statements (for reviews, see Carlson, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Though generics’ truth conditions may be unrelated to property prevalence (cf. Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), the same cannot be said about the implications of generic statements. When provided with a novel generic sentence, one often has the impression that the property talked about is widespread. For example, if we were unfamiliar with the West Nile virus and were told (generically) that mosquitoes carry it, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all, or at least a majority of, mosquitoes are carriers (Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002). It is this paradoxical combination of flexible, almost prevalence-independent truth conditions, on the one hand, and widespread prevalence implications, on the other, that is the main focus of this article. We will attempt to demonstrate empirically that the prevalence level that is sufficient to judge a generic sentence as true is indeed significantly lower than the prevalence level implied by that very same sentence. If told that, say, “Lorches have purple feathers,” people might expect almost all lorches to have these feathers (illustrating generics’ high implied prevalence), but they may still agree that the sentence is true even if the actual prevalence of purple feathers among lorches turned out to be much lower (illustrating generics’ flexible truth conditions). Additionally, we propose that this asymmetry is peculiar to generic statements and does not extend to sentences with quantified noun phrases as subjects. That is, the prevalence implied by a sentence such as “Most lorches have purple feathers” may be more closely aligned with the prevalence that would be needed to judge it as true. Before describing our studies, we provide a brief overview of previous research on the truth conditions and the prevalence implications of generic statements. 1.1. Generics’ truth conditions Some of the first experimental evidence for the idea that the truth of a generic statement does not depend on the underlying statistics was provided by Gilson and Abelson (1965; Abelson & Kanouse, 1966) in their studies of “the psychology of audience reaction” to “persuasive communication” in the form of generic assertions (Abelson & Kanouse, 1966, p. 171). Participants were presented with novel items such as the following: Altogether there are three kinds of tribes—Southern, Northern, Central. Southern tribes have sports magazines. Northern tribes do not have sports magazines. Central tribes do not have sports magazines. Do tribes have sports magazines? All items had the same critical feature: only one third of the target category possessed the relevant property. Despite the low prevalence, participants answered “yes” approximately 70% of the time to “Do tribes have sports magazines?” and other generic questions similar to it. Thus, people’s acceptance of the generics did not seem contingent on strong statistical evidence, leaving the door open for persuasion, and perhaps manipulation, by ill-intentioned communicators. A similar conclusion about the relationship between statistical prevalence and generics’ truth conditions emerged from the linguistics literature on this topic (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Dahl, 1975; Declerck, 1986, 1991; Lawler, 1973). For example, Carlson (1977) writes that “there are many cases where […] less than half of the individuals under consideration have some certain property, yet we still can truly predicate that property of the appropriate bare plural” (p. 67), as is the case with “Birds lay eggs” and “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” but also with “Lions have manes” (only males do), “Cardinals are red” (only males are), and others. He points out, moreover, that there are many properties that, although present in a majority of a kind, nevertheless cannot be predicated truthfully of that kind (e.g., more than 50% of books are paperbacks but “Books are paperbacks” is false). Thus, acceptance of a generic sentence is doubly dissociated from the prevalence of the property it refers to—not only can true generics refer to low-prevalence properties, but high-prevalence properties are also not guaranteed to be true in generic form

#### Debate solves arbitrary linguistic intuitions—we can determine the most predictable interp based on factors like clash and limits. Semantics are a floor not a ceiling—if we have a sufficiently predictable interpretation of the topic then division of ground is more important.

#### Standards:

#### 1] Clash—allows us to go in-depth on particular parts of the literature which allows for more nuanced debates because different plans are different

#### 2] Aff ground—No Advantage applies to all plans because each one has different mechanisms and processes.

#### Pics are comparatively worse—a) It forces 1AR restart mooting the 1AC and creating a 13-7 time skew b) negs have generics like politics and Econ DA but affs don’t have any vs pics

#### 3] Functional limits—There’s literally two proposals for FJG and the aff is the primary one proposed by Corey Booker and they both reach the same endpoint. Do prep.

#### 4] Overlimiting: They make whole res the only topical aff which is devastating vs specific negs and because they are implemented in different ways which means the aff can’t do both.

#### 5] Reasonability—good is good enough and key to avoid substance crowdout

### 1AR—T Federal

#### We meet— NIEC is a federal policy, not a state or local one. It’s the one Booker has been pushing for

SDCC – The Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity is a scholarly collaborative that studies the causes and consequences of inequality and develops remedies for these disparities and their adverse effects; “National Investment Employment Corps”; No date but it was written based off a study by their professors called “The Federal Job Guarantee—A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment”; <https://socialequity.duke.edu/portfolio-item/federal-job-guarantee-national-investment-employment-corps/> As+

The federal job guarantee allows any American, 18 years or older, to be able to find work through a federally funded public service employment program – a National Investment Employment Corps (NIEC). While providing a particular benefit – such as raising the minimum wage – for those Americans in the most desperate straits, a universal job guarantee would benefit all Americans who experience joblessness now or in the future.

Moreover, a universal job guarantee would mean that all Americans would have access to jobs promising an income above the poverty threshold.

#### Our plan is a federal jobs guarantee—definitions include the aff

Bhandari 19 — Ryan Bhandari; “What Is the “Federal Jobs Guarantee” and What Are People Saying About It?”; March 25, 2019; <https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it> As+

A federal jobs guarantee is as simple as it sounds on the surface: everyone in the country will be guaranteed a job by the US government should they desire one. There are two versions right now gaining attention. One plan is written by academics Mark Paul, Sandy Darity, and Darrick Hamilton. The other was written by Pavlina Tcherneva. In general, these plans promise:

### 1AR—T Guarantee

#### We meet— 1] the aff gives everyone a job with 100% certainty, 2] fiat solves— means we give everyone a job through the plan, the argument if we can or can’t sustain that many jobs is distinct and not a procedural issue

#### Guarantee means—

Dictionary.com — https://www.dictionary.com/browse/guarantee

a promise or assurance, especially one in writing, that something is of specified quality, content, benefit, etc., or that it will perform satisfactorily for a given length of time:

#### We meet— the aff specifies a government plan to enact which doesn’t skew substance because you can still read all the Disads, K’s, Counterplan’s, etc. We still guarantee everyone a job

Darity and Hamilton 18 — “The Federal Job Guarantee”; William Darity Jr., Darrick Hamilton; <https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2018/number/3/article/the-federal-job-guarantee.html> As+

Our plan for a federal job guarantee, administered by a permanent National Investment Employment Corps under the aegis of the U.S. Department of Labor, would provide assurance of a direct source of employment for all workers. It would structurally shift the U.S. economy away from low-wage work towards more moderate and high-wage jobs. Moreover, it would provide the best buffer against employment transitions due to automation and technological change.

Our proposal is far more extensive than local job training or search-assistance programs, which do not guarantee employment. Many skill-building and workforce development initiatives leave intact a host of structural barriers to employment. Our plan would include apprenticeships and on-the-job training.

#### Prefer our definitions:

#### 1] Colloquial— no one cares about grammar when you approach the topic. Most people approach the topic from a colloquial view in how you debate in a conversation

#### 2] Topic lit—your definition of guarantee is infinitely regressive—there are millions of ways you can define the words in the plan. Our definitions provide the most topic lit because there is a ton of lit on a federal job’s “guarantee” but barley anything on yours.

#### 3] Precision—our definition is specific to our plan meaning it understands the nuances associated

#### 4] Grammar DA – A] semantics first adopts a singular way of speaking English which oppressively shuts down minority voices excluding them, B] T is bad for debate linguistics— nonnative English speakers may not be as fluent as native one’s and bringing ultra-spec English into debate destroys their ability to engage which kills clash with them, C] destroys competitive equity—if we are good enough we should be able to debate – this is an independent voter they exclude these groups of people which defies your job as a adjudicator in this game

### 1AR—T Jobs

#### 1] We meet— nowhere in the aff do we specify what jobs that people get, 2] normal means solves— whatever jobs people usually take through a jobs guarantee are the jobs that the aff gives

#### 2] We meet— the NIEC is an overarching jobs guarantee which means that it doesn’t specify the jobs people are getting

Darity 13 — William Darity Jr; “Column: Create a job guarantee”; Dec. 6, 2013; <https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-create-a-job-guarantee/2155947/> As+

A National Investment Employment Corps would work similarly to the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps developed in response to the unemployment crisis of the Great Depression. Each National Investment Employment Corps job would offer individuals nonpoverty wages — a minimum salary of $23,000, plus benefits including federal health insurance. The types of jobs offered could address the maintenance and construction of the nation's physical and human infrastructure, from building roads, bridges, dams and schools, to staffing high-quality day care.

The program would include a training component to equip employees with the skills necessary to fill state and municipal needs.

#### These are different “we meet’s”— one is about the aff plan text and the other is about the plan itself

#### 3] We meet— the aff considers things like part time versus full time

Paul et al 18 – Mark Paul et. al, William Darity Jr., Darrick Hamilton (2018), Mark Paul is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, William Darity Jr. is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and the Director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, Darrick Hamilton is Professor of Economics and Urban Policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research, and Director of the Doctoral Program in Public and Urban Policy at The New School, The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3-9-2018 As+

Employment can be either part-time (20 hours a week) or full-time (35–40 hours a week) depending on the needs of the employee. For employees to receive their compensation, they must show up to their job and perform the tasks assigned to them. As was the case with the WPA, a Division of Progress Investigation (DPI) should be established to monitor shirking or corruption. If workers are found to be negligent, or generally disruptive to the workplace, disciplinary action can be taken by the DPI.

#### 4] We don’t spec contract working— people on contract may or may not need a job which is taken care of by the aff, if a person is a contract worker then they aren’t unemployed

### 1AR—Spec Jobs

#### We meet— we implement a federal jobs guarantee for all people of unemployment based off past education and experience

#### Counter-interp—the aff doesn’t have to specify what jobs they guarantee

#### 1] Aff ground— they incentivize small disads to the mechanism which avoids core topic debates about eliminating nukes and moots the 1ac

#### 2] Topic ed – the core of the debate is whether we should eliminate nukes, not how we should do it, so they force it to the margins

#### 3] No abuse – force them to provide a caselist of what they lost— it’s their burden to prove abuse and the 1n didn’t have one so the 2n is too late since it incentivizes sandbagging clash to screw the 2ar

#### 4] CX and preround prep check— ask me then and I can tell you what is and isn’t the aff which solves

### Extra T-Stuff

#### Our bill is sponsored and talked about on the US gov’s website— proves its T because they used the aff as their plan

Booker.senate.gov 18 — “New Booker Bill Seeks to Establish Model for Federal Jobs Guarantee Program in High-Unemployment Communities”; APRIL 20, 2018; <https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/new-booker-bill-seeks-to-establish-model-for-federal-jobs-guarantee-program-in-high-unemployment-communities#:~:text=Cory%20Booker%20(D%2DNJ),regions%20across%20the%20United%20States>. As+

William Darity, Jr., the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy at Duke University, said, “This bill provides an excellent prelude to a national job guarantee for all Americans. Implementation of a series of demonstration projects creates the opportunity to benefit from the ingenuity and knowledge of local communities in building the most effective program at the national level.”

#### Specific instances prove generics which also means I meet

Cimpian et al 10 (PhDs – Andrei, Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications, Cogn Sci. 2010 Nov 1; 34(8): 1452–1482)

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. Keywords: generic language, concepts, truth conditions, prevalence implications, quantifiers, semantics Go to: 1. Introduction A statement is generic if it expresses a generalization about the members of a kind, as in “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” or “Birds lay eggs” (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Such generalizations are commonplace in everyday conversation and child-directed speech (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008), and are likely to foster the growth of children’s conceptual knowledge (Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman, 2004, 2009). Here, however, we explore the semantics of generic sentences—and, in particular, the relationship between generic meaning and the statistical prevalence of the relevant properties (e.g., what proportion of birds lay eggs). Consider, first, generics’ truth conditions: Generic sentences are often judged true despite weak statistical evidence. Few people would dispute the truth of “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, yet only about 1% of mosquitoes are actually carriers (Cox, 2004). Similarly, only a minority of birds lays eggs (the healthy, mature females), but “Birds lay eggs” is uncontroversial. This loose, almost negligible relationship between the prevalence of a property within a category and the acceptance of the corresponding generic sentence has long puzzled linguists and philosophers, and has led to many attempts to describe the truth conditions of generic statements (for reviews, see Carlson, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Though generics’ truth conditions may be unrelated to property prevalence (cf. Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), the same cannot be said about the implications of generic statements. When provided with a novel generic sentence, one often has the impression that the property talked about is widespread. For example, if we were unfamiliar with the West Nile virus and were told (generically) that mosquitoes carry it, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all, or at least a majority of, mosquitoes are carriers (Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002). It is this paradoxical combination of flexible, almost prevalence-independent truth conditions, on the one hand, and widespread prevalence implications, on the other, that is the main focus of this article. We will attempt to demonstrate empirically that the prevalence level that is sufficient to judge a generic sentence as true is indeed significantly lower than the prevalence level implied by that very same sentence. If told that, say, “Lorches have purple feathers,” people might expect almost all lorches to have these feathers (illustrating generics’ high implied prevalence), but they may still agree that the sentence is true even if the actual prevalence of purple feathers among lorches turned out to be much lower (illustrating generics’ flexible truth conditions). Additionally, we propose that this asymmetry is peculiar to generic statements and does not extend to sentences with quantified noun phrases as subjects. That is, the prevalence implied by a sentence such as “Most lorches have purple feathers” may be more closely aligned with the prevalence that would be needed to judge it as true. Before describing our studies, we provide a brief overview of previous research on the truth conditions and the prevalence implications of generic statements. 1.1. Generics’ truth conditions Some of the first experimental evidence for the idea that the truth of a generic statement does not depend on the underlying statistics was provided by Gilson and Abelson (1965; Abelson & Kanouse, 1966) in their studies of “the psychology of audience reaction” to “persuasive communication” in the form of generic assertions (Abelson & Kanouse, 1966, p. 171). Participants were presented with novel items such as the following: Altogether there are three kinds of tribes—Southern, Northern, Central. Southern tribes have sports magazines. Northern tribes do not have sports magazines. Central tribes do not have sports magazines. Do tribes have sports magazines? All items had the same critical feature: only one third of the target category possessed the relevant property. Despite the low prevalence, participants answered “yes” approximately 70% of the time to “Do tribes have sports magazines?” and other generic questions similar to it. Thus, people’s acceptance of the generics did not seem contingent on strong statistical evidence, leaving the door open for persuasion, and perhaps manipulation, by ill-intentioned communicators. A similar conclusion about the relationship between statistical prevalence and generics’ truth conditions emerged from the linguistics literature on this topic (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Dahl, 1975; Declerck, 1986, 1991; Lawler, 1973). For example, Carlson (1977) writes that “there are many cases where […] less than half of the individuals under consideration have some certain property, yet we still can truly predicate that property of the appropriate bare plural” (p. 67), as is the case with “Birds lay eggs” and “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” but also with “Lions have manes” (only males do), “Cardinals are red” (only males are), and others. He points out, moreover, that there are many properties that, although present in a majority of a kind, nevertheless cannot be predicated truthfully of that kind (e.g., more than 50% of books are paperbacks but “Books are paperbacks” is false). Thus, acceptance of a generic sentence is doubly dissociated from the prevalence of the property it refers to—not only can true generics refer to low-prevalence properties, but high-prevalence properties are also not guaranteed to be true in generic form

#### Debate solves arbitrary linguistic intuitions—we can determine the most predictable interp based on factors like clash and limits. Semantics are a floor not a ceiling—if we have a sufficiently predictable interpretation of the topic then division of ground is more important.

#### Standards:

#### 1] Clash— allows us to go in-depth on particular parts of the literature which allows for more nuanced debates because different programs are different

#### 2] Aff ground— no advantage applies to all federal jobs guarantee programs because each one has different plan.

#### Pics are comparatively worse— a) It forces 1AR restart mooting the 1AC and creating a 13-7 time skew b) negs have generics like politics and Econ DA but affs don’t have any vs pics

#### 3] Functional limits— a viable aff needs strong uniqueness on things like job opportunities and feasible programs. Means affs that defend random jobs and programs are unfeasible. Our aff defends a plan which is topical and non-abusive cause you still get access to your Disads, Counterplans, K’s, etc.

#### 4] Overlimiting— they make whole res the only topical aff which is devastating vs specific negs

#### 5] Reasonability— good is good enough and key to avoid substance crowdout

#### 6] Grammar DA – A] semantics first adopts a singular way of speaking English which oppressively shuts down minority voices excluding them, B] T is bad for debate linguistics— nonnative English speakers may not be as fluent as native one’s and bringing ultra-spec English into debate destroys their ability to engage which kills clash with them, C] destroys competitive equity—if we are good enough we should be able to debate – this is an independent voter they exclude these groups of people which defies your job as a adjudicator in this game

# F/L—Counterplans

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## 1AR—Convicts CP

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### The Federal Jobs Guarantee is key to reduce the costs associated with inmates and solves back for incarceration

Tcherneva 19 – 7/16/2019, Taylor and Francis, “The Federal Job Guarantee: Prevention, Not Just a Cure”, Pavlina R. Tcherneva is an associate professor of economics at Bard College. She specializes in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and public policy. She previously taught at Franklin and Marshall College and the University of Missouri–Kansas City. During 2000–6, she served as the associate director for economic analysis at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, where she remains a senior research associate. In the summer of 2006, she was a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, and since July 2007 she has been a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute. Tcherneva is a two-time grantee from the Institute for New Economic Thinking for her work on rethinking fiscal policy, job creation, and public goods provisioning. She holds a BA in mathematics and economics from Gettysburg College and an MA and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Missouri–Kansas City, DOI: 10.1080/05775132.2019.1635804, KR

In a sense, the Job Guarantee prevents the exacerbation of the social costs of unemployment and other social deprivations by attempting to match the unemployed to jobs that meet basic unsatisfied needs, for example, healthy food, afterschool care, clean public spaces. The Job Guarantee aims to create socially useful output, that is, it produces “goods” and is therefore superior to the status quo, which produces “bads.”

It is useful to remember that unemployment is already “paid for” in terms of the lost output and increased resources dedicated to tackling pov- erty, declining health, crime, and other associated problems. The public sector and society in general are already bearing these costs. The Job Guarantee redistributes the expenditures and real resources toward more productive uses, such as human capital and community investment, rehabilitation, and renewal.

Furthermore, the Job Guarantee can have a positive effect on state budgets. As discussed in the modern money theory literature, unlike the federal government, individual states are constrained by tax revenue for funding pro- grams (which is why the Job Guarantee is pitched as a federally funded but locally administered program). Since Reagan’s “Devolution Revolution,” states have increasingly been responsible for funding and administering programs that were previously under the charge of the federal government. Additionally, state spending is constrained by their balanced budget amend- ments, which prevent states from deficit spending and supporting antipoverty programs precisely at a time when they are most needed—in downturns (Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance programs are just two exam- ples of countercyclical policies that often experience funding shortfalls in recessions). In other words, the costs that arise from the problem of unemployment are increasingly borne by the states.

Consider one example of the potentially large positive effect of the Job Guarantee on state budgets—state spending on incarceration. Nationally, the annual cost per inmate is $31,000 (compare that to a Job Guarantee job that pays $15 per hour, or $31,200 annually for full-time work). In some states these costs are much higher; New York State, for example, spent $60,000 per inmate in 2012, and the city of New York spent $168,000 (Henrichson and Delaney 2012).

Falling employment and wages have been found to increase incarcer- ation and recidivism (Western, Kleykamp, and Rosenfeld 2006) and com- munity-based employment programs, specifically, have been found to prevent it (Gillis and Nafekh 2005). In the United States, programs that place ex-convicts into jobs, such as the Jacksonville-based “Ready4Work,” have shown striking results—a reduction in recidivism from 70 percent to 15 percent.

Since the Job Guarantee offers jobs for the at-risk and hard-to-employ populations, the cost savings to states could be significant. The program can reduce state spending on inmates drastically, but it can also shrink other costs as it reduces the rate of reoffending and certain types of eco- nomic crimes. Furthermore, former inmates who enter the Job Guarantee program will make a net positive contribution to the local economy with their production, consumption, and ability to pay rent and taxes. Incarceration is but one example of the savings in terms of financial and real resources that states could enjoy if the Job Guarantee were in place.

### 1AR—Perm

#### Perm do the counterplan—it’s part of the aff.

Bee 18 – “How a Federal Job Guarantee can Help the Formerly Incarcerated”; 08/30/18; <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/08/former-prisoners-should-be-included-in-a-job-guarantee.html> As+

It’s important to remember this because after decades of dormancy, the Federal Job Guarantee is having a moment, as presumptive Democratic presidential candidates Cory Booker, Elizabeth Warren, Kamala Harris, and Bernie Sanders compete to endorse the most expansive pilot program promising jobs and benefits to American workers. Either Booker’s or Sanders’s plans, if passed, would be one of the most ambitious expansions of the welfare state since the New Deal. But they don’t go far enough, because they say nothing about a vulnerable population: people with criminal records.

This silence is surprising, given the broad left-of-center focus on reducing mass incsarceration and recidivism. In a piece for The Atlantic a couple of years ago, Booker “acknowledged how hard it was for anybody with a criminal conviction to get a job,” and recognized that “too many people give up … and in order to make money, some go back to doing things that get them arrested again.” Along with Warren, Sanders, and New York Democratic senator Kirsten Gillibrand, he later signed a letter urging former President Obama to “prevent employers from discriminating against applicants based on criminal history.” There’s no doubt that these prominent Democrats recognize the importance of helping people with criminal records reenter the workforce. But failing to connect full employment with criminal justice reform would be a huge missed opportunity.

The reasons to proactively include people with criminal records in a jobs guarantee program are both moral — everyone who wants to enter the workforce should be given a chance to work — and practical: Employing people with criminal records would also empower the rest of the workforce. When people are desperate for work, their bargaining power plummets, an even more urgent problem in a country in which union power has shrunk over the past century. Under-employment allows employers to offer lower wages, fewer benefits, and poorer labor conditions. But the more people are employed in good jobs, the more everyone else can negotiate for better jobs.

The class of people who fall into this category is not small: Close to 70 million Americans have criminal records, around 2.2 million of whom are incarcerated. Criminal records make it difficult to secure a job. Professional licensing rules contain thousands of clauses excluding people with records of misdemeanors and felonies, and finding work typically takes this class more than a year after being released. They remain less likely to be selected for an interview or receive a job offer, with even lower chances if the candidate is black. Controlling for other factors, this population’s wages also typically fall 10 to 40 percent below what other workers earn. And because individuals of color are incarcerated at higher rates than the rest of the population, it follows that these discriminatory employment practices hurt them and their families at disproportionate rates. This, in turn, only exacerbates inequality across our society.

Despite the misconceptions that many employers have about people with criminal records, people with a steady stream of wage income are less likely to commit crimes again. And the higher the wage, the lower the chance of re-offending: Studies show that even a modest wage increase to $10 or $12 per hour could halve the rate of recidivism and drop the crime rate by 5 percent. So while higher employment rates and wages would most directly benefit people with criminal records, society as a whole would enjoy collateral benefits like “reduced incarceration costs, increased income and payroll tax receipts, [and] lessened reliance on social services.”

## 1AR—Fossil Fuel Subsidies CP

### 1AR—Solvency Deficits

#### Can’t solve warming.

Aldy 13 [Joseph E Aldy is a professor of public policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He’s the faculty chair/research fellow/university fellow/senior adviser at a bunch of places including the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government. He focuses on climate, energy, and regulatory policy. BA from Duke, Master of Environmental Management from Duke, PhD in economics from Harvard.] “Proposal 5: Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies.” Hamilton Project/Harvard. 2013?<https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/THP_15WaysFedBudget_Prop5.pdf>

Because these subsidies do not effectively stimulate much additional production, eliminating them in the United States would deliver relatively modest environmental benefits. One recent analysis showed that eliminating the intangible-drilling cost expensing provision and percentage cost depletion would have lowered U.S. carbon dioxide emissions by about 4 million metric tons annually over 2005–09, or less than 0.2 percent of emissions from petroleum consumption over that period (Allaire and Brown 2012). If such reform of U.S. fossil fuel subsidies leveraged reform of fossil fuel consumption subsidies in developing countries, then it could significantly lower global carbon dioxide emissions, to the benefit of the climate. (See International Implications section below

#### Affordable and reliable energy from fossil fuels is the backbone of society – without it, the world becomes unsustainable.

Green 9 [Kenneth, PhD Environmental Science and Engineering, Scholar @ AEI at the time of publishing, now Resident Scholar and Chair in Energy and Environmental Studies @ Fraser Institute], "In Favor of Affordable, Abundant Energy," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, 7-28-2009 https://www.aei.org/articles/in-favor-of-affordable-abundant-energy/

Energy is the life-blood of our civilization. Harnessing fire influenced our evolution, shaping the size of our brain, the shape of our teeth, the length of our digestive tract, and most likely, our need for large quantities of body hair.

Modern human beings are obligatory energy users. Everything we make is made with energy, it’s shipped with energy, maintained with energy, and as often as not these days, requires energy to operate. Without energy to cook, heat and cool homes, grow food, and manufacture goods most of the world’s population could not be sustained.

When a human is stranded, they need three things most urgently: water, fire, and shelter. Food actually comes in a distant fourth.

Let me give you some examples of how omnipresent energy is in our lives. My colleague Aparna Mathur and I took a look at the amount of energy that is inherent in the things we use. What we found might surprise you.

It turns out that nearly half (46 percent) of total energy used in the United States is consumed indirectly, through production of foods, medicines, and consumer goods. The highest level of indirect energy consumption is in health care services and pharmaceuticals, and the second highest is in food production and preparation. At the other end of the spectrum, religious activities and education consume relatively little indirect energy.

Put in monetary terms, Americans in 2003 spent about $40 billion for the energy content of food, $18 billion for energy used in transportation, $10 billion for the energy used to supply them with entertainment, $10 billion for the energy used in providing them with health care, and $9 billion for the energy used in manufacturing housing. Aggregate indirect energy expenditures totaled $113.2 billion.

Proponents of renewable energy would have us increase these costs, rather than decrease them, but renewable energy is something of a red herring. It has its place in niche applications, but it is not a meaningful part of an energy policy aimed at providing abundant and affordable energy.

In fact, I’d like to take this opportunity to coin a new acronym for renewable energy which is DRIP. It’s Diffuse, Remote, Intermittent, and Pricey.

By diffuse, I mean that it requires concentration to make it useful. Whether it’s gathering up corn or biomass, concentrating sunlight, or running air through millions of windmills, you have to put quite a lot of energy into concentrating renewables before they’re good for anything.

By remote, I mean that the largest sources of renewable energy are far from where our most energy-hungry populations live. People don’t live in the desert much, nor in Yellowstone, nor in the wind corridor in the center of the US. That means endless miles of new transmission lines, with attendant cost, environmental obstruction and damage, and line losses.

By intermittent, I refer to the fact that the wind doesn’t always blow, nor the sun always shine. What that means is that you need both storage and redundancy, both of which boost the cost of renewables considerably.

All of these issues, the need to concentrate, transport, backup, and store renewable energy make it quite pricey.

In conclusion, we are at a cross-road when it comes to energy policy. In one direction, we can expand our production of affordable, reliable energy, enriching current and future generations, or we can leave the value of fossil fuels buried in the Earth, handing our descendents an energy system that is more costly and less reliable. Renewables have their uses, but they are, by and large, a distraction from what I believe our goal should be, to expand, as much as possible, our supply of affordable energy, to remove distortionary subsidies and mandates from our energy markets, and to allow those markets to find the optimal time for us to move away from fossil fuels into other forms of energy production.

#### Turn—the majority of fossil fuel subsidies are actually consumer subsidies, meaning they go to making energy more affordable for low income consumers.

Rapier 12: Rapier, Robert. “Bernie Sanders’ Favorite Oil and Gas Subsidy”. *Forbes.* Feb 12, 2016. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2016/02/12/bernie-sanders-favorite-fossil-fuel-subsidy/#31d419a41801> TB

There are a lot of things lumped into that category, but being the investigative sort I went to the source for that $1 trillion total. First of all, OCI was claiming $775 billion a year in subsidies, but they said that it could be higher. So McKibben and company rounded that up to an even $1 trillion a year (more on that below). But of the $775 billion cited by OCI, $630 billion was for “Consumption Subsidies in Developing Countries” and another $45 billion was for “Consumption Subsidies in Developed Countries.” Thus, **87% of the subsidies tabulated** by OCI **were directed at making energy more affordable for consumers**. Certainly, by their definition any program that "lowers the price paid by energy consumers" is a subsidy. But **by framing it as a “massive giveaway to Big Oil” activists manage to generate anger** by misinforming people. Why did McKibben cite a higher number than the $775 billion claimed by OCI? It turns out that **when you are keeping fuel costs low for consumers, higher oil prices = greater subsidies.** Venezuela is a classic example. Consumers there have long paid less than $0.10/gallon for gasoline. This is regulated by the government, and **the subsidy is tabulated as the difference between the price being paid by consumers and the market price**. Higher oil prices create a higher differential from the market price, and thus this "giveaway to Big Oil" -- to use McKibben's words -- becomes larger. All of which brings me to Bernie Sanders. Of the consumption subsidies **in the U.S.**, one of those cited by OCI was **the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program** (LIHEAP) that **helps low-income families with their heating bills.** **LIHEAP presently receives more than $3 billion a year in tax dollars**, **which** then **gets added to the tally of fossil fuel subsidies**. As a result, many people who otherwise hate fossil fuel subsidies love a fossil fuel subsidy. Like Bernie Sanders: LIHEAP and Bernie Sanders have long been synonymous in Washington D.C. and back in his home state of Vermont, where through the years, the Senator has brought home millions of dollars in crucial winter heating assistance to thousands of families throughout his traditional winter-weather state. Even while traveling the country running for President of the United States, **longtime Vermont Senator and LIHEAP champion Bernie Sanders found time in 2015 to help secure $17 million in funding for Vermonters, demonstrating his continued commitment as one of the program’s greatest champions in Congress.** So I suspect that LIHEAP is indeed Bernie Sanders' favorite fossil fuel subsidy. Now before Bernie Sanders' defenders come out of the woodwork, understand that I am not criticizing him for supporting LIHEAP. I am sure Hillary Clinton also supports LIHEAP. Count me among those do not want to see people freezing because they can't afford fuel. What I resent is not that billions of tax dollars are being spent to help people with heating bills, but that disingenuous or misinformed people paint that as a giveaway to Big Oil. The irony is that in many cases, those screaming the loudest about ending oil subsidies are some of the staunchest defenders of LIHEAP. For those who argue that they are against fossil subsidies, but support programs like this -- you are by definition for fossil fuel subsidies. The numbers that have been quoted again and again consist predominantly of programs designed to make fuel more affordable for consumers. Does it help fossil fuel companies sell more fuel? Yes. Is it a giveaway to these companies? If you answer yes, then you have to suspect that Bernie is in the pocket of Big Oil. I also don't mean to leave the impression that the fossil fuel industry doesn't get any tax breaks. They do. But they are in the form of tax deductions as opposed to tax payments from the treasury -- which is what most people envision when they hear the word "subsidy." Further, these **tax breaks make up a small fraction of the numbers being thrown around as fossil fuel subsidies** -- which is why I presume activists feel the need to exaggerate. But the disconnect between what you think a fossil fuel subsidy is -- and what is being classified as a fossil fuel subsidy -- is exactly why they are never going away. As I argued in a previous Forbes article, oil subsidies aren't going anywhere because Even Liberals Love Them.

## 1AR—Green New Deal CP

### 1AR—Perm

#### FJG bolsters the Green New Deal.

**Tcherneva 19** Pavlina Tcherneva, 2-20-2019, "Why the Green New Deal Includes a Jobs Guarantee," Real News Network, <https://therealnews.com/why-the-green-new-deal-includes-a-jobs-guarantee>

DHARNA NOOR: So before we get into the specifics of this program, talk a little bit about what something like a jobs guarantee is doing in the Green New Deal. Why aren’t climate change and employment two separate issues? PAVLINA TCHERNEVA: Well, the Green New Deal, as see it form in the public consciousness and debate, is really a call to action, and it’s a call to action to address the climate concerns. But there is a broad recognition that really, the climate threats cannot be separated from other forms of insecurity that people experience in their daily lives, and that is economic insecurity. So basically, environmental policy to tackle climate change is essentially economic policy, and every economic policy has impact on jobs, on livelihoods. And I think there is a recognition that when we make this call for action to address one existential threat, and that would be the threat of climate change, we are essentially saying, “Look, we’re going to do it in a way to address other existential threats that might not be so visible, but they’re ever-present.” And those would be basically the absence of an adequate number of jobs, of well-paying jobs, poverty, inequality, and various other socioeconomic concerns. So they are organically linked. One battle is essentially the same thing as the other battle. DHARNA NOOR: And of course, the resolution aims to create these millions of jobs, at least in part, to create the new infrastructure that would be needed to support this new green economy. What kinds of jobs would those be? I mean, they can’t possibly all be in constructing solar panels or wind farms. So what kinds of jobs? PAVLINA TCHERNEVA: Well, I think it’s useful to think of the Green New Deal as a mass mobilization effort. So here we are really talking about an urgent, very bold, very ambitious program that restructures the economy to make fossil fuels a thing of the past and transition to clean energy. The goal here, of course, is to stabilize carbon emissions and to limit warming within the decade. So we’re going to be talking about a wide range of jobs that will be in the energy sector, in the agriculture sector, in the infrastructure sector, to address problems of fallout from climate change, like the fires that we’re watching in California, like the destruction that we see from hurricanes and tornadoes and floods. So we really are talking about a comprehensive program. But I think it’s useful analytically to distinguish the millions of jobs that will be created through the green investment from specifically the Job Guarantee. The Job Guarantee has a unique purpose within this program, and that is the following, that it is essentially the backstop, it is essentially the safety net. It is a program that says if you have lost your fossil fuel job, so to speak, and you have not yet been incorporated into the green sector, we will ensure that transition for you, we will provide the safety net and employment opportunities in the interim in this transition, which for some people will be disruptive, and most likely for the most vulnerable it will be disruptive.

### 1AR—Aff Solves

#### FJG solves climate change

Prakash and Meyerhoff 18 (Varshini Prakash has been an organizer in the climate justice movement for over 5 years, first leading fossil fuel divestment cam­paigns at the local and national level and then moving on to found and direct Sunrise. She currently serves as the Communications Director. Varshini lives in Boston, MA. Sarah Meyerhoff supports the Sunrise Movement’s policy and communications work., "It’s Time for the Climate Movement to Embrace a Federal Jobs Guarantee," In These Times, <https://inthesetimes.com/article/climate-movement-federal-jobs-guarantee-bernie-sanders-2018> TB

Solv­ing the cli­mate cri­sis will be no easy feat. It will require mas­sive invest­ments, to the tune of tril­lions of dol­lars over the next few decades — to tran­si­tion toward a 100 per­cent renew­able ener­gy econ­o­my; to over­haul how we farm, trans­port and con­sume food; to restore deplet­ed ecosys­tems; and to empow­er the com­mu­ni­ties already affect­ed by the cli­mate cri­sis to adapt to changes that can­not be reversed.

Each of these under­tak­ings will also require mas­sive job cre­ation. A cli­mate jobs guar­an­tee has the poten­tial to cre­ate a labor force that could be the engine of rapid decar­boniza­tion, and the ser­vices it gen­er­ates can enhance com­mu­ni­ties’ resilience to cli­mate impacts. Impor­tant­ly, such a pro­gram can ele­vate those com­mu­ni­ties who have been sys­tem­at­i­cal­ly exclud­ed from eco­nom­ic pros­per­i­ty as well as those work­ers who risk being left behind by the tran­si­tion to a renew­able ener­gy economy.

A cli­mate jobs guar­an­tee could be the cli­mate movement’s ​“Medicare-for-All” pol­i­cy — a uni­ver­sal pro­gram big enough to address the mas­sive and com­pli­cat­ed cri­sis of cli­mate change, but still tan­gi­ble and pop­u­lar among the vast major­i­ty of Americans.

Like Medicare for All, a jobs guar­an­tee is wild­ly pop­u­lar. Polling firm Civis Ana­lyt­ics iden­ti­fied it as ​“one of the most pop­u­lar issues [they’ve] ever polled,” with a [major­i­ty](https://www.thenation.com/article/why-democrats-should-embrace-a-federal-jobs-guarantee/)of Amer­i­cans’ sup­port, and with dis­pro­por­tion­ate inter­est among low-income groups and com­mu­ni­ties of col­or, who tend to bear the brunt of unem­ploy­ment, under­em­ploy­ment and cli­mate chaos. While we’ve seen grow­ing momen­tum around calls for 100 per­cent renew­able ener­gy and keep­ing fos­sil fuels in the ground, a jobs guar­an­tee is the most promis­ing means of pop­u­lar­iz­ing the deficit spend­ing and enlarged role of gov­ern­ment that rapid decar­boniza­tion of the econ­o­my will require.

Fram­ing the cli­mate movement’s efforts around empow­er­ing Amer­i­cans from all walks of life to build an inclu­sive econ­o­my will not only gar­ner more pop­u­lar sup­port for cli­mate jus­tice goals, it could also help build stronger rela­tion­ships with labor, eco­nom­ic, social and racial jus­tice move­ments which will like­ly also throw their weight behind such jobs pro­gram pro­pos­als. The cli­mate jobs guar­an­tee offers an oppor­tu­ni­ty to strike down one of the deep­est fis­sures on the left, that between some labor and envi­ron­men­tal activists. By ham­mer­ing home the mes­sage that we can put Amer­i­cans to work solv­ing the cli­mate cri­sis, we can help end the fal­la­cy that has long under­cut our ties with labor and oth­er allies — that access to good-pay­ing jobs is incom­pat­i­ble with the well-being of our planet.

## 1AR—Jobs Opportunity CP

### 1AR—Solvency Deficits

#### 1] Can’t solve heg— people will still be unemployed because of things like qualifications, gender, race, etc.

#### 2] No training means that they don’t actually do anything to help workers

#### 3] They haven’t specified where, what, how, etc. they plan to do this

#### Double bind—either you solve for the DA but the aff is a solvency deficient because there are still some unemployed or you are close enough to the aff/creating and employing enough people that you link to the DA

### 1AR—Perm

#### 1] Perm do both—it’s not mutually exclusive because the aff increases jobs, gives training, provides insurance, and more

#### 2] We give everyone a job so fiat that there are enough jobs already

SDCC – The Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity is a scholarly collaborative that studies the causes and consequences of inequality and develops remedies for these disparities and their adverse effects; “National Investment Employment Corps”; No date but it was written based off a study by their professors called “The Federal Job Guarantee—A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment”; <https://socialequity.duke.edu/portfolio-item/federal-job-guarantee-national-investment-employment-corps/> As+

The federal job guarantee allows any American, 18 years or older, to be able to find work through a federally funded public service employment program – a National Investment Employment Corps (NIEC). While providing a particular benefit – such as raising the minimum wage – for those Americans in the most desperate straits, a universal job guarantee would benefit all Americans who experience joblessness now or in the future.

