# Faciality Shell

#### Power operates not by exclusion but by incorporation and capture – this is a machine known as faciality: a mode of coding which includes all bodies into spheres of recognition but in wholly differential ways – the 1AC conceives of power as a scale between inclusion and noninclusion – you should instead understand it as a circle with an idealized face at the center and deviant faces along its circumference. The aff’s dyadic understanding of subjecthood cannot account for the infinite proliferation of identities within the faciality machine, ensuring the reproduction of colonial domination

Saldanha 07**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

My disagreement is not with Fanon’sand Martín Alcoff’sinsistence on embodiment and emotion, but with their reliance on a Hegelian notion of recognition to explain encounter.Because of this they tend to treat white and nonwhite not only as a dyad, but as almost naturally opposed entities. There is, then, little attention paid to the complicated processes whereby some racial formations become dominant,that is, how racial formations emerge from material conditions and collective interactions, which greatly exceed the spatiality of self versus other. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality is not based on an intersubjective dialectics enlarged to world-historical scope. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari stronglydistance themselves from phenomenology and psychoanalysis**.** First of all, for them**,** it isn’t consciousness but an abstract machine of faciality that arranges bodies into relations of power. And second, faciality constantly invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries such as black/white (though binarization can be an important effect**).** That is precisely its strength. There are thousands of encounters, thousands of trains. Deleuze and Guattari believe faciality’s imperialism arose with institutional Christianity. Being imposed in lands populated by different phenotypes, faciality became a matter of imperialist racialization. That faciality originated in Renaissance humanism and depictions of Jesus seems a plausible if one-sided interpretation. It is less relevant than Deleuze and Guattari’s unusual theory of contemporary racism**:** If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the [white] wall [of signification], distributed by the [black] hole [of subjectivity]. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European racism as the white man’s claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an “other.” Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating thematgiven places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a Negro, it’s a lunatic...). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be.5 For Anjuna’s psy-trance parties, there were “no people on the outside.” Locals, domestic tourists, charter tourists, and beggars would join the white Goa freaks on the dance floor, sometimes even in Nine Bar. In fact, as with the United Colors of Benetton, it will be remembered that the rhetoric of PLUR demonstrated faciality’s inclusiveness—the parties were supposed to be open to all. But immediately, the faciality machine would place all bodies in relation to the Goa freak standard, both spatiotemporally and subjectively, measuring their acceptability through increasingly meticulous signs: sociochemical monitoring, scene savviness, chillum circles, sexual attractiveness. Many nonfreaks felt uneasy being pigeonholed like this—especially domestic tourists, who would retreat to the darker corners. The result was viscosity, bodies temporarily becoming impenetrable—more or less. It would seem to me that to understand the intricate hierarchies of racism, a framework that allows for gradual and multidimensional deviances is preferable to a dialectical model. Faciality also explains why after colonialism, with television and tourism, there is scarcely place left for any “dark others.” Everyone is included; everyone is facialized. At the same time, Euro-American ways of life continue to spread, and White Man (Elvis Presley, Sylvester Stallone, David Beckham) remains the global standard against which all other faces are forced to compete. What this account of racism has in common with the Fanonian is that whiteness is the norm, even in our “post”-colonial era. Where it differs, however, is that deviance is based not on lack of recognition or negation or annihilation of the other, but on subtle machinic differentiations and territorializations. The virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a; they continually differentiate as actual bodies interact and aggregate. Racism, then, can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.

#### The 1AC is built on a fantasy of legal incorporation that ensures a necessary outside of the personhood as property – it produces the terms and conditions under which the prison industrial complex realizes itself now – who is a person enough to exist within the confines of the law. What is necessary is a disarticulation of the human organism, the racializing assemblage, through a desubjectifiying mode of abolition taking its lead from slave revolts and pirate colonies that reconstruct humanity through an affirmation of the liminal spaces of not-quite-humans.

Weheliye 14Alexander Weheliye, Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University, 2014, “Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human,”

We are in dire need of alternatives to the legal conception of personhood that dominates our world, and, in addition, to not lose sight of what re­mains outside the law, what the law cannot capture, what it cannot magi­cally transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identity- based activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how the focus on inclusion, recognition, and equality based on a narrow legal framework (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) not only hinders the eradication of violence against trans people and other vulnerable populations but actually creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.”22 If demanding recognition and inclusion remains at the center of minority politics, it will lead only to a delimited notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively on only one form of subjugation at the expense of others, thus allowing for the continued existence of hierarchical differ­ences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans. This can be gleaned from the “successes” of the mainstream feminist, civil rights, and lesbian-gay rights movements, which facilitate the incorporate[ed]ion of a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at *the* cost of the still and/or newly criminalized and disposable populations (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.).23 To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the law itself has been thoroughly violent in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the [PIC] prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, and that it continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintain[s]ing the racializing assemblages in the world of Man. Instead of appealing to legal recognition, Julia Oparah suggests counteracting the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment” within the [PIC] prison-industrial complex and beyond with practices of “maroon abo­lition” **(**in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settlements in the Americas) to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and politicallegacies inform and undergird anti- prison work,” while also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law**.**24 Relatedly, Spade calls for a radical politics articulated from the “‘impossible’ worldview of trans political existence,” which redefines “the insistence of government agencies, social service pro­viders, media, and many nontrans activists and nonprofiteers that the ex­istence of trans people is impossible.”25 A relational maroon abolitionism beholden to the practices of black radicalism and that arises from the in­compatibility of black trans existence with the world of Man serves as one example of how putatively abject modes of being need not be redeployed within hegemonic frameworks but can be operationalized as variable liminal territories or articulated assemblages in movements to abolish the grounds upon which all forms of subjugation are administered**.**

