# JF Pragmatic Hyper War

## Framework V1

### Part 1: Ethical Decision Making

**Conflicting ethical viewpoints does not require the inevitable exclusion of one over another but rather the acceptance that both could be relevant and valuable ethical tool. Thus, the meta ethic should be moral pluralism. Prefer-**

#### 1] Empirics- Best studies prove pluralistic tendencies are inevitable

Polzler and Wright 19[Thomas Pölzler and Jennifer Cole Wright- “Empirical research on folk moral objectivism” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6686698/> NCBI. Published July 5th 2019] Dulles AS

Examining these studies' results more closely, however, makes it less clear whether this interpretation is appropriate (Pölzler, 2018b). Take again Goodwin and Darley's study. In this study, almost 30% of subjects' responses to the disagreement measure and almost 50% of their responses to the truth‐aptness measure fell on the option that the researchers took to be indicative of subjectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, pp. 1347, 1351). Moreover, while some moral statements were dominantly classified as objective (e.g., the above statement about robbery), many others were dominantly classified as nonobjective (e.g., the stem cell research statement). This suggests that subjects in Goodwin and Darley's study may have actually favored what Wright, Grandjean, and McWhite (2013) called “metaethical pluralism,” i.e., they sometimes sided with objectivism and other times with nonobjectivism. More recent studies have by and large confirmed this hypothesis of folk metaethical pluralism. Wright et al. (2013) and Wright, McWhite, and Grandjean (2014), for example, replicated Goodwin and Darley's results, using the exact same measures, but letting subjects classify the presented statements as moral and nonmoral themselves. Objectivity ratings for statements that were dominantly self‐classified as moral varied between as little as 5% and as much as 85%. Research based on different measures yielded high proportions of intrapersonal variation as well (e.g., Beebe, 2014; Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Fisher, Knobe, Strickland, & Keil, 2017; Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, 2017; Wright, 2018; Zijlstra, forthcoming.

#### Ethical claims should be grounded in statistical or empirical proof- it’s the only way to verify the contextual value of any theory and is the basis for corroborating our argumentation.

#### 2] Resolvability- Thousands of years of metaethical debates have concluded in indecisiveness so a 45-minute debate would be unable to correctly resolve nebulous ethical disputes and identify the correct theory. Resolvability outweighs on jurisdiction since it’s a meta-constraint on the judge’s final jurisdiction.

### Part 2: Pragmatic Reorientation-

#### Meaning only makes sense within a frame of reference that isolates the practical difference that it makes in action. Pierce 1 “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” Charles S. Peirce Popular Science Monthly 12 (January 1878), 286-302. Charles Sanders Peirce was an American philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist who is sometimes known as "the father of pragmatism” Dulles AS

Let us illustrate this rule by some examples; and, to begin with the simplest one possible, let us ask **what** **we mean by calling a thing hard**. Evidently **that it will not be scratched by many other substances. The** whole **conception of this quality**, as of every other, **lies in its conceived effects. There is** absolutely **no difference between a hard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to** the **test**. **Suppose, then, that a diamond could be crystallized in the midst of a cushion of soft cotton, and should remain there until it was finally burned up. Would it be false to say that that diamond was soft?** This seems a foolish question, and would be so, in fact, except in the realm of logic. There such questions are often of the greatest utility as serving to bring logical principles into sharper relief than real discussions ever could. In studying logic we must not put them aside with hasty answers, but must consider them with attentive care, in order to make out the principles involved. We may, in the present case, modify our question, and ask what prevents us from saying that all hard bodies remain perfectly soft until they are touched, when their hardness increases with the pressure until they are scratched. Reflection will show that the reply is this: there would be no falsity in such modes of speech. They would involve a modification of our present usage of speech with regard to the words hard and soft, but not of their meanings. For they represent no fact to be different from what it is; only they involve arrangements of facts which would be exceedingly maladroit. This leads us to remark that the question of **what would occur under circumstances which do not actually arise is not** a question of **fact, but only** of the most perspicuous **arrangement** of them. For example, the question of free-will and fate in its simplest form, stripped of verbiage, is something like this: I have done something of which I am ashamed; could I, by an effort of the will, have resisted the temptation, and done otherwise? The philosophical reply is, that this is not a question of fact, but only of the arrangement of facts. Arranging them so as to exhibit what is particularly pertinent to my question -- namely, that I ought to blame myself for having done wrong -- it is perfectly true to say that, if I had willed to do otherwise than I did, I should have done otherwise. On the other hand, arranging the facts so as to exhibit another important consideration, it is equally true that, when a temptation has once been allowed to work, it will, if it has a certain force, produce its effect, let me struggle how I may. There is no objection to a contradiction in what would result from a false supposition. The reductio ad absurdum consists in showing that contradictory results would follow from a hypothesis which is consequently judged to be false. Many questions are involved in the free-will discussion, and I am far from desiring to say that both sides are equally right. On the contrary, I am of opinion that one side denies important facts, and that the other does not. But what I do say is, that the above single question was the origin of the whole doubt; that, had it not been for this question, the controversy would never have arisen; and that this question is perfectly solved in the manner which I have indicated.

#### This commits us to practical deliberation as the method of moral inquiry Serra 1 Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member. Dulles AS

This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that **ethics is valuable** as a science in a broad sense. But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, **through** the **examination of past actions and** the **self-correction** of the self in view of future action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life can be lived. In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his system, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct (or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re- search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, **moral inquiry is performed in a deliberative way, weighing** up **argumentations**, beliefs **and principles, and comparing them** either **with** their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as well as possible **experiences that** can be forceful or **impinge upon the** deliberative **subject** in such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint- ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and thought experiments... **Such responsiveness is part of what it is to make a moral decision** and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)3. Likewise, **this** same **deliberative activity implies an effort to acquire habits,** beliefs and principles **that contribute to** a truly **free deliberation** which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas- ticity and receptiveness to experience4. Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi- ment carried out within imagination that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef- forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con- crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even more, according to Peirce, **the activity takes** the **form of experimentation** in the inner world; **and** the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. **The** real and **living** logical **conclusion is** that **habit** (CP 5.491, 1907). Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided (CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in- fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative subject.

#### Thus, the standard is promoting pragmatic deliberation. Prefer-

#### 1] Value Pluralism- Other ethical theories rely on minimalistic criteria as their foundation, our framework resolves this by using these criteria to better inform our judgments LaFollete 2K "Pragmatic Ethics" [Hugh LaFollette](http://www.hughlafollette.com/index.htm) In [Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory](http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/b-guide.htm) 2000. Hugh LaFollette is Marie E. and Leslie Cole Professor in Ethics at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg. He is editor-in-chief of The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Dulles AS

Pragmatic ethics takes a more aggressive approach, insisting that mankind is responsible for determining the best ethical system possible, which will be refined as new discoveries are made. Put simply; truth does not exist in some abstract realm of thought independent of social relationship or actions; instead, the truth is a function of an active … Pragmatism, according to William James, is derived from the Greek word pragma, which means action and serves as the basis of our English words practical and practice. Pragmatism originated in the United States around 1870, and now presents a growing third alternative to both analytic and Continental philosophical traditions worldwide. 1 - Acceptance . Ethics is a branch of philosophy that is responsible for studying the principles that govern the conduct of an individual. Employs criteria, but is not criterial The previous discussions enable us to say more precisely why pragmatists reject a criterial view of morality. Pragmatism's core contention that **practice** is primary in philosophy **rules out** the hope of logically prior **criteria**. Any meaningful criteria evolve from our attempt to live morally – in deciding what is the best action in the circumstances. **Criteria** are not discovered by pure reason, and they **are not fixed**. As ends of action, they are always revisable. **As we obtain new evidence** about ourselves and our world, and as our worlds changes, **we find** that **what was appropriate** for the old environment **may not be conducive to** survival in **the new** one. A style of teaching that might have been ideal for one kind institution (a progressive liberal arts college) at one time (the 60s) may be wholly ineffective in another institution (a regional state university) at another time (the 80s). But that is exactly what we would expect of an evolutionary ethic. Neither could criteria be complete. **The moral world is complex and changeable. No** set of **criteria could give us univocal answers about how we should behave in all circumstances.** If we cannot develop an algorithm for winning at chess, where there are only eighteen first moves, there is no way to develop an algorithm for living, which has a finitely large number of "first moves." Moreover, while the chess environment (the rules) stays constant, our natural and moral environments do not. We must adapt or fail. While there is always one end of chess -- the game ends when one player wins – the ends of life change as we grow, and **as** our **environments change**. Finally, we cannot resolve practical moral questions simply by applying criteria. We do not make personal or profession decisions by applying fixed, complete criteria. Why should we assume we should make moral decisions that way? Appropriates insights from other ethical theories Nonetheless, there is a perfectly good sense in which a pragmatic ethic employs what we might call criteria, but their nature and role dramatically differ from that in a criterial morality (Dewey 1985/1932) . **Pragmatic criteria** are not external rules we apply, but **are tools we use in making informed judgements**. They embody learning from previous action, they express our tentative efforts to isolate morally relevant features of those actions. These **emergent criteria can become integrated into our habits,** thereby **informing** the **ways** that **we react to**, think about, and imagine **our worlds** and our relations to others. This explains why pragmatists think other theories can provide guidance on how to live morally. Standard moral theories err not because they offer silly moral advice, but because they misunderstand that advice. **Other** moral **theories can** help us **isolate** (and habitually focus on) **morally relevant features** of action. And pragmatists take help wherever they can get it. Utilitarianism does not provide an algorithm for deciding how to act, but it shapes habits to help us "naturally" attend to the ways that our actions impact others. Deontology does not provide a list of general rules to follow, but it sensitizes us to ways our actions might promote or undermine respect for others. Contractarianism does not resolve all moral issues, but it sensitizes us to the need for broad consensus. That is why it is mistaken to suppose that the pragmatist makes specific moral judgements oblivious to rules, principles, virtues, and the collective wisdom of human experience. **The pragmatist absorbs these insights** into her habits, **and** thereby **shapes how she habitually responds,** and how she habitually deliberates when deliberation is required. This also explains why criterial moralities tend to be minimalistic. They specify minimal sets of rules to follow in order to be moral. Pragmatism, on the other hand, like virtue theories, is more concerned to emphasize exemplary behavior – to use morally relevant features of action to determine the best way to behave, not the minimally tolerable way