Moreover, a universal job guarantee would mean that all Americans would have access to jobs promising an income above the poverty threshold.

## 1AR—States CP

### 1AR—Solvency Deficit

#### The counterplan can’t be universalized like the plan.

[Sam Fulwood (2017), Fulwood analyzes the influence of policies on communities of color. He was a senior fellow at CAP where he founded and directed the Leadership Institute, This public policy idea can bring America to full employment, and it’s gathering momentum, THINKPROGRESS, 9-22-2017]//CHS PK

It would be more expensive in a per capita sense for a municipality typically to do this, especially since municipalities — and state governments, for that matter — are sometimes under a legal obligation to balance their budgets. But I think it would be feasible in larger cities because their budgets are such that it would not absorb their entire budgets to try to produce a program like this. But there would be a reciprocal benefit in terms of their tax basis that would compensate for the expenses they would be faced with in executing such a program. It would also reduce any local expenses that are associated with a variety of support programs that are needed for people who are subjected to impoverishment. So, yeah, I think it’s possible but it would be easier to be done in a larger municipality.

#### States CP solvency deficit

Gordon 97, Gordon, Wendell [Economist and professor at the University of Texas (Austin). President of the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE), an association of heterodox economic thinkers who are interested in economic policy and stress the evolutionary aspects of economic behavior.]. “Job Assurance: The Job Guarantee Revisited.” *Journal of Economic Issues*, vol. 31, no. 3, 1997, pp. 826–834. *JSTOR*, [www.jstor.org/stable/4227231. Accessed 12 Oct. 2020](http://www.jstor.org/stable/4227231.%20Accessed%2012%20Oct.%202020). // Sage AA

It seems pretty clear that the employer of last resort must be the government. The law can hardly successfully saddle private citizens with this responsibility. In the United States, this would probably mean the federal government. However, the possibility exits that state governments might be organized to handle the program, though it is difficult to see how. If there are differences from state to state in the generosity of the law, this can hardly result in a situation that is entirely satisfactory to the more generous state.

### 1AR—Links to the Net Benefit

#### Links to the net benefit— CP increases provides jobs in exactly the same amount as the affirmative because states rule on enacting a job guarantee.

#### Links to the net benefit— Compacts need presidential and congressional approval –

Adam Winkler 11 is Professor of Law at UCLA and a specialist in American constitutional law. His scholarship has been cited and quoted in landmark Supreme Court cases. He also received a master’s degree in political science from UCLA. “Healthcare Opponents’ Latest Effort to Circumvent the Constitution: Interstate Compacts.” 2011. <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/republicans-latest-effort_b_833956.html>

[Interstate compacts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstate_compact) are commonplace contractual agreements that states use to handle regional problems. They are used to establish agencies and rules for transportation systems that traverse state lines (like the Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in and around D.C.), waterways between states (like the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey), and any number of other multi-state issues, from environmental protection to waste disposal to cross-border adoption. Such agreements are perfectly legitimate. In fact, the Constitution itself envisions them. Article I, section 10 of the Constitution provides, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” If Congress consents, therefore, states may enter into binding contracts with other states. [Health care opponents](http://www.texaspolicy.com/press_releases_single.php?report_id=3574) are encouraging states to enter into a [compact](http://www.healthcarecompact.org/) that would exempt them and their residents from the demands of the Affordable Care Act, especially the requirement that most individuals have insurance. Yet such a compact faces the same insurmountable hurdle as the House Republicans’ repeal effort back in January. Any such compact would need to be signed by the president. Backers of the health care compact argue that because the “Interstate Compact Clause” only speaks of consent of “Congress,” approval only requires a vote by the House and the Senate. The law, they say, does not need to be submitted to the president. Perhaps they didn’t read all of the Constitution. The “Presentment Clause” of Article I, section 7 mandates that “Every Bill” and “Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary... shall be presented to the President of the United States” for his signature. In 1983, the Supreme Court in a case called [*INS v. Chadha*](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0462_0919_ZO.html) held that every act of Congress that has “the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons” is required to be presented to president. (The only exception is a constitutional amendment, which must have the support of 2/3ds of both houses of Congress — the same number required to override a president’s veto, making the executive’s approval irrelevant.) The health care compact is clearly designed to alter people’s legal rights and duties, such as eliminating the legal obligation to have health insurance. Other than a judicial ruling that a law is unconstitutional, the only vald way to reverse a federal law is by legislation passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the president. As the Court explained in *Chadha*, “Presentment to the President and the Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements could not be circumvented.” And yet Republicans, who have made such [a grand show lately of their allegiance to the Constitution](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/us_house_constitution), are now seeking to circumvent those requirements. So much for following the original intent of the Framers. Historical practice also indicates that presidential approval is necessary. Compacts have long been submitted to the president for his signature. Indeed, President Franklin Roosevelt twice vetoed congressional acts consenting to interstate compacts. Ironically, supporters of the health care compact may be subtly undermining their allies’ effort to overturn the health care law in court. The court cases assert that the law was beyond Congress’s limited powers under the Constitution. Yet the Supreme Court held in [one landmark case on interstate compacts](http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?friend=nytimes&navby=volpage&court=us&vol=449&page=449) that congressional approval is only required where “the subject matter of the agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation.” Compact proponents, who have repeatedly said that Congress must give its consent to the health care compact, are basically conceding that the health care law was within Congress’s authority.

### 1AR—Patchwork DA

#### The counterplan creates a patchwork of contradictory states policies — only national action solves collective action and coordination problems.

Daniel Abebe 13 and Aziz Z. Huq, Assistant Professors of Law, University of Chicago Law School, “Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach,” *Vanderbilt Law Review* 66(3), April 2013, retrieved at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1401&context=public\_law\_and\_legal\_theory

Consider the general case for centralizing regulatory authority over foreign affairs. Traditional justifications for centralization in the national government focus on collective action problems.287 Public goods such as military security and a national free market are often best achieved through national, rather than subnational, interventions. At the time of the Founding, the Framers perceived the absence of a concerted American voice in the international sphere to be a major weakness of the Articles of Confederation.288 The Constitution, accordingly, limits the capacity of states to sign international agreements289 or engage in military activity.290 The functional argument for centralization is even more compelling: given the importance of speed, secrecy, and foreign affairs expertise in providing military security, the centralization of diplomatic, military, and intelligence authorities in a single institutional actor makes sense.291 Were such authority dispersed among the several states, it would be extremely difficult for the United States to address diplomatic or military threats in the current international environment.

Similarly, maintenance of economic prosperity requires national-level coordination. For geographic, demographic, and technological reasons, the several states are unlikely to share the same interests in shaping economic policy. Some states’ economies depend on agricultural goods, others on manufacturing, and still others on the provision of goods and services. Such varied commitments naturally lead to competing interests in relation to free trade, tariffs, taxes, and trade-related subsidies. States will inevitably try to achieve their internal economic goals without taking full account of the externalities of their policies on other states.292 This collective action problem is best addressed at the national level, where the federal government can select net beneficial economic policies. Centralization increases overall social welfare.293

### 1AR—Flawed Signal

#### It sends a flawed signal

Ryan Baasch 16, Law Clerk to Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, “Congress and the Reconstruction of Foreign Affairs Feeralism,” *Michigan Law Review* 115(1), October 2016, pp. 52-8

Our third concern arises from the proclivity of states to undermine our national government’s conduct of foreign affairs. When the states adopt their own foreign policies, they may sow confusion in the international arena as to our nation’s stances. This problem can manifest in numerous ways. The federal government may adopt a foreign policy and assure the international community of its commitment to it. But dissenting states may act at cross-purposes to that federal policy. For instance, the United States policy towards Taiwan (the Republic of China) is a study in nuance and opacity.35 The idea is to say the minimum that satisfies the People’s Republic of China (namely, that there is one China and that we recognize the People’s Republic), while not wholly abandoning our longtime ally, Taiwan.36 But suppose that individual states, including California, New York and Texas, decided to recognize Taiwan and its pretensions to sovereignty over the mainland.37 And imagine further that such states sought to favor Taiwan, adopting policies that enraged the People’s Republic. Can anyone doubt that these states could hazard our nation’s relations with China, leading to heated rhetoric, trade wars, or—more troubling—real ones? Even when states and the federal government have the same general stance toward some foreign matter, seemingly minute differences can generate significant problems. Consider the events leading up to Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council. 38 In response to Burma’s suppression of dissenters, Massachusetts barred state agencies from making purchases from almost any company doing business in Burma, a rather sweeping law.39 Congress subsequently enacted a more restrained federal response to the suppression, creating some bars on foreign aid and delegating authority to the president.40 Using that authority, the president barred U.S. persons from investing in Burma.41 The resultant mess left members of the international community annoyed and flummoxed. The state law threatened to derail effective multilateral diplomacy because, by penalizing foreign companies for doing business with Burma, it effectively punished other nations as well as Burma.42 Many of our allies formally expressed their displeasure—some even filed complaints with the World Trade Organization alleging that the state act violated international trade agreements.43 As the European Union (EU) complained in its Supreme Court amicus brief, the state law “creat[ed] confusion about which entity speaks for and acts on behalf of American interests.”44 Moreover, the EU explained, such laws “greatly increase the difficulty of the U.S. Government to speak consistently and with one voice [in] foreign affairs.”45 Finally, even where state dabbling does not sow international confusion, it is problematic because the national government actors are elected to conduct diplomacy with foreign nations. State actors are not. More precisely, voters expect that federal officials will handle our international affairs. For the most part, voters do not elect governors or state legislators in order to advance human rights in Burma or to determine whether some government exercises (or should exercise) sovereignty over Palestine, Tibet, or Kashmir. When state actors condemn genocide, real or imagined, or punish nations for trading with others, these state officials act outside their bailiwick, at least as voters understand it. A few concluding words on the federal separation of powers in foreign affairs. In arguing for the elimination of state voices, we do not mean to exaggerate the level of unity at the federal level. Notwithstanding Justice Sutherland’s discussion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 46 presidents clearly are not the sole voice in foreign affairs. Though the executive enjoys significant residual authority over foreign affairs via the Vesting Clause’s grant of executive power,47 Congress may declare war,48 regulate foreign commerce,49 and proscribe activity that violates the law of nations.50 Hence, Congress enjoys constitutional authority that can be used to embarrass or offend nations that the executive wishes to cultivate or court. Relatedly, the executive can refuse to enforce Congress’s foreign affairs laws when he supposes them to be unconstitutional, creating a different sort of federal discord.51 In sum, the Founders’ Constitution supposed that the federal government would have more than one voice in foreign affairs. Having said that, foreign relations becomes far more discordant when we have not two federal actors, but a total of 102 national actors, with 50 state executives and 50 state legislatures adding their distinctive voices to those of the Congress and the president. That Congress and the executive may act at cross-purposes in foreign affairs hardly suggests the desirability of an even more jarring cacophony. Moreover, some concerns about state intervention are inapplicable at the federal level, even where Congress and the president are at odds. As noted, the political branches have expertise that comes from recurring engagement on foreign matters, steady contact with foreign officials, and a constant supply of intelligence from the State Department and the CIA. Moreover, foreign nations rightly assume that federal institutions speak for the nation. Finally, American voters expect federal officials to steward our foreign affairs. In sum, periodic federal disunity in foreign affairs hardly undermines the case against the discordant noise stemming from a multitude of state voices.

### 1AR—No Solvency

#### States lack the necessary capacity and planning and fight over investment

The Economist 11 – 04/28, “America's transport infrastructure: Life in the slow lane,” http://www.economist.com/node/18620944

Formula-determined block grants to states are, at least, designed to leave important decisions to local authorities. But the formulas used to allocate the money shape infrastructure planning in a remarkably block-headed manner. Cost-benefit studies are almost entirely lacking. Federal guidelines for new construction tend to reflect politics rather than anything else. States tend to use federal money as a substitute for local spending, rather than to supplement or leverage it. The Government Accountability Office estimates that substitution has risen substantially since the 1980s, and increases particularly when states get into budget difficulties. From 1998 to 2002, a period during which economic fortunes were generally deteriorating, state and local transport investment declined by 4% while federal investment rose by 40%. State and local shrinkage is almost certainly worse now. States can make bad planners. Big metropolitan areas—Chicago, New York and Washington among them—often sprawl across state lines. State governments frequently bicker over how (and how much) to invest. Facing tight budget constraints, New Jersey’s Republican governor, Chris Christie, recently scuttled a large project to expand the railway network into New York City. New Jersey commuter trains share a 100-year-old tunnel with Amtrak, a major bottleneck. Mr Christie’s decision was widely criticised for short-sightedness; but New Jersey faced cost overruns that in a better system should have been shared with other potential beneficiaries all along the north-eastern corridor. Regional planning could help to avoid problems like this.

### 1AR—Perm

#### Partnership between State and Federal governments is most favorable

Raymond 12 - US leader at Capital Projects and Infrastructure PwC (Peter, “Investing in transportation Doing more with less,” January 2012, [http://www.pwc.com/en\_US/us/capital-projects-](http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/capital-projects-infrastructure/publications/assets/infrastructure-investing-dot.pdf) [infrastructure/publications/assets/infrastructure-investing-dot.pdf](http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/capital-projects-infrastructure/publications/assets/infrastructure-investing-dot.pdf))

In several of the countries surveyed, a national body sets infrastructure investment policy and providesguidance to federal, state, and local governments. This body can incorporate various considerations such as research and development needs, private sector investment requirements, and social considerations. With guidance from thisnational body, the government is able to prioritize projects and funding across various competingsectors.The activities of this body are typically transparent, allowing the public—especially residents of the affected areas—to see how priorities are identified and investment decisions made. Infrastructure UK,established in 2010, creates long-termsplans in the UK to help address national infrastructure needs, coordinating future investment inresearch, development and innovation. The advisory body works withpublic- and private-sector stakeholders to develop and shape policy that encourages infrastructure investment within the UK. It also serves as a liaison between public- and private-sector stakeholders. In response to funding and financing challenges, the UK aims to collaborate with a diverse investor base (both geographically diverse and by type of investment) for large, complex projects

#### States can’t solve – insufficient funding, lack of debt backing, constrained budgets – the perm resolves all of these issues.

Carpenter and Hamilton 20 (Daniel Carpenter, Allie S. Freed Prof of Government @ Harvard. Darrick Hamilton, Executive Director of Kirwan Institute @ OSU. 4-30-2020. “A FEDERAL JOB GUARANTEE: ANTI-POVERTY AND INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY FOR A BETTER FUTURE” <https://scholars.org/contribution/federal-job-guarantee>) DLuo

What would a federal job guarantee program look like? The program would be administered by the Department of Labor and overseen by the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary and Department of Labor will be charged with working in conjunction with other agencies, and states and localities to identify an inventory of public infrastructure tasks and associated jobs. 1. Jobs to support state and local governments. State and local governments account for most of the government employment in the United States, and they comprise an important part of our federalist system. In a range of policy domains – public health, education and job training, infrastructure, health provision and conservation – it is state and local governments that have the legal authorities and historical capacities to act. Yet state governments also have the weakest capacity to respond to an economic crisis. First, state governments have nothing like the Federal Reserve to back their debt (this is one among several reasons that the Federal Reserve has recently been looking into mass purchases of municipal bonds). They cannot print money. Second, state governments lack the expansive revenue-generating capacity of the federal government. Beyond this, state governments have in recent decades constrained their powers with balanced budget amendments, while a number of states (Illinois and Connecticut are two examples) have badly underfunded pension systems, and still others have tethered their income to commodity (especially petroleum) sales, which are at historically low prices and whose price declines have damaged state revenues. Workers and some capital costs for projects at the local, county, or state levels can be funded in a way to provide regional full employment and infrastructure needs. The projects and areas with the greatest needs could be cued to receive the federal intervention sooner. The Department of Labor would work closely with local governments. Local and state governments would, in conjunction with community organizations, develop project proposals to address local infrastructure needs, similar to the local, state, and federal collaborations in the design of direct government employment programs of the New Deal. Localities are likely most aware of the infrastructure needs to offer the greatest benefit to their communities. In order to minimize inequality across states and reduce the burden of discrimination, the workers under this program would be federally employed but would be tasked or apportioned (perhaps by formula, to reduce near-term political discretion) to states according to their economic, public health, and infrastructure needs. Even if the work occurs at the state and local level, the federal government needs to step in to provide the jobs, and there are a range of tools it has to do so. The traditional tool consists of program-specific block grants that have been an important feature of American government since the New Deal and especially the Nixon era. The problem with these grants is that they often permit state and local officials to withhold important resources from populations in need, as occurred with so many states’ refusal to take Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act. Our proposal would build upon the strengths of grants by making the jobs available to states and local governments, but would address the inequality-related weakness of these programs by making the employees federal workers who, as such, are made available to state and local governments. In order to avoid potentially unconstitutional imposition of requirements upon state governments (which were declared unconstitutional in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)), the federal government could offer these jobs as an option, as it did with Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act. Another alternative is to allow state and localities to develop a bank of proposals for physical and human infrastructure from which a federal authority (operating under formulaic or discretionary procedures) can prioritize with regards to urgent and useful needs. The state and localities can even administer the program with federal oversight, however, the workers would be ultimately employed by the federal government, as opposed to state or local employees by way of a federal grant.

### 1AR—Administration DA

#### Forcing states to implement a federal jobs guarantee and continue with their day-to-day is impossible. Only the plan solves because it allows the federal governments to assign tasks and state governments to regulate the flow of work which checks against administrative issues

Bhandari 19 — Ryan Bhandari; “What Is the “Federal Jobs Guarantee” and What Are People Saying About It?”; March 25, 2019; <https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it> As+

Finally, matching millions of workers to the jobs envisioned under a jobs guarantee would be an administrative nightmare to implement. State and local governments will be tasked with finding the productive work to do, but how do we train millions of people to do these jobs? How does the Department of Labor oversee the millions of new jobs to make sure they’re legitimate? What are the qualifiers for the kind of work that’s eligible? What if a right-leaning state wants jobs done that a left-leaning federal government deems unproductive or socially unacceptable like building an oil pipeline or opening up a coal mine?

## 1AR—Levy CP

### 1AR—Private Sector DA

#### The PIC crowds’ out private sector with its horrible minimum wage increase plan

Bhandari 19 — Ryan Bhandari; “What Is the “Federal Jobs Guarantee” and What Are People Saying About It?”; March 25, 2019; <https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it> As+

#3: It could crowd out tens of millions of private sector jobs. There are currently 54 million people who earn $15 an hour or less. When they find out the federal government is offering $15 an hour plus benefits and permanent job security, many of those workers would quit their current job and join the federal workforce.3 Companies that could afford to would raise wages to keep some of these workers; other companies would simply go out of business. The labor markets would be controlled by the government in ways never seen before in America. And even if just half of low-wage private sector workers quit, the number of federal employees would rise by between 35 and 40 million.4 Costs to the government would then rise to anywhere from $1.6 trillion to $2.24 trillion per year, and the private sector would see massive repercussions.

### 1AR—Inflation DA

#### Their plan causes massive inflation—this card is talking about the PIC’s implementation of increasing the minimum wage

Bhandari 19 — Ryan Bhandari; “What Is the “Federal Jobs Guarantee” and What Are People Saying About It?”; March 25, 2019; <https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it> As+

#4: Inflation would rise. A sudden increase in the cost of labor for businesses will lead to inflation throughout the economy because of higher business costs that will need to be passed on to consumers. In addition, when only those at the bottom of the income distribution get a defacto raise to $15, there are upstream consequences. Workers who were making $15 an hour may demand $20 an hour now. Workers making $20 an hour might want $25 an hour and so on. This may seem like a benefit, but “this is a story of serious wage-price spiral, unless we introduce other measures,” warns progressive economist Dean Baker.5 We have been very fortunate that inflation has been well under control for the last few decades. A federal jobs guarantee could change that pretty quickly.

### 1AR—Adminstation DA

#### The PIC doesn’t have a system of punishment for bad workers

Bhandari 19 — Ryan Bhandari; “What Is the “Federal Jobs Guarantee” and What Are People Saying About It?”; March 25, 2019; <https://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it> As+

Finally, how does the federal government fire workers who are guaranteed a job? Tcherneva argues that workers can be fired for not showing up or threatening the safety of others, but what about extremely poor performance?

## 1AR—UBI CP

### 1AR—Solvency Deficits

#### [Economy] Can’t solve populism— the people who have a bad perception of the government still have a bad perception of the government in the CP since they don’t solve for unemployment and that is bad for both democracy and hegemony.

#### 1] 1AC Muro and Vidal 17 indicates that unemployment kills perception and only the aff can solve because citizens have a different perception of government when they’re employed.

#### 2] Unless there is universal employment, marginalized communities have an adverse reaction towards government and the fellow person.

#### UBI sucks—prefer math:

#### 1] UBI directs resources inefficiently.

[Melissa Kearney and Magne Mogstad (2019), Melissa Kearney is the Neil Moskowitz Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland. Kearney’s research focuses on poverty, inequality, and social policy in the United States. Her work has been published in leading academic journals and frequently cited in the press. Magne Mogstad is the Gary S. Becker Professor in Economics at the University of Chicago and the director of the Ronzetti Initiative for the Study of Labor Markets at the Becker Friedman Institute. His primary research fields are labor economics, public economics, and economic inequality, and his research focuses on how to address market failures and equalize opportunities, The math is clear: Universal basic income is a terrible idea, Business Insider, 11-23-2019]//CHS PK

Let's start with concerns about the income gap in the US. If the goal is to design a progressive policy that better redistributes income, [UBI is a terrible tool](https://www.businessinsider.com/universal-basic-income-new-study-says-it-doesnt-achieve-main-purpose-2019-5). Unlike programs crafted to specifically help people with low income and those with disabilities, a UBI program would, by design, spread payments across the widest possible base. This means that while the economically vulnerable would receive support, so too would middle- to upper-income families. Why give some money to everyone, rather than offer dedicated assistance to those who need it? Even if UBI payments were phased out and then capped for earners above a certain income, the program would still end up giving able-bodied working-age adults subsidies alongside families with low incomes, regardless of relative need. UBI by design fails to account for the elements of life that make families more or less in need of government support — such as having a child with a serious illness or a work-limiting disability oneself — and as such would result in a highly inefficient allocation of resources.

#### 2] UBI is staggeringly expensive.

[Melissa Kearney and Magne Mogstad (2019), Melissa Kearney is the Neil Moskowitz Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland. Kearney’s research focuses on poverty, inequality, and social policy in the United States. Her work has been published in leading academic journals and frequently cited in the press. Magne Mogstad is the Gary S. Becker Professor in Economics at the University of Chicago and the director of the Ronzetti Initiative for the Study of Labor Markets at the Becker Friedman Institute. His primary research fields are labor economics, public economics, and economic inequality, and his research focuses on how to address market failures and equalize opportunities, The math is clear: Universal basic income is a terrible idea, Business Insider, 11-23-2019]//CHS PK

Further, the likely fiscal costs of a UBI are staggering. Enacting a UBI that pays $10,000 to every US adult would distribute about $2.5 trillion in benefits each year. That's roughly 75% of the federal government's 2018 revenues. To fund a UBI program of this size, Congress would need to pass massive tax increases or spending cuts. Some proponents of UBI would fund the program, at least in part, by disbanding existing safety-net programs. This would be a disaster. Cutting a wide array of existing programs — such as the earned income tax credit (EITC), child tax credit (CTC), temporary assistance to needy families (TANF), supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP), and disability insurance — would cover only one-fifth of the cost of such a UBI and result in a massive loss of existing transfers to people with disabilities and families with children. This approach would exacerbate the needs of the most vulnerable members of society.

#### 3] UBI doesn’t address the automation problem.

[Melissa Kearney and Magne Mogstad (2019), Melissa Kearney is the Neil Moskowitz Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland. Kearney’s research focuses on poverty, inequality, and social policy in the United States. Her work has been published in leading academic journals and frequently cited in the press. Magne Mogstad is the Gary S. Becker Professor in Economics at the University of Chicago and the director of the Ronzetti Initiative for the Study of Labor Markets at the Becker Friedman Institute. His primary research fields are labor economics, public economics, and economic inequality, and his research focuses on how to address market failures and equalize opportunities, The math is clear: Universal basic income is a terrible idea, Business Insider, 11-23-2019]//CHS PK

Next, consider concerns about displaced workers and the threat of robots taking jobs. If the goal is to get people back to work, then UBI, again, is a terrible policy. Giving people unconditional cash payments does nothing to address the root causes of declining employment and wages among less educated people. Whereas a targeted wage subsidy would encourage work and increase take home pay, UBI discourages labor supply. Instead, we should spend money helping people invest in their own human capital and making it easier for them to get to work. We should spend money on promising career and technical education programs and help low-income workers pay for child care and transportation. All told, UBI is a sub-optimal and probably harmful policy response to all three of the challenges it purports to address. There are legitimate critiques to standard social safety net and welfare programs — they can be administered inefficiently and they aren't structured perfectly to fit the needs of today — but that doesn't mean they should be abandoned for a shiny policy idea taking Twitter by storm. Our country is facing serious and daunting economic challenges, and too many people feel left behind in today's modern capitalist economy. To address these challenges, we need to ground ourselves in reality by looking at the facts and designing programs that address the underlying problems. Candidates and policymakers should focus spending on targeted benefits and policies that support early-childhood education, skills training, subsidized daycare and housing, and other investments that support families and workers. Evidence shows that's much more likely to produce the desired social and economic outcomes for the American people than universal basic income.

#### 4] UBI is terrible in every way—our author smokes yours.

[Daron Acemoglu (2019), Kamer Daron Acemoğlu is a Turkish-born Armenian-American economist who has taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1993, Why Universal Basic Income is a bad idea, MarketWatch, 6-19-2019]//CHS PK

But UBI is a flawed idea, not least because it would be prohibitively expensive unless accompanied by deep cuts to the rest of the safety net. In the U.S. (population: 327 million), a UBI of just $1,000 per month would cost around $4 trillion per year, which is close to the entire federal budget in 2018. Without major cost savings, federal tax revenue would have to be doubled, which would impose massive distortionary costs on the economy. And, no, a permanent UBI could not be financed with government debt or newly printed currency. Sacrificing all other social programs for the sake of a UBI is a terrible idea. Such programs exist to address specific problems, such as the vulnerability of the elderly, children, and disabled people. Imagine living in a society where children still go hungry, and where those with severe health conditions are deprived of adequate care, because all the tax revenue has gone to sending monthly checks to every citizen, millionaires and billionaires included. Though UBI makes for a good slogan, it is a poorly designed policy. Basic economic theory implies that taxes on income are distortionary inasmuch as they discourage work and investment. Moreover, governments should avoid transfers to the same people from whom they collect revenue, but that is precisely what a UBI would do. In the U.S., for example, around three-quarters of households pay at least some federal income or payroll taxes, and an even greater share pays state taxes.

#### Past analysis proves that UBI fails.

Semprevivo 18 (“Universal Basic Income: An Idea That's Already Been Tried And Failed” 12/20/2018 https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/universal-basic-income-experiments-fail/)

Two Democratic front-runners for 2020 are positioning themselves as champions of UBI-light policies — [Kamala Harris and Cory Booker](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/kamala-harris-cory-booker-basic-income-plans-likely-remove-work-incentive-think-tank-says). They're not exactly treading new ground. During the last election cycle, Bernie Sanders [flirted](https://www.vox.com/2015/7/28/9014491/bernie-sanders-vox-conversation) with the concept, and has been more vocal about supporting UBI since 2016. Hillary Clinton's book "What Happened" reveals that she would have liked to make UBI a larger part of her campaign.

While politicians often try to package UBI as a fresh new idea, the concept has been tried before. And unsurprisingly, it hasn't worked.

In 2017, Finland experimented with a pilot program, putting 2,000 randomly chosen Finns on UBI, with the government providing a monthly check of €560. But earlier this year, Finland abruptly decided to not extend its experiment. Although the Finnish government doesn't plan to release the findings until the end of 2019, some point to the program's price tag as one of the main reasons it was doomed to fail from the start.

In fact, [according](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/04/25/finland-basic-income-685-fails/549087002/) to an independent analysis, Finland would have been forced to raise their income tax by nearly 30% to keep such a program alive. And when the personal income tax rate in Finland already maxes out at more than 50%, another increase would likely prove unsustainable.

Finland is not the only example where the flaws of UBI have been exposed.

In Canada, Ontario's government decided to launch a UBI experiment in July of last year. But a few months ago, they decided to [end the experiment](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/01/ontarios-new-conservative-government-to-end-basic-income-experiment) — two years ahead of schedule. Upon the conclusion of the trial, a Canadian official called the experiment "quite expensive" and said "it was certainly not going to be sustainable."

Already Failed In The U.S.

Even here in the United States, a form of universal basic income has already been tested. From 1968 to 1980, the federal government ran a "negative income tax" experiment — meaning that a minimum income is guaranteed, but phased out as earnings increase. The goal was to incentivize work, but the policy ended up encouraging just the opposite.

The program resulted in a drop in working hours across the board. Most strikingly, working hours fell by [43%](https://www.jstor.org/stable/145402?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) for single men not responsible for a family. To make matters worse, stints of unemployment were [prolonged](https://www.jstor.org/stable/145401?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) — meaning that after someone lost a job, it took them longer to begin a new one.

Democrats may attempt to use basic income program proposals to help build support in the 2020 presidential election, but they better hope Americans don't venture beyond their elevator pitch. Because after examining universal basic income programs of the past, it's clear the policies lack feasibility and weaken economic prowess.

If politicians want to gain the support of the American electorate, they should focus on policies that build off the economic success of the past year rather than undermine it.

#### UBI fails— 5 thumpers.

Goldin 18, Ian Andrew Goldin is a professor at the University of Oxford in England, founding director of the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford, 02-11-2018, "Five reasons why universal basic income is a bad idea," Financial Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/100137b4-0cdf-11e8-bacb-2958fde95e5e//> TB recut

First, UBI is financially irresponsible. Universal means everyone gets it. Even in the richest societies, if UBI was set at a level to provide a modest but decent standard of living it would be unaffordable and lead to ballooning deficits. To close the UBI budget black hole, much higher taxes or reallocation of resources from other areas such as health and education would be needed. Second, UBI will lead to higher inequality and poverty. It typically aims to replace existing unemployment and other benefits with a simple universal grant. As shown by the OECD, the Paris-based club of mostly rich nations, by reallocating welfare payments from targeted transfers (such as unemployment, disability or housing benefits) to a generalised transfer to everyone, the amount that goes to the most deserving is lower. Billionaires get a little more. Third, UBI will undermine social cohesion. Individuals gain not only income, but meaning, status, skills, networks and friendships through work. Delinking income and work, while rewarding people for staying at home, is what lies behind social decay. Crime, drugs, broken families and other socially destructive outcomes are more likely in places with high unemployment, as is evident in the drug pandemic in the US. Fourth, UBI undermines incentives to participate. Stronger safety nets are vital. No decent society should tolerate dire poverty or starvation. But for those who are able, help should be designed to get individuals and families to participate in society; to help people overcome unemployment and find work, retrain, move cities. Wherever possible, safety nets should be a lifeline towards meaningful work and participation in society, not a guarantee of a lifetime of dependence. Fifth, UBI offers a panacea to corporate and political leaders, postponing a discussion about the future of jobs. The demographic pressures in rich countries, and the deep challenge AI poses to development prospects in poor ones, adds to the need for this conversation. There must be more part-time work, shorter weeks, and rewards for home work, creative industries and social and individual care. Forget about UBI; to reverse rising inequality and social dislocation we need to radically change the way we think about income and work.

### 1AR—Perm

#### Perm do both—they’re not mutually exclusive.

[Sam Fulwood (2017), Fulwood analyzes the influence of policies on communities of color. He was a senior fellow at CAP where he founded and directed the Leadership Institute, This public policy idea can bring America to full employment, and it’s gathering momentum, THINKPROGRESS, 9-22-2017]//CHS PK

Some people advocate for a guaranteed income for all Americans. How does that compare with your ideas? Let me say at the outset that the job guarantee and the basic income guarantee are not necessarily mutually exclusive. I could conceive of scenarios where we had both polices in place simultaneously and I’m not opposed to that. But of one without the other, we lose the benefit of the social work that could be done under the job guarantee and we lose the benefit of meeting individual sense of dignity that’s associated with work. Those would be the losses. The way I like to put it is that if you made me choose between the two, I’d rather have the job guarantee without the basic income guarantee, than to have the basic income guarantee without the job guarantee.

#### The perm solves best.

Spross 20 (Jeff, was the economics and business correspondent for The Week, an economics and climate reporter for ThinkProgress, and has written for the policy journal Democracy, “Universal Basic Income or Job Guarantee? Why Not Both?” <https://prospect.org/economy/universal-basic-income-or-job-guarantee/>) TB

Before the coronavirus struck, the American left and the Democratic Party found themselves debating two wildly ambitious policy schemes: [the job guarantee](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/6/16036942/job-guarantee-explained) and [a universal basic income](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/politics/universal-basic-income-andrew-yang.html). The pandemic and the ensuing economic collapse have actually reinvigorated these borderline-utopian ideas: [Pennsylvania](https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/08/852857094/civilian-coronavirus-corps-aims-to-get-pennsylvania-back-to-work) and [California](https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-24/california-seniors-food-state-program-restaurant-workers-coronavirus-gavin-newsom) are actively pursuing New Deal–style public-works programs, while House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) [recently asked](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/guaranteed-basic-income-coronavirus-economic-recovery-nancy-pelosi/) if “a guaranteed income for people” was “worthy of attention”—then concluding, “perhaps so.” As a quick refresher: A universal basic income (UBI) would be a no-strings check sent regularly—probably every month—to every person in the country. [The idea is to set a floor for everyone’s standard of living](https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/stocktons-awesome-public-experiment/). Meanwhile, a job guarantee (JG) is essentially a public option for employment: Anyone who wants work will be provided a job in their community, funded by the federal government, with benefits, and at a decent living wage. [The idea here is twofold](https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/44/youre-hired/): to set a floor for conditions and compensation in the U.S. job market, as well as to push the economy to full employment and keep it there. The two programs have often been cast in opposition to one another. To an extent, the friction is understandable: The UBI seeks to lessen Americans’ entanglement with work by breaking the link between jobs and income, while the JG can be seen as an attempt to strengthen that entanglement further. But the coronavirus has offered a very concrete and painful lesson in why this friction must be overcome. The destruction wreaked by the disease is demonstrating how the implicit critiques the UBI and the JG level at U.S. society are both right—and how we must tend to both solutions if America is to dig itself out of this mess and learn anything from the catastrophe. The idea here is twofold: to set a floor for conditions and compensation in the U.S. job market, as well as to push the economy to full employment and keep it there. Let’s begin with universal basic income, since its relevance to the coronavirus pandemic is probably more intuitive. America’s overwhelming reliance on employment to deliver incomes is bad enough in normal times, when many [cannot or should not work](https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2017/09/12/who-was-in-poverty-in-2016/), and when recessions occasionally throw millions out of their jobs through no fault of their own. But in a pandemic, when people must stay away from their jobs for the sake of their own health, their families, and their communities, it’s utterly perverse. At least [36 million Americans](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/36-5-million-jobs-lost-023246258.html)have lost their jobs since the outbreak began, bread lines [are exploding across the country](https://prospect.org/coronavirus/the-return-of-the-breadline/), and roughly a third [cannot pay their rent](https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/09/business/americans-rent-payment-trnd/index.html) or other bills. We ostensibly have programs like unemployment insurance and food stamps to step in as an alternative income. But, precisely because America’s political culture assumes that any income from a source other than work is something to be avoided and discouraged, [these programs are grossly inadequate](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/the-us-should-just-write-checksbut-wont/609637/), riven by bureaucratic hurdles, poor design, and [deliberate sabotage by policymakers](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5dzmyk/our-broken-unemployment-system-is-a-national-scandal). The CARES Act [attempted to step into the breach](https://theweek.com/articles/904647/congress-set-pass-biggest-stimulus-history-not-completely-terrible), by temporarily boosting unemployment benefits and handing out one-time, no-strings checks for $1,200. But both measures fall utterly short of what’s needed. This raw necessity explains why we now have Pelosi openly musing about a guaranteed income, and why several Democrats in the Senate [are now proposing $2,000 payments each month](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/08/monthly-payments-2000-coronavirus-243670) to all Americans making less than $120,000 until the end of the crisis. In the House, Rep. Rashida Tlaib (D-MI) has a bill [that would do something similar](https://tlaib.house.gov/sites/tlaib.house.gov/files/Automatic%20Boost%20to%20Communities%20Act%20.pdf)—without the cutoff for higher incomes, making it genuinely universal. None of these proposals, of course, is a true UBI. They’re temporary, or they aren’t available for people above certain incomes. But we have no idea when the coronavirus will be brought under control, and the economic damage will remain for years. Any “temporary” policy now could be with us for some time. Moreover, utopian policy demands like the UBI and the JG are never simply policy demands; they frame politics and policy by diagnosing an overarching problem and recommending a particular kind of solution. The implicit critique of UBI is that some basic level of consumption should be a universal human right. And the coronavirus-response policies that Democrats are toying with certainly point in that direction. What of the job guarantee? Since one of its primary goals is to reach and sustain full employment, it’s a seemingly odd fit for a crisis where we’re trying to keep vast numbers of Americans away from their jobs. But once the pandemic passes, it will be time to drive the economy back to full capacity again. [There is no guarantee of a speedy bounce-back](https://theweek.com/articles/907855/how-make-sure-recovery-quicker-than-last), and another slow-grind recovery like we endured after 2008, but starting from 20 percent unemployment or more, would be an unthinkable human catastrophe. If the goal of the UBI is to make a baseline of consumption a human right, the goal of the JG [is to make work itself a universal human right](https://theweek.com/articles/786745/what-could-sue-government-job)—one the government is legally bound to provide in both cases. The need for the latter will be of the utmost importance for whatever world comes after the coronavirus. Only the federal government has the power to supply money to economic projects without concern for whether they generate a return. But even that is only part of the story. Even as many of us avoid our jobs to contain the virus, the work done by a significant chunk of the population has become, well, essential: health care, food production and distribution, sanitation, the Postal Service, warehouse workers, shipping, child and elder care, public transit, and so on. And yet, just as these forms of production have become more necessary than ever, capitalism’s ability to effectively organize that production via price signals and competitive private markets has gone haywire. There are critical shortages of masks, gloves, and ventilators, both because hospitals and providers [kept their resources on thin margins for years](https://www.wsj.com/articles/miscalculation-at-every-level-left-u-s-unequipped-to-fight-coronavirus-11588170921)and because they [cannot figure out what or how much to buy](https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/03/18/ventilator-shortage-hospital-icu-coronavirus/) for fear they will be eating losses once the crisis is over. [We’re having a political slugfest](https://theweek.com/articles/911623/republicans-literally-want-work-americans-death) over whether to keep portions of our food supply system open at the risk of workers’ health. The country cannot seem to manufacture or administer nearly enough tests to actually make reopening the economy feasible. And with the restaurant industry in hibernation, farmers and food providers [are simply discarding massive amounts of goods and allowing crops to rot](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/business/coronavirus-destroying-food.html), because they cannot cheaply retool their supply chains to meet the domestic grocery market, as the latest data suggests [that many more Americans are going hungry](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/05/06/the-covid-19-crisis-has-already-left-too-many-children-hungry-in-america/). Yes, it is perverse and cruel that we leave people’s incomes at the mercy of the job market, and of the self-interested profit motives of the gatekeepers of private capital. But the right to consume will also mean nothing if society does not produce the goods and services people must buy with their UBI checks to maintain a basic standard of living. Deciding what should be produced, when, and how is also a matter we have left to the markets and the gatekeepers of private capital. And they are failing us. Nor is this failure a one-off emergency related to the coronavirus. It is built into the nature of market capitalism, which can handle calm and predictability, [but turns irrational and self-destructive](https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/RI_WWII_Working-Paper_202003-1.pdf) whenever future returns are uncertain or when market participants must work together. It’s why America had to effectively socialize the economy to fight World War II, and why private markets have thus far utterly failed to address the still-oncoming crisis of climate change. It’s why, after the shocks of globalized trade and industrialization destroyed thousands of American communities, no new forms of employment flooded in to fill the breach. The coronavirus is an extreme event. But, just as with the question of incomes, it’s an event that reminds us that these problems, in greater or lesser form, crop up all the time. Some of these challenges, such as with medical supplies, can probably be addressed simply by the government [operating as a centralized buyer](https://theweek.com/articles/906642/why-trump-reluctant-economy-war-footing). But for other matters, there is simply no substitute for a workforce organized and financed by public rather than private means. The food supply chain is a prime example. We can still produce enough food for everyone in America, running the farms and the plants while also taking precautions to keep workers safe. What is in doubt is whether we can do these things in a manner that is profitable to private owners. If not, then someone else will need to direct and finance that economic activity—someone who does not suffer from the private owners’ limitations. And only the federal government has the power to supply money to economic projects without concern for whether they generate a return. Imagine how we could have responded to the coronavirus’s overlapping production challenges if we already had a platform for public works in place. There is a minimalist conception of the job guarantee, in which the program is solely a countercyclical stabilizer, geared toward providing temporary jobs until the private market can snatch workers up again. But the stronger version could also operate as a kind of permanent staging platform for public-works projects—one that can be spun up quickly to respond to various needs or crises. Such a job guarantee program could both [organize large regional or even national public projects](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/09/opinion/federal-jobs-guarantee-coronavirus.html) (think installing solar panels on every home and weatherizing every building) or [match workers to local needs](https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2020/5/4/21243725/coronavirus-unemployment-cares-act-federal-job-guarantee-green-new-deal-pavlina-tcherneva) via local decision-making. There would be challenges: Maintaining a population of skilled professionals who could train and supervise new JG enrollees would require outbidding private employers, for instance. And that could possibly complicate the JG’s goal of stabilizing inflation. But we should also not fetishize “skills” too much. Up until the last few decades, learning on the job [was a common American experience](https://theweek.com/articles/852340/grandpa-wouldnt-have-been-impressed-by-amazons-plan-retrain-workers-neither-should). The Works Progress Administration of the New Deal era [put millions of unemployed Americans to work](https://www.npr.org/2020/04/04/826909516/in-the-1930s-works-program-spelled-hope-for-millions-of-jobless-americans) by teaching them how to build bridges and dams, as well as [buying, storing, processing, and redistributing food](https://onlabor.org/today-is-the-w-p-a-s-85th-birthday-lets-bring-it-back-for-a-food-industry-in-crisis/) that farmers would have otherwise left to rot, thanks to the haywire market disruptions of the Great Depression. Which should sound familiar. Imagine how we could have responded to the coronavirus’s overlapping production challenges—providing health care, testing and contact tracing, food provision—if we already had a platform for public works in place. That brings up one last point: To do any policy well requires practice. If America limits itself to disbursing universal checks or attempting big public works in singular economic collapses that come along once a decade or so, it will inevitably do it in a confused and ad hoc fashion, [as we have seen](https://theweek.com/articles/905207/need-send-people-money-need-fix-how) in this crisis. If Americans already had something like a UBI in operation in non-crisis times, the infrastructure to distribute additional money aid would be firmly in place. The same goes for public-employment efforts like [Pennsylvania’s plan](https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/08/852857094/civilian-coronavirus-corps-aims-to-get-pennsylvania-back-to-work) to train a “Commonwealth Civilian Coronavirus Corps” to conduct testing and tracing, or [California’s effort](https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-24/california-seniors-food-state-program-restaurant-workers-coronavirus-gavin-newsom) to employ laid-off restaurant workers to provide meals to seniors. The lesson of the coronavirus is that none of this can be dealt with in isolation. Production and consumption cannot be politically hived off from one another. Recessions and emergencies will strain both in different ways, and their consequences will bleed into both spheres. For one to be democratized, they both must be. And the best way to learn is by doing.