#### This figures into the production of “Man” as racializing assemblage – blackness is positioned simultaneously inside and outside Man which creates the conditions for the emergence of the sociogenetic demarcation between human and not-quite-human – instead, we should foreground the deconstruction of Man as a category

Weheliye 2 Alexander Weheliye, Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University, 2014, “Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human,”

Wynter’s large-scale intellectual project, which she has been pursuing in one form or another for the last thirty years, disentangles Man from the human in order to use the space of subjects placed beyond the grasp of this domain as a vital point from which to invent hitherto unavailable genres of the human**.** 27According to this scheme in western modernity the religious conception of the self gave way to two modes of secularized being: first, the Cartesian “Rational Man,” or homo politicus, and then beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, “Man as a selected being and natural organism . . . as the universal human, ‘man as man.’” 28 The move from a supernatural conception of world and the self’s place within this cosmos, however, does not signal the supersession of a primitive axiomatic with an enlightened and rarefied type of the human. Rather, one genre of the human (Judeo-Christian, religious) yields to another, just as provincial, version of the human, and, although both claim universality, neither genre fully represents the multiplicity of human life forms**.** In the context of the secular human, black subjects, along with indigenous populations, the colonized, the ~~insane~~ [cognitively disabled], the poor, the disabled, and so on serve as limit cases by which Man can demarcate himself as the universal human. 29 Thus, race, rather than representing accessory, comes to define the very essence of the modern human as “the code through which one not simply knows what human being is, but experiences being**.**” 30 Accordingly, race makes its mark in the dominion of the ideological and physiological, or rather race scripts the elision of the former with the latter in the flesh. In her latest writings, Wynter identifies homo politicus’s successor in the long road from “theodicy” to “biodicy” as the liberal “bio-economic man.” 31 The idea of “bio-economic man” marks the assumed naturalness that positions economic inequities, white supremacy, genocide, economic exploitation, gendered subjugation, colonialism, “natural selection,” and concepts such as the free market not in the realm of divine design, as in previous religious orders of things, but beyond the reach of human intervention all the same**.** In both cases, this ensures that a particular humanly devised model of humanity remains isomorphic with the Homo sapiens species. Wynter’s approach differs markedly from arguments that seek to include the oppressed within the already existing strictures of liberal humanism or, conversely, abolish humanism because of its racio-colonial baggage; instead Wynter views black studies and minority discourse as liminal spaces, simultaneously ensconced in and outside the world of Man, from which to construct new objects of knowledge and launch the reinvention of the human at the juncture of the culture and biology feedback loop. Even though the genre of the human we currently inhabit in the west is intimately tied to the somatic order of things, for Wynter, the human cannot be understood in purely biological terms, whether this applies to the history of an individual organism (ontogenesis) or the development at the level of a species (phylogeny). This is where Fanon’s important concept of sociogeny comes into play, offering Wynteran approach of thinking of the human— the “science in the social text,” to echo Spillers’s phrase— where culture and biology are not only not opposed to each other but in which their chemistry discharges mutually beneficial insights. 32 In this scenario**,** a symbolic register, consisting of discourse, language, culture, and so on (sociogeny) always already accompanies the genetic dimension of human action (ontogeny), and it is only in the imbrication of these two registers that we can understand the full scope of our being-in-the-world**.** Fanon’s concept of sociogeny, arising from the inadequacy of traditional psycho­analytic models in the analysis of racialized colonialism, builds on Freud’s appropriation of recapitulation theory. 33 Thus, according to Fanon, Freud breaks with the strict codes of Darwinism and social Darwinism (phylogenetic theory) in order to analyze the psyche of the modern individualized subject from an ontogenetic vantage point. While the ontogenetic technique yields, depending on your general sympathy for the now very antiquated protocols of Freudian psychoanalysis, abundant results when evaluating white subjects ensconced in the liberal nuclear family, it encounters a roadblock when transplanted to the colonial settlement, which is why “the alienation of the black man [black people] is not an individual question. Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny, there is also sociogeny. . . . Society, unlike biochemical processes, does not escape human influence. Man is what brings society into being**.”** 34Why does the colonial situation specifically necessitate a reformulation of Freud’s and Darwinism’s procedural frame of reference?Since colonial policies and discourse are frequently grounded in racial distinctions, the colonized subject cannot experience her or his nonbeing outside the particular ideology of western Man as synonymous with human, or, as Fanon writes, “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man**.” 35** The colonial encounter determines not just the black colonial subject’s familial structure or social and physical mobility and such, but colors his or her very being as he-or-she-which-is-not-quite-human, as always already tardy in the rigged match of the survival of the fittest**.** Conversely**,** in this ontological face-off, the white colonial subject encounters herself or himself as the “fullness and genericity of being human.” However, he or she only does so in relation to the deficiency of the black subject and indigenous (Wynter, 40). To be precise, Fanon and Wynter locate racializing assemblages in the domain of being rather than the realm of epiphenomena, showing how humans create race for the benefit of some and the detriment of other humans.Yet because race is thought to rest in biology, it necessitates different analytic protocols than bare life and bio­ politics, namely ones that draw on both ontogeny and sociogeny. Whereas Fanon’s mobilization of ontogeny remains rooted in the Freudian paradigm as pertaining to the individual subject**,** Wynter summons the explanatory apparatus of neurobiology to elucidate how racialization, despite its origins in sociogeny, is converted to the stuff of ontogenesis; this is what Wynter refers to as “sociogenetic.” 