#### 2] Materiality- Our framework moves away from abstraction and understands knowledge as changing in order to base social change and revision of ideas. Glaude 7’ Eddie S. (Eddie S. Glaude Jr. is the chair of the Center for African-American Studies and the William S. Tod Professor of Religion and African-American Studies at Princeton University.) In a Shade of Blue : Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. University of Chicago Press, 2007. EBSCOhost. (5-7) Bracketed for grammer. Dulles AS

In a Shade of Blue is my contribution to the tradition I have just sketched. My aim is to think through some of the more pressing conceptual problems confronting African American political life, and I do so as a Deweyan prag-matist. I should say a bit about what I mean by this self-description. John Dewey thought of philosophy as a form of cultural and social criticism. He held the view that **philosophy**, properly understood as a mode of wis-dom, ought to aid us in our efforts to overcome problematic situations and worrisome circumstances. The principal charge of the philosopher, then, **is to deal with the problems of human beings**, not simply with the problems of philosophers. For Dewey, over the course of his long career, this involved bridging the divide between science, broadly understood, and morals—a divide he traced to a conception of experience that has led philosophers over the centuries to tilt after windmills. Dewey declared, “The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from life.”9Dewey bases this conclusion on several features of his philosophy: (1) anti foundationalism, (2) experimentalism, (3) contextualism, and (4) soli-darity.10 Antifoundationalism, of course, is the rejection of foundations of knowledge that are beyond question. Dewey, by contrast, understands **knowledge** to be **the fruit of our undertakings as we seek “the enrichment of our immediate experience through the control over action** it exercises.”11He insists that **we turn our attention** from supposed givens **to** actual consequences, **pursuing a future** fundamentally **grounded in values shaped by experience** and realized in our actions. This view makes clear the experimental function of knowledge. Dewey emphasized that knowledge entails efforts to control and select future experience and that we are always con-fronted with the possibility of error when we act. **We** experiment or **tinker, with the understanding that all facts are fallible** and, as such, occasionally afford us the opportunity for revision.12Contextualism refers to an understanding of beliefs, choices, and actions as historically conditioned. Dewey held the view that inquiry, or the pursuit of knowledge, is value-laden, in the sense that we come to problems with interests and habits that orient us one way or another, and that such pursuits are also situational, in the sense that “knowledge is pursued and produced somewhere, some when, and by someone.”13Finally, **solidarity captures** the associational and cooperative dimensions of Dewey’s thinking. Dewey conceives of his **pragmatism as “an instrument of social improvement**” aimed principally at expanding democratic **life and broadening the ground of individual self-development.**14Democracy, for him, constitutes more than a body of formal procedures; it is a form of life that requires constant attention if we are to secure the ideals that purportedly animate it. Individuality is understood as developing one’s unique capacities within the context of one’s social relations **and** one’s community. The formation of the democratic character so important to our form of associated living involves, then, **a** caring **disposition toward the plight of our fellows** and a watchful concern for the well-being of our democratic life.

#### 3] Social relations are dynamic and constantly being decentered from normative systems of knowledge; only pragmatism’s understanding of interactive knowledge production can mitigate entrenched violence.

Kadlec 8, Alison. "Critical pragmatism and deliberative democracy." Theoria 55.117 (2008): 54-80. (doctorate in political science from the University of Minnesota and bachelor's degrees from Michigan State University in political theory, constitutional democracy and English literature.)//Dulles AS

Social Intelligence: The Critical Potential Lived Experience Though human nature is intersubjectively generated on an ongoing basis, we are not merely the products of Platonic conceptions of ourselves. Individuals are cultivated in and by society through experiential processes in which we are acted upon, and act back upon a dynamic environment. For Dewey, 'experience' connotes a very specific process that stands in stark contrast to the traditional conception of experience as a matter of private consciousness. Because Dewey's notion of experience is **social, active, and educative,** what he calls the 'experiential continuum' is the process by which we are best able to develop social intelligence. The 'experiential continuum' is characterised by our enduring and undergoing the consequences of our actions, and intelligence is to be understood as the self-conscious and ongoing process of adjusting our attitudes in light of these consequences.25 In The Public and Its Problems , Dewey gives this view of intelligence a decidedly deliberative spin when he says, 'we lie, as Emerson said, in the lap of an immense intelligence. But that intelligence is dormant and its communications are broken, inarticulate and faint until it possesses the local community as its medium'.26 In 'Ethical Principles Underlying Education', Dewey is more explicit in explaining his view of the relationship between social intelligence and the normative commitment to democracy in his declaration that 'ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more nor less than social intelligence the power of observing and comprehending social situations and social power trained capacities of control at work in the service of social interest and aims'.27 Dewey's unflagging faith in the transformative potential of social intelligence intrinsic to democracy as a way of life **is not Utopian**, nor is it based on a belief that all problems are finally solvable. Rather, it expresses a moral commitment that suggests that a working faith in social intelligence is our best shot at crafting habits and institutions that will further encourage us to identify **new opportunities for the expansion of our capacities** moving forward. The upshot here is that democracy as a way of life means, above all, that we stop thinking of democracy as a thing and start thinking about it as a way. Democracy is belief in the ability of human experience to generate the aims and methods by which further experience will grow in ordered richness. . . . Democracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any special result attained, so that the special results achieved are of ultimate value only as they are used to enrich and order the ongoing process. Since the process of experience is capable of being **educative**, faith in democracy is all one with faith in experience and education. All ends and values that are cut off from the ongoing process become arrests and fixations. They strive to fixate what has been gained instead of using it to open the road and point the way to new and better experiences.28 On this account, social intelligence is not a possession, it is a de-centred and educative process of ordering our **experiences** through manifold **communication**. The guiding principles, then, of social intelligence are 1) the protection and expansion of our capacity for free and communicative inquiry and 2) the protection and expansion of our capacity to perceive the shared consequences of our habits and policies. We judge the goodness or badness of these consequences by evaluating the way they act back on and impact our individual capacities for free inquiry that inform the ongoing development of social intelligence In turn, the 'proper conditions' for social intelligence then are those that increase our ability to perceive the complex shared consequences of our choices and practices. Intelligence is social in pragmatism because it requires the development of both firstand second-order attitudes that can only take place in an ongoing process of communication. Free inquiry is not just a matter of having the opportunity to seek information that will allow for the generation of thoughtful attitudes about issues, it is also a matter of appreciating and harnessing the democratic potential of second-order attitudes (attitudes about our attitudes). We are not passive receivers of information, **but dynamic interactors**, and therefore intelligence is intrinsically communicative. Free inquiry is the engine of social intelligence, which is in turn based on our willingness to have our firstorder attitudes adjusted in light of our second-order attitudes.29 The ongoing mutual adjustment of our first-order and second-order attitudes through a back and forth process between the two emerges only to the extent that we have the opportunities to communicate freely with others, and this is none other than the 'method' of social intelligence. The goal of communicative inquiry then is to build an ever richer context for the ongoing development of our ability to perceive the relationship between our beliefs, practices, and institutions. By taking a principal focus on increasing our ability for evermore sophisticated perception of the consequences of our habits of thought and action, we will be better equipped to distinguish between those habits that improve and those that impede our capacities for free inquiry. This is the material of problem-solving, as it is just this capacity for free inquiry that makes it possible to identify common problems in a way that they may be productively addressed. Turning back to the challenges leveled by radical democratic theorists, we can begin to see the opportunities made possible by critical pragmatism. Tapping into the critical potential of lived experience under conditions of unalterable changefulness begins with the therapeutic recognition that there is no such thing as a unified field of power directed entirely by stable and fixed interests. The first implication here is that there are always new opportunities to exploit cracks and fissures in various structurally **entrenched forms of power**. Second, the essentially complexity and flux of our world is always **producing new opportunities for transformative resistance** and for the development of more creative approaches to meaningful deliberation. Critical pragmatism pivots on the notion that under such conditions what we most need are not fixed and static foundations, we need the flexible habits of inquiry and **communication** that make it possible to both identify pernicious obstacles to deliberation and to challenge, circumvent, or neutralise their impact.