#### UBI And Federal Jobs Guarantee can coexist – but poorly implemented UBI yields climate change

Battistoni 18 Alyssa Battistoni is a doctoral candidate in political theory at Yale and an associate faculty member at the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research. "Jobs Guarantee or Universal Basic Income? Why Not Both?" Published by In These Times on June 20, 2018. Available here: (https://inthesetimes.com/features/universal-basic-income-federal-jobs-guarantee-climate-change-inequality.html) – AP Recut As+

THE ARGUMENT ABOUT A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME (UBI) VERSUS A JOB GUARANTEE (JG) has become one of the liveliest and most contentious debates on the Left. Each has been touted as a solution to all ills: the way to decrease depression, close the racial wealth gap, recognize historically undervalued forms of work, transform the economy, save the planet. Though UBI and JG are typically counterposed, it’s entirely plausible they could coexist. If paid work is as important to well-being as JG advocates say, most people would want a job even with UBI. In particular, the black freedom movement, from civil rights leaders to Black Lives Matter, has called for both a basic income and guaranteed jobs. Whether both can do all the things proponents promise—in particular, the essential work of transitioning quickly to a low-carbon economy—is a different, harder question. Whether it’s possible to achieve both is yet another. From the July 2018 issue A UBI program could actually be a danger to the climate if, in distributing revenue from publicly owned resources, we rely on profits from destructive industries such as oil, as in Alaska. But there are alternatives: a depletion tax on companies that degrade so-called natural capital, a tax on carbon and other pollutants, or a land value tax targeting large landowners—all of which foster environmental conservation and make public claims to natural wealth. I initially supported UBI because separating livelihoods from jobs is important, not only for human wellbeing but for breaking an environmentally destructive growth cycle. That’s where many JG proposals make me nervous. I have yet to see a JG proposal that doesn’t promise, at least tangentially, to increase growth and productivity. A proposal published by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, for example, suggests a JG would produce “increases in the growth rate of GDP, and substantial productivity and capacity gains.” But not all such gains are desirable. We ought to crowd out the many jobs that are actively harmful to people, society and the environment, whether in fast fashion or Amazon warehouses. Raúl and Rohan agree that we should work less in general, and it’s possible to build work reduction into a JG program. But the valorization of work nevertheless permeates JG discourse, often framed in terms of dignity or solidarity. If the point is for everyone to contribute to necessary work in the spirit of equality and solidarity, we should be making everyone work—but no one yet has proposed drafting landlords and the idle rich to shovel compost. (I’m on board.) It is encouraging, however, to see that many current JG advocates are thinking about what constitutes low-carbon, socially beneficial work. Economists Stephanie Kelton and Pavlina Tcherneva have both called for a JG oriented around care: for people, for the planet and for communities. Important questions remain. Could parents get “jobs” caring for their children? Could friends get jobs caring for one another? Yet the move to put care work at the heart of a climate program is important. We need to move away from the work of resource-intensive consumer goods toward the work of bettering lives, planting trees, constructing playgrounds, making art. Perhaps most promising is the combination of a JG and universal basic services: free and publicly provided housing, transportation, internet access, education, healthcare and other necessities. Dense housing and public transportation are particularly crucial to reducing carbon emissions in a just way.

### 1AR—Economy Turn

#### UBI causes stagflation – only the plan can stabilize the economy.

Tcherneva 12 [Pavlina R. Tcherneva is an associate professor of economics at Bard College. She specializes in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and public policy. She previously taught at Franklin and Marshall College and the University of Missouri–Kansas City. During 2000–6, she served as the associate director for economic analysis at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, where she remains a senior research associate. In the summer of 2006, she was a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, and since July 2007 she has been a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute., 2-2-2012, "The Job Guarantee: Delivering the Benefits That Basic Income Only Promises – A Response to Guy Standing", Basic Income Studies, https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bistud/v7y2012i2p66-87n5.html] LHSSN

The second financing mechanism for BIG is fraught with similar problems. As I have discussed elsewhere (Tcherneva, 2006), federal funding for such programs is not technically constrained in countries that issue and control their own currencies, though it is constrained by the political process of appro- priating budgets for these programs. In these sovereign monetary regimes, governments pay for their purchases by issuing their own liabilities – that is, by creating reserves. This is the normal financing operation of governments in countries like Canada, U.S., U.K., or Japan but not in countries like those of the European Monetary Union, which have abdicated control of their monetary systems. In the former case, there are no technical and operational limits to how much governments can spend (though to be sure there are political constraints, as noted above).

Suppose that the U.S. Congress signed into law a policy that provided a basic income grant annually to every U.S. citizen, sufficient to provide him or her with the bare minimum standard of living. The first effect of such a policy would be a mass exodus from those “bad” jobs and a decline in production and output that would accompany the helicopter drop of money (via the BIG policy). There is only one consequence of such a policy – inflation. Additionally, should Congress incorporate a cost-of-living-adjustment provision and increase the BIG grant to compensate the recipients for the loss of value in their income from inflation, the result will be even more inflation, as more people opt out, produc- tion is disrupted further, and more and more money chases fewer and fewer goods (Tcherneva, 2006). Only if BIG were a one-time grant provided to recipi- ents, it might temporarily boost aggregate demand and stimulate production, because people would know that they would still need to work for their sub- sistence once BIG expires and would not leave the labor market en masse. In other words, both supply and demand could rise without any necessary increase in the price level. But if BIG is a permanent policy that guarantees an annual income to all at a level that will provide the base standard of living without the requirement to work, the effect of the grant would be precisely the opposite – a boost in demand and a shock to supply, which is the well-known phenomenon of stagflation – that is, inflation below full employment.

This is the fundamental problem with modern fiat systems – they have the unique ability to fund many different public programs without technical spend- ing constraints, but also carry the inherent possibility of inflation. In modern monetary economies, governments have a responsibility to anchor the value of their currencies. The JG program explicitly aims to do so and the program’s main stabilizing feature is it counter-cyclical buffer stock mechanism.

Public employment expands when the private sector lays off workers and shrinks when private employment recovers. In other words, when the economy is experiencing deflationary pressures from layoffs, countercyclical spending provides the expansionary force that counters them. By contrast, when the economy is experiencing inflationary tendencies from private sector job growth, public sector spending shrinks and dampens these inflationary pressures. Furthermore, the buffer stock wage is fixed, at a base (preferably living-wage) level, which provides a genuine floor to incomes and an anchor to prices in the economy. This base wage may well produce a one-time jump in prices but since it is not indexed to inflation, it does not have the embedded inflationary mechanism of BIG. Additionally, government spending is controlled through the countercyclical fluctuations of the JG program – it does not grow ad infinitum the way it would with BIG or any generous pump-priming program that aims to produce full employment through conventional pro-investment pro-growth policies. No similar counter-cyclical mechanism exists in the BIG proposal.

#### UBI destabilizes the economy – only the plan can solve.

Tcherneva 12 [Pavlina R. Tcherneva is an associate professor of economics at Bard College. She specializes in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and public policy. She previously taught at Franklin and Marshall College and the University of Missouri–Kansas City. During 2000–6, she served as the associate director for economic analysis at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, where she remains a senior research associate. In the summer of 2006, she was a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, and since July 2007 she has been a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute., 2-2-2012, "The Job Guarantee: Delivering the Benefits That Basic Income Only Promises – A Response to Guy Standing", Basic Income Studies, https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bistud/v7y2012i2p66-87n5.html] LHSSN

The argument herein is that the very implementation of a universal and unconditional BIG in a modern monetary production economy would bring considerable instability at the macroeconomic level, uncertainty in basic goods provisioning, and unsustainability of the program itself. In modern market economies, aggregate income is generated through the commodification of labor and production for sale. While Standing envisions an economy that has decommodified a large portion of its labor – which BIG itself is supposed to facilitate, he has not explained the alternative financing mechanism that would generate the basic income for all.

In the modern world, there can be two funding sources for BIG. The first would be employed at the state or local levels or in nations which do not control their own currencies, that is, in circumstances where governments face hard funding constraints. The financing mechanism would use these governments’ power to tax certain economic activities and redistribute that income to all in the form of BIG. The second funding mechanism would work at the federal level in nations with sovereign control over their national currencies (U.S., Canada, Japan, UK, to name a few) and would use pure government fiat to pay for BIG. In this case, what would be required is for the government to pass a law mandating that all citizens receive a BIG at the basic living standard and then spend the necessary amount by directly crediting the bank accounts of all BIG recipients. In this case, income is not redistributed per se to fund the program, as tax collections simply destroy aggregate income (rather than stockpile it), while government spending creates it.

Funding BIG through either of these sources would produce a destabilizing effect. In the former case, the tax-and-spend redistributive mechanism that would be necessary to finance a large-scale, permanent and universal BIG for all, would undermine the very production process that it relies on to generate the income necessary to provide for the BIG. The funding for BIG comes from a monetary production system that relies on commodified labor, which BIG pro- ponents wish to devalue. This, in turn, destabilizes the economic system and the process of income generation and, consequently, the program itself. Alternatively, if the funding were to come directly from government spending by fiat, the program will be inflationary and possibly hyperinflationary (more below, see also Tcherneva & Wray, 2005b; Tcherneva, 2006). This point is yet to be addressed by BIG advocates. In either case, the financing of BIG relies on debasing the currency – either (1) by introducing incentives to curb production, employment, and therefore income generation or (2) by hyperinflating the government fiat currency. Keynes famously attributed to Lenin the claim that “the best way to destroy the Capitalist System was to debauch the currency” (Keynes, 1971[1920], p. 235). Considering BIG’s negative consequences on the currency and the economy, it is peculiar that its advocates have adopted this method for transforming the market system – that is, by destabilizing it. And if history is any guide, macroeconomic instability inflicts the most pain on those at the bottom of the income distribution, presumably the very same people who BIG proponents wish to help the most. By contrast, as will be discussed below, the JG proposal has important transformative effects on the labor market, with- out destroying the monetary system and the economy. Furthermore, the JG offers a long-run macroeconomic stabilization mechanism as it aims to make labor market conditions more just and humane.

#### Redistributive taxes for a UBI fail – discourage productivity and collapses the economy.

Tcherneva 12 [Pavlina R. Tcherneva is an associate professor of economics at Bard College. She specializes in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and public policy. She previously taught at Franklin and Marshall College and the University of Missouri–Kansas City. During 2000–6, she served as the associate director for economic analysis at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, where she remains a senior research associate. In the summer of 2006, she was a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, and since July 2007 she has been a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute., 2-2-2012, "The Job Guarantee: Delivering the Benefits That Basic Income Only Promises – A Response to Guy Standing", Basic Income Studies, https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bistud/v7y2012i2p66-87n5.html] LHSSN

How income is generated and how BIG is financed

The fact that the BIG proposal decommodifies labor at the margin presents a unique problem for the way BIG is financed and sustained. As discussed, there are two general ways to pay for BIG. One is through a tax-and-redistribute mechanism at the local level where various taxes are levied on profits, wages, sales, or property (e.g., Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend). The other is through government spending at the federal level, in which case spending on BIG is not constrained by tax collections and can be financed by pure fiat, the way modern sovereign currency nations finance most federally-funded programs.

The tax-and-redistribute scheme provides a series of negative impacts on the economy as a whole (Clark, 2002). Sales taxes are highly regressive, while property taxes are widely unpopular. Should any portion of the property tax income is diverted to BIG, in the US at least, the first institutions that would suffer would be local school districts, which are almost entirely funded by property taxes. Boosting taxes on profits and wages to collect additional BIG revenue fundamentally erodes the entire income generation mechanism on which BIG relies, because it taxes production to finance leisure. Note, that this is explicitly acknowledged by Standing who advocates BIG as a means of advancing the claims of leisure over the claims of employment (current article pg. xx). In short, this is a redistribution policy with the worst kind of perverse incentives – it dis-incentivizes the very production process that generates the income that supports the BIG program.

To be clear, there is nothing inherently wrong with policies that aim to redistribute income. After all, every macroeconomic policy helps create a certain structure of production that advances the income claims of one group over another. In the modern world, pro-growth, pro-investment trickle-down policies have tended to advance the claims of the capital and rentier shares of income, as well as the income shares of the high-salary individuals at the expense of the low (or medium) wage workers. The latter are continually undervalued, under- paid, and underutilized as a consequence of the race-to-the-bottom profit-seek- ing practices in an increasingly globalized world.

What BIG aims to do is tax profits, salaries, and rents at the top of the distribution to provide an unconditional basic income grant to all, including those whom the private sector refuses to employ (namely the low-skilled, poor, and unemployed individuals) or those who do not wish to participate in market activity on their own accord, either because they are involved in unpaid work or because they have chosen a life of leisure (note again, BIG encourages this outcome).

In other words, BIG wants to tax the income that is currently generated through production and employment and redistribute it to all without the con- dition to participate in the very process that generates that income. A predictable outcome of such a policy would be that the activities being taxed would be curtailed. This would have a desirable effect when rentier income and environ- mentally devastating production are concerned. But when all polluting activ- ities, parasitic rentier incomes and “bad” jobs have been curbed (assuming that governments can design and implement such a carefully-targeted tax policy), BIG’s funding will depend on taxing profits and high wages of useful, productive activities and will continue to provide the same disincentive to doing these. What will the BIG policy tax next to fund the income guarantee?

Suppose that BIG manages to transform production and the organization of society into one where more humane and environmentally friendly production processes are taking place. Would the BIG policy not have to tax those as well to provide the BIG grant to all citizens? Indeed, it would, because unemployment is a monetary phenomenon and would remain a fundamental feature of profit- seeking market processes (humane or not) that would continue to deprive some individuals of income and thereby necessitating the BIG policy.

Taxing production cannot be a permanent funding mechanism for the BIG proposal. There is a clear logical limit to BIG’s ability to fund itself because it provides disincentives to engaging in said production, which in turn undermines the income necessary to sustain a universal, unconditional, and permanent BIG policy. Considering how many jobs offer poor pay and working conditions (on this issue we agree), at the margin, there will be an unambiguous shift away from work into idleness. This after all is one of the objectives of BIG, namely to eliminate the bad jobs and provide the means of subsistence to individuals without the requirement to work. This way, BIG proponents argue, grant reci- pients could choose the activities they wish to do on their own terms – some individuals would pick leisure, some self-employment, some subsistence pro- duction. Note that all individuals, even those who engaged in subsistence production, would still need to purchase commodities,1 but only those who had chosen self-employment and supply some goods or services on the market, would contribute to the very process that generates the aggregate income that BIG redistributes.

How does the BIG policy guarantee that the above-mentioned negative impact on the labor force and employment does not occur? BIG advocates argue that the “stimulus” from BIG would boost demand for product, enticing firms to hire back the people who just quit their jobs to enjoy leisure or unpaid work. Hiring them back would require raising wages to persuade BIG recipients to return to the labor market and raising prices to cover firms’ rising costs. This rise in wages and prices would reduce the real value of the income of BIG recipients, and to maintain the same basic standard of living, the BIG grant would need to be increased, necessitating yet another round of wage and price

1 In a capitalist economy, it is not completely possible to divorce oneself (much less the society at large, by definition) from the modern market. If it were possible to organize production at the macro-level in a way that individuals did not need to purchase any commodities, then there would be no need for BIG. However, in large part due to the existence of property rights, even those individuals who may want to engage in subsistence production will still need to purchase commodities (seeds for the gardens, timber for home repair, solar panels for home electricity production, etc). increases. A similar inflationary mechanism would occur even if BIG were financed through pure government fiat (more below). As will be discussed later, unlike BIG, the JG provides a price anchor that does not trigger the same wage-price spiral (see also Wray, 1998; Tcherneva, 2006).

BIG supporters claim that once the recipients have been provided with income, they could choose the pursuits they undertake. Many of those activities would include the production of socially valuable output, which I presume would be sold on the market. Thus, the BIG grant would enable the increase of output from self-employment. But the assumption that the positive impact on output from self-employment outweighs the negative impact from the tax that is necessary to fund such a large and generous program, requires nothing short of divine intervention or some spontaneous choice on behalf of those BIG recipi- ents at the margin to engage in production for sale. Some self-equilibrating mechanism must be assumed to argue that they will still end up participating in the market provisioning process. Equilibrium analysis is not an appropriate method for studying social provisioning. If the market equilibrium process worked in the first place, there would be no need for a BIG or JG policy.

Since BIG is a universal grant to all, it makes little difference whether or not some people choose to remain in paid employment (surely many will), but the relevant labor market impact from BIG is the one at the margin, where the bad jobs are. Once again, BIG advocates do not want everyone to participate in the market process and explicitly support the choice not to do so. Providing income to those who want to engage in leisure or subsistence production is a favored policy which, as discussed, cannot provide a steady stream of funding when by its very nature it discourages the type of market production that generates the income which is taxed to finance the BIG program. It should be noted that, just because income is primarily generated through paid work and market participa- tion, it does not mean that policy makers should accept bad jobs and poor work conditions as a “necessary evil” in order to finance public policy (be it BIG or JG). In contrast to the mischaracterization by Standing, the job guarantee does not rely on bad jobs for its existence.

### 1AR—Paternalism Turn

#### UBI is paternalistic and renders marginalized communities invisible – the plan is key to satisfaction and empowerment.

Tcherneva 12 [Pavlina R. Tcherneva is an associate professor of economics at Bard College. She specializes in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and public policy. She previously taught at Franklin and Marshall College and the University of Missouri–Kansas City. During 2000–6, she served as the associate director for economic analysis at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, where she remains a senior research associate. In the summer of 2006, she was a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, and since July 2007 she has been a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute., 2-2-2012, "The Job Guarantee: Delivering the Benefits That Basic Income Only Promises – A Response to Guy Standing", Basic Income Studies, https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bistud/v7y2012i2p66-87n5.html] LHSSN

Plan Jefes vs. Plan Familias

Paternalistic visions of who should and should not work led to the gradual reform and eventual closure of the Jefes program. Plan Jefes promised a job to heads of household only, presumably male. Nevertheless, three-fourths of the beneficiaries were in fact women. Some economists argued that the program artificially brought women who were previously outside the labor force into the labor market. This “activation” of women was considered undesirable – a market distortion triggered by the job guarantee. But policy makers and economists failed to recognize that women wanted to work (every single woman Wray and Tcherneva interviewed, wanted paid employ- ment) and that they reaped great benefits from having access to jobs in their own community and in close proximity to their homes and children’s schools. The subsequent reform of Plan Jefes involved two components – training and job placement assistance for the male workers and a basic income guarantee for the female workers. The rationalization for this reform was particularly problematic from a gender perspective. Poor women were viewed as unemployable by policy makers who argued that their place was in the home, not in the labor market. Policy makers rationalized the replace- ment of Jefes work with family income assistance on the grounds that it was unfair to make poor women work, since they carried a large unpaid care burden. Men by contrast were deserving of the job assistance, as they were the proper breadwinners in the household.

But women did not transition initially to the income assistance program in large numbers. In order to encourage them to do so, Plan Familias offered a stipend that was higher than the wage from Plan Jefes. Even with the higher stipend, many women chose to stay in their Jefes jobs. When the reform was first under consideration, a pilot program for income support was launched in the Santa Fe province (IADB, 2005, p. 29). A World Bank study of the pilot program indicated that Plan Familias had considerable difficulty attracting women away from Jefes. Less than 50% of the targeted beneficiaries (poor women with children) made the switch. The World Bank then proposed that the government step up its PR efforts to explain the benefits of Plan Familias to poor women.

As noted earlier, one surprising result from the Tcherneva and Wray field- work was that every woman that was interviewed wanted to work rather than receive a welfare check of equal amount (Tcherneva & Wray, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). During the second evaluation of Plan Jefes, the Ministry of Labor also found that many women were disappointed to return to inactivity as a result of being moved into Plan Familias (MTEySS, 2005). A third survey by Pastoret and Tepepa (2006) found that women who moved to Plan Familias, but whose Jefes community projects were not yet discontinued, kept going to work, even though they were now exempt from the work requirement and no longer qualified for participation in Jefes. They felt the need to be part of the community and to work outside the home.

It seems, the World Bank and Argentine government failed to recognize that poor women reaped important benefits from paid work – from greater bargain- ing power within the home, to more empowerment, to dignity from work. The proper reform would have been to increase the Jefes wage and to continue to socialize the unpaid care burden of participants further. Nevertheless, the experience of the Santa Fe province is telling. Women and poor women in particular want work. Jefes provided clear structures to reduce their double day shift by socializing some of their care responsibilities and by allowing the community to participate in this process. So whereas Standing is concerned with the fact that modern society does not recognize care work as useful social labor that deserves remuneration, Jefes did and encouraged such care activities. Jefes also recognized artistic pursuits, recreation, subsistence production and other activities as socially useful labor (Tcherneva, 2005).

A survey conducted by Garzón de la Roza (2006) focused specifically on the impact of Plan Jefes on poor women. Her study is particularly illuminating because it focuses on poor women’s narratives, and shows that their first exposure to paid work significantly boosted their self-perceptions, promoted collective and individual empowerment, and had important qualitative changes to their lives (Garzón de la Roza, 2006, p. 8). Like Pastoret and Tepepa, Garzón de la Roza finds that the socialization of women’s work increased the respect and recognition women received in their own homes and the community at large. The main finding of Garzón de la Roza’s work is that, even those policies that are initially implemented as crisis resolution tools will, over time, produce important changes to poor women’s lives (ibid., p. 10). Garzón de la Roza also finds that those who had lost the Jefes benefit after the reform often came back to work in Jefes as volunteers. She specifically finds that men, who were no longer able to find employment in the city and were compelled to join their neighbors in the community work projects, had expanded their views about family and work as a result of their “socialization with women and children and contact with other realities” within the impoverished neighborhoods (Garzón de la Roza, 2006, p. 68). All workers reported that by working in the community, they learned things they did not know before and the experience opened their eyes to poverty and child destitution they did not know existed (ibid., p. 79). Pastoret and Tepepa (2006) report that men participating in the Jefes program felt that it had provided them with a “second family” (ibid.).

While the Basic Income grant intends to provide the means of subsistence, it also makes the beneficiaries invisible. By contrast, as the survey evidence above suggests, Jefes provided an institutional structure for civic engagement and community building. Plan Familias replaced Plan Jefes over time and was based on the idea that poor women, already burdened with unpaid care respon- sibilities, should not be required to work in exchange for the income support they received. But the reform was also motivated by gender stereotypes about what type of work was considered productive and unproductive and who should be considered employable and unemployable.

In the end, however, it was not child-care and other unpaid care work responsibilities that presented the obstacle to work; it was the paternalistic policies, which presumed to know what is better for the poor than the poor themselves that drove the reform of the job guarantee to income guarantee.

### 1AR—UBI Worse

#### UBI is only a half solution but a federal jobs guarantee is the best solution

Akhtar 31/7 – Allana is a breaking business news reporter for Business Insider; “Congress' failure to extend the stimulus reveals a broken safety net, but a jobs guarantee could wipe out unemployment for good”; Jul 31, 2020; <https://www.businessinsider.com/bards-pavlina-tcherneva-on-a-federal-job-guarantee-instead-of-ubi-2020-7> As+

After the coronavirus pandemic has wiped out millions of jobs and left many Americans unable to pay their bills, policy makers have advocated for giving citizens a universal basic income that would lessen inequality.

But simply giving Americans money may not solve every problem. The real solution to pervasive inequality might be guaranteeing every citizen has a job to go to, argues economist Pavlina Tcherneva. It's an especially pressing matter as congress failed to extend the expanded unemployment benefits that have kept the economy afloat amid the pandemic while unemployment is still in double digits.

Tcherneva is a leading researcher on monetary policy and one of several economists who have advocated variations on "Modern Monetary Theory" in the early 21st century. This school of thought is related to "post-Keynesianism," and advocates much bigger government spending than even the great economist John Maynard Keynes proposed during the Great Depression.

Tcherneva, an associate professor of economics at Bard College and a researcher at the Levy Economic Institute, recently authored a new book, "The Case for a Job Guarantee." In it, she argued that addressing poverty and destitution is a multifaceted problem, and that a jobs guarantee comes closer to solving it than UBI.

While automation will kill some jobs, a popular argument Silicon Valley elites give when advocating for UBI, giving citizens cash doesn't necessarily address all problems related to wellbeing if they still live in a polluted community or a food desert.

Federally guaranteed jobs solves two problems at once: communities would be able to hire for jobs that specifically address their needs and unemployment would no longer exist.

"The vision that I'm questioning that we are helpless in the face of technological change," Tcherneva said in an interview with Business Insider. "There would be automation, and we can still create good employment opportunities for people who need them."

#### A federal jobs guarantee accomplishes so much more than UBI— multiple solvency deficits like mental health, economic opportunities, resource disparities, etc. prove

Tcherneva 18 – Pavlina R. Tcherneva is an associate professor of economics at Bard College. She specializes in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and public policy. She previously taught at Franklin and Marshall College and the University of Missouri–Kansas City. During 2000–6, she served as the associate director for economic analysis at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, where she remains a senior research associate. In the summer of 2006, she was a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge Centre for Economic and Public Policy, and since July 2007 she has been a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute. Tcherneva is a two-time grantee from the Institute for New Economic Thinking for her work on rethinking fiscal policy, job creation, and public goods provisioning. She holds a BA in mathematics and economics from Gettysburg College and an MA and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Missouri–Kansas City; 04/??/2018; “The Job Guarantee: Design, Jobs, and Implementation”; <http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_902.pdf> As+

42. Why don’t we just give people cash assistance instead?

Even if UI were increased, other cash assistance programs were strengthened, and a form of basic income guarantee were implemented, people would still want jobs. Research indicates that the nonpecuniary costs of unemployment (85–93 percent) far outweigh the pecuniary costs (15–7 percent) (Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1995). This suggests that interventions that are based on providing income alone will not be successful. People reap a great many benefits from working; income is but one of them (see figure A4 in appendix II). Decent work at decent pay brings significant mental and physical health benefits, it increases and deepens one’s social capital, strengthens educational and labor market outcomes of other family members, and offers institutional support and economic opportunities not available to those outside the labor market, to name just a few. While there are many good reasons why some people cannot or should not work and why other public policies should be designed to offer them economic security, income assistance does not solve the problem of involuntary unemployment. 60

43. Isn’t universal basic income (UBI) a better program?

See answer to question 42. There are many reasons to doubt the effectiveness of UBI programs. The first is that they do not address unemployment and the associated social and personal costs. Experiments around the world show that, even in places where some form of UBI has been implemented, many people still seek but are unable to find paid employment. Secondly, UBI in and of itself does not guarantee access to needed real resources. Working families today have trouble finding adequate housing, care, afterschool programs, clean public spaces, etc., even if they already have above-poverty incomes. The JG guarantees both: the income and the public goods and services that are currently in short supply. The JG is a type of guaranteed income, except it guarantees both the income—through public service employment—and the provisioning of the very goods and services communities need.

## 1AR—Unemployment Benefits CP

### 1AR—Solvency Deficits

#### 1] No training means they can’t solve the aff—

#### 2] People will still be unemployed so their perception of the government will still be bad

### 1AR—Handouts Fail

#### 1] Government handouts to the unemployed have never worked and they won’t in the future—the mindset of the counterplan is rooted in a deep capitalistic mindset

Hartman 5/18 – Mitchell Hartman is a staff reporter for Marketplace covering the economy, economic indicators, employment, labor and workforce; “Half of Americans who lost work or wages are getting $0 jobless benefits”; May 18, 2020; <https://www.marketplace.org/2020/05/18/half-of-americans-who-lost-work-or-wages-are-getting-0-jobless-benefits/> As+

Still, state and federal jobless benefits aren’t getting to millions who are eligible and need the money.

A report from the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project finds that according to the Treasury Department, federal and state governments had sent out $48 billion in unemployment checks by the end of April. But the amount of income that Americans lost in April from layoffs and lack of work due to the pandemic was at least $80 billion.

“The unemployment insurance probably covered about half of the drop in personal wage and salary income,” said Hamilton Project director Jay Shambaugh. “It’s not that everybody’s getting half as much unemployment insurance as they should. It’s really more — half of people are getting covered, and half are getting nothing right now.”

A major problem is that states have struggled to get up to speed with the new federal Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program, said Michele Evermore, senior researcher at the National Employment Law Project.

“A lot of people don’t understand that they’re eligible for PUA,” Evermore said. “Some states are completely denying people for regular unemployment insurance, and then inviting them to reapply for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance.”

And in many states, it’s been hard to make a regular unemployment claim in the first place. Florida has been notorious. Its antiquated computers and understaffed offices have been overwhelmed.

#### 2] States can’t continuously fund unemployment benefits

Stone and Chen 03/24 – William Chen joined the Center in August 2012 as a Research Associate with the Federal Fiscal Policy division, where he focuses primarily on federal budget, deficit, and debt issues. Prior to joining the Center, he worked on best practices and innovation in sustainable development at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, polling data management at Georgetown University, and China policy at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Before coming to D.C., he raised funds for affordable housing and community development at InterIm CDA, a community development corporation in Seattle’s International District. He holds a Master of Public Policy degree from Georgetown University and a B.A. in Fine Arts from Amherst College; “Introduction to Unemployment Insurance”; July 30, 2014, Updated March 24, 2020; <https://www.cbpp.org/research/introduction-to-unemployment-insurance> As+

The U.S. unemployment insurance system was designed to be “forward funded.” That is, states are supposed to levy taxes on employers to build up balances in their UI trust funds during periods of healthy economic growth, and then draw down those balances to provide payments to unemployed workers during local or national economic downturns and recessions. Forward funding ensures that when recessions hit, unemployment payments will help sustain laid-off workers and their families, whose spending in turn will support the economy when consumer demand is weak.

Rather than forward fund their programs, however, many states adopted a “pay-as-you-go” approach that held taxes artificially low when the economy was healthy instead of preparing for recession by building adequate trust fund reserves.

Though more than a decade had passed since the 1994 bipartisan advisory council urged states to return to forward financing,[30] many states kept state UI taxes artificially low and by 2008 had actually reduced their UI tax rates to historically low levels.[31]

Therefore, a number of states’ UI trust funds were inadequately prepared for the Great Recession, and most states had to borrow from the federal government to help pay benefits. Because unemployment is expected to remain high for some time, such borrowing will likely continue for the next few years.[32]

### 1AR—Aff Solves

#### 1] We eliminate unemployment, so benefits aren’t even necessary

#### 2] This is the squo—we have unemployment benefits right now

US Department of Labor — “How Do I File for Unemployment Insurance?”; <https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/unemployment-insurance#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Department%20of%20Labor's,cash%20benefits%20to%20eligible%20workers>. As+

The U.S. Department of Labor's unemployment insurance programs provide unemployment benefits to eligible workers who become unemployed through no fault of their own and meet certain other eligibility requirements.

Unemployment insurance is a joint state-federal program that provides cash benefits to eligible workers. Each state administers a separate unemployment insurance program, but all states follow the same guidelines established by federal law.

### 1AR—Perm

#### Perm do the counterplan and the aff— they’re not mutually exclusive because we provide benefits under our program.

#### Also, adding unemplyment benefits just work because older people who can’t work will get them

#### The perm is intirinisc as we add on unemployment benefits as a glorified form of a pension

Paul et al 18 – Mark Paul et. al, William Darity Jr., Darrick Hamilton (2018), Mark Paul is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, William Darity Jr. is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and the Director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, Darrick Hamilton is Professor of Economics and Urban Policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research, and Director of the Doctoral Program in Public and Urban Policy at The New School, The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3-9-2018 As+

Because of the vital role of state and local governments in providing public workers and services, it is essential that federal agencies and the NIEC are empowered to work closely with these governments. Local and state governments will be encouraged to develop employment proposals in conjunction with community leaders, local government officials, labor organizations, and local residents to ensure the proposals will serve the needs of the constituents and available pool of labor. The employment proposals may not be used to employ individuals who will replace or speed the displacement of existing employees or individuals who would otherwise perform similar work.35 The program will cover wage, benefits, and material expenses.36 This structure will largely parallel the direct employment programs under the New Deal, whose projects were developed and proposed by local and state governments. Fostering partnerships and buy-in from local and state partners is critical to the success of the program, as localities may be most aware of the skills of their available workers as well as projects that will provide the greatest benefit to their communities.

## 1AR—Pilot Program CP

### 1AR—Competition

#### 1] PDB—the cp isn’t competitive insofar as all they do is experiment first

#### 2] PDCP—the plan is implemented slowly over a period of 2 to 3 years—means the CP is effectively the plan.

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Once the program is initiated, it will take time, perhaps two to three years, to scale the program to meet countrywide demand for employment.[39] In the initial phases of the program, the supply of employment opportunities will likely be insufficient to meet the demand for jobs. During this period, the Secretaryshall target employment grants and engage in direct hiring in areas with the greatest level of need. These should be determined by indicators such as the unemployment and “underemployment rate” (“U-6” from the monthly employment report.