36 Although human life has a biochemical core defined by a species-specific adaptive reward and punishment mechanism (poison = bad and food = good) that “determines the way in which each organism will perceive, classify, and categorize the world,” it is “only through the mediation of the organism’s experience of what feels good to the organism and what feels bad to it, and thereby of what it feels like to be that organism” that a repertoire of behaviors, which ensure the continued existence of the species, develops(Wynter, 50)**.** For the human species, because it is defined by both organic and symbolic registers, this is complicated by the way culturally specific sociogenic principles such as what is good or bad work to trigger neurochemical reward and punishment processes, in the process “institut[ing] the human subject as a culture-specific and thereby verbally defined, if physiologically implemented, mode of being and sense of self. One, therefore, whose phenomenology . . . is as objectively, constructed as its physiology” (Wynter, 54). 37 Phenomenological perception must consequently don the extravagant drag of physiology in order to “turn theory into flesh, . . . [into] codings in the nervous system,” so as to signal the extrahuman instantiation of humanity. 38 Wynter’s description of the autopoiesis of the human stretches Fanon’s concept of sociogeny by grounding it in an, albeit false or artificial, physiological reality. In other words, Wynter summons neurobiology not in order to take refuge in a prelapsarian field anterior to the registers of culture and ideology, but to provide a transdisciplinary global approach to the study of human life that explains how sociogenic phenomena, particularly race, become anchored in the ontogenic flesh. Also, in contrast to treatments of racialization more squarely articulated from the disciplinary perspective of sociobiology, Wynter does not focus on the origins and adaptive evolution of race itself but rather on how sociogenic principles are anchored in the human neurochemical system, thus counteracting sociobiological explanations of race, which retrospectively project racial categories onto an evolutionary screen. 39 That is to say, Wynter interrogates the ontogenic functioning of race— the ways it serves as a physiologically resonant nominal and conceptual pseudonym for the specific genre of the human: Man— and not its role in human phylogeny. Consequently, racialization figures as a master code within the genre of the human represented by western Man, because its law-like operations are yoked to species-sustaining physiological mechanisms in the form of a global color line— instituted by cultural laws so as to register in human neural networks— that clearly distinguishes the good/life/fully-human from the bad/death/not-quite-human. This, in turn, authorizes the conflation of racialization with mere biological life, which, on the one hand, enables white subjects to “see” themselves as transcending racialization due to their full embodiment of this particular genre of the human while responding antipathetically to nonwhite subjects as bearers of ontological cum biological lack, and, on the other hand, in those subjects on the other side of the color line, it creates sociogenically instituted physiological reactions against their own existence and reality. 40 Since the being of nonwhite subjects has been coded by the cultural laws in the world of Man as pure negativity**,** their subjectivity impresses punishment on the neurochemical reward system of all humans, or in the words of Frantz Fanon: “My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter’s day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is wicked, the Negro is ugly**.”** 41 Political violence plays a crucial part in the baroque techniques of modern humanity, since it simultaneously serves to create not-quite-humans in specific acts of violence and supplies the symbolic source material for racialization. For Wynter, the promise of black studies— and the numerous other ruptures precipitated by the 1960s— lies in its liminality, which contains potential exit strategies from the world of Man. However, we must first devise new objects of knowledge that facilitate “the calling in question of our present culture’s purely biological definition of what it is to be , and therefore of what it is like to be, human.” 42 We must do so because we cannot fully understand the present incarnation of the human from within the “biocentric and bourgeois” epistemic order that authorizes the biological selectedness of Man and, conversely, the creat[es]ion of “dysgenic humans” (those who are evolutionarily dysselected), “a category comprised in the US of blacks, Latino[/a]s, Indians as well as the transracial group of the poor, the jobless, the homeless, the incarcerated,” the disabled, and the transgender~~ed~~. 43 Within our current episteme, these groups are constituted as aberrations from the ethnoclass of Man by being subjected to racializing assemblages that establish “natural” differences between the selected and dysselected. In other words, black, Latino, poor, incarcerated, indigenous, and so forth populations become real objects via the conduit of evolutionarily justified discourses and institutions, which, as a consequence, authorizes Man to view himself as naturally ordained to inhabit the space of full humanity. Thus**,** even though racializing assemblages commonly rely on phenotypical differences, their primary function is to create and maintain distinctions between different members of the Homo sapiens species that lend a suprahuman explanatory ground (religious or biological, for example) to these hierarchies. As Wynter explains, **“**all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth resources . . . —these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle.” 44 Wynter’s oeuvre facilitates the analysis of the relay between different forms of subjugation, because in it the human operates as a relational ontological totality. Therefore, the Man versus Human battle does not dialectically sublate the specificity of the other struggles but articulates them in this open totality so as to abolish Man and liberate all of humanity rather than specific groups**.**