### Part 3: Impact Calc:

#### 1] Deliberation is procedural not substantive, which means that we are first concerned with the decision-making procedure of deliberation and then evaluation of what impacts matter most. To clarify, consequences are a sequencing question. Serra 2

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: As LaFollette presents it, the key to understanding pragmatist ethics is that it is not an ethical theory per se, but rather it is an anthropology, a way of understanding the human being and his moral action. Therefore, pragmatist ethics in reality does not propose a new ethical theory, but rather “reconstructs” through a new prism the basic intuitions of the best ethical theories. The fundamental element on which the attention of pragmatist ethics centers is deliberation. **Deliberation is not directly responsible for directing action, but** only **does so indirectly, by** means of a critique of past actions, **the effort to** correct or **reinforce certain habits** and mental experiments that each actor performs in order to determine his own future conduct, and even to determine in a general manner the way in which one wishes to live one’s life (or, what amounts to the same thing, the type of person one wishes to be). **The task of a pragmatist** ethics, therefore**, is not to provide final solutions, but** rather to indicate that it is **only** via **the testing and communication of experiences that** the **superiority** of **one** moral **idea** over another **can be demonstrated**. In this sense, one of the principal missions of any given version of pragmatist ethics is to indicate some general manner in which habits can be acquired which, later, will facilitate personal deliberation – both internal and external – in the broad variety of circumstances which make up the moral life.

## Contention

#### 1] Intrincisness- LAW’s are incapable of ethical deliberation, objectify targets, and cannot base decisions on particularities

HRW 18[Human Rights Watch- “Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” [https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots August 21st 2018](https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-robots%20August%2021st%202018)] UT AI

Due to their lack of emotion and legal and ethical judgment, fully autonomous weapons would face significant obstacles in complying with the principles of humanity. Those principles require the humane treatment of others and respect for human life and human dignity. Humans are motivated to treat each other humanely because they feel compassion and empathy for their fellow humans. Legal and ethical judgment gives people the means to minimize harm; it enables them to make considered decisions based on an understanding of a particular context. As machines, fully autonomous weapons would not be sentient beings capable of feeling compassion. Rather than exercising judgment, such weapons systems would base their actions on pre-programmed algorithms, which do not work well in complex and unpredictable situations. Showing respect for human life entails minimizing killing. Legal and ethical judgment helps humans weigh different factors to prevent arbitrary and unjustified loss of life in armed conflict and beyond. It would be difficult to recreate such judgment, developed over both human history and an individual life, in fully autonomous weapons, and they could not be pre-programmed to deal with every possible scenario in accordance with accepted legal and ethical norms. Furthermore, most humans possess an innate resistance to killing that is based on their understanding of the impact of loss of life, which fully autonomous weapons, as inanimate machines, could not share. Even if fully autonomous weapons could adequately protect human life, they would be incapable of respecting human dignity. Unlike humans, these robots would be unable to appreciate fully the value of a human life and the significance of its loss. They would make life-and-death decisions based on algorithms, reducing their human targets to objects. Fully autonomous weapons would thus violate the principles of humanity on all fronts.

#### 2] Depersonalization is built into LAWs they categorize people as “friend” or “enemy” which causes a violent rather than adversarial relationship when conflict arises

#### Danckwardt 15:

Danckwardt, Petter. "Increasing De-personalization in Warfare: Levinasian Words on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems." (2015).

In Precarious Life, Butler uses the Levinasian understanding of the self’s relation with the Other to understand the mechanisms behind how moral demands are made and what it means for others to make such demands upon us. She focuses on the Levinasian term of the “face” of the Other–a term connected to Levinas’ philosophical work, although less so in Otherwise than Being. What she also pays attention to is the meaning of the appearance of the other in various images in varying contexts. I have already discussed Levinas’ idea of thematization that threatens the alterity of the other, and how Levinas maintains that there is precariousness to life, and the very role of philosophy is to show this precariousness. What makes this interesting in relation to Butler’s elaboration on this topic, is that she refers to the context of the global war on terrorism, to and points out how the representations of the human in the media inclines to hide this precariousness of the human: the woman in the burqa is represented as a Muslim woman in a burqa, the man with the long beard, represented as a terrorist—in other words pictures that dehumanize people by their very categorisation. Returning to the question of targeting, there are clearly, in the Levinasian sense, some problematic implications. One of them is that the targeting of LAWS presupposes categorization. LAWS, being able to autonomously target and kill human beings, always find its human “trace” in its code. This presupposes a thematization of a target; depending on the software and procedural protocols, the other is reduced to parts of algorithms. The LAWS analyses the information available and, based on a set of fundamental algorithms target and destroy the target. This refusal of the alterity or proximity of the other is depersonalizing and also dehumanizing. Here, the dehumanization being discussed in the debates I illustrated on LAWS receives a deeper meaning: that of forcing upon the other a certain essence by categorizing the Other which then becomes "the friend" or "the enemy". This is not unique to LAWS; dehumanizing and depersonalization occur all the time. But regarding LAWS it is essential for the very functioning of the weapon; it cannot function or be meaningful without reducing alterity to numbers, codes and images. This is what makes the weapon purely rationalistic in the sense that feelings and perception are out of the grid. By distinguishing the absolute sincerity of saying, (saying as Communication in my passivity before passivity in my relation to others) and the congealing of such saying in the said, Levinas is able to show the priority of the primordial ethical relation of saying over the saying understood as situated in the said (which is at work when robots are “behaving ethically” by means of categorization). What is problematic when saying is congealed to the said? It implies we have forgotten about the surplus of meaning that is carried by the saying; one has become insensitive to another. This could have many reasons, but it is the insensitiveness that is of issue here. Categorization implies thematization. Thematization is exhausting on, and inflicting violence on what it is tries to conceptualize. There is violence already at work in categorization. What, then, is at stake regarding LAWS? What are the implications for the relation between me and the Other when robots autonomously and deliberately target and destroy human beings? I stated previously how LAWS do not constitute a radical break between the signature and the author; it is the current peak of a radical development of weapons technology. I showed why the question of making robots “behave ethically” misses the point–”the Good can not enter into a present nor be put into a representation” (OB 15). Programming humanitarian law (jus in bello) into a computer does not alter in any way the ethical situation. There is the human trace, which leads us back to a face looming over the LAWS itself. This human trace is represented through LAWS, reducing the other to thematization, which results in depersonalization, dehumanization. The generalized point of view that is adopted through LAWS is structured around a structure trying to grasp, understand, appropriate and assimilate that to which is beyond, otherwise than being. However, it is a human being doing so through the rationality and effectiveness of the robotic; it is the human trace appearing as the robot and not the other way around: robots not becoming human but a human trace becoming robotic. This relation between the human being behind the LAWS and the thematized and dehumanized “enemy”, in which the same dominates or absorbs the other, is in radical contrast with the ethical relation, substitution-proximity-responsibility, which Levinas in an interview describes as “no fusion: the relation to the other is envisioned as alterity… the other is alterity” (Levinas 1995, 103). One could then say: dehumanization and flagrant violations of human dignity have been going on as far back as one can remember.56 Levinas was of course aware of the darkness of European history; both his family and Levinas himself were direct victims of National Socialism. Indeed, the possibility of ethics is the possibility of murder; by saying, “do not kill me” you imply there is a possibility of violation. The command “Thou shalt not kill” would otherwise be meaningless–“the face is that possibility of murder” (ibid, 104). In Peace and Proximity and Totality and Infinity, Levinas discusses how it is possible to murder someone. This is a delicate question: if the face is the site of our relation to the other, if responsibility is incumbent on me exclusively,57 how is murder, then, even possible? His answer is that murder is one possible enactment of the ethical relationship: to murder is not to actually dominate or assimilate someone, but murder is first presupposing a relationship with the Other; murder is one’s choice of action in response to this (TI 198-9.). The impossibility of refusing the ethical relationship and the impossibility of a complete appropriating or domination of the other or to dominate can end up in me destroying the other. As I have showed, Levinas argues that the self is self through the other, where the other is not a mere negation of the self or the ego, but as alterity as such. The Other: unknown and non-representable. In this sense, the Other is inassimilable and also indestructible. So what does it mean, then, when robots are deliberately targeting and killing human beings? What seems to be a technological effect of LAWS–and perhaps also with drones–as a weapon is the presupposition of de-personalization. To function properly, LAWS require a de-personalisation already made; de-personalization is produced, however not in LAWS due to the fact that robots cannot be in proximity with the other, but some place else. One could also argue that better categorization and appropriation of the Other, implies a more well functioning LAWS; one becomes a target even before being targeted, a defined enemy before hostilities, deprived before deprivation. In fact, the whole point of LAWS is not the actual destruction and targeting of the Other, but instead, how LAWS can effectively do it without me being involved. It is not the distance or separation from actions per se that contributes to this sort of de-personalization, but the fact that the weapons systems are dependent on depersonalization to begin with. This de-personalization cannot come from pilots or soldiers like in, for example, World War II, but necessarily from the military, technological or political structure behind the weapon/warrior itself. This is the consequence of arbitrarily blending “warrior” and “weapon” into a technical artefact. Pursuing the argument of Butler mentioned above, there is representation of the Other at the very heart of the function of LAWS. Her argument is that the domains of representation are where humanization and de-humanization ceaselessly occur. Violence then happens through the representation and categorization of the Other, which, in the context of LAWS, is through imagery, codes, algorithms, intelligence information et cetera. No representation can fully show the proximity of the Other; all representation fail at conveying the alterity of the Other; all representations congeal or displace the face. In every attempt to represent and capture the Other beyond being, loss of that very beyond is taking place. However, this “loss” does not necessarily mean that the representations as such dehumanizes. This “betrayal” of the other does not mean the other is lost. In a way, the other needs to be betrayed.58 Just as Levinas needs to betray the saying in order to problematize the saying, “in language qua said everything is conveyed before us, be it at the price of a betrayal”, writes Levinas (OB 6). Nevertheless this is required for Levinas in order to mention “be it by betrayal” that language nevertheless is an “outside of being” (ibid). In this sense, and as I have argued above in Chapter II, through resaying, subjectivity becomes the site in which the discourse of the Said is ”interrupted”. Ethical interruption is in this sense the conveying of the elemental relation of the one-for-the-other. 59 This interruption, however, is denied in the context of LAWS. As I stated, LAWS cannot properly be programmed to “behave ethically”. Neglecting the problem of making robots not being able to “behave ethically”, LAWS becomes from the very start thematization because of the presupposition of seeing ethics as something written in a code or an algorithm–who to kill and who not to kill. The pre-programmed “ethical behaviour” of a robot becomes an uninterrupted totality, an uninterrupted thematization. “Behaving ethically”, LAWS cannot unsay or interrupt anything. Ethics, in the Levinasian sense, fails to interrupt this totality; therefore:

## Advantage

### Plan

#### I Affirm the Resolution – Resolved: States ought to ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons.

#### I’ll define lethal autonomous weapons as all weapons that can automatically selectively target and fire at human targets without human control, targeting, and supervision.-

For Spec: The actor is the States, enforcement will be done through an inter-state treaty facilitated for all countries in the world involving arms export controls. We will use cryptographic proof of accountable human control to verify compliance.

Gubrud 16 Mark Gubrud 6-1-2016 "Why Should We Ban Autonomous Weapons? To Survive" <https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/military-robots/why-should-we-ban-autonomous-weapons-to-survive> (Mark Gubrud is an adjunct professor in the Curriculum in Peace, War & Defense at the University of North Carolina. His PhD is in ultra-low temperature and nanoscale experimental physics, and he has experience in mechanical, electronic, and software engineering, diaper-changing and banjo-playing)//Elmer

Many statements at the CCW have endorsed human control as a guiding principle, and Altmann and I have suggested **cryptographic proof of accountable human control as a way to verify compliance** **with a ban on autonomous weapons**. Yet the CCW has not set a definite goal for its deliberations. And in the meantime, the killer robot arms race has taken off. FULL SPEED AHEAD In 2012, the Obama administration, via then-undersecretary of defense Ashton Carter, directed the Pentagon to begin developing, acquiring, and using “autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems.” Directive 3000.09 has been widely misperceived as a policy of caution; many accounts insist that it “requires a human in the loop.” But instead of human control, the policy sets “appropriate levels of human judgment” as a guiding principle. It does not explain what that means, but senior officials are required to certify that autonomous weapon systems meet this standard if they select and kill people without human intervention. The policy clearly does not forbid such systems. Rather, it permits the withdrawal of human judgment, control, and responsibility from points of lethal decision. The policy has not stood in the way of programs such as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, slated for deployment in 2018, which will hunt its targets over a wide expanse, relying on its own compute1rs to discriminate enemy ships from civilian vessels. Weapons like this are classified as merely “semi-autonomous” and get a green light without certification, even though they will be operating fully autonomously when they decide which pixels and signals correspond to valid targets, and attack them with lethal force. Every technology needed to acquire, track, identify, and home in or control firing on targets can be developed and used in “semi-autonomous weapon systems,” which can even be sent on hunt-and-kill missions as long as the quarry has been “selected by a human operator.” (In case you’re wondering, “target selection” is defined as “The determination that an individual target or a specific group of targets is to be engaged.”) It’s unclear that the policy stands in the way of anything. In reality, the directive signaled an upward inflection in the trend toward killer robots. Throughout the military there is now open discussion about autonomy in future weapon systems; ambitious junior officers are tying their careers to it. DARPA and the Navy are particularly active **in efforts to develop autonomous systems**, but the Air Force, Army, and Marines won’t be left out. Carter, now the defense secretary, is heavily promoting AI and robotics programs, establishing an office in Silicon Valley and a board of advisors to be chaired by Eric Schmidt, the executive chairman of Google’s parent company Alphabet. The message has been received globally as well. Russia in 2013 moved to create its own versions of DARPA and the of the U.S. Navy’s Laboratory for Autonomous Systems Research, and deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin called on Russian industry to create weapons that “strike on their own,” pointing explicitly to American developments. China, too, has been developing its own drones and robotic weapons, mirroring the United States (but with less noise than Russia). Britain, Israel, India, South Korea… in fact, **every significant military power** on Earth **is looking in this direction**. “The United States has been leading the robot arms race, both with weapons development and with a policy that pretends to be cautious and responsible but actually clears the **way for vigorous development** and early use **of autonomous weapons**” Both Russia and China have engaged in aggressive actions, arms buildups, and belligerent rhetoric in recent years, and it’s unclear whether they could be persuaded to support a ban on autonomous weapons. But we aren’t even trying. Instead, the United States has been leading the robot arms race, both with weapons development and with a policy that pretends to be cautious and responsible but actually clears the way for vigorous development and early use of autonomous weapons. Deputy defense secretary Robert Work has championed the notion of a “Third Offset” in which the United States would leap to the next generation of military technologies ahead of its “adversaries,” particularly Russia and China. To calm fears about robots taking over, he emphasizes “human-machine collaboration and combat teaming” and says the military will use artificial intelligence and robotics to augment, not replace human warfighters. Yet he worries that adversaries may field fully autonomous weapon systems, and says the U.S. may need to “delegate authority to machines” because “humans simply cannot operate at the same speed.” Work admits that the United States has no monopoly on the basic enabler, information technology, which today is driven more by commercial markets than by military needs. Both China and Russia have strong software and cyber hacking capabilities. Their latest advanced fighters, tanks, and missiles are said to rival ours in sophistication. Work compares the present to the “inter-war period” and urges the U.S. to emulate Germany’s invention of blitzkrieg. Has he forgotten how that ended? A DISASTER WAITING TO HAPPEN Nobody wants war. Yet, fearing enemy aggression, we position ourselves at the brink of it. Arms races militarize societies, inflate threat perceptions, and yield a proliferation of opportunities for accidents and mistakes. In numerous close calls during the Cold War, it came down to the judgment of one or a few people not to take the next step in a potentially fatal chain of events. But machines simply execute their programs, as intended. They also behave in ways we did not intend or expect. “Networks of autonomous weapons could accidentally ignite a war and, once it has started, **rapidly escalate it out of control**. To set up such a disaster waiting to happen would be foolish” Our experience with the unpredictable failures and unintended interactions of complex software systems, particularly competitive autonomous agents designed in secrecy by hostile teams, serves as a warning that networks of autonomous weapons could accidentally ignite a war and, once it has started, rapidly escalate it out of control. To set up such a disaster waiting to happen would be foolish, but not unprecedented. It’s the type of risk we took during the Cold War, and it’s similar to the military planning that drove the march to war in 1914. Arms races and confrontation push us to take this kind of risk. Paul Scharre, one of the architects of Directive 3000.09, has suggested that the risk of autonomous systems acting on their own could be mitigated by negotiating “rules of the road” and including humans in battle networks as “fail-safes.” But it’s asking a lot of humans to remain calm when machines indicate an attack underway. By the time you sort out a false alarm, **autonomous weapons may actually have started fighting**. If nations can’t agree to the simple idea of **a verified ban to avoid this danger**, it seems less likely that they will be able to negotiate some complicated system of rules and safeguards. Direct authority to launch a nuclear strike may never be delegated to machines and a war between the United States and China or Russia might not end in nuclear war, but do we want to take that risk? There is no reason to believe we can engineer safety into a tense confrontation between networks of autonomous weapons at the brink of war. The further we go down that road, **the harder it will be to walk back**. Banning autonomous weapons and asserting the primacy of human control isn’t a complete solution, but it is probably **an essential step to ending the arms race** and building true peace and security. BACK TO BASICS The fundamental problem is conflict itself, which pits human against human, reason against reason and machine against machine. We struggle to contain our conflicts, but passing them on to machines risks finding ourselves nominally still in command yet unable to control events at superhuman speed. We are horrified by killer robots, and we can ground their prohibition on strong a priori principles such as human control, responsibility, dignity—and survival. Instead of endlessly debating the validity of these human prejudices, we should take them as saving grace, and use them to stop killer robots.