### 1AR—Net Benefit

#### 1] Plan key now—COVID caused massive recessions making recovery impossible without implementation soon and the plan reverses this by creating long term growth—it’s do-or-die—that’s Paul et. Al 18

#### 2] We don’t link to the NB—as long as we win our advantages you buy that the plan solves

### 1AR—Market Swings

#### NIEC would stabilize the job market— minimal costs

**Darity** **12**, William Darity Jr professor of public policy at Duke University, January 2012, "From Here to Full Employment" No Publication, <https://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/1958//> **TB**

-bracketed for ableist language

The United States needs to form a National Investment Employment Corps (Darity 2010) to provide work for all who want to work. States and municipalities would develop inventories of needed work to produce a job bank. Jobs could address both the physical and human infrastructure needs of the nation, including the building, repair and maintenance of roads, bridges, dams, mass transit systems, and school facilities. Employees of the National Investment Employment Corps could be put to work to rejuvenate the [challenged] postal system. Personnel could be trained to provide high quality child care for very young children, thereby facilitating parents capacity to take work. The precedent for a massive jobs program for infrastructure development is embodied in the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps adopted during the Great Depression 80 years ago. Much of the currenteffort to restore employment has been driven by stimulus packages and other indirect approaches toward job creation that essentially seek to bribe the private sector into doing the right thing. The federal job guarantee makes the government the direct employer for all who need a job. What would be the cost of such a program? All employees could be assured of a minimum annual salary of $20,000 plus benefits including federal health insurance. A job ladder could be introduced that would provide opportunities for advancement. If the mean expense per worker was $50,000 (salary, benefits, materials) it would cost $750 billion to put 15 million persons to work. It is less than the total amount of the first stimulus package Congress enacted during the early years of the downturn. It is vastly less than the $10-$30 trillion doled out to the banks by the Federal Reserve (Wray 2011). Moreover, the existence of a federal job guarantee would minimize the need to bail out the banks in the first place. We could reduce dramatically the moral hazard problem associated with de facto insuring their bad lending practices and fraudulent impulses. The National Investment Employment Corps would constitute employment insurance for the 99 percent rather than malfeasance insurance for the 1 percent. Government would become the employer of last resort instead of lender of last resort. This is the program that should be the centerpiece of an agenda for the Occupy movement. The federal job guarantee would function as a classic automatic stabilizer. Its provision of employment would expand on the downswing and contract on the upswing of the business cycle.

## 1AR—Public Option CP

### 1AR—Competition

#### 1] PDB—their paul ev indicates that the plan is only 3% of GDP—means doing both is feasible

### 1AR—Solvency Defeciet

#### 1] They can’t solve the CJS adv—employment is uq k2 reducing recidivism and they don’t solve for that

#### 2] can’t solve [populism/political trust] long term growth is k2 solving those impacts—those o/w

#### 3] the plan solves better—our evidence indicates that it boosts innovation as well as providing healthcare benefits to workers—best since it means we generate the resources to prevent things like diseases from spreading

### 1AR—Chernew evidence

#### 1] their chernew ev was written 10 years ago—ask yourself why we haven’t felt the effects of it yet

### 1AR—Independence Turn

#### 1] countries have been interdependent forever especially in the nuclear era—it has never gone nuclear meaning their ev is just hypothetical

#### 2] Turn— Interdependence key to solve global conflict – prefer our evidence—it’s proven by multiple studies on trade patterns.

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins(1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Momberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

## 1AR—Work from Home CP

### 1AR—PDB

#### Perm do both—it’s not mutually exclusive because we are adding on the option to work from home which is intrinsic

#### This counterplan just is the aff

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### 1] This mindset is ableist in it of itself— by taking into account and pointing out people’s disabilities you’re excruciating their pain and widening the gap between the disabled and the normal human.

### 1AR—No Net Benefit

#### 1] This is normal means— A] we include things like these for everyone, B] There are programs for people with disabilities that trump the CP and apply to the aff to make it better for these people

#### 2] The CP is the squo— account for disabilities and adjust job preferences and assignments

## 1AR—Sex Offenders PIC

### 1AR—Perm

**perm do the aff and include delineated background checks by the government for sex offenders, limited Intrinsicness k2 testing pics for link uqness, independently that's normal means - you don't get a job without a background check**

### 1AR—No Net Benefit

1. **This is normal means—the NIEC employs a program that penalizes workers that do this, so we solve.**

# F/L—Disadvantages

## 1AR—Econ DA

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### Trump has already killed the market out of spite and has cut a ton of aid programs which are key for working class Americans— our reports are by Krugman who’s literally the leading economist of the world

Krugman 10/09 — Paul Robin Krugman was born February 28, 1953 is an American economist who is the Distinguished Professor of Economics at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and a columnist for The New York Times. In 2008, Krugman was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to New Trade Theory and New Economic Geography. The Prize Committee cited Krugman's work explaining the patterns of international trade and the geographic distribution of economic activity, by examining the effects of economies of scale and of consumer preferences for diverse goods and services. Krugman was previously a professor of economics at MIT, and later at Princeton University. He retired from Princeton in June 2015, and holds the title of professor emeritus there. He also holds the title of Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics. Krugman was President of the Eastern Economic Association in 2010, and is among the most influential economists in the world. He is known in academia for his work on international economics (including trade theory and international finance), economic geography, liquidity traps, and currency crises. Krugman is the author or editor of 27 books, including scholarly works, textbooks, and books for a more general audience, and has published over 200 scholarly articles in professional journals and edited volumes. He has also written several hundred columns on economic and political issues for The New York Times, Fortune and Slate. A 2011 survey of economics professors named him their favorite living economist under the age of 60. As a commentator, Krugman has written on a wide range of economic issues including income distribution, taxation, macroeconomics, and international economics. Krugman considers himself a modern liberal, referring to his books, his blog on The New York Times, and his 2007 book The Conscience of a Liberal. His popular commentary has attracted widespread attention and comments, both positive and negative. According to the Open Syllabus Project, Krugman is the second most frequently cited author on college syllabi for economics courses; “Paul Krugman column: Trump is killing the economy out of spite”; OCT 09, 2020; <https://www.baltimoresun.com/featured/sns-nyt-op-trump-killing-economy-out-of-spite-20201009-q7iebkfb3jh2fmlh5qhhaaevmi-story.html> As+

Last year Donald Trump called Nancy Pelosi, the House speaker, a “nasty, vindictive, horrible person.” Actually, she isn’t — but he is.

Trump’s vindictiveness has become a major worry as the election approaches. He has already signaled that he won’t accept the result if he loses, which seems increasingly likely though not certain. Nobody knows what chaos, possibly including violence, he may unleash if the election doesn’t go his way.

Even aside from that concern, however, a defeated Trump would still be president for 2 1/2 months. Would he spend that time acting destructively, in effect taking revenge on America for rejecting him?

Well, we got a preview of what a lame-duck Trump presidency might look like Tuesday. Trump hasn’t even lost yet, but he abruptly cut off talks on an economic relief package millions of Americans desperately need (although as of Thursday he seemed to be backtracking). And his motivation seems to have been sheer spite.

Why do we need economic relief? Despite several months of large employment gains, America has only partly recovered from horrific job losses in the early months of the pandemic — and the pace of recovery has slowed to a relative crawl. All indications are that the economy will remain weak for many months, maybe even years.

Given this grim reality, the federal government should still be providing the kind of relief it offered in the first few months of the crisis: generous aid to the unemployed and loans that help keep small businesses afloat. Otherwise we’ll soon be seeing millions of families unable to pay their rent, hundreds of thousands of businesses going under.

In addition, state and local governments — which, unlike the federal government, are generally required to balance their budgets — are in desperate fiscal straits, because the pandemic slump has drastically reduced their revenues. They need a lot of aid, soon, or they will be forced into deep cuts in employment and services. We’ve already lost around 900,000 jobs in state and local education.

So there’s an overwhelming humanitarian case for major spending on relief: Unless the federal government steps in, there will be huge unnecessary suffering. There’s also a macroeconomic case: If families are forced to slash consumption, if businesses are forced to close and if state and local governments are forced into extreme spending cuts, the economy’s growth will slow and we might even slide back into recession.

I know, I know, the usual suspects will say that the calls for economic relief are just more big-government liberalism. But warnings about the dangers of failing to provide more relief aren’t just coming from progressive Democrats; they’re coming from Wall Street analysts and Jerome Powell, the chairman of the Federal Reserve.

Yet negotiations over relief have been stalled for months, even as special aid to the unemployed and small businesses has expired. The main stumbling block, I’d argue, has been the adamant refusal of Senate Republicans to consider aid to state and local governments; Democrats would probably have agreed to a deal that included significant aid, even though it would have helped Trump politically.

But Republicans have insisted — falsely — that this is all about rescuing badly run blue states. And Trump echoed that falsehood as he pulled the plug on Tuesday, claiming that Pelosi’s proposals are nothing but a bailout of “high crime, poorly run, Democrat States.” (Not that facts matter, but Democratic states actually have lower crime rates, on average, than Republican states.)

The question is, why did Trump choose to reject even the possibility of a deal less than a month before Election Day? True, it’s too late for legislation to make much difference to the state of the economy on Nov. 3, although a deal might have averted some corporate layoffs. But it would surely be in Trump’s political interest to at least look as if he’s trying to help Americans in distress. Why would Trump choose this, of all moments, to torpedo economic policy?

#### The DA is nonunique—economic collapse is the squo

Wolf 20 — Martin Wolf is chief economics journalist at the Financial Times, London. He was awarded the CBE (Commander of the British Empire) in 2000 “for services to financial journalism; “The world economy is now collapsing”; April 14 2020; <https://www.ft.com/content/d5f05b5c-7db8-11ea-8fdb-7ec06edeef84> As+

In its latest World Economic Outlook, the IMF calls what is now happening, the “Great Lockdown”. I prefer the “Great Shutdown”: this phrase captures the reality that the global economy would be collapsing even if policymakers were not imposing lockdowns and might stay in collapse after lockdowns end. Yet, whatever we call it, this is clear: it is much the biggest crisis the world has confronted since the second world war and the biggest economic disaster since the Depression of the 1930s. The world has come into this moment with divisions among its great powers and incompetence at the highest levels of government of terrifying proportions. We will pass through this, but into what?

As recently as January, the IMF had no idea of what was about to hit, partly because Chinese officials had failed to inform one another, let alone the rest of the world. Now we are in the middle of a pandemic with vast consequences. But much remains unclear. One important uncertainty is how myopic leaders will respond to this global threat.

For what any forecast is worth, the IMF now suggests that global output per head will contract by 4.2 per cent this year, vastly more than the 1.6 per cent recorded in 2009, during the global financial crisis. Ninety per cent of all countries will experience negative growth in real gross domestic product per head this year, against 62 per cent in 2009, when China’s robust expansion helped cushion the blow.

In January, the IMF forecast smooth growth this year. It now forecasts a plunge of 12 per cent between the last quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020 in advanced economies and a fall of 5 per cent in emerging and developing countries. But, optimistically, the second quarter is forecast to be the nadir. Thereafter, it expects a recovery, though output in advanced economies is forecast to remain below fourth quarter 2019 levels until 2022.

This “baseline” assumes economic reopening in the second half of 2020. If so, the IMF forecasts a 3 per cent global contraction in 2020, followed by a 5.8 per cent expansion in 2021. In advanced economies, the forecast is of a 6.1 per cent contraction this year, followed by a 4.5 per cent expansion in 2021. All this may prove too optimistic.

The IMF offers three sobering alternative scenarios. In the first, lockdowns last 50 per cent longer than in the baseline. In the second, there is a second wave of the virus in 2021. In the third, these elements are combined. Under longer lockdowns this year, global output is 3 per cent lower in 2020 than in the baseline. With a second wave of infections, global output would be 5 per cent below the baseline in 2021. With both misfortunes, global output would be almost 8 per cent below the baseline in 2021. Under the latter possibility, government spending in advanced economies would be 10 percentage points higher relative to GDP in 2021 and government debt 20 percentage points higher in the medium term than in the already unfavourable baseline. We have no real idea which will prove most correct. It might be even worse: the virus might mutate; immunity for people who have had it might not last; and a vaccine might not be forthcoming. A microbe has overthrown all our arrogance.

What must we do to manage this disaster? One answer is not to abandon the lockdowns before the death rate is brought under control. It will be impossible to reopen economies with a raging epidemic, increasing numbers of dead and pushing health systems into collapse. Even if we were allowed to buy or go back to work, many would not do so. But it is essential to prepare for that day, by creating vastly-enhanced capacities to test, trace, quarantine and treat people. No expense must now be spared on this, or on investment in creating, producing and using a new vaccine.

#### Economic collapse in the squo—can’t get worse

Tappe 09/03 — Anneken Tappe is a senior writer at CNN Business, covering financial markets and the U.S. economy; This is the worst economic crisis of our lifetimes. Yet 30% of Americans think the economy is fine; 09/03/20; <https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/03/economy/economy-perception-pew-study/index.html> As+

New York (CNN Business)— The pandemic has caused the worst economic crisis in living memory. Yet Americans were more downbeat about the state of the economy during the Great Recession than they are now.

A new study from the Pew Research Center says 69% of Americans think the current economic situation is bad, while 30% think it's good. By comparison, only 17% thought the economy was in good shape in 2009, the worst year of the Great Recession.

That's striking, because by a lot of metrics, the current downturn is a lot worse than the years following the financial crisis: Far more jobs were lost, unemployment is higher, the economy contracted more sharply and the government is spending more. (Check CNN Business' recovery tracker for more on these and other effects of the pandemic.)

There are key differences that may be affecting how Americans see and feel this downturn. The Great Recession was often dubbed "man-cession" because so many jobs in male-dominated sectors like manufacturing and construction vanished. This time around, job losses have been concentrated in the services sector -- particularly in hospitality and travel industries, which employ more women than men.

The pandemic downturn also struck when things were generally going well, creating a sharp comparison point. It's come on the heels of the longest economic expansion in America's history, with the unemployment rate near a 50-year low in February.

#### Low wage work is common right now especially for marginalized groups – that decks the economy.

Ross and Bateman 19 Martha Ross [Martha Ross is a features writer who covers everything and anything related to popular culture, society, health, women's issues and families.] and Nicole Bateman [Nicole Bateman is a research analyst with the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings.], 11-21-2019, "Low-wage work is more pervasive than you think, and there aren’t enough “good jobs” to go around," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/11/21/low-wage-work-is-more-pervasive-than-you-think-and-there-arent-enough-good-jobs-to-go-around/> AG

Even as the U.S. economy hums along at a favorable pace, there is a vast segment of workers today earning wages low enough to leave their livelihood and families extremely vulnerable. That’s one of the main takeaways from our new analysis, in which we found that 53 million Americans between the ages of 18 to 64—accounting for 44% of all workers—qualify as “low-wage.” Their median hourly wages are $10.22, and median annual earnings are about $18,000. (See the methods section of our paper to learn about how we identify low-wage workers.)

The existence of low-wage work is hardly a surprise, but most people—except, perhaps, low-wage workers themselves—underestimate how prevalent it is. Many also misunderstand who these workers are. They are not only students, people at the beginning of their careers, or people who need extra spending money. A majority are adults in their prime working years, and low-wage work is the primary way they support themselves and their families.

Low-wage work is a source of economic vulnerability

Does the job provide supplemental, “nice to have” income, or is it critical to covering basic living expenses?

We didn’t analyze the first question directly, but other research is not encouraging, finding that while some workers move on from low-wage work to higher-paying jobs, many do not. Women, people of color, and those with low levels of education are the most likely to stay in low-wage jobs. In our analysis, over half of low-wage workers have levels of education suggesting they will stay low-wage workers. This includes 20 million workers ages 25-64 with a high school diploma or less, and another seven million young adults 18-24 who are not in school and do not have a college degree.

As to the second question, a few data points show that for millions of workers, low-wage work is a primary source of financial support—which leaves these families economically vulnerable.

Measured by poverty status: 30% of low-wage workers (16 million people) live in families earning below 150% of the poverty line. These workers get by on very low incomes: about $30,000 for a family of three and $36,000 for a family of four.

### 1AR—Link Turn (General)

#### The plan is key to reinvigorating long term economic growth—prefer our evidence it’s specific to the NIEC

Paul et al 18 – Mark Paul et. al, William Darity Jr., Darrick Hamilton (2018), Mark Paul is a Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, William Darity Jr. is the Samuel DuBois Cook Professor of Public Policy, African and African-American Studies and Economics and the Director of the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University, Darrick Hamilton is Professor of Economics and Urban Policy at the Milano School of International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy and Department of Economics at the New School for Social Research, and Director of the Doctoral Program in Public and Urban Policy at The New School, The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3-9-2018 As+

Table 1 provides estimates for program uptake and gross cost under the NIEC given the most recent labor market statistics. Using January 2018 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we estimate a total annual program cost of $543 billion, or just under 3 percent of GDP. While headline economic numbers commonly cite the official unemployment measure, we generate the estimate using a broader notion of unemployment and underemployment, known as U-6. We assume U-6 would be brought down to 1.5 percent—what we believe to be a reasonable estimate for frictional unemployment in the U.S. economy—by the uptake of employment through the NIEC and the elimination of involuntary unemployment. This would result in the employment of 10.7 million workers, or 9.7 million full-time equivalent positions.

We expect the number of workers employed under the NIEC to fall substantially as the private sector responds to the sizable increases in employment and the growth of workers’ purchasing power under the program. Harvey (2011) provides estimates of indirect job creation from a job guarantee program, finding that for every direct job created by the government, the private sector could generate an estimated .26 jobs; however, multipliers tend to be smaller under full employment.

Although the job guarantee may result in the displacement of some workers currently employed in the private sector, especially at the low end of the labor market, evidence from the minimum wage debates may provide insight into the employment dynamics with a job guarantee. Previous research estimating the employment effects of increases in the minimum wage by Allegretto, Dube and co-authors consistently shows that the employment effects of modest increases to the minimum wage are not distinguishable from zero.42 Since the job guarantee places a floor in the labor market, employers will likely have to offer compensation packages at least as desirable as those offered under the NIEC. Thus, it is, de facto, similar to a rise in the minimum wage; in fact, the increase in total compensation under NIEC exceeds our traditional conception of the minimum wage.43

The gross cost of implementing the NIEC would be offset substantially by increases in local, state, and federal tax revenues, decreases in uptake of existing social insurance programs, increases in the growth rate of GDP, and substantial productivity and capacity gains in the U.S. economy. While we do not argue for the elimination of existing social insurance programs, the uptake of employment through the NIEC coupled with the establishment of a new floor in the labor market will result in many families earning incomes above program thresholds. The Congressional Budget Office’s Budget and Economic Outlook provides current expenditures on social insurance programs.44 Using actual government expenditures from 2016, we see that the U.S. government already spends hundreds of billions on social insurance programs annually. While these programs have been estimated to have reduced the poverty rate by half, they have not gone far enough to totally eliminate working poverty.45 46

What programs could we expect to be scaled back through the reduction of need? With the job guarantee providing employment at non-poverty wages, we expect the demand for unemployment insurance ($33 billion FY 2016) to fall substantially.47 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF; $16 billion FY 2016) could be nearly eliminated, as the job guarantee would be able to fill the gap for qualifying families in many instances. Additionally, with higher wages from the job guarantee, fewer households may qualify for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC; $70 billion FY 2016). For instance, those without dependents working full-time would no longer qualify, while those with dependents would be more likely to see EITC benefits reduced as they phase out of the program due to higher earnings.

With increased earnings, many families are likely to exceed the income limits for the necessary food assistance program, known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; $73 billion FY 2016). Finally, with the provision of health benefits to full-time workers through the NIEC, we expect to see a sizable fall in the need for Medicaid ($368 billion FY 2016) and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP; $14 billion FY 2016).48

Beyond savings from the reduced need for existing social insurance programs, we argue the NIEC will also generate sizable increases in tax revenue throughout the economy by increasing productive capacity and maintaining consumer spending. While the majority of economists in recent history have argued that monetary policy was sufficient to stabilize the economy, there has been a recent shift amongst economists recognizing an “activist fiscal policy” is necessary for full employment and macroeconomic stabilization.49 50

There would also be cost savings associated with enhanced human capacities from a job guarantee. Research indicates that extended periods of high rates of unemployment in the economy can lead to “skill losses among workers, reducing human capital and lowering future output.”51 Putting millions of people to work through the NIEC will result in the buildup of the United States’ human and physical infrastructure and the provision of additional socially useful goods and services, resulting in a profound impact on the productivity and the long-term growth rate of the economy.

The program could be financed through a variety of mechanisms. While financing the job guarantee is not the focus of the paper, we provide three ways to finance the program policymakers should consider. First, as discussed above, the implementation of a job guarantee will substantially reduce costs in existing social insurance programs. Non-poverty wages will mean many workers no longer need to rely on government assistance to meet their basic needs. A recent UC Berkeley Center for Labor Research and Education study found that $153 billion a year is currently spent on public assistance programs because of low wages, money which could be repurposed to provide more people with a non-poverty standard of living.52 Also, the program could be financed through implementing a financial transaction tax (as proposed in Rep. John Conyers’ H.R. 1000 bill), modifying estate and gift tax provisions, or the implementation of carbon taxes.53

#### FJG would be the best way to maintain price stability

Mitchell 17 (William Mitchell is Professor of Economics and Director of Centre of Full Employment and Equity at the University of Newcastle, Australia, “The Job Guarantee and Modern Money Theory: Realizing Keynes’s Labor Standard”, Binzagr Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, Chapter 3: The Job Guarantee: A Superior Buffer Stock Option for Government Price Stabilisation, 2017) //EG

Once we understand the options that a currency-issuing government has, it becomes obvious that a better alternative would be to utilise an employment buffer stock approach. The Job Guarantee (JG) is an example of this approach and we argue that is the best way to maintain price stability while avoiding the massive costs of unemployment. Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, western governments realised that with deficit spending supplementing private demand, they could ensure that all workers who wanted to work could find jobs. Although private employment growth was relatively strong during this period, governments were important employers in their own right, and also maintained a buffer of jobs for the least skilled workers: for example, in the major utilities, the railways, local public services and major infrastructure functions of government. By absorbing workers who lost jobs when private investment declined, government jobs acted as an economic safety valve. Ormerod (1994: 203) noted that the economies that avoided high unemployment in the 1970s maintained a ‘... sector of the economy which effectively functions as an employer of last resort, which absorbs the shocks which occur from time to time, and more generally makes employment available to the less skilled, the less qualified’. He concluded that societies with a high degree of social cohesion (such as Austria, Japan and Norway) were willing to broaden their concept of costs and benefits of resource usage to ensure that everyone had access to paid employment opportunities.

It is in that context that the JG can be understood. The JG is a simple concept with far reaching consequences. The JG would involve the government making an unconditional job offer to anyone who is willing to work at a socially acceptable minimum wage and who cannot find work elsewhere. The buffer stock of jobs would expand (decline) as private sector employment declined (expanded). To avoid disturbing private sector wage structures and to ensure the JG is consistent with stable inflation, the JG wage rate should be set at the minimum wage level, defined to ensure the worker is never socially excluded. The minimum wage should be an expression of the aspiration of the society of the lowest acceptable material standard of living. Since the JG wage would be open to everyone, it would functionally become the national minimum wage. JG workers would enjoy stable incomes, and their increased spending would boost confidence throughout the economy and underpin a private spending recovery.

The JG would thus provide an absorption function to minimise the real costs currently associated with the flux of the private sector. On the other hand, when aggregate spending growth is such that private firms desire to expand, wage bids above the minimum wage would attract workers back into private employment. The nation always remains fully employed, with only the mix between private and public sector employment fluctuating in response to the spending decisions of the private sector. Mitchell (1998) called this mix the buffer employment stock ratio (BER).

The anti-inflation mechanisms of a JG are easy to understand. If inflationary pressures develop in the private sector as it reaches full capacity, the government can manipulate fiscal and monetary policy settings to constrain private sector spending to prevent the economy overheating. Labour would be transferred from the inflating private sector to the ‘fixed wage’ JG sector and eventually this would resolve the inflation pressures. In general, there cannot be inflationary pressures arising from a policy that sees the government offering a fixed wage to any labour that is unwanted by other employers (see Mitchell 1998; Mosler 1997–1998; Mitchell and Muysken 2008).

The JG introduces no relative wage effects and the rising demand per se does not necessarily invoke inflationary pressures because by definition it is satisfying a net savings desire. Additionally, in today’s demand constrained economies, firms are likely to increase capacity utilisation to meet the higher sales volumes. There are no new problems faced by employers who wish to hire labour to meet the higher sales levels. Any initial rise in demand will stimulate private sector employment growth while reducing JG employment and spending (Mitchell 1998; Mosler 1997–1998).

#### An FJG will stabilize the economy by creating buffers against boom-and-bust cycles.

Paul 17 **[**Mark Paul, an assistant professor of economics at New College of Florida and a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/federal-job-guarantee-universal-basic-income-investment-jobs-unemployment/>, “Why we need a federal jobs guarantee] JJ

A FJG is a sounder mechanism to combat structural inequalities, for instance through closing the persistent unemployment gap experienced by stigmatized groups who face continued discrimination. (Note, since 1972 unemployment has average double digits for black workers and has never fallen below 7 percent — a level that is only reached during times of economic crisis — for white workers).

Further, the FJG will have a strong macroeconomic stabilization effect. During economic downturns, it would expand and hire more people; it would then shrink during economic boom periods as people move from public to better-paying private employment. [Pavlina R. Tcherneva](http://www.pavlina-tcherneva.net/about), a [leading voice](http://neweconomicperspectives.org/category/pavlina-r-tcherneva) on the FJG’s macroeconomic effects, argues that policies like the UBI have no counter-cyclical features. Thus, when the economy takes a downturn — say as it did in 2007 — basic incomes provide no automatic stabilizers to right the sinking ship.

This is good for the economy as a whole. Rather than expanding the [unemployment insurance](http://www.cbpp.org/research/introduction-to-unemployment-insurance) rolls during economic busts, the FJG would put folks to work and moderate the business cycle. Federal workers’ paychecks will increase demand, which will increase economic growth. [Many economists](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYpVzBbQIX0) agree that today’s secular stagnation — insufficient demand — is contributing to continued “[lackluster](https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/why-economic-growth-is-so-lackluster/504989/)” growth after the Great Recession. Only modest upticks in growth for the foreseeable future will come if we continue the status quo.

#### Federal job programs create net more money for the economy.

Lowrey 18 [Annie Lowrey, an Amaerican journalist who writes on politics and economic policy for the Atlantic Magazine, previously covered economic policy for the New York Times, “A promise so big, democrats aren’t sure how to keep it,” <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/the-democratic-party-wants-to-end-unemployment/560153/>] JJ

There are good models. RecycleForce, for instance, cuts the recidivism rate of recently incarcerated individuals to 26 percent, versus a national rate of 64 percent, Keesling told me. And it saves the taxpayer $1.20 for every dollar invested. Surveys show that similar jobs programs have raised both earnings and employment rates for their participants, and also “decreased family public benefit receipt, raised school outcomes among the children of workers, boosted workers’ school completion, lowered criminal-justice system involvement among both workers and their children, improved psychological well-being, and reduced longer-term poverty,” a [survey by](http://www.georgetownpoverty.org/issues/employment/lessons-learned-from-40-years-of-subsidized-employment-programs/) the Georgetown Law Center on Poverty and Inequality found. “There may be additional positive effects, such as increased child-support payments and improved health.”

#### The aff aids the economy

Tcherneva 18 – Pavlin Tcherneva, Prof and Director of Econ Program at the Levy Econ Institute @Bard College, http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp\_902.pdf, 10-8-2020] OHSMB

When the economy enters a recession (on average, every seven years in the United States), firms lay off workers en masse. Government spending automatically increases, including on UI, TANF, and other anti-poverty programs. Other government programs attempt to grow the economy, such as tax or interest rate cuts, and subsidies or other incentives to private firms. While government spending always increases countercyclically in recessions, since the 1980s it has failed to produce strong job growth in recoveries. Jobless recoveries have become the norm. With the JG in place, as companies lay off workers in recessions, these same workers can transition directly to the JG. Without the JG, they face uncertain prospects of finding another job, and the meager unemployment assistance they receive ensures that they will curb their spending—they skip shopping trips, restaurant outings, or going to the movies. That ripple effect results in additional laid off workers—servers, cash register operators, movie ticket attendants, and many more. In a sense, one unemployed person throws another one out of work. The JG stops and prevents this vicious cycle. When private employment shrinks and workers are laid off, they transition into the JG. The increase in government expenditure on hiring those workers is the very stimulus the economy and the private sector need to recover from the depths of a recession. Spending patterns are much more stable when someone gets a job (as compared to UI) and the avalanche effect of layoffs is contained. As the economy begins to grow, those workers return to their old jobs or to other better-paying employment opportunities. The program shrinks as the economy expands. Thus the program is a countercyclical buffer, a complement to private sector activity. It expands in recessions and contracts in expansions, thus providing the needed countercyclical stabilization. It is superior to current stabilization methods, because it does not use the unemployed to stabilize growth and inflation, and thus drastically reduces the existing costs of unemployment (see question 15). It makes jobless recoveries a thing of the past by securing true full employment over the long run—in good times or bad.

### 1AR—Link Turn (Taxes)

#### 1] The aff raises the salary and ergo income tax of all US citizens—this increases taxes massively and solves all proximate harms to the aff

### 1AR—Link Turn (Welfare)

#### Welfare plans like the aff boost the economy and solves collapse

Steinberg 14 – Sarah Ayres Steinberg, Prior to joining JPMorgan Chase, Sarah was Senior Economic Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress, where she led CAP’s research on workforce development and expanding apprenticeships. Her research has been cited by The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post, among others. She has a bachelor’s degree in government and sociology from Dartmouth College.Sarah Ayres Steinberg joined JPMorgan Chase & Co. in 2015 as Vice President of Global Philanthropy for New Skills at Work, a $250 million global workforce training and demand-driven training initiative. Her work focuses on promoting economic opportunity and prosperity through investments in workforce practice, innovation, and policy. Sarah is the Program Officer for New Skills for Youth, a $75 million, five-year global career readiness initiative launched in January 2016 and aimed at investing in high-quality, career-focused education that prepares young people to prosper in the growing global economy. (March 31, 2014) The Safety Net Is Good Economic Policy - Center for American Progress. Retrieved August 18, 2020, from <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2014/03/31/86693/the-safety-net-is-good-economic-policy/> //smhs MM

The report attempts to back up this assertion with social-science research, but it is not the unbiased, evidenced-based review that it claims to be. Rep. Ryan’s report relies on a combination of overstating the evidence, ignoring relevant studies, and simply misrepresenting the research to make the argument that the safety net creates a “poverty trap.” This issue brief reviews economic research on the effectiveness of anti-poverty programs; a significant body of research demonstrates that not only have anti-poverty programs successfully raised millions of families out of poverty, but they also increase the economic mobility of recipients and support broader economic growth. In particular: The War on Poverty succeeded in reducing the poverty rate by one-third, from 26 percent in 1967 to 16 percent in 2012 Far from serving a static underclass of the perpetually poor, safety net programs benefit the majority of Americans—70 percent—at some point in their lives Safety net programs boost economic mobility, making poor children more likely to graduate from high school, attend college, and enter the middle class Poverty costs the U.S. economy more than $500 billion every year, the result of low productivity, poor health, and high levels of crime and incarceration There is also little evidence that the safety net reduces labor participation by much, if at all. Some policies—such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, or EITC—have been shown to increase work among recipients—as Rep. Ryan acknowledges. Where policies do negatively affect labor participation, the result is small and has a very limited impact on poverty levels. A comprehensive review of the literature reveals that the safety net supports social mobility and strengthens our economy. The safety net increases economic mobility A significant body of evidence supports the view that, far from creating a so-called poverty trap, the safety net actually reduces poverty, increases economic mobility, and strengthens our national economy. Moreover, studies have shown that many antipoverty programs, especially those that target children, offer an excellent return on investment to taxpayers.

### 1AR—Link Turn (Automation)

#### Economic instability due to automation is a real threat – aff prevent this

Loomis 18 Erik Loomis, an associate professor of history at the University of Rhode Island. "The Case for a Federal Jobs Guarantee." Published by the New York Times on April 25, 2018. Available here: (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/opinion/sanders-booker-gillibrand-humphrey-hawkins.html) – AP Recut As+

Employment numbers may look solid now, but economists, physicists and industrial engineers all say that automation will, in the not-so-distant future, drive higher unemployment. The Columbus Dispatch recently calculated that in Ohio, out of total state employment of about 5.5 million workers, 2.5 million jobs are at risk of automation. How do we prepare for such disruption and the future of work? We might revisit an idea from the 1970s: a federal guarantee of employment. In recent weeks, three Democratic senators (and likely presidential contenders) — Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Cory Booker of New Jersey and Bernie Sanders of Vermont — have either expressed their approval of the idea or unveiled initial ideas about how an updated version could work. They are building on the legacy of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, introduced in the 1970s by Senator Hubert Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, and Representative Augustus Hawkins, Democrat of California. In addition to the guarantee of employment, their initial bill allowed citizens to sue the government if they could not find a job. Resurrecting Humphrey-Hawkins can help pre-empt a technology crisis and even future labor dislocation from globalization. In the original Humphrey-Hawkins bill — not the watered-down version that ultimately passed in 1978 — the president would submit an annual plan to Congress to achieve full employment, and local committees would coordinate job needs in their communities. The bill would have spurred private-sector job creation and a New Deal-style federal job creation program. Private employment would limit government investment, while federally mandated wage and price controls would fight inflation. The final bill fell far short of this. Unions stripped out the wage and price controls in exchange for their support and put a priority on negotiating better contracts for their members over the fate of the nation’s poor. The Carter administration fretted about the potential impact on inflation from a bill without those controls. President Jimmy Carter never truly supported it, and the bill that passed committed the nation to ending inflation more than to full employment. Since then, the idea of full employment has largely disappeared from the American political system. The arguments against Humphrey-Hawkins in 1978 are largely irrelevant today. After decades of low inflation, wage and price controls are unlikely to be problems. Mr. Booker’s pilot plan to test these ideas in 15 areas of the country builds on the Great Society belief in community control over federal resources. The potential is great for helping revive depressed communities. West Virginia could clean up its streams and roadsides while building better housing. Flint, Mich., could construct new water systems and provide stability for private business to support a newly robust community. New York could construct low-cost housing to solve its homelessness crisis. What must exist in any job-guarantee program is an enforcement mechanism. The initial version of Humphrey-Hawkins allowing workers to sue for a job reminds us of the need for a strong enforcement mechanism. Without a legal requirement to provide work, lawmakers will find political excuses to not implement the program, and it will not serve as a useful solution to automation, poverty and social instability. True full employment would require an expansive view of worthy labor that moves us beyond nostalgic images of white men employed in steel mills and coal mines. This can range from the building of badly needed infrastructure to giving children music lessons. It can also underwrite our elder care and child care crises. Moreover, while an expanded public sector would be necessary to achieve full employment, the government can provide a variety of incentives to the private sector to increase employment. Ideally, a permanent Works Progress Administration, with the government directly employing tens of millions of unemployed workers, would not be required. For the last several decades, a corporate culture of quarterly earnings reports has emphasized short-term profit and executive bonuses based on cost cutting. That approach came at the cost of labor. With real competition for labor from the government, corporations would need to invest in long-term planning and job creation and training programs to keep workers. And if the most drastic claims of automation’s impact on employment come true, our society will have developed a plan to ensure economic and social stability through robust public employment, one that can be funded through taxes on the wealthy benefiting from automation and from those directly employed by the state. For those who cannot work, a limited version of universal basic income-style direct cash transfers can substitute. Job creation fits American cultural norms around work more effectively than the idea of universal basic income. It avoids politically unpopular forms of welfare while significantly bolstering the welfare state for those who need it. Encouraging private sector job creation would limit the impact on the deficit while adding tax money to the nation’s coffers. A federally guaranteed job is not the full answer to economic inequality or an automated world. It needs to be paired with a higher minimum wage and labor law reforms that allow workers to unionize and win collective bargaining agreements. Work under the federal job guarantee starting at $15 an hour would help produce those outcomes. The implementation of a federal employment guarantee would consist of difficult compromises, power struggles and policy corrections. But it also provides the most politically realistic answer to our future employment crisis. It deserves serious consideration.

### 1AR—Link Turn (Recession)

#### The plan key to recover from the economic damage caused by the pandemic by increasing productivity.

Marketplace 6/16 [Pavlina Tcherneva, an associate professor of economics at Bard College and author of the forthcoming book “The Case for a Job Guarantee,” edited transcript of her conversation with “Marketplace Morning Report” host David Brancaccio, “The effects of unemployment spread like a virus, Marketplace Morning Report, <https://www.marketplace.org/2020/06/16/covid-19-economy-job-guarantee-government-hiring/>] // Proof DR \*I didn’t bracket anything\*

Over 44 million jobless claims have been filed in the last 12 weeks, and some of those jobs are gone forever. The call for big ideas in job creation, like President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, are growing louder. One such idea, the job guarantee, was once seen as fringe but is gaining acceptance. The concept is simple: For everyone who wants a job, a job will be provided by the government. Pavlina Tcherneva, an associate professor of economics at Bard College and author of the forthcoming book “The Case for a Job Guarantee,” says a job guarantee could be the key to the recovery of the post-COVID-19 economy. The following is an edited transcript of her conversation with “Marketplace Morning Report” host David Brancaccio. David Brancaccio: We all know about the coronavirus and the pandemic, but you say, actually, unemployment propagates like a disease? Pavlina Tcherneva: You notice that when people lose their jobs, they obviously curb their own expenditures. And then that unintentionally reduces revenue for other firms, and other firms have to respond by cutting their own payrolls. And so if you were to look at unemployment just spatially, geographically, you see a wave of unemployment that ripples through communities. But it also has the other impacts on people and families and communities. We know that people are sicker, weaker, they make more trips to the doctors, they take more medication and mortality rates increase as a result of unemployment. And so this is also a public health issue. Brancaccio: So not just a metaphor here, but it is actually deadly in many cases. You have a cure for this particular epidemic. It’s about the government hiring a lot of people, not just in the next couple of months, but as a matter of policy. Tcherneva: Much like FDR did it during the New Deal, but more aggressively and quicker because we already have had the experience. Now, instead of doing direct employment programs as crisis resolution policies, we can put in place a policy framework, one that will be a permanent tool in the toolkit of policymakers, even when the economy is doing well. If there are folks looking for work, the public sector can provide public service employment opportunities that are good and well paid for those who need them. Brancaccio: Can we afford it? A massive, ongoing program to keep people employed on the taxpayer tab? I know interest rates are low, but it will have a cost. Tcherneva: Well, the cost is real. The cost is not doing anything and allowing mass unemployment and all of the associated social and economic costs. We just passed a $2.2 trillion CARES Act budget. That is large and unprecedented by any standard. So we can certainly pass a budget to create, for example, a job guarantee that would employ of 20 million people to the tune of $500 billion to $600 billion. Brancaccio: And the private sector could learn to pay more? Because it would be competing for workers, and we start to see a bit of it when we’re at, quote-unquote, full employment. Tcherneva: The private sector either hires from a pool of unemployed or hires from a pool of employed. Private firms don’t like to hire the unemployed. They prefer to poach from competitors. They prefer people who have work, who have smaller gaps in their resumes. So the [job guarantee] will provide that on-the-job training education and experience. Now, if the argument is that we should have permanent unemployment so that private firms should have the right to pay below living wages or maybe even poverty wages, and use the threat of unemployment to create working conditions that are not desirable, then maybe that’s the world we need to leave behind.