#### The alternative is to use this gathering to affectively invest in new possibilities for a thousand tiny races.

**Saldanha 06**[[2]](#footnote-2)

**Every time phenotype makes a**nother **machinic connection**, **there is a stutter**. **Every time bodies are** further **entrenched in segregation**, however brutal, **there needs to be an affective investment** of some sort. **This is the ruptural moment in which to intervene. Race should not be eliminated, but proliferated**, **its** many **energies directed at multiplying racial differences so as to render them joyfully cacophonic**. Many in American critical race theory also argue against a utopian transcendence of race, taking from W E B Du Bois and pragmatism a reflexive, sometimes strategically nationalist attitude towards racial embodiment (compare Outlaw, 1996; Shuford, 2001; Winant, 2004). **What is needed is an affirmation of** race's creativity and virtuality: **what race can be**. **Race need not be about** order and **oppression, it can be wild**, far-from-equilibrium, **liberatory.** It is not that everyone becomes completely Brownian (or brown!), completely similar, or completely unique. It is just that white supremacism becomes strenuous as many populations start harbouring a similar economic, technological, cultural productivity as whites do now, linking all sorts of bodies with all sorts of wealth and all sorts of ways of life. That is, **race exists in its true mode when it is no longer stifled by racism**. ``**The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers; there is no race but inferior, minoritarian**; **there is no dominant race; a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination**. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race'' (Deleuze and Guattari, [1980] 1987, page 379). In ``A thousand tiny sexes'', Grosz (1994b) follows a well-known passage of Deleuze and Guattari to argue for non-Hegelian, indeed protohuman feminism that utilises lines of flight of the gender assemblage to combat heterosexist patriarchy. ``If we consider the great binary aggregates, such as the sexes or classes, it is evident that they also cross over into molecular assemblages of a different nature, and that there is a double reciprocal dependency between them. For the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes'' (Deleuze and Guattari, [1980] 1987, page 213). Similarly, **the molecularisation of race would consist in its breaking up into a thousand tiny races.** It is from here that cosmopolitanism should start: the pleasure, curiosity, and concern in encountering a multiplicity of corporeal fragments outside of common-sense taxonomies. ``We walk the streets among hundreds of people whose patterns of lips, breasts, and genital organs we divine; they seem to us equivalent and interchangeable. Then something snares our attention: a dimple speckled with freckles on the cheek of a woman; a steel choker around the throat of a man in a business suit; a gold ring in the punctured nipple on the hard chest of a deliveryman; a big raw fist in the delicate hand of a schoolgirl; a live python coiled about the neck of a lean, lanky adolescent with coal-black skin. Signs of clandestine disorder in the uniformed and coded crowds'' (Lingis, 2000, page 142). **Machinism against racism builds upon a gradual,** fragmented, and shifting **sense of corporeal difference**, that of course extends far further than the street. Responsibility, **activism**, and antiracist policy **will follow only from** feeling and **understanding the geographical differentials that exist between many different kinds of bodies**: **between a Jew and a black soldier, between a woman in the Sahel and a woman in Wall Street, between a Peruvian peasant and a Chinese journalist**. **A machinic politics of race takes into account the real barriers to mobility and imagination that exist** in different places; cosmopolitanism has to be invented, not imposed. It may seem that machinism is as utopian and open ended as Gilroy's transcendent antiracism. It is not, because it is empirical, immanent, and pragmatic. **The machinic geography of phenotype shows that racism differs from place to place, and cannot be overcome in any simple way**. It shows that **white supremacy can subside only by changing the rules** of education, or the financial sector, or the arms trade, or the pharmaceutical industry, or whatever. For machinic politics,the cultural studies preoccupations with apology, recognition, politically correct language and reconsiliation, or else cultural hybridity, pastiche, and ambivalence, threaten to stand in the way of really doing something about the global structures of racism. **A thousand tiny races can be made only if it is acknowledged that racism is a material, inclusive series of events, a viscous geography which cannot be `signified away'**. Miscegenation, openness to strangers, exoticism in art, and experimentations with whiteness can certainly help. But ultimately cosmpolitanism without critique and intervention remains complacent with its own comfortably mobile position. In a word, ethics encompasses politics, and politics starts with convincing people of race's materiality

#### This proliferation of racial difference is capable of freaking whiteness; a reflexive process of becoming which refuses to cede creativity to forces of domination – this reclamation of difference as joyful is capable of creating an affective relation toward race not bound by hegemonic identitarian categories