### Scenario

#### New developments in Autonomous Weapons have put crisis stability on the brink – each threat triggers catalytic Nuclear War

Johnson 21, James. "‘Catalytic nuclear war’ in the age of artificial intelligence & autonomy: Emerging military technology and escalation risk between nuclear-armed states." Journal of Strategic Studies (2021): 1-41. (School of Law and Government – Dublin City University)//Elmer

In the contemporary digitized landscape, the theft of nuclear grade materials, the detonation of atomic weapons, and ‘dirty bombs’ by non-state actors are not the only threats that states must worry about. Emerging technologies – most notably cyber, AI technology, and drones – are rapidly creating new (and exacerbating old) low-cost and relatively easy **means for non-state actors** to fulfill their nefarious goals; without the need for actual physical contact with or manufacture of nuclear weapons to have the ‘power to hurt’ – or the power to get others to hurt each other. 27 One of the critical potential ‘threat vectors’ (i.e., a mechanism or means by which an actor can gain access to a network in order to deliver a malicious payload) is the severe consequences that would result from a non-state actors’ deliberate **actions to penetrate or manipulate nuclear command**, control, and communication (NC3) **systems with AI-enhanced conventional capabilities**. Above all, cyber operations targeting early-warning satellites and radars are central to this article’s central focus. 28 The presumption of immunity or overconfidence in the robustness of NC3 networks to external (or insider) threats may increase the chances that states underestimate nuclear weapon systems’ vulnerabilities to a multitude of possible attack mechanisms, inter alia, **data manipulation, malware** cyber-attacks, ‘**false-flag cyber operations**,’ 29 social media flooding, or **spoofing** decision-makers **with disinformation** and misinformation. Minuteman missile silos are, for example, considered to be particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks. 30 Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) once believed to be air-gapped – not connected to the internet and considered ‘hack-proof’ – are, however, connected via various electromagnetic signals that create potential vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. A committed non-state or third-party actor may, for example, disrupt (digital jamming), deny (denial of service attacks), and distort or destroy information (spoofing or malware attacks) used by SSBN’s command and control networks to sow miscalculation and misperceptions, fan the waves of a crisis, or trigger an accidental nuclear launch. 31 In extremis, third-party hackers (or ‘cyber terrorists’) during a crisis might use AI-augmented false flag cyber operation to mislead submarine commanders (or political decision-makers) that an SSBN was – or expected to be in the case of a ‘launch on warning’ policy – under-attack. 32 Echoing these concerns, a 2009 study commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) warned that non-state actors might penetrate command and control (C2) systems – and even launch an unauthorized nuclear attack – an easier and more plausible ‘alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves.’ 33 Recent developments in AI-enabling technology have **exacerbated** these **vulnerabilities** **and introduced additional threat vectors** non-state actors might leverage, **which may precipitate a catalytic nuclear war** that manipulates the information landscape in which decisions about atomic weapons occur. In particular, social media manipulation and the spreading of misinformation, false memes, and fake news. For example, in 2016, a false news story appeared on the AWD News site that claimed that Israel had threatened to attack Pakistan with nuclear weapons if Islamabad interfered in Syria. The report consequently caused a tit-for-tat incendiary rhetorical exchange on Twitter – the Pakistani defense minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif warned that Israel should remember that Pakistan is also a nuclear-armed state debunked as fictitious by the Israeli Defense Ministry. 34 This incident puts a modern spin on the Cold War concept of catalytic nuclear war – in which third party actions provoke a nuclear war between the two nuclear-armed powers – and demonstrates the potentially severe damage caused by the misinformation and manipulation of information by non-state actors. During a crisis involving a competitive strategic dyad – such as the conflict-prone South Asia or Northeast Asia – when communication is compromised, nuclear arsenals are on high-alert, decision-making timeframes are compressed, or launch authority is pre-delegated (e.g., to nuclear-armed submarine commanders), **the consequences could be catastrophic**. 35 Moreover, in a high pressured crisis environment with confusion and paranoia running high the risk of misperceptions of an adversary’s intentions and behavior (e.g., putting nuclear arsenals on high-alert status) non-routine troop movement), the temptations for pre-emptive action increases. 36 That is, the catalyzing non-state actor produces the effect of an imminent attack on one or both of two nuclear-armed states, for which pre-emption is considered the most advantageous strategy. 37 What factors might aggravate these escalation pathways during a crisis?

#### Multiple Internal Links:

#### 1] International Stability- LAWs threaten international stability even if they work – capability matters more than usage

Horowitz and Scharre 21 Michael Horowitz and Paul Scharre 1-12-2021 "AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures" <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures#fnmarker5> (Michael C. Horowitz is Richard Perry Professor and the Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Paul Scharre is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.)//Elmer