#### We only cost 1% of the U.S.’s GDP per year and solve rescessions which increases the return on investment by the plan

Ip 18 Greg Ip, 5-2-2018, "The Problem With a Federal Jobs Guarantee (Hint: It’s Not the Price Tag) ," WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-problem-with-a-federal-jobs-guarantee-hint-its-not-the-price-tag-1525267192//BP

**Yes, a job guarantee would cost a fortune, but ignoring the obvious political impediments, the price tag isn’t the catastrophe some critics claim. To hire all the official and unofficial unemployed and half the involuntary part timers at $15 an hour plus $3 an hour for benefits would cost around $450 billion, or 2.3% of gross domestic product. The actual cost could be much lower: Many of the unemployed won’t take up the federal offer because they expect to get something better, don’t like what’s being offered, or face some sort of obstacle (family, disability, etc.). Also, some of what gets spent on salaries will be saved in reduced Medicaid, tax credits, unemployment insurance and other safety net outlays. Five scholars at the Levy Institute, a think tank, have advanced a plan they say will cost just 1% to 1.5% of gross domestic product**. The federal government spends three times that on Social Security and twice that on defense. **The price tag would jump in recessions as laid-off people flock to the program. That’s a feature, not a bug: By automatically injecting public money into the economy, it would prop up spending, private employment and tax revenue, lessening the recession’s severity.** And unlike universal basic income, another fashionable idea for reducing inequality in which everyone gets a check regardless of whether they work, a jobs guarantee gets the taxpayer something in return: workers. That, however, is also the problem. Here’s why. According to the Economic Policy Institute, 39% of the workforce, some 54 million people, now earn $15 an hour or less. All would have an incentive to quit and join the federal program. Of course, most wouldn’t because their employers would, grudgingly, raise pay to keep them, then pass the cost on to customers, a de facto inflation tax. **Indeed, advocates say the job guarantee accomplishes the same thing as a $15 minimum wage without the job loss.** NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP Real Time Economics The latest economic news, analysis and data curated weekdays by WSJ's Jeffrey Sparshott. PREVIEW SUBSCRIBE Nonetheless, potentially millions of workers would end up on the federal payroll instead of in the private sector. And there’s the rub. Utopians would argue jobs exist to give people dignity and a decent standard of living. The reality is more mundane: Jobs are how people, as producers, satisfy their needs as consumers. Low-paid work such as brewing coffee, cleaning hotel rooms and flipping hamburgers gets a bad rap but it satisfies a genuine demand: People want coffee, clean hotels and hamburgers. A federal make-work program would crowd out many of those private services. Crowding out is fine when the government is providing something more valuable, Roger Farmer and Dmitry Plotnikov, economists at the University of California at Los Angeles, wrote in 2010. For example, military spending crowded out private consumption during World War II, when the U.S. “was fighting for its survival.” In ordinary times, that is a harder case to make. A 2011 study by ​Lauren Cohen,​ Joshua Coval​ and Christopher Malloy of Harvard Business School found that when a member of Congress takes over an important committee, his state often enjoys an influx of federal spending. But that benefit is offset by a contraction in private investment and employment, evidence of crowding out. Enabling workers to make a decent living is a noble goal; even better is enabling them to do so while serving the needs of a market economy. Small steps could include curbing barriers to employment such as excessive incarceration and inadequate child care, and providing more generous earned-income tax credits to top up low wages. One big step: for the Fed to get unemployment below 4%, and keep it there.

### 1AR—No Link (Affordable)

#### 1] There evidence is about other plans not the aff— it’s radically different because other plans don’t train workers, provide extra benefits, etc.

#### 2] We employ in both government and private sector jobs which solves US economic downturn

Dodge 04/23 — Joel Dodge is a civil rights attorney and public policy researcher in New York City. He writes about domestic policy and politics with a focus on social insurance, healthcare, poverty, and reforming government.; “The promise of a jobs guarantee”; <https://jdodgeblog.wordpress.com/2018/04/23/the-promise-of-a-jobs-guarantee/> As+

Paul, Darity, and Hamilton conceive of the NIEC as a “public option for employment”—a government-provided safety net that can both employ people left behind by the private sector, and keep the private sector accountable to provide good wages and benefits. They point to the positive spillover effects of a jobs guarantee as one of its major benefits: the standards for pay and benefits set by the public jobs program would pressure private employers to keep up. Paul, Darity, and Hamilton propose that public jobs pay annual wages of $24,600 per year, or $11.83 per hour, with a full benefits package (health insurance, retirement pans, paid family and sick leave, and four weeks of vacation time per calendar year). (On wages at least, Booker would go further, offering public jobs at $15 per hour or the prevailing industry wage, whichever is higher.)

The precise jobs that a jobs guarantee would provide remain somewhat mysterious. Booker’s bill relies on local community governments and agencies to identify jobs needed on the ground. Paul, Darity, and Hamilton would have the federal government “identify areas of needed investment in the U.S. economy, including goods (examples: infrastructure, energy efficiency retrofitting) and services (examples: elder care, child care, job training, education, and health services).”

They also mention several other areas that would be a good fit for a federal jobs program, including: “the repair, maintenance, and expansion of the nation’s infrastructure, housing stock, and public buildings; energy efficiency upgrades to public and private buildings; assistance with ecological restoration and services to reduce the country’s carbon footprint; engagement in community development projects; provision of high-quality preschool and afterschool services; provision of teachers’ aids; provision of high-quality elder care and companionship; rejuvenation of the nation’s defunded postal service; support for the arts; and other activities that shall support the public good.”

Some of these jobs seem to be a better fit for the accordion-like design of the jobs guarantee than others. Public infrastructure repair and construction are classic stimulus work that can be provided by government as an employer of last resort. But child care and elder care are much more permanent jobs that we wouldn’t want people fleeing as private market conditions improve.

The jobs guarantee seems to be trying to solve two market failures at once: eliminating involuntary unemployment, and providing social goods that are currently under-provided by the market. Those twin goals drive toward a bifurcated public jobs program: one temporary “stimulus” jobs corps that does yo-yo as the economy expands and contracts, and a second much more permanent jobs corps program in communities and industries that have been long-term underserved by the private economy.

There certainly are vast regions that are jobs deserts, not to mention child and elder care deserts, too. To the extent that these three overlap, then the jobs guarantee could quickly make the government a permanently dominant employer in certain communities. Which is not inherently a problem—there are already many communities that depend on a public employer, like a university or government agencies. Communities deprived of employment opportunities today would certainly be better off with government-facilitated work than with none at all.

#### The plan is affordable

Dayen 18 [David Dayen is the executive editor of The American Prospect who also writes regularly for the Intercept.] “WHETHER AMERICA CAN AFFORD A JOB GUARANTEE PROGRAM IS NOT UP FOR DEBATE.” The intercept. April 30, 2018. <https://theintercept.com/2018/04/30/federal-job-guarantee-program-cost/> BSPK

SEN. BERNIE SANDERS’S [endorsement of a guaranteed job](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2018/04/23/bernie-sanders-to-unveil-plan-to-guarantee-every-american-a-job/) for anyone who wants one, joining previous supporters such as Sens. [Kirsten Gillibrand](https://www.thenation.com/article/why-democrats-should-embrace-a-federal-jobs-guarantee/) and [Cory Booker](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/20/17260578/cory-booker-job-guarantee-bill-full-employment-darity-hamilton), reinvigorated a debate that has been roiling within economics Twitter and academic circles for a long time. Those more partial to a universal basic income untethered to work clash with job guarantee supporters [from the left](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-obsessed-with-the-virtue-of-work-what-about-the-virtue-of-rest/2018/04/25/f829f406-48bf-11e8-8b5a-3b1697adcc2a_story.html?utm_term=.3859cd09732f); those who see the job guarantee as a dangerous slip into socialism [attack from the right](https://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/2018/04/24/yes-the-jobs-guarantee-is-absurd/#7ca2740aafd0). And mainstream Democrats not running for the presidency [don’t really want to talk about it](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sanders-jobs-guarantee_us_5adf8f5fe4b061c0bfa280ab?z5).

Those fresh to the debate, meanwhile, instinctively ask what feels like an intuitive question: How on earth can we pay for that?

But if we’re going to have an honest debate about whether the government should be spending hundreds of billions of dollars so that people can obtain jobs, we should acknowledge that the government already does. Officials at the local, state, and federal levels push enormous amounts of money toward this stated purpose — they just channel it through corporations, in the form of special tax breaks and “economic development” subsidies. It’s not clear that businesses actually use all that money to create jobs, rather than just enjoying the subsidies and tax cuts for themselves, so if the true purpose really is to create work for people, the new jobs guarantee debate offers a much simpler — and probably much cheaper — approach to the same end.

So while it’s worth talking about the best way to achieve full employment, the question of whether we can afford to spend the money can be dismissed. We can.

The job guarantee proposal from Mark Paul, Sandy Darity, and Darrick Hamilton for the [Center on Budget and Policy Priorities](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment) estimated an annual program cost of $543 billion, enough to pop out the eyes of more cautious policymakers. This would be partially offset by reduced demand for benefit programs for the working poor, like food stamps, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, as well as the increased economic activity driving up tax revenues across the country. A report from [economists at the Levy Institute](http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/rpr_4_18.pdf) put final costs at between $260 and $354 billion annually in the first five years and lower outlays after that.

Put aside the fact that America controls its own money supply and that modern monetary theory suggests that the country need not actually pay for all federal spending. The question here is whether the nation can possibly manage spending $354 billion a year toward the goal of ensuring that all Americans have a job if they want one. Here’s the often-overlooked data needed to answer that question.

Subsidies from state and local governments to attract employers to locate their facilities cost [as much as $80 billion](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/opinion/amazon-hq2-incentives-taxes.html) a year. I have to say “as much as” because local governments and businesses [keep these deals secret](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/opinion/amazon-hq2-incentives-taxes.html). Even though the Governmental Accounting Standards Board requires localities to make such “economic development” deals public, around half of all local governments [just don’t comply](http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-new-rules-disclose-tax-breaks-half-governments.html).

But thanks to public filings and the [subsidy trackers](https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/subsidy-tracker-2#/) at Good Jobs First, we know enough to confidently make the $80 billion a year estimate. Wisconsin [promised $3 billion to Foxconn](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/business/wisconsin-foxconn-tax-subsidies.html) for a factory employing around 13,000 people at its peak. Cities and states have [offered as much as $8.5 billion](http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-amazon-package-passed-20180404-story.html) to Amazon for its second headquarters, which would house around 50,000 people. These giveaways can include tax abatements or forgiveness, cash grants for relocation expenses, and in Amazon’s case, even giving workers’ state payroll taxes back to the company to use for its own purposes.

It’s not clear that economic development subsidies create jobs, as much as they pit regions against one another to move jobs around to the benefit of large corporations rather than workers. A report from the [Economic Policy Institute](http://www.epi.org/138921/pre/df76290c66d625383dfc9dc07dc0d18582ba1bd4bc8b0a7490dd545fc4481dab/) on Amazon’s $1.1 billion in known subsidies for “fulfillment center” warehouses found that they do not increase overall private sector employment within a particular county.

The $80 billion in economic development subsidies is just the beginning. The Trump tax cuts were sold on the basis of job creation effects. The Republican Congress called the bill the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.” Sen. Mitch McConnell parroted the typical GOP take on the bill when he [wrote last year](https://www.nbcnews.com/think/politics/democrats-must-forget-about-trump-join-gop-tax-reform-ncna808976) that the tax bill would “unleash the potential of American enterprise to create more jobs and keep more of them here.”

As a result, Republicans slashed the corporate tax rate by 40 percent, at a cost estimated by the Joint Committee on Taxation to be $1.34 trillion over the next 10 years. And like the economic development subsidies, the job creation potential of severely reducing corporate taxes is debatable. Even though the logic of the tax cuts was that they would give businesses more money to invest in equipment and wages, those measurements have [actually fallen](https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/03/02/the-corporate-tax-cuts-arent-working/) since the tax cut was enacted. GDP growth in the first quarter [cooled off a bit](https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2018-04-27/u-s-growth-cools-to-2-3-as-gains-in-consumer-spending-ease) compared to the end of 2017.

Combining economic development subsidies and corporate tax cuts comes out to an average annual total of $214 billion per year, spent chasing job creation by handing over money to corporations. And there’s more. Nearly every state in America offers [job creation tax credits](http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/job-creation-tax-credits.aspx), literally money paid per job. There are massive incentives in each state available for [film and television production](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Movie_production_incentives_in_the_United_States). Special “[bonus depreciation](https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2018/01/02/tax-geek-tuesday-changes-to-depreciation-in-the-new-tax-law/)” rules allow companies to write down equipment costs, deferring taxes for years on investments. And there are dozens of other ways in which corporations grab public money with the promise of delivering jobs.

As Suzanne Mettler wrote in her well-regarded book “[The Submerged State](https://blog.politics.ox.ac.uk/review-the-submerged-state-how-invisible-government-policies-are-undermining-american-democracy/),” these kinds of under-the-surface perks and benefits form a barrier to activist government policies like a federal job guarantee. While enormous sums are funneled to private industry beneath the surface, the same policymakers who green-lit the expenditures claim that large public sector outlays to create jobs are fiscally impossible. This is nonsensical.

The current unemployment rate of 4.1 percent may lead those dumping hundreds of billions of dollars on corporations for job creation to suggest that their plan is working. But the [lower employment/population ratio](https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2018/04/raw-data-how-many-people-have-jobs/) and [tougher employment prospects](http://money.cnn.com/2018/01/23/news/economy/black-unemployment/index.html) for people of color suggests that there’s more to be done. A plan for publicly funded jobs to pick up the slack happens to be [absurdly popular](https://splinternews.com/turns-out-a-federal-jobs-guarantee-is-very-popular-and-1823932493).

Critiques of the federal job guarantee — from [the left](http://peoplespolicyproject.org/2018/03/22/some-notes-on-federal-job-guarantee-proposals/) and [the center](https://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/04/democrats-are-rushing-a-jobs-guarantee-its-a-huge-mistake.html) — make some valid points. Job guarantee positions would rise and fall with the business cycle, so they couldn’t be so essential that the nation would experience a shortage of teachers or child care workers when recessions ended and people returned to the private sector. (One way around this is to make job guarantee positions align with apprenticeships.) To ensure universal eligibility, it would be difficult for jobs to require advanced skills, making professions like construction — among the nation’s more dire needs — somewhat off-limits. Some see the proposal as [similar to “workfare” programs](http://peoplespolicyproject.org/2018/04/24/prior-models-for-workable-workfare-work/) that conditioned welfare benefits to jobs.

But the one critique that cannot really be put on the federal job guarantee is that it costs too much. Or at least, you cannot say this without ignoring the mountain of taxpayer money we already employ for that intended purpose. That existing money could be channeled into direct job creation pretty quickly. It’s entirely reasonable to differ on how to accomplish the ultimate goal of ending poverty and the crushing burdens, both psychological and material, of unemployment. But there’s no real debate on whether America can afford it. We’re already picking up the tab.

### 1AR— No Inflation

#### FJG avoids inflation

Mitchell 17 (William Mitchell is Professor of Economics and Director of Centre of Full Employment and Equity at the University of Newcastle, Australia, “The Job Guarantee and Modern Money Theory: Realizing Keynes’s Labor Standard”, Binzagr Institute for Sustainable Prosperity, Chapter 3: The Job Guarantee: A Superior Buffer Stock Option for Government Price Stabilisation, 2017) //EG

The JG would maintain ‘loose’ full employment because the government would be offering jobs to workers who are not currently in demand by the market. The JG would recruit labour ‘off the bottom of the market’ in contradistinction to general government spending, which involves the government competing with other purchasers for resources including labour at market prices. By not competing with the private market for resources, the JG would avoid the inflationary tendencies of traditional Keynesian pump priming, which attempts to maintain full capacity utilisation by ‘hiring off the top’, that is, competing for resources at market prices and relying on so-called spending multipliers to generate extra jobs necessary to achieve full employment. The latter approach fails to provide an integrated full employment price anchor policy framework. Further, under a JG, the government would know that the last person who seeks a job on any particular day would define the minimum government spending boost required to ensure there are enough jobs available. It is also true that because it would be impossible to run a JG matching all the skills to jobs the employment buffer stock comprises ‘loose’ full employment in the sense that there would be some skills-based underemployment remaining when the pool was large. In better times, as the JG pool shrank, and was predominantly occupied by workers who would typically be the last employed by any private firm (if ever), the gap between ‘loose’ and ‘true’ full employment would approach zero.

### 1AR—Economic Revitalization

#### Aff solves – revitalizes infrastructure and the economy

Carpenter and Hamilton 20 (Daniel Carpenter, Allie S. Freed Prof of Government @ Harvard. Darrick Hamilton, Executive Director of Kirwan Institute @ OSU. 4-30-2020. “A FEDERAL JOB GUARANTEE: ANTI-POVERTY AND INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY FOR A BETTER FUTURE” <https://scholars.org/contribution/federal-job-guarantee>) DLuo

To combat the current health and economic crisis, and build national infrastructure in the public health, environmental and transportation domains, American government should directly hire millions of citizens in the coming two years, offering a federal job guarantee (FJG) that strengthens government at all levels, especially local and state.  Doing so would transcend the limits of current stimulus programs. Those programs confer money but not stable, dignified work. This direct government employment (DGE) would rebuild sectors of our country that have withered – our public health clinics and agencies, our transportation network, our physical plant for education and services in both urban and rural settings. DGE would also supply workers for the vital transition to a new, energy-efficient, reduced-carbon infrastructure. Unlike other relief programs, a federal job guarantee can eliminate involuntary unemployment, directly build the capacity of government to reduce the likelihood of future crises and respond effectively to those crises that do arise. A FJG can complement other relief programs including social insurance and income support, but there is no substitute for its poverty-combatting, inequality-reducing, worker-empowering, nation-stabilizing, and infrastructure-building potential. Scale matters. To meet the needs of the nation, a FJG would provide millions of new jobs, ranging from public health positions (at least 250,000 jobs), enhanced postal services, including postal banking (at least 100,000 jobs), construction, rehabilitation, retrofitting and staffing of schools, clinics, parks, senior centers and civic centers (at least 1 million jobs), new infrastructure, energy transition and conservation work, including solar installation (many millions of jobs), as well as investments in unemployment and social insurance and job training (hundreds of thousands of jobs). And a FJG would rejuvenate America’s civil service at a moment of mass impending retirements, injecting greater diversity and youth into a system that sorely needs it. Introduction The multidimensional crisis unfolding with the global coronavirus pandemic calls for a multidimensional solution. It demands bold thinking. American public officials have done some of that bold thinking in greatly extending unemployment benefits, in offering loans and loan guarantees by the hundreds of billions of dollars, and by using rarely-invoked federal authority to incentivize and compel the production of medical necessities. The Federal Reserve has undertaken actions even beyond those it took in response to the financial crisis of 2008. Yet an important part of the policy toolkit has been neglected to date: direct government employment. Put simply, governments at all levels can and should employ millions more Americans in the years to come. [Direct government hiring at all levels of the American political system](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/senate-coronavirus-bill-is-not-enough.html) will be an essential part of the response to the coronavirus pandemic. This paper lays out the case for large-scale direct government hiring—a federal job guarantee, and then explains the types of jobs and projects that could deliver value to the American people. Part One: The Case There are at least three reasons why a federal job guarantee with direct federal government employment at the federal, state, and local levels has to be part of the portfolio of policy responses to the crisis. 1. The Need for Sustained and Meaningful Job Creation. This will not be a V-shaped recession. Public health restrictions are [likely to remain in place](https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/03/americans-are-underestimating-how-long-coronavirus-disruptions-will-last-health-experts-say/) for many months more and to resurface in fall 2020. Many small and medium-sized businesses that have closed or will close in the coming weeks and months will not re-open, and if they do, they will not likely hire their full pre-crisis workforce. This is in part due to the usual cycles of business downsizing and the costliness and delay of start-up after lay-up and scrapping, but part of it comes from the economic disruption of COVID-19. Until a coronavirus vaccine is widely available (not merely a matter of medical innovation but of mass administration of the treatment to hundreds of millions of Americans), American consumers will likely refrain from spending at anything like the rate they did before January 2020. Indeed, older Americans (who are on average wealthier than younger generations and with more disposable income) are the most likely to continue to curtail their spending behavior in the summer and fall of 2020 and into 2021, forgoing restaurants and bars, gyms, haircuts and other businesses where people gather or there is physical proximity. Add to this the well-known psychological effects of major recessions, and it is likely that the coming years will be characterized by greater savings behavior (which happened after the Great Depression, for instance). More robust savings would be a good thing in many respects, but in a heavily service-oriented economy dependent upon consumer spending, it means that millions of private sector jobs are not coming back. 2. The Need for Public Sector Capacity in America. Just as important as counter-recessionary policy, American government at all levels has weakened considerably over the past half-century. These frailties are visibly on display in the crisis. States that need to process unemployment benefits cannot do so. Public health departments lack the capacity to monitor the health of citizens. Medical stockpiles were depleted and depreciated. Federal, state, and local agencies that conduct scientific research, provide services to vulnerable populations, and construct and operate physical, technological, and transportation infrastructure, have the lowest workforce levels they have had in a half-century or more. In total, the federal government now employs about the same number of people that it did in 1967 — even as the total U.S. population grew from 200 million to around 330 million. Today the federal government employs considerably fewer people than in [1990](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CES9091000001). State government hiring has increased much more since the 1960s, from approximately 2 million full-time equivalent employees to 4.3 million, but [most of this increase](https://www.governing.com/gov-data/public-workforce-salaries/state-government-employment-by-agency-job-type-current-historical-data.html) is due to growing community colleges, other colleges and universities, and prisons and corrections systems. Hiring in welfare, public hospitals, conservation, and even policing has stagnated in the last two decades, with all of these sectors declining on a per-capita basis. 3. Government Employment Has Distinct Advantages. Direct government hiring has advantages over other forms of counter-recessionary policy. In addition to direct government payments (stimulus checks, for example), government hiring provides jobs. One’s dignity is not limited to work, but jobs do entail work, and productive work with proper working conditions can confer dignity, meaningful exercise of mind and body, and benefits often in social settings. And combined with at least livable wages and salaries, a federal job guarantee would increase worker bargaining power in the private sector and reduce uncertainty over income streams. Unlike “gig economy” work, where take-home pay is often limited, and work provided by contractors, where pay may be very low for some and potentially egregiously high for others, government jobs are characterized by limited high-end pay and provide meaningful working-class to middle-class incomes. Direct government employment thus holds the potential for limiting income volatility and inequality, and the very real possibility that counter-recessionary policy will only exacerbate it. And finally, the spending that goes into direct government employment is spread diffusely among workers, limiting the gains from lobbying for contracts and grants, and thus blunting some of that political activity. We’ve Started This Before, and We Can Finish It Today: The New Deal and Contemporary Proposals. The proposal here builds on and meshes with the ideas of others. The obvious precedent rests in many public hiring programs that exist in American and world history, most notably the New Deal. Especially in the first two terms of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency, the American government launched a bold series of public hiring programs whose names are now etched in memory: the Works Progress Administration, the Civil Works Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. These programs provided many grants to states (such as through the Public Roads Administration and Social Security Administration Public Assistance Program), but also sponsored direct government employment, such as the federal component of the Public Works Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. Whether in grants to states or directly, work relief programs mean a massive increase in public sector hiring. Importantly, research by economic historians suggests that the New Deal’s public employment programs were robustly associated with a range of desirable public policy outcomes, including boosts in state income, consumption activity, and internal migration, and reductions in crime and mortality. The program of loans to banks and railroads under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is not associated with these indicators of economic and social wellbeing. And as many historians and political scientists have shown, the effects of the New Deal were sharply limited by the racial segregation of its program structures. The New Deal thus provides positive and negative lessons for direct government employment programs today. In more recent years, one of us ([Darrick Hamilton, and his coauthors Mark Paul and William Darity](https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment)) has along with other economists (such as [Pavlina Tcherneva](https://www.pavlina-tcherneva.net/job-guarantee)) called for a government jobs guarantee. This proposal advances that idea while also making the case for governing capacity to finance and deliver meaningful jobs. Given the possible magnitude of the emerging wave of unemployment, a government jobs guarantee might provide more jobs in a near-term environment than programs that focused only on augmenting government capacity alone. The second difference is one of emphasis: the aim of this program is both to provide jobs and to augment government capacity at all levels in the United States, especially in areas of dire need including public health infrastructure, forging a care economy that professionalizes child care, adult care and senior care, rural broadband and communications provision, energy and environmental transition programs, and transportation infrastructure. Poverty and inequality reduction alone are enough reason for policies like these, but the crisis lain bare by the pandemic goes beyond economic dimensions. Our body politic is rotting, and our republic is withering.

#### Jobs Guarantee increases wages – stimulates the economy

Brancaccio 20 – David Brancaccio – host of radio business program, marketplace, and PBS newsmagazine Felicia Wong – president of the Roosevelt Institute “Would a Federal Jobs Guarantee be Good for the Economy” Marketplace, May 28,2020 https://www.marketplace.org/2020/05/28/covid-19-federal-jobs-guarantee-program-great-depression-wpa/

Brancaccio: One criticism — besides, perhaps, the cost of employing so many people as a matter of policy — one criticism is that, with the government offering the guaranteed job, private employers would have to raise what they pay, and that would make the U.S. less competitive when competing with countries that don’t do that. Wong: See, I gotta say I think that’s a feature not a bug of this idea. We should be raising pay. It’s really important that workers [who we now see are essential](https://www.marketplace.org/2020/03/27/who-is-hiring-during-global-covid19-pandemic/), grocery clerks and delivery workers and home health aides, they need to make a living wage — of course, to support their families, but also to support the whole economy. These folks need to be able to themselves pay for education, buy groceries, go on vacation. That stimulates the whole economy. And they can’t do that right now on the sub-minimum wages that they’re getting.

### 1AR—Recession

#### Federal Jobs guarantee stabilizes the economy by preserving workforces during recession

Pearkes 2/13 – George Pearkes is a research analyst and key writer for Bespoke Market Intelligence. "The latest progressive economic policy is designed to stabilize the US labor market — and it looks a lot like the military." Published by Business Insider on February 13, 2020. Available here: (<https://www.businessinsider.com/job-guarantee-economic-idea-progressives-us-military-similarities-2020-2>)//Skaps

One of the burgeoning policy ideas in progressive circles is the idea of a job guarantee: a policy in which the government would offer a well-paying job with full benefits to anyone who wants one. While that may sound radical — and has drawn its fair share of scorn from conservatives — it should be familiar to anyone that knows how our military works. How the guarantee would work A federal jobs guarantee is a pretty simple idea: if you want a job, you get one, at a living wage and with full benefits that we associate with full-time labor, like healthcare. Granular specifics such as the level of wages offered or the specific level of non-wage benefits can vary, but all job guarantee proposals share those basic attributes. Unlike other left-wing policy proposals like universal basic income, a jobs guarantee involves production instead of simple transfer of resources. In plain English, participants in the program would be providing goods or services we as a society think are being under-supplied such as infrastructure improvements, childcare, or healthcare. The specifics of which goods or services would be provided also vary. For instance, some proposals like the Green New Deal focus on de-carbonizing the economy, while others put forward ideas like inadequately available child care for working parents. A jobs guarantee would also serve a variety of other roles within the US economy: improving worker bargaining power and raising labor income, stabilizing economic cycles, and improving productivity. A jobs guarantee could help stabilize the US economy Let's work through some of those benefits, the first being an increase to workers' wages. Wages for work as part of the guarantee program would in most cases serve as a wage floor, forcing private sector employers to pay above what the program was offering in order to attract and retain talent; that would to a large degree make minimum wages less relevant. Why work at a fast food restaurant that offers 30 hours a week and no healthcare when the job guarantee gives you full hours and coverage? Of course, that competition hurts employers relative to employees, and that's one potential cost of the program to consider. In periods of strong labor demand from the private sector, higher wages or benefit packages offered by non-government employers would draw workers away from the jobs guarantee. But during recessions, the program would act as a fallback option for workers and help prevent catastrophic declines in demand by preserving worker income and keeping them involved in the labor force. By preventing large pools of workers from dropping out of the labor force during periods of weak economic activity, losses of skills and networks with other workers are avoided. This preservation of skills and labor force attachment would likely improve labor productivity over time. A jobs guarantee also has some distinct advantages over ideas like UBI. Rather than simply transferring income, important capital projects like infrastructure can be built as jobs guarantee projects which in turn would raise the US economy's productive capacity. Even in relatively good times like these, there are millions of Americans who are looking for work, want a job but haven't been able to find one, or who are working part-time because they can't get full-time hours. As I mentioned in my last piece, the proportion of the workforce in those categories is at a record low, but that still means at least 10.6 million people are without a job and at least another 4.1 million who could be working more.

### 1AR—Affordability

#### **The plan is easily afforable**

Spross 20 [Jeff Spross was the economics and business correspondent for The Week, an economics and climate reporter for ThinkProgress, and has written for the policy journal Democracy.] Spross Jeff, 2020, "You're Hired!," Democracy Journal, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/44/youre-hired/

Now let’s talk price tag. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest the program described above would run at least $670 billion in its first year—or about 3.6 percent of the economy—if instituted today. That’s very large, but hardly unimaginable: It’s roughly the annual cost of the federal government’s various health-care subsidies, and less than Social Security.

More importantly, the cost would rapidly and dramatically shrink once the program was up and running. Millions of formerly jobless would have new income to spend, so private businesses would expand, their wage and benefit offers would rise, and people would leave the job-guarantee rolls for greener pastures. The program would moderate itself by expanding the private sector. Eventually, it would stabilize at a much lower level of spending. Case in point: Argentina’s Jefes program began in 2001, and recipients peaked at two million in 2003. But by 2006, the number of Jefes recipients had fallen by 40 percent. Over that time, the national unemployment rate fell from 21 percent to 8 percent.

On top of all that, the rolls of people qualifying for safety net programs like Medicaid, SNAP, housing assistance, and more would shrink as well. We’d face fewer of the social ills that flow from joblessness—crime, incarceration, mental health, addiction, etc.—further reducing spending. Rough estimates by Darity, Tcherneva, and several other economists suggest at least a fourth of the job guarantee’s annual budget would be offset by these other reductions, and maybe much more.

### 1AR—Impact Turn (Dedev)

####  Stopping growth solves extinction from eco collapse – decoupling is impossible even under perfect conditions, and transition dangers are overhyped

Hickel 18 [Jason Hickel is an anthropologist, author, and a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. Why Growth Can’t Be Green. Foreign Policy Magazine. September 12, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/]

Warnings about ecological breakdown have become ubiquitous. Over the past few years, major newspapers, including the Guardian and the New York Times, have carried alarming stories on soil depletion, deforestation, and the collapse of fish stocks and insect populations. These crises are being driven by global economic growth, and its accompanying consumption, which is destroying the Earth’s biosphere and blowing past key planetary boundaries that scientists say must be respected to avoid triggering collapse.

Many policymakers have responded by pushing for what has come to be called “green growth.” All we need to do, they argue, is invest in more efficient technology and introduce the right incentives, and we’ll be able to keep growing while simultaneously reducing our impact on the natural world, which is already at an unsustainable level. In technical terms, the goal is to achieve “absolute decoupling” of GDP from the total use of natural resources, according to the U.N. definition.

It sounds like an elegant solution to an otherwise catastrophic problem. There’s just one hitch: New evidence suggests that green growth isn’t the panacea everyone has been hoping for. In fact, it isn’t even possible.

Green growth first became a buzz phrase in 2012 at the United Nations Cosnference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. In the run-up to the conference, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the U.N. Environment Program all produced reports promoting green growth. Today, it is a core plank of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.

But the promise of green growth turns out to have been based more on wishful thinking than on evidence. In the years since the Rio conference, three major empirical studies have arrived at the same rather troubling conclusion: Even under the best conditions, absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use is not possible on a global scale.

A team of scientists led by the German researcher Monika Dittrich first raised doubts in 2012. The group ran a sophisticated computer model that predicted what would happen to global resource use if economic growth continued on its current trajectory, increasing at about 2 to 3 percent per year. It found that human consumption of natural resources (including fish, livestock, forests, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels) would rise from 70 billion metric tons per year in 2012 to 180 billion metric tons per year by 2050. For reference, a sustainable level of resource use is about 50 billion metric tons per year—a boundary we breached back in 2000.

The team then reran the model to see what would happen if every nation on Earth immediately adopted best practice in efficient resource use (an extremely optimistic assumption). The results improved; resource consumption would hit only 93 billion metric tons by 2050. But that is still a lot more than we’re consuming today. Burning through all those resources could hardly be described as absolute decoupling or green growth.

In 2016, a second team of scientists tested a different premise: one in which the world’s nations all agreed to go above and beyond existing best practice. In their best-case scenario, the researchers assumed a tax that would raise the global price of carbon from $50 to $236 per metric ton and imagined technological innovations that would double the efficiency with which we use resources. The results were almost exactly the same as in Dittrich’s study. Under these conditions, if the global economy kept growing by 3 percent each year, we’d still hit about 95 billion metric tons of resource use by 2050. Bottom line: no absolute decoupling.

Finally, last year the U.N. Environment Program—once one of the main cheerleaders of green growth theory—weighed in on the debate. It tested a scenario with carbon priced at a whopping $573 per metric ton, slapped on a resource extraction tax, and assumed rapid technological innovation spurred by strong government support. The result? We hit 132 billion metric tons by 2050. This finding is worse than those of the two previous studies because the researchers accounted for the “rebound effect,” whereby improvements in resource efficiency drive down prices and cause demand to rise—thus canceling out some of the gains.

Study after study shows the same thing. Scientists are beginning to realize that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce cars and iPhones and skyscrapers more efficiently, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services such as education and yoga, but even universities and workout studios require material inputs. Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up.

These problems throw the entire concept of green growth into doubt and necessitate some radical rethinking. Remember that each of the three studies used highly optimistic assumptions. We are nowhere near imposing a global carbon tax today, much less one of nearly $600 per metric ton, and resource efficiency is currently getting worse, not better. Yet the studies suggest that even if we do everything right, decoupling economic growth with resource use will remain elusive and our environmental problems will continue to worsen.

Preventing that outcome will require a whole new paradigm. High taxes and technological innovation will help, but they’re not going to be enough. The only realistic shot humanity has at averting ecological collapse is to impose hard caps on resource use, as the economist Daniel O’Neill recently proposed. Such caps, enforced by national governments or by international treaties, could ensure that we do not extract more from the land and the seas than the Earth can safely regenerate. We could also ditch GDP as an indicator of economic success and adopt a more balanced measure like the genuine progress indicator (GPI), which accounts for pollution and natural asset depletion. Using GPI would help us maximize socially good outcomes while minimizing ecologically bad ones.

But there’s no escaping the obvious conclusion. Ultimately, bringing our civilization back within planetary boundaries is going to require that we liberate ourselves from our dependence on economic growth—starting with rich nations. This might sound scarier than it really is. Ending growth doesn’t mean shutting down economic activity—it simply means that next year we can’t produce and consume more than we are doing this year. It might also mean shrinking certain sectors that are particularly damaging­­­ to our ecology and that are unnecessary for human flourishing, such as advertising, commuting, and single-use products.

But ending growth doesn’t mean that living standards need to take a hit. Our planet provides more than enough for all of us; the problem is that its resources are not equally distributed. We can improve people’s lives right now simply by sharing what we already have more fairly, rather than plundering the Earth for more. Maybe this means better public services. Maybe it means basic income. Maybe it means a shorter working week that allows us to scale down production while still delivering full employment. Policies such as these—and countless others—will be crucial to not only surviving the 21st century but also flourishing in it.

#### Warming causes extinction – a confluence of nonlinear and unpredictable effects – action now is key

Melton 19 [Michelle Melton is a 3L at Harvard Law School. Before law school, she was an associate fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she focused on climate policy. Climate Change and National Security, Part II: How Big a Threat is the Climate? January 7, 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-and-national-security-part-ii-how-big-threat-climate]

At least until 2050, and possibly for decades after, climate change will remain a creeping threat that will exacerbate and amplify existing, structural global inequalities. While the developed world will be negatively affected by climate change through 2050, the consequences of climate change will be felt most acutely in the developing world. The national security threats posed by climate change to 2050 are likely to differ in degree, not kind, from the kinds of threats already posed by climate change. For the next few decades, climate change will exacerbate humanitarian crises—some of which will result in the deployment of military personnel, as well as material and financial assistance. It will also aggravate natural resource constraints, potentially contributing to political and economic conflict over water, food and energy.

The question for the next 30 years is not “can humanity survive as a species with 1.5°C or 2°C of warming,” but, “how much will the existing disparities between the developed and developing world widen, and how long (and how successfully) can these widening political/economic disparities be sustained?” The urgency of the climate threat in the next few decades will depend, to a large degree, on whether and how much the U.S. government perceives a widening of these global inequities as a threat to U.S. national security.

By contrast, if emissions continue to creep upward (or if they do not decline rapidly), by 2100 climate-related national security threats could be existential. The question for the next hundred years is not, “are disparities politically and economically manageable?” but, “can the global order, premised on the nation-state system, itself based on territorial sovereignty, survive in a world in which substantial swathes of territory are potentially uninhabitable?”

National Security Consequences of Climate Change to 2050

Scientists can predict the consequences of climate change to 2050 with some measure of certainty. (Beyond that date, the pace and magnitude of climate change—and therefore, the national security threat posed by it—depend heavily on the level of emissions in the coming years, as I have explained.) There is relative agreement across modeled climate scenarios that the world will likely warm, on average, at least 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by about 2050—but perhaps as soon as 2030. This level of warming is likely to occur even if the world succeeds in dramatically reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as even the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report implicitly admits. In other words, a certain amount of additional warming—at least 1.5°C, and probably more than that—is presumptively unavoidable.

Looking ahead to 2050, it can be said with relative confidence that the national security consequences of climate change will vary in degree, not in kind, from the national security threats already facing the United States. This is hardly good news. Even small differences in global average temperatures result in significant environmental changes, with attendant social, economic and political consequences. By 2050, climate change will wreak increasing havoc on human and natural systems—predominantly, but not exclusively, in the developing world—with attenuated but profound consequences for national security.

In particular, changes in temperature, the hydrological cycle and the ranges of insects will impact food availability and food access in much of the world, increasing food insecurity. Storms, flooding, changes in ocean pH and other climate-linked changes will damage infrastructure and negatively impact labor productivity and economic growth in much of the world. Vector-borne diseases will also become more prevalent, as climate change will expand the geographic range and intensity of transmission of diseases like malaria, West Nile, Zika and dengue fever, and cholera. Rising public health challenges, economic devastation and food insecurity will translate into an increased demand for humanitarian assistance provided by the military, increased migration—especially from tropical and subtropical regions—and geopolitical conflict.