Saldanha 07**[[3]](#footnote-3)**

“In no real sense did the hippies become Indians or poor blacks, or prostitutes or tramps—or only in a guilty disingenuous sense—but they found their own significance in what they took these groups to be: a significance to be understood against the dominant society and with respect to their own special awareness,” says the ethnographer Paul Willis.11 Seeing blacks, Mexicans, and Indians as more authentic, because relatively untouched by mainstream white modernity, the counterculture transformed white modernity by appropriating some of that authenticity. But it is that very appropriation that betrays white privilege and that spawns new tropes of subcultural (and potentially racist) snobbism. A creative movement turning in on itself, becoming paranoid and reactionary, is what Guattari called “microfascism.” Psychedelics clearly turned microfascistic in Anjuna, accompanied as it was by arrogance, segregation, noise pollution, corruption, exploitation, and psychosis. If whiteness is defined by its lines of flight, microfascism becomes as interesting to the study of whiteness as Nazism. Psychedelics—travel, music, drugs—is whiteness accelerating, whiteness stuttering: either a deeper entrenchment into economic and cultural exploitation, or a shedding of privilege, at least here and now. On the whole, the Goa freaks of Anjuna do not follow the lines of flight of whiteness to critique their own position as whites. In this sense, they were hardly “freaking” the racial assemblage. Recall the proposition of Rachel Adams and Leslie Fiedler of appropriating freak as a critical category: [F**]**reaks cannot be neatly aligned with any particular identity or ideological position. Rather, freak is typically used to connote the absence of any known category of identity.... I am drawn to freak because, like queer, it is a concept that refuses the logic of identity politics, and the irreconcilable problems of inclusion and exclusion that necessarily accompany identitarian categories**.**12Atrue freaking of whiteness would grasp its lines of flight not for fascism but for a future where paler-skinned bodies have no privileged access to economic and cultural capital andto happiness. Freaking whiteness is problem-based, coalition-led, and self-critical; it would try to understand what biophysical and technological forces subtend it(computers, HIV, floods, radiation).Humanism and cosmopolitanism are severely limited if the struggle against racism is defined only in human terms. So: race should not be abandoned or abolished, but proliferated. Race’s energies are then directed at multiplying racial differences, so as to render them joyfully cacophonic. What is needed is an affirmation of race’s virtuality. When racial formations crumble and mingle like this, the dominance of whiteness in the global racial assemblage is undermined as the faciality machine finds it increasingly difficult to take hold of bodies. It is not that everyone becomes completelyBrownian (or brown!), completely similar, or completely unique. It is just that white supremacism slowly becomes obsolete as other racial formations start harboring the same creativity as whites do now, linking all sorts of phenotypes with all sorts of wealth and all sorts of ways of life (sedentary, touristic, ascetic). When no racial formation is the standard, race acquires a very different meaning: The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers; there is no race but inferior, minoritarian; there is no dominant race; a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race.13 When no racial formation is clearly hegemonic, perhaps there will be no need anymore for the term “race.” Although there will always be phenotypical variation and relations of power, perhaps sometime in the future they won’t be correlated at all. Unlikely, but possible. Until then, however, there seems little point in trying to stop talking about race, as antiracists such as Paul Gilroy suggest we do.14 Race is creative, and we can heed its creativities against itself. Challenging the global faciality machine encompasses the transformation not just of prejudice, tabloid journalism, and Unesco, but of the pharmaceutical industry, farm subsidies, seismology, the arms trade, income tax policy, and the InternationalMonetaryFund**.** In contrast to what many antiracists and advocates of political correctness prescribe, the sites where the most urgent battles are to be fought are not culture and language, but trade and health. Freaking whiteness is no easy task. A good startfor social scientists, however, is to acknowledge the persistent materiality of race. It is important that the real barriers to mobility and imagination that exist in different places be taken into account. Cosmopolitanism has to be invented, not imposed. Taking responsibility and activism will only follow from both understanding and feeling the intensive differences that exist between many different kinds of bodies**:** between a Jew and a black soldier, between a woman in the Sahel and a woman on Wall Street, between a Peruvian peasant and a Chinese journalist**.** Strategies for Anjuna In research from a materialist point of view, there can be no separating politics and ethics from ontology and science. A short article of mine on the Goa trance scene in the Unesco Courier of July/August 2000 reached a wide range of tourism and youth activists. A German NGO and an Israeli antidrugs officer contacted me for more information. I sent the dissertation on which this book is based to Panjim’s Central Library and NGOs such as Goa Desc and Goa Foundation, from where it made its way to some Goan journalists and a number of interested academics and psytrancers. My research was never just representation but itself a (small) component in Anjuna’s machinic assemblage. I was a bit nervous, for example, about my Friday Balcão seminar in Mapusa, just a few miles from Anjuna, and asked Goa Desc not to publish my first name in the local newspapers. A materialist ethnography accepts that it will have some material effects and tries to foreshadow them. If the suggestions below seem somewhat unabashed, this is because I was necessarily very much involved in what I was studying. The multiplication of race I’m proposingshould be distinguished from other antiracist strategies. It is neither antiwhite, nor pro-Indian, nor a simple celebration of hybridity, nor multicultural or universalist. Machinic antiracism isn’t antiwhite because it is aware that the freaky creativities of the white racial formation can be used against white supremacy. It doesn’t take sides in racial politics at all (for Indians, for minorities, for the poor, against the rich) but asks what needs to happen for there to be sides at all. Machinism is wary of any identity politics as this tends to hide internal fissures of the identity it seeks to defend. In my case, the resistance against cultural imperialism in defense of some Goan identity has often been severely limited by a strong Catholic, nostalgic and middle-class bias, as well as homophobia and conservative moralism.15 Machinism also avoids the easy reverence for travel and bricolage found in postmodernism and a lot of cultural studies. Mobility and hybridization can be good or bad. A lack of cosmopolitanism cannot be held against anyone but must be explained. Hailing the transracial inventiveness in consumer tactics hardly erodes the international division of labor, advertising, and the military-industrial complex that support racial clustering in the first place. Finally, machinism does not imply multiculturalism or liberal universalism, because hoping for horizontal equality (“color blindness”) and mere tolerance of the other leaves out of analysis the privileged location of whites from which equality and tolerance are bound to be defined. Importantly, though, these common antiracist practices aren’t without their relevance. They just need to be seen as limited in their effectivity and