Military Uses of AI: A Risk to International Stability? Militaries have an inherent interest in staying ahead of their competitors, or at least not falling behind. National militaries want to avoid fielding inferior military capabilities and so will generally pursue emerging technologies that could improve their ability to fight. While the pursuit of new technologies is normal, some technologies raise concerns because of their impact on stability or their potential to shift warfare in a direction that causes net increased harm for all (combatants and/or civilians). For example, around the turn of the 20th century, great powers debated, with mixed results, arms control against a host of industrial era technologies that they feared could alter warfare in profound ways. These included submarines, air-delivered weapons, exploding bullets, and poison gas. After the invention of nuclear weapons, concerns surrounding their potential use dominated the attention of policymakers given the weapons’ sheer destructive potential. Especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrated the very real risk of escalation, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in arms control on a range of weapons technologies, including strategic missile defense, intermediate-range missiles, space-based weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), biological weapons, and apparent tacit restraint in neutron bombs and anti-satellite weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union also, at times, cooperated to avoid miscalculation and improve stability through measures such as the Open Skies Treaty and the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement. It is reasonable and, in fact, vital to examine whether the integration of AI into warfare might also pose risks that policymakers should attend. Some AI researchers themselves have raised alarm at militaries’ adoption of AI and the way it could increase the **risk of war and international instability**.5 Understanding risks stemming from military use of AI is complicated, however, by the fact that AI is not a discrete technology like missiles or submarines. As a general-purpose technology, AI has many applications, any of which could, individually, improve or undermine stability in various ways. Militaries are only beginning the process of adopting AI, and in the near term, military AI use is likely to be limited and incremental. Over time, the cognization of warfare through the introduction of artificial intelligence could change warfare in profound ways, just as industrial revolutions in the past shaped warfare.6 Even if militaries successfully manage safety and security concerns and field AI systems that are robust and secure, **properly functioning AI systems could create challenges for international stability.** For example, both Chinese and American scholars have hypothesized that the introduction of AI and autonomous systems in combat operations could accelerate the tempo of warfare beyond the pace of human control. Chinese scholars have referred to this concept as a battlefield “singularity,”7 while some Americans have coined the term “**hyperwar**” to refer to a similar idea.8 If warfare evolves to a point where the pace of combat outpaces humans’ ability to keep up, and therefore control over military operations must be handed to machines, it would pose significant risks for international stability, even if the delegation decision seems necessary due to competitive pressure. Humans **might lose control over managing escalation**, and **war termination could be significantly complicated if machines fight at a pace** that is **faster than humans** can respond. In addition, delegation of escalation control to machines could mean that minor tactical missteps or accidents that are part and parcel of military operations in the chaos and fog of war, including fratricide, civilian casualties, and poor military judgment, could **spiral out of control and reach catastrophic proportions** before humans have time to intervene. Even if militaries successfully manage safety and security concerns and field AI systems that are robust and secure, properly functioning AI systems could create challenges for international stability. The logic of a battlefield singularity, or hyperwar, is troubling precisely because competitive pressures could drive militaries to accelerate the tempo of operations and remove humans “from the loop,” even if they would rather not, in order to keep pace with adversaries. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work succinctly captured this dilemma when he posed the question, “If our competitors go to Terminators ... and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?”9 While this “arms race in speed” is often characterized tactically in the context of lethal autonomous weapon systems, the same dynamic could emerge operationally involving algorithms designed as decision aids. The perception by policymakers that war is evolving to an era of machine-dominated conflict in which humans must cede control to machines to remain competitive could also hasten such a development, particularly if decision makers lack appropriate education about the limits of AI. In extremis, the shift toward the use of algorithms for military decision-making, combined with a more roboticized battlefield, could potentially change the nature of war. War would still be the continuation of politics by other means in the broadest sense, but in the most extreme case it might feature so little human engagement that it is no longer a fundamentally human endeavor.10 The widespread adoption of AI could have a net effect on international stability in other ways. AI systems could change strategy in war, including by substituting machines for human decision-making in some mission areas, and therefore removing certain aspects of human psychology from parts of war.11 Warfare today is waged by humans through physical machinery (rockets, missiles, machine guns, etc.), but decision-making is almost universally human. As algorithms creep closer to the battlefield, some decisions will be made by machines even if warfare remains a human-directed activity that is fought for human political purposes. The widespread integration of machine decision-making across tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare could have far-reaching implications. Already, AI agents playing real-time computer strategy games such as StarCraft and Dota 2 have demonstrated superhuman aggressiveness, precision, and coordination. In other strategy games such as poker and go, AI agents have demonstrated an ability to radically adjust playing styles and risk-taking in ways that would be, at best, challenging for humans to mimic for psychological reasons. AI dogfighting agents have similarly demonstrated superhuman precision and employed different tactics because of the ability to take greater risk to themselves.12 In many ways, AI systems have the ability to be the perfect strategic agents, unencumbered by fear, loss aversion, commitment bias, or other human emotional or cognitive biases and limitations.13 While the specific algorithms and models used for computer games are unlikely to transfer well to combat applications, the general characteristics and advantages of AI agents relative to humans could have applications in the military domain. As in the case of speed, the net consequence of machine decision-making on the psychology of combat could change the character of warfare in profound ways.14 AI could have other cumulative effects on warfare. Policymakers generally assess adversaries’ behavior based on an understanding of their capabilities and intentions.15 Shifts toward AI could undermine policymaker knowledge in both of those arenas. The transition of military capabilities to software, already underway but arguably accelerated by the adoption of AI and autonomous systems, could make it harder for policymakers to accurately judge relative military capabilities. Incomplete information about adversary capabilities would therefore increase, conceivably increasing the **risks of miscalculation**. Alternatively, the opposite could be true—AI and autonomous systems used for intelligence collection and analysis could radically increase transparency about military power, making it easier for policymakers to judge military capabilities and anticipate the outcome of a conflict in advance. This added transparency could decrease the risks of miscalculation and defuse some potential conflicts before they begin. The transition of military capabilities to software, already underway but arguably accelerated by the adoption of AI and autonomous systems, could make it harder for policymakers to accurately judge relative military capabilities. The integration of AI into military systems, in combination with a shift toward a more roboticized force structure, could also change policymakers’ threshold for risk-taking, either because they believe that **fewer human lives are at risk** or that AI systems enable greater precision, or perhaps because **they see AI systems as uniquely dangerous**. The perceived availability of AI systems could change policymakers’ beliefs about their ability to foresee the outcome of conflicts or to win. It is, no doubt, challenging to stand at the beginning of the AI age and imagine the cumulative consequence of AI adoption across varied aspects of military operations, including effects that hinge as much **on human perception** of the technology as the technical characteristics themselves. The history of attempts to regulate the effects of industrial age weapons in the late 19th and early 20th centuries suggests that even when policymakers accurately anticipated risks from certain technologies, such as air-delivered weapons or poison gas, they frequently crafted regulations that turned out to be ill-suited to the specific forms these technologies took as they matured. Furthermore, even when both sides desired restraint, it frequently (although not always) collapsed under the exigencies of war.16 There is no reason to think that our prescience in predicting the path of future technologies or ability to restrain warfare is any better today. There is merit, however, in beginning the process of thinking about the many ways in which AI could influence warfare, big and small. Even beyond the scenarios described above, it is possible to frame how military applications of AI could impact international stability into two broad categories: (1) risks related to the character of algorithms and their use by militaries, and (2) risks related to militaries using AI for particular missions. Risks Due to the Limitations of AI A challenge for military adoption of AI is that two key risks associated with new technology adoption are in tension. First, militaries could fail to adopt—or adopt quickly enough or employ in the right manner—a new technology that yields significant battlefield advantage. As a recent example, despite the overall growth in the military uninhabited, or unmanned, aircraft market, the adoption of uninhabited vehicles has, at times, been a source of contention within the U.S. defense establishment, principally based on debates over the merits of this new technology relative to existing alternatives.17 Alternatively, militaries could adopt an immature **technology too quickly**, betting heavily and incorrectly on new and untested propositions about how a technology may change warfare. Given the natural incentive militaries have in ensuring their capabilities work on the battlefield, it may be reasonable to assume that militaries would manage these risks reasonably well, although not without some mishaps. But when balancing the risk of accidents versus falling behind adversaries in technological innovation, militaries arguably **place safety as a secondary consideration**.18 Militaries may be relatively accepting of the risk of accidents in the pursuit of technological advantage, since accidents are a routine element of military operations, even in training.19 Nevertheless, there are strong bureaucratic interests in ultimately ensuring that fielded capabilities are robust and secure, and existing institutional processes may be able to manage AI safety and security risks with some adaptation. For militaries, balancing between the risks of going too slow versus going too fast with AI adoption is complicated by the fact that AI, and deep learning in particular, is a relatively immature technology with significant vulnerabilities and reliability concerns.20 These concerns are heightened in situations where there may not be ample data on which to train