Long-term trends such as declining food security, coupled with short-term events like hurricanes, could sustain unprecedented levels of migration. The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe portends the kinds of population movements that will only accelerate in the coming decades: people from Africa, Southwest and South Asia and elsewhere crossing land and water to reach Europe. For the United States, this likely means greater numbers of people seeking entry from both Central America and the Caribbean. Such influxes are not unprecedented, but they are unlikely to abate and could increase in volume over the next few decades, driven in part by climate change-related food insecurity, climate change-related storms and also by economic and political instability. Food insecurity, economic losses and loss of human life are also likely to exacerbate existing political tensions in the developing world, especially in regions with poor governance and/or where the climate is particularly vulnerable to warming (e.g., the Mediterranean basin). While the Arab Spring had many underlying causes, it also coincided with a period of high food prices, which arguably contributed to the protests. In some situations, food insecurity, economic losses and public health crises, combined with weak and ineffectual governance, could precipitate future conflicts of this kind—although it will be difficult to know where and when without more precise local studies of both underlying political dynamics and the regionally-specific impacts of climate change.

2100 and Beyond

While the national security impacts of climate change to 2050 are likely to be costly and disruptive for the U.S. military—and devastating for many people around the world—at some point after 2050, if warming continues at its current pace, changes to the climate could fundamentally reshape geopolitics and possibly even the current nation-state basis of the current global order.

To be clear, both the ultimate level of warming and its attendant political consequences is highly speculative, for the reasons I explained in my last post. Nonetheless, we do know that the planet is currently on track for at least 3-4°C of warming by 2100. The “known knowns” of higher levels of warming—say, 3°C—are frightening. At that 3°C of warming, for example, scientists project that there will be a nearly 70 percent decline in wheat production in Central America and the Caribbean, 75 percent of the land area in the Middle East and more than 50 percent in South Asia will be affected by highly unusual heat, and sea level rise could displace and imperil the lives hundreds of millions of people, among other consequences.

But even higher levels of warming are physically possible within this century. At these levels of warming, some regions of the world would be literally uninhabitable, likely resulting in the depopulation of the tropics, to say nothing of the consequences of sea-level rise for economically important cities such as Amsterdam and New York. Even if newly warmed regions of the far north could theoretically accommodate the resulting migrants, this presumes that the political response to this unprecedented global displacement would be orderly and conflict-free borders on fantasy.

The geopolitical consequences of significant levels of warming are severe, but if these changes occur in a linear way, at least there will be time for human systems to adjust. Perhaps more challenging for national security is the possibility that the until-now linear changes give way to abrupt and irreversible ones. Scientists forecast that, at higher levels of warming—precisely what level is speculative—humanity could trigger catastrophic, abrupt and unavoidable consequences to the ecosystem. The IPCC has considered nine such abrupt changes; one example is the potential shutting down of the Indian summer monsoon. Over a billion people are dependent upon the Indian monsoon, which provides parts of South Asia with about 80 percent of its annual rainfall; relatively minor changes in the monsoon in either direction can cause disasters. In 2010, a wetter monsoon led to the catastrophic flooding in Pakistan, which directly affected 20 million people; a drier monsoon in 2002 led to devastating drought. Studies suggest that the Indian summer monsoon has two stable states: wet (i.e., the current state) and dry (characterized by low precipitation over the subcontinent). At some point, if warming continues, the monsoon could abruptly shift into the second, “dry” state, with catastrophic consequences for over a billion people dependent on monsoon-fed agriculture. The IPCC suggests that such a state-shift is “unlikely”—that is, there is a 10 to 33 percent chance that a state-shift will happen in the 21st century—but scientists also have relatively low confidence in their understanding of the underlying mechanisms in this and other large-scale natural systems.

The consequences of abrupt, severe warming for national security are obvious in general, if unclear in the specifics. In 2003, the Defense Department asked a contractor to explore such a scenario. The resulting report outlined the offensive and defensive national security strategies countries may adopt if faced with abrupt climate change, and highlighted the increased risk of inter- and intra-state conflict over natural resources and immigration. Although the report may be off in its imagined timeframe (positing abrupt climate change by 2020), the world it conjures is improbable but not outlandish. If the Indian monsoon were to switch to dry state, and a billion people were suddenly without reliable food sources, for example, it is not clear how the Indian government would react, assuming it would survive in its current form. Major wars or low-intensity proxy conflicts seem likely, if not inevitable, in such a scenario.

This is not to say that a parade of climate horribles is certain—or even likely—to come to pass. Scientific understanding of the sensitivities in the climate system are far from perfect. It is also possible that emissions will decline more rapidly than anticipated, averting the worst consequences of climate change. But this outcome is far from guaranteed. And even if global emissions decline precipitously, humanity cannot be sure when or whether the planet has crossed a climate tipping point beyond which the incremental nature of the current changes shifts from the current linear, gradual progression to a non-linear and abrupt process.

Within the next few decades, the most likely scenario involves manageable, but costly, consequences on infrastructure, food security and natural disasters, which will be borne primarily by the world’s most impoverished citizens and the members of the military who provide them with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. But while the head-turning national security impacts of climate change are probably several decades away, the nature of the threat is such that waiting until these changes manifest is not a viable option. By the time the climate consequences are severe enough to compel action, there is likely to be little that can be done on human timescales to undo the changes to environmental systems and the human societies dependent upon them.

## 1AR—Unions/Welfare DA

### 1AR—Uniqueness (Unions)

#### Unions don’t work in the squo

Sherk 13 – As research fellow in labor economics at The Heritage Foundation, James Sherk researched ways to promote competition and mobility; “Unions Have Failed to Adapt”; Feb 4th, 2013; <https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/unions-have-failed-adapt> As+

Collective bargaining means one contract covers everyone. Such contracts do not reflect individual contributions. Instead unionized companies typically base promotions and raises on seniority, not merit. Unions designed this system for the industrial economy of the 1930s.

Today’s knowledge economy looks quite different. Machines and computers automated many of the rote tasks of the industrial age. Most employers today value employees for their skills and abilities — “human resources” — instead of seeing them as interchangeable cogs on the assembly line. Employees also expect to be rewarded for what they bring to the table.

Collective contracts make that challenging, especially when unions fight against individual recognition. In 2011 Giant Eagle grocery stores gave several employees in Edinboro, Pa., raises. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 23 promptly sued, arguing their contract prevented the company from awarding individual pay increases. The courts agreed and ordered Giant Eagle to rescind the raises. Local 23 wanted everyone to make the same amount, no matter how good they were at their job.

Many unions share this attitude. Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., introduced legislation to allow unionized employers to give performance-based raises. These pay increases would come on top of union wages. Unions nonetheless denounced the proposal. SEIU President Mary Kay Henry objected that the bill would allow “arbitrary” wage increases. The Teamsters derided it as a “bosses’ pet” bill. This attitude alienates many potential union members.

In the past unions offset such concerns by negotiating higher pay for everyone. In today’s competitive economy, they no longer can. If unions raise labor costs, consumers can shop elsewhere. Unions that insist on uncompetitive wages wind up like Hostess’s Bakery Union — with unemployed union members. Consequently, studies find unions do not raise pay at most newly organized companies.

Without being able to offer higher pay, unions have to sell workers on the value of collective bargaining itself. But that has proven difficult. The government already requires employers to provide employment protections like safety standards protections and overtime rates. Polls show that most workers feel their employer respects them. Unsurprisingly, polls also show that only one in 10 non-union workers want to join a union.

This makes it difficult for unions to organize enough new members to replace those lost to bankruptcy. Union membership has steadily declined over the past two generations. Today just 11.2 percent of employees belong to unions, fewer than when President Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. The private sector figures are even lower — just one in 15 private employees hold union cards.

### 1AR—Link Turn (Unions)

#### We increase unions sizes massively— if a super high percentage of people work then that increases union sizes which increases unions funding, power, and influence. Key to check back against things like infringement on workers’ rights

#### 1] There evidence is about Booker’s plan not the aff— it’s radically different because Booker’s plan doesn’t train workers, provide extra benefits, etc.

#### 2] Unions are still a thing—we need something to check back against worker rights abuse. Nowhere in the aff do we say unions bad/will be removed

### 1AR—No Link (Unions)

#### 1] We don’t destroy unions— your evidence doesn’t take into account for things like corona or Trump which are key to accessing the current employment situation

#### 2] Corona has seen a massive increase in unions which supercharges their lifespan in the future

McNicholas et. al. 08/25 — “Why unions are good for workers—especially in a crisis like COVID-19”; August 25, 2020; <https://www.epi.org/publication/why-unions-are-good-for-workers-especially-in-a-crisis-like-covid-19-12-policies-that-would-boost-worker-rights-safety-and-wages/> As+

The Trump administration’s failure to provide essential workers with basic protections during the coronavirus pandemic has underscored the importance of unions (McNicholas and Poydock 2020b). With a union, workers have negotiated additional pay,10 health and safety measures,11 paid sick leave,12 and job preservation.13 Furthermore, unionized workers have felt more secure speaking out about hazards (Jamieson 2020).

Without unions, many workers are forced to work without personal protective equipment or access to paid leave or premium pay. And when nonunion workers have advocated for health and safety protections or wage increases, they have often been retaliated against or even fired for doing so (Paul 2020; Davenport, Bhattarai, and McGregor 2020; Kruzel 2020; Eidelson 2020; Miller 2020). The lack of these basic protections has led to thousands of essential workers becoming infected with the coronavirus, and many are dying as a result (Bhattarai 2020; Kaplan and Kent 2020; Jewett, Bailey, and Renwick 2020).

How unions help working people broadly

While the coronavirus pandemic has underscored the importance of unions for working people, the benefits of union membership pre-date the pandemic and extend to a broad swath of the U.S. workforce. The following findings show just how diverse the unionized workforce is and how the union-led wage and safety benefits help advance the goal of a fair and prosperous economy.14 Unless otherwise noted, the data findings that follow are for both private- and public-sector workers and derive from our analysis of Current Population Survey microdata pooled from 2015–2019 (EPI 2020), and “union workers” refers to workers covered by a union contract.

#### 3] Unions become irrelevant in a post plan world— all the components of a union are taken into account in the NIEC like healthcare, income equality, minimum wage, women’s representation, etc. They can’t name a net benefit to workers unions

#### 4] A federal jobs guarantee doesn’t remove unions—it just cerates employment opportunities for everyone

#### 5] We allow workers to choose options—either full employment or partial employment which solves all your unclear link senarios about the aff

### 1AR—Uniqueness (Welfare)

#### 1] Uniquess is dead— their ev is from before 2019 a doesn’t take into account for COVID, elections, SOCTUS, etc.

#### 2] Welfare costs the us WAY more than it’s should— trying to save it useless

Rector 11 – “Worse Than Useless Measure of Poverty”; Nov 11th, 2011; <https://www.heritage.org/poverty-and-inequality/commentary/worse-useless-measure-poverty> As+

The Census Bureau’s old measure failed to fully take into account the nearly $1 trillion a year in federal welfare benefits received by low-income families. How many of these benefits were counted toward an individual or family income when calculating poverty? Almost none.

That’s part of the reason that, despite decades of increased welfare spending, poverty rates remained nearly unchanged.

The new measure, released Monday, does take more of these benefits into account when calculating poverty. But it further distorts the picture of poverty by placing income thresholds on an automatic elevator that climbs as overall income rises.

Thus, by this measure, even if the income of all Americans doubled immediately, poverty wouldn’t decrease, because the income thresholds would also double. Poverty would fall only if the incomes of the poor rise more quickly than those of the rest of the population.

Inaccurate as the old measure was, the new measure is much worse. It will ensure that “poverty” can’t be alleviated except by extreme income leveling.

The new measure is designed to provide a never-ending argument for the Left to insist that we must continue to “spread the wealth” by throwing more money into welfare programs.

The federal government continues to pour taxpayer dollars into welfare, now spending four times the amount necessary to pull every single poor person out of poverty. But government fails to address the major causes of poverty: lack of work -- even in good economic times -- and the rise in the out-of-wedlock birthrate in low-income communities.

### 1AR—Link Turn (Welfare)

#### 1] The aff is a welfare program—we literally give people helathcare, insurance, et.c at a fized and affordable cost

#### 2] The aff decreases the need for a program like welfare

Rochford 18 – “A Jobs Guarantee Could be a Better Form of Welfare”; September 27, 2018; Jonathan Rochford; <https://www.narrowroadcapital.com/memos/a-jobs-guarantee-could-be-a-better-form-of-welfare/> As+

In the US and Australia anti-poverty advocates have been calling for increased income support for those in the lowest income brackets. This has taken on a different form in each country, with a jobs guarantee and higher minimum wages being promoted in the US and a higher Newstart Allowance (unemployment payments) being promoted in Australia. This article focusses on the Australia situation as an example of how a jobs guarantee could be used to lift incomes and increase workforce participation, at little or potentially even negative cost. If implemented correctly, a jobs guarantee is something that could be supported by all parts of the political spectrum with substantial benefits for those moved from welfare to work.

The Basic Numbers

The campaign for a higher Newstart Allowance has been led by the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS). They are calling for the Newstart Allowance to be increased from $273 per week to $348 per week. As of June 2018, 745,902 people were receiving a Newstart Allowance. An across the Board increase of $75 per week would cost $2.917 billion. The Australian minimum wage is $18.93 per hour, with many industries having higher rates and casual workers receiving an additional payment of at least 25%. ACOSS’s proposed Newstart Allowance is equivalent to 18.4 hours of work per week at the minimum wage with the current Newstart Allowance being equivalent to 14.4 hours.

What Would a Jobs Guarantee Look Like?

The design of a jobs guarantee is critical in determining whether it becomes a successful program or yet another well-meaning government program that delivers little practical improvement at substantial cost. Crucially, a jobs guarantee needs to create new jobs rather than merely shifting existing jobs between people. Targeting areas where the work isn’t being done because potential employees are being fussy (e.g. fruit picking or food processing) or areas where the work doesn’t exist because the minimum wage makes it unviable (e.g. not for profit programs, manufacturing, labour intensive infrastructure and environmental works). Employer participation in a jobs guarantee program would be voluntary. Where employers chose to use the jobs guarantee system (with the potential of receiving a subsidy for doing so) a nearby Newstart recipient would be contacted. The potential employee would be instructed to attend the workplace at set times (minimum 18 hours per week) and undertake the work required. The employee would look like any other new employee, receiving the legally required minimum wage from the employer. Newstart recipients that have shown the least progress in obtaining employment or undertaking employment training would be the first to be contacted when a job via the jobs guarantee program arises. Failure to attend work when instructed would result in a reduction or cessation of their Newstart Allowance. Once the employment begins the Newstart Allowance would be replaced by the wage from the employer. Lessons learnt from successful jobs programs should be studied and where appropriate adopted in Australia. Examples include US programs in the Great Depression and an ongoing program in Utah that helps people with finding both work and housing. An example of what not do comes from the Obama administration, where the average cost of creating a new job was $53,000. The Productivity Commission is well placed to review these and other examples of job creation programs and advise on the optimum design. Small scale trials in regional and suburban areas with higher rates of unemployment would an ideal way to road test potential designs.

What Would a Jobs Guarantee Cost?

Forecasting the ultimate cost of a jobs guarantee is not a simple exercise. It requires assumptions on the number of jobs that are part of the program, the subsidies required, administration costs, welfare drop out rates, increased tax collections and numerous second order impacts. It is noted that that some parts of Australia already have something like a jobs guarantee program in place via welfare to work programs and activity tests. The cost of the program could be greatly reduced by requiring potential employers to bid for places in a “Dutch auction” with those asking for the least subsidies being awarded places. Examples could include local councils bidding for places to conduct labour intensive infrastructure and environmental works, not for profits seeking workers for food collection and distribution, employers in regional areas needing workers for fruit picking, or private sector employers for 3 month traineeships, internships or seasonal work. The use of Dutch auctions would substantially lessen the government component of the weekly payment. The second order effects of a jobs guarantee are likely to be substantially positive for government, taxpayers and unemployed people. Whilst the percentage is highly debated, there is no doubt that a meaningful percentage of welfare recipients are either not motivated to work or are undertaking undeclared cash in hand work. A jobs guarantee provides an instant activity test. Those who fail to attend their designated workplace without valid reason will see a reduction or cessation of their government payments. People taking cash in hand jobs would find a requirement to attend a workplace at set times greatly reduces their ability to undertake undeclared work. Another benefit is the upskilling of those currently unemployed as they undertake a form of paid work. This is particularly the case where employers are using the subsidy as a form of traineeship period for a new employee. Those who work hard when undertaking seasonal or traineeship work will be best placed to become regular employees when vacancies arise. Increased employment also benefits society by reducing crime and other costly social issues.

The combination of fewer welfare recipients reducing the total benefits paid, more taxes collected as cash in hand work reduces, and lower spending on crime and other social issues would greatly decrease the overall cost of a higher Newstart Allowance. Whilst the overall cost is not easy to estimate, a review by the Productivity Commission would provide greater clarity of the costs and benefits of switching Newstart Allowance recipients to a jobs guarantee.

### 1AR—No Link (Welfare)

#### 1] Their ev is about other plans not the NEIC— we still provide welfare benefits like healthcare, insurance, pensions, etc. are all normal means and provided by the aff.

### 1AR—Republicans Block Welfare

#### 1] Republicans block welfare anyways

Becker 18 — “Factbox: What Republicans mean when they talk about U.S. welfare reform”; JANUARY 8, 2018; <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-welfare-factbox/factbox-what-republicans-mean-when-they-talk-about-u-s-welfare-reform-idUSKBN1EX1ZZ> As+

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Donald Trump had indicated he would like to rein in spending on U.S. social welfare programs to follow up on his 2017 victory in overhauling the U.S. tax code.

Some Republicans, including House of Representatives Speaker Paul Ryan, welcomed the effort. Others, including Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell, indicated they are hesitant to tackle this politically volatile issue in a congressional election year.

Trump said after speaking to congressional leaders that they may need to delay pursuit of a welfare overhaul, prioritizing immigration changes and infrastructure spending.

There are roughly 80 welfare programs. Here are some that Republicans, who voted last month to add $1.5 trillion to the U.S. national debt over 10 years to pay for tax cuts, may target as they seek to cut federal spending.

MEDICAID

Federal and state governments jointly fund Medicaid. The health insurance program for low-income, disabled, elderly and other individuals is administered by the states.

About 68 million people - about one in five Americans - are insured by Medicaid. The program cost about $553 billion in 2016. It is open-ended, meaning its cost can fluctuate if more individuals qualify for Medicaid coverage.

Ryan has said capping Medicaid spending is a long-time goal.

As a candidate, Trump promised not to cut spending for Medicaid, the Medicare health insurance program for the elderly or the Social Security retirement program. But a White House budget blueprint released in May proposed slashing more than $600 billion from Medicaid’s budget over a decade.

The Trump administration is examining ways to limit Medicaid eligibility. Seema Verma, head of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, said in November the administration would encourage states to add work requirements to the program.

CHIP

The Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) offers health insurance for 8.9 million children in lower-income families. It is run jointly by the federal and state governments.

Congress allowed CHIP funding to expire at the end of September 2017. States warned that they could be forced to shut down their programs or freeze enrollment.

Under a deal to keep the government open through Jan. 19, Congress approved $3 billion for in CHIP funding through March, when it will need another congressional reauthorization.

TANF

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF) provides federal block grants to states for programs to help needy families. TANF grants in 2017 aided 1.1 million families. The program has an annual budget of about $16.5 billion, which Trump proposed trimming by 10 percent in his May blueprint.

#### 2] Even during Pandemic people can’t get welfare—multiple warrants like IRS numbers,current mean house income, and more prove

Yglesias 03/20 – Matthew Yglesias co-founded Vox.com with Ezra Klein and Melissa Bell back in the spring of 2014. He's currently a senior correspondent focused on politics and economic policy, and co-hosts The Weeds podcast twice a week on Tuesdays and Fridays. Before launching Vox, he was the author of the Moneybag column for Slate and before that he wrote and blogged for Think Progress, The Atlantic, TPM, and The American Prospect. Yglesias is the author of two books, most recently "The Rent Is Too Damn High" about the policy origins of the middle class housing affordability crisis in America. Yglesias was born and raised in New York City, but has lived in Washington DC since graduating college in 2003; “Senate Republicans’ cash assistance plan is far too limited”; March 20/2020; <https://www.vox.com/2020/3/20/21188087/mcconnell-cash-assistance-plan-limited> As+

McConnell’s plan will still help people and help stabilize the economy. But the limitations placed on this program give it serious shortcomings as both a humanitarian relief measure and an economic stimulus.

Little help for those who need it most

The shortcomings start with the fact that, reflecting longstanding conservative hostility to helping people who don’t have much market income, the people most in need of assistance get the least help here. Republican governors and the Trump administration have been trying for years to impose work requirements on Medicaid benefits, which studies show leads to lower enrollment but no change in employment. The White House is also pushing forward with a plan to impose more stringent work requirements on SNAP beneficiaries even as the economy collapses, likely leading 700,000 people to lose their benefits.

Judged by that standard, McConnell’s plan is surprisingly generous. The poorest households get some money, even as Republicans try to take their health and nutrition benefits away.

From a humanitarian standpoint, however, there’s something perverse about throwing together an emergency financial assistance program that gives the least assistance to those most in need. And from a macroeconomic standpoint, it’s the most desperate households that we can be most sure will immediately spend any money they get — thus doing the most to stabilize the economy. As for the other limitations — restricting any money from going to higher-income households — they at least have a clear rationale. The idea is these families don’t really need the money. But there are both technical and practical reasons to doubt whether even that kind of targeting really makes sense.

Backward-looking data doesn’t predict present needs

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median psychologist in America earns $97,770 a year, which puts you right about where the McConnell plan phases benefits down to $0.

Now that’s fine for those who actually make $97,770. But the way this plan works is the IRS would be basing what checks people get based on the data it already has, data about the past. So if you’ve had to close your office and offer your patients the option of doing remote therapy sessions, and 20 percent of them have decided they don’t want to do it (some because they don’t like the idea, some because they’ve lost their jobs, others because they’re just nervous and trying to conserve money), then your household budget has probably been thrown into disarray. But you’re still not getting any help.

You could go down the line with scenarios and the point will always be the same.

The reason we’re talking about this is that a very large and disruptive thing happened. Under the circumstances, past earnings are not very predictive of present conditions. Some jobs are not that impacted by Covid-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus. A few industries are probably even boosted. But other sectors are devastated. Owning a decent takeout pizza joint is suddenly a great career move, but being the chef of a Michelin-starred restaurant in Las Vegas is worthless.

There’s no tractable way for the government to take all these considerations into account. But that’s why just giving money to everyone and accepting that some of it will go to those who don’t really need help is probably the best solution. If you’re really worried about it, you could always launch a big drive to exhort people to donate their checks if they have no immediate spending needs.

Last but by no means least, treating a child as worth 40 percent the value of an adult is very questionable under the current circumstances.

## 1AR—Corruption DA

### 1AR—No Link

#### No link—robust accountability mechanisms.

[Laura Tatum et al. 19 “The Youth Opportunity Guarantee: A Framework for Success.” Georgetown Center on Poverty and Inequality, 2019. Available at www.georgetownpoverty.org/issues/ employment/youth-opportunity-guarantee-framework.]//CHS PK

Efforts to ensure accountability can draw from the lessons learned in states’ experimentation with outcomes-based funding (OBF) in higher education. OBF is intended to improve colleges’ performance. However, as states increase the percentage of funding tied to outcomes, institutions may respond by increasing selectivity to help them achieve outcomes. This would make it more difficult for underprepared students to access higher education; due to historic and systemic reasons, these students are more likely to be low-income and/or students of color. Therefore, Anna Cielinski and Duy Pham at CLASP have proposed “equity measures” as performance measures serving two related purposes: to counteract OBF’s incentives for postsecondary institutions to increase selectivity, and to help ensure sufficient resources for institutions serving students most in need.474 The number of degree completions by low-income students exemplifies such an equity measure. An important means to increase transparency would be a student-level federal postsecondary data system to provide information about what programs are helping students to earn credentials and attain good jobs. These data would allow students to compare return on investment for different programs, as it varies widely. The bipartisan College Transparency Act outlines a new system that would publicize aggregate information including students’ enrollment, completion rates, debt repayment, and employment outcomes for postsecondary programs.475, 476 This privacy-protected system would build on the U.S. Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System and College Scorecard which have advanced transparency but do not offer a complete picture.477 Data would be disaggregated along lines including race/ethnicity, income, and gender. In addition to these postsecondary statistics, other statistics to evaluate youth opportunity by state and community include: the high school completion rate, youth disconnection rate, youth unemployment rate, and duration of young adults’ periods of unemployment. These rates must be evaluated in the aggregate and broken down by income, race, and gender. Transparency is also needed with respect to the use of public funds under the Youth Opportunity Guarantee, and federally-funded evaluations would be utilized to assess impact.

### 1AR—Normal Means

#### Normal means includes monitoring for corruption

Mark **Paul 18**. Postdoctoral Associate at the Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity at Duke University. “The Federal Job Guarantee - A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. March 9, 2018. https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment

Employment can be either part-time (20 hours a week) or full-time (35–40 hours a week) depending on the needs of the employee. For employees to receive their compensation, they must show up to their job and perform the tasks assigned to them. As was the case with the WPA, a Division of Progress Investigation (DPI) should be established to monitor shirking or corruption. If workers are found to be negligent, or generally disruptive to the workplace, disciplinary action can be taken by the DPI.

#### That’s NIEC specific too.

Ryan Nunn 18. The Hamilton Project and the Brookings Institution. “Labor Market Considerations for a National Job Guarantee, “The Hamilton Project. December 2018. https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/JobGuarantee\_FP\_web\_120318.pdf

The proposed NIEC would include a Division of Progress Investigation (DPI) tasked with monitoring shirking or corruption, and that would be empowered to take disciplinary actions against participants engaged in such behavior

### 1AR—Private Sector

#### Private sector’s worse.

Pavlina R. Tcherneva 18. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, “The Job Guarantee: Design, Jobs, and Implementation,” Levy Economics Institute. Working Paper No. 902. April 2018. http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp\_902.pdf

But isn’t this program prone to inefficiency, corruption, and abuse?

As above (see questions 26–28), the private sector efficiency criteria do not apply here. The question is: Are public schools, blood banks, libraries, and community health centers more prone to corruption, inefficiency, or abuse? Are farms, daycare centers, theaters, and fish- monitoring efforts uniquely susceptible to these problems? It is not clear that they are. Arguably, there are many private sector initiatives more prone to corruption and abuse than these examples.

## 1AR—Offshoring DA

### 1AR—No Link

#### 1] No link—most people go into labor jobs like public sanitation that cannot be offshored

#### 2] Their ev. just isn’t about our plan—the NEIC doesn’t increase minimum wage or do any of the other things the dissad says it does

#### 3] They drop the ball—the aff employs everyone so there would be no offshoring—we would just give other countries the jobs without impact

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### 1] Their evidence is from 2018— you cannot seriously think it applies ot a pandemic world and that it’s stats are up to date.

#### 2] Offshoring is non-unique—India and China prove

### 1AR— Wages

#### 1] Their evidence is from pre China trade war and COVID—no one goes oversees anymore

### 1AR—Turn (Quality)

#### Offshoring boosts savings and quality.

Smith 06 — David Smith, journalist and author, specializing in economics, economics editor at The Sunday Times, also an assistant editor and policy adviser, visiting professor at the University of Wales, 2006 (“Offshoring: Political Myths and Economic Reality,” Wiley Online Library, May 7th, Available Online at <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00781.x>,)

**If cost saving is the motivation, how much do companies reckon to save? For most – more than three-quarters – the savings are between 10 and 50 per cent** compared with the costs of **carryingout the same operations at home**. **For a few there are even bigger savings**.

### 1AR—Turn (Job Creation)

#### Offshoring offers small GDP boosts, lowers inflation, and creates jobs.

Smith 06 — David Smith, journalist and author, specializing in economics, economics editor at The Sunday Times, also an assistant editor and policy adviser, visiting professor at the University of Wales, 2006 (“Offshoring: Political Myths and Economic Reality,” Wiley Online Library, May 7th, Available Online at <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00781.x>, Accessed 7-03-18) tb recut

**Most of the detailed work has been done from America.** The estimate you will see everywhere is that a cumulative **3.3 million US jobs will be offshored over the next decade or so.** But the estimate, from McKinsey, also came with some context attached. That was that the annual flow of jobs overseas was small in relation to the normal job market inflows and outflows. **Annual flows of jobs offshore, in fact, are broadly equivalent to a good month’s employment growth**.

What about some of those wider economic benefits listed earlier? **To what extent will offshoringboost GDP in the country sending jobs overseas, and to what extent will inflation be kept down by outsourcing? Global Insight, a US economic consultancy,** has tried to **put some numbers on this. The GDP boost, which comes from higher real incomes and the shift of workers into more productive activities, is estimated by them to reach $124 billion** by 2008. That sounds like a lot, but it is only around one per cent of GDP.

What about inflation and interest rates? Global Insight tried to estimate this too and came up with the result that **the cost-reduction effect will be worth a cumulative 2–2.5 per cent off the level of the GDP deflator by 2008, and that other things being equal interest rates will be 0.4 per cent lower than otherwise.** Again, we can debate the figures, although the direction is plausible.

This then allows the crucial third step in the economic argument. How many more jobs will be created by stronger economic growth and lower inflation? They suggest quite a lot, and certainly more than are lost due to offshoring. In this example **a quarter of a million IT service jobs will have been lost by 2008, but 600,000 additional non-IT jobs created. The net effect is more employment.**

### 1AR—Turn (Stops US-China War)

#### \*\*BEST OFFSHORING TURN

#### Chinese and American economies are intertwined now economically because of offshoring and interdependency --- this caps the impact to a trade war, but eroding those ties risks war

Yong 18 Wang Yong, Wang Yong is Professor at the School of International Studies and Director of the Center for International Political Economy at Peking University. “China and the United States must avoid a new Cold War.” East Asia Forum. July 11, 2018. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/07/11/china-and-the-united-states-must-avoid-a-new-cold-war/

US President Donald Trump’s trade war against China and the world is subverting the global open trading order and effectively dismantling the World Trade Organization as the universal authority for the resolution of trade disputes. After imposing tariffs on steel and aluminium imports, the US administration has now slapped tariffs on US$34 billion of Chinese imports, and it is expected to do so for more imports from China in the future.

This trade friction has deep roots in the restructuring of domestic politics in China and the United States, as well as in changes in their perceptions of one another. While China–US interdependence and common interests continue to expand, technological and strategic competition between the two nations has come earlier than expected. Economic competition, combined with differences in ideology, development models and political systems, may push China and the United States into a new Cold War.

In terms of economics and trade, Trump is reversing two decades of US policy that emphasised online and high-tech sectors in favour of trying to revive US manufacturing to supposedly correct trade imbalances. In terms of foreign policy, Trump has challenged the long-held view of the liberal international order as one that must be led by the United States, applying protectionist trade pressure on allies and demanding that they increase defence spending and purchase more US weapons to reduce the US fiscal burden. Domestically, Trump’s presidency has brought about a fierce clash of values and greatly weakened the United States’ social and political consensus.

Over the past five years, China’s state apparatus under President Xi Jinping has re-established its authority, restructured its policy institutions and formulated a clearer medium- and long-term development strategy. Central authority has been strengthened and supervision over the exercise of public power has been bolstered.

But the complex interdependence between China and the United States formed during the era of economic globalisation will still limit any substantial deterioration in bilateral relations in the near future. Despite increasing frictions, China–US relations will continue to be characterised by shared interests and cooperation for four reasons.

First, US–China trade has reached nearly US$700 billion and bilateral [monetary and financial relations](https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/united-states-and-global-adjustment-process) are also very close. China’s continued purchase of US Treasury bonds supports the US economy and the status of the dollar. In turn, if China wants to have greater influence in international financial and currency markets, it will also be inseparable from the US dollar and the US market.

Second, after more than 40 years of development, exchanges between the two countries have formed a dense network of close interpersonal relationships that would constrain any attempt at ‘decoupling’ the two countries.

Third, the personal interactions between Xi and Trump as leaders have been good so far, and a relatively smooth communication channel has been formed.

Fourth, China’s national strategies are not intended to challenge US hegemony but instead seek to achieve national modernisation. China’s foreign policy is mainly based on international economic cooperation, and China supports existing international mechanisms and is promoting their reform. The country’s national security policy is mainly aimed at self-defence. While many believe that China’s development model and philosophy pose a challenge to the United States, this argument does not make much sense because China does not advocate exporting ideology and emphasises respect for the right of each country to choose its own development path.

The future of US–China relations faces two options. The first is that the two countries strengthen cooperation under the framework of global governance. China and the United States can reach a lot of consensus on the framework of global governance and jointly provide international public goods to safeguard common interests. In the past, the two countries generally handled their relations in a practical way. As a result, their shared interests and consensus have continued to expand.

Beijing and Washington made considerable progress in cooperation within the G20 framework. The United States has shown some flexibility in allowing China to play a greater role, while China respects the status of the United States in the international system.

The other option is the so-called decoupling of the economies of China and the United States, with each building its own system and eventually colliding with each other in a new Cold War. The cost of decoupling would be huge and it is not a realistic choice for either China or the United States.

To avoid decoupling, confrontation and a new Cold War, the most important thing is for China and the United States to conduct effective dialogue and communication, achieve strategic trust and reduce the current trust deficit. Many US commentators have misunderstood China’s [domestic political changes](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/07/01/where-is-chinese-governance-headed/#more-134207) since the 19th Party Congress in Beijing in October 2017. Chinese leaders need to do more explaining of China’s political system to US elites to reduce misunderstanding.

Both countries must commit to the basic policy of building a ‘new type of [great power relations](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/01/25/chinas-vision-for-a-new-world-order/)’. In 2012 Xi proposed the strategic idea that both countries would commit to redefining their relationship based on the principles of no conflict, no confrontation and mutual benefit. This is key to addressing US elites’ deep sense of anxiety about the possibility of the United States’ decline and China’s rise. Both sides should properly handle economic and trade frictions. The Chinese side should realise that US government and corporate complaints are an expression of the strong US interests in the Chinese market.

Economic and trade links are a ‘stabilising stone’ in bilateral relations. In economic and trade negotiations, China should adhere to its principles and respond to unreasonable US demands with strength. At the same time, China must deepen reforms and expand its opening up to consolidate the common interests that are the foundation of China–US relations.

#### Trade ties, especially in the context of offshoring and manufacturing, bind the US and China together --- this solves conflict --- elimination of those ties would be catastrophic

Schiavenza and Kroeber 18 – Matt Schiavenza and Arthur Kroeber. Matt Schiavenza is the Senior Content Manager at Asia Society. His work has appeared at The Atlantic, The Daily Beast, The New Republic, Fortune, and strategy + business among other publications. Arthur R. Kroeber is founding partner of Gavekal Dragonomics, a China-focused economic research consultancy he established in Beijing in 2002. “What's Next for U.S.-China Economic Relations?” Asia Society. June 15, 2018. https://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/whats-next-us-china-economic-relations

The current dispute over trade form just one part of the complex, evolving relationship between the United States and China, the world's two largest economies. To get a better sense of where China is headed, and what Washington should do about it, Asia Blog recently spoke to Arthur Kroeber, a longtime expert on the Chinese economy. The conversation has been edited and condensed for clarity.

The most recent findings of the [China Economic Dashboard](https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/china-dashboard-tracking-chinas-economic-reform-program), a collaboration between the Asia Society Policy Institute and Rhodium Group, indicate that China's economic reforms are mainly stalling and, in some cases, going backward. Why do you think that's happening?

I'm not certain that "reform" is really the right lens through which to view the Chinese economy. Their original aim was to create a successful mixed economy that would be well-integrated in the global economy, deliver broad-based income gains, and engineer rapid growth. And that's what they've got.

So I think the position of [Chinese President] Xi Jinping is that reform is a game that the Chinese don't really have to play. The current balance in China has as much to do with optimizing the performance of the state sector than it does optimize the performance of the market.

I think there was a lot of wishful thinking in the West that the universal laws of economics would inevitably force the Chinese state to liberalize the economy because otherwise, they wouldn't be able to forge economic growth. But China has shown that it's perfectly able to achieve six to seven percent growth annually with large state sector involvement, and as long as that keeps happening they won't be forced to do anything.

The grand strategy for the U.S. and the West over the past three decades has been to integrate China into the global economy. Given the recent struggles of working-class people in the West, was this strategy, in retrospect, a mistake?

Absolutely not. I think that this was absolutely the correct strategy. Having China as a constructive player in the global economy, with their interests aligned with peace and stability and not with stirring the pot, is a gigantic achievement. Only people who were willfully ignorant of the problems that existed before and willfully blind to the enormous benefits could make that kind of statement.

However, bringing China into the global economy — which involved moving hundreds of millions of low-wage, poorly-educated workers into the manufacturing sector — was a huge shock and one of the things that contributed to the reduction of manufacturing employment and wage reduction in the U.S.

The failure wasn't in the China policy. It was in the domestic policy.

To my mind, that's an understandable and practical cost of bringing China into the global economy, which was a massive achievement. But the U.S. has done a terrible, terrible job of helping people adjust to that trauma. The failure wasn't in the China policy. It was in the domestic policy. There could have been a lot more investment in education and infrastructure.

Even if President Trump hadn't been elected in 2016, was there a need to reassess U.S. policy toward China?

Yes. To get back to the previous question, folding China into the global economy was the correct strategy — but it had an expiration date. China became powerful and then decided to do things its own way. They wanted to build their own sphere of influence in Asia and influence global institutions in a way that better reflected their values.

What that meant was that the West has already accomplished its goal of bringing China into these institutions, and the current situation required a fresh approach — regardless of who got elected in 2016. And I think that's occurring now.

But there are two reasons why it's difficult to determine what's going on. One is President Trump. He's such a completely chaotic force. The other is that there's no consensus in the administration beneath him of what U.S. policy toward China should be. Everyone can agree that the old policy was no longer functional. But there's a lot of debate beneath Trump about what to do next without any real coalescence from the top.

Is the era of economic interdependence between the U.S. and China coming to an end?

The short answer is no. For one, the U.S. is still China's second-largest export market, behind Europe, accounting for 17 to 18 percent of exports. Then look at [Chinese telecommunications giant] ZTE. Can they do without America? No, they can't. They're dead within weeks if they can't get their components from America. The [ZTE story](https://www.vox.com/world/2018/5/14/17352088/trump-zte-china-trade-war) served as a good reminder of the high degree of interdependence in the tech sector in general — something that's going to be hard to abandon.

A lot of the products produced in China rely on U.S. components. Over 40 percent of Chinese exports are produced by foreign-invested firms, many of which are, if not American, then American subcontracted. Seventy to 80 percent of high-tech exports involve foreign-invested firms. So even if relations can get bad in a political sense, the economic reality of interdependence is real.