#### Unintelligiability Net Benefit – The 1AC is an identitarian formation that forces speech into *grids of intelligibility* – our 1NC is a scream of deviance, a destruction of intelligibility, that forces new types of languages that subvert the surveillance apparatus

Puar 07**[[4]](#footnote-4)**

There is no entity, no identity, no queer subject or subject to queer, rather queerness coming forth at us from all directions, screaming its defiance, suggesting a move from intersectionality to assemblage, an affective conglomeration that recognizes other contingencies of belonging (melding, fusing, viscosity, bouncing) that might not fall so easily into what is sometimes denoted as reactive community formations-identity politics-by control theorists. The assemblage, a series of dispersed but mutually implicated and messy networks, draws together enunciation and dissolution, causality and effect, organic and nonorganic forces**.** For Deleuze and Guattari, assemblages are collections of multiplicities: There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. There is not even the unity to abort in the object, or "return" in the subject. A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature(the laws of combination therefore increase as the multiplicity grows ).... An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections. There are no points or positions.... There are only lines**.21** As opposed to an intersectional model of identity, which presumes that components-race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, age, religion-are separable analytics and can thus be disassembled, an assemblage is more attuned to interwoven forces that merge and dissipate time, space, and body against linearity, coherency, and permanency.22 Intersectionality demands the knowing, naming, and thus stabilizing of identity across space and time, relying on the logic of equivalence and analogy between various axes of identity and generating narratives of progress that deny the fictive and performative aspects of identification: you become an identity, yes, but also timelessness works to consolidate the fiction of a seamless stable identity in every space. Furthermore, the study of intersectional identities often involves taking imbricated identities apart one by one to see how they influence each other, a process that betrays the founding impulse of intersectionality, that identities cannot so easily be cleaved. We can think of intersectionality as a hermeneutic of positionality that seeks to account for locality, specificity, placement, junctions. As a tool of diversity management and a mantra of liberal multiculturalism, intersectionality colludes with the disciplinary apparatus of the state-census, demography, racial profiling, surveillance-in that "difference" is encased within a structural container that simply wishes the messiness of identity into a formulaic grid, producing analogies in its wake and engendering what Massumi names "gridlock": a "box[ing] into its site on the culture map." He elaborates**:** The idea of positionality begins by subtracting movement from the picture. This catches the body in cultural freeze-frame. The point of explanatory departure is a pin-pointing, a zero point of stasis**.** When positioning of any kind comes a determining first, movement comes a problematic second.... Of course, a body occupying one position on the grid might succeed in making a move to occupy another position.... But this doesn't change the fact that what defines the body is not the movement itself, only its beginnings and endpoints.... There is "displacement," but no transformation; it is as if the body simply leaps from one definition to the next. ... "The space of the crossing, the gaps between positions on the grid, falls into a theoretical [abyss] ~~no-man's land~~."B Many feminists, new social movement theorists, critical race theorists, and queer studies scholars have argued that social change can occur only through the precise accountability to and for position/ing. But identity is unearthed by Massumi as the complexity of process sacrificed for the "surety" of product**.** In the stillness of position, bodies actually lose their capacity for movement, for flow, for (social) change. Highlighting the "paradoxes of passage and position," Massumi makes the case for identity appearing as such only in retrospect: a "retrospective ordering" that can only be "working backwards from the movement's end." Again from Massumi: "Gender, race and sexual orientation also emerge and back-form their reality, ... Grids happen. So social and cultural determinations feed back into the process from which they arose. Indeterminacy and determination, change and freeze-framing, go together.**"24**

## Race

#### The aff is a structuralist political ontology which situates blackness as a static position forced from the outside – this is a concession to systems of domination which reinforces a sad affect and eradicates the truly dangerous power of blackness: becoming