machine learning systems. Machine learning systems generally rely on very large data sets, which may not exist in some military settings, particularly when it comes to early warning of rare events (such as a nuclear attack) or tracking adversary behavior in a multidimensional battlefield. When trained with **inadequate data sets** or employed outside the narrow context of their design, AI systems are often unreliable and brittle. AI systems can often **seem deceptively capable,** performing well (sometimes better than humans) in some laboratory settings, then failing dramatically under changing environmental conditions in the real world. Self-driving cars, for example, may be safer than human drivers in some settings, then inexplicably turn deadly in situations where a human operator would not have trouble. Additionally, deep learning methods may, at present, be insufficiently reliable for safety-critical applications even when operating within the bounds of their design specifications.21 For example, concerns about limits to the reliability of algorithms across demographic groups have hindered the deployment of facial recognition technology in the United States, particularly in high-consequence applications such as law enforcement. Militaries, too, should be concerned about technical limitations and vulnerabilities in their AI systems. Militaries want technologies that work, especially on the battlefield. Accordingly, the AI strategy of the Department of Defense (DoD) calls for AI systems that are “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.”22 This is undoubtedly the correct approach but a challenge, at least in the near term, given the reliability issues facing many uses of algorithms today and the highly dynamic conditions of battlefield use. An additional challenge stems from security dilemma dynamics. Competitive pressures could lead nations to shortcut test and evaluation (T&E) in a desire to field new AI capabilities ahead of adversaries. Similar competitive pressures to beat others to market appear to have played an exacerbating role in accident risk relating to AI systems in self-driving cars and commercial airplane autopilots.23 Militaries evaluating an AI system of uncertain reliability could, not unjustifiably, feel pressure to hasten deployment if they believe others are taking similar measures. Historically, these pressures are highest immediately before and during wars, where the risk/reward equation surrounding new technologies can shift due to the very real lives on the line. For example, competitive pressures may have spurred the faster introduction of poison gas in World War I.24 Similarly, in World War II, Germany diverted funds from proven technologies into jet engines, ballistic missiles, and helicopters, even though none of the technologies proved mature until after the war.25 This dynamic risk might spark **a self-fulfilling prophecy** in which countries accelerate deployment of insufficiently tested AI systems out of the fear that others will deploy first.26 The net effect is not an arms race but **a “race to the bottom” on safety**, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems and heightening the **risk of accidents and instability**. Even if military AI systems are adequately tested, the use of AI to enable more autonomous machine behavior in military systems raises an additional set of risks. In delegating decision-making from humans to machines, policymakers may de facto be **fielding forces with less flexibility** and ability to understand context, which would then have **deleterious effects on crisis stability** and managing escalation. While machines have many advantages in speed, precision, and repeatable actions, machines today cannot come close to human intelligence in understanding context and flexibly adapting to novel situations. This brittleness of machine decision-making may particularly be a **challenge in pre-conflict crisis situations**, where tensions among nations run high. Military forces from competing nations regularly interact in militarized disputes below the threshold of war in a variety of contested regions (e.g., the India-Pakistan border, China-India border, South China Sea, Black Sea, Syria, etc.). These interactions among deployed forces sometimes **run the risk of escalation due to incidents or skirmishes that can inflame tensions on all sides**. This poses a challenge for national leaders, who have imperfect command-and-control over their own military forces. Today, however, deployed military forces rely on human decision-making. Humans can understand broad guidance from their national leadership and commander’s intent, such as “defend our territorial claims, but don’t start a war.” Relative to humans, even the most advanced AI systems today **have no ability to understand broad guidance**, nor do they exhibit the kinds of contextual understanding that humans frequently label “common sense.”27 Militaries already employ uninhabited vehicles (drones) in contested areas, which have been involved in a number of escalatory incidents in the East China Sea, South China Sea, Syria, and Strait of Hormuz.28 Over time, as militaries incorporate more autonomous functionality into uninhabited vehicles, that functionality could complicate interactions in these and other contested areas. Autonomous systems may take actions based on programming that, while not a malfunction, are other than what a **commander would have wanted** a similarly situated human to do in the same situation. While the degree of flexibility afforded subordinates varies considerably by military culture and doctrine, humans have a greater ability to flexibly respond to complex and potentially ambiguous escalatory incidents in ways that may balance competing demands of ensuring national resolve while managing escalation.29 **Autonomous systems will simply follow their programming, whatever that may be, even if those rules no longer make sense or are inconsistent with a commander’s intent in the given situation**. This challenge is compounded by the fact that human commanders cannot anticipate all of the possible situations that forward-deployed military forces in contested regions may face. Employing autonomous systems in a crisis effectively forces **human decision makers to tie their own hands** with certain pre-specified actions, even if they would rather not. Unintended actions by autonomous systems in militarized disputes or contested areas are a challenge for militaries as they adopt more autonomous systems into their forces. The complexity of many autonomous systems used today, even ones that rely on rule-based decision-making, may mean that the humans employing autonomous systems lack sufficient understanding of what actions the system may take in certain situations.30 Humans’ ability to flexibly interpret guidance from higher commanders, even to the point of disregarding guidance if it no longer seems applicable, is by contrast a boon to managing escalation risks by retaining human decision-making at the point of interaction among military forces in contested regions.31 Unintended escalation is not merely confined to lethal actions, such as firing on enemy forces. Nonlethal actions, such as crossing into another state’s territory, **can be perceived as escalatory**. Even if such actions do not lead directly to war, they could heighten tensions, increase suspicion about an adversary’s intentions, or inflame public sentiment. While in most cases, humans would still retain agency over how to respond to an incident, competing autonomous systems could create **unexpected interactions or escalatory spirals**. Complex, interactive dynamics between algorithms have been seen in other settings, including financial markets,32 and even in situations where the algorithms are relatively simple.33 Another problem stems from the potential inability of humans to call off autonomous systems once deployed. One reason for employing autonomous functionality is so that uninhabited vehicles can continue their missions even if they are operating without reliable communication links to human controllers. When there is no communication link between human operators and an autonomous system, human operators would have no ability to recall the autonomous system if political circumstances changed such that the system’s behavior was no longer appropriate. This could be a challenge in de-escalating a conflict, if political **leaders decide to terminate hostilities** but have no ability to recall autonomous systems, at least for some period of time. The result could be a continuation of hostilities even after political leaders desire a cease-fire. Alternatively, the inability to fully cease hostilities could undermine truce negotiations, **leading to the continuation of conflict**. These problems are not unique to autonomous systems. Political leaders have imperfect command-and-control over human military forces, which has, at times, led to similar incidents with human-commanded deployed forces. For example, the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812 was fought after a peace treaty ended the war because of the slowness of communications to deployed forces. Risks Due to the Use of AI for Particular Military Missions The introduction of AI into military operations could also pose risks in certain circumstances due to the nature of the military mission, even if the AI system performs correctly and consistent with human intentions. Some existing research already focuses on the intersection of AI with specific military mission areas, most notably nuclear stability.34 Nuclear stability is an obvious area of concern given the potential consequences of an intentional or unintentional nuclear detonation.35 Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), a particular use of AI in which lethal decision-making is delegated from humans to machines, also represents a focus area of existing research. Other areas may deserve special attention from scholars concerned about AI risks. The intersections of AI with cybersecurity and biosecurity are areas worthy of exploration where there has been relatively less work at present.36 Potentially risky applications of AI extend beyond the battlefield to the use of AI to aid in decision-making in areas such as early warning and forecasting adversary behavior. For example, AI tools to monitor, track, and analyze vast amounts of data on adversary behavior for early indications and warning of potential aggression have clear value. However, algorithms also have known limitations and potentially problematic characteristics, such as a lack of transparency or explainability, brittleness in the face of distributional shifts in data, and automation bias. AI systems frequently perform poorly under conditions of novelty, suggesting a continued role for human judgment. The human tendency toward automation bias, coupled with the history of false alarms generated by non-AI early warning and forecasting systems, suggests policymakers should approach the adoption of AI in early warning and forecasting with caution, despite the potential value of using AI in intelligent decision aids.37 Education and training to ensure the responsible use of AI in early warning and forecasting scenarios will be critical.38 The human tendency toward automation bias, coupled with the history of false alarms generated by non-AI early warning and forecasting systems, suggests policymakers should approach the adoption of AI in early warning and forecasting with caution, despite the potential value of using AI in intelligent decision aids. Finally, autonomous systems raise novel challenges of signaling in contested areas because of ambiguity about whether their behavior was intended by human commanders. Even if the system performs as intended, adversaries may not know whether an autonomous system’s behavior was consistent with human intent because of the aforementioned command-and-control issues. This can create ambiguity in a crisis situation **about how to interpret an autonomous system’s behavior.** For example, if an autonomous system fired on a country’s forces, should that be interpreted as an intentional signal by the commanding nation’s political leaders, or an accident? This, again, is not a novel problem; a similar challenge exists with human-commanded military forces. Nations may not know whether the actions of an adversary’s deployed forces are fully in line with their political leadership’s guidance. Autonomous systems could complicate this dynamic due to uncertainty about whether the actions of an autonomous system are consistent with any human’s intended action.