### 1AR—Tech Competition

#### Competitiveness not key to heg

Brooks and Wohlforth, 8

[Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “World out of Balance, International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy,” p. 32-35]

 American primacy is also rooted in the county's position as the world's leading technological power. The United States remains dominant globally in overall R&D investments, high-technology production, commercial innovation, and higher education (table 2.3). Despite the weight of this evidence, elite perceptions of U.S. power had shifted toward pessimism by the middle of the first decade of this century. As we noted in chapter 1, this was partly the result of an Iraq-induced doubt about the utility of material predominance, a doubt redolent of the post-Vietnam mood. In retrospect, many assessments of U.S. economic and technological prowess from the 1990s were overly optimistic; by the next decade important potential vulnerabilities were evident. In particular, chronically imbalanced domestic finances and accelerating public debt convinced some analysts that the United States once again confronted a competitiveness crisis.23 If concerns continue to mount, this will count as the fourth such crisis since 1945; the first three occurred during the 1950s (Sputnik), the 1970s (Vietnam and stagflation), and the 1980s (the Soviet threat and Japan's challenge). None of these crises, however, shifted the international system's structure: multipolarity did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s, and each scare over competitiveness ended with the American position of primacy retained or strengthened.24

Our review of the evidence of U.S. predominance is not meant to suggest that the United States lacks vulnerabilities or causes for concern. In fact, it confronts a number of significant vulnerabilities; of course, this is also true of the other major powers.25 The point is that adverse trends for the United States will not cause a polarity shift in the near future. If we take a long view of U.S. competitiveness and the prospects for relative declines in economic and technological dominance, one takeaway stands out: relative power shifts slowly. The United States has accounted for a quarter to a third of global output for over a century. No other economy will match its combination of wealth, size, technological capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future (tables 2.2 and 2.3).

The depth, scale, and projected longevity of the U.S. lead in each critical dimension of power are noteworthy. But what truly distinguishes the current distribution of capabilities is American dominance in all of them simultaneously. The chief lesson of Kennedy's 500-year survey of leading powers is that nothing remotely similar ever occurred in the historical experience that informs modern international relations theory. The implication is both simple and underappreciated: the counterbalancing constraint is inoperative and will remain so until the distribution of capabilities changes fundamentally. The next section explains why.

#### Not zero-sum –

#### A. We’ll get tech no matter who makes it

Bhide, 9

[Amar, Glaubinger Professor of Business at Columbia University, editor of Capitalism and Society, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and author of The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses, “ The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains

Prosperity in a More Connected World,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance • Volume 21 Number 1, Winter 2009]

 The techno-nationalist claim that U.S. prosperity requires that the country “maintain its scientific and technological lead” is particularly dubious: the argument fails to recognize that the development of scientific knowledge or cutting-edge technology is not a zero-sum competition. The results of scientific research are available at no charge to anyone anywhere in the world. Most arguments for the public funding of scientific research are in fact based on the unwillingness of private investors to undertake research that cannot yield a profit. Cutting-edge technology (as opposed to scientific research) has commercial value because it can be patented; but patent owners generally don’t charge higher fees to foreign licensors. The then tiny Japanese company Sony was one of the first licensors of Bell Labs’ transistor patent. Sony paid all of $50,000—and only after first obtaining special permission from the Japanese Ministry of Finance—for the license that started it on the road to becoming a household name in consumer electronics.

Moreover, if patent holders choose not to grant licenses but to exploit their inventions on their own, this does not mean that the country of origin secures most of the benefit at the expense of other countries. Suppose IBM chooses

to exploit internally, instead of licensing, a breakthrough from its China Research Laboratory (employing 150 research staff in Beijing). This does not help China and hurt everyone else. Rather, as I discuss at length later, the benefits go to IBM’s stockholders, to employees who make or market the product that embodies the invention, and—above all—to customers, who secure the lion’s share of the benefit from most innovations. These stockholders, employees, and customers, who number in the tens of millions, are located all over the world.

In a world where breakthrough ideas easily cross national borders, the origin of ideas is inconsequential. Contrary to Thomas Friedman’s assertion, it does not matter that Google’s search algorithm was invented in California. After all, a Briton invented the protocols of the World Wide Web—in a lab in Switzerland. A Swede and a Dane in Tallinn, Estonia, started Skype, the leading provider of peer-to-peer Internet telephony. How did the foreign origins of these innovations harm the U.S. economy?

#### B. We can commercialize tech fastest – proves location of technological innovation is irrelevant and competitiveness is sustainable

The Economist, 6

[“Venturesome consumption.” Economist, 00130613, 7/29/2006, Vol. 380, Issue 8488 ]

 In a marvellously contrarian new paper\*, Amar Bhidé, of Columbia University's business school, argues that these supposed remedies, and the worries that lie behind them, are based on a misconception of how innovation works and of how it contributes to economic growth. Mr Bhidé finds plenty of nice things to say about many of the things that most trouble critics of the American economy: consumption as opposed to thrift; a plentiful supply of consumer credit; Wal-Mart; even the marketing arms of drug companies. He thinks that good managers may be at least as valuable as science and engineering graduates (though given where he works, perhaps he is talking his own book). But he has nothing nice to say about the prophets of technological doom.

Mr Bhidé says that the doomsayers are guilty of the "techno-fetishism and techno-nationalism" described in 1995 by two economists, Sylvia Ostry and Richard Nelson. This consists, first, of paying too much attention to the upstream development of new inventions and technologies by scientists and engineers, and too little to the downstream process of turning these inventions into products that tempt people to part with their money, and, second, of the belief that national leadership in upstream activities is the same thing as leadership in generating economic value from innovation.

But nowadays innovation--a complex, gradual process, often involving many firms making incremental advances over many years--is not much constrained by national borders, argues Mr Bhidé. Indeed, the sort of upstream innovation (the big ideas of those scientists and engineers) most celebrated by those who fear its movement to China and India is the hardest to keep locked up in the domestic market.

The least internationally mobile innovation, on the other hand, is the downstream sort, where big ideas are made suitable for a local market. Mr Bhidé argues that this downstream innovation, which is far more complex and customised than the original upstream invention, is the most valuable kind and what America is best at. Moreover, perhaps the most important fact overlooked by the techno-nationalists, notes Mr Bhidé, is that most of the value of innovations accrues to their users not their creators--and stays in the country where the innovation is consumed. So if China and India do more invention, so much the better for American consumers.

The most important part of innovation may be the willingness of consumers, whether individuals or firms, to try new products and services, says Mr Bhidé. In his view, it is America's venturesome consumers that drive the country's leadership in innovation. Particularly important has been the venturesome consumption of new innovations by American firms. Although America has a lowish overall investment rate compared with other rich countries, it has a very high rate of adoption of information technology (IT). Contrast that with Japan (the original technology bogeyman from the East) where, despite an abundance of inventive scientists and engineers, many firms remain primitive in their use of IT.

### 1AR—Modernization

#### China can’t catch up and no risk of war

Zenko and Cohen 12 (Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and MIchael Cohen, Senior Fellow at the American Security Project, serves on the board of the National Security Network and has taught at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, served in the U.S. Department of State, former Senior Vice President at the strategic communications firm of Robinson, Lerer and Montgomery, bachelor’s degree in international relations from American University and a master’s degree from Columbia University, 3/14/2012, "Clear and Present Safety", yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/clear-and-present-safety)

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China’s rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China’s proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China’s senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China’s military ambitions remain dominated by “regional contingencies” and that the People’s Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that “extend global reach or power projection.” In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China’s legitimate regional interests. It is true that China’s neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China’s room to maneuver. The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China’s export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one.

#### No impact – modernization is slow and defensive

Bitzinger and Desker, 9

[Richard, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Barry, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, “ Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival | vol. 50 no. 6 | December 2008–January 2009

Overall, most Western assessments agree that the PLA has made considerable progress over the past decade in adding new weapons to its arsenal, and that China has noticeably improved its military capabilities in several specific areas – particularly missile attack, power projection over sea and in the air, and information warfare. Most predict that Chinese military power relative to its likely competitors in the Asia-Pacific region – especially Taiwan – and the United States will continue to increase significantly over the next ten to 20 years. There are, however, some striking differences of opinion when it comes to interpreting the significance of these hardware developments. Many Western analysts assert that the PLA continues to suffer from considerable deficiencies and weaknesses that limit its ability to constitute a major military threat: in spite of all its efforts, China is still at least two decades behind the United States in terms of defence capabilities and technology. In particular, the PLA still lacks the logistical and lift capacity – both by sea and by air – for projecting force much beyond its borders. China also lags far behind the West in areas such as C4I architectures and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Some therefore argue that China’s current rearmament programme is an incremental, long-term modernisation process that must be understood in the context of competing force-modernisation activities taking place among China’s likely rivals.

Moreover, what the PLA has been engaged in over the past 10–15 years may not really be a revolution in military affairs at all. First, there is very little evidence that the Chinese military is engaged in an revoutionary overhaul of its organisational or institutional structures. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly, the PLA, despite its emphasis on the ‘importance of information technology and knowledge-based warfare on the battlefield … has yet to promulgate a definitive military doctrine to guide the development of capabilities and operations in this area’.38 Most of China’s ground forces remain traditional infantry units, hobbled by a shortage of rapid-mobility assets such as helicopters, airlift or amphibious lift.39 The PLA’s highly hierarchical and top-down command structure and its inter-service compartmentalisation does not seem to have changed, and even the Pentagon acknowledges the PLA’s deficiencies when it comes to things like interoperability.40 Secondly, while the Chinese military is certainly acquiring new and better equipment, little of it could be construed as particularly revolutionary, or be seen as leapfrogging a generation of weapons development. For example, using short- and medium-range ballistic missiles as precision-attack systems may be a unique approach, but in China’s case this may be more a matter of making a virtue out of a necessity – the PLA simply lacks sufficient numbers of other types of precision-guided munitions, particularly for land attack. In addition, systems such as the J-10 fighter jet, the Song-class diesel-electric submarine and the Type-52C Luyang II-class destroyer (which is equipped with an Aegis-type air-defence radar), while advanced for the PLA, are basically 1980s-era weaponry, technologically speaking. The J-10, for instance, is operationally comparable to the US F-16C, which first entered service in the mid 1980s. Even the equipment the Chinese have acquired from Russia (Su-27 fighters, Sovremennyy-class destroyers, Kilo-class submarines, and S-300 surface-to-air missiles) – arguably the sharpest edges of the PLA spear – are hardly cutting-edge, transformational weapons systems. Moreover, most Chinese weapons systems coming online today were developed more or less sequentially – that is, following traditional patterns of incremental research and development. For example, Chinese fighter-aircraft development has moved in a fairly routine fashion from second-generation (J-7/ MiG-21) to third-generation (J-8) to fourth-generation (J-10) systems – acknowledging, of course, the 20-year period of near-total absence of new research from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s. Overall, therefore, Chinese military transformation looks fairly mundane, consisting mostly of buying new platforms, such as fighter jets, warships, submarines, missile systems, tanks and other weapons.

Thirdly, modernisation does not seem to be accelerating. Indeed, over the past few years the pace of PLA arms acquisitions has declined in some areas. The Chinese have not laid down a new destroyer in more than three years. In 2006 and 2007, Chinese overseas arms purchases were worth, respectively, $100 million and $150m, a far cry from the $2.8bn-worth of foreign weapons systems it bought in 2005. The most recent edition of the US Defense Department’s annual report on Chinese military power shows that, while the PLA has made considerable progress in incorporating ‘modern’ weapons systems into its forces, as of 2007, 70% of its surface combatants, 60% of it submarine force and 80% of its fighter jets were still considered ‘old’.41 Clearly, Chinese military modernisation has a long way to go.

Fourthly, it is worth noting that Chinese military modernisation efforts are still embryonic or experimental, and Western observers possess only a vague idea as to the PLA’s intentions and progress in many areas of informatisation, such as information warfare or digitisation, or whether these programmes will ever be effectively implemented. The PLA still possesses no centralised C4ISR infrastructure, and has an incomplete foundation for networking, leading to poor interoperability.42

Fifthly, recapitalising the Chinese military with modern equipment, and in particular pursuing improvements in C4ISR, does not in and of itself constitute a revolution in military affairs; on the contrary, acquiring these systems makes perfect sense even without worrying about transformation. Finally, it is possible that PLA transformation may turn out to be much less revolutionary in practice. According to Dennis Blasko, the current concept of limited, informationalised war is, in many ways, People’s War adapted to twenty-first-century requirements and capabilities. He argues that the Chinese see no contradiction in using the most advanced weapons and technology available to them in conjunction with existing, often antiquated, weaponry to fight a Local War on China’s border using the principles of People’s War. People’s War is still often referred to as China’s ‘secret weapon.’43 In particular, he points out that while the PLA appreciates the effectiveness of such transformational concepts as information warfare and massed, conventional missile attack, it does not see these weapons in and of themselves as decisive in battle. Blasko quotes the PLA officer’s training manual, which states that ‘in the employment of forces, one should mainly rely on high tech “magic weapons” … while at the same time maximizing one’s superiority in conducting a People’s War’.44

On the whole, the PLA seems to have done a good job adopting the rhetoric of transformation while pursuing a ‘modernisation-plus’ approach. China’s current military build-up is ambitious and far-reaching, but is indicative of evolutionary, steady-state and sustaining, rather than disruptive or revolutionary, innovation and change. Forget leapfrogging – the Chinese are simply playing catch-up.

## 1AR—Corona DA

### 1AR—Nonunique

#### We are clearing the hill and leaving the pandemic behind us

Reich 11/15 – “BioNTech CEO: Our coronavirus vaccine can end the pandemic”; <https://www.jpost.com/health-science/biontech-ceo-our-coronavirus-vaccine-can-end-the-pandemic-649128> As+

German biotech firm BioNTech is behind one of the leading coronavirus vaccine candidates, having jointly developed it with US-based pharmaceutical company Pfizer. And according to its CEO, the 90% effective vaccine candidate is set to bring an end to the global pandemic.

Speaking to UK newspaper The Guardian over Zoom, BioNTech CEO Ugur Sahin said he was optimistic of the vaccine's success.

“If the question is whether we can stop this pandemic with this vaccine, then my answer is yes, because I believe that even protection only from symptomatic infections will have a dramatic effect,” he told the UK daily.

Sahin explained he wasn't fully confident at first, but that all changed after the Phase III trial results were revealed last Monday. The way it works is by attacking the virus in multiple ways, first by making it difficult for it to actually get into the body, and then by training the immune system to fight back if it does.

“The vaccine hinders COVID-19 from gaining access to our cells. But even if the virus manages to find a way in, then the T-cells bash it over the head and eliminate it,” he told The Guardian.

“We have trained the immune system very well to perfect these two defensive moves. We now know that the virus can’t defend itself against these mechanisms.”

There are still some questions regarding the vaccine, however, such as how long the immunity caused by the vaccine could last. Sahin explained to The Guardian, however, that “Studies of COVID-19 patients have shown that those with a strong immune response still have that response after six months. I could imagine we could be safe for at least a year.”

#### Multiple vaccines and Biden’s presidency check for any risk of offence from the disad

Smith 11/16 – “Will a COVID-19 vaccine be ready in 2020? It looks like Pfizer and Moderna might make it happen”; <https://www.cnet.com/how-to/will-a-covid-19-vaccine-be-ready-in-2020-it-looks-like-pfizer-and-moderna-might-make-it-happen/> As+

Both companies plan to apply for emergency authorization from the FDA this month. Pfizer, if authorized, expects to produce up to 50 million vaccine doses in 2020, and 1.3 billion in 2021. Moderna plans to ship 20 million doses in 2020 and another 500 million to 1 billion in 2021, if authorized. With over 330 million people in the US alone, not everyone will be able to get a vaccine at once -- the first doses to reach market will likely go to heath care personnel, followed by essential workers, people with underlying medical conditions and older adults.

Pfizer and Moderna represent only the tip of the iceberg. Currently, there are 67 coronavirus vaccines in various stages of clinical trials, with a handful almost ready to apply for authorization. Most experts believe we'll have several more ready to distribute by early 2021, but it may not be until 2022 that life starts to get back to normal.

#### COVID is nonunique —it will always be here, and they provide no way to resolve it which means there’s no net benefit to voting neg on the disad

BBC 8/22 – “Coronavirus will be with us forever, Sage scientist warns”; 22 August 2020; <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53875189> As+

Sir Mark Walport said people would need to be vaccinated at regular intervals.

His comments come after the head of the World Health Organization (WHO) said he hoped the pandemic would be over within two years, as the Spanish flu had taken two years to overcome. Sir Mark said denser populations and travel meant the virus spread easily. He also said the world population was now much larger than in 1918.

Speaking to BBC Radio 4's Today programme, Sir Mark said that, in order to control the pandemic, "global vaccination" would be required, but coronavirus would not be a disease like smallpox "which could be eradicated by vaccination". "This is a virus that is going to be with us forever in some form or another, and almost certainly will require repeated vaccinations," he said. "So, a bit like flu, people will need re-vaccination at regular intervals." Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, head of the WHO, has said that the Spanish flu of 1918 took two years to overcome, and that advances in technology could allow the world to halt coronavirus "in a shorter time". The flu of 1918 killed at least 50 million people. Coronavirus has so far killed 800,000 people. Nearly 23 million infections have been recorded but the number of people who have actually had the virus is thought to be much higher due to inadequate testing and asymptomatic cases.

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### Workers are the crucial internal link to testing infrastructure and contact tracing – there’s not enough of them in crucial hostspot zones

Simmons-Duffin 6-18 Selena Simmons-Duffin 6-18-2020 "As States Reopen, Do They Have The Workforce They Need To Stop Coronavirus Outbreaks?" <https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/06/18/879787448/as-states-reopen-do-they-have-the-workforce-they-need-to-stop-coronavirus-outbre> (Simmons-Duffin attended Stanford University, where she majored in English. She took time off from college to do HIV/AIDS-related work in East Africa. She started out in radio at Stanford's radio station, KZSU, and went on to study documentary radio at the Salt Institute, before coming to NPR as an intern in 2009.)//Elmer

An NPR survey of state health departments shows that the national coronavirus contact tracing workforce has tripled in the past six weeks, from 11,142 workers to 37,110. Yet given their current case counts, only seven states and the District of Columbia are staffed to the level that public health researchers say is **needed to contain outbreaks**. Contact tracers are public health workers who reach out to each new positive coronavirus case, track down their contacts, and connect both the sick person and those who were exposed with the services they need to be able to safely isolate themselves. This is an essential part of **stamping out emerging outbreaks**. To understand how that picture had changed since NPR's initial contact tracing survey in late April, NPR reached out again to all state health departments, as well as Washington, D.C., and the U.S. territories. In total, NPR reporters were able to assemble data from all 50 states along with D.C., Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. Many states are still planning to hire more contact tracers, reassign existing government staff, or train outside volunteers. Some already have a bank of trained staff or volunteers in waiting, able to pivot to tracing contacts if new positive cases spike. Many of them are relying on the National Guard, AmeriCorps, volunteers or part-time workers to fill these ranks. With the plans to hire and reserve staff, the national workforce grows to 68,525 contact tracers. "I think it's amazing that the workforce scale-up has gone this far in such a short period of time," says Crystal Watson, a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and a lead author of the center's white paper on contact tracing capacity. "But I'm also — at the same time — concerned, because we're seeing these increases in case numbers in a lot of different states." Tom Frieden, former director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, agrees that NPR's survey shows some progress has been made, but that it's "**not nearly enough** and not **nearly fast enough**." Public health experts say tracing the contacts of each positive case and asking them to quarantine **is crucial for allowing communities to safely reopen** — those who are sick or have been exposed stay home while the rest of the public begins to return to normal life. If communities don't have enough tracers to quickly call and investigate each positive case and to effectively follow up with contacts, that strategy to curb transmission falls apart. In the U.S., many places are reopening before fully establishing the robust tracing system public health leaders were calling for months ago. "We're reopening before we have the system ready to stop cases from becoming clusters and clusters from becoming outbreaks," Frieden says. How many tracers is enough? To estimate how many tracers is enough for each state, NPR analyzed each state's current need based on the number of cases in each state over the past 14 days, using the Contact Tracing Workforce Estimator developed by the Fitzhugh Mullan Institute for Health Workforce Equity at The George Washington University. The analysis assumes workers are calling 10 contacts per case and that contacts are followed up with every other day. Ten contacts may be a conservative estimate, considering that many places have begun to ease social distancing measures, and when people go out to restaurants or shopping, the number of contacts can grow quickly. The analysis also assumes that tracers reach 45% of contacts, since sometimes it's not possible to track people down — that's a midpoint of three strategies outlined in a contact tracing workforce tool recently published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Those inputs are designed to represent the real-world challenges contact tracers might have in reaching all possible contacts. "It's hard to get a hold of people," says Watson. "There are many other factors that may make people unwilling or unable to do this, including its historic issues with trust in government [...] I do think any amount of contact tracing does help." The results of NPR's analysis show that several states have enough contact tracers estimated to be needed to investigate their current burden of recent cases. Seven states — Alaska, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Oregon, Vermont and West Virginia — along with Washington, D.C., and the territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, currently have enough tracers, given local transmission. Six more states — Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, North Dakota, South Carolina and Washington — have enough when reserve staff are included in their staffing count. **Thirty-seven states do not have enough contact tracers**, according to NPR's analysis. Still, many states indicated that they felt they did have enough tracers to reach out quickly. With 1,500 contact tracers, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of Health wrote to NPR, "This is successfully meeting the current operational demand, which is reassessed daily as additional cases are confirmed." By NPR's analysis, Florida would need about three times the current number of contact tracers to be able to investigate and follow up with contacts for every coronavirus case. Florida is one of more than a dozen states **where cases of COVID-19 are currently rising**. Every place is different. A county with only a few new coronavirus cases a week might be able to manage contact tracing with only a few staffers tracing part time. But with a highly infectious virus, that set-up is risky, public health experts warn. A spike **can happen suddenly** and **get out of control** without adequate contact tracing. Testing is also critical. It's the first step in the test, trace and isolate strategy public health leaders have emphasized needs to be in place. If a community isn't testing enough, positive cases can't be identified and traced.

## 1AR—Terror DA

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### Terrorism not a threat in a post plan world

Mueller 8/23/16

John Mueller is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, a senior research scientist at the Mershon Center, and a member of the political science department at the Ohio State University, War on the Rocks, August 23, 2016, “GETTING REAL ON THE TERRORISM THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES”, http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/getting-real-on-the-terrorism-threat-to-the-united-states/

Objectively speaking, the hazard posed by terrorism to the United States is popularly perceived to be far more dangerous than it actually is. Regardless of the statistics and facts, public fears persist at high levels, impelling political posturing and irresponsible policymaking.

Even including the 9/11 attacks (which proved to be an aberration, not a harbinger), an American’s chance of being killed within the United States by a terrorist of any motivation over the last few decades is about one in four million per year. For industrial accidents, it’s one in 53,000, homicides, one in 22,000, auto accidents, one in 8,200. Since 9/11, an American’s chance of being killed by an Islamist terrorist is about one in 40 million per year.

There was great alarm, of course, in the wake of 9/11, when the intelligence community was certain that an even more destructive “second-wave” attack was imminent and when it informed reporters that between 2,000 and 5,000 trained al-Qaeda operatives were on the loose in the United States.

In the ensuing 15 years, not only has no second wave taken place, and not only did those thousands of trained operatives never materialize, but al-Qaeda has singularly failed to successfully execute an attack in the United States.

True, there have been several dozen disconnected plots by homegrown would-be Islamist terrorists in the United States since 9/11, some of them inspired by al-Qaeda. However, few of them have been successful. Even those tragic few that have resulted in violence have caused limited damage in total—on average, some seven deaths per year. Most of the plots have been disrupted, but even if they had been able to proceed further, it seems clear that most of the plotters were pathetic. When these cases are examined, the vast majority of the offenders turn out to have been naive, amateurish, inept, and gullible. Their schemes, when unaided by facilitating FBI infiltrators, have been incoherent and clumsy, their capacity to accumulate weaponry rudimentary, and their organizational skills close to non-existent. The judge at one trial described the antics of one plot leader as “buffoonery” that was “positively Shakespearean in its scope.” It is a characterization that could be applied much more broadly.

The new demon group is the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also called ISIS). Alarmed exaggeration is again both rampant and unwise. Sen. Dianne Feinstein has insisted that “the threat ISIS poses cannot be overstated” — effectively proclaiming hyperbole on the subject to be impossible. And Sen. Jim Inhofe, born before World War II, has claimed that “we’re in the most dangerous position we’ve ever been in” and that ISIL is “rapidly developing a method of blowing up a major U.S. city.”

Outrage over the tactics of ISIL is certainly justified, as is concern about the menace it presents in the Middle East. But fears over the danger the group poses to domestic security in the United States have been overblown to unjustified proportions to the detriment of our politics.

ISIL does not deserve as much credit for great military prowess as many people are willing to grant them. The group’s ability to behead defenseless hostages certainly should not justify the pervasive fear of terrorism afflicting so many Americans. The unique circumstances that contributed to its most important military advance, the conquest of the city of Mosul in Iraq in 2014, are unlikely to be repeated. ISIL’s original idea was to hold part of the city for a while in an effort, it seems, to free some prisoners. The defending Iraqi Army, trained by the American military at enormous cost to U.S. taxpayers, simply fell apart, abandoning both its weaponry and the city itself to the tiny group of seeming invaders.

After its fortuitous advances of 2014, the vicious group’s momentum has been substantially halted and reversed. It has alienated just about everybody, and, on close examination, its once highly vaunted economic capacity — particularly of the smuggling of oil and antiquities — may end up proving to be as illusory as its military prowess. It has cut pay for its fighters in half, and it has to work hard to keep people from fleeing its lumpen caliphate. This degradation will likely continue.

ISIL has two avenues by which it might be able to inflict damage within the United States. The first is from militants who have gone to fight with the group and then sent back to do damage. However, very little of that has occurred so far, and it is far more likely to happen in Europe than in the United States.

The second avenue involves the possibility that potential homegrown terrorists will become inspired by ISIL propaganda or example. The group has and will surely continue to take credit for mayhem caused by people with little or nothing to do with it. ISIL could still provide inspiration to death cult sycophants in the United States and elsewhere, but this is likely to decline as the group’s military progress in the Middle East, once so exhilarating to would-be jihadists, is stifled. There are signs this process is already well under way. In 2015, there were 14 ISIL-inspired plots in the United States. Thus far in 2016, there have been but two. And there has been a pronounced decline in the number of Americans seeking to go abroad to join the group.

There has also been a trendy concern about the way ISIL recruits using social media. However, as several analysts have pointed out, the foolish willingness of would-be terrorists to spill their aspirations and their often childish fantasies on social media has been, on balance, much to the advantage of the law enforcement officials seeking to track them.

Although al-Qaeda scarcely presented anything that could be considered to be a “threat” to the United States after 9/11 (except for its repeated, and repeatedly unfulfilled, proclamations of dire intent in its incessant videos), public opinion has continued to be alarmed. During the decade after 9/11, there was little change in the percentage of people saying that they worried that they might become a victim of terrorism, that they expected an attack “causing large numbers of Americans to be lost” to occur “in the near future,” that the terrorists remained capable of launching “another major attack,” or, despite the expenditure of over a trillion dollars on homeland security, that they felt safer than before 9/11.

This sense of alarm, needless to say, has scarcely been dampened by the rise of ISIL, which captured attention not with anything on the scale of 9/11, but with the disgusting online beheadings of some American captives in 2014 — a prime example of the group’s mindless propensity to engage in behavior that is counterproductive to its goals. Indeed, by the spring of 2016, fully 77 percent of Americans had come to deem the group to present “a serious threat to the existence or survival of the US.”

Those are the kind of numbers that terrorize politicians, bureaucrats, and the media, lead to knee-jerk alarmism and irresponsible spending, and impel into action those with products, services, and schemes for which there seems to be a market. In that sense, perhaps terrorism does present something of a threat after all.

### 1AR—Internal Link

#### 1] Your link card talks about corporate corruption, but your internal link and impact cards talk about government corruption- the two aren’t even on the same playing field

### 1AR—No Nuc Terror

#### Opportunity cost deters terror

\* Eliminates future opportunities; other weapons more appealing; escalation trap; development alone risks being discovered/tradesoff with other operations

McIntosh & Storey 18 (Christopher McIntosh is visiting assistant professor of political studies at Bard College, Ph.D. in 2013 from The University of Chicago, specializing in international relations and has an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown & Ian Storey is a fellow at the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities at Bard College, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago; Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, *International Studies Quarterly*, 19 April 2018, sqx087, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx087)

When looked at in isolation, each of the three areas of potential loss presents significant disincentives for immediate attack. In combination—as they would be considered in practice—the higher strategic value of available alternatives appears decisive. In other words, even if one reads our analysis as affirming the importance of nuclear acquisition, when considering competing options and the dangers that attach to any detonation attempt, nuclear attack is highly unlikely.

Future opportunities available for “using” a nuclear weapon are effectively foreclosed depending on the aggressiveness of the option a group chooses. The two-by-two matrix of nuclear strategies in Figure 1 is only a rough guide encompassing many possible permutations in the nuclear sphere. The organization always retains non-nuclear options, even once they acquire nuclear weapons. As evidenced by the Cold War and in Kargil, the stability-instability paradox holds empirical weight. Nuclear acquisition by two opposing actors does not necessarily foreclose conventional and/or asymmetric attacks (Cohen 2013; Kapur 2005). Given the unique relationship between a state and terrorist organization, we can expect similar and even exacerbated levels of instability. This can expand even beyond aggression. Remaining options range all the way from the pacific—pursuing negotiations, cooption, entrance into the legitimate political arena (for example, Sinn Fein)—to heightened conventional attacks and the usage of non-nuclear forms of WMDs.

This last point is worth emphasizing. Even in the remote case where an actor successfully acquires a nuclear weapon and primarily seeks raw numbers of casualties—whether due to outbidding or audience costs—other forms of WMDs are likely to be more appealing. As Aum Shinrikyo indicates, this is particularly the case for the group that overcomes the inevitable political and technological hurdles (Nehorayoff et al. 2016, 36–37). For these groups, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons (CBRW) are considerably easier to acquire, use, and stockpile. This is especially true when considered over time, rather than a single operation.18 While there are certainly downsides to CBRWs vis-à-vis nuclear weapons (delivery may paradoxically be easier and the maintenance risks comparatively smaller), they are undoubtedly easier to procure and produce (Zanders 1999). More importantly, CBRWs are perceived as easier to produce and thus likely to be viewed by targets as iterable. Unlike a nuclear attack, CBRW threats are more credible because a single CBRW attack can likely precipitate an indefinite number of follow-ups.

In addition to the problem of iterability, a terrorist organization must always worry about the possible ratchet effect of an attack—a problem Neumann and Smith (2005, 588–90) refer to as the “escalation trap.” A terrorist organization is different than a state at war because it manipulates other actors primarily through punishment. Campaigns are a communicative activity designed to convince the public and the leaders that the status quo is unsustainable. The message is that the costs of continuing the target state's policy (such as the United States in Lebanon, France in Algeria, or the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland) will eventually outweigh the benefits. Once an organization conducts a nuclear attack, it lacks options for an encore. Not even the most nightmarish scenarios involve an indefinite supply of weapons. If a single attack plus the threat of one or two others does not induce capitulation, the organization might unwittingly harden the target state's resolve. The attack could raise the bar such that any future non-nuclear attack constitutes a lessening of costs vis-à-vis the status quo.

There are also heavy opportunity costs involved in pursuing, developing, and maintaining a nuclear capacity, let alone actually deploying and delivering it. As Weiss puts it, “even if a terror group were to achieve technical nuclear proficiency, the time, money, and infrastructure needed to build nuclear weapons creates significant risks of discovery that would put the group at risk of attack. Given the ease of obtaining conventional explosives and the ability to deploy them, a terrorist group is unlikely to exchange a big part of its operational program to engage in a risky nuclear development effort with such doubtful prospects” (Weiss 2015, 82).

#### No escalation – attack induces international cooperation, not retaliation

McIntosh & Storey 18 (Christopher McIntosh is visiting assistant professor of political studies at Bard College, Ph.D. in 2013 from The University of Chicago, specializing in international relations and has an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown & Ian Storey is a fellow at the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities at Bard College, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago; Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, *International Studies Quarterly*, 19 April 2018, sqx087, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx087)

Externally, in a world post-nuclear attack, international cooperation would be instant and deep. One of the only international treaties to even define a terrorist in international law post-2001 has been the Nuclear Terrorism Convention (Edwards 2005). A nuclear attack would be far outside the norm of international politics. It would disrupt the dominance of state-actors and likely stimulate unparalleled cooperation to apprehend the responsible parties to prevent future attacks. Moreover, many large terrorist organizations require (some) tacit acquiescence by a host state. Even those with hostile host states have territory where they remain relatively unaffected by local governments (Korteweg 2008). Post-nuclear attack, these host states face an enormous incentive to find the actors responsible before the target state does. After an attack, regimes would find it difficult to claim that they “didn't know” or “couldn't stop them.” Claims of corruption or ineffective institutions would be unlikely to find much sympathy. Faced with potential organizational extinction itself, a host state/government will likely be much less committed to the survival of the terrorist group. This is likely to vary significantly from how they might otherwise behave after a more conventional attack. For these states, there would be a real fear of “Talibanization” and ruthless attempts at regime change post-attack.

From the perspective of the group, it would know that it could be facing a unified international community and the removal of tacit state support. It would take a particularly confident leadership to presume it could continue to function post-attack without massive disruptions. Most strategic actors are risk-averse when facing the potential of complete elimination. There is little reason to believe terrorist groups would act any differently.

#### No risk of nuke terrorism

Mearsheimer 14

John Mearsheimer, IR Prof at UChicago, National Interest, January 2, 2014, "America Unhinged", http://nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.

What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.

Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.

### 1AR—Impact Turn

#### No escalation – attack induces international cooperation, not retaliation which net reduces terror

McIntosh & Storey 18 (Christopher McIntosh is visiting assistant professor of political studies at Bard College, Ph.D. in 2013 from The University of Chicago, specializing in international relations and has an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown & Ian Storey is a fellow at the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities at Bard College, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago; Between Acquisition and Use: Assessing the Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, *International Studies Quarterly*, 19 April 2018, sqx087, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx087)

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## 1AR—Grids DA

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### No impact and it’s crazy nonunique

Clark 14

Meagan Clark, Aging US Power Grid Blacks Out More Than Any Other Developed Nation, 2014, <http://www.ibtimes.com/aging-us-power-grid-blacks-out-more-any-other-developed-nation-1631086>

The United States endures more blackouts than any other developed nation as the number of U.S. power outages lasting more than an hour have increased steadily for the past decade, according to federal databases at the Department of Energy (DOE) and the North American Electric Reliability Corp. (NERC). According to federal data, the U.S. electric grid loses power 285 percent more often than in 1984, when the data collection effort on blackouts began. That’s costing American businesses as much as $150 billion per year, the DOE reported, with weather-related disruptions costing the most per event. “Each one of these [blackouts] costs tens of hundreds of millions, up to billions, of dollars in economic losses per event,” said Massoud Amin, director of the Technological Leadership Institute at the University of Minnesota, who has analyzed U.S. power grid data since it became available in the '80s. “The root causes" of the increasing number of blackouts are aging infrastructure and a lack of investment and clear policy to modernize the grid. The situation is worsened by gaps in the policies of federal and local commissioners. And now there are new risks to the grid from terrorism and climate change's extreme impacts, Amin said. Also, demand for electricity has grown 10 percent over the last decade, even though there are more energy-efficient products and buildings than ever. And as Americans rely increasingly on digital devices, summers get hotter (particularly in the southern regions of the U.S.) and seasonal demand for air conditioning grows, the problem is only getting worse. While customers in Japan lose power for an average 4 minutes per year, customers in the American upper Midwest lose power for an average 92 minutes per year, and customers in the upper Northwest lose power for an average 214 minutes per year, according to Amin’s analysis. Those estimates exclude extreme events like severe storms and fires, though those have been increasing the past two decades. “We used to have two to five major weather events per year [that knocked out power], from the ‘50s to the ‘80s,” Amin said. “Between 2008 and 2012, major outages caused by weather increased to 70 to 130 outages per year. Weather used to account for about 17 to 21 percent of all root causes. Now, in the last five years, it’s accounting for 68 to 73 percent of all major outages.” The power grid, which could be considered the largest machine on earth, was built after World War II from designs dating back to Thomas Edison, using technology that primarily dates back to the '60s and '70s. Its 7,000 power plants are connected by power lines that combined total more than 5 million miles, all managed by 3,300 utilities serving 150 million customers, according to industry group Edison Electric Institute.

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### A FJG is key to updating electrical grids

Guastella 19 Dustin Guastella 12-29-2019 (director of operations for Teamsters Local 623 in Philadelphia), Jobs for All: A job guarantee puts workers in the driver’s seat, NONSITE.ORG, <https://nonsite.org/jobs-for-all-a-job-guarantee-puts-workers-in-the-drivers-seat/>

The good news is that there is plenty of work to be done—ork that is both socially productive and desirable: the work needed to care for an aging generation, the work needed to teach our children, the work needed to emancipate working families from the thankless and exhausting task of child rearing, the work needed to build monumental infrastructure projects and reinvigorate our mass transit or update our electric grid. All of these jobs have two things in common: first, each could only be created through massive investment and central planning and, second, they are all jobs that capitalists are unwilling or unable to provide. A robust job guarantee can do all this while inspiring a collective vision of a society and strengthening the leverage that workers have to demand more. After all, the essence of a socialist economy is the regulation of production, distribution and consumption for social ends through democratic means. What better way to foster the tender shoots of a such a system than by democratically regulating the distribution of work? The fruits of such a program would be countless. Not only could we build the self-assurance and class consciousness needed to inspire a renewed labor movement, we would create a robust political base that would help keep the programs around. Once good jobs are provided by the state and once workers see the usefulness in such a massive program good luck trying to take it away.

### 1AR—Internal Link Turn

#### Cyber attacks unlikely—empirics are conclusive—their ev assumes espionage/sabotage, not war

Rid, Reader in War Studies – King's College London, ‘13

(Thomas, “Cyberwar and Peace,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December)

Yet the hype about everything “cyber” has obscured three basic truths: cyberwar has never happened in the past, it is not occurring in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb the future. Indeed, rather than heralding a new era of violent conflict, so far the cyber-era has been defined by the opposite trend: a computer-enabled assault on political violence. Cyberattacks diminish rather than accentuate political violence by making it easier for states, groups, and individuals to engage in two kinds of aggression that do not rise to the level of war: sabotage and espionage. Weaponized computer code and computer-based sabotage operations make it possible to carry out highly targeted attacks on an adversary’s technical systems without directly and physically harming human operators and managers. Computer-assisted attacks make it possible to steal data without placing operatives in dangerous environments, thus reducing the level of personal and political risk.