Koerner 12**[[5]](#footnote-5)**

In “The Case of Blackness” Moten (2008b: 187) perceptively remarks, “What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies.” What if we were to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming? How might such a thinking transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of historyand the thinking of history (Moten 2008a: 1744)? Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition,a “lived experience,” and in doing so effectively eradicate its unruly character as a transformative force.Deleuze and Guattari, I think, offer a compelling way to think of this unruliness when they write, “What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self- positing as concept, escapes History” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). To bring this relation between blackness and becomingfurtherinto the open — toward an affirmation of the unexpected insinuation of blackness signaled by the use of Jackson’s line as an “event in its becoming” — a few more words need be said about Deleuze’s method. The use of Jackson’s writing is just one instance of a procedure that we find repeated throughout Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where we constantly encounter unexpected injections ofquotations, names, and ideas lifted from other texts, lines that appear all of sudden as though propelled by their own force. One might say they are deployed rather than explained or interpreted; as such, they produce textual events that readers may choose to ignore or pick up and run with. Many names are proposed for this method — “schizoanalysis**,** micropolitics**,** pragmatics, diagrammatism, rhizomatics, cartography” (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 94) — but the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation of texts, proposing instead that we think of a book as “a little machine” and ask “what it functions with, in connection with what other things does it or does it not transmit intensities?” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 4).8 Studying how Soledad Brother functions in Deleuze’s books, connecting Jackson’s line to questions and historical issues that are not always explicitly addressed in those books, involves one in this action. And further, it opens new lines where the intensities transmitted in Jackson’s book make a claim on our own practice. This method can be seen as an effort to disrupt the hierarchical opposition between theory and practice and to challenge some of the major assumptions of Western Marxism. In an interview with Antonio Negri in the 1990s, Deleuze (1997: 171) clarifies that he and Guattari have “remained Marxists” in their concern to analyze the ways capitalism has developed but that their political philosophy makes three crucial distinctions with respect to more traditional theoretical approaches: first, a thinking of “war machines” as opposed to state theory; second, a “consideration of minorities rather than classes”; and finally, the study of social “lines of flight” rather than the interpretation and critique of social contradictions**.** Each of these distinctions, as we will see, resonates with Jackson’s political philosophy, but as the passage from Anti-Oedipus demonstrates, the concept of the “line of flight” emerges directly in connection to Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter with Soledad Brother**.** The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts. It is above all for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari insist that society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,” because such a concept enables the thinking of the movements, energies, and intensities (i.e., the lines of flight) that such machines transmit. The thinking of machines forces us not only to consider the social and historical labor involved in producing society but also the ongoing potentials of constructing new types of assemblages (agencement). One of the key adversaries of this machinic approach is “interpretation” and more specifically structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions**.** According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 293), structuralism persisted in the “submission of the line to the point” and as a result produced a theory of subjectivity, and also an account of language and the unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction. Defining lines only in relation to finite points (the subject, the signifier) produces a calculable grid, a structure that then appears as the hidden intelligibility of the system and of society generally. Louis Althusser’s account of the “ideological State apparatus” as the determining structure of subjectivityisperhaps the extreme expression of this gridlocked position (an example we will come back to in a later section). Opposed to this theoretical approach, diagrammatism (to invoke one of the terms given for this method) maps vectors that generate an open space and the potentialsfor giving consistency to the latter.9 In other words, rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system, Deleuze and Guattari’s method aims to map the ways out of it.

#### The relationship of negativity resurrects the most violent forms of humanism by defining blackness in opposition to civil society and serves only to banish the positive beauty of blackness that the affirmative attempts to reclaim