#### 2] Arms Racing – LAW proliferation results in invincible AI weapons that undermine geopolitical stability

Sofge 15 Erik Sofge 5-28-2015 "What Might A Killerbot Arms Race Look Like?" <https://www.popsci.com/what-would-killerbot-arms-race-look/> (Erik Sofge is a technology, science and culture writer based in Massachusetts, and an unabashed robot apologist. He started covering robotics during the 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge)//Elmer

Russell's prediction is one of focused, efficient lethality. But to anthropomorphize this assault cloud, imagining it as a swarm of tiny, flying snipers or grenadiers, is another mistake. Russell estimates that, with enough iteration and innovation, the systems developed in a LAWS arms race could eventually be as cheap as $10 apiece. They would be closer to a plague of guided munitions than an automated fighting force, leaving a locust-like trail of inert, disposable components alongside their victims. Unleashing such a weapon on a city, with orders to kill anyone holding a weapon-like object, or simply every male within a given age group, would be too cheap, and **too effective to resist**. “No matter where this sort of arms race ends up, it becomes clear that **humans don't stand a chance**.” Russell's worry is not that the future of warfare will be merely unsettling, or unfair. In a commentary published today in Nature, Russell reiterates many of the concerns he presented this past April in Geneva, at a United Nations meeting on the topic of banning LAWS. Among those concerns are the prospects of autonomous weapons being misused—used to commit war crimes, for example—as well as overused. The clear appeal of sending robots into traditionally casualty-heavy situations, such as urban combat, combined with their potential lethality, could transform armed conflicts into a series of one-sided massacres. "The stakes are high," he writes. "LAWS have been described as **the third revolution in warfare**, after gunpowder and nuclear arms." The debate over autonomous weapons has typically centered on who, or what, is making the decision to kill. Human Rights Watch and other opponents of the technology have often warned that the benefits of allowing robots to choose their own targets—such as when distance or terrain interrupts communication links between operators and drones—make the fielding of such systems inevitable. Military personnel, meanwhile, insist that there's no will for these machines, and that commanders will always want a human "in the loop," giving the final order to attack a given target. But **the defense industry is nonetheless moving towards this capability.** The marketing language used by defense contractor BAE Systems to describe its in-development Taranis stealth drone includes the phrase, "full autonomy." And in his Nature article, Russell cites two DARPA projects whose aim is to significantly increase drone autonomy. The Fast Lightweight Autonomy (FLA) project is developing methods for small unmanned systems to navigate themselves through cluttered environments, and the Collaborative Operations in Denied Environments (CODE) program is explicit about its interest in autonomous combat. "Just as wolves hunt in coordinated packs with minimal communication, multiple CODE-enabled unmanned aircraft would collaborate to find, track, identify and engage targets, all under the command of a single human mission supervisor," said DARPA program manager Jean-Charles Lede in an agency press release earlier this year. Despite the mention of a human supervisor, engaging targets is part of CODE, a program intended to deal with situations where unmanned vehicles may be forced to act autonomously. "They tend to put in a couple of fig leaf phrases, here and there, related to the man in the loop," says Russell. "but I think they are interested. And I think **without a ban, there will be an arms race**, and they will be used." In fact, he believes that LAWS have already been deployed. Israel's Harop drone is designed to loiter over an area, searching for enemy radar sites. If it detects a given source of radiation, the system automatically crashes into it, detonating its warhead. "That seems to me to cross the line," says Russell. "What it's doing is possibly indiscriminate. And you could imagine Palestinians putting a radar system in a crowded school, to trick the Israelis into committing a war crime." But even if LAWS were to function perfectly, and could somehow cut through the fog of war to avoid large-scale friendly fire incidents, or full-blown, automated atrocities, they may share an important similarity with nukes. **There's no viable defense** against the overwhelming destructive force of a nuclear attack. Russell argues that, once autonomous weapons have matured, they will be just as **unstoppable**, resurrecting the tenuous **doomsday geopolitics** of the Cold War's nuclear standoff. If nations don't start the complex process of defining and banning these systems, and preventing an escalation before it begins, he fears it's only a matter of time before the clouds roll towards one city or another. “I imagine that people will come up with countermeasures,” says Russell. “Some kind of electromagnetic weapon, or they might send up their own cloud of counter-drones.” But if his analysis is right, and a LAWS arms races peaks at **swarms that number in the millions** targeting large populations, would anything be effective against what amounts to an autonomous weapon of mass destruction? Russell laughs, a little too knowingly. “I feel like we don't want to find out.”

#### AI Arms Race results in super-intelligence armed w/ genius weapons that causes Extinction

Del Monte 18, Louis A. Genius Weapons: Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Weaponry, and the Future of Warfare. Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 2018. (a bestselling author, award winning physicist, CEO of Del Monte & Associates, Inc. and a featured speaker. He is considered a top futurist on artificial intelligence technology and nanoweapons)//Elmer

Concurrently, though, AI technology continues its relentless **exponential advancement**. AI researchers predict there is a 50 percent probability that AI will equal human intelligence in the 2040 to 2050 timeframe.8 Those same experts predict that AI will greatly exceed the **cognitive performance of humans** in virtually all domains of interest as early as 2070, which is termed the “singularity.”9 Here are three important terms we will use in this book: 1. We can term a computer at the point of and after the singularity as “superintelligence,” as is common in the field of AI. 2. When referring to the class of computers with this level of AI, we will use the term “superintelligences.” 3. In addition, we can term weapons controlled by superintelligence as “genius weapons.” Following the singularity, humanity will face superintelligences, computers that greatly exceed the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest. This raises a question: **How will superintelligences view humanity**? Obviously, our history suggests we engage in devastating wars and release malicious computer viruses, both of **which could adversely affect these machines**. Will superintelligences view humanity as a threat to their existence? If the answer is yes, this raises another question: Should we give such machines military capabilities (i.e., **create genius weapons**) that they could potentially use against us? A cursory view of AI suggests it is yielding numerous benefits. In fact, most of humanity perceives only the positive aspects of AI technology, like automotive navigation systems, Xbox games, and heart pacemakers. Mesmerized by AI technology, they fail to see the dark side. Nonetheless, there is a dark side. For example, the US military is deploying AI into almost every aspect of warfare, from Air Force drones to Navy torpedoes. Humanity acquired the ability to destroy itself with the invention of the atom bomb. During the Cold War, the world lived in perpetual fear that the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would engulf the world in a nuclear conflict. Although we came dangerously close to both intentional and unintentional nuclear holocaust on numerous occasions, the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) and **human judgment kept the nuclear genie in the bottle**. If we arm superintelligences **with genius weapons**, will they be able to replicate human judgment? In 2008, experts surveyed at the Global Catastrophic Risk Conference at the University of Oxford suggested a **19 percent chance of human extinction** by the end of this century, 10 citing the top four most probable causes: 1. Molecular nanotechnology weapons: 5 percent probability 2. Superintelligent AI: 5 percent probability 3. Wars: 4 percent probability 4. Engineered pandemic: 2 percent probability Currently, the United States, Russia, and China are relentlessly developing and **deploying AI in lethal weapon systems**. If we consider the Oxford assessment, this suggests that humanity is combining three of the four elements necessary to edge us **closer to extinction**.

#### 3] Counter-Forcing – LAWs creates perception of Counter-Forcing which forces nuclear escalation

- AT Umbrello – creates perception amplifying fear of counter-force strike – incentivize first-use to preserve strike capabilities

Laird 20 Burgess Laird 6-3-2020 "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations" <https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html> (Senior International Researcher for Rand)//Elmer

Third, and perhaps of greatest concern to policymakers should be the likelihood that, from the vantage point of Russia's leaders, in U.S. hands the operational advantages of AWS are likely to be understood as an increased U.S. capability for what Georgetown professor Caitlin Talmadge refers to as “**conventional counterforce**” operations. In brief, in crises and conflicts, Moscow is likely to see the United States as confronting it with an array of advanced conventional capabilities backstopped by an interconnected shield of theater and homeland missile defenses. Russia will perceive such capabilities as posing both a conventional war-winning threat and a conventional counterforce threat (PDF) poised to degrade the use of its strategic nuclear forces. The likelihood that Russia will see them this way is reinforced by the fact that it currently sees U.S. conventional precision capabilities precisely in this manner. As a qualitatively new capability that promises new operational advantages, the addition of AWS to U.S. conventional capabilities could further cement Moscow's view and in doing so increase the potential for **crisis instability and escalation** in confrontations with U.S. forces. In other words, the fielding of U.S. AWS could augment what Moscow already sees as a formidable U.S. **ability to threaten a range of important targets** including its command and control networks, air defenses, and early warning radars, all of which are unquestionably critical components of Russian conventional forces. In many cases, however, they also serve as critical components of Russia's nuclear force operations. As Talmadge argues, attacks on such targets, even if intended solely to weaken Russian conventional capabilities, will likely raise Russian fears that the U.S. conventional campaign is in fact a counterforce campaign aimed at neutering Russia's nuclear capabilities. Take for example, a hypothetical scenario set in the Baltics in the 2030 timeframe which finds NATO forces employing swarming AWS to suppress Russian air defense networks and key command and control nodes in Kaliningrad as part of a larger strategy of expelling a Russian invasion force. What to NATO is a logical part of a conventional campaign could well appear to Moscow as initial moves of a larger plan designed to degrade the integrated air defense and command and control networks upon which Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal relies. In turn, such fears could feed pressures for Moscow to escalate to **nuclear use** while it still has the ability to do so.

#### 4] Signaling – LAW usage misreads signals and undermines diplomacy causes escalation

Laird 20 Burgess Laird 6-3-2020 "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations" <https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html> (Senior International Researcher for Rand)//Elmer

Finally, even if the employment of AWS does not drive an increase in the speed and momentum of action that forecloses the time for exchanging signals, a future conflict in which AWS are ubiquitous will likely prove to be a poor venue both **for signaling and interpreting signals**. In such a conflict, instead of interpreting a downward modulation in an adversary's operations as a possible signal of restraint or perhaps as signaling a willingness to pause in an effort to open up space for diplomatic negotiations, AWS **programmed to exploit every tactical opportunity** might read the modulation as an opportunity **to escalate offensive operations** and thus gain tactical advantage. Such AWS could also misunderstand adversary attempts to signal **resolve solely as adversary preparations for imminent attack**. Of course, correctly interpreting signals sent in crisis and conflict is vexing enough when humans are making all the decisions, but in future confrontations in which decisionmaking has willingly or unwillingly been ceded to machines, **the problem is likely only to be magnified**.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

## Method

#### 1] Aff gets 1ar theory since the neg can be near infinitely abusive, drop the debater, no rvi, competing interps, aff theory 1st a) the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance and is a bigger time investment 1/4 vs 1/7 b) dta is severance which is bad b/c neg can uplayer c) competing interps means the 2n can’t dump on a reasonability bright-line that excludes only what they did wrong d) no rvi because the neg has time advantage on the theory layer