These developments represent important changes in the nature of political violence, but they also highlight limitations inherent in cyberweapons that greatly curtail the utility of cyberattacks. Those limitations seem to make it difficult to use cyberweapons for anything other than one-off, hard-to-repeat sabotage operations of questionable strategic value that might even prove counterproductive. And cyber-espionage often requires improving traditional spycraft techniques and relying even more heavily on human intelligence. Taken together, these factors call into question the very idea that computer-assisted attacks will usher in a profoundly new era.

THE THIN CASE FOR CYBERWAR

No known cyberattack has met Clausewitz’s definition of an act of war.

One reason discussions about cyberwar have become disconnected from reality is that many commentators fail to grapple with a basic question: What counts as warfare? Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, still offers the most concise answer to that question. Clausewitz identified three main criteria that any aggressive or defensive action must meet in order to qualify as an act of war. First, and most simply, all acts of war are violent or potentially violent. Second, an act of war is always instrumental: physical violence or the threat of force is a means to compel the enemy to accept the attacker’s will. Finally, to qualify as an act of war, an attack must have some kind of political goal or intention. For that reason, acts of war must be attributable to one side at some point during a confrontation.

No known cyberattack has met all three of those criteria; indeed, very few have met even one. Consider three incidents that today’s Cassandras frequently point to as evidence that warfare has entered a new era. The first of these, a massive pipeline explosion in the Soviet Union in June 1982, would count as the most violent cyberattack to date -- if it actually happened. According to a 2004 book by Thomas Reed, who was serving as a staffer on the U.S. National Security Council at the time of the alleged incident, a covert U.S. operation used rigged software to engineer a massive explosion in the Urengoy-Surgut-Chelyabinsk pipeline, which connected Siberian natural gas fields to Europe. Reed claims that the CIA managed to insert malicious code into the software that controlled the pipeline’s pumps and valves. The rigged valves supposedly resulted in an explosion that, according to Reed, the U.S. Air Force rated at three kilotons, equivalent to the force of a small nuclear device.

But aside from Reed’s account, there is hardly any evidence to prove that any such thing happened, and plenty of reasons to doubt that it did. After Reed published his book, Vasily Pchelintsev, who was reportedly the KGB head of the region when the explosion was supposed to have taken place, denied the story. He surmised that Reed might have been referring to a harmless explosion that happened not in June but on a warm April day that year, caused by pipes shifting in the thawing ground of the tundra. Moreover, no Soviet media reports from 1982 confirm that Reed’s explosion took place, although the Soviet media regularly reported on accidents and pipeline explosions at the time. What’s more, given the technologies available to the United States at that time, it would have been very difficult to hide malicious software of the kind Reed describes from its Soviet users.

Another incident often related by promoters of the concept of cyberwar occurred in Estonia in 2007. After Estonian authorities decided to move a Soviet-era memorial to Russian soldiers who died in World War II from the center of Tallinn to the city’s outskirts, outraged Russian-speaking Estonians launched violent riots that threatened to paralyze the city. The riots were accompanied by cyber-assaults, which began as crude disruptions but became more sophisticated after a few days, culminating in a “denial of service” attack. Hackers hijacked up to 85,000 computers and used them to overwhelm 58 Estonian websites, including that of the country’s largest bank, which the attacks rendered useless for a few hours.

Estonia’s defense minister and the country’s top diplomat pointed their fingers at the Kremlin, but they were unable to muster any evidence. For its part, the Russian government denied any involvement. In the wake of the incident, Estonia’s prime minister, Andrus Ansip, likened the attack to an act of war. “What’s the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?” he asked. It was a rhetorical question, but the answer is important: unlike a naval blockade, the disruption of websites is not violent -- indeed, not even potentially violent. The choice of targets also seemed unconnected to the presumed tactical objective of forcing the government to reverse its decision on the memorial. And unlike a naval blockade, the attacks remained anonymous, without political backing, and thus unattributable.

A year later, a third major event entered the cyber-Cassandras’ repertoire. In August 2008, the Georgian army attacked separatists in the province of South Ossetia. Russia backed the separatists and responded militarily. The prior month, in what might have been the first time that an independent cyberattack was launched in coordination with a conventional military operation, unknown attackers had begun a campaign of cyber-sabotage, defacing prominent Georgian websites, including those of the country’s national bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and launching denial-of-service attacks against the websites of Georgia’s parliament, its largest commercial bank, and Georgian news outlets. The Georgian government blamed the Kremlin, just as the Estonians had done. But Russia again denied sponsoring the attacks, and a NATO investigation later found “no conclusive proof” of who had carried them out.

The attack set off increasingly familiar alarm bells within American media and the U.S. national security establishment. “The July attack may have been a dress rehearsal for an all-out cyberwar,” an article in The New York Times declared. Richard Clarke, a former White House cybersecurity czar, warned that the worst was yet to come: the Georgian attack did not “begin to reveal what the Russian military and intelligence agencies could do if they were truly on the attack in cyberspace.” Yet the actual effects of these nonviolent events were quite mild. The main damage they caused was to the Georgian government’s ability to communicate internationally, thus preventing it from getting out its message at a critical moment. But even if the attackers intended this effect, it proved short-lived: within four days after military confrontations had begun in earnest, the Georgian Foreign Ministry had set up an account on Google’s blog-hosting service. This move helped the government keep open a channel to the public and the news media. What the Internet took away, the Internet returned.

IN CODE WE TRUST?

Perhaps the strongest evidence presented by advocates of the concept of cyberwar is the Stuxnet operation launched against Iran by the United States and Israel. Stuxnet, part of a set of attacks known as Operation Olympic Games, was a sophisticated multiyear campaign to sabotage Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz by inserting a harmful computer worm into the software that ran the facility’s centrifuges, causing them to overload. American and Israeli developers started designing the project as early as 2005, and it launched in 2007, growing more sophisticated until its discovery in 2010. The attack was groundbreaking in several ways. The developers built highly target-specific intelligence into the code, enabling the Stuxnet software to make autonomous decisions in its target environment. Most important, Stuxnet represented the first and only physically destructive cyberattack launched by one state (or, in this case, two states) against another.

Yet even cyberattacks that cause damage do so only indirectly. As an agent of violence, computer code faces a very basic limit: it does not have its own force or energy. Instead, any cyberattack with the goal of material destruction or harming human life must utilize the force or energy embedded in its target: for example, shutting down an air traffic control system and causing trains or planes to crash or disrupting a power plant and sparking an explosion. Yet besides Stuxnet, there is no proof that anyone has ever successfully launched a major attack of this sort. Lethal cyberattacks, while certainly possible, remain the stuff of fiction: none has ever killed or even injured a single human being. Thanks to its lack of direct physical impact, code-induced violence also has less emotional impact. It would be difficult for a cyberattack to produce the level of fear that coordinated campaigns of terrorism or conventional military operations produce.

Owing to their invisibility, cyberweapons also lack the symbolic power of traditional ones. Displays of weaponry, such as the elaborate military parades put on by China and North Korea, sometimes represent nothing more than nationalist pageantry. But revealing one’s arsenal can also serve tactical and strategic ends, as when countries deploy aircraft carriers to demonstrate their readiness to use force or carry out operations designed to intimidate the enemy, such as using military aircraft to conduct deliberately low flyovers. Indeed, displaying weapons systems and threatening to use them can prove more cost-efficient than their actual use. But cyberweapons are hard to brandish.

#### Their authors exaggerate and cyber defense tech is improving

Libicki 8/16/13

MARTIN C. LIBICKI is a Senior Management Scientist at the RAND Corporation and a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, Foreign Affairs, August 16, 2013, "Don't Buy the Cyberhype: How to Prevent Cyberwars From Becoming Real Ones", http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139819/martin-c-libicki/dont-buy-the-cyberhype

These days, most of Washington seems to believe that a major cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure is inevitable. In March, James Clapper, U.S. director of national intelligence, ranked cyberattacks as the greatest short-term threat to U.S. national security. General Keith Alexander, the head of the U.S. Cyber Command, recently characterized “cyber exploitation” of U.S. corporate computer systems as the “greatest transfer of wealth in world history.” And in January, a report by the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board argued that cyber risks should be managed with improved defenses and deterrence, including “a nuclear response in the most extreme case.”

Although the risk of a debilitating cyberattack is real, the perception of that risk is far greater than it actually is. No person has ever died from a cyberattack, and only one alleged cyberattack has ever crippled a piece of critical infrastructure, causing a series of local power outages in Brazil. In fact, a major cyberattack of the kind intelligence officials fear has not taken place in the 21 years since the Internet became accessible to the public.

Thus, while a cyberattack could theoretically disable infrastructure or endanger civilian lives, its effects would unlikely reach the scale U.S. officials have warned of. The immediate and direct damage from a major cyberattack on the United States could range anywhere from zero to tens of billions of dollars, but the latter would require a broad outage of electric power or something of comparable damage. Direct casualties would most likely be limited, and indirect causalities would depend on a variety of factors such as whether the attack disabled emergency 911 dispatch services. Even in that case, there would have to be no alternative means of reaching first responders for such an attack to cause casualties. The indirect effects might be greater if a cyberattack caused a large loss of confidence, particularly in the banking system. Yet scrambled records would probably prove insufficient to incite a run on the banks.

Officials also warn that the United States might not be able to identify the source of a cyberattack as it happens or in its immediate aftermath. Cyberattacks have neither fingerprints nor the smell of gunpowder, and hackers can make an intrusion appear legitimate or as if it came from somewhere else. Iran, for example, may not have known why its centrifuges were breaking down prematurely before its officials read about the covert cyber-sabotage campaign against the country’s nuclear program in The New York Times. Victims of advanced persistent threats -- extended intrusions into organization networks for the purpose of espionage -- are often unaware for months, or even years, that their servers have been penetrated. The reason that such attacks go undetected is because the removal of information does not affect the information in the system, so nothing seems amiss. The exfiltration of information can also be easily hidden, such as in the daily flow of web traffic from an organization.

But since everything is becoming increasingly dependent on computers, could levels of damage impossible today become inevitable tomorrow? As it happens, all of the trend lines -- good and bad -- in cyberspace are rising simultaneously: the sophistication of attackers, but also that of the defenders; the salience of cyberattacks as weapons, but also the awareness of the threat they pose; the bandwidth available for organizing larger attacks, but also the resources to ward them off. It is bad news that Iran is beginning to see cyberwar as a deniable means of exploiting easy targets. And it is good news that software companies are now rethinking the architectural features of their systems that permit such vulnerabilities to exist in the first place.

### 1AR—No Link

#### 1] Your ev is about the Green New deal which won’t be passing—

#### 2] Power tagging on two accounts— A] your card never says splits senate and B] it doesn’t mention how people will confuse them just that they are same

### 1AR—Alt Causes

#### Tons of alt causes but empirics disprove the impact

Plumer 14

Brad Plumer, It's way too easy to cause a massive blackout in the US, April 14, 2014, http://www.vox.com/2014/4/14/5604992/us-power-grid-vulnerability

If you wanted to knock out America's electric infrastructure and leave everyone in the dark for a few weeks, it might not be that difficult. A STRIKE ON JUST NINE SUBSTATIONS COULD CAUSE A COAST-TO-COAST BLACKOUT Back in March, the Wall Street Journal reported that a terrorist attack on just nine of the country's 55,000 electric substations could cause a coast-to-coast blackout — especially on a hot summer's day. This followed an eye-catching report on how a mysterious sniper had damaged a substation in California in 2013 — threatening to black out Silicon Valley. Experts have been warning about these vulnerabilities in the power grid for years, but the Journal stories seem to have finally jolted people to attention. Last week, the Senate held a big hearing to figure out just how exposed the nation's power grid really is. Trouble is, there wasn't a clear answer. Experts, regulators, and industry officials often have different theories on what makes the grid vulnerable — which makes it hard to agree on a solution. Still, it's an important topic — in the worst case, an extended blackout could cost many billions of dollars, plus death and destruction. So here's a broad overview of what the US power grid is and why it's so vulnerable: What's the power grid again? It's the system that brings electricity to homes, buildings, and factories. That includes all the high-voltage power lines that transport electricity from distant power plants to populated areas. There are also electrical substations with transformers to "step down" that high-voltage electricity so it can be carried in the wires you see around the city and used safely in your home. Plus a bunch of monitoring systems. Is the US power grid prone to blackouts? 801201 Workers repair a power grid April 13, 2001 in Brooklyn, New York. Spencer Platt/Newsmakers/Getty Images That's fair to say. Problems with the power grid cost the US economy an estimated $150 billion per year. And large blackouts seem to be getting more common over time. LARGE BLACKOUTS APPEAR TO BE GETTING MORE FREQUENT Between 2000 and 2004, there were 149 power outages that affected 50,000 people or more. Between 2005 and 2009, that had risen to 349, according to Massoud Amin of the University of Minnesota. Outages can happen for lots of reasons — an overheated transmission line or problem at the power plant. Truly massive blackouts, however, are often triggered when a tree or a storm or a wildfire knocks out power lines and then causes failures to ripple elsewhere. That's what happened in the 2003 Northeast blackout that left 50 million people without power. Other large blackouts are caused by equipment failures or operator errors — like the big 2011 blackout in southern California. Given all that, there's a lot of interest in the question of how easy it would be for, say, a terrorist to cause a blackout intentionally. Could a person intentionally cause a blackout? Possibly. There are a few options: Small-scale attacks: Back in April 2013, a sniper opened fire on an electric substation near Silicon Valley, knocking out 17 transformers in a mere 19 minutes. (This incident remained little-known for nearly a year until Foreign Policy reported it.) A major blackout was only avoided thanks to quick-thinking utility workers, who rerouted power. SOME EXPERTS THINK A FEW MEN WITH AK-47S COULD DO MORE DAMAGE THAN CYBERATTACKS Attacks like this could do some genuine damage. There are dozens of critical (and relatively unprotected) substations around the country — if they got taken out, it could potentially lead to widespread failures. The extreme case could be quite bad: in March, the Journal reported that an attack on just nine of the nation's 55,000 electric substations could lead to coast-to-coast blackouts. (The paper didn't specify which substations.) That was according to a secret analysis from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This is a worst-case scenario, but even regional blackouts could cause billions of dollars in damage. Cyberattacks: The other big fear is that a hacker, say, could disrupt the grid by taking over the computer systems that monitor and supervise it, known as SCADA systems. So far, there hasn't been a case of a cyberattack causing a blackout in North America. But utilities already have to fend off thousands of attempted attacks each month (though most of these are efforts to steal customers' financial information, not cause a blackout). Some grid experts, like former Federal Energy Regulatory Commission chair Jon Wellinghoff, think cyberattacks are somewhat less of a problem than physical attacks or security breaches. Many utility officials, meanwhile, think the industry should be spending at least as much money guarding against cyberattacks as they do against natural disasters. What's the doomsday scenario? 76412182 The sun shines over towers carrying electical lines August 30, 2007 in South San Francisco, California. Justin Sullivan/Getty Images Back in 2012, the National Research Council worried that a well-coordinated attack on the grid "could deny large regions of the country access to bulk system power for weeks or even months. … If such large extended outages were to occur during times of extreme weather, they could also result in hundreds or even thousands of deaths due to heat stress or extended exposure to extreme cold." How would that work? It's worth walking through the mechanics of how a truly massive blackout — like the 2003 Northeast blackout that left 50 million people without power — can happen. REALLY BIG BLACKOUTS ARE OFTEN CAUSED BY CASCADING FAILURES IN THE GRID Power grids are, by their nature, extremely complex. It's hard to store electricity for any extended period. That means that the output from power plants has to be equal to the use of electricity at all times. Otherwise, power lines can get overloaded or generators underloaded, causing damage to the equipment. Usually, the grid has protective devices that switch off a piece of equipment if there's a problem. So if, say, a sagging power line hits a tree — causing it to overheat — that line will get disconnected. The problem is that all the other lines now have to carry excess current. If they start overheating and have to switch off, you can get … cascading failures. So power grid operators have to constantly monitor the system to make sure that power generation and power use are matched up and that a single fault can't cause the entire grid to fail. They're usually very good at this. But it's a difficult task — and if, the grid is already running at capacity or a major piece of equipment falters, it can be hard to prevent "cascading failures." The National Research Council was worried about an attack causing this sort of cascading effect. Who oversees the power grid? Natl\_power\_grid Here's where things get tricky. The United States doesn't have a single "national" grid — more than 90 percent of the lines and wires and stations that make up the grid are owned by private companies. THERE'S NO SINGLE NATIONAL GRID — INSTEAD THERE ARE THREE REGIONAL GRIDS Grid operators have voluntarily organized themselves into regional bodies to coordinate the flow of electricity and keep everything running smoothly. These bodies are all overseen by a private company called NERC, which works with the federal government on various standards and policies. At a very broad level, the nation's electric infrastructure is divided into three main regions, each with limited links between them: There's the Western Interconnection, the Eastern Interconnection, and the Texas Interconnection (see map above). What makes the power grid so vulnerable? 51155301 A figure looks at the dynamic map board showing power distribution through California's electrical grids in the control center of the California Independent System Operator (Cal-ISO) as hot weather threatens to break state electricity consumption records August 9, 2004 in the Alhambra sector of Los Angeles, California. David McNew/Getty Images Here's what the National Research Council concluded in 2012: many of our power grids are getting old, with aging equipment. The systems for monitoring and securing the grid are often inadequate. That all makes cascading failures more likely to occur. And the private sector doesn't appear to invest enough in upgrades or security measures. THE POWER GRID IS GETTING OLD — AND MANY UTILITIES HAVE LITTLE INCENTIVE TO UPGRADE One big reason: the regulatory environment for the grid is … complicated. The federal government, states, and localities all have a hand in overseeing the system, and those roles keep shifting over time. Some states are deregulating their utilities; others are re-regulating. So, the report noted, companies often have little incentive to invest in upgrades. There are also a few specific problems that are getting more attention now. Many electrical substations aren't guarded — they're often unstaffed and protected by just a chain-link fence and some cameras. So it would be relatively easy for someone to attack these stations, causing ripple effects elsewhere. (One report by New Jersey regulators, unearthed by the Washington Free Beacon in March, found that break-ins and intrusions were quite common in the state's electrical facilities.) Then there's cybersecurity. Regulators have done a fair amount of work in crafting standards to protect high-voltage systems. But a recent report from the Bipartisan Policy Center argued that not enough is being done to protect low-voltage distribution systems — and that companies don't always share enough information with each other to protect themselves from attacks. Policymakers, for their part, can't always decide what problem to focus on. At the Senate hearing last week, some senators criticized the Wall Street Journal for publishing information about grid vulnerabilities. Others have blamed the Environmental Protection Agency for imposing tighter air-pollution rules and forcing some coal plants to shut down. Still other members of Congress want federal regulators to impose specific upgrades and security measures — an approach that utilities say is inappropriate. So how do we protect the grid? In its 2012 report, the National Research Council made a slew of recommendations for protecting the grid from attacks, from getting utilities to stockpile key pieces of equipment to security upgrades. Some of these, the report found, were likely worth the cost. Other fixes — like certain cyberdefenses — were still quite expensive and needed additional R&D to bring the cost down. ADVANCED SMART GRIDS COULD LET GRID OPERATORS TO FIX PROBLEMS MORE RAPIDLY The report also looked at a wide variety of upgrades to the grid that could make it more resilient against cascading failures. Such upgrades wouldn't just help the country survive a terrorist attack — they would also be useful for protecting the grid against hurricanes or ice storms or space weather. Advanced smart grid technologies, for instance, could allow operators to identify problems more rapidly and allow the system to repair itself in real time. Alternatively, a more distributed power system would be harder to knock out — say, if more and more facilities had their own solar-power generators. These technologies have been gradually catching on for years — the 2009 stimulus bill had $11 billion in incentives for utilities to install smart-grid tech. But it's slow going, due in part to the complex governance structure of the power grid system (see here). And smart grids can have downsides: Some critics have noted that some of these new "smart" technologies can make the grid more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Ultimately, the National Research Council report didn't think it was possible to stop all types of large blackouts — it's too difficult to protect large, complicated systems from every last possible failure. But there's a fair bit more that could be done — and that report, at least, thought many of these steps were worth the cost. Further reading: On a related note, here's an old piece on how space weather (yes, space weather) could, under certain circumstances, also fry the US power grid. One of the more useful defenses here would be better early-warning systems.

#### Zero impact

Clark 12 – MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’12

(Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred – trees shorted a power line and caused a

fault – that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis

2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and

subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars,

brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other catastrophic

events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American¶ history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the¶ fragility of the U.S. energy grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context¶ of the robustness of the electrical grid.¶ When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the¶ intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was¶ unlikely to succeed because of the “huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system¶ that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult” (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view¶ is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural¶ catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the¶ U.S. grid fails frequently. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always¶ present. Power outages that affect more than 50,000 people have occurred steadily over the last¶ 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively¶ high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel¶ 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies¶ and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding¶ agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic¶ disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev¶ 2009).¶ The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system¶ supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010).¶ Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, the economy is¶ affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like that caused by Hurricane¶ Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis¶ 2010).¶ Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and¶ interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security¶ challenge” (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the¶ top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is¶ crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of¶ Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate¶ Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

### 1AR—Solar Flares

#### Solar flares swamp the grid and outages are routine

Kerry-Ann Adamson, research director leading Pike Research's Smart Energy practice, 12 [“Solar Storms and the Electricity Grid,” Pike Research, March 29, http://www.pikeresearch.com/blog/solar-storms-and-the-electricity-grid]

The solar cycle lasts between 9 and 14 years, and during the so-called Solar Maximum, solar flares and sunspots increase in frequency and energy. These massive bursts of solar plasma and charged particles create geomagnetic storms when they hit the earth’s atmosphere. Although it’s thought unlikely that we would face another solar super-storm anytime soon, the frequency and intensity of solar storms is on the rise and is forecast to peak sometime in 2013.¶ These geomagnetic storms have the potential to knock out satellites, disrupt airplane navigation systems, and overload the electricity grid. That’s exactly what happened in 1989, when a solar flare saturated power transformers in Quebec, Canada, taking out 9.5 gigawatts from the system instantaneously. That was in 1989, before the ubiquitous Internet, before smart phones and tablets, before laptops in every home.¶ Today, we rely on the continuous free flow of high-quality electricity to provide heat and power to our homes and offices and to power all of the gadgets we use on a daily basis. Power outages are all too common already, as shown in the chart below.

## 1AR—Stem DA

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### There is no availability in STEM jobs except CS which college degrees aren’t key for

Lohr 17 —Steve Lohr has covered technology, business and economics for The New York Times for more than 20 years. In 2013, he was part of the team awarded the Pulitzer Prize for Explanatory Reporting. He was a foreign correspondent for a decade and served as an editor, and has written for magazines including The New York Times Magazine, The Atlantic and Washington Monthly; “Where the STEM Jobs Are (and Where They Aren’t)”; Nov. 1, 2017; <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/education/edlife/stem-jobs-industry-careers.html> As+

A working grasp of the principles of science and math should be essential knowledge for all Americans, said Michael S. Teitelbaum, an expert on science education and policy. But he believes that STEM advocates, often executives and lobbyists for technology companies, do a disservice when they raise the alarm that America is facing a worrying shortfall of STEM workers, based on shortages in a relative handful of fast-growing fields like data analytics, artificial intelligence, cloud computing and computer security.

“When it gets generalized to all of STEM, it’s misleading,” said Mr. Teitelbaum, a senior research associate in the Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School. “We’re misleading a lot of young people.”

Unemployment rates for STEM majors may be low, but not all of those with undergraduate degrees end up in their field of study — only 13 percent in life sciences and 17 percent in physical sciences, according to a 2013 National Science Foundation survey. Computer science is the only STEM field where more than half of graduates are employed in their field.

If physicists and biologists want to enjoy the boom times in the digital economy, a few specialist start-ups will train them and find them jobs as data scientists and artificial intelligence programmers.

Insight Data Science Fellows Program, which has offices in New York, Boston, Seattle and Palo Alto, Calif., began its first training program five years ago and now has 900 alumni working at companies like Facebook, LinkedIn, Airbnb, Amazon and Microsoft. Jake Klamka, a physicist who founded the program, kept hearing from Silicon Valley executives that they had considered hiring traditional scientists, but converting them to technologists seemed time-consuming and risky. So Mr. Klamka decided he would start a company to provide scientists a smoother pathway into the tech industry.

Carlos Faham made that passage. He had an impressive academic career, with a string of grant awards and fellowships. His Ph.D. from Brown University was in dark-matter physics. After Brown, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

Dr. Faham loved the research, but after nearly two years he was feeling the strain of that life. By then, he had spent 12 years in college, graduate school and postgraduate research. His next step would be to compete for a handful of tenure-track teaching openings across the country. For the pricey Bay Area, he wasn’t making enough. A postdoc researcher typically makes $40,000 to $60,000 a year.

Dr. Faham had done serious programming for his physics research. He applied to tech companies, figuring they would be eager to hire someone with his intellectual firepower. He couldn’t get an in-person interview. He was told his background was too academic. He fumbled a couple of phone screening interviews because the statistical and machine-learning problems were unfamiliar to him.

“It was like hitting a wall running at full speed, really humbling,” he recalled.

Dr. Faham joined the seven-week Insight Data Science Fellows program in 2015. There was no formal course work. Other than a few tutorials by industry people, the time was spent creating a product — his was software for recognizing and tracking faces in video — and training for interviews. That involved solving a programming problem on a white board and explaining his thinking. “Interviewing is a muscle and you have to exercise it again and again,” he said. After the program, he received six job offers. He accepted the offer from LinkedIn. (Insight is free for participants; hiring companies pay an undisclosed fee.)

Today, Dr. Faham, 33, is a senior data scientist, working on a team that uses machine learning and statistical models to detect illicit activity on the social network, including fake job listings, ad fraud, spam and bot attacks.

The range of data-intensive detective work, he said, is “extremely rich” and “it moves so much faster than my previous world.” He makes a “pretty good six-figure salary,” about five times what he did as a postdoctoral researcher.

About 90 percent of those who enter the Insight program have landed jobs as data analysts, the company says, with a dropout rate of about 3 percent.

### 1AR—Turn (STEM bad)

#### STEM is useless as a system and going to college for it doesn’t uniquely help people

Zaloom 19 – Caitlin Zaloom is a cultural anthropologist, Associate Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis at New York University, and Editor in Chief of Public Books; “STEM Is Overrated”; SEPTEMBER 10, 2019; <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/college-not-job-prep/597487/> As+

This morally laden political argument for yeomanship presents itself as hardheaded, but it mischaracterizes the realities of the job market that it vaunts. For one, the presumption that a liberal-arts education would prevent students from getting jobs is spurious. Graduates with a broad-based education are in demand. Writing for the National Bureau of Economic Research, the economist David J. Deming argues that employers are currently seeking skills that come from a more exploratory college education, like the one that students receive by studying liberal arts. What’s more, these workers’ “soft skills”—their capacity to communicate and work with others—are in short supply. And Deming points out that the income benefits of STEM jobs are in decline. Economists have observed that since 2000, managerial, professional, and technical occupations have stalled considerably in both the number of jobs and their wage growth. In other words, colleges and universities need to provide the materials for students to cultivate their potential, not just to obtain the kind of targeted, cognitive skills that a narrowly conceived STEM education offers.

The argument for yeomanship also fails to acknowledge that the high cost of college makes it an iffy proposition if the only purpose is to find a well-paying job. The economists John Schmitt and Heather Boushey found that among 24-to-35-year-olds, almost 20 percent of college graduates “actually do no better than their counterparts who left school after high school,” even before taking college debt into account.

The argument for yeomanship also denies the turbulent job market graduates will face. Jobs are much less secure now than they were in the post–World War II decades, and they are likely to become even less so in the future. College students will enter a world in which many jobs are designed to be temporary. Although the corporations of the mid-20th century depended on a stable workforce of long-term employees, capitalism in the U.S. today works by assuming that a “flexible” workforce accustomed to temporary and insecure employment will be at corporations’ disposal.

Because the growth of temporary employment has coincided with massive technological changes, such as the development of the internet, this social reorganization has appeared to be largely a natural consequence of innovation and competition rather than the outcome of human choices. But as the historian Louis Hyman demonstrated in Temp: How American Work, American Business, and the American Dream Became Temporary, the shift was an explicit goal of business leaders. Beginning in the 1970s, corporate heads and their consultants began to look for short-term profits, cutting their commitments to their employees. Workers who might stay for years or decades required promotions and benefits and were protected by unions. Disposing of expensive workers became a key to meeting profit targets. In their place, corporations began to rely on short-term employees who would stay for the job at hand and then leave.

### 1AR—Turn (College bad)

#### College educations are unnecessary and worsen employment—this turns the DA

Rittenberry 16—“College is a Bad Idea for Most Young People”; Sep 12, 2016; <https://mystudentvoices.com/college-is-a-bad-idea-for-most-young-people-7d3983f478ad> As+

College is a bad idea for most young people. A half century ago this wasn’t the case. We had a great education system. College was affordable. The bright and passionate kids pursued higher education because they wanted to learn. They wanted to be exposed to new ideas. They wanted to understand the world they lived in. They wanted a true education and they had high hopes in taking lucrative and fulfilling positions in some of the most reputable businesses out there.

College had a good return on investment.

Today, the cost of college is outrageous. And graduating (if it happens) doesn’t come with the worthwhile rewards and benefits as it once did. In other words — the return on investment is awful.

Right now, college student loan debt has surpassed auto loan debt and credit card debt, becoming the second biggest source of personal debt. Now, couple this daunting reality with the fact that 85% of college grads will return home jobless or underemployed — I think it’s hard to deny the impending disaster, right?

Academia is in a massive bubble and it’s ready to bust.

Picture this…

Little Bobby gets accepted into one of these universities. First time on his own. He makes friends and hangs with other young people who are in the same boat. They party it up, drink themselves silly, go to class hungover. And maybe, overcoming the fact that nearly half of all college students drop out before graduating, little Bobby prevails and passes by the skin of his teeth.

He now enters the shitty job field. With little life or work experience, he has a hard time finding a quality job. And with $45,000 of debt lagging behind him, he is forced to take a step back and move back into his parent’s house. Bobby settles for an entry-level job that doesn’t require a college degree. Of course, this dilemma leaves him riddled with anxiety and stress and he falls into a state of hopelessness, leaving his dreams floundering in the abyss of despair.

This is the situation in today’s America.

Why is college tuition so expensive?

The average cost of tuition and fees at a private, non-profit, four-year university is around $32,400 — up sharply from $1,832 in 1971–1972 (in current dollars). Just in the last 5 years alone, tuition has jumped a whopping 24%.

If we look back in recent history we’d see that college tuition started its steep incline around the time that the federal government started meddling in higher education. Prices jumped drastically when the government started subsidizing universities via government loans.

As Mises Institute’s Ryan McMaken recently pointed out:

“The government subsidies to students have lowered the perceived cost of attending college. This, in turn, allows a larger number of students to pay the ever-increasing tuition bills. Put another way, the inelasticity of demand for a college education has increased significantly thanks to the fact that students can now just go get a low-interest unsecured student loan rather than have to save the money to use a high-interest private-sector loan.

Without these loans, students would be far more sensitive to increases in the cost of education, and colleges would have to find ways to cut costs in order to remain competitive in terms of pricing. With a nearly endless stream of government loans, however, colleges need never have to worry about cutting costs. Government subsidies will simply make up the difference, and price-sensitive students will go to college anyway. The downside comes later when students must then pay off large loans.”

Does a college degree make you more successful?

Universities, with their extravagant marketing schemes, have peddled the misguided notion that those with a college degree make more money during their lifetime than those who don’t have a college degree. This statistic is misleading, to say the least. It’s based on looking back at a time when having a college degree was very rare and therefore more valuable.

Today, 70 percent of High School grads attend college, making it extremely difficult to differentiate oneself in the job field. Everyone has a degree. What makes you unique?

A lot of these students pursue a Master’s degree, thinking that’s the answer. Now they’re taking on more debt while delaying, yet again, the potential money and experience they could be earning in the real world.

Also, the flawed “have a college degree make more money” numbers are derived from surveying intelligent young people who yearn to go to college and really get an education. And it’s comparing these people to the sometimes homeless, drug addicts, and ones with little or no ambition to better their lives. It’s comparing Doctors and Lawyers to people who refuse to work or learn a trade, so of course the numbers are going to be skewed.

The folks who attend college and attain a degree would likely be financial winners with or without college. So it’s not necessarily that “college” is the reason for their financial success, it’s the fact they were motivated and more driven from the get go.

Some of the most successful entrepreneurs and artists out there, including Steve Jobs, Michael Dell, Tom Hanks, James Cameron, Bill Gates, Lady Gaga, Zuckerberg and Oprah to name a few, are college dropouts. To these folks, college was an obstacle in the way of their future success. So they avoided it, pursued the unconventional route, took some risks and worked their ass off. The rest is history.

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### Not pursuing college saves millions I debt which helps thousands of Americans and also fills up the economy instead of massive student debt loans dragging us down

## 1AR—Lithium DA

### 1AR—No Link

#### No link— where in the 1AC do we say we actively improve tech, increase sale of lithium batteries, or increase the number of jobs that require lithium batteries—we don’t do any of those

### 1AR—Adaptation

#### 1] Lithium batteries are out of style—no one uses them anymore

#### 2] The aff is not a sufficient push over the brink to overthrow lithium limit

#### 3] Your link ev is also spec to the UK not the US

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### 1] Your ev is from 2018—predications combined with crappy quals mean you don’t have a uniqueness scenario

#### 2] Trump has increased the use of Lithium batteries anyways means the DA is non-unique

### 1AR—Alt Causes

#### So many alt causes!

CEF, 13 ("Water Pollution Facts", www.conserve-energy-future.com/various-water-pollution-facts.php)

Below are 40 Facts on Water Pollution

Fact 1: The total volume of water available on Earth is about 1.4 billion km and about 70% of the earth is covered in water.

Fact 2: The largest quantities of water are in the oceans.

Fact 3: Fresh water in the world is only 2.5% of the total water available on this planet. Make sure the water you drink is clean with this [water filter](http://www.strauss-water.ca/technology).

Fact 4: Around 70% of the industrial waste **is dumped into the water bodies** where they pollute the usable water supply.

Fact 5: At least 320 million people in China do not have access to clean drinking water.

Fact 6: 20% of the groundwater in China is used as drinking water which is highly contaminated with carcinogenic chemicals which cause high levels of water pollution.

Fact 7: **Fourteen billion pounds** of garbage mostly plastic, is dumped into the ocean every year.

Fact 8: The nuclear crisis that occurred in Japan after 2011 [Tsunami](http://www.conserve-energy-future.com/various-tsunami-facts.php) prompted Japanese government dumped 11 million liters (2 million gallons) of radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean.

Fact 9: 15 million children under the age of five die each year because of diseases caused by drinking water.

Fact 10: The Ganges river in India is one the most polluted in the world. It contain sewage, trash, food, and animal remains.

Fact 11: According to the WHO (World Health Organization) and United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), around 2.5 billion people do not have access to improved sanitation.

Fact 12: The 2011 Tsunami in Japan created 70 km long island of debris which is floating out into the Pacific Ocean.

Fact 13: Ground water in Bangladesh is contaminated with arsenic. Arsenic is very toxic, acute poison and a carcinogen. Approximately 85% of the total area of Bangladesh has contaminated groundwater.

Fact 14: In America, **40% of the rivers and 46% of the lakes**are polluted and are considered unhealthy for swimming, fishing or aquatic life.

Fact 15: According to UNICEF, more than 3000 children die everyday globally due to consumption of contaminated drinking water.

Fact 16: Water pollution is the major cause of various diseases like cholera and typhoid.

Fact 17: On an average 250 million people worldwide succumb to diseases related to water pollution.

Fact 18: According to the World Health Organization, 3.2 million children under the age of five in developing nations die each year as a result of unsafe drinking water and poor sanitation.

Fact 19: 80% of the water pollution **is caused due to** domestic sewage like throwing garbage on open ground and water bodies.

Fact 20: According to the survey done by Food & Water Watch cites that approximately 3.5 billion people in 2025 will face water shortage issues. This will be mainly due to water pollution. This is likely to happen because the world pollution is increasing tremendously with more water sources getting contaminated as a result of water pollution.

Fact 21: As per U.S. EPA estimates, every year in the U.S, 1.2 trillion gallons of sewage from household, industry and restaurants is dumped in to U.S. water annually.

Fact 22: Asia has maximum numbers of polluted rivers than anywhere else in the world. Most of it contains bacteria created from human waste.

Fact 23: Plastic waste being a major water pollutant, is causing huge destruction of marine life and is believed to be responsible for deaths of more than 100,000 sea mammals, sea birds and various types of fishes.

Fact 24: Canada has 10 most polluted rivers- some of which are Petitcodiac River, Okanagan river and Eastmain River.

Fact 25: The waste produced in the river contains bacteria, parasites and viruses. These cause life- threatening diseases like diarrhoea, cholera and typhoid.

Fact 26: Rivers in Asian subcontinent re considered to be the most polluted. The bacteria (from human waste) found in these rivers are 3 times as much as that of the global average.

Fact 27: About 700 million people worldwide drink contaminated water.

Fact 28: Important water contaminants which are man-made include heavy metals, nutrients, microbial pathogens, sediments, organic matter etc.

Fact 29: About 1.2 billion people or 1 in 3 people in rural areas defecate in the open. Open defecation poses an human health risk and compromises quality in nearby water bodies.

Fact 30: Aquatic animal have faced an estimated extinction rate five times more than that of terrestrial animals.

Fact 31: According to WHO and UNICEF, approximately 894 million people globally don’t have access to improved water sources.

Fact 32: Over 30 billion tons of urban sewage discharged into lakes, rivers and oceans each year.

Fact 33: Leather and chemical industries cause are major contributors of water pollution and are emerging leading market economies.

Fact 34: Two million tons of human waste is disposed in water everyday.

Fact 35: As per reports by UNESCO, 27% of the urban population do not have piped water in their homes.

Fact 36: An estimated 1000 children die every day in India due to [polluted water](http://www.conserve-energy-future.com/PollutionTypes.php).

Fact 37: Lack of safe drinking water and sanitation in cities leads to cholera, malaria and diarrhoea.

Fact 38: Huge oil spill was caused by BP in the year 2010. Over 1,000 animals i.e. birds, turtles, mammals have been reported dead and many of them were on the endangered species list.

Fact 39: Each year 1.2 trillion gallons of untreated sewage, storm water, and [industrial waste](http://www.conserve-energy-future.com/causes-effects-of-industrial-pollution.php) are dumped into U.S. waters.

Fact 40: Cruise ships are also a major source of water pollution. They produce over 200,000 gallons of sewage which is mostly released in the ocean. Apart form that, they are also causing at least 35,000 gallons of water contamination due to oil spill.

Even though people have already started taking precautions, the water pollution levels are rising rapidly and there is very little hope left to the polluted water bodies. One big step that every human being can take to prevent water pollution is to minimize water contamination and wastage from their side at every possible level. This was we will be able to save some clean water for the future generations.

## 1AR—Private Industry DA