Larue 11**[[6]](#footnote-6)**

By trying to uncover a human ontology, humanism underscores the necessity and value of “knowing” origins. Origins, to date, have been used as principles by which things, objects, and people can be grouped and segregated. Questions such as “where are your people from?” or “where are you from?” seek origins so that the speaker can be lumped into a group, which is usually pre-established as either “acceptable” (Western European) or “unacceptable” (all others). While this is a gross oversimplification of categories, it does serve to show how determining ontological roots affects human society. Not only did Descartes‟ cogito renew a desire to find the origins of human existence, but it set the origins of the human within the confines of its own mind—in the human‟s ability (or lack thereof) to reason. This practice both set the stage for understanding existence through a reliance on reason and provided a “reasonable” justification for an exclusion of all those beings who, according to the Enlightenment model of the human, could not demonstrate reason. Since colonized individuals did not effectively demonstrate “Enlightenment” reason, they were effectively considered outside of European humanity. Apart from this, setting up this “foundation” for human existence proves troubling because the very concept of a foundation—structurally speaking—seeks to dislocate bodies from the rest of the world. Foundations set apart, and isolate, all that is built on their perimeter. It limits what can and cannot be established, killing off all roots--or histories--and establishing itself as the origin of the order. Ironically, as they convey a desire to unite multiple elements into one single structure (just as the foundation of a house attempts to bring together all of the parts of the house, from the wood used to construct spaces, to the spaces themselves), foundations are based on a system of “is/is not.” Because they are finite regions, they always exclude. Seeking a “foundational” humanity, then, sets up an understanding of the human that requires exclusions and boundaries. So far, this desire for a foundational humanity is what has limited much expansion of the concept of what it means to be “human.” In order for humanity to progress beyond the point of a binarized logic of either/or this concept of a “foundation” of human existence must be eradicated. Since its inception, the Cartesian division (of mind and body, or reason and form) has become the cornerstone for definitions of humanity. However, if, as Bart Simon argues, “the revolutionary Enlightenment narratives” of the human reestablished the foundations of the human and “challenged an oppressive feudal order and reenvisioned [sic] „man‟ as rational, autonomous, unique, and free” (4), it only did so for a small sector of humanity. As focusing on the “feudal order” left many other sectors of humanity untouched and without vision, it served to both turn the human into a product of politics and economics by expanding the population of humanity based on ownership rights. And, as Susan Bordo argues, the Cartesian model presents problems for humanity because it “is nothing if not a passion for separation, purification, and demarcation,” where the body is separated from the mind (17). Acting as the scalpel, Descartes‟ reliance--or, perhaps more appropriately, his insistence—on reason further complicates the question of “what is human” since, in an attempt to form “a unified system of absolute knowledge” (4), the model further divided human existence within the world, and placed humanity further at odds with the rest of the world (4). Instead of uniting humanity, the Cartesian “Man” was now limited to white males who could reason and who could, with this reason, properly make use of the environment; or, in other words, at this point, another classification of the human was established based on “his” ability to subjugate “his” environment and all that existed (without Enlightenment approved reason) within it.6 Origins became tied to European reason, and, in doing this, denied all non-Europeans access to ontology. It is from this point—from an attempt to enter the “body” of humanity—that Fanon’s humanism seems to stem Fanon’s cries for seeing the “equality of all men in the world” **(**Black Skin 110) based on their ability to rationalize it (123) show him continually trying to climb onto, and establish residency on this “revolutionary” foundation of humanity**.** By clinging to the already troubled concept of a “foundational” humanness, Fanon seems to ignore the fact that this “all-inclusive” humanity is established on principles of exclusion and can never be entered as long as the system remains intact. Fanon troubles a potentially fruitful argument on postcolonial existence because he, as many of his predecessors, attempts to focus on the origins of postcolonial individuals—looking to the ideologies of the colonizer as the point of this origin—and, all the while further grounding a postcolonial future within the colonial situation. If postcoloniality is forever a “descendent” of colonization, it can never move beyond exclusion because it is always defined as exclusion. For postcolonialism alone, this is an arduous—and perhaps impossible—task. However, by “reading” postcoloniality as part of whatGiles Deleuze and Felix Guattari call a rhizome (6), it is possible to break Fanon‟s postcolonial search for reclaiming an origin, and allow for an understanding of “self” that does not predicate itself upon the rationalization of existence, but on the understanding and appreciation of interconnections of existence. In order to move beyond the effects of colonization, postcoloniality can no longer afford to be seen as a “product of” colonization—or white European actions. It must be understood on different terms.¶ While it must be noted that posthumanism— much like postcolonialism—is an academic endeavor, the field’s importance comes in its insistence that, as Myra Seaman phrases it, “there has never been one unified, cohesive ‘human’” (246-47). The “human” derived from European humanism have been nothing more than, to quote N. Katherine Hayles, a labels knighted upon a “fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice” (286). It is in this attempt to rethink human relationships not only with the environment but with other human bodies, and ultimately redefine what it means to be human from a more “global” perspective that possible strategies for rethinking postcoloniality arise. Because it emphasizes “deterritorializations” and “reterritorializations” **(**Deleuze and Guattari 10) the rhizome offers a break from an understanding of the human as a “point” to be entered. As “there are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root” (8) the idea that the human has a point of origin, and that, in postcoloniality, European culture is the postcolonial‟s point of origin can be discarded. What, instead, the rhizome makes available are a multiplicity of lines (8) which can be understood as continuous forms. This is important because, “reading” postcoloniality as part a rhizome means understanding that there was existence before, through, and after the events of colonization, therefore separating the origins of postcolonial individuals from those of the colonizer. A separation in this way restores “validity” to the existence of the postcolonial, removes the concept of victimhood—or victimization—and sets the understanding that not all contact is—although there may at times be horrific incidents, or periods**—**negative.¶ In addition to this, since rhizomes are multiplicities (of lines, no less) and seek—unlike Fanon—to do away with the concept of “unity,” since unity “always operates in an empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding)” (8), there no longer exists a need for postcolonial individuals to desire to ascend the hierarchy established by colonization**.** Postcoloniality, as a rhizome, no longer needs to enter into the humanity of the colonizer because, as a rhizome, it is allowed—no, it is necessary—to be apart from the other. As a rhizome they remain connected. Moreover, redefining the human in terms of a posthuman-postcoloniality allows for the possibility of opening all sectors of humanity so that the human is understood as a nexus rather than a solid form. Still, much work is needed in order to more fully understand postcoloniality as rhizomatic. As established, postcoloniality includes not only the physical, political, economic, and social modes of postcolonized individuals, but at the heart of these modes rests a linguistic model that establishes the “presence” of individuals. This presence works in two parts: first it establishes a vacuum in which it can place its subject, and it then institutes them as European-style individuals.

1. Arun Saldanha, Associate Professor of Geography, Environment, and Society at University of Minnesota, Senior Lecturer of Social Sustainability at Lancaster University, 2007, “Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race,” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Arun Saldanha Department of Geography, University of Minnesota "Reontologising race: the machinic geography of phenotype" 2006, Volume 24, pages 9-24 www.tc.umn.edu/~saldanha/published\_files/s%26s%20saldanha.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Arun Saldanha, Associate Professor of Geography, Environment, and Society at University of Minnesota, Senior Lecturer of Social Sustainability at Lancaster University, 2007, “Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race,” [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Jasbir Puar, professor of women’s and gender studies at Rutgers University, Duke University Press: Durham, NC and London, UK, pg. 211 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Michelle Koerner, Professor of Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley, 2012, “Line of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson” *Genre*, Volume 44, Number [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Robert Larue, M.A. in English from the University of Texas at Arlington, “MOVING BEYOND THIS MOMENT: EMPLOYING DELEUZE AND GUATARRI‟S RHIZOME IN POSTCOLONIALISM,” August 2011, https://dspace.uta.edu/handle/10106/6148‎ [↑](#footnote-ref-6)