#### Skepticism is true:

#### [1] Moral truth cannot exist – objective knowledge is merely an acceptance of each individual’s conception of the good. Macintyre 81

[Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue. <https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268035044/after-virtue/>. Published 1981] SHS ZS

The most influential account of moral reasoning that emerged in response to this critique of emotivism was one according to which **an agent** **can only justify a** particular **judgment by referring to some universal rule** from which it may be logically derived, **and can only justify that** **rule** in turn **by deriving it from some more general rule** or principle; but on this view **[S]ince every chain of reasoning must be finite**, such a process of justificatory **reasoning must** always **terminate with** the assertion of **some rule** or principle **for which no further** **reason can be given**. ‘Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effect of observing those principles. **If** [I] **the enquirer** still **goes on ask ing** ‘But why should I live like that?’ then **there is no further answer to give** him, because we have already, ex hypothesi, [we have already] said everything that could be included in the further answer.’ (Hare 1952, p. 69). **The terminus of justification is thus always**, on this view, a not further to be justified choice**, a choice unguided by criteria**. **Each individual** implicitly or explicitly **has to adopt his or her own** first **principles on the basis of such a choice**. **The utterance of any universal principle is** in the end an expression of **the preferences of an** **individual will** and for that will its principles have and can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them.

#### [2] Empirically proven – the competition between competing reasons has been going for centuries. Leiter

[Leiter, Brian. Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement: Developing an Argument from Nietzsche. March 25, 2010.] SHS ZS

With respect to very particularized moral disagreements — e.g., about questions of economic or social policy — which often trade on obvious factual ignorance or disagreement about complicated empirical questions, this seems a plausible retort. But **for over two hundred years**, **Kantians and utilitarians have** [developed] **been developing** increasingly systematic **versions of their respective positions**. The Aristotelian tradition in moral philosophy has an even longer history. **Utilitarians** [They] **have become** particularly **adept at explaining how they can accommodate** [**others**] Kantian and Aristotelian intuitions about particular cases and issues, **though** in ways that are usually found to be systematically unpersuasive to the competing traditions and which, in any case, **do nothing to dissolve the disagreement** about the underlying moral criteria and categories. Philosophers in each tradition increasingly talk only to each other, without even trying to convince those in the other traditions. And **while there may well be ‘progress’ within traditions** — e.g., most utilitarians regard Mill as an improvement on Bentham—**there does not appear to be any progress** [towards] **in moral theory**, in the sense of a consensus that particular fundamental theories of right action and the good life are deemed better than their predecessors. What we find now are simply the competing traditions — Kantian, Humean, Millian, Aristotelian, Thomist, perhaps now even Nietzschean — who often view their competitors as unintelligible or morally obtuse, but don’t have any actual arguments against the foundational principles of their competitors. **There is**, in short, **no sign** — I can think of none — **that we are heading towards any epistemic rapprochement** between these competing moral traditions. Are we really to believe that hyper-rational and reflective moral philosophers, whose lives, in most cases, are devoted to systematic reflection on philosophical questions, many of whom (historically) were independently wealthy (or indifferent to material success) and so immune to crass considerations of livelihood and material self-interest, and most of whom, in the modern era, spend professional careers refining their positions, and have been doing so as a professional class in university settings for well over a century — are we really supposed to believe that they have reached no substantial agreement on any foundational moral principle because of ignorance, irrationality, or partiality

#### [3] Rule following paradox prevents the application of moral rules, even when justified. Langseth

[Langesth, Jonathan. “Wittengenstein’s Account of Rule-Following and Its Implications”. Stance Vol 1, April 1, 2008. <http://www.bsu.edu/libraries/virtualpress/stance/2008_spring/12Wittgenstein.pdf>] SHS ZS

This section shows that **rules themselves do not determine how they are to be followed**. **There is nothing**, for example, **inherent in an arrow that shows us which way it is pointing** or directing us to go.2 Similarly, as the above quote shows, **there is no means by which it can be known** with com- plete certainty that, in following the arithmetical sequence 0, n, 2n, 3n, 4n... in line with the order “+1**,” a person is following the intended rule**, for he or she may be following an alternative rule that is compatible with the intended rule up to a certain point. **There must be something in addition to the rule that directs us in a particular manner and indicates to us that we proceed accordingly**. The argument Wittgenstein is making in Section 185 is dependent upon the fact **that a rule, in order to be a rule, must be able to be broken.** **There must be correct and incorrect applications of a rule**. The question that arises here is: What determines correct and incorrect application of a rule? Or, what justifies following a rule correctly? **If a rule in itself does not show us how we are to follow it,** then. **[But] our interpretation of a rule must also not determine correct use**. If interpretation was what determined correct use, there would be no incorrect application of a rule. **This is the case because any interpretation can be seen to be in accordance with a rule.**

#### Skepticism negates:

#### [1] Denying moral obligations triggers permissibility. That negates – A. Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – a. Predictability – we prep based on the wording of the res and b. Constitutivism –the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text B. Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent C. Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)